Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The BAD BOY of Operation Market Garden | General 'Boy' Browning" video.
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'Political calculations and pressure came into play as well. By late summer, 1944, Hitler's V-1 and V-2 rockets were raining down on targets in Europe and the U.K. There was intense political pressure from the British public upon PM Churchill to do something to end the missile attacks. Overrun the launching sites, for example, many of which were in Dutch territory along the North Sea and in the Ruhr industrial heartland. This pressure was probably also brought to bear upon Ike by President Roosevelt and his advisors as well, indirectly if not directly.'
V2s were a very real threat to British people.
'History has shown that trying to slog into Germany through the Scheldt Estuary was a costly blunder. General George Patton, had he been allocated the gasoline and supplies he had requested, which instead went to Monty's fatal gamble, 3rd Army could have punched across the Rhine months ahead of schedule and into heartland Germany.'
But no fuel or supplies were taken away from Patton for Market Garden.
'That's all speculation now, but it is hard to envision Patton doing as poorly as Monty or conceiving a plan so badly flawed as his.'
Who can say? Patton was never senior enough to be involved in such a decision.
'The British had many great and able senior officers, but Monty himself was vastly overrated.'
Montgomery perfomed with distiction as a single division commander in trying circumstances in France in 1940. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa and Sicily. As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
Unlike Eisenhower, Bradley and Devers, Montgomery had personal combat experience - in the First World war. He was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO.
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@johnburns4017
This from Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
Part One
‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete’ His words.
By April 1945, the war was long since over as any sort of contest. In any case, the situation was absolutely nothing to crow about, The USA is, and was, huge compared to Britain in land area, population, ego, and bad taste. Untouched by war before and after its its brief period in the fighting,
and having bled Britain and France white, its teenage citizens now have got the bare faced cheek to try to tell others about the war. There was no Battle of Britain, or Battle of Moscow for the USA. American war stories are boring, their supposed efforts and privations on their home front pale by comparison with the home fronts in Britain, and Russia. No wonder their film makers steal other countries history, and their writers are constantly trying to do other countries down.
‘From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.’ His words
Total Rubbish:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P492
‘The countries of the sterling area were with us: they adopted the same kind of exchange control policy as we did and were willing takers and holders of Sterling. With others we made special arrangements by which we paid them in sterling, which could be used anywhere in the sterling area, and they undertook to hold any sterling for which they had no immediate use and to keep dealings at the official rate of exchange. Such arrangements were originally made with the Argentine and Sweden, but were extended to a number of other countries on the Continent and in South America. These arrangements were completed after the spring of 1940, and it was a matter of satisfaction – and a tribute to sterling – that we were able to achieve and maintain them in circumstances of such difficulty. In this way we were able to go on dealing with most parts of the world in sterling, and to conserve most of our precious gold and dollars for our vital purchases in the United States.’
And of course, the USA did not take advantage of the situation, perish the thought…
P506
‘The President sent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold we had gathered there. The great British business of Courtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of the United States Government at a figure much below its instrinic worth.’
‘*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts’ His words.
The last time I saw Andrew Roberts on TV, he was getting taken apart by a couple of Indian historians, who demolished his lunatic views on the state of India at the time of independence.
‘p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse’ His words.
This clown Roberts must be out of his mind. The is no record of any desperation on the part of Britain to seek involvement from US forces. A German invasion in 1940 was almost certain to fail. A German invasion in 1941, 1942 and so on…bring it on.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P278
‘We have seen how our many anxieties and self-questionings led to a steady increase in the confidence with which from the beginning we had viewed the invasion project. On the other hand, the
more the German High Command and the Fuehrer looked at the venture, the less they liked it. We
could not, of course, know each other’s moods and valuations; but with every week from the middle of July to the middle of September, the unknown identity of views upon the problem between the German and British Admiralties, between the German Supreme Command and the British Chiefs of Staff, and also between the Fuehrer and the author of this book, became more definitely pronounced. If we could have agreed equally well about other matters, there need have been no war. It was, of course, common ground between us that all depended upon the battle in the air. The question was how this would end between the combatants; and in addition the Germans wondered whether the British people would stand up to the air bombardment, the effect of which in these days was greatly exaggerated, or whether they would crumple and force His Majesty’s Government to capitulate. About this Reichsmarshal Goering had high hopes, and we had no fears.’
Likewise, a sudden Russian collapse…Churchill did not think so, and he called the shots.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE. 1950.
P352
‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
It took four years for Britain and the late USA, easily the two biggest shipbuilding countries in the world to build up invasion force, supported by the world’s two largest navies, massive air forces, round the clock bombing, Britain reading German codes, the populations of the occupied on the allies side. Even in the very, very, unlikely event that Germany got the best of Russia,, how long would they have needed an invasion force to compare with Overlord? Hitler would have dead long before any such to pass. In which case, the Germans would have made peace, which was exactly what they did in 1945.
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@johnburns4017
Part Two...
‘p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well’
Really?..
