Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Who to Blame? John Frost on Operation Market Garden's Failure WW2" video.

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  30.  @akgeronimo501  The medical figures are important. Remember no one is more important than a medic when you need one. Yea, that's why Americans have to carry a bunch of credit cards to pay for an ambulance. But back on topic, this should let you know all you need know: The Emergency Medical Services, Volume 1: England and Wales, Edited by Dunn, Cuthbert, L. London: HMSO, 1952 The Emergency Medical Services, Volume 2: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Principal Air Raids on Industrial Centres in Great Britain, Edited by Dunn, Cuthbert L. London: HMSO, 1953 The Royal Air Force MedicalServices, Volume 1: Administration, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1954 The Royal Air Force Medical Services, Volume 2: Commands, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1955 The Royal Air Force Medical Services, Volume 3: Campaigns, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1958 The Royal Naval Medical Service, Volume 1: Administration, Coulter, Jack L. S. London: HMSO, 1954 The Royal Naval Medical Service, Volume 2: Operations, Coulter Jack L. S. London: HMSO, 1956 The Army Medical Services, Administration, Volume 1, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1953 The Army Medical Services, Administration, Volume 2, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1955 The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 1: France and Belgium, 1939-40, Norway, Battle of Britain, Libya, 1940-42, East Africa, Greece, 1941, Crete, Iraq, Syria, Persia, Madagascar, Malta, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1956 The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 2: Hong Kong, Malaya, Iceland and the Faroes, Libya, 1942-43, North-West Africa, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1957 The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 3: Sicily, Italy, Greece (1944-45), Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1959 The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 4: North-West Europe, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1962 The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 5: Burma, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1966 The Civilian Health and Medical Services, Volume 1: The Civilian Health Services; Other Civilian Health and Medical Services, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1953 The Civilian Health and Medical Services, Volume 2: The Colonies, The Medical Services of the Ministry of Pensions, Public Health in Scotland, Public Health in Northern Ireland, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1955 Medical Services in War: The Principal Medical Lessons of the Second World War, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1968 Medicine and Pathology, Edited by Cope, Sir Zachary London: HMSO, 1952 Surgery, Edited by Cope, Sir Zachary London: HMSO, 1954 Casualties and Medical Statistics, Edited by Franklin, William M. London: HMSO, 1972 Medical Research, Edited by Green, F. H. K. and Major-General Sir Gordon Covell London: HMSO, 1953 Enjoy! So his Atkins writes stories rather than history?..
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  33.  @akgeronimo501  R ‘None of that included Morphine or the grandaddy of them all Penicillin.’ How do you know? ‘The ones fighting at the time were getting on hundred percent of their supplies from the US.’ How do you know? ‘You do know that Democrats lied to congress about lend lease?’ No, I don’t know. How do you know? ‘The Republicans wanted the "allies" to repay whatever was "loaned". This is why no one knows the exact amount of things sent.’ How so? Britain knows exactly what was sent to us. You have seen the figures. Why would leaders in the USA not know what was sent? If they did not know what was sent, how could they work out what should be repaid? According to what I have seen, decades later, another Republican, Donald Trump, had not repaid a girl dance troops called the ‘USA Freedom Kid’ for appearing at one of his rallies. Perhaps Donald was preoccupied with looking at the backside of the oldest of those girl, he forgot to get his cheque book out. ‘"Supplanting it [42 production] in 1943 would be thirty thousand tanks- more than three per hour around the clock, and more in a year than Germany would build from 1939 to 1945." Even better.’ Even better than what? Germany produced 67,000 tanks, Britain and Russia produced 140,000 between them. My apologies for the length of this, but it is important for framing. "More than 12 percent of the British population now served in the armed forces; with national mobilization nearly complete, severe manpower shortages loomed if the war dragged on, particularly if it required storming the glacis of Festung Europa across the Channel. British deaths already exceeded 100,000, with thousands more missing, 20,000 merchant mariners lost, and 45,000 dead in the United Kingdom from German air raids. Salvation lay here, in America. The green and feeble U.S. Army of just a few years earlier now exceeded 6 Million, led by 1,000 generals, 7,000 colonels, and 343,000 lieutenants. The Army Air Forces since mid-1941 had grown 3,500 percent, the Army Corps of Engineers 4,000 percent. A Navy that counted eight aircraft carriers after Pearl Harbor would have fifty, large and small, by the end of 1943. More cargo vessels would be guilt this year in the United States-liberty ship now took just fifty days, from keel laying to launch- than existed in the entire British merchant fleet. Just today, perhaps as a subtle reminder to Churchill before his arrival, Roosevelt had publicly announced that 'production of airplanes by the United States' - 86,000 in 1943 now exceeds that of all nations combined. Of the 48 billion in war supplies provided by the United States to its allies, two thirds would go to Britain." Its too late, the crisis was in 1940, when the USA was nowhere to be seen. Rick Atkinson… I exchanged emails with him on points in his book ‘The Guns at Last Light’ - after Big Woody made the mistake of quoting from that work. Atkinson seems to be a nice guy. You seem to be making the same mistake. ‘Just stop, you little asses were kicked and you dad had to come get the Bully out of your yard. So again, all that is required is a thank you. In fact Churches in England should be required to fly the Stars and Strips on Sundays.’ The Red Flag would be more appropriate, after all Britain and Russia defeated Germany. How are you getting with those stats for British imports of medical supplies?
