Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.
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'If it was Monty's plan then why wasn't he involved in the battle?'
Montgomery started he battle at his advanced headquarters, 12 miles behind the GARDEN start line, and was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands. Allied land forces commander, Eisenhower was in Normandy, nearly 400 miles away, First Allied Airborne Army commander, Brereton stayed in Britain for almost the entire operation.
Montgomery was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. MARKET GARDEN involved one of those armies. Bradley was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. Bradley was no more involved in the Lorraine Campaign, Aache, and the Hurtgen Forest, than Montgomery was with MARKET GARDEN.
What do people expect? Montgomery to have been in the lead tank?
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'A single road wide open to flank attacks, both sides. Monty checked out before the battle and went dark. '
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
'I believe Monty would've been smashing in the Quartermaster Corps but not as a combat General.'
So what roles should have been given to Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers?
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@johndawes9337
Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave. He lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
He hates Britain, and Britons, especially Montgomery.
He has called Churchill a drunk, Carrington a coward, XXX cowards, my Uncle a coward, Montomery a rancid runt, and many other things. He is a sucker for any opinion about the war that agrees with his views, no matter how far removed from those events the author is. This being the likes of Antony Beevor, Nial Barr, William Weidner, and so on...
Over the last five or six years he has regularly copied my turn of phrase. In this , I am not remotely flattered.
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@tspoon772
Rubbish.
Stop stating things up about Polish people that you cannot back up.
_______________________________________________________________________
Who went war for what reasons:
Germany attacked Poland.
Italy attacked France.
Japan attacked the USA.
Russia was attacked by Germany.
The USA was attacked by Japan.
Great Britain (And France) went to war on behalf of Poland.
_______________________________________________________________________
Australian forces in North Africa (Including Egypt) were called home by their government in order ro meet a perceived threat to their homeland.
_______________________________________________________________________
The idea that Britain was on he verge of starvation is absurd.
Food in Great Britain in 1941:
UK crops harvest: 53.164 million tons
Cereals, Potatoes and Sugar Beet: 6.5 million tons
Cattle, Calves, Sheep and Lambs:13.109 million
UK Milk production: 1,222.8 million gallons
Total food imports: 14.654 million tons
Lend-Lease food imports (7.4% of total food imports): 1.078 million tons
UK Processed food production:20,314 million tons
Total food consumption (UK): 19.996 million tons
Foodstuffs lost at sea enroute to Britain: 787,200 tons (5.3%) of the intended 15 million tons of food imports in 1941.
We can do 1939, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945 if you wish...
_______________________________________________________________________
UK war finaces were built around UK taxation, government borrowing at home and overseas, trading in Sterling Credits, and after British Dollar reserves were almost exhausted by cash and carry purchases from the USA, US Lend-Lease, which amounted to 11% of Britain's wartime needs, and not forgetting the generous gifts from Canada.
_______________________________________________________________________
All clear now?
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@johnburns4017
Czechoslovakia, Autumn 1938.
If Britain did not agree to German demands, Czechoslovakia would be invaded straightaway. Germany would not even allow the Czech government to attend the conference. Britain was going to save the Czech's how? The Fench did not want it, and they actually had an alliance with Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement found favour in the US press, and with the US government - 3,000 miles away.
Dunkirk, Spring 1940.
Britain was taking bullets as it evacuated 110,000 French troops, mostly in British ships, and even extended the evacuation by another day to take away more French troops. And all this after the French war effort had folded like a house of cards.
Italy / Southern France, Summer 1944.
Like the French were going to pass up the chance to liberate their own soil as the stupid American leaders stopped the chance to finish Italy in 1944, allowed the Germans to move troops to Normandy and the Eastern Front, as the invasion of Southern France achieved nothing that could not be left to a later date, and damaged the West's position in the Balkans in the post-war years.
The Netherlands, Autumn / Winter 1944 to Spring 1945.
The Dutch government in London urged the Dutch people to obstruct German transport before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, which was designed to take allied troops to the Lower Rhine and the Ijsselmeer and not to Berlin. an operation that Montgomery attended to from just 12 miles behind the start line, while Eisenhower was in Normandy, and Bereton was in Britain.
Cleveland, Ohio, USA, Summer 2023.
Big Woody (aka Para Dave) needs professional help.
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hdfoster5507
' the lives of 3,996 US, and 11,000-13,000 Brits & Poles with 6,450 captured, all elite fighting men.'
The dead of MARKET GARDEN amounted to 2,224, out of 17,000 killed, wounded, and captured.
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From the US Official History:
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
Page 156
In the eyes of the 8zd Airborne Division commander, Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin, possession of the ridge represented the key to success or failure. "With it in German hands," General Gavin was to note later, "physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it." General Gavin believed that if he held this ridge, the British ground column ultimately could succeed, even if his airborne troops should be driven away from the bridges. The high ground also represented a ready airhead for later operations.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
You need to look further than Antony Beevor.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
The Bulge:
‘He went on in the Bulge, provisionally commanding the US 12th Army Group, and managed to irritate the Americans (again) in a press interview (‘In his book The Longest Winter, Alex Kershaw says, “The picture Montgomery gave of the battle was of massive American blundering: only when he had been brought in to command the armies holding the northern shoulder had catastrophe been averted.”’
Of the US 12th Army Group, Montgomery was actually brought in to command the US 1st army (Hodges) and the US 9th army (Simpson). US 3rd Army (Patton) remained under US command.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, US 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, German 5th Panzer Army.
And the press conference:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 637
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
'My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.'
All this can be found on-line. Why don’t people like this Alex Kershaw check first?
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@ErikExeu
'Fantastic. I have never seen such made up excuse before. He "drew all the veteran German troops and numbers on him intentionally to help the American". You use quatation marks, can you provide the source for this fairytail?'
Sure...
US General Omar Bradley:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
Field Marshal Alanbrooke:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th [1944].
‘Then Dinner with the P.M., Ike and Bedell Smith’
‘Next morning [28th] Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talk with the Supreme Commander.’
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Sicily:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
Pages 319-320
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
P322
Alexander, embarrassed that he had given Patton permission to bolt in the opposite direction, now lamely offered to put the American division under Monty's direct command, explaining why he had given Patton permission to split off the major portion of his Seventh Army in its drive to Palermo: 'Would you like to have one American Div front under your command now for operating in your northern sector? Seventh Army should take advantage of Italian demoralization to clear up the west of the island and at least seize Palermo, from which port they can be based, and if Germans are too strong for you Seventh Army can take over a sector in the north from St Stefano to Troina.¹
Had Monty been the glory-seeking British bigot of Patton's imaginings, he would undoubtedly have taken up Alexander's offer. Instead Monty insisted the American division stay under Patton's command, no doubt as a gage in ensuring, belatedly, that Seventh Army face eastwards and not westwards: 'Re American div. Would like one to operate eastwards on North coast road, but suggest it should remain under Patton,' he signalled back.²
¹ Alexander Papers (WO 214/22), PRO.
² Ibid.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Normandy:
The diary that you quoted was not written by Montgomery, from D-Day to VE Day, it was a series of notes composed by members of Montgomery’s staff. On the 4th August date that you noted, Alanbrooke wrote to Montgomery:
‘I am delighted that our operations are going so successfully and conforming so closely to your plans. For the present all the 'mischief making tongues' are keeping quiet; I have no doubt they will start wagging again and am watching them.’
Montgomery planned for British Second Army to protect the US First Army whilst it spread out to take the key port – Cherbourg, the Cotentin Peninsular and then further afield from the earliest days of his planning for OVERLORD.
Caen disappeared as a D-Day objective with the jettisoning of General Morgan’s OVERLORD plan.
On this matter, the evidence is clear:
C-in-C's Directives (21 A Gp/1062/2/C-in-C): 21.03.1944
It is very important that the area to the S.E. of CAEN should be secured as early as Second Army can manage.'
This, from an attendee at Montgomery’s briefing to allied leaders at St Paul’s School, West London on the 15th May 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’
From Montgomery’s directive: NO mention that Caen had to be taken on D-Day.
The claim that Caen not being captured on D-Day ‘stalled the entire Normandy campaign’ is absurd. Caen was far less important objective than Cherbourg. Whatever importance capturing Caen had for the allies began to subside almost from the first day of OVERLORD as the Germans played into Montgomery’s hands by beginning to mass almost all of their armour at CAEN.
The scale of the German armour at Caen was noted by Alanbrooke to Montgomery on the 28th July, 1944:
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front.” ‘
As for Eisenhower the military leader...
He made a poor job of the allied campaign in Tunisia, he, and, in turn Alexander failed to grip the situation in Sicily, and then went on to make a muck of the invasion of Italy by, not for the last time failing to concentrate allied forces, in this case by undertaking AVALANCHE, BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK at the same time. In North West Europe, he failed to concentrate allied forces for a push into Germany when he took over as allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944, prolonging the war well into 1945. He dithered at the start of the German push in the Ardennes, and failed to support in his race against time to stop the Russians from getting into Denmark.
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Kerry Dennison
What debacle in Normandy?
Montgomery committed to get the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
'if you read the history of the generals and the European campaign many of them were very quickly relieved and replaced for far less failures' Your words.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@johnburns4017
'Britsh pathfinders were captured with their radios and they listened in to everything thing. Even they couldn't believe Monty chickened out unlike a real Field Marshall Walter Model' Para Dave.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started. Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@Johnny Carroll
'The captured plans: it is likely that is was an 101st AB signals officer attached to Brownings 1st AB Corps that crashed landed, and he had operational documents for the 101st but not the whole Corps. This explains why Browning had no radio contact with the 101st.
The timeline also shows that Bittrich reacted faster than when Model received the information. Quote ‘A Bridge Too Far’: “Student had never felt so frustrated. Because of his communications breakdown, it would be nearly ten hours before he could place the secret of Market-Garden in Model's possession”.
The Germans were quick to realise the scope of the Operation. If anything the plans, allowed the Luftwaffe to target the landings over the next few days. They arrived at the right time but missed the landings because of the delay with the weather.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@ToolTimeTabor
1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary quotes, supplied on here by Johnny Carroll:
‘1335 - Glider element, under command of Capt. D. Allsop lands. Flak negligible. Landing zone is a potato field, very soft, and dry. Majority of gliders have crash-landed. Commence to unload.
1410 - Sky full of Dakotas - streams of coloured parachutes in the air.
1500 - Capt. Allsop’ s glider unloaded - move to rendezvous.’
1515 - Report to Commanding Officer, Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. Glider and parachute personnel coming in continuously.
1530 - Squadron HQ complete except for one glider load carrying Lieut Wadsworth and 2 Jeeps. Casualty list - 4 O.R.s’.
1540 - Tac HQ under command Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. moves out, preceded by "C" Troop and followed by "D" Troop and Support Troop. "A" Troop report to Divisional HQ. Route is North and then East along track which runs north of railway line but parallel to it in the direction of Arnhem.'
The German Battalion Krafft was in action by 14.40
According to Middlebrook, the recce squadron was due to depart for Arnhem Bridge at 3pm, but left at at.3.35 (noted as 3.40pm in the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary).
If the troops that landed by parachute, had landed in the gliders with their vehicles?
Those troops would have been on the ground at 13.35 pm? With the majority of gliders having ‘crash landed’ into ‘a potato field, very soft, and dry’, it beggars belief that the vehicles would not have taken more time to unload from gliders. Graeme Warrack stated that Horsa glider interior was about the same size as a London Underground train passenger car. A glider lands with its nose in soft ground with its tail in the air, a glider lands with all of its undercarriage smashed, and so on. In almost any case, it seems a likely outcome that the cargo might have shifted and or been left in a state, making it harder to extract from the glider, thus extending the departure time. Perhaps the delay to the departure would have been less if the remainder of the squadron troops had landed with the gliders. Who can say?
Why did troops land separately? How should I know?
Middlebrook noted that the squadron troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the glider landings in Sicily. I find Antony Beevor’s claim that those troops wanted the honour of landing by parachute to ludicrous, unless his claim is backed up reliable evidence.
Was it a space saving decision?
From a web site ‘Key Military’
BASH ON! GOUGH’S RECCE MEN
‘The squadron travelled to Arnhem on Sunday, September 17 in two parties, one parachuting from Dakotas, the other in gliders. One glider carried a jeep and trailer together with the reserve petrol supply and a hamper of 2in mortar bombs – a heavy and combustible cargo. Others carried less-frightening loads, including 20mm Polsten guns – a simpler and cheaper Polish derivative of the Oerlikon cannon. Two Polstens, each jeep-towed, formed an antiaircraft section, but their heavy rounds and fast rate of fire – between 250 and 320rpm – made them lethal defensive weapons against infantry and light armour. They were included the support troop, commanded by Lieutenant John Christie.’
If the squadron troops had landed with their vehicles, they would have saved a walk from DZ-X to LZ-S. 20 minutes or so? Perhaps those troops could have helped to save time with the unloading of Jeeps. If so, would it have been enough to get the squadron into Arnhem without encountering the Battalion Krafft? Unless there is reliable evidence as to how much quicker it was for six men to unload a Horsa glider than three men. Who can say?
What if Gough’s troops had made it to Arnhem Bridge before the Germans?
Middlebrook notes that the Grabner Squadron included 22 armoured cars and half-track armoured personnel carriers. I can hardly bare to type the next bit: Para Dave has pointed out that the Germans had 20 mm cannons.
Up against that force would have been 16 jeeps armed with machine guns and 48 men.
As far as I can see, Gough’s actions in the landings on the 17th September are a footnote in the Arnhem story. The biggest specific issues in regard to Arnhem seem to have been the MARKET air plan, and events at Nijmegen Bridge. But of course, all this is hindsight by someone (me) who was nowhere these events, and does not even have any military background.
For, all those persons involved in MARKET GARDEN made reasonable decisions based on the information available to them at that time. In the case of Major Gough, it hard to see how he could have assessed whether sending his troops in by parachute would be crucial to the outcome at Arnhem, and that it seen by people in the future to be crucial to the outcome of the MARKET GARDEN undertaking.
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@johnburns4017
From Big Woody (aka Para Dave):
‘The evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered?’ Para Dave.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started . Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg, twenty miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
Whether Eisenhower was a ‘pathetic pratt’ or not is probably a matter of opinion. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was in Granville in Normandy, 400 hundred miles from his field armies, even further away from the FAAA.
'The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Para Dave.
Wilmot went on to state:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation, which should, and could, have been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West.’
A British caution in regard to casualties is entirely understandable, given that Britain, with a population of 47 million had been at war for FIVE years, in just about all parts of the world. Whereas the ‘American reluctance to concentrate’ ran in defiance of clear headed military planning, and therefore there can be no excuse on the part of the USA.
And over the page in Wilmot's work…
‘Ambitious American generals, like Patton and MacArthur, habitually represented their progress and prospects in the rosiest light, for they believed that they were then likely to be given greater resources. Reinforcing success ' is sound military practice, provided that the success is advancing the strategic plan, but, in war as in life, the Americans tend to value success for its own sake.’
Ouch!
Interestingly, the above quotes are taken from the chapter headed THE LOST OPPORTUNITY in THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE by Chester Wilmot.
‘Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany” Para Dave.
Perhaps de Guingand was right. Perhaps Eisenhower’s ‘SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing ‘a some Germans’ Para Dave.
Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles’ Para Dave.
As I have to hand, the works of the seemingly trusted Chester Wilmot, let us see what he has to state:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXIX. THE AUTUMN STALEMATE
P 631
‘with every division trying to make a breakthrough, the artillery support was dispersed, and [Manton S] Eddy was able to gain only fifteen miles in eight days. The German line sagged, but did not break, for at no point was it subjected to an overpowering onslaught. Meanwhile, the enveloping attack against Metz, also made on a broad front, was similarly checked by skilful and stubborn defence. Even after a week of heavy fighting, the city was not encircled.’
P 634
‘after a bitter month which had taken heavy toll of his infantry, Bradley's troops were only eight miles deeper into Germany.’
As I am in a good mood...a lesson for Para Dave for the future... If you are going to cite Chester Wilmot, its best to go to his works, rather show a few of his words that have been included in some comic book US history.
‘As the Dutch poster Oddball SOK stated on this board *Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944.So tell me, how come ?How come the Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Monty/Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in September, not in October and not in November.’ Para Dave.
This has got be one of the most stupid YouTube comments I have read in a long while… And considering the number of idiotic YouTube comments posted by Para Dave, that is quite an accolade.
Its actually hard to see whether Oddball SOK or Para Dave is responsible for this throwaway comment. However, let us examine this claim…
The Scheldt. The 15th Army evacuated across the waterway (a 45 minute journey) between 5th September and the 20th September 1944. An evacuation that took place with German and Dutch shipping already in place, with both banks in German hands, with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and which took place at night and on bad weather days.
The Scheldt. Liberated by the 21st Army Group in a series of landings for operations in which ‘tanks and troops’ were ferried across the estuary and landed on hostile shore with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and therefore closed to allied shipping.
So how do these compare?..
What else with this ferrying of 'tanks and troops over rivers/canals?'..
MARKET GARDEN? The Germans used bridges already in their hands to help to get forces to the battle area, including the Arnhem (later, John Frost) Bridge which they recaptured it, rather than ferrying troops. There was no major German river assault at Nijmegen, or anywhere else in that operation. The allies were able to ‘ferry’ troops across the Rhine from Oosterbeek to allied lines. By allies, in this instance, I do of course mean British, Canadian, and Polish forces.
Anyone know where else were the Germans ferrying tanks and troops in that period? I do of course mean more than just the odd tank and troops across a Dyke here or there... If there is such an instance... we can take a look the circumstances.
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GR Joe
MARKET GARDEN never envisaged reaching Berlin by Christmas. As evidenced by Arthur Tedder when interviewed by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated 'that
the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.'
GARDEN was devised the FAAA, headed by the US general Lewis Brereton, over who, Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
'The whole planning and the operation itself shows the short comings of the
bureaucratic top comand structure of the British.'
If any top command had shotcomings, it was the US top command: their failure to see the importance of the campaign in the Mediterranean, theit linatic plan to invade France in 1942, Eisenhower's dipersal of the forces in the invasion of Italy. Eisenhower, and his US colleagues failure to understand the stategy for Normandy, Eisenhower's failed broad front strategy, which led directly to US Ardennes debacle, via Aachen, Lorraine, and the Hurtgen Forest. And then crowning foul up, when Eisenhower and Bradley made an absolute meal of encircling the Ruhr, then allowing too many allied formation to the south and then neglecting to support the allied forces in the North, which nearly alllowed the Russians to get into Denmark.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower and his vast bureaucracy was 400 miles behind the front, in, as usual, the the biggest chateaux he could find, with his signals taking up to three days to reach front-line commanders. His communications were so poor, his message would have reached the front more quickly if he had stayed in London. Later in the Autumn, he even had to get his chauffeur to telephone a US commander to find out if a particular attack had gone ahead.
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@Keimzelle
ROTFL
'What exactly was the picture the German commanders had?'
Er... They had a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan with two hours of the onset of the operation, after they had found a copy of the plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US landing zone.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
Antony Beever should have read a few books.
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@ErikExeu
'The whole idea was extremely stupid. The British should have focused on to clear up the access to Antwerpen and to trap von Zangens army. But these were too small things for Montgomery. His only objective was to take resources from the Americans. Well, then we can perhaps agree MG was 90% succesful.'
Not really...
