Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944" video.

@lyndoncmp5751 It seems that much has been made about Eisenhower huge effort to meet Montgomery in an aircraft at Brussels airport on the 10th September, 1944, due to his leg being in plaster, or whatever it was. However bad his injury was, it had not stopped him attending the Liberation of Paris parade on the 8th. Doubtless it did not stop him regularly getting his leg over Mrs Summersby while all that stuff was going on.
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Good one Lyndon
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@johnlucas8479 You should look at the situation facing the allies when Montgomery tried, in vain, to get a concentration of allied resources for an advance into Germany.
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@johnlucas8479 Montgomery met Bradley on the 17th August, and spoke about Montgomery’s proposal that 40 allied divisions should move together towards Germany. Montgomery went away from that meeting in the belief that Bradley had agreed with that proposal. Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August and proposed that, given the allied logistic situation, half of the allied divisions in Europe could kept on the offensive, if they were priotitized over the remaining divisions, but if no such prioritisation took place, then the whole allied advance would grind to halt. Montgomery proposed that the British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army could advance in the North to the Ruhr with such priotization. Failing that, Montgomery agree to the US 1st, and US 3rd Armies advancing into Germany, South of the Ardennes. Eisenhower did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt. By the time that Eisenhower met Montgomery again on the 10th September, Eisenhower had taken on the role of allied land forces commander, and he again refused to concentrate allied resources into a plan that keep at least as sizeable part of allied resources on the move. He did however, agree to a limited undertaking, MARKET GARDEN, which was designed to give the allies a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to take the allies to the Ijsselmeer in the hope that such a move would degrade the German V-2 rocket campaign against Britain. The evidence is clear that it was not an attempt to reach Berlin, and that it was not expected to end the war in Europe soon… CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P336 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery had received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' There can little doubt that if Arnhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the Ijsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P49 [Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’ ‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: ‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’ In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’ And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN: ‘21 Army Group Operations OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN” 17-26 Sept 1944 Page 3 SECTION 2 SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN” GENERAL 2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’ Thanks go to you for drawing attention to this. MONTGOMERY ALAN MOOREHEAD HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946 P 214 ‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’ 79 years later, it is clear, given situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, and with the benefit of hindsight, that Mongomery’s appreciation of the allied situation at that time, and what should be done moving forward was the correct one. The seems to be allied understanding of the German situation from evidence from allied forces, and from intelligence sources presented a (correct) picture of German armies in the West… SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44: ‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44: [the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44: ‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P523 When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West. At that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces in the area North of the Ardennes than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. The logistical situation was already easing as the allies moved into September, with the allied armies already getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day… Dieppe was liberated on the 1st September, and was operational four days later to give the allies another 3,000 tons per day, enough for the 1st Canadian army. Ostend was operational by the 28th of that month. October saw Le Havre (exclusively for US use), operational on the 13th, and Boulogne became operational on the 22nd. Calais became operational during November. Further, the road and rail network in the allied rear was improving by the day. By how much the war would have been shortened, and how far the allies would have got into Germany in the late Summer, and Autumn of 1944, due to a sensible concentration of allied resources is a matter that cannot be determined. That such a concentration of resources would have been the correct decision, is be beyond dispute. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan of how the OVERLORD campaign would unfold, and gave the allies a huge victory. Only those that want split hairs can find serious falt with that plan. Eisenhower squandered the fruits of Montgomery's victory by adopting a plan that put political considerations ahead of military considerations, a plan that could have been devised by a fourteen-year-old. Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front ‘strategy brought the allied advance to a halt, and gave the Germany the continuing use of the Ruhr until well into 1945, and in a broader sense, gave the Germans what they most needed after their catastrophe in Normandy, time, and space to rebuild their armies in the West. A look at German production in the Ruhr after Eisenhower’s fateful decision, and the make-up of the German forces in the Ardennes attack, make this clear. The immediate beneficiary of the ‘Broad Front’ mistake was Nazi Germany. The longer-term beneficiary was the USSR, who went into the Yalta conference knowing how much of Germany they could gobble up, and also, due to US leaders failing to recognize the importance of the Italian campaign, in a commanding position in the Balkans. Harsh but fair.
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@johnlucas8479 'This is what Alan Brooke (Montgomery Boss) said "Triumph in the West" Arthur Bryant page 232 "October 5th 1944 "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made of Antwerp in the first place." Clearly, it was recognized to late that Antwerp was the key for a successful drive into Germany, either by Montgomery single thrust or Eisenhower broad Front.' Not really… There is no reason infer that Alanbrook’s words (which he wrote, rather than spoke), appertained to anything other than the situation that developed as a result of the limited MARKET GARDEN undertaking, and the loss of the opportunity to advance towards Germany with a much larger force before then. In regard to decision making for allied strategy after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, Alanbrook's words are in these extracts: ARTHUR BRYANT TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 1943-46 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959 P262-263 ‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’ ‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’ … ‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
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'Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler.' September Hope,by John C.McManus John C.McManus Born: 13.09.1965. That makes him about 39 years to young to have been on MARKET GARDEN. His book was published about 73 years after the event. Only some oppo from say, Cleveland, Ohio, USA would quote him.
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@johnlucas8479 'That interesting "Only some oppo from say, Cleveland, Ohio, USA would quote him." because you mate DaveMac also quotes him.' People can quote who they wish to quote. I could quote McManus if he cites known statistics, contemporary documents, and the words of other people. I doubt if I would. Nearly all of the real information was published a generation or two before McManus chipped in. What I am not interested in, is his opinions, like this: 'Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler.' How is this John C.McManus going to know, 73 years after the event? 'You also state that Clay Blair is A General Life" unreliable because it was published after Bradley death.' 'You prefer Nigal Hamilton "Monty" as one of your sources. Hamilton published the book "Monty" in 1982 6 years after Montgomery death.' Clay Blair's A General Life" purports to be Bradley's autobiography. Nigel Hamilton makes no such claim for his biography of Montgomery.
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'I heard from a Canadian that served during WWII that the British were quick to punish Canadians more harshly in part because they thought Canadians were of mixed blood with natives.' But by what authority would the British have punished Canadians?
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If Montgomery's plan had been followed, the German counter attack in the Ardennes could not have taken place.
