Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Who's to blame for the Battle of Anzio 1944? | Patreon Q&A 8" video.

  1.  @andy313131313136  'What did you think of Montgomery's performance during operation overlord?' Excellent. Montgomery won with 22% fewer than expected casualties and ahead of the planned completion date of D+90. His strategy worked very closely to the plan he put to allied leaders brfore D-day and that plan was able to cope with the disruption caused by the great storm of soon after D-Day wich all but wrecked the allied build up timetable.
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  2. So what has Montgomeery got to do with Anzio and Rome.
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  3. Total rubbish. The shipping was not in place for a cross channel invasion in 1943, the air war was not won and the Germans still had options to move forces from East to counter an invasion.
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  4.  @blastulae  Total rubbish. Operation Husky never amounted to more half a million men. Overlord amounted to three million. If Wedemeyer knew more about allied capabilities than me then he wasted his knowledge. When the US General Marshall turned up in London in 1942 with his lunatic plan to invade France in 1942, presumably Wedemeyer was a party to that US proposal. Torch, with the US General Eisenhower at its head was agreed for 1942 (just) but the subsequent campaign in Tunisia took until May 1943 and thus no invasion of Europe could take place until the Autumn of that year. At Cassablanca the allied leader discussed the options for 1943 and agreed that Italy and the Mediterranean were the best places to use the available allied resources rather than in the war against Japan. Operations in Sicily, Italy and clearing the Mediterranean freed up one million tons of shipping, tied down 50 German divisions and gave the allies the opportnity to hit German industry and the Romanian oil fields beyond the range of bombers based in Britain. 1943 gave Britain the chance to win the U-boat and for the combined bomber offensive to take effect. All of this at no cost to the invasion of france which was agreed at Casablanca. Further, invading France in 1944 reduced the chance of Germany being able to pull forces from Russia to send to France. also, by making the main 1943 effort in Italy rather than the Far East, some help was given to the Russians and fighting the Germans rather than the Japanese meant that there was less chance that that Russia might be tempted to make peace with Germany. The allies invaded France in June 1944 with complete mastery of the air, the sea, with greatly incresed human and material resources and in coordination with the war in the east.
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  5.  @blastulae  Get real. An invasion of France in 1942 would have amounted to 7 British and 2.5 US divisions and landing craft for 5,000 men. This against 25 German divisions already in France. They would have crushed an invasion without bringing a single soldier over from the east. Even an invasion of France in 1943 would only have amounted to 21 British and 27 US divisions and and pronounced shortage of shipping. 'The US should never have agreed to assign Monty the left of the Allied front. The terrain there was tank country, suited for bold Patton, not the timid Monty.' Get real. British forces were in Central and Eastern England while US foces were in the West. That is why British forces were on the left and US forces were on the right. Anyone should know that. None of France was particularly suited to tanks. The US forces were given the easier task with 84% of German armour massed agaist British Second Army. 'Even American Roundup planning in December 1941 emphasized the importance of Antwerp' Really? So why were US planners working on a plan to invade France in 1943 (Roundup) in December 1941, before working on their even more lunatic 1942 invasion plan (Sledgehammer)? As for the US commanders, Patton never commanded in a major battle and got himself passed over for army group command by slapping his own soldiers. Bradley got found out at Omaha Beach, Normandy and in the Battle of the Bulge. Any questions?
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  6.  @blastulae  Dear, oh dear... The German had long since proved itself to be superior to the Western allied armies in any situation where the odds were anywhere equal. They would have crushed any invasion attempt in 1943. The troop numbers you mentioned fail to note the number of US divisions that were en-route to France or preparing to leave for France. Further, those allied formations were facing an enemy that was working with increasingly dated equipment, was unable to be reinforced from Russia due toOperation Bagration or from the South where allied forces were tying down a million Germans. This was Alanbrooke's strategy coming to fruition, stretching the Germans far and wide. The landing was to take place in Normandy, there was no merit in taking US troops to the East. Those troops came from the West and landed in the West. look at any may map of D-Day. It was bleeding obvious.
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  7. The Italian campaign tied down a million German troops to counter modest allied numbers, at no cost to the invasion of Northern France.
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  8. TIK One Daniel Eyre has posted on here that you have 'made several videos that laugh at Churchill and his rubbish leadership.' - his words. Do you consider this statement to be true?
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  9.  @r.williamcomm7693  'it was evidence that Churchill wasn’t being honest with Stalin?' Why do you ask that question?
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  10.  @andy313131313136  D-Day and Normandy Montgomery led the allied ground campaign in Normandy, completing the campaign ahead of the scheduled completion date (D+90) and with 22% fewer than expected casualties. ACCORDING TO THE US GENERAL EISENHOWER: ‘The Battle of the Beachead was a period of incessant and heavy fighting and one which, except for the capture of Cherbourg, showed few geographical gains. Yet it was during this period that the stage was set for the later, spectacular liberation of France and Belgium. The struggle in the beachhead was responsible for many developments, both material and doctrinal, that stood us in good stead throughout the remainder of the war.’ ‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ ‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’ Regarding Caen, it was one of a number of objectives which had wish to have by dates set against them, which Montgomery noted in his briefing to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London before the invasion. An eye witness to that briefing noted: ‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND. Caen was a nice to have objective, but its capture or not capture changed little, the Germans still massed the great bulk of their forces in Normandy there. Cherbourg was the more important objective and this was captured 10 days later than expected. Overall, Montgomery’s plan for Normandy was very simple, to draw the great bulk of German forces onto the British front in order to allow the US forces to break out against far weaker opposition. ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY Falaise Gap Bradley failed to close to Falsie Gap. It was he who stopped Patton: These are Bradley's own words: "In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise". MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND: ‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’ SIR BRIAN HORROCKS: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’ Notice that all of the people I have quoted were actual participants in the events they were describing. If you want to read about those times, start with the people who were actually there.
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