MARKET GARDEN presented an opportunity to get the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine, while they believed that the Germans in disarray after Normandy, and to stop the flow of German resources into the western part of the Netherlands for V2 rocket attacks on Britain, and before the Germans could recover from their deat in Normandy.
There is opinion that to 'clear up the access to Antwerpen' (The Scheldt), would have been a very difficult task and it could taken up to a month.
Meanwhile, any chance of getting across the Rhine at that time would have gone, and the V2 rockets would have continued to fall on Britain.
Montgomery had given Eisenhower the opportunity to take resources from the 2st Army Group and give them to the 12th Army Group, when they mt on the 23rd August 1944.
A note of caution:
Anyone can form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever on the decision making of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Browning, Gavin, and so on, based on what is now known about the outcome of those decisions. Far, far harder, is to form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever, based on what we know of the circumstances that those people faced at that time.
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andrewmay7284
I found this, make of it what you will...
'Lord Carrington again...
the Germans would blow this immense contraption we were to be accompanied by an intrepid Royal Engineer officer to cut the wires and cleanse the demolition chambers under each span. Our little force was led by an excellent Grenadier, Sergeant Robinson, who was rightly awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his action. Two of our tanks were hit not lethally - by anti-tank fire, and we found a number of Germans perched in the girders who tried to drop things on us but without great effect. Sergeant Robinson and the leading tank troop sprayed the opposite bank and we lost nobody, When I arrived at the far end my sense of relief was considerable: the bridge had not been blown, we had not been plunged into the Waal (In fact it seems the Germans never intended to blow the bridge. The demolition chambers were packed with German soldiers, who surrendered), we seemed to have silenced the opposition in the vicinity, we were across one half of the Rhine."
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men: reached it. When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay."
"The pursuit had ground to a halt. The war was clearly going on. We spent the winter of 1944 in Holland, first near Nijmegen where the Germans had flooded the land between the two great rivers, and there was little activity."
The meeting of the 82nd men and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge at the village of Lent where the railway embankment from the railway bridge met the north running road running off the main road bridge. The 82nd men did not reach the north end of the actual road bridge, the Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry got there first from the south.
Historians get confused. There are two bridges at Nijmegen. a railway bridge to the west and and road bridge to the east. They are about 1km apart. The 82nd men rowed the river west of the railway bridge and seized that bridge. The railway bridge was not suitable for running tanks over of course. After seizing the north end of the unimportant rail bridge the 82nd men moved along the railway embankment north to where the embankment meets the road approach to the road bridge at Lent.
Heinz Harmel (played by Hardy Kruger in the film A Bridge too Far), the 10th SS Panzer Division commander who was between Arnhem and Nijmegen, says it was the British tanks who raced across the bridge seizing the bridge. Harmel did not know of that three Tiger tanks that had crossed the Arnhem bridge running south, the German communications was disjointed. Harmel stated that there was little German armor between Nijmegen and Arnhem. That was not correct. The three powerful Tiger tanks would have made scrap metal out of the British Shermans. By the time the Guards tanks crossed Nijmegen bridge Johnny Frost and the British paratroopers at the Arnhem bridge were being overrun because of the long delay in seizing the Nijmegen bridge.
Only 4 tanks were available at the north end of the bridge to secure it. No tanks were available to run on any further to Arnhem and any that did would have been sitting ducks on the raised road. The Guards tanks were split up and spread out over 20 miles, supporting the 82nd all over the place around Nijmegen. Which was supposed to have already been taken by the 82nd. All over Nijmegen, Mook, Groosbeek, Grave etc. Some even had to go back down the road towards Eindhoven when Panzer Brigade 107 tried to cut the road.
Only five British tanks were able to cross the bridge that night, and two of them were damaged. 4 tanks initially went across then Carrington's lone tank followed, guarding the northern end of the bridge by itself for nearly an hour before he was relieved by infantry.
Nor did the 82nd take the southern end of the bridge in Nijmegen town. Lt Col Ben Vandervoort of the 82nd was in the southern approaches to the bridge, alongside the Grenadier Guards tanks as the Royal Engineers were removing charges on the bridge. Vandervoort and his men never went onto the bridge to take it. He remained at the southern approaches to the bridge with the rest of the 82nd and also the Grenadier Guards infantry, as Sgt Robinson and his four tanks raced on up the main road, up onto the bridge, and across it. Vandervoort was full of praise for the tankers of the Grenadier Guards. Here are his own words: "The 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was attached to the famed Guards Armoured Division on Tuesday 19th September. We were honoured to be a momentary part of their distinguished company....The clanking steel monsters were a comfort to the foot slogging paratroopers.....Morale was high....For soldiers of different Allied armies it was amazing how beautifully the tankers and troopers teamed together. It was testimony to their combat acumen as seasoned veterans, both Yanks and Tommies...The battalion had fought with tanks before, but never in such lavish quantities. The tanks were the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, the Grenadier Group as a whole being commanded by Lt Col Edward Goulburn....Col Goulburn, a perceptive commander, more or less turned individual tanks loose and let them go. The Guards tanks gave us all the tank support we needed. Some Shermans and their crews were lost as we went along. Usually it happened when the tank was employed too aggressively."
After 2 days fighting, split up, spread out and disjointed, the Guards Armored Division had to regroup, re-arm and re-fuel. It was simply not possible for them to have moved onto Arnhem that night. The task the five tanks that crossed the bridge were given was to defend the bridge and consolidate against enemy attacks. Moffat Burris of the 82nd is mistaken, there was not a 'whole corps' of tanks ready to go.
General Browning, of the 1st Airborne Army, who parachuted into Nijmegen and seeing the bridge untaken told General Gavin of the 82nd on the evening of 18th September that the Nijmegen bridge must be taken on the 19th, or at the latest, very early on the 20th. The Nijmegen bridge was not captured on the 17th because there was a foul up in communication between General Gavin and Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR of the 82nd Airborne. Gavin allegedly verbally told Lindquist during the pre-drop talk to take a battalion of the 508th and make a quick strike to the bridge on the 17th and to "move without delay" but Lindquist understood it that Gavin had told him that his 508th should only move for the bridge once his regiment had secured the assigned 508th's portion of the defensive perimeter for the 82nd Division. So Lindquist didn't move his battalion towards the Nijmegen bridge until after this had been done, and by that time it was too late.
This misunderstanding/miscommunication, which had disastrous ramifications for the overall Market Garden operation, has been the subject of much debate and controversy ever since.
This was passing the buck, in an attempt to shift blame due to the 82nd totally failing to take the Nijmegen road bridge, casting aspersions on the British tankers who's job it was to defend the bridge and prevent the Germans from taking it back. Had the 82nd done the job it was supposed to have done, the bridge would have been taken 3 days before and XXX Corps would have reached Arnhem and relived the beleaguered British paras.
Sources:
It Never Snows in September by Robert Kershaw.
The Battle For The Rhine by Robin Neilands.
Reflect on Things Past by Peter Carington.
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Magry (a Dutchman).
Poulussen (a Durchman), Lost at Nijmegen.
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@davemac1197
Absolutely...
With the Arnhem book, any negative for US forces is understandable, or only to be expected, or the fortunes of war, or, and, as in most cases with him, its all the fault of the British.
With him (A Briton), railway goods wagons become box cars, pigs become hogs, Mustang fighters become P-51s, Achillies tank destroyers becomes the M 10 Achilles, and so on, and so on. Doubtless the Autumn has the Fall.
He is utterly shameless in his pursuit of US book sales, and getting himself onto the US lecture circuit.
As far as I am concerned, he brings nothing new to the subject of Arnhem. He even half admits that in his acknowledgements. He cites the Cornelius Ryan archive, which any one can visit on-line, and the unused material acquired by the US author Rick Atkinson.
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@ninjakid6
'Big Woody That’s not an adequate reply to my point.'
You will not get one. On here, Big Woody also uses the name Clone Warrior. He (or she) is about 17 years old and lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Here is an example of his handiwork:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Market Garden:
There is no evidence of British political interference in the matter of MARKET GARDEN. It too small an undertaking to gain any notice outside of the senior military figures involved in the war in Europe.
Churchill and Alanbrooke were travelling to, attending, and travelling home from the OCTAGON conference in Quebec from before MARKET GARDEN was even proposed, through to the last days of the operation. VCIGS Nye signalled to Montgomery on the 9th September to ask what could be done to stop the Germans from launching V weapons at Britain from the western part of the Netherlands. No reasonable person could take a desire to protect British citizens from rocket attacks as political interference.
Montgomery was as entitled to his opinion on the outcome MARKET GARDEN as anybody else was, or is. He stated this:
'in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’S unrepentant advocate.’
The ex-SS man, and Nazi Party member, Prince Bernhard, was rightly shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s, in the wake the Lockheed scandal.
How would Antony Beevor know that Montgomery “never wanted to admit that he had been responsible for something going wrong?” I have not seen any evidence that Beevor and Montgomery ever met.
As far as I am concerned, given the situation that allies found themselves at that time, the decision to launch MARKET GARDEN was a quite reasonable one. The rocket attacks on Britain, justified the MARKET GARDEN undertaking, quite apart from the information that allied military saw in regard to available allied logistics, and the state of the German armed forces at that time.
There is no reliable evidence that ‘Montgomery refused to listen when Eisenhower's HQ expressed concern about German strength around Arnhem’, apart from what General Bedell Smith later claimed he said to Montgomery in a private meeting on the 12th September. This would seem to be a strange claim, seeing that Bedell Smith was sent to see Montgomery to offer more resources to ensure that MARKET GARDEN could be started on the 17th September. Also, given what seems to have been known to SHAEF at the that time:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
Stephen Ambrose, like Antony Beevor, had zero Second World War experience. Google him. He has been labelled a liar and a plagiarist.
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
Hamish Hamilton Ltd. 1946
P 214
Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine. In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
N.B. Tedder was one of Montgomery’s harshest critics.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
Any comparison between bad weather for MARKET GARDEN and the German attack in the Ardennes is spurious. Bad weather was a setback for airborne forces during MARKET GARDEN. Bad weather was an aid to the German advance in the Ardennes. Think it through next time.
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@randylucas2458
Ah so you have no evidence that 'Market Garden happened to shut Monty up because while Patton was shooting all over the place Monte was missing the limelight'
As for wastage of men, ammunition, fuel. Perhaps you should compare Market Garden (17,000 casualties) with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties), and so on, and so on...
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@johnlucas8479
That Brereton had the final say in airborne matters seems to have been accepted by a number of people:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It beggars belief that given what happened with Walcheren, and that Eisenhower almost always sided with his fellow American commanders, particularly after 1st September, 1944, that Brereton could not stopped MARKET if he so chose.
Montgomery words only covered matters appertaining to the l Airborne Corps, which Montgomery had been given the use of prior to MARKET GARDEN. His words:
'I had been allotted the First Allied Airborne Corps and on the 3rd September, the day we liberated Brussels., I had asked its commander (General Browning) to come and see me, so that we might discuss the general axis of the thrust towards the Rhine and the best areas in which to drop the
airborne divisions.'
It seems that Montgomey had been obliged to seek the help of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as the USAAF and RAF transport units for MARKET GARDEN, when he met Eisenhower on the 10th September. Even within the operation itself, it seems that l Airborne Corps forces only came under the command of British Second Army when they linked up with XXX Corps.
No doubt davemac will know the precise details of these matters.
No one on YouTube knows what would have been outcome if Montgomery said yes, and Brereton said no. The available evidence that I have seen seems to show that Brereton's view would have prevailed every time.
Slightly off topic...
Montgomery's words in his memoirs regarding his mistakes with Arnhem, and the Scheldt should contrasted with the lack any admission of fault in the contents of the memoirs written by Bradley, and Eisenhower.
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@johnlucas8479
Lets try again...
It would be good to see and read more about INFATUATE, and the rest of stuff about the Scheldt.
My Father was on INFATUATE, my Uncle also, if you count the naval bomardment. 97% of the YouTube stuff about the Netherlands in 1944 is about MARKET GARDEN.
But this not about INFATUATE itself, its about who had the final say on airborne operations at that time, with INFATUATE being good evidence as to who had that say.
This, from Brereton's 'wartime diary':
'ASCOT, 11 September 1944 (D-Pus-94). Everywhere the Germans are retreating. trying to reach the protection of the Siegfried Line and their prepared defenses. Our big problem Is supply. Our armies are consuming enormous quantities of ammunition. fuel, and food.
The First Army captured Liege three days ago and is at the Luxembourg-German border. The Third Army has reached the Moselle and made a junction with the Seventh Army coming up from the south. The British and Canadians in the north liberated Brussels and Antwerp a week ago and were close to the Dutch border. The stage is set to deal the enemy a knockout. Our airborne forces are available for a bold stroke in the enemy's rear. Ten operations are planned:
OPERATION COMET, desired by the Northern group of armies on the Rhine bridges from Arnhem to Wesel to facilitate an advance on the Ruhr from the north.
OPERATION INFATUATE, a landing on Walcheren Island to aid in opening the port of Antwerp by cutting off or harassing the German retreat across the Scheldt Estuary.
OPERATION NAPLES I, an operation behind the Siegfried 'Line to the east of Aachen.
Operation NAPLES II, a bridgehead over the Rhine in the vicinity of Cologne.
MILAN I, breaching the Siegfried Line at Trier.
MILAN ll, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Neuwied and Coblenz.
CHOKER I, to assist in breaching the Siegfried Line at Saarbrücken.
CHOKER II, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Maine and Mannheim.
Operation MARKET, to seize the vital bridges across the Maas, Waal, and Lower Rhine and establish a corridor through Holland and into Germany for the British Second Army.
OPERATION TALISMAN, in the event of German surrender to seize airfields in the Berlin area to facilitate the establish. spent of a SHAEF force there and the seizure of the German naval base at Kiel.
I refused Operation INFATUATE because of intense flak on Walcheren. difficult terrain which would prevent glider landings, excessive losses likely because of drowning, non-availability of U.S. troops, and the fact that the operation is an improper employment of airborne forces.'
His words.
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@nickdanger3802
The Germans retrieved a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in an US landing zone, within two hours of the start of the operation.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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Not really…
Montgomery showed his appreciation of logistics at almost every stage of his time of army / army group command: in his build up for Alamein, the chase across North Africa after Alamein, in his skilful handling of allied armies in Normandy and planning his masterclass at the Rhine.
Even at the time of Market Garden, his view of how war should be fought was clear. With both army groups getting 7,000 of supplies each per day, there was enough to continue the advance of 20 divisions. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in late August, Montgomery stated that the thrust in the north, envisaged before D-Day, would leave the allies able to surround the Ruhr and stop German war production. To do this meant stopping 1st Canadian Army and the 3rd US Army to let British 2nd Army and the 3rd US Army advance together. Montgomery went on to state that if Eisenhower was not prepared to do this, then Montgomery would offer to stop Canadian 1st Army and British 2nd Army so that US 1st Army and US 3rd Army could advance into Germany in the less important southern route, provided a decision was taken to properly use the available resources.
Eisenhower did neither, and the entire allied advance ground to a halt. All this after Montgomery had inflicted a defeat on the Germans in Normandy as big a Stalingrad and with the Germans having fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the Western Front than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space.
Stopping the whole of 21st Army Group to clear the Scheldt would have changed nothing. There was still 100 miles of estuary banks to clear, the Germans were still in strength in the Breskens Pocket and the heavy fortifications at the mouth of the Scheldt were still intact. Further, the mine clearance in November took three weeks, and it would also have taken three weeks in September.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan and cleared France in less than 90 days. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander with no plan and went nowhere in the following 90 days.
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@seth1422
1) Don’t give us that crap. I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands. It is at Vaals in Limburg – ‘Drielandenpunt’ – where the borders of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium meet. Even that is only a thousand feet.
The Groesbeek heights are about a third of the height of ‘Drielandenpunt’ and are six miles from the Nijmegen Bridge I have also been in at the Groesbeek heights, as was my farther, in his case in the Winter of 1944-45. Many years later we discussed the point about Groesbeek and its proximity (or lack of) to Nijmegen. The high ground north of Arnhem is as high as Groesbeek and is nearer to Arnhem Bridge. Yet 1st Airborne sent troops to Arnhem Bridge on the first day. Gavin did not do likewise in regard to Nijmegen.
2) Changes nothing. Gavin failed to act against Nijmegen Bridge on the first day.
3) The evidence shows that, as anyone would expect, senior officers met, but the last word on airborne matters was down the airborne commanders.
4) Nope. He wanted agreement. The last word was his – as can be judged by what actually happened, in drop zones and in the number of lifts on the first day.
5) But battle by battle Montgomery showed his way was superior.
‘Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
‘Montgomery was not my immediate Commander, but he always kept in such close touch with the battle that he knew when and where ‘the shoe pinched’. He then went down to see the Commander on the spot – in this case, me – and listened to what he had to say. He then made up his mind immediately. As he drove away I knew that he had probably already forgotten about Bremen and would already be considering the next problem.
That was what made him such a superb battle commander.’
Sir Brian Horrocks.
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled. He well understood the personal equation of the British soldier, and the morale of his remained high, in spite of frustrations and losses that could easily have shaken troops under a commander in whom they did not place their implicit trust.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
Notice how I quote people who were actually there. Unlike the prick Big Woody who quotes just about anyone who writes sonething likes and that he can find on Wikipedia.
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John Cornell
'Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ' Fondly quoted by Big Woody.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
His words.
Oh, and while I am about it, from the same source:
P419
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland. '
His words.
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@lufasumafalu5069
'and you are not there' Your words.
As you so rightly state, I am 'not there'.
'and never intetviewd vets from both sides.' Your words.
You are right there. I have spoken to two people who at Arnhem, both were of whom were British. Spoken to, not interviewed. I ain't met any Germans that were there.
You have intervied who, about this subject? As I thought, nobody.
Like me, you are reliant upon what other people have written about this subject.
Cornelius Ryan was in France at the time of MARKET GARDEN, but was not at Arnhem. Therefore, any opinions he expressed, if he did so, on the fighting at Arnhem are next to worthless. As far as passing judgement on fighting in Arnhem was concerned, you were either there, or or you were not.
Anyone can trot out the statistics, dates, contemporary documents etc. But all of that has long since been done.
'go home kid , try to read some history books instead of playing call of duty'
To be able to call me kid you would need to 70 years of age or older. Are you of that age?..
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'The drops began landing at ~12:30 that day.
It was not until ~15:30 nearly three hours later that Major Gough's men formed up and departed for Arnhem. Unfortunately, by this time, the Germans had established defensive positions that allowed them to repulse the Jeep mounted forces. The consequence being, nobody was getting to Arnhem, except on foot. This was a CRITICAL failure!'
But according this bloke Middlebrook, glider landings (LZ-S, and LZ-Z) took place between 13.00 and 13.40, and parachute landings (DZ-X) took place between 13.50 and 14.08.
That could truncate the time to unload Jeeps, for troops to muster and for the force to set off for Arnhem down to 52 minutes. If Middlebrook is correct, to layman such as me, it does not seem to be that unreasonable. But of course, I have not taken part in an airborne landing at brigade scale in wartime. Doubtless, Antony Beevor has such experience...
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@ToolTimeTabor
If Gough's squadron was to avoid the German Battalion Krafft, it seems it would have to have left the landing grounds at about 1.30pm. But the parachute troops (Among them, Gough's men?), did not start to land until 1.50pm.