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'If Monty's plan had been followed, the German counter attack in the Ardennes would have succeeded, because all the southern armies would have been stripped of supplies and could not have stopped the Germans short of the Muse.' But the Germans were stopped short of the Meuse was stopped by northern armies (US 1st, and 9th Armies), directed by Montgomery, with back up from British 2nd Army. The German commanders rated the chance of a German victory in the Ardennes at about 5%.
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If Hitler had 'waited 2-3 years(instead of 1939)or focused on Britain rather than the Soviets, probably all be speaking German as our 2nd language' If Hitler had waited until 1941 or 1942 to start the war, Germany would have been up against Britain and France, both of who's rearmament programme would have been far more complete. What is to say that in 1941 or 1942, the French Army would have collapsed in the way that it did in 1940? By then Britain would have been more able to commit a lot more troops to to the fighting in France. Belgium and The Netherlands would also been far better prepared to resist a German attack. If Hitler had decided to attack Russia in 1939, German forces would still have to had to got through Poland to get to the Soviet Union. If Germany had attacked Poland, Britain and France would still have been obliged to go to war, unless there was no Anglo/French/Polish agreement. Probably the only way that this would have happended would have been if Hitler had slackened the pace of his moves in the East, against Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In that case, German forces would have been even further from Russia than they were in 1939. In 1937, German technocrats had warned Hitler that then German weapons technology would be obsolete by 1943. A warning that by largely proved to be correct. German treasury officials warned about the long-term unsustainability of German armaments spending as the war approached. Hitler then gambled on a short war, and lost.
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@11nytram11 "The Second Battle of El Alamein was a turning point in the North African campaign. It ended the long fight for the Western Desert, and was the only great land battle won by the British and Commonwealth forces without direct American participation." What great land battle did US forces win without British involvement? None in Europe, none in Africa, there were no great land battles in the Pacific.
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@nickdanger3802 'Monty was still in the process of achieving his second victory in WWII when the UK/US Operation Torch took place behind Rommel.' Yea, like a couple of thousand miles behind Rommel. The sound of the TORCH gunfire must have really disturbed his sleep. 'Monty landed unopposed in Sicily'... thanks for Montgomery for sorting out the allied HUSKY plan. Montgomery landed unopposed in Italy thanks to Eisenhower's lunatic plan that seperated AVALANCHE, BAYRTOWN, and SLAPSTICK by hundreds of miles, and gave the allies a near disaster at Salerno. 'In Sicily Monty took a road from the US Army'... who f*cked off to Palermo.
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@nickdanger3802 'What evidence is there Monty was better at analysis or planning at that level ?' In the way that he made the OVERLORD land campaign work - amongst other evidence.
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Not really.
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When Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August 1944, Montgomery told Eisenhower that the allies supply situation could only sustain half of its forces in attack at that time, and that in order to keep the allied advance going, two of the armies in the North (British Second Army, and US First Army) should be prioritized for resources, (while the Canadian First Army, and the US Third Army were stopped) as they were the best position to hurt the Germans by attacking the Ruhr. Montgomery went on to state that failing that, the US First Army and the US Third Army should advance towards the Saar region, with British Second Army and the Canadian First Army stopped to make this happen. He went on to state that he would abide with Eisenhower’s decision, provided such a prioritizing of resources took place. Eisenhower did neither, and when took over as land forces on the 1st September, the whole advance ground to a halt . Montgomery and Patton were never equals after HUSKY. Patton attacked Sicilian peasants and two of his own soldiers, and was then passed over for army group command in favour of his subordinate Bradley. Patton missed out on D-Day, and the battle in Normandy until it was two parts over. Montgomery went on to command allied land forces in OVERLORD, and remained as an army group commander until the end of the war, being promoted to Field Marshal rank in that period. There does not seem to be much evidence that Montgomery ever gave Patton much thought. Why would he have? If anything, Montgomery was Patton’s nemesis. As for Rommel. He prospered when he took part in the battle of France in 1940, where so much was in the German’s favour, and then in North Africa in the period there that the British were under resourced, and still trying create a large modern mechanized army. He eventually outran his supplies, and was defeated by Auchinleck at Alamein, and then by Montgomery at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, at other points various in North Africa, and in Normandy, where, like in North Africa, Montgomery, did not give him the slightest opportunity to alter the overall course of the battle. Rommel was severely wounded in Normandy, when his car was attacked by RCAF Spitfires, and he then took no further part in the war, until death later in the same year. As for Rommel and Patton, they never faced each other in battle at any time during the war.
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Broad front led to the entire allied advance stopping.
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So?..
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@ditto1958 'I’ve been told by other Americans that if Ike had assigned Montgomery to do a narrow front offensive, he would have failed miserably' Which other Americans told you that?
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The Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North.
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But Montgomery's plan was to get Eisenhower to agree to concentrate the available allied resources to keep an allied advance going, after Montgomery's victory in Normandy. The preference being for an advance in the North in order to capture the Ruhr. Failng that Montgomery stated that Eisenhower should strike in the South, and that Montgomery would abide by whatever decision was made regarding where the advance should continue. Eisenhower chose neither route, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt, giving the Germans what the most needed, time and space to rebuild their shattered forces. What followed was a series of under resourced allied efforts in th Netherlands (MARKET GARDEN), and elsewhere towards Aachen, the Hurtgen Forest, and in Lorraine.
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A reasonable comment.
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@TimKitt From the 1st September 1944 decisions about which targets to go for were made by Eisenhower. What was the allied supply situation at that time? CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 591-592 ‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." ² This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@TimKitt 'They are going to need a port sooner rather then later'. But how much sooner? The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign. When Montgomery met Eisenhower on the 23rd August, Montgomery said words to effect that that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken to use the available resources to keep the allies advance on the advance. The Germans were suffering a defeat as big as Stalingrad in France. SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44: ‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 'When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.' Post war research into the German situation at that time showed that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces North of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower accepted neither of Montgomery's proposals, all of the allied were thus under resourced, and the entitre allied advance groind to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed: time and space to rebuild their forces. The Germans seemed to agree with Montgomery's view of things: Field Marshall Von Runstedt: “the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.” Hasso Von Mantueffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army: “I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.” Gunther Blumentritt: "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."