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  57.  @coachhannah2403  Not really... FAAA was to be sustained by air until its link up with XXX Corps (That is the ground ‘GARDEN’ force for the undertaking, to save you looking it up), and even before the operation, the only resources diverted to the build up were 500 tons per day, by air that had previously been used to supply the civilian population of Paris in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of that city. This was set against the additional resources that were already arriving from Dieppe (liberated 01.09. 44), Ostend (Liberated 09.09.44), and Le Havre, solely for US use (Liberated 12.09.44). All this was in addition to the 14,000 tons per day that was being equally split between Bradley’s and Montgomery’s armies. Also, the idea that the rest of the allied advance ground to a halt to accommodate MARKET GARDEN is yet another US myth. Bradley’s subordinate commander Hodges was continuing it advance towards Aachen. Bradley’s other subordinate commander, Patton, had outran his supplies on the 31st August and stopped, and then resumed his advance a few days later, before MARKET GARDEN was even mooted. An eye witness, Alan Moorehead, noted: 'With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days latter with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.' As for Bradley's subordinate commander, Patton, his own offensive towards Metz failed and clocked up casualty figures that were far in excess of MARKET GARDEN. An offensive, that even had it succeeded, would not have gone to nowhere of importance compared to the Ruhr. Patton, had been passed over for army group command, probably because of his inability to control himself when he personally attacked Sicilian peasants and his own soldiers. He seems to have desired personal glory ahead of success for the allied cause, as he noted in his diary before D-Day: . “I fear the war will be over before I get loose". Not, I hope it goes well, or whatever. No, only his personal ambition.
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  71. Big Woody is a liar, and this is why: Read on and use the link... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments Lead comment: John Cornell 3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020) Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden. The 25th reply is the lie: Big Woody 1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020) Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front! This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from: http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603 What went wrong with Operation Market Garden? Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010. Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next > RAM Member Joined:Dec 11, 2007 Messages:507 Likes Received:9 ... 'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ... RAM, July 28 2010 ...From another opinion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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  85.  @bigpants6121  ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK VIKING 1994 P66-67 'Criticism is usually directed at Browning for ignoring Brian Urquhart's warnings. Yet Browning was faced with an appalling dilemma. He had not received all the intelligence available and he was far from uncaring about the fate of his men; he had threatened to resign over the ill-preparedness of one of the earlier proposed operations. But was a British general to jeopardize this great airborne operation, perhaps the last opportunity of the war, a mainly American operation, for fear of what might happen to British troops? Perhaps Brian Urquhart was wrong. Perhaps the German armour, if present, would not react quickly and the bridge at Arnhem could be held until XXX Corps arrived. Morale among the airborne units would certainly suffer if 'Market' was cancelled. Browning decided that it was too late, that the risks must be taken and that the operation must proceed. Browning's written orders to 1st Airborne, dated 13 September and signed by himself, had contained this paragraph: 'ENEMY INFORMATION The latest Intelligence will be sent to you up to the time of take-off ' But the latest reports were not passed on. General Urquhart may have been told by Browning; his memoirs do not mention this. What is certain is that no official warning of the latest German tank strength reached units, and neither Brereton nor Browning made any attempt to amend the plan to lessen the danger from the Panzers. John Frost says that his battalion would have still been quite happy to carry on with the operation, but could have benefited from a warning by taking more anti-tank weapons and ammunition and possibly leaving such heavy items as mortars behind.'
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  93. Jerry 2234 At that time all information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground was routinely disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that respect. The Ultra information, as in most other cases, as far from complete: The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that: "..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming" Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson P260 ‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’ P263 ‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque. The aerial photographs can be seen on-line, they gave a far from complete picture of German forces in the region. The same information as seen by Eisenhower and Brereton, Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, over whom, Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
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