As to why Gough's troops landed by parachute... Perhaps it was as Antony bloody Beevor's dubious claim that those troops landed by parachute as a matter of pride. Matin Middlebrook merely notes that those troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the airborne landings in Sicily.
Beevor did not put his claim into print until 2018.
Middlebrook's work was described by the Arnhem Fellowship as (And I quote):
'Probably the best general history ever of the battle. Written for the 50th anniversary and the author was able to speak with around 500 veterans.'
I know who’s version I would trust out of Beevor and Middlebrook. What say you?
Gough’s men were 35 minutes behind schedule for their departure to Arnhem Bridge. Before attempting to pass judgement on this delay, it would be good to see if information could be found regarding how the gliders carrying the jeeps landed. Based on eye witness testimony, there were problems with some of 1st Airborne glider landings. Colonel Graeme Warrack witnessed one such incident, albeit involving Hamilcar, rather than a Horsa. Middlebrook notes that two of Gough's gliders crash landed. Was time spent helping with these crashes, to free people in the gliders, and the glider cargoes? Perhaps a slightly heavy landing rather than a crash for a glider led to more time being needed to unload the glider. Who knows I don’t.
Was 50 minutes for mustering Gough’s too short a time frame? I have not been in such an undertaking, so I could not possibly know. Perhaps other people on here do know.
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@wintersking4290
But how big a failure was it?..
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at AACHEN (20,000 casualties), METZ (45,000 casualties), and the HURTGEN FOREST (55,000 casualties).
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@rob5944
'produce the post where I bad mouthed cancer suffers' Big Woody.
OK:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1dz3pqbRaw&lc=z22nynu4atrhwxlnjacdp4325nlpx1skqtxs4nq3whdw03c010c.1525899193752468&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
Big Woody 3 years ago (edited)
‘From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este
After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assesesed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily"said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt .Grudging admiration of Patton was even expressed by Adolf Hitler,who referred to him as "that crazy cowboy General"’
Big Woody 3 years ago
'Trevor Dupay numbers weren't close to the US Army archives - the guy had 5 wives and committed suicide,doesn't sound real solid unfortunately,
TheViila Aston 3 years ago
‘As for this bloke Dupuy, it seems that he actually served in the war and during his life was a professor at Harvard University. He wrote or co-wrote 50 books. Why would he make this sort of stuff up?
Regarding his suicide, this is what I found: ‘Dupuy committed suicide by gunshot at his home in Vienna, Virginia on June 5, 1995; he had learned three weeks earlier that he had terminal pancreatic cancer.’ Judge him how you will, I won’t.’
Big Woody 3 years ago
‘My mother in law died of pancreatic cancer and so did a co-worker,i probably should have sought their views on the subject then.'
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@Answer Questions
-Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched.
-The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
-The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden.
-The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place.
-The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place.
-Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden.
-The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower.
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@Answer Questions
'Monty did crap in the ardennes puhleeeze,What he won he won in NA with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.'
Montgomery's actions in the Ardennes drew this comment from Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Winning with 'overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support' applied to every single US vicory in Europe. Which ones do Americans want?
'Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.'
What a load of rubbish.
'he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.'
Who cares?
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@johnlucas8479
Great, that that will do very well. The final piece in the evidence chain in regard to the aims in regards to MARKET GARDEN. And to think...I already had the evidence. Clearly two pairds of eyes were better than one in this case.
An attempt to cut off communications between Germany and the Low Countries, and as a consequence, damage German attacks on Britain with V2 rockets did, in my opinion, entirely justify the MARKET GARDEN undertaking. Justify, because statistics in regard to the death an destruction those weapons caused, and the first hand accounts I have heard regarding their effect, some of them from members of my own family.
I note that the wording states 'dominate the country to the north as far as Zuider Zee'. That would lead to a question, which I am not going to dwell on, as to whether the allies being in control of the land as far North as say Deelen Airfield, would allow that domination, or whether the allies would have needed to reach the Zuider Zee, or some point between.
N.B. Of course, by 1944, the Dutch had renamed the Zuider Zee as the IJsselmeer, after the completion of the Afsluitdijk in 1932.
Pleased as punch I am.
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@jbjones1957
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
MARKET ground commanders made a request for two lifts on the first day. Those people were experienced soldiers, who were working with experienced soldiers. It beggars belief that those people would have made those requests if such a thing could not have been done. All that you have done is to state the sequence of events on the day. As best I can judge from what has been written is that the commander of the FAAA, USAAF General Brereton decided that the the airborne plan would prioritize the convenience of his air forces over the needs of the airborne soldiers. If the American, Brereton had put a two lift plan together, that was scuppered by the weather, then he was in the clear. As it was...
'Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality
Sunset:
Ritchie, Sebastian; (S2 page 201) “On 17 September sunset occurred at 18.11 p.m. and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 p.m.”'
Thanks. That will do nicely, when it comes to the Hollywood myth, so beloved by Americans, that XXX Corps sat around drinking tea immediately after Nijmegen Bridge had been captured, when they supposedly could have been pushing on to Arnhem straightaway.
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@johnlucas8479
‘On September 4th when this was 1st presented as an extension of COMETit was clear to all there at the meeting that the Scheldt was to be opened as part of the Operation.’ Para Dave / Big Woody.
What meeting on 4th September can Para Dave be on about?..
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton, met at Chartres, on the 2nd September.
Montgomery, Bradley, Hodges, and Dempsey met at Dempsey’s headquarters on 3rd September 1944. Eisenhower, the allied land forces commander did not attend. However, Eisenhower did find time to go to the Allied victory parade in Paris on the 8th September, and then on the 9th, visit Brest, and then Versailles.
Meanwhile…V2 rockets started landing on London on the 8th September. On the 9th September
the VCIGS, General Nye sent this message to Montgomery:
‘Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM.’
Montgomery and Eisenhower met in Brussels on the 10th September, their first meeting since Eisenhower had become allied land forces commander. At that meeting, Eisenhower authorised Montgomery to undertake MARKET GARDEN.
And the meeting on the 4th?...Anyone can chip in with evidence.
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@Keimzelle
'That's the most laughable argument ever.' Your words.
So what does Antony Beevor bring the subject, or any Second World War subjects that he writes about?..
He was not there, so there is no first hand experience. He was not even on the subject in time to eyeball the key people involved, that had been done by the likes of Chester Wilmot, Liddell Hart, and so on, even Cornelius Ryan. How many quotes that he uses are from his own interviews?.. All the key facts and contemporary documents that have a bearing on the story have been in the public domain for many decades.
I heard him spouting off about his Arnhem book in a YouTube item about how his book brings to light the sufferering of the Dutch people after Arnhem. Yea, new history that has only been known about since Operation Manna was all over newsreels in 1945. Brilliant, said no one.
Beevor got himself chucked out of Russia for trying to tell the Russians his version of Stalingrad. Pity we do not do the same thing in Britain. He will never get slung out of the USA, he writes the sort of shallow stuff they love. It gets him on to book carousel stands in shops in airport departure lounges, and onto the US lecture circuit.
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MIchael Basford
Who was were during MARKET GARDEN.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started. Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
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Michael Basford
Rick Atkinson:
Based on an email exchange I have had with Rick Atkinson, he is a nice enough person, but his work is in places either slapdash, or crafted in order to mislead.
Montgomery’s sittings for the second portrait of Montgomery by James Gunn seem to have ended on the 1st September, the last of 14 sittings on consecutive days. There is no record of any sittings after this time. Montgomery wrote to his son’s guardians the Reynolds, on the 10th September, stating: ‘The portrait is completely the cat's whiskers; it will without doubt be the great picture of the year at next year's Academy’. And again on 20th September to the Phyllis Reynolds: ‘The portrait is completely the cat's whiskers; it will without doubt be the great picture of the year at next year's Academy’. MARKET GARDEN took place 17th to 25th September 1944. Why don’t people check first?
Antony Beevor:
‘After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles.And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.’
There was in fact no material benefit for MARKET GARDEN that came out of promises made to Montgomery by Bedell Smith, on the 12th September. It was on the basis of those promises that MARKET GARDEN even went ahead. Antony Beevor claims that General Bedell-Smith and Strong stated their fears about German strength on the 12th September, presumably in the same meeting.
It would seem odd to have made offers of more resources in order to get things moving, and then to state that it would not work... if the words were spoken. I do not know either, but it seems to smack of the arse covering / re-writing of history so often undertaken by Americans.
Kenneth Strong stated that Bedell-Smith and Strong saw Montgomery about this matter on the 15th, not the 12th, but that Strong was not present in the meeting. Montgomery made no mention of such a meeting. Of course he would not have mentioned it, would be the obvious response. But neither did Eisenhower, Alanbrooke, Chester Wilmot, or one Sebastian Ritchie, in a recent work that seems to be relied on in YouTube comments.
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@laurencetilley9194
'Monty gained 60 miles. at Patton had gained 400 miles'
Get real. Montgomery took almost all of the German forces on the British 2nd front in Normandy,
so that Bradley could use his subordinate commanders, Hodges and Patton to break out.
As evidenced by Bradley:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
And when the time came for the break out and chase across, British 2nd Army were no slouches,
as evidenced by Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
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@BaronsHistoryTimes
-Montgomery was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands, Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England. Model was Oosterbeek when the landings started, but soon fucked off, as anyone else would have. Only an imbecile would try to claim that Student was an 'Air Born General' in September 1944.
-The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden.
-Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched.
-The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
-The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place.
-The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place.
-Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden.
-The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower.
-The SS officer Prince Bernhard, was shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s. Nobody is interested in his vile comments.
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@manosdelfuego1
Not really…
‘One battalion took the brunt of the casualties instead of multiple units within the division.’
Your words.
But the figurers do not really seem to bear this claim out:
1st Airborne fatalities were: First Parachute Brigade: 209, Fourth Parachute Brigade: 294, 1st Airlanding Brigade: 325, Divisional and attached units: 346.
‘The 1st Airborne pretty much ceased operations as a full unit after Arnhem while the 82nd was able to hold its ground until well into November.’ Your words.
They do not compare.
1st Airborne was at the wrong end of Brereton’s air plan, and was attacked in far greater numbers by SS Panzer forces than either of the US airborne divisions. US 82nd was relieved by XXX Corps, starting the 3rd day of the operation, XXX Corps never reached 1st Airborne. Further, British forces filled out the Nijmegen bridgehead and began transferring forces there, after the completion of the Scheldt campaign for the push into Germany to the Rhine.
Even 76 later, it seems to be hard for a layman (me) to make a case for any delay in an attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge. There was a delay, and look what happened. Here is one view, from a professional soldier:
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994.
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’
‘The overreach was on Monty, it was his plan and Browning, he failed to appreciate the situation tactically.’ Your words.
The head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton had the final say in all airborne operations at that time. Just prior to Market Garden he had vetoed a plan to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island in the Scheldt. Further, as far as Brereton having the final on Market planning is concerned, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘The plan would have been more sound and effective had the objective been Nijmegan. Once Nijmegan was secured it could've been used as a lynch pin to secure Arnhem and turn into the Ruhr.’
Your words.
So, what should Eisenhower and Montgomery have done to try to stem the V2 rocket attacks on Britain:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
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@nickdanger3802
'The broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II wiki'...
would have done well to have included this:
P512
'Montgomery had no opportunity of discussing the problem with Eisenhower until August 23rd when they met for the first time in a week. Montgomery then put the issue bluntly. " Administratively," he said, " we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
Hardly the words of someone who was 'wanting to beat Patten to Berlin'.
Meanwhile, what sort of tit head would post this on a thread about MARKET GARDEN:
'Almost daily in the Desert bernard wouldn't confront the DAK,letting them escape,not chancing a black eye after every one else propped him up,Air Corp/ULTRA/RN,the USA with massive influx of men.artillery/armor/food/fuel'
Firstly, no sensible commander would have risked the fruits of the victory at Alamein during a 1,400 mile plus advance across the desert by taking chances against an enemy that, when the odds were even, proved itself to be better than the British army, and much better than the Red Army, and much better than the US army, when it eventually joined in the fight.
Secondly, as far as the war in the desert was concerned, the US provided almost zero fuel (that came from the Persian Gulf), almost zero food, because the modest amount of US suplies went to the civillian population, and all the military were already well provided with food throught the SIX year conflict. The only US artillery there were 90 'Priest self propelled howitzers, which were converted to use the British 25 pounder gun asap. The US Stuart and Lee/Grant tanks were mainly bought and paid for. The Shermans were an improvement on what went before, but not much, and they seem not have been liked by the crews. In any case, the key weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun: the German 88, and the British 6 and 17 pounder weapons. Anyone care to state what US troops took part in the desert campaign?...
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Harry Sung
'Then British badly needed a hero for propaganda purposes.'
No they did not. The whole thrust of British 'Propaganda' was to emphasise the collective effort and the role of ordinary people in the war effort, rather than generals, admirals and politicians.
Example: The First official history of the Battle of Britain published in 1943 did not even mention Dowding, the head of Fighter Command.
Example: The films being shown in cinemas: 'Went The Day Well', 'The Foreman Went To France', 'The Way Ahead', 'Millions Like Us' , and so on, and so on.
Example: Government posters wording: 'We' 'Us', 'Together' etc, etc.
Example: The BBC: Workers Playtime', 'Music While You Work', JB Priestly, and so on, and so on.
'His Market-garden plan is his figment of imagination, totally useless and impractical, arrogant and stupid.'
The government was demanding action against V2 rocket attacks on London from the Netherlands was not 'impractical, arrogant and stupid.'
Get something right next time.
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Blame?
Montgomery had no final say on the MARKET airborne forces and plan.
The operation was launched on a weather forecast of four clear days.
The Germans captured a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan from a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US combat zone.
Where is the blame in all that?
By September 1944, Eisenhower was both supreme commander and allied land forces commander. does he only get to be ultimately responsible for the best bits.
Tragic failure?..
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
The Chamberlain government ended its policy of appeasement in March 1939, when Hitler broke the Munich agreement of September1938, by occupying the whole of Czechoslovakia, leading to Britain and France giving a undertaking to Poland go to war if Poland was attacked by Germany. Britain and France declared war on Germany on the 3rd September 1939, two days after Germany had attacked Poland. Winston Churchill took up the post of Prime Minister on the 10th May 1940. The period 1938 to the Summer of 1940 saw Britain create the then most formidable air defence system in the world. It worked. That, along with the then world’s largest Navy and Merchant Marine, the fortitude of the British people, and Winston Churchill’s leadership ensured that we are not ‘speaking German today’.
‘I have to believe that having already breeched the Atlantic wall at Normandy at great cost, the allies would have been better served by applying what they'd learned and strategically attacking the Siegfried Line at key locations head on than by "going around their butt to get to their elbow"’. Your words.
In that case you are in agreement with Montgomery, who went into Normandy with a clear plan: hold on the left (British 2nd Army), break-out on the right (US First Army). Charged with getting the allies to the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78, and with 22% fewer than expected casualties. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander on 1st September 1944 with no plan, and the allies went nowhere.
‘the 101st and the 82nd bore the brunt of Market Garden's casualties’
Airborne forces casualties
1st Polish Parachute Brigade 378
US 82nd Airborne Divison 1,430
Us 101st Airborne Division 2,118
British 1st Airborne 6,462
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‘Maybe the American commander did make a wrong (and crucial decision) but the British were habitually obsequious when dealing with the Americans and also myopic to the point of total blindness by any fault on thier own part.’
There no sense in that. If the British were ‘habitually obsequious when dealing with the Americans’ then surely they would not have not found any fault with the actions of the US forces. And if the British are ‘myopic to the point of total blindness by any fault on thier own part', why is there a succession of documentaries about the likes of Market Garden on YouTube, most of them British.
This was evident by their refusal to learn from tactics or weapons used successfully against them.
How was it evident? As Britain created a much larger modern army between 1940 and 1942/3 many of the lessons from earlier in the war were applied, particularly the concentration of firepower, as at Alamein and in Normandy. As far as the management of the war was concerned, Britain with its marked emphasis on air and sea power judged matters far better than Germany, which had started wars with Britain, Russia and the USA without acquiring the means to defeat them.
‘The poles were the obvious choice as scapegoats.’
Not really, they were criticised for their performance at Market Garden not for iits sccess or failure. And their argumentative sod of a leader Sosabowski, had refused to integrate his airborne force with the rest of the allied forces.
‘Of course I may be biased.’
Yes you are, and you are uninformed.
As a kiwi living in England in the early 2000s when a memorial to NZ losses in WW2 was finally erected, a question I was often asked by English colleagues. "Was NZ in the war?"
Often asked? I doubt it. In any case, Anzac day has been commemorated in Britain since 1916.
"Lest we forget" is clearly not a part of thier culture.
Nor in other countries, about 90% of Americans do not know that anyone else fought the Nazis, including New Zealand.
‘Claiming credit for the achievements of others and blaming failure upon thier allies was also habitual even when dealing with Commonwealth troops;’
Like when?
‘Whatever else, the defence was a brilliant example of German improvisation (a supposed weakness) and the battle an example of almost unbelievable courage by all the allied airborne troops. Great docco.’
What supposed weakness?
I will point out that this Big Woody, who has previously used the YouTube name ‘Para Dave’ is a 16 year old from Cleveland, Ohio, USA who suffers from acute Anglophobia, calls all and sundry Britons cowards and claims that the USA saved Australia and New Zealand from invasion by Japan.
Btw. Its their, not thier
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@GiacomoLockhart
Err... no, Montgomery never acquired the the title of Supreme Commander. At all times Montgomery was accountable to Eisenhower. More so at the time of Market Garden than previously. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander throughout the campaign in Europe, and from 1st September 1944 had taken over from Montgomery as Allied Land Forces Commander. If the Max Hastings book does not mention that fact then you should ask that author for your money back.
Eisenhower's broad front strategy, enacted when he took over as Allied Land Forces Commander from 1st September 1944, took the allies nowhere in three months and cost 20,000 casualties at Aachen, 45,000 casulaties at Metz and 55,000 - and led to the Battle of the Bulge. Also during that period Market Garden cost 17,000 casualties and took the allies to the top end of he Siegfried Line.
Montgomery's tenure as Allied Land Forces Commander from D-Day (that was the 6th June 1944 btw) to 31st August 1944 and cleared the whole of France, and inflicted a bigger defeat on Germany than Stalingrad.
Perhaps I should start reading books about Market Garden, doubtless I have been sidetracked by the works of Alanbrooke, Churchill, DeGuingand, Eisenhower, John Frost, John Hackett, Leo Heaps, Lipmann Kessel, Martin Middlebrook, Cornelius Ryan, Graeme Warrack, Chester Wilmot and Roy Urquhart.
If you are lucky (or perhaps unlucky in your case) John Cornell will tell you about allies intelligence and those German troops at Arnhem.
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@GiacomoLockhart
Your wors in 'single quotes':
‘Montgomery was in charge of Op Market Garden. He was supreme commander - small "s" and "c". Fact.’
Anybody, but anybody, care to try to tell me where Montgomery was described as supreme commander or Supreme Commander in any situation in 1944-45?
‘Monty's failure meant that Ike's broad front strategy was then adopted’
Get real. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy was in place before Market Garden was even devised. One of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton had already resumed his offensive towards the Saar and another of his subordinate commanders, Hodges was moving towards Aachen.
That was the point of Market Garden, It left he broad front strategy intact. The only new forces involved were airborne divisions from the First Allied Airborne Army. The only additional suppliers were 500 tons per day (enough for one division) for a limited period before the onset of Market Garden.