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@johnlucas8479 ‘Your state " The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign.’ That seems to have been the case… but I might not be right. Given the evidence of the information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen, that would seem to be a reasonable view. ‘It's all well and good to looking at post war research to make claims’ But in my case, I cited information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen. ‘How far do you think the 2nd British and 1st US Army can go with supply lines stretching back to Cherbourg and Normandy beaches.’ Who can say? Not Me. What is known, is that with a lot less resources, a month after Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, British forces got to a mile from Rhine at Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN undertaking,. Albeit, with Dieppe operational by 5th September to provide resources for the First Canadian Army. Ostend was captured on the 9th, Le Havre on the 12th, Boulogne on the 22nd, and Calais on the 30th. 23rd August – 5th September… I have not seen any estimate how long it would have taken to make any changes to allied military affairs needed to enable two of the four allied armies together as per Montgomery’s proposals on the 23rd August, have you? If Eisenhower had agreed to Montgomery’s proposals, and preparations for such an advance had taken until 5th September, there would have the certainty that Dieppe would be available to supply the First Canadian Army as it continued with the liberation of Channel and North Sea Ports. What is known, is that Eisenhower turned down Montgomery’s offer to stop the British and Canadian forces in order that US forces could advance, provided that a decision was made about a way forward that was based on making the best use of allied resources at that time. Also, that Eisenhower cited political reasons for not agreeing to any of Montgomery’s proposals regarding the way forward. I have not been any military organization, much less planned, or taken part in any war. But it seems to me that Montgomery knew a lot more about war than Eisenhower did, particularly about what happens when armies suffer huge defeats. Montgomery had been a front-line soldier in the First World War, and had seen the defeat of the German army in 1918. He had been on the wrong end of the allied defeat in France in 1940, and he had led the pursuit of Axis forces in 1942 and 1943. Eisenhower did not have single day of personal combat experience to his name, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He seems to have had no reference point from personal experience to judge his decision making against.
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@johnlucas8479 'Not everyone agrees with your assessment of Eisenhower ability. This from amen that know Eisenhower during the war' But what assessment have I made? I stated this: 'Eisenhower got a very important decision wrong because he put US considerations ahead military considerations. I might not be be right.' My words, now read this: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P520 The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it." I also stated this: 'Anyone with even the smallest amount of combat experience would have more of that experience than Eisenhower. My mother had probably seen more of the enemy than Eisenhower at that time. But, all other factors being equal, then who would be the better choice for making military decisions?..' My words. My question was about Eisenhower and Montgomery, not Eisenhower and my mother. Eisenhower may, or may not have beeen an able military commander. How should I know? All that I have stated is what seems to have been Eisenhower's motive for turning down Montgomey's proposal for the advance to Germany, and put to you a question about the relevence of personal combat experience in assessing a military leader.
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@johnlucas8479 'Also, how many of the 49 transport companies were available between the 23rd August to 4th September when they were needed to support the rapid advance from the Seine to Antwerp?' I don't know. I can go back to the relevent volume in the HMSO history of the war, but from memory, I dont think it contains precise dates in regards to the availability each transport company at that time. Beyond that, for more detailed information it might be a question of going to the MOD library, or something like that. All that I did was answer you question: ‘were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’, with the information that I have, that by the 26th September, 21st Army Group was operating with 59 transport companies. Perhaps 43 of those transport companies arrived on the 25th September... Its not very likely, but I do not know the details. But I stand by the opinion that I have aleady stated, that given what I know of the situation that faced the allies on the 23rd August, for me, Montgomery's proposal would have been the correct way forward. But that is an opinion based on incomplete information, and it is the opinion of someone with no military experience. Someone may yet produce evidence that would cause me to change my opinion. All that I would add, is that given what seems to be Montgomery's track record on logistics, it does not seem very likely to me that Montgomery would made such a proposal, even in broad terms, with out having some idea as to how the logistics might work. The chase after Alamein, where Montgomery made sure that the logistics properly assessed for the 1400 mile advance across North Africa, rather than some risky gung ho chase for glory, the day after battle ended. His detailed plan for OVERLORD, with allied build up being at the centre of his planning, his advice to Eisenhower on the 11th September, 1944, that MARKET GARDEN would have to be cancelled due to logistic matters, the massive preparations for PLUNDER in March 1945, and so on...
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@dongilleo9743 'Was the Ruhr still all that important of an objective by late 1944 to justify a narrow front thrust by the Allies to get there?' CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P509 ‘the Ruhr-Aachen area which was producing 51.7 per cent of her hard coal and 50.4 per cent of her crude steel. Without these basic resources the output of arms and ammunition would be drastically curtailed, if not crippled. The armies in the East might be supplied for a time from the mines and factories of Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but these could not nourish a war on two fronts. If the Ruhr and the Rhineland could be captured or neutralised, it would matter little what armies Hitler might keep in the field in the West, since he would not be able to provide them with the means of continuing the fight.'
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@dongilleo9743 'Given the growing shortage of replacements for the British and Canadians, was Monty's 21st Army Group really the force to use in a major campaign.' But Motgomery's proposal was to stop 1st Canadian Army and leave it to clear the Channel and Noth Sea ports, and for British 2nd Army (Dempsey) and US 1st Army (Hodges) to advance together into Germany.
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@dongilleo9743 ‘It seems like one major criticism of the broad front strategy was that it spread Allies forces out too thinly from the English Channel to Switzerland. If you are concentrating Monty's narrow front 40 divisions in the north, wouldn't that by necessity require the rest of the front to be thinly held, like the Ardennes were prior to the Bulge? If the rest of the front is static and thinly held, with no threat of an attack, wouldn't Germany be able to concentrate all of it's best forces and reinforcements to oppose the narrow front? By August, Germany was scrapping together men to man the Siegfried Line, and building Volksgrenadier divisions. In September the Germans were able to scrape together enough men and material to stop Market-Garden.’ But the material point is that when Montgomery proposed the narrow front strategy in August 1944, the German Army had suffered a defeat in Normandy that was as big as Stalingrad. When British forces entered Amiens at the end of August, they captured German documents showed the state of German forces in the West. This information was later proven to be accurate as it is known that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces north of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk. The German forces that attacked in the Ardennes in December of 1944 were created and equipped in the period when the allied advance had ground to a halt. It was one thing for German forces to overcome (just) a limited undertaking like MARKET GARDEN, quite another to have been able to resist a concentrated thrust of allied divisions to the Ruhr. Here are some views on the matter. 'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved' German General Hasso von Manteuffel. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. German General Gunther Blumentritt 'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. Instead he [Eisenhower] hesitated, then backed Montgomery when it was too late' Ralph Ingersoll. 79 years later, no one knows for certain if a concentration of allied forces in a thrust into Northern Germany in September 1944 would have shortened the war. However, it seems to be clear that given the situation that the allied leaders faced at that time, the thrust into Northern Germany would have been the correct decision.
