Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8" video.
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@Bialy_1
'Fact that gen. Sosabowski during planing of the operation pointed most of the big flaws of this plan and was not only ignored by Mountgomery but he was happy to blame him for his own faults and lie that gen. Sosabowski and his soldiers were fighting badly... gen.'
There is no evidence that Montgomery and Sosabowski met during the planning for Market Garden. Why would they have? Sosabowski reported to Browning and Brereton.
on 17 October 1944 Montgomery wrote to Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, referring to Arnhem: ‘Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you might like to send them to join the other Poles in Italy.'
Right or wrong, Montgomery was entitled to his opinion, but seemingly he made no specific mention of Sosabowski.
Perhaps Sosabowski might have helped his cause if he had not declined the offer to lead an airborne division, ruling his troops out of taking part in D-Day and then held out for the totally unrealistic aspiration of his brigade being dropped into the Warsaw during the up-rising there.
'Sosabowski died in poverty because of all that lies and British was doing everything to hide truth about him and his men in this whole operation.'
Not really, Sosabowski, like thousands of Poles, was given a home in Britain under terms of the Polish Resettlement Act 1947. The British government was under no obligation to do so. There was camp full of them in my area until they were allowed settle here. There were so many of them, they had, and still have, Polish language services in the local Roman Catholic Church.
And all this before a million of them came over in the early 2000s like a plague, driving down wages , not queing at bus stop and so on. The sooner they fuck off home the better.
'Dutch TV showed document about it and ofc noone in Britain saw it or is interested in facts but because of that document Dutch made decision to ignore British wishes and made recognition of Gen. Sosabowski and his man actions...'
What British wishes? The Dutch award was postumous. Britain had already made him an Honorary Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
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@nickdanger3802
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Chapter 5
The Advance to Brussels and Antwerp
Page 80
‘Although the order for us to halt came from my immediate boss, General Dempsey Commander of the Second Army, I am certain that it did not have the blessing of Field-Marshall Montgomery. I think it was a direct result of the Broad Front policy insisted on by Eisenhower, mainly for political reasons. Montgomery had stressed to me over and over again, ‘Never let up the pressure Jorrocks, or the Germans will recover. They are very good soldiers. Keep at them day and night!’.
For the second mistake I must at least take part of the blame. When the 11th Armoured Division had been ordered to capture Antwerp, ‘Pip’ Roberts had asked me for a definite objective; an armoured division was not the ideal formation with which to capture a large town – even with he help of the Belgian resistance. I replied, ‘Go straight for the docks and prevent the Germans destroying the port installations.’ My reason for this was that I still retained painful memories of the delays imposed on the Eighth Army during their advance along the North African coast; the Germans always destroyed the port facilities and thus slowed down the unloading of our supplies. Marvellous to relate, Roberts captured the docks in full working order, including those on the north bank of the Scheldt. This was an almost unbelievable stroke of luck, for the sluice gates and the dockside equipment, all electrically operated, could easily have been put out of action. Here the Belgian ‘Armée Blanche’ appeared in force. With their assistance, the 159th Infantry Brigade assaulted the many concrete emplacements surrounding the German H.Q. in the park.'
His words.
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@Clone Warrior
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more aircraft for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more ground forces for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
There is ample evidence that Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower in August 1944 that there were not enough supplies to maintain an advance by all allied forces. He stated this to Eisenhower on 23rd:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
His words.
H was right, Eisenhower’s poor decision making gave the Germans victories at Aachen, Arnhem, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, as well as giving the Germans the opportunity build up forces for the Ardennes.
As for who was where. As usual, Montgomery was up with his armies, Eisenhower was in Normandy, Brereton was in England. What evidence is there that Montgomery did not fully cooperate with First Allied Airborne Army? Montgomery proposed, and got approval for Market Garden on the 10th September, he Briefed Browning on the same day, Brereton convened a meeting (In England) on the same day. If the airborne army was not in a position to carry out Market then Brereton should have said stop. What was the airborne army there fo in late 1944 , if not to carry out major operations at short notice.?
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He chose to dismiss Bletchley Park's warning of the German defenses available as informed by the Dutch.'
Nobody dismissed warnings of German defences. Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery all saw the same intelligence information, which was not a complete picture.The Dutch did not inform Bletchley Park. Bletchley Park was facility for breaking German codes, not evaluating information supplied by allied sources.
'Over the expressed misgivings of Bradley and Patton'
Patton was too junior to be consulted. Bradley stated that it should go ahead due to the potential gains that could be achieved.
