TheVilla Aston
TIKhistory
comments
Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "History is a Debate | Responding to a Comment from my Operation Market Garden Documentary" video.
5
3
2
2
Michael McCotter
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.
The 21st Army Group report on Market Garden noted:
'D -1 16 Sep 1630 hrs. Lt-Gen BRERETON decided to proceed with op MARKET'
On what basis should MARKET GAEDEN have been cancelled?..
It seems that neither Dempsey or Brereton said no can do. The weather forecast was good, the intelligence picture was probably of concern, but it was far from conclusive. The urgent request from London for action against V2 rocket launches from the Netherlands had to be attended to.
Montgomery later stated that he should have insisted on certain changes to the MARKET plan, a very noble thing to do, given the overwhelming evidence that he did not have the power to insist on those changes.
P.S. There is another TIK follower from Alaska...
2
Michael McCotter
Oh well…
At this point we seem to have a reached a consensus, due to the lack of any evidence posted so far that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan.
As to what date Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, in my previous comment I noted what other people had stated in YouTube comments about that date. Let us recap on what I stated:
‘It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.’ My words.
Young Big Woody(aka Para Dave on YouTube comments) has taken it upon himself to get up-tight about this, as if I had as if I claimed that this is an irrefutable fact. How would I know, I have not read the book. ROTFL.
Para Dave goes to paste substantial (by YouTube standards), amounts of quotes which all of which may or may not be quotes from this august work by Buckingham. Its not that clear.
Here is one that Para Dave notes a page for, like the rest, It is nothing to do with who had he final say on the MARKET airborne plan, or what date Montgomery saw that plan.
‘ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations’
How is this Buckingham supposed to know?.. I doubt that he can cite actual experience of those events, according to what I can find on-line, he is a tutor at the University of Glasgow. I doubt if that University employs tutors who are in their nineties. There could be any number of reasons why ‘both US Airborne formations’ were in the front line for as long as they were…lack of allied troop numbers?, they were considered to be effective units?, and so on. British 6th Airborne was retained in the front line for a longer period after D-Day that the US Airborne divisions were after MARKET GARDEN. Why don’t people check these things?..
Notice that young Buckingham states ‘the Failure of MARKET’ rather than the failure of MARKET GARDEN.
2
So its still the case that we have not seen any evidence in these comments that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan. Or as to when Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, if it was not on the 15th September.
Chester Wilmot, who, unlike Ambrose, Atkinson, Barr, Beevor, Buckingham, Hamilton, Hastings, Weidner, and so on, was actually there went on to state this view in regard to MARKET GARDEN:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation’.
Sitting here, 78 years later, it would seem that British caution about casualties was understandable, given Britain’s manpower situation after five years of war. The American reluctance to concentrate resources is hard to account for, given the success of a such a policy when it was put into effect by the Germans in 1940, by Montgomery in North Africa and Normandy, and by the Russians in 1944. By the time that Eisenhower made the mistake of appointing himself as allied land forces commander, in September 1944, dispersal of resources had failed when Eisenhower and Alexander allowed Patton to abscond from the battlefield in Sicily and Eisenhower had spread out the allied forces in invasion of Italy.
As far as what Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton should have been told to do is concerned…it was really an American matter as who should command American forces. One of the opinions posted here by Para Dave would seem to indicate an opinion that there was something wrong with the performance of the US 12th Army Group. Seemingly, Montgomery was of the opinion at the beginning of December that Patton would have been a better choice to lead US forces in the North, rather than Bradley’s other subordinate commanders, Hodges and Simpson.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
‘F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December.’
Notice that I have quoted what was stated at that time, not Nigel Hamilton’s opinion.
Reinforce in the North, reinforce in the South? Montgomery said then that Eisenhower should do one or the other. He did neither.
This what others, who were there had to say:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
Gunther Blumentritt
And also, it seems, one American:
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas.'
Ralph Ingersoll.
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
And that funeral...
‘Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "*...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."’’
OK, lets look at some other parts of Triumph in the West:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P 340
“November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.”
“At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.2”
“As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.”
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.”
P 341
The offensive which Eisenhower had ordered in October, which Patton had anticipated by his attacks south of the Ardennes and which Bradley, after waiting a fortnight for the weather to clear, had launched on a far too wide front in mid-November was now petering out. Except for the capture of the Metz forts, it had achieved nothing; neither the drive on the Saar nor the drive on Cologne got the Americans anywhere or even engaged the German reserves.
‘From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’
‘From a PHD at King's College
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
Two for the price or one here…
This from Ramsey:
‘Went to see Fred de Guingand, he was rather depressed at the state of the war in the west, saying that the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a lot of Germans and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany. He said in fact that the higher direction of the war had been bad in the last 2 months, that Ike's policy was only skin deep and anyone could deflect it. . . . He said that the American leadership had been bad, the Generals being too inexperienced. They did not know how to combine artillery with infantry, put all divisions in line and had no supports to leap-frog and make headway, that they were every-where too weak to break through and that they had utterly failed to reach their objectives—the Rhine. This was all very depressing but no surprise to me’ His words.
‘With Prejudice, by Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."’
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ DWIGHT D EISENHOWER, his words.
Tedder was also at the meeting on 10th September, perhaps he should have checked old diaries before writing this stuff.
‘Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp’
‘Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"’
Not really… SHAEF Intelligence summaries read as follows:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
Hastings is referring to meeting between Montgomery and Eisenhower’s subordinate, Bedel-Smith on the 12th September 1944. Before any idiot from say, Cleveland, Ohio, or some such place gets the idea that this Smith was trying to tell Montgomery not undertake MARKET GARDEN, then they should think
again, if that is possible. Smith merely suggested that one of the two US airborne division earmarked for the operation be moved up to Arnhem. He would have done better to suggested this to the US general Brereton as he had the final say on the airborne MARKET plan. Smith also spoke to Montgomery about a promise from Eisenhower to finally allocate more allied resources to MARKET GADEN, 1,000 tons per day to be delivered to Brussels, hardly an earth shattering amount, but hardly the act of some who might have doubts as the whether the operation should go ahead.
‘Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’
I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation’ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E, his words.
baa
1