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A great post robm9999. In the American view of the war (Their1942-1945 diet version), its the USA this, USA that. Such as they mention anyone else at all, the British were cowering cowards until the USA turned up. Russia was as bad as Nazi Germany and only sustained by Lend-Lease supplies, US Lend-Lease supplies, British and Canadian supplies to Russia are disregarded. The Canadians were completely ignored, and the British relegated to some sort of quaint sideshow in the Hollywood film 'The longest Day.' Hollywood went on to steal British history in the film U-571, and to steal Canadian history in the film Argo. The Canadian part in the war is well liked in Britain. They were with us from the start, and they punched well above their weight in their war effort. Its just pours out of the USA, as if on a conveyor belt: Books, films, TV documentaries, lectures... all for an uncritical, chauvinistic audience. The lectures about the likes of TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD, MARKET GARDEN, and so on usually start off with character assasinations of the British commanders involved, while US commaders are spoken of in uncritical, reverential tones. Ditto, the books, which usually have stars and stripes graphics, and photos of US Generals in tin helmets. They then move on to include character assasinations of the British commanders involved, while US commaders are spoken of in uncritical, reverential tones. The statistics and contemporary documents they cite have normally been in the public domain for about six decades. The films usually show the British as scheming upper class idiots, Dick Van Dyke style 'gorblimey guv' cockneys, and English rose women falling for the tough, down to earth Americans (a-la, the slapper Kay Summersby). A few, of the many films to watch out for: Saving Private Ryan, Patton, The Winds of War (Cheesefest), the War and Remembrance (Cheesefest), U-572 (Goes without saying), Anne Frank: The Whole Story, Ike Countdown to D-Day, a Bridge Too Far, Mussolini The Untold Story, Band of Brothers, Pearl Harbour, and so on, and so on. This list is almost endless. Needless to state in all this, there is a dig at Montgomery at every possible opoortunity. The upshot of all this... the likes of nickdanger3802, and Para Dave (bigwoody)
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@hdfoster5507 'Eisenhower approved the the operation he knew would fail to embarrass Monty in order to shut him up.' If that be true, then the 17,000 MARKET GARDEN casualties are down to Eisenhower.
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@nickdanger3802 What sort of clown answers his own comments?
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@nickdanger3802 "most of them British-Tedder, Morgan, Coningham-were becoming extremely impatient with General Montgomery and critical of his methods." And they all shut up when Montgomery gave the allies a victory as big as Stalingrad.
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@nickdanger3802 'The Battle of Leros'... And?..
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@nickdanger3802 'Operation Dragoon' what?
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@nickdanger3802 Right ho... 'Throughout May and June, both before the German-French armistice and after it, Mr. Churchill sent to the President many personal telegrams containing specific requests for aid.' Shall we see what happened to those requests?.. Please, please say yes. Look on this as a sort of Hors d'oeuvre, in case you say yes... 'forty or fifty of your old destroyers' That did not happen in July 1940, the ships (46 in total) only started ariving in October of that year, after the USA had been granted base facilities in a signicant number of Commonwealth and Empire locations. By May 1941, not even 30 were fit for sea, by which time, the Flower Class Corvette building programme (10 of which were transferrred to the USN in 1942) had largely solved the problem. This from Churchill regarding the condition of those destroyers: WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. P533 ‘Prime Minister to First Sea Lord 14.XII.40’ Let me have a full account of the condition of the American destroyers, showing their many defects and the little use we have been able to make of them so far. I should like to have the paper by me for consideration in the near future.’ This from the hater of Britain, one Lynne Olsen: 'One British admiral called them the "worst destroyers I had ever seen" ' Fancy some more? Remember, I never bluff. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 'they ignore these enormous provisions' Para Dave (aka bigwoody) Shall we look at those 'enormous provisions' as well?..
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@nickdanger3802 Let me help you some more: 'the British needed for their struggle at sea: they asked the Americans to give them motor torpedo boats for Channel fighting and seaplanes for Atlantic patrol: they wanted the United States Navy to make a show of power by sending units to the Mediterranean and to Iceland: they asked the United States Government to consider whether it was ready to take steps leading to the abolition of the 'combat zones'—for it was a reinforcements of their carrying capacity in dangerous waters that they needed, not only of their fighting strength. They needed at the same time immediate help for the battles they might very soon have to fight on their own soil against invading German armies. They asked for American aircraft for the R.A.F and American rifles, machine guns, field guns and mortars to replace some of the equipment that the B.E.F. had lost in France and to arm the Home Guard.' Motor Torpedo Boats 656 built for Britain. 102 of those 656 boats built in the USA. None in use by Britain until 1942. A fat lot of use they would have been in 1940. Showing of Strength That didn’t happen apart from US troops moving into Iceland after British troops had bravely brought the place in to allied hands. Aircraft (Sold to Britain) What? Apart from what was on order to the British and French governments, which had to be bought, paid for, and collected. Rifles (Sold to Britain) 500,000 First World War .300 Lee Enfield Rifles that were passed to the Home Guard. Possibly, both of my grandfathers were issued with them. Hope not. Field Guns (Sold to Britain) 500 French First World War ‘soixante-quinze’ were placed around the 11,073 miles British coastline. Even allowing for concentration at key points on the coast, they were hardly cheek by jowl. Mortars Let me know how many the USA sent to Britain in 1940, and 1941, and we can compare that number to the 29,284 mortars that Britain produced in that same period.