‘everyone (except Monty) knew that Market Garden had been a failure.’
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P419
It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
'Since Ike's strategy lasted until the end of the war - and not merely the 9 days that Market Garden did - there can be no comparison of casualty figures. You fatuously compare a few days with the remaining 9 months of war. That is just plain dumb.’
Get real, I have left out loads: the Bulge, Operation Queen and so on and so on.
‘The Battle of Aachen, which lasted 2 weeks and 9 days, resulted in 2,000 US dead and c.5,000 casualties, totalling 7,000, not 20,000, and, once again, was due to stiff German resistance, not Ike's broad front strategy.’
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign p. 185
Chapter 10. Aachen and the River Roer
P.224
‘The recent battering at Aachen had had occupied the first Army for a full month and cost 20,000 casualties and yet at no point had Hodges got more than twelve miles into Germany.’
N.B. Best you look further than Wikipedia next time.
‘that cannot be laid at the door of Ike's broad front strategy’
Get real.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1959
CHAPTER 10. HITLER’S LAST THROW
P 340
November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.
At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.
As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.
P 341
‘The offensive which Eisenhower had ordered in October, which Patton had anticipated by his attacks south of the Ardennes and which Bradley, after waiting a fortnight for the weather to clear, had launched on a far too wide front in mid-November was now petering out. Except for the capture of the Metz forts, it had achieved nothing; neither the drive on the Saar nor the drive on Cologne got the Americans anywhere or even engaged the German reserves.’….more to add
As Montgomery had warned Eisenhower when he refused to concentrate, the Western Allies were now in a “strategic straight-jacket”. They were bogged down and reduced to the trench warfare it had always been their objective to avoid.
‘For D-Day, Montgomery was made C-in-C 21st Army Group (that was the name of his command btw), not Supreme Commander. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander (capital "S" and "C") from December 1943.’
Thanks for letting me know about Montgomery’s title. My father mentioned it once when he told me about his army briefings before he set out for D-Day. But I thought na, that can’t be right. Thanks for putting me straight.
Btw. You failed to mention, or did not know that Montgomery was also allied land forces commander.
‘Finally, I note that you do not challenge the fact that Hastings was highly critical of Monty's plan. In fact, he said of it that it was a "rotten plan".’
Who cares? Hastings was nowhere near the events those events. He was not even born until after the war had ended. He was a journalist in Vietnam and later in the Falklands War. That was it.
It seems to get a bit better with this Robert Kershaw, he has at least had some military experience, but he is still far too young to have been in the war. As for Anthony Beevor, like the other two he is too young to have been involved in the war, he as in and out of the army in less than four years. He writes history to level of works seen in book racks in shops in airport departure lounges – American airport departure lounges. I have seen him spouting his nonsense in YouTube clips, its like dung dolloping out of a cow’s backside.
All three of them are being wise after the event.
Here is Martin Middlebrook, another post war historian, on Arnhem:
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
CHAPTER 21
The Reckoning
P441
Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.
Your contribution: 1/10 for effort.
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@GiacomoLockhart
'not Alanbrooke, Churchill, De Guingand, Eisenhower or Chester Wilmot'
Yea, right ho, or wrong in your case.
Alanbrooke offered no opinion on Market Garden itself merely confining himself to a diary entry after that operation, noting his opinion to the effect that Montgomery should prioritized the Scheldt over Market Garden.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Winston Churchill's opinion on Market Garden was:
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
De Guingand's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Eisenhower's opinion on Market Garden was:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Wilmot's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this. And in this case of course, your father did not meet him.
Not a mention of Montgomery's ego hear, or of him being supreme commander hear. Its a pity we cannot here what you have to say, we could do with a laugh. Doubtless your family have to here your drivel.
You are a cretin, James Bogle. Whether you were in the British or not is of no consequence as you nothing about the events in question here. However, if you were in the army, that fact would only lend credence to American criticism's of the army in YouTube comments.
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
'Churchill could use this accusations to put more pressure on Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk to cooperate with Stalin, because it could be argued that one of his most valuable assets, Sosabowski's elite brigade, was no longer useful to the Allied war effort.' Your words
Do you actually think that there was ever any realistic chance that the the Polish Airborne
Brigade was was going any sort asset in dealing with Stalin? That the Brittish, and the Americans - who would have to provide transport, could have conveyed a brigade of troops across German held territory to Warsaw is absurd.
'But that wasn't the only lousy behavior from our unfaithful "allies". When you have allies like that, you really don't need enemies! Churchill was just as dishonest and mendacious as Montgomery and the traitor Chamberlain who betrayed Poland in 1939. Polish soldiers should never have fought alongside this treacherous army!'
Yea, so unfaithful that they went to war on behalf of Poland in 1939, they housed, fed, clothed many thousands of Poles to the tune of about £200 million in 1940s money, and then those Poles were allowed to settle in Britain under the terms of the The Polish Resettlement Act 1947.
If Britain is so obnoxious to Poles, then perhaps the million Poles that migrated to Britain in the 2000s should fcuk off home, so thatwe can all can understand what care workers say, and people can queue at bus stops again.
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Bullet-Tooth Tony
Who mentioned Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and France, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete,Hong Kong, Libya, Tobruk, Dieppe, Singapore?..
Not me, not you. Why would we, in a comments section about Market Garden?
Why would any sane person?
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'Montgomery’s failure at Arnhem was his second time. The first time was at Caen during the Normandy campaign, the place where was supposed to be taken over on D+1, but actually happened on D+31. This is why after Operation Market Garden, we did not hear much from Montgomery any more, who basically retired, or was forced to retire ever since.' Your words.
The only undertaking that Montgomery gave about Normandy was to be at the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78. After Market Garden, Montgomery cleared the Scheldt (The only allied victory in the Autumn of 1944, sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine, and then saved Denmark from being occupied by the Russians.
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@nickdanger3802
Its a definate no.
whilst Britain was buying large amounts of 100 octane from the US, that wasn't the only source of supply. They were also importing it from Abadan in Iran, Trinidad, Curacao and Aruba in the Caribbean and producing it in 2 British refineries, Billingham and Stanlow.
Government records show that in August 1940, planned and actual imports between May 1940 and April 1941 would amount to 27.8 million tons of oil, of which 6.3 million tons would come from the US.
1,324,000 tons of this would be aviation fuel, of which 205,900 tons, 16% of the total, would come from the US.
Britain later cut back on imports from the Middle East in favour of increased imports from the US, because the sea route was shorter, but the RAF was not dependent on US fuel for the BoB.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain in the English Historical Review.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain -- Bailey CXXIII (501): 394 -- The English Historical Review.
Abstract
Aviation historians have advanced the supply of 100-octane aviation fuel as a critical and recognisably American contribution to the Battle of Britain during the critical events of 1940. A study of the contemporary Air Ministry records in the Public Record Office indicates that this assertion can be challenged. This challenge can be made both on the grounds of the aircraft performance benefit involved, as indicated by contemporary RAF testing, and on the national origin attributed to 100-octane fuel supplies. These records demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of aviation history, the supply of 100-octane fuel to the RAF in time for use in the Battle of Britain must be attributed to pre-war British planning and investment during the rearmament period of the late nineteen- thirties.
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
Overture: 1932-40
P13
‘There were some instances where one could sense a firm’s long-term selfish interest at work, and on the other hand there were some remarkable examples of unselfish collaboration between rivals. I think, perhaps, that the most remarkable of these was the collaboration between I.C.I. and Shell and Trinidad oil companies in designing and setting up a 100-octane petrol plant in Heysham.’
100 octane fuel only increased performance below about 15,000 ft, and most of the fighting was at that level or above. By far the bigger improvement was the switch to constant speed propellers for Fighter Command aircraft, that began to happen in July 1940.
100 Octane fuel had actually been developed by the French before the war and Britain had used it in Schneider Trophy competitions before the war.
N.B. Never, ever, ever let me see you trying to invent a US angle on the Battle of Britain again. 2,936 Fighter Command pilots took part in the battle, eleven (yes, that's 11) were American. Happy to acknowledge those eleven, one of whom was killed, none of whom had a confirmed 'kill', none of whom were Ben Affleck..But that's it.
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@moonshinerman
Its still a definite no.
There is not a shred of evidence that Montgomery considered Patton to be a rival of him. Why would he? Patton was junior to Bradley, was in another army, and was at the other end of the Front. However, at one point, Montgomery asked Patton to be moved North, to command US forces next to his armies.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
'Monty did not think highly of either Hodges or Simpson, the First and Ninth US Army Commanders. If only Bradley would transfer Patton to the Ardennes or preferably to Ninth US Army's sector, then Monty was sure all would be well—F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December. 'He [Monty] said that he always intended that General Patton should come North as part of General Bradley's command'
Hardly the act of someone who considered Patton to be a rival was it?..
The intro to A Bridge Too Far is nonsense. It also claims that Hitlers was still winning the war in 1944.
As for Messina...
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact, he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
Your best bet is to stop relying on chauvinistic Hollywood films for your history.
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@georgesenda1952
When Eisenhower eventually ventured out to meet Montgomery, he went to the meeting by armoured train.
As relatd by General Simpson:
'Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.'³ Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures. '
The author Nigel Hamilton stated of Montgomery:
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained.⁴ Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently.⁵ Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized. Bradley's and Eisenhower's caution in view of the rumour of enemy assassination teams struck Monty as excessive'
³ General Sir Frank Simpson, Wason interview, loc. cit.
⁴ Lt-Colonel 'Kit' Dawnay, interview of 24.8.78.
⁵ Lt-Colonel Trumbull Warren, interview of 9.11.81.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had fought in the frontline during the First World War, being wounded twice,and being awarded the DSO.
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@georgesenda1952
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans have had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
Field Marshall Alanbrooke.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
'GIs actually contained Bernard in a barn when he had his driver try to run a road block in the Ardennes'
Para Dave (aka bigwoody)
The story about Montgomery being detained by US soldiers is utter rubbish. No credible histories of the Battle of the Bulge include this story. Only a gullible idiot would believe that story.
Montgomery's activities in his visit to the First Army HQ are well known.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 448
‘At 12.52 p.m., a SCHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshall Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Twelfth Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army.
P449
‘Having been alerted to the impending command change at 2:30 Wednesday morning, he dispatched a major to Chaudfontaine for a “bedside conference” with Hodges who was roused from his sleep to learn that four British divisions were moving towards the Meuse to secure he riverbanks and bridges. Roadblocks also had been built on the Brussels highway with vehicles and carts.
‘The field marshal himself arrived at Chaudfontaine at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday in a green Rolls-Royce flying a Union Jack and five-star pennant from the front fenders, accompanied by outrider jeeps with red-capped MPS. As usual he was dressed without orthodoxy in fur-lined boots, baggy corduroy trousers and as many as eight pullovers. “Unwrapping the bearskin in which he was enveloped,” Iris Carpenter reported, “he picked up his box of Sandwiches, his thermos jug of tea and his situation map chalked over with his grease pencil, and marched inside.’
‘Politely declining Hodges’s offer of lunch—“Oh, no, I’ve got my own” — he propped his map on a chair and said calmly “ Now let’s review this situation…The first thing we must do is to tidy up the battlefield.”’
‘Three hours later they had both a plan and an understanding. Hodges and his staff appeared tired and dispirited, British officers later reported, but determined to hold fast.’
The only source for the false story that Montgomery was detained by US troops is 'Killing Patton' by some hack authors called Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard.
Montgomery's only visit to the Bulge battle area is well documented . He travelled from his headquarters in Zonhoven in Belgium to Hodges's headquarters at Chaudfontaine in Belgium on the 20th December 1944. A distance of approximately 45 miles. He arrived at Hodges's headquarters at 1pm, stayed for three hours and then returned to Zonhoven and there exchanged cable messages with Eisenhower.
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@Jerry-sw8cz
Not really…
Montgomery with four divisions, defeated Rommel who had four divisions at Alam-el-Halfa.
Montgomery re-invigorated and re-organized Eighth Army to make it fit for battle, as evidenced by eye witnesses:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P464
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
With the Qattara Depression on the left, the sea on the right, the only way was to attack the German through the German minefield. The battle was won with just 13,500 casualties and the victory at Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest.
Any questions?..
‘If not my country already occupied and it's population would be completely cleansed from the surface of this planet. Western allies namely Britain and France have 95% responcebility for WW2 and my country still is yet to receive war reparations. Regardless of your opinion on the subject.’
Your words.
Responsibility for the Second World War rests with Germany. Germany attacked other countries. France and Britain could have easily stayed out of the war in 1939. But no, they went to war on behalf of Poland. What is your country, and what reparations are they due?
Now can you please stop deflecting from Market Garden? I would certainly appreciated that. Or may be you actually have nothing to add to that complete utter failure Market Garden was and that is why you try to catch me on my words and constantly deflect to el Alamein.
‘Now can you please stop deflecting from Market Garden? I would certainly appreciated that. Or may be you actually have nothing to add to that complete utter failure Market Garden was and that is why you try to catch me on my words and constantly deflect to el Alamein.’
Your words.
You are the one that brought up Alamein. As for Market Garden…
It liberated up to 20% of the Dutch population, hindered German attempts to launch V Weapons at Britain, stretched meagre German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well-paced to strike into the Rhineland. The 17,000 casualties incurred should be compared to outright allied failures in the same period at : Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@johnlucas8479
Nope.
The evidence is clear, Arnhem was added to Market Garden because of the
V2 attacks on London.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
Comet weas cancelled due to stiffening German resistance. Market Garden was a beefed up version of Comet intended to overcome stiffer German resistance. The V2 rocket campaign against London put Arnhem as in the new plan. Otherwise, Market Garden would have taken a diferent direction to Comet.
As far as what order the Channel and North Sea Sea ports were attacked, the final decision must have been Eisenhower's, if he chose to exercise his authority, as land forces commander from 1st September 1944 onwards.
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@therealkillerb7643
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
'Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.
Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.
Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north.
Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.
Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history.
Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be.
He discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.'
www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/4/
Patton: The German View
'Patton, for his part, fully intended to make an unrelenting push to the Rhine after Normandy. He succeeded for a short time, brazenly gambling that the speed of his advance and Allied air superiority would keep the Germans too off balance to attack his unprotected flank. But Third Army’s advance was soon slowed by gasoline and ammunition shortages as Third Army reached the bank of the Moselle River, giving the Germans time to organize their defenses. Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause, and Third Army established a bridgehead across the Moselle on September 29—before halting again to wait for supplies. The fortress city of Metz did not fall until December 13, holding up Third Army long enough for the Germans to make an organized withdrawal behind the Saar River, setting the stage for the Battle of the Bulge.
The Germans, unaware of the Allies’ supply issues, credited their counterattacks throughout the withdrawal for Third Army’s seemingly hesitant advance. Lieutenant General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans and the French, [and that our] troops…have fought beyond praise.” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’
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@johnburns4017
I wonder where it all comes from with Para Dave and his hatred of Montgomery?..
Montgomery was dead over 20 years before he was born. I never seen any evidence that Montgomery ever visited Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Eisenhower made a muck in Tunisia, the invasion of Italy, and North West Europe after August 1944.
Bradley messed up in Normandy, the Hurtgen Forest, the Ardennes, the Ruhr. Devers did little. Below them, Hodges went to pieces in the Ardennes, Patton said a lot, did little, and so on, and so on.
That lot should be occupying his time, not a commander in a different army, from a different country.
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@johnburns4017
‘This from an Australian poster
Patton beat Monty to Messina going around the whole island. He also broke out of Normandy at operation cobra. Those 15 miles at bastogne was also made while pivoting in the middle of an attack on the Siegfried line. Listen, Monty was an infantry commander. He was not skilled in maneuver warfare. Patton was a calvary man and knew how to push and exploit breakthroughs. Monty got jealous, put together a stupid plan for his ego and got good men killed. Add on top of that what would have happened if Monty did cross the Rhine (the slaughter of xxx corp) and you should realize how horrible of a commander Monty truly was. Alexander was way better and he at least knew his role as a subordinate to the Americans.’ Via Para Dave.
AH!!!!!!!!!!!! That’s a hammer blow…How can anyone ever recover from that?...Still, lets have a go:
Sicily…
Patton absconded from the battlefield, and had to be lured back to the fight with the promise of being first into Messina. He got there having faced almost zero opposition, and finding time to assault Sicilian peasants, and couple of his own soldiers.
Operation Cobra…
Started and finished before Patton was even in the battle in France.
Jealousy of Patton…
This Australian seemed to have known what was in Montgomery’s mind. Perhaps he met Montgomery who then confided in him. I have no such experience, having to base any view on the relationship between the two, on the common place observation that Montgomery was in a different army, has higher in command after Sicily, and was in a different part of the front after Patton eventually joined fighting in North West Europe. Still, its not all bad…Montgomery actually requested that Patton take over a part of the allied from line from Hodges. But of course, that request would have gone through Patton’s superior officer, Bradley.
XXX Corps across the Rhine…
Given the limited ambitions of MARKET GARDEN, and the state of German forces at that time, it would seem hard to see how the Germans could have put in a stint that would have led to ‘the slaughter of xxx corp’. They were unable to do such a thing in the months after MARKET GARDEN.
Alexander
Like Montgomery, and unlike Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers, Alexander had personal combat experience, like Montgomery, he was awarded the DSO in the First World war. Like Montgomery, Alexander had performed with distinction in very difficult circumstances in France in 1940, in a situation that was none of their making. Like Montgomery, Alexander had to cope with American commander’s self-centred behaviour in Sicily (Patton), and in Italy (Clark) – when the American commander left British and American troops in the lurch to seek personal glory in Rome - horrible.
...This was easier than swatting flies.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Big Woody has also used the name Para Dave on here. He is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
As Big Woody he has called Carrington a coward, XXX Corps cowards, Montgomery every name under the Sun, he has disparaged the US author Dupay because he caught cancer.
Even on here:
'Winston was too bi-polar,half genius half mad.'
'So he brings in Monty who plies him with brandy' Not a shred of evidence.
'Bill Slim', 'Richard O'Connor', they only get mentioned by him in an attempt to deflect attention away from his childish obsession with Montgomery, which he has no doubt picked up from chauvinistic Hollywood films and the works hack US historians ,and the likes of Antony Beever, who like most of his sources were nowhere the war.
'Cpl Gadway or USMarineRifleman0311' Yes, I remember them / him. I did not know he / they had been outed as imposter(s).
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@billybuzzard4843
A reasonable question.
This might be an answer...
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summaries were seen by Senior allied commanders, including Bradley, Brereton, Devers, and Montgomery.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
Montgomery then devised operation COMET to take bridges at various bridges in a line up to, and including Arnhem, with British 1st Airborne, and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade.
In the face of reports of stiffening German resistance, and in answer to an urgent war office request to know what could be done to stem V2 rocket attacks on London, Montgomery cancelled COMET, and on the 10th September got Eisenhower's approval to MARKET GARDEN,
which added two more airborne divisions to the same plan as COMET. D-Day for MARKET GARDEN was set for the 17th September.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The aerial recce photos for MARKET GARDEN can be seen on line an comprise a series of high level, overhead aerial shots.
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@warspite1807
'No, Student was not delivered plans for the entire operation.It was a one page SUMMARY for the 17th Airborne Corps if the memory serves me well, and delivered not on the first day, but the second. By that time all German forces were already tactically engaged or heading for objectives so this didn't make any difference.'