'temporarily abandoning his strategy of advancing toward Germany on a broad front to totally destroy the German Army in the west which ultimately proved successful.'
The point is that Market Garden did change Eisenhower's stategy, if such a term can be used. The ground forces only involved XXX Corps, which could be sustained from 21st Army Group supplies and the First Allied Airborne Army which was sustained from Britain. The US 12th Army Group had supplies to sustain either its 1st Army or its 3rd Army. Bradley stupidly chose to sustain his 3rd Army instead of pushing his 1st Army through the Aachen gap to double the forces that the Germans in the North would be facing. Eisenhower's strategy cannot be considered successful. Montgomery took the allies from Normandy to the German border in three months. Eisenhower took seven months to advance across half of Germany. During that time the Germans were able to launch the Bulge offensive and were able to put most of their resources in he East - the Russian advance was by a distance the most important cause of he German collapse. That is what happens when you allow a bloke like Eisenhower, with almost no command experience and with zero personal combat experience in charge.
'The goal of ending the war in '44 actually, by Market Garden's failure, guaranteed that it would not.'
Esisenhower's dithering in August 1944 cost the allies the chance of ending the war in 1944 . Market Garden was too small an undertaking to change that.
'The commencement of the Ardennes Offensive, aka the Battle of the Bulge, three months later could have completely turned the tide of the war on the western front completely around. Had it not been for the German critical shortage of fuel and the heroic stand of Gen McAuliffe and his 101st Airborne at Bastogne, Operation Autumn Mist would have succeeded.'
There you have it. TheGermans had no fuel, even their own comanders gave it a 5% chance of success. Montgomery warned that a broad front strategy would leave the allies vulnerable to a counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinates, Patton warned about an attack in the Ardennes. How right they were.
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@danwelch8547
Normandy.
‘If Normandy had been left in Monty's culpable, errr capable hands, he still would have been mired near Caen when he died. He had an opportunity to break out of Normandy with Operation Perch but Monty gonna monty. No, Normandy was -- and the subsequent pursuit made possible -- by Bradley slogging through bocage and Patton brilliantly exploiting the breakthrough. Again, Monty could not finish the deal at Falaise when presented the opportunity.’ Your words.
Normandy as a whole:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
US GENERAL DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
In his offensive of early July he had attacked along the entire front from St Lo to the sea and, since this dispersal of his strength was accentuated by the nature of the country, he had been unable to gain a clear success anywhere. For COBRA, however, he had accepted Montgomery’s suggestion that he should concentrate a powerful striking force on a 6,000 yard front, five miles west of St Lo.’
CHESTER WILLMOT
Normandy, Falaise in particular:
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
‘to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND
‘When presented with the opportunity of using the Port of Antwerp, Monty montied.’
Your words.
Not really...
The port of Antwerp was captured 4th September, 1944. However, both banks the Scheldt Estuary as still in German hands and a campaign of at least three weeks plus time for mine clearance would be needed to clear the estuary. Meanwhile the opportunity to take the war into Germany slipped away, as evidenced by the German General Gunther Blumentritt:
‘”The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.""
His words.
And also Eisenhower:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
'
His words.
‘Exactly what battles did Monty actually win?’
Your words.
As an army commander: Alam el Halfa, the Second Battle of El Alamein, Medenine, Sicily. As an army group commander: Normandy, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and or course sorting out the northern half of the Bulge.
‘The folly that the most timid Allied general would lead a bold stroke through Holland was delusional.’
Your words.
What was timid about Montgomery? Certainly not in the aftermath of El Alamein, or the Normandy breakout. His task of handling the 3rd British Division in the trying circumstances of France in 1940 would never have been given to ‘timid’ commander. Montgomery was thoroughly professional soldier whose approach to war was influenced by his experiences in the First World War (Unlike Bradley and Eisenhower, he had personal combat experience) and British manpower constraints. Thorough prepartion of forces, careful planning and battle management wins almost every time. As Montgomery's record proved.
Any questions?
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@danwelch8547
‘1. Alam Halfa -- The defensive plan he won by executing Dorman-Smith's plan? Or the non-existent counterattack whereby he completely failed to annihilate a worn down enemy with no fuel?’
Err…neither.
The ‘defensive plan’:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
CHAPTER lll TWO BATTLES
ROMMEL AT ALAM HALFA P22
‘Recently there has been discussion whether or not General Montgomery ‘adopted’ as his own the plan evolved by his predecessor for the action that was shortly to be fought – actually within a little more than a fortnight of his taking over command – in defence of the Alamein position.