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@nickdanger3802 Because I am such a nice person... 80,000 machine guns were also SOLD to Britain in 1940 alongside those state-of-the-art rifles and field guns. No doubt a week long firearms amnesty in US High Schools found those 80,000 machine guns, and more. Churchill also noted that those arms SALES to Britain left the USA with equipment for only 1.8 million men at that time. With the nearest potential enemy a mere 3,000 miles from the US homeland, its a wonder that US leaders were able to sleep at night...
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Its a definite no.
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@davemac1197 This from Horrocks on whether clearing the Scheldt shold have taken place before MARKET GARDEN: 'Was Monty correct in, carrying out the Arnhem operation, which meant advancing sixty to seventy miles into Holland ? Would it not have been better if, after Brussels, 21st Army Group had turned north-west and cleared both sides of the Scheldt estuary to open the port of Antwerp which could then have been developed into a main base area, thus curing many administrative headaches. I can only give you the opinion of a corps commander who was on the spot and has since made a study of the problem. Had he adopted this course, as many critics think he should have done, the port of Antwerp would certainly have been open to Allied shipping earlier than it was. But how much earlier it is not easy to say, because the campaign to clear the Scheldt estuary would certainly have been difficult. The ground could be flooded at will by the Germans, while Walcheren could not be captured until it was flooded. Large German forces would have been cornered south of Breskens and could have put up a stubborn resistance in this difficult country where it was almost impossible to deploy large numbers of our troops. If we had devoted all our resources to clearing Antwerp in September it would have been impossible later on to carry out the swift advance up to the lower Rhine at Arnhem, because by then the German defences would have been given time to solidify. We were able to make this deep penetration only because General Student's Parachute Army was still moving down from Germany. In my opinion Monty was right. We had advanced rapidly up the coastal plain while the Germans were still disorganised. His eyes were focused on the big prize to bounce a crossing over the Rhine and cut off the industrial heart of Germany, thus finishing the war in 1944. While there was still any chance of this succeeding he would have been wrong to deflect his resources to a subsidiary task. The clearance of the Scheldt estuary would certainly have eased the administrative situation, but would it have shortened the war by even one day? On the information available, Arnhem was a justifiable gamble.'
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@11nytram11 Yep. When Montgomery offered stop 21st Army Group so that the available resources could be made available for a US advance, the offer was to let Bradley move forward by directing his subordinates, Hodges and Patton, in a way that he, Bradley would chose.
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@johnlucas8479 'Your statement "The Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North." when did they say they agreed?' No, I typed typed that the Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North. My words, my opinion, based on this: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 601 ‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr. Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’ This is in full, what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine"" Surely you do not think that I meant every single German, do you?.. There might be Germans who took a different view. If so, it would be good to see those views. As for General Carver... I would be interested to know if his words were words were written at the time, or were they words based on hindsight?
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@johnlucas8479 More than the stuff about who did what at Nijmegen, Browning, Brereton, and so on, there can never be conclusive proof about what should have been done after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy As previously noted, the German opinion that I have seen, is that the allies should have concentrated resources on a single thrust towards Germany at that time, in the North. Given what the allies knew about the state of enemy, its forces in the West, and the German crisis on the Eastern Front, the reluctance of Eisenhower to concentrate the available allied resources is hard to account for. The state of allied logistics at that time, with the allied forces getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day, would have allowed 20 allied divisions, each with up to 500 tons of supplies per day to continue the allied advance with the remaining forces held back from such an advance until such time as material circumstances changed. Events in the latter part of 1944 seem to have happened broadly as Montgomery and Alanbrooke had warned about, with the allies not being strong enough anywhere to force a breakthrough into Germany. The upshot being that the Germans were given what they most needed: time and space to rebuild, and re-equip existing forces, and to create new forces in order counter attack in the West. Perhaps there was a direct line from the US casualties in the Bulge to Eisenhower’s decision making in the previous Summer, who can say? Politics and the War in France in 1944. As far as I can see, Eisenhower should have been planning for the post Normandy campaign by having a clear view on where the allies should advance and by making decisions to keep the Germans off balance, as (as Montgomery had in Normandy), and being able to direct allied resources to where they were most needed. Eisenhower seems to have put non-military factors ahead of military considerations far too often, particularly after he decided to take over as allied land forces commander from the 1st September 1944. Perhaps, by that time, as the US was increasing established on the continent, they were done with the allied alliance? ARTHUR BRYANT TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 1943-46 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959 Pages 262-263 ‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’ ‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’ … ‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P520 The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it." Arnhem. Arnhem seems to be almost a red herring in regard to the matter of the broad front versus a narrow(er) front. MARKET GARDEN was a limited undertaking by comparison to Montgomery’s proposals as to how the war should be carried forward, and was undertaken after Eisenhower had spurned the chance to opt for a thrust into Germany when the German forces were at their lowest ebb. The evidence that I have seen is clear in regard to the intended scope of MARKET GARDEN: CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P336 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P49 [Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’ ‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: ‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’ In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’ Montgomery sought personal glory? There seems to be little evidence to support the (mainly American) view that Montgomery proposed a consolidation of allied resources into a narrower thrust towards Germany in the Summer of 1944, in order to gain personal glory. On the contrary, when Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery stated (these not his exact words), that the allies should advance in the North because that was where the most vital parts of German industry were located. He also stated that he would agree to stop 21st Army Group to allow 12th Army Group to advance in the South, provided that a decision was made to narrow the allied advance to a realistic size. Further, after this time, Montgomery continued to advocate the appointment of a separate land forces commander after Eisenhower had taken that role for himself, to the point that he would accept Bradley being appointed land forces commander, provided that such decision was made. In conclusion, if conclusions can be reached. From the point that Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander, the war in North West Europe, with his ‘broad front’ strategy the war continued for another eight months. What the (Western) allied casualties were in that period, I do not know. Whether a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have ended the war sooner, cannot proved. However, based on the evidence that I have seen regarding the situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, in my opinion, a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have been the best strategy for the allies to adopt at that point. Footnote. ARTHUR BRYANT TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 1943-46 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959 Pages 436-437 On page 372 of Eisenhower's " Crusade in Europe " he refers to a conversation which took place between us on the day this diary-entry was written. I feel certain that he did not write down at once the statement which he attributes to me, and I can only assume that, when he came to write it, he did not remember clearly what I had said. According to him, when we stood together on the bank of the Rhine on March 25th, I said to him :—" Thank God, Ike, you stuck by your plan. You were completely right, and I am sorry if my fear of dispersed effort added to your burdens. The German is now licked. It is merely a question of when he chooses to quit. Thank God, you stuck by your guns." When this statement is considered in connection with what I wrote in my diary that evening, it will be clear that I was misquoted. To the best of my memory I congratulated him heartily on his success and said that, as matters had turned out, his policy was now the correct one; that, with the German in his defeated condition, no dangers now existed in a dispersal of effort. I am quite certain that I never said to him, " You were completely right," as I am still convinced that he was " completely wrong." I am convinced that Alanbrooke was correct in his memory, regarding this matter.