Your words.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@warspite1807
‘The plan was not to go to the coast...that was 'promoted' later by some people in British command, and it takes some thinking to realise why The bridges at Arnhem do cross the Rhine, but the roads north lead nowhere important from military strategy point of view The 52nd Lowland was supposed to be in the first day lift!’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Arnhem was confirmed as being in the MARKET GARDEN plan because of the urgent request from London for Montgomery’s forces to do something to stop V2 rocket attacks on London. Stiking out to the IJsselmeer would stop V2 rockets from reaching their lauchins areas in the Western provinces of the Netherlands.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course [an advance towards the Rhine at Wessel]. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
‘on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.¹
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back:
Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want.
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@warspite1807
For MARKET GARDEN, XXX Corps comprised one armoured division, two infantry divisions, and one armoured brigade. The wooded highlands you refer to were of little consequence. The highest point is only a few hundred feet above sea level, and it is in an area used by the Dutch Army, and by the German Army in 1944 to rest armoured formations. It was of little consequence beyond the plan to capture Deelen airfield. From Arnhem, allied forces would have struck out North West to the Ijsselmeer, and, or East towards Germany.
Based on the available evidence, what you have claimed is a load of rubbish.
First Airborne’s build up plan was clear, Day 1, First Airlanding Brigade to secure the landing ground grounds, First Parachute Brigade to capture the Rhine Bridges. Day 2, Fourth Parachute Brigade to take the higher ground to the north of Arnhem . Day 3, The 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade to land to the South of the main Arnhem Bridge. Day 5, by which time, it was expected that 1st Airborne would have linked up with XXX Corps, the 52nd Lowland Division would be flown in, if Deelen Airfield was in allied hands.
There is no myth surrounding the 52nd Lowland Division. It was never formally part of the FAAA army, and it ended up performing a number of roles after MARKET GARDEN. My own father saw it in INFATUATE in late October of the same year. It was never going to be flown into Deelen Airfield until XXX Corps had linked up with 1st Airborne. Its intended role in MARKET GARDEN ended up being a footnote in that story.
Far from marching to the sound of guns, Hackett was ordered, against his original orders, to detach part of his force to support the advance to the Arnhem Bridges by the acting divisional commander Hicks.
As far as MARKET GARDEN objectives were concerned, the evidence is clear, go give the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter months set in.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
It was also, by including Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN plan, Montgomery’s answer to the need to curtail German V2 rocket attacks on London by stemming the supply of those rockets from Germany to the western provinces of the Netherlands.
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@Johnny Carroll
'The split was predetermined by the loading plan, the weight restrictions of the Horsa gliders and the space inside to allocate equipment with personnel. The Recce Squadron had 22 Horsa and 8 C-47s allocated to them for 181 men and 27 armed jeeps plus trailers and supplies. They needed more gliders. You’re timings are also optimistic, when in reality and on the ground the timings was much longer.'
Your words.
According to one Martin Middlebrook, this recce squadron comprised of three troops, each of eight jeeps, with two troops to be sent to Arnhem Bridge, along with an additional four jeeps carrying troops who were designated to remove German explosives from the Bridge. These four jeeps and their troops did not arrive. Also, that the recce squadron jeep drivers travelled by glider with their jeeps.
‘According to Beevor's research, Major Gough and his men were paratroopers and they did not take kindly to riding into battle in gliders.’ Tool Time Tabor.
This bloke Middlebrook notes that these troops were trained as paratroopers after the airborne operations in Sicily, and he makes no comment on their attitude to travelling by glider.
What does this bloke Beevor bring to the subject?.. His 'Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges' was published 74 years after the event. Just about everyone involved has had their say, and are now dead. Most of the key documents have been long since published, other authors seem to have carried out more thorough research.
‘CPT Graebner crossed the Arnhem bridge sometime between 18:00 and 20:00 when Frost's men arrived to secure the north end of the bridge. It was these forces under Graebner that proved instrumental in defending the delayed attack on the Nijmegen bridges later that evening by the 82nd Airborne. So, it is not unreasonable to suggest that had Major Gough's men moved off the drop zones in the first 30-60 minutes that they might have advanced before German defenses setup and secured the bridge before Graebner's men crossed it heading south towards Nijmegen.’
Tool Time Tabor.
But those 16 Jeeps, assuming they all reached Arnhem Bridge, were supposed to be able to stop that German Battalion? Also, later in the evening, after 20.00 would mean an attack to capture Nijmegen bridge in the dark. Did this happen?
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@Johnny Carroll
'Can you explain what was Montgomery doing isolated in his caravan from 10th September to the 24th September?'
Your words.
Who can say? Not me. I have not seen a day-by-day account of his activities.
On the 11th September he was sending a signal to Eisenhower regarding more resources for MARKET GARDEN. On the 12th, he was conferring with US General Walter Bedell Smith about additional resources and support for MARKET GARDEN, most of which, it seems, did not materialise.
On the 15th, he was seeing the MARKET plan for the first time, I think, according to one Sebastian Ritchie. According to Bedell Smith, and Major-General Kenneth Strong, on the same day, Smith was trying persuade Montgomery to alter the MARKET GARDEN plan. At one point, he was moving his advanced headquarters from Everburg to Zonhoven. General Simpson arrived on the 22nd and attended a conference at Versailles on his behalf. Perhaps, at other times Montgomery was attending to other MARKET GARDEN matters, and also to operations at the Channel Ports and the preparations for clearing of the Scheldt.
A member of Montgomery’s staff, Brigadier Richardson, was cut off for 36 hours during a visit to the front at Nijmegen on Montgomery’s behalf. Dempsey’s Chief of Staff was in an aircraft that was shot down. Dempsey advised Montgomery not to visit the front. Were you were trying to imply that Montgomery should have been up there on Nijmegen Bridge alongside Carrnigton and the others?..
Montgomery’s papers are stored at the Imperial War Museum, and microfilm copies are available to view. I doubt that those papers will show Montgomery to be sitting on his hands during the period that you asked about. Do you share that doubt?..
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@ToolTimeTabor
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’
John Frost was at Arnhem, not Nijmegen, but I'd take his opinion over the likes of Antony Beevor.
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@ToolTimeTabor
17.09.1944
13.00 – 14.18:
The Recce Squadron landed at DZ-X and LZ-S. One glider had cast off its tow rope over England, two gliders crash landed, presumably at LZ-S.
Trooper Arthur Barlow stated that his vehicle started off ‘at least half an hour late’, without stating the intended start time. However, Martin Middlebrook noted that the intended start off time for the squadron was 3pm, that it left at 3.35pm (from DZ-X), and that it encountered enemy troops at 3.45pm.
14.40 – 15.30:
Battalion Krafft was in action against British force, and established its defensive line to block the Northern ’Leopard’ route to Arnhem Bridge.
So, if the recce squadron had left on time, it would still have run into the German forces.
Beevor is talking through his backside, yet again, this time, trying to shift the reason for Nijmegen bridge not being taken on the first day from the actions of US forces onto British forces, with added, unfounded implied accusation of the recce squadron of having a Colonel Blimp mentality.
Word is, Beevor slung out of Russia, doubtless after tried to tell the Russians all about how Stalingrad would have been lost but for tins of Spam, or some such Lend-Lease old wives’ tale that Americans lap up.
This from Wikipedia, of all places:
‘General Gavin's orders to Colonel Lindquist of the 508th were to "move without delay" onto the Nijmegen road bridge. Lindquist's 508th started jumping at 13:28 with 1,922 men. The jump was perfect with the regiment 90% assembled by 15:00. The commander of 3rd Battalion wrote later that..."we could not have landed better under any circumstances". The 508th was still sitting around when Gavin asked them at 18:00 if they had got to the bridge yet.’
The source of this information is cited as ‘Operation Market Garden. Then and Now. Vol. 1’, by one Karel Margry.
As far as I can judge, this 508th outfit landed about 3 miles from Nijmegen, probably a bit longer by road. A bit different to 8 mile run from DZ-X to Arnhem bridge. An hour or so of marching would have got them to Nijmegen by about 4pm, with the Battalion Krafft arriving there sometime after 6pm. Perhaps the 508th would have had time to brew to coffee before the Germans arrived if they had arrived there sooner. Who can say?
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@johnlucas8479
Thank you for confirming that Brereton would not have been required to change his plans during any one day regarding the number of airlifts, seeming to make his decision to not undertake a second lift even less defensible. With the option to postpone by 24 hours, Brereton could have had a two airlift plan ready for the start of the day on the 17th September, with the whole of plan also in place for use on the following day.
Of course, the same document notes that the advace by the ground troops would be at ' 'Z' hour ', like to be 1 hour after ' 'H' hour '. Further evidence that Brereton had control full of the airborne plan and his decisions would prevail.
‘Some comments blame the failure of Operation Market on the shoulders of Brereton and Williams because they claim the Air Plan was faulty and Brereton and Williams were responsible for all key decisions and that even Montgomery was unable to persuade Brereton to include a second lift.’
Your words.
As far as Brereton and his staff had the final word on the MARKET air plan, the evidence is clear:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
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@Clone Warrior
OK.
So how does my not having been in the forces invalidate anything that I have stated?
How does you having trained in the Brecon Beacons, Nothumberland, Cumbria, Dartmoor and the West of Scotland, and having knowledge of an operation in Afghanistan make you any more well informed about Market Garden? Examples, whether or not Montgomery deferred to Brereton on the air plan, how many tanks got across Nijmegen Bridge on the 21st September 1944, and so on and so on, and so on.
We've had plenty of people on here claiming special knowledge because they were in this or that outfit, usually at least 50 years after the war, in operations that were tiny compared operation in North west Europe in 1944-45. They have all been found out. My father went right through 1939-45, D-Day to VE Day. He was in the Netherlands at the time of Market Garden but was was not a part of it. He was not any better informed about Market Garden than a layman, he never claimed to be. But I'd take his opinion on the subject a lot more seriously than I would yours.
As I recall, you are up to your neck in that nonsense with the idiot Big Woody, claims that John Burns, John Cornell, Giovanni and me are all one and the same, as well as that spiteful cloning of the John Burns YouTube name.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really…
The quotes that I posted from Charles B. MacDonald, Chester Wilmot and Rick Atkinson show clear evidence that Brereton had the final word on the ‘Market’ air plan and I made this clear in my comment. All of your stuff about pure speculation detracts not one iota from that point.
As far as Brereton’s ‘Market’ air plan goes, He seems to have sided with the USAAF airmen and created an air plan that suited them at the expense of what was most needed by the troops to meet their objectives: as many troops as possible landed on first day, and some to land as near to their principal objectives as possible. If Brereton had put a plan together that had two air-lifts on day one that was only thwarted by the weather he would have been free from criticism. If he had created a plan that included a landing next to Arnhem Bridge, as Richard Gale and possibly others advised, and landings at Nijmegen Bridge and Zon Bridge he would have been free from criticism, even if those landing had incurred high casualties.
It beggars belief, 75 years later, that two five-six hour round trips could not have been could have been fitted in on the first day if the will to do so had been there. Americans have been quick to point the finger at XXX Corps for supposedly being risk adverse, usually with un-founded tripe about stopping for tea and the like. There is clear evidence of the American Brereton being risk averse to the point of undermining the entire Market Garden operation.
As I someone who was not there, given the six year endurance of Britain and the four year endurance of Russia, I find hard to be understanding of the American Brereton as he buggered around in his mansion at Sunninghill Park cooking up the ‘Market’ plan.
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@johnlucas8479
Montgomery saw Eisenhower on 23rd August to propose a single thrust into Germany. Preferably in the North, towards the Ruhr and Aachen, as the Ruhr-Aachen area was producing 51.7 per cent of Germany's hard coal and 50.4 per cent of Germany's crude steel? The Alllies might not have known of these exact figures but they well knew that the Ruhr was by a distance, the most important industrial region in Germany.
Failing a decision to go in the north, Montgomery offered to halt 21st Army Group so that Bradleys armies could go forward in the south.
Allied leaders knew that a total of 14,000 tons were being delivered to both army group per day. Another 500 tons per day that was being deivered by air to Paris for use by the civilian population in the immediate aftermath of the libration of that city would soon be available to the army groups. 14,500 would support an advance of 20 divisions with the remaining forces held back.
At that time SHAEF Intelligence stated " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
Eisenhower turned down Montgomery's proposal for political reasons stating: that it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry, and that: "The American public, would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war.
The matter of US politics interferring with military matters had been on Alanbrooke's mind as he confided to his diary on the 9th August:
it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
On the 4th September, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”. Esenhower again said no when the two met on the 10th September, he did however, approve 'Market Garden' which could be attempted without diverting resources from elsewhwere.
Even as Market Garden was being planned, the allies had the knowledge that Le Havre (for use by US forces) and Dieppe (3,000 tons per day) would soon be available for use.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Market Garden would almost certainly have not taken place in the way that it did if Eisenhower has decided to back a single thrust into Germany instead of his politically motivated broad front strategy.
Montgomery, the professional, was already looking to way forward into Germany in the middle of August, meeting with Bradley on the 17th to try to agree a way forward - a waste of Montgomery's time as it turned out.
Montgomery offered Eisenhower options: Stopping Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army to let British 2nd Army and US 1st Amy go forward. Or stop 21st Army Group and let US 12th Army go forward.
Eisenhower, the amateur, opted to stay at his chateaux in Normandy with his hand up Kay Summersby's skirt and sipping vintage champagne (my preferred option).
Montgomery had been through two world wars and had already seen German collapses in France in 1918, in North Africa in 1942 and in Sicily in 1943. Eisenhower had no such experience. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad, ahead of schedule. Eisenhower took over and squandered the benefits of all of the work that Montgomery had done by allowing politics to dictate military strategy.
Montgomery was without doubt right, given what the allies knew in the Summer of 1944. He was even more right when it was later discovered that at the beginning of September the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces across the entire western front that Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
Montgomery's view was later corroborated by German commanders after the war.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
US film makers, US hack historians and US thickoes commenting on YouTube seem to be forever putting the case the US moved quickly while the British plodded. The above shows otherwise.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Its hard to make a case for any changes you noted taking place on the 18th August as Eisenhower and Montgomery did not meet until the 23rd August.
That meeting could have with a number of outcomes. Eisenhower might have agreed to a single thrust but still have decided to appoint himself as land forces. Eisenhower might have opted to make Bradley land forces commander and given Bradley carte blanche to advance as he wished. Given Bradley’s bog ups in Normandy and later, in the Ardennes that might have been another of Eisenhower’s poor decisions. Eisenhower might have made the correct decision and let Montgomery continue as land forces commander and then done what he should have done, not be swayed by US public opinion and given Montgomery carte blanche to advance as he wished. There may have been other possible outcomes from that meeting.
If Montgomery had been allowed to continue as land forces commander and had been allowed to run the war on the ground in his own way one can only guess what would have happened. Given his track record for thorough planning, and with the authority and backing of Eisenhower, things might well have roughly as they did until, say 4th September with the capture of Antwerp and Bradley’s subordinate, Patton had reaching the Moselle, presumably by which time, Montgomery is ready with his plan to reach the Ruhr. This plan might well have seen Bradley’s subordinate Hodges being further supported as he reached the Siegfried Line on the 10th September. By this time that British 2nd Army could already have been advancing east in conjunction with the US 1st Army. Time would have surely also been available for Canadian 1st Army to complete the clearing of Dieppe which could handle 6,000 tons per day, with Ostend already in allied hands.
With the Germans having to try to counter the surge of British 2nd Army and US 1st Army towards the Ruhr, when the War Office enquired about what could be done about the V-2 campaign against London, Montgomery could have pointed to the allied campaign to cut of the Ruhr dragging German forces to the east and he would still have had the option to look to use the First Allied Airborne to further hinder German supplies reaching the Western part of the Netherlands.
The chapter in ‘The Struggle for Europe’ by Chester Wilmot that covers the period after Arnhem is titled ‘The Lost Opportunity’. A title that seems rather apt.
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@lyndoncmp5751
Seemingly more from this clown Weidner...Second World Way experience: Zero.
'-(Chapter 10: General Montgomery's Bitter Pills, page 312) I would submit that Prime Minister Churchill and the CIGS Allen Brooke were culpable in this ruse as well, as they were committed to ensuring the press showed the British in the best possible light. Having the Americans close the Gap, could well have finished the war early and showed the British to be struggling with manpower and unable to compete in a mechanized, mobile war, where the Americans truly were the masters.'
How ridiculous can this get: Even the bloke who actually failed to close the Falaise Gap - Bradley, admitted that he had failed to close the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
And also, another actual participant:
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Sir Brian Horrocks’ Corps Commander. Page 53.
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@lyndoncmp5751
And more nonsense, not sure if its William Weidner's nonsense or Big Woody (aka Para Dave)'s nonsense.
'-American commanders Eisenhower and Bradley covering for Montgomery in the interest of harmony in the allies camp.'
ROTFL. Covering for what, delivering victoty in France, ahead of schedule and with fewer than expected casualties.Btw: Eisenhower personal combat experience: zero, Bradley personal combat experience: zero,
'Why? Certainly, Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton by both American and British press and the innuendo that Monty's troops weren't doing their part.'
ROTFL. 'Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton'. Yea like anyone is supposed to know that. In any case, Montgomery had long since seen Patton off - who had disgraced himself in Sicily by assaulting Sicilian peasants and US soldiers, getting himself passed over for Army Group command by Bradley and having to sit out the invasion of France while Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery sat at the top table.
'-Montgomery's campaign shortcomings which led to this result were manifested in his failure to capture Caen and the Port of Antwerp on the allied timetable'
Err... Caen had no timetable, it was only one point in the Battle of Normandy, which finished ahead of schedule. There was no timetable for the Port of Antwerp, it was catured on the 4th September 1944.
'his carefully orchestrated "showcase" British 2nd Army crossing of the Rhine (when elements of Patton's 3rd Army and General Courtney Hodge's U.S. 1st Army were already across). Montgomery's crossing, which was augmented by U.S. Airborne troops, resulted in some 5,000 allied casualties.
Yea...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P759
'Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."
And a post war view:
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED
1994
Chapter 21. P406:
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
That was Montgomery's Operation Plunder. Shall we move on to Brereton's Operation Varsity?..
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@marknieuweboer8099
Not really...
As far as the advance into Germany was concerned, MARKET GARDEN was intended ro end with the capture of Arnhem.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces'
His words.
Anhem was added to MARKET GARDEN on the 10th September 1944, in response to an urgent request from the War Office regarding what could be done to hinder, or cutail V2 rocket attacks on London.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
'on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared. By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.'
Englandspiel may have ended before MARKET GARDEN, but British caution would seem to have been wholly understandable, given what had happened. Further, the activities Christiaan Lindemans, and the understandable mistrust of the SS man, Prince Bernhard by British and US intelligence services continued to complicate intelligence matters involving the Dutch after MARKET GARDEN had finished.
The troops on the ground made some use of help from the local population. Given that the Germans found a copy of the MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone at the very start of the operation, it is hard to see how any tardiness on the part of British troops in using information supplied by the local population had any real bearing on the outcome of the operation.