I cannot conceive that General Montgomery is likely to have been interested in other people’s ideas on how to run the desert war; and in my own conversation with General Auchinleck, before taking over command, there was certainly no hint of a defensive plan that at all resembled the pattern of the battle of Alam Halfa as it was actually fought.
…as I have already indicated, the actual pattern of the battle was exclusively Montgomery’s.’
‘The ‘non-existent counterattack’’:
Which quite rightly did not take place, as it was exactly what Rommel wanted Montgomery to do.
Rommel complained to Kesselring, "The swine isn't attacking!"
THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45.
CHAPTER 11.
‘2. Alamein -- the battle he could not lose because Torch was going to force Rommel to retreat anyway? And yet Monty nearly lost anyway?’
No, Rommel had no brief to retreat, as no German general had. The forces that opposed Torch were Vichy French. Alamein was goin to be won by 2nd November, the Anglo/America Torch landings began on the 8th November.
‘3. Medenine -- Really? The battle he fought after he allowed Rommel to retreat, unmolested and uncontested, for 1,500 miles? A battle not needed if he had destroyed PanzerAmee Afrika?’
No, not really. 1,500 miles left plenty of opportunity for the Axis to regroup, surprise Eighth Army and turn the tables – the allies had been twice up and twice back already. Montgomery did not allow this to happen a third time and was then able to easily defeat the, by then, reinforced Axis forces at Medenine.
‘3. Normandy -- The original plan was to break out in the east before the Germans could reinforce. Monty won the battle of the buildup at every step but could not break through. He had an open German flank during Perch and one understrength panzer company routed his forces. The western breakthrough was attempted only after the eastern breakthrough failed. And failed. And failed. Claims that the western breakthrough was the original plan are revisionist history.’
Is this 3 or say 3A? If it is revisionist history, it started on the 15th May 1944 at St Paul’s School when Montgomery briefed Allied commanders on Overlord. There he clearly stated that the main effort in the opening phase would be west - to capture Cherbourg. That is what happened. Shall we go through those quotes again?
‘4. The Scheldte should have been cleared immediately upon the seizure of the port of Antwerp. Every available resource should have been dedicated to that end. Instead of throwing 1st Para Army at a target defended by remnants of two panzer divisions, 1st Para should have been thrown at the Scheldte as both infantry and paras. The Germans should not have been given a moment to recover.’
If so, then Eisenhower is the cause of that. By the 4th September 1944 Eisenhower had appointed himself as allied land forces commander in place of Montgomery. What a mistake that was. Be that as it may, such a decision had to be his. In his directive of the 4th September he targeted the Rhine, the Ruhr and Antwerp.
Not just Antwerp.
‘It's amazing how your litany of successes conveniently overlooks the big failures. Or the credit due others (Dorman-Smith, Bradley, etc).’
What failures? What credit goes to the later IRA helper Dorman-Smith / O'Gowan?
What credit goes to Bradley?
All clear now?..
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The operation took the allies over 50 miles to to the top of the Siegfried Line, leaving them well placed to cross the Rhine in the following year. Amongst other benefits where the curtailment of V Weapons being launched against Britain - something no American can relate to.
The operation incurred 15,000 casualties and should be compared to UG bog-ups in the same period such as Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties),
Eisenhower took final responsibility as, by September 1944 he was both Supreme Comander and by then had apointed himself to be land forces commander.
'They always thought that they were better than the rest of the Allies.'
Britain was the only major participant to fight for the entire six years of the war, the only major participant to go to war on behalf of another country , per head it out-produced every other major participant. It fought in every theatre of war.
Any questions?
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John Cornell
Its a Monday, so to cheer ourselves up...
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Ouch!
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Thought for the day...
As we all know, the US Army was nowhere near the German Army until 1943. By which time, as we all know, the Germans were irretrievably committed in Russia, and were short of fuel, manpower and so on.
But what of their big ticket items such as tanks? The Marks III and IV were pre-war technology. The production of new generation of German tanks, (Tiger I and II), Pather, Jagdtiger and Jagdpather amounted to just 8,400.
On their own , Britain produced 10,676 new generation: Churchills, Cromwells and Comets.
And Aeroplanes? At the end of the war, the Luftwaffe was still using 1939 technology in big numbers: Bf-109, Bf-110, Do 217, He 111 and so on. The Me 262 production amounted to just 1,430.
8,400 new generation tanks, 1,430 jet fighters to be spread across three fronts.
Americans should shut up. Their forces never had to face the Germans when they were at their peak between 1939 and mid 1942.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Not really...