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@johnlucas8479 The matter of Berlin was noted by me only in regard to the goals for MARKET GARDEN. Montgomery, Eisenhower, and Tedder noted that MARKET GARDEN was only intended to get the allies across the Rhine. You pointed out the the 21st Army Group report on MARKET GARDEN noted that the ultimate goal of that undertaking was the Ijsselmeer (incorrectly noted as the Zuider Zee in that report) That Montgomery was looking for the Western allies to eventually get to Berlin before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN is not in dispute. My guess is that on the 18th September, Montgomey belived that MARKET GARDEN would succeed - giving the allies a bridgehead across the Rhine, and sealing off the Western part of the Netherlands. Thereafter, a new plan would take advantange of the gains made by MARKET GARDEN and look to take the allies to the Ruhr, and beyond - to Berlin. Depending on the situation that presented itself at the end of MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery would have proposed that the allies push on into Germany, or possibly pause, while the Scheldt was cleared. Or possibly both. A wholly successful MARKET GARDEN might have given that degree of choice. Who can say?
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@johnlucas8479 That Berlin was in Montgomery's thinking before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN, and later in the war is not in dispute. I merely pointed out that it was not a stated goal for MARKET GARDEN. The goals for which seemed to be get the allies across the Rhine, as stated by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Tedder. Also, according the 21st Army Group MARKET GARDEN report, the untimate goal was the Ijsselmeer (noted as the Zuider Zee in that report) - as previously pointed to me by you. Hence, my opinion that MARKET GARDEN has not much to do with the main Broad Front v Narrower Front stuff. My opinion is that with MARKET GARDEN reaching the Ijsselmeer, and the Rhine, there would have been further discussion, based on the situation after MARKET GARDEN regarding the position of allied forces, and the evolving supply situation. Who can say?
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But the plan for the campaign after OVERLORD was to advance in the North towards the Ruhr.
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About what?
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@nickdanger3802 What was the point of posting that quote?
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Bullet-Tooth-Tony From Para Dave (aka big woody) 'Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse' There is no sense in that. Britain did not fear invasion in 1940, let alone in 1942 or whenever Even in the unlikely event that Germany defeated Russia, how many years would it have taken for Germany to mount an invasion of Britain? It took Britain and the USA several years to build up an invasion force for OVERLORD, and this against a tiny German Navy, and an emaciated German airforce? What sort of victory could have Germany gained against Russia? Some sort of uneasy peace with Germans having to man a front 700 miles into Russia? If Britain had gone to the Germans and said 'can we talk?' They would have bitten our hand off for a deal. The last time that I saw Robberts on TV, he got destroyed by a couple of Indian historians about the state of India at the time of Indian independence. The bloke is a rubbish historian. I understand he goes down a storm in the USA.
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Bullet-Tooth-Tony The quotes supplied by Para Dave seem to have nothing to do with 'Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944' . Para Dave has included these words in a qoute from 'With Prejudice': '*Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies in Normandy" '
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- 'IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen' Para Dave (aka bigwoody) The British Army destroyed at Caen? Do you know of any evidence to back up this claim? Eisenhower (IKE) 'should have been removed' Any idea for what reason Eisenhower should have been removed? He had all but zero input into the OVERLORD campaign, he seems only to have been there for political reasons.
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From Para Dave (aka bigwoody), seemingly aimed at Montgomery: '-Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 (338,000,British,Dutch,French Troops in all evacuated) -Greece, Crete & Hong Kong in 1941 (3700 captured in Greece, 12,274 captured in Crete,10,000 captured in Hong Kong) -Tobruk and Singapore in 1942 (28-33,000 captured at Tobruk ,81,000 captured in Singapore)' 0/10 Norway. Did not involve Montgomery. Netherlands. Did not involve Montgomery. Belgium and France, Dunkirk. Montgomery was only a single division commander. Greece, Crete & Hong Kong. Did not involve Montgomery. Tobruk and Singapore in 1942. Did not involve Montgomery.
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@johnlucas8479 ‘Bayeux to Rouen on the Seine River is 156 klms. Bayeux to Antwerp is 533 Klms. For each 100 trucks need to supply a division from Bayeux to Rouen would require 328 trucks to supply the same division from Bayeux to Antwerp.’ How so? Would that pre-suppose that transport resources for the advance from Bayeux to were being used to full capacity? Would that also pre-suppose that the same size of force advanced from Rouen to Antwerp was the same size of force that had advanced from Bayeux to Rouen? ‘Question were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’ Who can say?.. British Second Army transport companies in France increased from six to 49 by the 26th September, with another seven to follow. That meant an increase from 360 Lorries to 3,000 Lorries, with another 420 to follow. N.B. Most of those transport companies used the British Army spec 4x4 3-ton lorries: the AEC Matador, the Austin K5, the Bedford QL, and the Crossley Q-Type, as well as Canadian Military Pattern vehicles. Further, two of those transport companies, that were using 6x6, 10-ton lorries (Leyland Hippo) at that time were issued with 5-ton trailers to be towed by those lorries. The Canadians were running another 10 transport companies. ‘If he uses aircraft from the USAAF and RAF Transport Commands to make up the difference that FAAA would not have the planes available to launch any Airborne Operations. Each proposed Airborne Operation would stop the air resupply missions.’ Perhaps you are right. But with an advance by British Second Army, and US First Army, put in hand after Eisenhower and Montgomery had met on the 23rd of August, what role would there have been for airborne drops? ‘For 2nd Army to maintain the same level of supplies at Essen compared to Rouen. Each 100 Truck at Rouen the 2nd Army would need 446 trucks at Essen. I just looking at the numbers. Either Montgomery thrust would stop at line Antwerp to Aachen until additional ports are operational which will not occur until October, or the number of Divisions would need to be reduced to maintain the pushes in the case of 2nd Army of the initial 9 Divisions at Rouen less than 3 could be supported on a drive from Antwerp to Essen. The US 1st Army 9 Division at Seine less than 6 at Aachen would be in a position to push onto Essen.’ In my opinion, you are reaching conclusions without knowing the full story. Besides that, I think that you would do well to consider what you think what conclusion would have justified a narrow-thrust attack, and what conclusion would have rendered a narrow-thrust attack a failure. There can never be a definite conclusion to this matter. I stand by my opinion: that based on what is known of the situation facing the allies at that time, as they understood it, a decision to adopt Montgomery’s proposal regarding the advance towards Germany in the late Summer and Autumn of 1944 would have been the correct decision.