In his great work ‘THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE’, Chester Wilmot makes no mention Portal in the narrative, nor does he mention him as a source:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON SOURCES
‘I am under a great obligation to those who have helped me and particularly to: Air Chief Marshall Lord Dowding; Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder; General W. Bedell Smith, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, General Sir Frederick Morgan, Major-General K. W. D. Strong and Brigadier E. J. Foord (all of SHAEF) ; Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Major-General Sir Miles Graham, Brigadier
R. F. K. Belchem, Brigadier E. T. Williams, and the late Col. J. O. Ewart (of 21st Army Group) ; Air Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, who was Chief of Staff to the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Admiral Sir George Creasy, who was Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay; General Sir Miles Dempsey and Col. L. M. Murphy (of Second British Army); the late Lieut.-General George S. Patton, Lieut.-General W. H. Simpson, Major-General Clift Andrus, Major-General H. W. Blakeley, Major-General James M. Gavin, Major-General C. H. Gerhardt, Major-General R. W. Grow, Brigadier-General E. L. Sibert, and Col. B. A. Dickson (of the U.S. Army); General Sir Evelyn Barker, Lieut.-General G. C. Bucknall, General Sir John Crocker, Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, General Sir Richard O'Connor (all of whom commanded corps in Second Army) ; Major-General C. M. Barber, Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, Lieut.-General Sir Richard Gale, Major- General Sir Percy Hobart, Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, Major-General D. C. Spry, General Sir Ivor Thomas (all of whom commanded divisions in Second Army) ; Major-General G. W. Lathbury, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, Brigadier K. G. Blackader, Brigadier B. A. Coad, Brigadier J. W. Hackett, Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey, Brigadier S. J. L. Hill, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde, Col. A. Jolly, Lt.-Col. R. M. P. Garver, Major A. D. Parsons, and Dr. J. M. Stagg. Finally, I must express my gratitude to the many anonymous staff officers—British, Canadian and American—who prepared the operational studies, historical narratives, and After-Action Reports upon which I have drawn extensively in the preparation of this book.’
And this is just from the allied side. Now compare this with the sources cited by clowns like Beevor, Roberts, Weidner, and so on…
‘p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there’
Not really…
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE 1951.
P162
‘Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 15 Apr 42
I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be:
(a) The loss of Ceylon.
(b) Invasion of Eastern India, with incalculable internal consequences
to our whole war plan, including, the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma.
2. We had hoped that by the end of April the American Pacific Fleet would be strong enough to reoccupy Pearl Harbour and offer some menace to the Japanese which they would have to consider seriously.’
From the minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee and American representatives General Marshall, and Mr Hopkins:
P285
‘At the moment we had no sure knowledge of the United States’ naval intentions and movements in the Pacific. The first essential in that area was to get superiority over the Japanese in seaborne aircraft. We ourselves would very shortly have three aircraft-carriers in the Indian Ocean, and these might be joined in due course by the Furious.’
‘He’ [Mr.Hopkins] ‘had sensed public opinion both in America and in the United Kingdom, and had found it disturbed as to what the United States Navy was doing.’
ROTFL. As you can see, Britain was bloody terrified about coping in the Indian Ocean on their own.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave:
'Asked the Dutch they always appreciated the Big boys who didn't get bounced into the channel.They didn't appreciate fighting the Gerries as Bernard and the Burns family scurried for the boats'
The Dutch folded in four days, (17th May 1940) having previously tried to take a neutral stance.
The Dutch Royal Family and others then found sanctuary in Britain, from where the Free Dutc h forces and the Dutch government in exile were organized in London. The Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg governments in exile signed the Benelux Customs Union agreement in London in 1944. What did they listen to?.. The BBC Dutch Service, and Radio Oranje - from the BBC, on which Queen Wilhelmina broadcast to the Dutch people on 34 occasions.
Young Para Dave should come with me to the Scheldt when he is old enough, its usually free drinks for the British, all night. He might even get a half of lager to himself.
If Para Dave wants, we can go through the what happened with Belgians, the Danes, the Norwegians, the French, and the rest...He has not got a fcuking clue...
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’
This is no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, and Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
‘Fancy some more?’
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when he (or she) pulls the trigger.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."’
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’. Notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
'Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it'
‘The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt on its own. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
'From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
No how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’
Why go to Max Hastings, when you can get it straight from de Guingand:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
'How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
The old div, Max Hastings, the Golf club bar bore, reported on the from the Falklands war, and then appointed himself an expert all things Second World War. He should have checked first.
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
'How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
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@kevinhodgkinson9292
If your grandfather fought and died at the Somme, that would mean that your father was born no later March 1917?
The commander of the British forces at the Somme was Douglas Haig, who died in 1928, 11 years before the Second World War started. It hard to see what his role in MARKET GARDEN was. Perhaps you could explain?
Of the two commanders you mentioned, Montgomery fought in the front line in the First World War. He was wounded twice, and was award the DSO. Browning also served in the front line in the First World War, and, like Montgomery, was awarded the DSO.
If your father owed his rescue from Arnhem to the Polish troops, then that is new one on me. All of the accounts that I read, have noted that the withdrawal from the Oosterbeek was organised, and carried out by the 43rd Wessex Division, and the Royal Canadian Engineers. 2,398 troops took part in the withdrawal, of which 160 were Polish.
As far as blame is concerned...If such a term can be used, Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the German General, Student, blamed the adverse weather. Montgomery also noted a lack support from Eisenhower, and his own mistakes. I don’t know what opinion Browning expressed about the reasons for Arnhem not being captured, and judging by the contents of your comments here, neither do you.
Montgomery and Browning each criticized the conduct of Polish forces during the battle. Whether or not those criticisms were justified, that is quite a different matter from blaming the Poles for failure at Market Garden.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’ How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
‘Fancy some more?’
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when Para Dave pulls the trigger.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Brereton said no to airborne operations on Walcheren at at that time, clearly his authority over FAAA operations was absolute, unless, of course, Eisenhower, who by that time was allied land forces commander, as well as supreme commander.
Examples of Brereton having the final say:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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