If it is a question of bragging, then the facts are very simple. Britain is the size of the US State of Oregon, with a population the same as the US states of California and Texas. Britain had to import 40% of its needs. Britain was bombed, blockaded, and its major European enemy in control of the European coast from the North Cape to the Bay of Biscay, and at one point it was 21 miles away from mainland Britain. Relative to its circumstances, Britain out-produced every other major combatant.
US Lend-Lease supplies amounted 11% of Britain’s needs across the war years. Nobody, but nobody tells Britain about production during the war.
Britain fought from the first day of the war to the last day of the war, the only major belligerent nation to do. Britain was the only major belligerent nation to go to war on behalf of another country (Poland). All of the others, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the USA either attacked other countries or were attacked by other countries. Britain was the only country to fight Nazi Germany on its own - while Russia was allied to Germany, the USA was neutral, Britain nearest ally, Canada (then population 11 million) was 2,500 miles away.
The chiefs staff told the government at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 that Britain could be ready for a major war before 1941. A year later, in the face of Nazi aggression, Britain found itself at war. France collapsed in a matter of weeks, Italy declared war cutting Britain from the Mediterranean shipping routes. 18 months later, Japan declared war on Britain. Britain had to build a mechanized army with conscripted soldiers almost from scratch. Thank god (the world should be also thankful) that Britain had the foresight to prioritize the Navy and the air force in the build up to the war.
Come the hostilities, Britain (and Russia) faced Germany when it was at the height of its powers in terms of manpower, resources and technology.
Germany was never again as powerful in relation to its enemies as it was in 1940 and 1941. Britain won the Battle of Britain, the most important battle of war - which condemned Germany to a two front war. The air force then took the fight to Germany on its own until 1943, and on its own again in the winter of 1944/45. Britain's effort in Greece helped to delay the German attack by five fatal weeks. In Greece, as in Norway and at Dunkirk, British sea power was able to retrieve allied forces in the face of defeat. The Royal Navy defeated the German surface fleet, the Italian surface fleet, and put the French fleet beyond as was by a distance, the major factor in winning the battle of the Atlantic - almost 70% of U-boat sinkings were due to the Royal Navy. The navy was even able to venture into the Pacific towards the end of the war.
Clear headed British thinking led to the Germany first decision and the Mediterranean strategy, which denied Germany access to resources outside of Europe, freed up one million tons of merchant shipping with the conquest of Sicily. The strategy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans, an advantage that the USA began to undo in the Summer 1944.
Britain led the world in RDF, ASDIC and other technologies, code breaking and espionage.
Russia suffered much more in human and material terms than Britain but only ever fought on land, and on one front. They come second after Britain. But overall, if push comes to shove, as regards to who did what during the war, we rule.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Not really...
If Battle of Britain had been lost, particularly in the high summer, anything could have happened. German aircraft ranging unopposed across Southern England could easily have led to a change of government and or a capitulation or negotiated peace. The German attempt to mount an invasion was never a bluff until the autumn. German preparation were far too extensive, right down to sorting the waterproofing of tanks, which they mastered in a matter of weeks, and the issuing of guide books to the troops. The Germans may have been reluctant to go ahead and some were pessimistic about its outcome, but they were quite prepared to go ahead. Victory in the air made Britain's survival a certainty. Victory led to the Germans having to leave one million troops and a third of its air force in the west. An expensive submarine building programme, an air defence system, Germany being cut off supplies outside of mainland Europe and a fatal five week delay to Barbarossa. Von Runstedt was asked by Russian interogators after the war, what the point when Germany lost the war (They were expecting his reply to be Moscow or Stalingrad etc). His answer: The Battle of Britain. With Britain out of war, Germany gets its free hand in the east, no Battle of the Atlantic, no second front.
The war started on 1st September 1939. No responsible person could think otherwise. America only went to war because Japan (With violence), Germany and Italy declared war on the USA. Germany attacked other countries, Italy attacked other countries, Russia was attacked.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Just so as you know...
A cretin, from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, who used the name Big Woody (and other names) on YouTube spent about two years on You Tube calling Montgomery a coward, XXX Corps cowards, Lord Carrington a coward, disparaging cancer sufferers and so on and so on. He (or She) was everywhere on YouTube items about Montgomery, Market Garden etc., quoting hack US historians who were nowhere the events they were passing judgement on. He disappeared last summer, after me, and others outed him, but has now started using my name, John Cornell's name, John Burns's name, and possibly others too. He is on this thread using my name.
Don't go down the same route...
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