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'Monty enjoyed a well deserved reputation for caution and sloth.' How so?
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WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. P486 ‘On November 9 Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of at least knowing that his country had at least turned the WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950. P352 ‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’ _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Western bourgeois political and military historians are trying to prove that the Red Army only achieved its superiority in material thanks to the material assistance rendered by the USA and Britain. I do not wish to deny this completely and make out that this aid did not exist. It did help the Red Army and the war industry to a certain extent, but, all the same, it should not be regarded as more significant than it actually was. Our material superiority over the enemy was gained thanks to the advantages of the Soviet social system, the heroic struggle of the Soviet people, guided by the party, at the front as well as in the rear. Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 196-197 Nevertheless, for years after the war bourgeois historiography has asserted that it was the Allied deliveries of armaments, materials, and foodstuffs that had played a decisive role for our victory over the enemy. As for the armaments, what I would like to say is that we received under Lend-Lease from the United States and Britain about 18,000 aircraft and over 11,000 tanks. That comprised of a mere 4% of the total amount of armaments that the Soviet people produced to equip its army during the war. Consequently, there is no ground for talk about the decisive role of the deliveries under Lend-Lease. As for the tanks and aircraft supplied to us by the British and US governments, they, to be frank, did not display a high fighting qualities; especially tanks which, running on petrol, would burn like torches. Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 460
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@nickdanger3802 Read, and learn: WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. P486 ‘On November 9 Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of at least knowing that his country had at least turned the corner.' WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950. P352 ‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
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@nickdanger3802 Marshal Zhukov... 'Western bourgeois political and military historians allege that the Soviet army was able to achieve its superiority in material owing to Anglo-American assistance. This is far from true. I do not wish completely to deny its value though as in some degree it did help the Soviet army and our war industry. However, it did not amount to much and hence cannot be considered of much significance. We gained our material superiority over the enemy thanks to the advantages of Soviet social order and through heroic, tremendous efforts of the Soviet people led by the Party, both at the front and in the rear.' Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 466 'As far the armaments, what I would like to say is that we received under the Lend-Lease Act from the United States and Britain 18.7 thousand aircraft, 10.8 thousand tanks and 9600 artillery pieces. All that comprised 12, 10.4, and 2% respectively of the total amount of armaments that the Soviet army was equipped with during the war. Undoubtedly, that was of definite significance, but really there is no ground for talk about a decisive role.' Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 684
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@nickdanger3802 Here is one to keep you going: Lunchbox Lecture: “Sicily 1943: Patton vs. Montgomery vs. the Wehrmacht” As a bonus, this Rick Jacobs has a face I would like to punch.
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@nickdanger3802 US Lend Lease to USSR, 11 billion USD. That is about £2.2 billion in real money, in 1940s numbers. So what? It was 5% of Russia's needs. £428 million of British free aid to Russia. A really brilliant effort by Britain. Canada free aid to Britain, 2.7 billion USD.' That is about £540 million in real money, in 1940s numbers. A really brilliant effort by Canada. US Lend Lease to Britain, over 20 billion USD. That is about £4 billion in real money, in 1940s numbers. So what? It was 11% of Britain's needs.
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'Monty wanted to glorify himself' How so?
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‘Monty’s forces captured Antwerp Sept 4 1944. Supplies for the European theater didn’t start flowing through the port until late November. Why? It took 3 months for the Canadians to clear German forces through the Scheldt River 20:41 estuary’ Your words. Not really… Due to the pace of the allied advance from Normandy, many of the assets needed for the clearance of the Scheldt were still West of the River Seine. The banks of the Scheldt are over 100 miles long, and the entire lot needed to be in allied hands before ships could discharge their cargos at Antwerp. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe. The Germans were still on the South side of the estuary, at the Breskens pocket. Further, the period of time you noted included a three-week minesweeper campaign to clear the estuary of mines. This would have applied whenever the land battle had been completed. ‘Because Monty didn’t pay any attention to this huge problem and gave the Canadians scant resources to complete the job. He was too busy with his genius Market Garden operation which was partially successful. Monty was not the man who should receive the mass of supplies since his ego was incredibly inflated compared to his abilities.’ Your words. Not really… It was Eisenhower that gave the go-ahead for MARKET GARDEN to take place before the opening of the Scheldt, as he later admitted: CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ ‘Maybe if Eisenhower had given the fuel and supplies to Third Army they could have achieved something quickly. But that would mean stopping four other armies and giving most everything to one army.’ Your words. Not really… At the time of MARKET GARDEN, US Third Army was 100 miles from Rhine. Any attack on the US Third Army front would not have taken allied forces into any vital part of the German homeland, unlike in the North, where an advance into Germany would taken the allies to the Ruhr. ‘How quickly did Monty pursue Rommel?’ Your words. In North Africa, Montgomery pursued Rommel’s forces 1,350 miles to Tripoli between 03.11.42 and 23.01.43. A pursuit that took place along a single main road, in some of most extreme conditions in the world, with hundreds of miles between re-supply points. Alamein to Tobruk is 375 miles, Tobruk to Benghazi is 310 miles, Benghazi to Tripoli is 600 miles. Between supply points there was virtually no means of living of the land. ‘How quickly did Monty take his army from Sicily through the Italian boot to the allied bridgehead barely hanging on outside Naples?’ Your words. If the allied bridgehead outside of Naples was ‘barely hanging on’, then that was down to Eisenhower, and his planning, as, not for the first or last time, he split allied resources, as he sought to bolster the prestige of the US army by sending Montgomery to the pointless diversion of operation BAYTOWN, and the even more pointless diversion that was operation SLAPSTICK, in which the 1st Airborne Division was transported to Taranto on the decks of four Royal Navy cruisers, one Royal Navy minelayer, and one USN cruiser. This left scant allied forces spread out over hundreds of miles, and Eighth army needing to cross any number of rivers to bridge and cross as the Germans escape northward, thanks to Eisenhower taking charge of the campaign. ‘No one trusted Monty to move his army quickly and achieve all he promised. He had let his allies and compatriots down too many times.’ Your words. Montgomery delivered complete victory in North Africa, and in Normandy. If anybody let allies down it was Patton, when he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to gain personal glory at Palermo, and again when he headed towards Paris instead of enveloping German forces in Normandy. Or how about Mark Clark leaving British and US forces in the lurch as sought personal glory in Rome?