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@johnlucas8479
From Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen#cite_note-Spanjaard-6
On 18 September, Model sent reinforcements from Arnhem to keep the Waal Bridge out of the Allies' hands. Because elements of the British 1st Airborne Division were still in control of the Arnhem bridge at the time,[24] the 1. Kompagnie SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung commanded by SS-Untersturmführer Werner Baumgärtel and the 2. Bataillon SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 under leadership of SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling crossed the Rhine at Pannerden as the 500 man strong 'Kampfgruppe Euling', used the still intact Waal Bridge and dug in at the Hunnerpark.[6] These reinforcements enabled the SS to regroup under the command of Sturmbannführer Leo Reinhold, who set up his headquarters on the north Waal bank. Fallschirmjäger Oberst Henke prepared the Railway Bridge's defences. The two roundabouts and beltway were reinforced during the next 48 hours. The Americans would have to wait for the XXX Corps' help in taking the bridges, even though according to the planning, they should have been captured before the British arrival.[22]
[24] Saunders, Tim (2008). Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781783461141. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
[6] Spanjaard, Aard (2013). Historische route De slag om Arnhem: langs de sporen van operatie Market Garden 17-26 september 1944. Delft: Uitgeverij Elmar. p. 145. ISBN 9789038922775. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
[22] Saunders, Tim (2008). Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781783461141. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
Oddball and Screwball claim that the Pannerden Ferry was in use through September, October, and November. Its had to why with the Arnhem Bridge in German hands.
It seems that with both Huissen and Pannerden Ferries firmly in German held terrtitory, it seems that between 17th and 20th September (probably mainly the 18th and 19th), the Germans were able to move four tanks, some artilley pieces, and 500 troops southwards? You concur?..
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@johnlucas8479
Not really…
‘1) Went are you going to provide any evidence that two lifts on the 17th was Doable, when morning fog on the 17th restricted takeoff until it cleared at 0900 hours. I what evidence not rehash of extract from Historians were they provide no evidence that a second lift was actual doable. Prove a extract from a Historian that has provide evidence that 2 lifts was doable.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.’
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING1994
P17
‘He [Urquhart] asked Brereton and Williams if the Arnhem force could have two lifts on the first day, as had been envisaged for the recent Operation ‘Comet’. His request was refused.’
P443
…’Air Chief Marshall Scarlett-Streatfield, produced a combined 38-46 Group report on Arnhem which reads: ‘In future operations against an organized enemy, it may be found necessary to complete the entire lift within a matter of hours, landing every essential unit or load within a matter of hours, landing every essential unit or load before the enemy can assess the situation, and not relying on airborne reinforcement or resupply.’¹ It was the blueprint for the successful airborne landing across the Rhine in March 1945.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision’
Seemingly, The airborne division commanders considered that two lifts on one day could be done, otherwise, why would they ask for them? You ask for proof that ‘2 lifts was doable’, but offer no proof that 2 lifts was not doable. US FAAA commanders stating that 2 lifts could not be done is not proof. What can be allowed is that if two lifts had taken place, and Arnhem was not taken then Brereton is in the clear. If two lifts had planned for but a second lift was thwarted by the weather, then Brereton is in the clear. But neither of these happened. Perhaps if Brereton had presented his MARKET plan to Montgomery and Eisenhower and words to effect ‘here is the airborne plan, but we can only go with one lift on day one, so we do not consider that MARKET can work’, he would be in the clear. Is there any evidence that this type of opinion was expressed?.. This: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mowr70IhL6E&t=1040s&ab_channel=FoundationofWayneCommunityCollege
is the standard American ‘tts all the fault of the British’ fare, so beloved by you and your American mates in YouTube comments, but at 16 minutes, and five seconds gets it somewhere near right about Brereton.
‘2) Were your evidence that Brereton was involved in selecting the Arnhem DZ/LZ , as these site were selected by the RAF for Operation Comet.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
Yep, this this in particular is about Zon. There is zero chance that decision making on Zon DZ/LZs was any different to decision making for Arnhem DZ/LZs,
and that Brereton was not involved in this process.
‘3) How would additional resource assist Operation Market Garden?’
Who can say? I cannot. I have to rely on the opinion of others…
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P589
‘When Eisenhower placed the Airborne Army at Montgomery’s disposal on September 4th, he was committing his strategic reserve, the only major force he could throw in to clinch the victory that had been won in France. But he did not make available to Montgomery the supply resources necessary to ensure that the maximum advantage was drawn from the commitment of this precious reserve.’
ON TO BERLIN
BATTLES OF AN AIRBORNE COMMANDER
1943-1945
JAMES M, GAVIN
LEO COOPER LONDON. 1979
P184
‘Why was Montgomery not given adequate troop and logistic support at least one more division?’
‘4) "Gavin had "got the stick out" and advanced on Nijmegen Bridge on day one". Have you any evidence that proves with 100% certainty that if 1/508 Bn did not stop short of the bridge that they would have capture both end of the Bridge or is it just speculation?’
I have not got 100% certainty on this matter, and neither have you, who would have? There can be little doubt that those troops would have stood a much better chance of taking Nijmegen Bridge on day one if they had made an attempt to take the bridge. The reality was that the Bridge was in German hands when XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen.
‘5) "Bradley had made a worthwhile effort to work with Market Garden". Well TheVilla Aston what you mean by worthwhile effort. Any attack by 12th Army Group during the period of Market garden could be considered a worthwhile effort because either
1) it would stop the Germans from moving troops and equipment from the 12 Army Group Front to Arnhem or
2) it would force the Germans to split their reserves between Arnhem and 12th Army Group Front.’
Worthwhile, meaning Bradley stopping his subordinate Patton, and giving another of his subordinate commander, Hodges, fuller backing for thrust through the Aachen gap, or moving his forces across to support Dempsey. What Bradley decided to do was to split his supplies equally between Hodges and Patton. What happened, Metz failed, Aachen failed, Arnhem was not taken. As far as this stuff is concerned, all roads lead back to Eisenhower… If Americans would but admit it.
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John Lucas
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody), 'larf', 'wright at him'. An example of what can go wrong in US schools? Or a weak attempt by a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, to imitate British pronuciation of English words?
And you, John Lucas, being half-way sensible...
Para Dave to me: 'you clearly blamed the Gavin and the GIs for years, agreeing with TIK to get your boy off the hook .'
As I have noted on here, many times before...
Based on the evidence I have seen, Gavin took the decision not to prioritize the capture of Nijmegen Bridge on Day One of MARKET GARDEN. As a result, XXX Corps were unable to reach Arnhem Bridge in time to link up with British forces there. Does that mean Gavin made a bad decision? How am I supposed to know?
That might have been an entirely reasonable decision given the cicumstances that Gavin found himself in at the time. Who can say? I cannot.
Does that mean I attach blame to Gavin? How can I? I was not in that war, not in any war to date, I have not even been a member of any armed forces. All I can rely on is what I have read, and what I seen, and have I heard. Most of what I have read from sensible sources (meaning, not Beeevor, Hastings etc.) I have quoted in YouTube. I have been in Nijmegen, and the Groesbeek heights, for all the help that was. I have known one person who was at Nijmegen at that time, who offered no opinion on those events. So blame? Definately not from me.
Perhaps Para Dave has knowledge from personal experiece that guides him in composing his outbursts.
And while I am about it:
'on September 4th he told IKE that opening up the port of Antwerp was part of the plan' Para Dave.
'told ' would suggest verbal communication. Do you know where there is evidence that Eisenhower and Montgomery spoke to each other on the 4th September 1944?
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Not really...
Browning.
Browning had considerable airborne experience, starting November 1941, when he was appointed GOC 1st Airborne, he qualified as a pilot, as was involved in airborne forces operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Europe. The story Major Brian Urquhart’s involvement in Browning’s intelligence seems to be nowhere as straightforward as presented by Cornelius Ryan. There is a comprehensive record of allied reconnaissance flights at that time at time, and there is no note of a flight going ahead at Urquhart’s request. Browning’s decision to take a headquarters to Groesbeek was no more last minute than anything else connected with MARKET GARDEN. It seems to have considered to have been a poor decision, but there seems to be no real opinion that it cost the allies Arnhem.
Motives for launching Market Garden.
The only documented impetus behind the launching of MARKET GARDEN, as far as Arnhem was the need to counter the launching of V2 Rockets at London from the western provinces of the Netherlands, which had begun on the 8th September 1944, two days before MARKET GARDEN was approved, causing the War Office to send this message to Montgomery on the 9th: “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?”
In regard to the operation as a whole, Eisenhower later stated: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
Air lifts.
The decision to undertake one lift per day rested with the head of the FAAA US General, Lewis Brereton. This has been considered to be one of the key reasons why the allies failed to take Arnhem.
Intelligence.
This is how allied leaders were briefed:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The weather.
The weather held good for only two of the nine days of the operation, severely limiting the ability of the allies to use their air asset. When it could get to the targets, the RAF blasted German forces, as it around the Oosterbeek perimeter near the end of the operation. Eisenhower, Churchill, Montgomery, and the German General Karl Student cited the weather as key reason why the allies could not capture Arnhem.
The Poles.
Montgomery and, later criticized the attitude and the performance of the Polish forces during MARKET GARDEN. The did not blame them for the failure to take Arnhem.
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John Cornell
Yea, the German collapse left them with less tanks and artillery to defend the entire Western Front than Britain had to defend Britain just after Dunkirk. The Allies needed leadership and viable plan that was capable of taking advantage of the German's dire state. Instead they got Eisenhower and his broad front policy.
As for the Scheldt in early September 1944:
The Germans were in force on the south bank, the defences on Walcheren were already some of the most formidable in Europe and the estuary would still have taken five weeks to clear. By any reckoning it would have been seven to ten weeks to before Antwerp could be used.
As you so rightly noted:
'We see what happened when the Germans had time to consolidate, regroup and re-arm. They managed to strengthen for Market Garden in just two weeks. Goodness knows how much stronger they would have been had the clearing of the Scheldt been done first, giving them even more time.'
As for my father, he was in the 79th Armoured Division. He was on D-Day (Sword Beach), Normandy, the Scheldt, the Reichwald and the Rhine. He was not on Market Garden or the Bulge. That did not make him an expert on the campaign in Europe, he never claimed to be. He never really took that much interest in that stuff.
If it is of interest, my Uncle was an RN Gunner who's ship took part in D-Day
(Utah Beach) and the attack on Walcheren. Before that he had been in the Indian Ocean, and in the Mediterranean for Husky.
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Don Stapp
Get lost.
Britain declared war on Germany in 1939 - to aid another country. Apart from France, no other country did that. All the rest attacked other countries, were attacked, or had war declared on them.
From 1939, through the fall of Poland, France and so on through the war in Russia, Britain could have a deal any time it wanted one, without a single German soldier ever landing in Britain.
Britain carried on, the major country to fight the full six years of the war. Not forgetting of course, the solidarity shown by Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Affica.
All clear now?
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@derekhooker7086
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
P 354
‘On April 9th, the Marshall memorandum was presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
“Started C.O.S. at 9 a.m. as Marshall was due at 10.30 a.m. He remained with us till 12.30 p.m.
and gave us a long talk on his views concerning the desirability of starting a western front next September and that the U.S.A. forces would take part. However, the total force which they could transport by then only consisted of two and a half divisions, no very great contribution! Furthermore, they had not begun to realise what all the implications of their proposed plan were’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P288
‘General Marshall had advanced the proposal that we should attempt to seize Brest or Cherbourg, preferably the latter, or even both during the early autumn of 1942. The operation would have to be almost entirely British. The Navy, the air, two thirds of the troops, and such landing craft as were available must be provided by us. Only two or three American Divisions could be found.’
P391
Former Naval Person to President 8 July 42
‘No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend “Sledgehammer” as a practical operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported “The conditions which would make “Sledgehammer” a sound, sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur. They are now sending their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.’
What sort of turd would try to deny that Marshall wanted to invade Europe in 1942?
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@seth1422
'As far as your interpretation of Operation Infatuate, you have your dates, times, personalities, and command structure mixed up.'
Not really...
The material point being, as Brereton made clear, that as with Market, the final word on who did what, when and where was not down to Montgomery.
'you have your dates, times, personalities, and command structure mixed up.'
Who can say? Walcheren has always been of interest to me. In this case memories related by people who were there add to that interest.
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@NorwayT
Have your own way...
‘If it was at all to succeed, securing the bridges and the only artery resupplying them ASAP and with force, should have been drilled into every commander.’
Montgomery stated to Dempsey that the ground forces attack should be ‘rapid and violent, without regard to what is happening on the flanks’.
How the airborne forces were briefed was down to the US General Brereton.
‘This whole operation seemed hastily thrown together, and relied too much on luck and weather and way too little on the generally very precise observations of the Nederlands verzet, the Dutch Resistance.’
Market Garden was the type of operation that the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) was created for, with troops and air forces able to work together.The key points that stopped Arnhem from being taken were all associated with FAAA. All communications at that from the Dutch Resistance were routinely ignored, due to the German ‘Englandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Resistance. Market Garden was no different to any other situation in that regard.
‘I believe that Operation Market Garden should serve as a warning to battlefield commanders of the dangers of following the whims of Prima Donnas competing for the big prize, in this case being first into Berlin.’
But what hard evidence is there that Market Garden was devised on a whim? As for anyone being a ‘Prima Donna’, the best evidence I can find of this is here:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Here is one of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton, thinking only about himself, rather than the war.
‘Such politics unfortunately still plague the top tier of military planning in NATO’.
We are all entitled to our views. I would think that the big lesson is that it would have be to go into such a time as September 1944 with a plan based on military considerations, rather than political considerations.
Montgomery had said to Eisenhower on the 23rd August that the allies could not sustain an advance across the front and that the allies should hold on the right and push on the left, or hold on the left or push on the right.
Having offered to stop 21st Army Group, what else was he supposed to do?
Eisenhower’s replied that ‘it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."
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@mikemazzola6595
“Well, to begin with, because Montgomery stopped other possibly better options for use of available forces and logistics. Such as clearing the Scheldt Estuary so Antwerp could revitalize the full combat power of the Western Allies by resupply.”
A decision to prioritize Market Garden had to be Eisenhower’s, who, as we all know, from the 1st September 1944 was both Supreme Commander and Land Forces Commander. Eisenhower confirmed this when he stated:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
“It is interesting that the U.S. First, Third, and Seventh Armies all made it across the Rhine before Montgomery's grandiose "Operation Plunder" could be executed. Even Churchill's celebrated relief of himself in the Rhine occurred after Patton had done the same thing.”
Why is it interesting? The Rhine crossing by Montgomery’s armies faced far more difficulties than any of the others, including the width of the river and the level of German opposition. Its outcome was of far more importance than the other crossings. This is Eisenhower’s view on Operation Plunder:
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
His words.
Notice that Eisenhower notes only two other Rhine crossings. Also, where is it recorded that Churchill relieved himself in the Rhine?
“And, speaking of the Germans thwarting Market Garden, I felt including that option in the list of three for why Market Garden failed showed TIK's intellectual honesty. Taking it a step further, what would have happened if a narrow front fed by "Hell's Highway" had just barely made it across the Rhine? I have read sober assessments in the past that recognized the exploitation of Market Garden would have, at best, been bottled up not far across the Rhine in a Remagen type situation. Or at worst a considerably larger force than 1 Para Division would have been cut off and stranded with a good chance of being forced to surrender. The Allies were probably fortunate that Market Garden failed.”
But what opposition was going to bottle up an advance? In the immediate aftermath of a victory the 52nd Lowland Division was due to land at Deelen airfield. Both VII and VIII Corps were to advance on either side of XXX Corps. Further, the adverse weather and allied communications problems that had aided the Germans at Market Garden were never going to last. A US advance towards Aachen would have added to German problems. Even without having Antwerp available, Allied logistics still allowed for an 18 Division advance.
“The regrettable fact is that it was attempted at all. Montgomery admitted as much after the mistake in delaying the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary became so apparent. For that blunder, maybe Montgomery and Eisenhower should share the blame for Market Garden, and they often do.”
What was regrettable about using additional forces to move the war on? As well as this, the need to hamper German V-Weapon attacks on Britain from the western part of the Netherlands justified the Market Garden initiative. What Montgomery actually stated was ‘I must admit a bad mistake on my part I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.’ That is not a statement that it had been wrong to undertake Market Garden.
“Eisenhower's broad front strategy was the only one really viable in the face of still powerful German combat capabilities.”
On the 27th September, 1944, Model had 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces along the entire western front. This was less armour and artillery than Britain had immediately after Dunkirk.”
“This was demonstrated later when Plunder gave Montgomery the last laugh over Field Marshal Model.”
I am not sure that last laugh is a term to be used. My father took part in Plunder, he never mentioned hilarity in regard to that undrtaking.
“Model committed suicide surrounded in the Ruhr pocket after Eisenhower's broad front strategy encircled the Ruhr from BOTH the North and the South. Market Garden would not have likely achieved this by itself.”
Eisenhower’s broad front strategy squandered the initiative gained by tying down German forces in Italy and the German losses in Montgomery's victory in Normandy. Market Garden (15,000 casualties), Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties) were a direct result. As was the German attack in the Ardennes – using forces and equipment that were created in the autumn of 1944. A single thrust into Germany in August / September 1944 would have deprived the Germans of the Ruhr and brought the war to an early end. Montgomery went into Normandy with a plan and delivered a victory to rival the Russian victory in Stalingrad in under 90 days. Eisenhower took over with no plan and delivered nothing in the next 90 days.
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@mikemazzola6595
Eisenhower and Montgomery
Eisenhower was Land Forces Commander from the beginning of September. In that role politics should have given way to military sense. Eisenhower had little experience of commanding at a high level, zero personal combat experience and it showed. Montgomery went into Normandy with a plan and cleared France in 90 days. Eisenhower took over with no plan and went nowhere. The battle in the west could, and should have been over as a contest in 1944. Montgomery proposed that all available resources should be put into a northern thrust in August, as had been agreed before the invasion. Failing that, Montgomery proposed that all resources should be put into a thrust with the southern armies. Eisenhower did neither, and everything the allies the then tried suffered. Eisenhower’s decision making led to 140,000 casualties in failed US piecemeal attacks on the Siegfried Line during his tenure as Land Forces Commander. Perhaps his total lack of personal combat experience contributed to his poor decision making? Likewise with Bradley? Who knows?
Market Garden
Market Garden was a chance that was worth taking - as judged at the time, and with hindsight, the V-Weapon attacks on Britain alone justified the undertaking. No American can identify with this. Their homeland was 3,000 miles from any external threat. Further, the combined chiefs of staff where urging that use be made of the First Allied Airborne Army. The was no ‘opportunity squandered by the hapless failure of Market Garden’, there was no other proper plan to continue the war at that time. Market Garden did not take resources away from other undertakings, 21st Army Group was the only force within effective range of the Airborne Army. The idea that Dams that were 70 miles away were going to be opened in September 1944 to give the Germans a couple of weeks respite is hard to credit.
The Rhine
‘The Seventh Army was across the Rhine at essentially the same time as Plunder.’ And Plunder took place in ‘essentially the same time’ as all the other Rhine crossings.’
So why did you draw attention Plunder taking place after crossings that had taken place further down-stream?
Here is a modern American view:
The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
From Ike & Monty: Generals at War
By Norman Gelb 1994 Constable and Company Limited
Chapter 21. P406.
I am very familiar with Churchill’s six volume history of the war. In volume VI, Chapter XXIV ‘Crossing the Rhine’ deals with his visit to see the Rhine crossing. There is no mention of him relieving himself in the Rhine. Churchill make a nuisance of himself at the crossing? Who can say? Eisenhower turned up to watch as well. Churchill was by a country mile the outstanding war leader in any country during that SIX year conflict. If he turned up for such an occasion then so be it.