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@phillipmiller1247 All clear now?..
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@johnlucas8479 Carver wrote this in 1944?
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@johnlucas8479 Not really John...
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This is on record?
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@johnlucas8479 ‘You quoted the dates the various ports were captured, but failed to state the dates the ports became operation.’ Not mentioning those operation dates for those ports was a deliberate decision by me because I looked to see what can be judged by a lack of evidence as to how long Montgomery’s proposed advance with British Second Army, and US First Army would take to prepare for, and then to mount, and how fast, and how far such advance could achieve. Whether military people, and civilian authorities could provide reliable timescales for when ports would be usable after their liberation, I do not know. However were they able to do so, then perhaps allied military leaders might have been able to take those matters into account as an advance continued. ‘So, if Dieppe provide the resource for 1st Canadian Army to continue to operate against the channel ports. Then the 1st US and 2nd British Army would be depended on Cherbourg and Normandy Beaches until the end of September.’ But the British Second Army, and the US First Army would have been operating with greater share of allied resources at that time. ‘As to change the Military affairs I have no idea, I simple looking at when additional capacity would be available. On the 23rd of August’ As of the 23rd August, here were no additional resources available, hence Montgomery’s proposal to re-distribute allied the then available resources in such a way as to keep the allied advance moving. ‘2nd British Army had 10 Divisions and 1st US Army had 9 Divisions at total of 19 Divisions. The reason Montgomery stop at Antwerp on the 4th of September was that due to German collapse 2nd Army outran its supplies lines. The same problem also thing happen to both the 1st and 3rd US Army. The Armies were moving faster than the supply organization could keep up.’ Then perhaps, all the more reason to concentrate allied resources to where they could do most damage to the enemy?.. ‘From Montgomery own accounts clearly, the Germans were staring to recovery by early September. The reason he canceled Operation Comet was due to increasing resistance in front of 2nd Army.’ Again, perhaps, all the more reason to concentrate allied resources to where they could do most damage to the enemy?.. ‘As to Eisenhower citing political reasons all your need to read the outage in UK Press when Bradley was made Army Group Commander on the same level as Montgomery. I doubt the British press or Government would accept Montgomery reporting to Bradley.' In that case, the telling point seems to be that Eisenhower was prepared to ignore opinion in Britain, but he was not prepared to ignore opinion in the USA. ‘I agree Montgomery had more combat experience than Eisenhower, but lack of combat experience does not rule out his ability to lead the ground war. In the PTO Admiral Nimitz also had no combat experience lead a successful naval and island-hopping campaign.’ Anyone with even the smallest amount of combat experience would have more of that experience than Eisenhower. My mother had probably seen more of the enemy than Eisenhower at that time. But, all other factors being equal, then who would be the better choice for making military decisions?.. ‘Remember Montgomery WW1 experience after he was wounded was a general staff officer and at end the war as chief of staff of 47th Division.’ But that leaves Montgomery way ahead of Bradley, Devers, and Eisenhower in combat experience. As someone with no experience of war, a far I am concerned, you have either been in it, or you have not. ‘My personal view when the German Army collapse in August 1944 senior officers look back to famous 100 days (August to November 1918) think that the same thing was happening again and that one large push across the whole front will end the war in 1944.’ Perhaps? The numbers regarding the allied supply situation at that time do not seem to be in dispute. The evidence regarding what the allied leaders knew about the state of German forces that I have seen, seems to show that a reasonable view was taken of that information. Did the allies underestimate the ability of the German army to recover from setbacks, and the determination of the Germans defend their homeland? Who can say?.. Not me. Since the war, information that has come to light seems to show that the allied assessment of the German material situation was broadly correct. Also, since the war a number of German commanders have stated their view that an advance in the north of the front along the lines that Montgomery proposed would have been the best option. There is nothing conclusive about that, but it must be well worth taking account of. Hordes of people on YouTube, most of them Americans, post opinions regarding this or that aspect of the war in North West Europe, based on hindsight. As far as I am concerned the key question is nearly always, what view should be taken of the decisions made at that time based on the situation faced by those decision makers at that time. Would a narrower thrust of a limited number of allied divisions to the Ruhr and beyond have succeeded, and shortened the war or not? I don’t know, how can anybody know? Would a narrower thrust of a limited number of allied divisions have been the correct decision to take at that time given the situation that the allies faced? Its a definite yes for me. My personal view is that Montgomery was the most professional and experienced of the senior allied military leaders, and that was prepared to consider tough decisions that others would not do so, if necessary, regardless of what might have been seen as British interests, regardless of his own personal prestige, and that Eisenhower got a very important decision wrong because he put US considerations ahead military considerations. I might not be be right.
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@johnlucas8479 A Japanese invasion of Russia?.. What would have been in it for Japan?
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Eisenhower was there to do want American leaders wanted done for US interests. He just said no Montgomery and others in a nice way.
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