The Hurtgen Forest
It was an allied failure that cost 33,000 casualties (September to December 1944) and ultimately 55,000 casualties. Poor ‘generalship’? Who can say? Eisenhower spread his forces right across the front, told them all to attack at the same time and as a result everything suffered. He squandered the initiative that the British had previously built up over a couple of years.
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@mikemazzola6595
Total rubbish.
A general of the stature of Eisenhower oversaw the failure at Arnhem, the defeats at Aachen, Metz, the Hurtgen Forest and the avoidable German attack in the Ardennes. All this stuff about the various national economies is nothing to do with Eisenhower's poor performance.
If Market Garden was a military mistake then Eisenhower must bare ultimate responsibility. That goes with the job along with the the châteaux, the cars, and first crack female drivers. Based on his performance he would not have known a military strategy from hole in the road. Montgomery remained Market Garden's unrepentent advocate and Alanbrooke made his comments on Market Garden with hindsight, in his diary which as not published until he late 1950's.
That stated, let us see some more of Alanbrooke's diary from those times:
‘ “November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.”
“At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.2”
“As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.”
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.” ‘
How right he was.
This Friday coming sees the 75th anniversary of VE Day. Britons, quite rightly will get the day off. Germans, Italians and Japanese should have to work. Russsians should only have to work for half the morning and Americans should get a half day off.
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@manosdelfuego1
'Eight thousand brave British soldiers, some of the absolute best soldiers the British Army had, lost their lives at Arnhem.' Your words.
Err...fraid not.
The dead were:
1st Airbourne: 1,174, Polish Brigade: 92, Glider Pilots: 219. Total: 1,485.
That total includes: Killed in action, died or wounds, drowned in the evacuation, shot in attrocities, shot in escape attempts.
Deaths in air operations over Arnem, RAF and air dspathers: 231.
USAAF: 27.
Any questions?
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@the_imposter_knight5752
Your Priggish attitude and comments cut no ice with me.
Urquhart was hiding. Seems to imply cowardice. Do you think he was a coward?
So what was he supposed to do? Climb down from the up-stairs of that house and get himself captured? How was that going to help anyone?
‘Hackett refused to go to Arnhem.’ Again, are you implying cowardice?
If Urquhart’s book is your reference for this claim, then you are wrong. Hackett was told that he was to lose one third of his brigade to another task without being told anything about the overall situation except he had been passed over for command of the division in favour of Hicks. All this after a trying day in which Hackett’s command had been delayed in its departure from Britain, his command came under fire as it landed, and he then had to attempt to carry out its brief without a third of his command. The late night meeting at divisional HQ led to Hackett stating he needed a plan that showed how his forces would work with the forces already moving towards Arnhem. He wanted clarity. I think I probably would have done if I had been in that situation.
‘Cometh the hour, cometh the man and Hackett wasn’t that man.’
Why? Because he was a coward?
‘it infuriated me that Barlow was in the wrong place at the wrong time because the situation demanded someone take control’
Why does that infuriate you? Are you related to Barlow?
As far as I know, none of these people are still around to be able to reply to your attempted smears against them.
As far as I, a layman can judge, what was decided in the heat of battle in Arnhem had little bearing on the outcome of the outcome. That outcome was decided by the poor Market air plan, the decision not to try to assault Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, with the Germans getting a hold of the entire Market Garden plan on the first day thrown in for good measure.
As for any lack of moral fibre – you can shove that attempted insult where the sun does not shine.
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@the_imposter_knight5752
I must have read, anywhere between 15 and 25 works that that cover Market Garden, and many of them state opinions about why Arnhem did not succeed. As far as I can recall, not one of them blames Brigadier Hackett for the failure to take Arnhem.
Here is one: Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle, by Martin Middlebrook. This lists 10 reasons why the author thinks that Arnhem failed. Not one of those reasons is anything to do Brigadier Hackett and the 4th Parachute Brigade.
General Urquhart likewise: no mention of Hackett as a reason why Arnhem failed.
Let us remind ourselves as to where this started, with my speculation to another person in this comments section as to whether the 4th Parachute Brigade casualties might have been affected by the Germans getting hold of the plans for Market Garden on the first day, enabling them to contest the 4th Parachute Brigade landing on the following day.
You then waded to state some sort of theory that those casualties were down to Hackett’s actions and that their high casualties were mainly Prisoners or War.
How ridiculous can this get? Here are the words of an actual eye witness to that landing:
GRAEME WARRACK
TRAVEL BY DARK
First published by the Harvill Press Ltd 1963
1 THE BATTLE OF ARNHEM
P22-23
‘Three o’clock was now the hour for fixed for the landing, so Lt Col. Henty Preston, the A/Q; Lt Col. Ian Murray, the Glider Pilot CO, and I went off to the landing zone to meet them.
The enemy had infiltrated into the area and established machine-gun section posts round about, so there was a good deal of activity going on. At about 3 o’clock I arrived at the RAP which Capt. Graham Jones, MO to the Border Regiment, had established at the landing zone. As the second lift came in there was a considerable amount of shooting and the situation was very different from our peaceful landing on the previous afternoon. Then, as the 4th Parachute Brigade came in, we heard the noise of even more violent action coming from the direction of Ede.
Graham Jones and his sergeant, Thomson, dealt with casualties as they arrived and evacuated them to the dressing station at Wolfhesze.’ His words.
Further, 4th Parachute Brigade casualties were only the highest in regard to fatalities. Their losses as prisoners of war (and evaders) were 1,115 (67.2%). The figures for First Parachute Brigade were only slightly lower (66.6%) and were exceeded by the First Parachute Brigade at (80.2%).
Anyone can read the books and use hindsight to state, because of this, that happened, because of that, this happened, and so on, and so on. You, me, the turd Anthony Beevor, Martin Middlebrook and anyone else.
What I will not do is use hindsight to pass judgement of the legitimate decisions of the people involved, when the bullets were flying, the bombs were dropping, the people were dying, and so on and so on. I am not qualified to do so, I was not there. Perhaps you were there, perhaps you do consider yourself to be qualified to pass judgement.
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@johnlucas8479
All I could do is give an opinion based on what I have read, about events nearly 76 years ago. So what?
For me it would be Brereton's air plan, the failure to agree the the RAF proposal to mount two airlifts on the first day, poor choices of landing sites, the failure take on board suggestions from Montgomery:
'General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days. '
The Guns at Last Light, Rick Atkinson. P262.
When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.'
The Struggle for Europe, Chester Willlmot. P588.
Once the operation as underway, the failure of the US 82nd Airborne Division to secure Nijmegen before XXX Corps arrived.
The rate of advance of XXX Corps does not come in to it as they were in contact with US 82nd in a time that would have left them able to link up with British troops at Arnhem Bridge if the 82nd had handled things differently.
Finally, regarding the idiot comment, 'And Monty never showing up on the field of battle':
What rubbish. Supreme Comander and Allied Land Forces Commander Eisenhower was at Versaiiles, 250 miles away. Brereton was in England. Montgomery was already at Eindhoven by the end of the operation. What would any reasonable person expect of a commander in charge of two armies? That he shoud be at the front line at Nijmegen alongside 2nd Army Commander Dempsey? Only a 17 year would think this.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
None of this lets Brereton out. The three divisional commanders pressed for two drops,
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.
Your convoluted attempts to get Brereton off the hook do not cut it. It seems that people that knew about such matters showed that Brereton failed to use his resources as well as he could have, by not having a plan to have two drops on day one, and by not putting more troops nearer to their main objectives.
Further, he was quick to try pass judgement on the performance of XXX Corps, whose performance was would have been good enough to have saved the day at Arnhem, if Brereton had done his job properly.
I never met Brereton, perhaps you did? Based on what I have read, he seems to have been a unpleasant individual who Bradley had been glad to see the back of, and who was nowhere to be seen when things did not go well, and who was not above writing a diary after the war and to passing it off as a contemporaneous record of events during the war. Doubtless, none of this would have mattered if Brereton had listened to professionals during planning for Market Garden, or if Eisenhower had not over promoted him, doubtless, for narrow nationalistic reasons.
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Sgt Rock
A Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
The seeds of failure were sown long before the Operation Market Garden was launched. Discord and disagreement had festered between the allied commanders Montgomery, Bradley and Patton since the campaign in North Africa.
Neither the Americans nor the Germans considered Monty to be a commander of any great ability, he was probably the most overrated allied commander during WWII. The Americans found him arrogant to the point of bumptiousness, bad mannered and ungraceful, what one American called ‘his sharp beagle nose, the small grey eyes that dart about quickly like rabbits in a Thurber cartoon.’
General Omar Bradley stated waspisly at one occasion:
‘Montgomery was a third-rate general and he never did anything or won any battle that any other general could not have won as well or better.’
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
After the invasion in Normandy Montgomery had promised to take Caen the first day, but had not done so even by the end of June.
Finding himself overshadowed and sidelined by the flamboyant, gun-toting Ol’ Blood n’ Guts George Patton was more than he could stand, so he went to Eisenhower and demanded his ‘own’ operation.
Tact was never a prominent feature of Monty’s character and he made no attempt to conceal his disregard of Eisenhower’s broad front policy, constantly criticizing it and demanding additional resources of troops and supplies for his own purposes.
Although ‘Market Garden’ was launched on September 17, it was already by then too late. The opportunity to drive north through a disorganized and retreating enemy had been lost.
Like the British General Sir Brian Horrocks put it:
‘We had made the cardinal mistake of underestimating our enemy – a very dangerous thing to do when fighting the Germans, who are among the best soldiers in the world. Their recovery after the disaster in Normandy was little short of miraculous.’
RAM, July 28 2010
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Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
The Chamberlain government ended its policy of appeasement in March 1939, when Hitler broke the Munich agreement of September1938, by occupying the whole of Czechoslovakia, leading to Britain and France giving a undertaking to Poland go to war if Poland was attacked by Germany. Britain and France declared war on Germany on the 3rd September 1939, two days after Germany had attacked Poland. Winston Churchill took up the post of Prime Minister on the 10th May 1940. The period 1938 to the Summer of 1940 saw Britain create the then most formidable air defence system in the world. It worked. That, along with the then world’s largest Navy and Merchant Marine, the fortitude of the British people, and Winston Churchill’s leadership ensured that we are not ‘speaking German today’.
‘I have to believe that having already breeched the Atlantic wall at Normandy at great cost, the allies would have been better served by applying what they'd learned and strategically attacking the Siegfried Line at key locations head on than by "going around their butt to get to their elbow"’.
In that case you are in agreement with Montgomery, who went into Normandy with a clear plan: hold on the left (British 2nd Army), break-out on the right (US First Army). Charged with getting the allies to the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78, and with 22% fewer than expected casualties. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander on 1st September 1944 with no plan and the allies went nowhere.
‘the 101st and the 82nd bore the brunt of Market Garden's casualties’
Airborne forces casualties
1st Polish Parachute Brigade 378
US 82nd Airborne Divison 1,430
Us 101st Airborne Division 2,118
British 1st Airborne 6,462
As for the Dutch....
A fifth of their population was liberated by MARKET GARDEN. Further, MARKET GARDEN did displace any plan to liberate the Netherlands. If the operation had not taken place, the Netherlands would have been bypassed until Germany had been forced to surrender.
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‘Yes, blame. Montgomery, in the private opinions of his peers, was an arrogant jerk who did not care in the least about what they had to say in any matter.’
At the time of MARKET GARDEN, who were Montgomery’s peers. Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat experience between them. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. Eisenhower had made mess of the only campaign he had commanded in, the invasion of Italy. Bradley had performed without distinction in Normandy, and would later be found wanting in the Battle of the Bulge. Montgomery had served with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. In trying circumstances, in France in 1940, in command of a single division Montgomery had performed with distinction as he trained his division to the highest pitch of efficiency. His work proved its worth as he led his troops on the famous night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. When so ordered, he brought his division back to Britain almost intact. As a single army commander, in his first major command, he reorganized 8th Army, won against Rommel with inferior numbers at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to end the war in North Africa as a contest at Alamein. For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up Patton’s lunatic plan to land all around the island to shreds and concentrated allied forces in one place, the campaign was over in six weeks. Montgomery finished OVERLORD ahead of schedule (D+78, instead of D+90), with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad.
‘Talking to him was like talking to yourself.’
You met him when?
He absolutely refused to hear any of the warnings given him concerning the roads, enemy strength, and his unrealistic time schedule.
This is what Montgomery and Eisenhower saw:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The roads and the time schedule did cost the allies Arnhem, Brereton’s airborne plan did that.
.‘Without the massive manufacturing capabilities of the United States, our hard working men and women who built planes, tanks, trucks, ships, weapons and ammo, who sewed uniforms, grew and processed food and medicine, and who faced death in delivering it all in unprecedented amounts to Europe.... the allies didn't stand a chance at victory.’
Yea, the British just sat on the hands and did nothing. Its an old wives tale that relative to their circumstances, Britain out mobilized and outproduced every other major belligerent and in absolute terms outproduced the Germans in every year except one.
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@tlb2732
Not really…
What as Britain supposed to do? Its economy had been dragged down by the world-wide recession created by the USA. The USA that was happy to enjoy the benefits of world-wide trade but none of the obligations to help to maintain international order. Further, Britain had lost getting on for a million persons in the First World War. The French lost twice that number, and got half of their country smashed up. Both countries had had their exchequers emptied in the conflict. The people of both countries were seemingly permanently scarred by the war. Nobody in Britain or France was looking for another war. Example: Both of my grandfathers had the misfortune to serve on the Western Front in the First World War, each had three bothers that also served, each lost one of those brothers. Not much of note there, millions of families in Britain, France and Russia fared far worse than that. But when my father calmly announced to his father that he had joined the Army in June 1939, my grandfather tore into him, citing the horrors of the trench warfare. Further, the population of Britain, and probably of France were led to believe that a war would lead to bombing of cities on a monumental scale and that casualties would run into hundreds of thousands.
At the time of the Czech crisis, the heads of the armed forces told Chamberlain that Britain could not be ready be ready for a general war until 1941. Czechoslovakia was hundreds of miles away, how could Britain help?
The French were obligated to the Czechs by treaty, Britain as not. The French were looking for a way out, and asked Britain to get involved. What began as a dispute between Sudeten Germans and the rest of Czechoslovakia was quickly turned by Hitler into a dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Every time that negotiations took place, Hitler upped his demands, In the end, it was a question of either accepting the annexation of the Sudetenland or Hitler would invade Czechoslovakia. The only alternative would have been to strike a deal with Stalin to bring the Russians in. Doubtless that would not have found favour in the USA.
Chamberlain was at least able to get a public undertaking from Hitler that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe. An undertaking Hitler broke a few months later, thus demonstrating to the world that his word could not be trusted. Judging by newspaper content at that time, the Munich agreement found widespread favour in the USA.
Aachen, Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, Metz, The Bulge, all suffered from Eisenhower’s incompetence as a commander. The man took political decisions instead of military decisions. A fourteen year old could have come up with his idea of all of the armies attacking at the same time. Thorough planning and campaign management beats hands off every time. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan. British 2nd Army to tie down the Germans and thus protect the US 1st Army while it liberated Cherbourg and other ports and broke out into the French interior. It worked.
Eisenhower took over as land forces commander with no plan and look what happened, the allies stopped all along the front. When Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery put it to him, there were only the resources to advance with half of the allied forces and therefore those forces should be concentrated in the North, because that is where the Ruhr is, and to this end, stop the forces in the South. Surround the Ruhr, and Germany cannot continue the war. Failing that, Eisenhower should stop the forces in the North (Montgomery) and go with Bradley southern forces. Eisenhower "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it. Presumably Eisenhower was already thinking ahead to his post-war career.
Eisenhower was nearly always far behind the front, usually in the biggest Château he could find. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was at Ranville in Normandy. A message he sent to Montgomery on the 4th September took three days to arrive. At one point he got his chauffeur, Mrs Summersby to telephone a front-line commander to find out the progress of an attack he had authorized. At a meeting with Churchill and Alanbrooke in the latter part of the year, he could not even state the number of divisions he would have for operations in 1945. At the same time he was trying to form a committee to be located at Versailles to devise allied strategy!
Eisenhower formed the First Allied Airborne Army so that opportunities or needs that presented themselves quickly could be pounced upon, and put an American airman, Brereton in charge of it. When the day came to use it, the FAAA was badly led. All they key reasons why Arnhem was not taken were down to the FAAA.
The Germans concentrated resources in France in1940 and won. They failed to concentrate resources in Russia in 1941 and lost. Montgomery concentrated resources in North Africa and won. Eisenhower failed to concentrate resources in Italy and got through by the skin of his teeth. Eisenhower failed to heed the lessons of the past and the allies got Aachen, Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, Metz, the Bulge, and he Russians in Berlin.
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@tlb2732
Not really…
'I see clearly. Just like Montgomery, and just like Britain in general, you have your opinion and your views and will accept no other.'
The USA media and hack historians have created a n America this, America that, version of history, and Americans seem to be mystified when they people from other parts of the world not agreeing with them.
‘Why did you ask for my source if you had no intention of using it? Evidently, you don't want any knowledge of Poland's code breaking successes. Sounds to me like you don't want to know any facts other than those you think place your country on a higher plain than all others.’
But I asked you to pass evidence that the Poles tried to give Britain and France a copy of a German plan to invade Poland. Where is that evidence. The stuff about the Poles penetrating Enigma has been in the public domain for over 45 years.
How Chamberlainesque! Bury your head in the sand till everyone else stops talking. No surprise there. Yet another example of you Brits being unable and unwilling to see past your elevated noses. In the words of the Captain in Cool Hand Luke, "Some men.... you just can't reach".
Na, I doubt if anyone would have acted differently to Chamberlain at the time of Munich. Not Daladier, France had the biggest Army in the world at that time, and a treaty with Czechoslovakia, they did not act. Russia held back, they were closest to Czechoslovakia. Not the USA, they were content to make money from Europe, but not get their hands dirty.
‘I'll waste no more of my time corresponding with you except to leave you with a few more facts.’
Its probably for the best, you are not in my league.
‘1. Woodrow Wilson negotiated a lasting peace with his 14 points at the end of WWI that Germans would have accepted. Instead, Europe insisted upon the Treaty Of Versailles, which was the catalyst for WWII.’
Woodrow Wilson made a high handed speech on behalf of a country that had suffered little during the brief time that it had been in the war, and had made money hand over fist from the conflict. The French in particular, wanted a lot more from the Germans. Who can blame them? Germany had started on them, caused enormous French casualties and had wrecked a large area of France.
‘2. Chamberlain had many chances to stop Hitler while the Nazis were still weak and could be stopped, but failed to take the necessary actions to do so.’
Hitler was never going to stop, regardless of anything that Chamberlain did. The only time that Hitler might have stopped was when he went into the Rhineland in 1936. Chamberlain was not Prime Minister at that time.
‘3. Without Britain calling for U. S. help, Eisenhower wouldn't have been on European soil.’
Nope. Eisenhower was on British soil because Japan and Germany declared war on the USA.
‘4. The war would have been lost without U. S. manufacturing might which outfitted and supplied the Allied militaries across all fronts.’
Not in the case of Britain. Britain stated the war with the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest merchant marine, the world’s largest shipbuilding industry and Europe’s largest Automobile and aircraft industries. The Germans were never going to be in a position to successfully invade Britain after 1940. In 1941 Hitler pressed the self-destruct button by invading Russia. Imports from the USA amounted 16.5% of Britain’s needs: 5.5% bought and paid for, 11% Lend-Lease.
‘5. We'll be here next time you call.’
Really? In recent decades it has been the USA that has been calling Britain: Vietnam, where we said no, Yom Kippur, when we said no. Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on. In Iraq, Britain was the biggest supporter of the US, twice. What did we get for our trouble?, the French walked off with the bigger rebuilding contracts. In the Falklands War, the USA was very tardy about taking sides with Britain in the case of a clear breach of international law by Argentina. On the night of the Argentine invasion, the US ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick was socialising at the Argentine embassy in Washington. At the same time, the Argentine regime was throwing its political opponents out of aircraft at 20,000 feet with parachutes. Even at the end of the war, with 256 British dead, Reagan was still trying to get Britain to agree to some sort of 50-50 draw. What arrogance.
Fancy some more?..
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@imperialcommander639
An example of Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
The seeds of failure were sown long before the Operation Market Garden was launched. Discord and disagreement had festered between the allied commanders Montgomery, Bradley and Patton since the campaign in North Africa.
Neither the Americans nor the Germans considered Monty to be a commander of any great ability, he was probably the most overrated allied commander during WWII. The Americans found him arrogant to the point of bumptiousness, bad mannered and ungraceful, what one American called ‘his sharp beagle nose, the small grey eyes that dart about quickly like rabbits in a Thurber cartoon.’
General Omar Bradley stated waspisly at one occasion:
‘Montgomery was a third-rate general and he never did anything or won any battle that any other general could not have won as well or better.’
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
After the invasion in Normandy Montgomery had promised to take Caen the first day, but had not done so even by the end of June.
Finding himself overshadowed and sidelined by the flamboyant, gun-toting Ol’ Blood n’ Guts George Patton was more than he could stand, so he went to Eisenhower and demanded his ‘own’ operation.
Tact was never a prominent feature of Monty’s character and he made no attempt to conceal his disregard of Eisenhower’s broad front policy, constantly criticizing it and demanding additional resources of troops and supplies for his own purposes.
Although ‘Market Garden’ was launched on September 17, it was already by then too late. The opportunity to drive north through a disorganized and retreating enemy had been lost.
Like the British General Sir Brian Horrocks put it:
‘We had made the cardinal mistake of underestimating our enemy – a very dangerous thing to do when fighting the Germans, who are among the best soldiers in the world. Their recovery after the disaster in Normandy was little short of miraculous.’
RAM, July 28 2010
As you are not Big Woody I am sure you will agree that it is despicable.
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@nickdanger3802
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
So there you have it. Brereton had the final say on MARKET.
Eisenhower had the final say on MARKET GARDEN, as by the beginning of September 1944, he was both allied supreme commander and allied land forces commander.
By why be so glum?..
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
Be happy...two American Generals were ultimately responsible for MARKET GARDEN.
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Not really...
Montgomery had no final say so in the MARKET airborne plan. on this the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
'What ever happened to the idea that the person planning the operation is the person executing that operation on the ground!' Your words.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, wat at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
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@BaronVonHobgoblin
Not really...
All of the evidence in my previous comment shows that Montgomery had no final over the airborne plan, where, it seems that the key reasons why Arnhem was not captured can be found. The final decisions on MARKET belonged to the US General, Brereton. Brereton had already vetoed a request to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived.
'This is squarely a failure of planning on the part of General Montgomery. To blame anyone else is to undermine the principle of the chain of command and the military as a whole.' Your words.
The FAAA had been formed to bring together resources to be able to act quickly in the ever changing situation in August and September 1944, and afterwards. Montgomery got approval from Eisenhower to undertake MARKET GARDEN on the 10th September, but did not see the FAAA MARKET plan until 15th September, at most, two days before the start date for MARKET GARDEN of 17th. As I have already shown, there is clear evidence that Montgomery had no final say on what the FAAA decided to do.
'It’s all fine for you to sit comfortably in your chair and let Monty save his face.' Your words.
Save face from what? Ill-informed historians who have zero experience of the events they are passing judgement on?
'As a former soldier who might at one time have been asked to do something similar that position is more than unhelpful when looking towards the future.' Your words.
As someone who is not a former soldier, I can only look to contemporary evidence, and the words of people who were there, to form opinions regarding who did what . As far as apportioning blame for things that went wrong is concerned, I am not remotely interested in hindsight. Any judgement must be based on the circumstances prevailing at that time, and what people knew when they made their decisions. As far as MARKET GARDEN is concerned, I would start with Eisenhower, who by that time, was both supreme commander, and allied land forces commander. Eisenhower had already presided over the entire land campaign since the beginning of September, as it ground to a halt after Normandy. He agreed to MARKET GARDEN, as a limited effort to gain the allies a foothold East of the Rhine, using the only additional resources to the allies at that time, the FAAA. He later stated:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.’ His words.
Montgomery was under pressure that was not applied to US commanders. Declining British resources led Montgomery being pressured to keep the war moving, as forces under his command were being earmarked for transfer to the Far East. Further, the first German V-2 rocket on London took place on the 8th September, two days before Montgomery’s meeting Eisenhower regarding
MARKET GARDEN.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.’
The V2 rocket could be launched from a mobile trailer, and once it was airborne, was all but impossible to intercept. The launching of V weapons against Britain took place in the Netherlands, in sight of British troops, my own father among them. It was considered that the only realistic way of stemming the V weapon bombardment was to cut off the flow of weapons to the Netherlands.
‘Either the commander's intent and the associated tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders were selected.’ Your words.
What is your point? That the failure to take Arnhem was down to these factors?
MARKET GARDEN was launched on a weather forecast of four clear days, starting, 17th September, which turned out to be false. How does that fit with tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders being selected? The Germans captured a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan right at the beginning of the operation, from a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone. How does that fit with tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders being selected?
‘As a former soldier who might at one time have been asked to do something similar that position is more than unhelpful when looking towards the future. In fact such face-saving obstruction of a proper accounting of Monty’s responsibility is actively anti-soldier in its content!’ Your words.
But Montgomery’s responsibility for everything he did as an army commander, and an army group commander, including MARKET GARDEN, has been looked to hair-splitting detail, particularly by American authors, to an extent that they do not go into with US commanders, even to the point ascribing motives to his behaviour such as a desire to get to Berlin before Patton or some such rubbish, for which there is not a shred of reliable evidence.
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@GiacomoLockhart
'I have read Horrocks, Monty, Kershaw, Hastings, Beevor, Burgett, Ryan, Middlebrook, Wilmot and some sources in German, among others'
OK. I have Montgomety, Middlebrook and Wilmot here. Take your pick.
I will type the first few words of text in a chapter...and you carry on from where I stop...
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John Cornell
'From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army'
What rubbish is this?..
Myth?...
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
CHAPTER ll
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
Alexander, Alanbrooke, Churchill and about 29 out of every 30 soldiers in the 8th Army talked about the effect Montgomery had on that army when he arrived.
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John Cornell
'From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 477 Brooke and the other chiefs of staff should never have allowed Churchill to dictate minor detail,nor to sack Generals and Admirals on a whim(the Air Marshalls got off lightly).Probably the worst example of picking the wrong man and backing him come what may,was in Brooke's constant support for Montgomery,who should have been dismissed once it became clear that he could not operate in a coalition environment,but whose retention soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War'
This Corrigan clown was born in 1942- making him 3/4 years old when the war ended. He was in the Gurkhas, but at the time of the Falklands, Corrigan was not even in the army. So much his close up knowledge.
Montgomery not able to operate in a coalition environment? I doubt if I could if I were him. A professional having to deal with a bunch of know nothings, without a day of personal combat experience between them. In any case, the politics and smooth relations was down to Eisenhower. He had fuck all else to contribute.
'soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War'. I don't think so. Montgomery was Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe in the 1950's. The new reality was the cold war. Who in allied circles was then going to bang about the war?
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@GiacomoLockhart
'You disparage everyone else's military service, even senior officers, if they disagree with you.' Your words.
'A professional having to deal with a bunch of know nothings, without a day of personal combat experience between them.' My words.
Eisenhower and Bradley had zero personal combat experience. Fact.
'Hastings was nowhere near the events those events. He was not even born until after the war had ended. He was a journalist in Vietnam and later in the Falklands War. That was it.' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decion makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'It seems to get a bit better with this Robert Kershaw, he has at least had some military experience, but he is still far too young to have been in the war.' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'As for Anthony Beevor, like the other two he is too young to have been involved in the war, he as in and out of the army in less than four years.
' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'This Corrigan clown was born in 1942- making him 3/4 years old when the war ended. He was in the Gurkhas, but at the time of the Falklands, Corrigan was not even in the army. ' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
In the case of Corrigan, his lunatic claim that 'National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army' is destroyed by the written account of Churchill, Alexander, DeGuingand and doubtless a good many others.
'So do tell us....what arm or service did you serve in?' Your words.
Why do you ask? You are the one claiming military experience, 25 years I believe. Why not tell us about it and how it qualifies you know, amongst other things, Montgomery's motive for launching Market Garden? Shall we remind ourselves of what you stated. Also, where in a British Army education did they use the term supreme commander?
I can hardly bear to type the words, but based on these exchanges you probably know less than Big Woody, if that is possible.
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@GiacomoLockhart
You have had your warning , several times over.
All of your opinions are clearly consistent with someone who has read a single modern version of events which you accept without question.
You used the term supreme commander where it clearly does not apply, you claim to know about what was in the mind of people who were involved in these events, you use the first thing you can find in wikipedia to try to back up ill thought through comments.
You dismiss the works of Alanbrooke, Churchill, DeGuingand, Eisenhower, Chester Wilmot and so on as 'boys' war comics'. Oh, and it seems, looking at your other defeat - to John Cornell, also the works of the US General Gavin.
On top of that, you claim a twenty five year in an army, without stating which army, and when cornered by real evidence, you come up with some cock and bull story about who your father knew.
You have had your chance to walk away and you have spurned it. From now on on, every time you come on hear, this is what you will get.
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Not really...
Casualties:
Fatal Casualties (%) Prisoners of war Evacuated safely(%) Total
and evaders (%)
1st Airborne 1,74 (13.1) 5,903 (65.8) 1,892 (21.1) 8,969
Glider pilots 219 (17.3) 511 (40.5) 532 (42.5) 1,262
Polish brigade 92 (5.4) 111 (6.6) 1,486 (88.0) 1,689
Total 1,485 (12.5) 6,525 (54.7) 3,910 (32.8) 11,920
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Arnhem casualties:
Fatal Casualties (%) Prisoners of war Evacuated safely(%) Total
and evaders (%)
1st Airborne 1,174 (13.1) 5,903 (65.8) 1,892 (21.1) 8,969
Glider pilots 219 (17.3) 511 (40.5) 532 (42.5) 1,262
Polish brigade 92 (5.4) 111 (6.6) 1,486 (88.0) 1,689
Total 1,485 (12.5) 6,525 (54.7) 3,910 (32.8) 11,920
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Again, for the thicko Polak:
`[The] Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’
Where in there?.. is there any hint that Montgomery blamed the Poles for the outcome at Arnhem.
And while I am about it...
...It was not just the Poles that penetrated the secrets of Enigma. The French had a hand in it as well, and when the secrets came to Britain in 1939, there was still a considerable amount of work to do to make the reading of German coded messages a practical reality.
...Britain was not obliged by treaty to go to war with the USSR after it invaded Eastern Poland.
...The Battle of Britain was won by a far, far, wider margin than the contribution of the Polish pilots, whose kill claims do not match German records.
...It was impossible in the middle of 1943 for Britain and the USA to accuse the USSR of being responsible for the Katyn Massacre.
...General Sikorski was not murdered. He was not important enough.
...Sosabowski was pain in the backside, with not allowing his troops to take part D-Day being amongst his greatest hits.
...Churchill tried repeatedly, without success, to get Roosevelt and Stalin to cooperate in get help to the Poles involved in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.
...There was no chance, short of all-out war to make the Russians create a free Poland in 1945.
...The omission of Polish airmen from the 1946 Victory Parade in London was an oversight that is dwarfed by what Britain did for Polish exiles during and after the war.
All clear now?..
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@johnlucas8479
'So your position is, as Supreme Commander Eisenhower was responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden. '
Eisenhower was ultimately responsible for the outcome of Market Garden.
It went with the job, along with the big Chateau hundreds of miles behind the front, the cars, the press conferences, and first crack at the female drivers.
If Arnhem had been taken, Eisenhower's name would have been all over the Hollywood films about about it. There would not have been mention of Montgomery.
'Then I can assume that you would argue that Montgomery should not receive any credit for the success of Operation Husky'
Montgomery did his job in Husky, including bribing Patton to rejoin the battle when he threw his toys out of his pram.
For Husky, unlike Market Garden, Eisenhower was not Allied Land Forces Commander.
'Operation Varsity and the Battle of the Bulge as the credit is due to Eisenhower as he was the Supreme Commander. Am I right.'
Not really...
The Bulge was entirely avoidable, with Montgomery warning Eisenhower about allied forces being spread too thinly and a warning from one of Bradley's subordinate commanders - Patton about a German attack in the Ardennes. Still, when it kicked off, Eisenhower did quite well, the first thing he did was to put the whole of the northern half of the bulge under Montgomery's command. As we all know, Montgomery quickly brought things under control.
Varsity as linked with Plunder went extremely well, as Eisenhower acknowledged:
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
His words.
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@johnlucas8479
If you look back, you will see that I stated that ultimate responsibility for Market Garden rested with Eisenhower in response to this comment from Sean Adams:
‘The blame for Operation Market Garden rest with Montgomery alone, plain and simple.’
His words.
Why is the term blame to be used? Market Garden failed to capture the Arnhem Bridge but it freed a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched German forces still further, hindered German efforts to reinforce and re-supply their forces in the remainder of the Netherlands, and their V-Weapon campaign against Belgium and Britain. If casualties are set against gains then Market Garden compares well with other operations at that time: Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest.
Blame applies where people and what they knew when decisions were made can be judged.
Hindsight can be easily applied to a situation but blame is quite a different matter.
Eisenhower created the First Allied Airborne Army (I believe, I do not know, against the advice of Bradley and Montgomery). Eisenhower turned down the opportunity to go into Germany with a combination of British 2nd Army and US 1st Army or by a combination of US 1st Army and US 3rd Army. His decision making or lack of decision led to the allies stopping along the entire front and allowing the Germans to recover from their defeat by Montgomery in Normandy.
Eisenhower created the overall situation, he approved Market Garden, he takes his share of responsibility. As does Brereton, who devised the airborne plan and over whom Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
As for Plunder/Varsity, Eisenhower learned the lessons of the past and wisely allowed Montgomery to plan and execute a complete victory as he had done at Alamein and in Normandy.
The US author Norman Gelb noted:
‘The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
As for Hollywood, look at what has happened: For decades Hollywood has distorted and stolen British history in order to promote a chauvinistic US version of history. Particularly the Second Word War in the likes of Patton, Pearl Harbour, Anne Frank: The Whole Story, Mussolini: The Untold Story, Objective, Burma!, Saving Private Ryan, and a good many more, with the perhaps the crowning turd being U-571, which years later drew this admission: "I did not feel good" about suggesting Americans captured the Enigma code rather than the British. It was a distortion... a mercenary decision to create this parallel history in order to drive the movie for an American audience,"
- David Ayer, Screenwriter U571
Its not just Britain and the Second World War. Argo (2018) showed blatant falsehoods about the parts played by Britain, Canada and New Zealand in saving Americans in Iran in 1979. The Patriot (2000) took a Nazi atrocity and falsely attributed it to Britain in the American War of Independence.
All this puts Hollywood alongside Stalin’s Russia and Nazi Germany in the distortion of history.
Hollywood has shown no interest in Plunder because Montgomery was in charge and it was successful. Hollywood has, however been all over the capture of Remagen Bridge which Eisenhower stated was due to good fortune.
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@johnlucas8479
‘My personal position regarding Operation market garden is that no individual is personally responsible for the failure just a combination of factors for example, single road, weather, distance from the objectives and the level of German resistance. I image the blame game started with TIK in blaming Gavin for the failure. After that each person than started to pass the blame on other individuals based on various decisions made without actual considering the underlying factors behind the particular decision or if any alternative decision was available.’
I do not really see blame as particularly appropriate. Lessons for the future maybe.
In my opinion, the decision to launch Market Garden was a reasonable one, given the circumstances at that time.
‘The push for the establishment of the 1st Airborne Army was by the British supported by Gen Marshall and Arnold. (Source Airborne Operations WW2).’
But the British only favoured a unified command of airborne troops. Eisenhower went much further by looking to integrate air forces into an allied airborne force, seemingly under pressure from General Marshall. Montgomery seems to have been doubtful of what use could be made of such a force:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 261
‘Under relentless pressure on Eisenhower from George Marshall and others in Washington to get those airborne divisions into the fight, the plan had been slapped together in less than a week. The First Allied Airborne Army, also created at War Department insistence, and the corps headquarters that preceded it had drafted and discarded eighteen operational plans in the past forty days.’
‘Even Montgomery seemed exasperated by the frantic cycle of concocting and scuttling plans to sprinkle paratroopers across the continent. “Are you asking me to drop cowpats all over Europe” the field marshal had reportedly asked his subordinates.’
The merits of broad front verse a single thrust can be hotly debated, as each approach has benefits and limitations. If you study the eastern front the Russian used both approaches at various times. The stopping of the Allies was due to supply shortest than Eisenhower decision making. Any advance into Germany would need the port of Antwerp to be operational whether its was a single thrust or Broad front. You raised a very interesting point.
But before Market Garden each army group was getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day, together, they were enough to sustain twenty division in attack with the remainder in a defensive situation. Later in the month (September) Dieppe would be available to add another 3,500 tons per day – enough to sustain the Canadian 1st Army in a renewed advance.
‘The 1AAA was allocated to 21st Army Group for the Operation, therefore theoretical under a normal chain of command Brereton would be reporting to Montgomery in the same way Dempsey. So why did Montgomery have no jurisdiction? Was one of the weakness of the Operation that there was no overall Commander or was the problem the short planning time of only 7 days did not allow for any one exercise the level of command required.’
Who can say? The evidence I have seen is clear in regard to Montgomery not being able to order the airborne forces.
When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 588
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days. Particularly for the British, the combination of too few men with too far to travel would soon prove fateful, even as paratroopers from the 1st Airborne Division collected their kit and hurried east in search of a bridge to seize.’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 265
‘Operation Plunder/Varsity was on the 24th March which was successful, however 2nd March 9th Army requested a surprise crossing of the Rhine was there was little opposition but was vetoed by Montgomery (source Airborne Operation WW2) because of German resistance in 2nd Army Area. What would have been the outcome if Montgomery had said yes.’
Who can say? So late in the war, why take the risk?
‘As to Remagen bridge, yes it was good fortune or luck, point is they take advance of good fortune and some time the difference between success and failure is timing or luck. Dunkirk would not have occurred if the German High Command did not stop the Panzer Division. A lucky hit sunk the Hood and later a lucky hit by British Swordfish resulted in the sinking of the Bismarck. Luck sometimes plays it part in a battle.’
But Eisenhower still understood that Montgomery had (again) given a masterclass in planning and battle management.
As noted by an American author, who, admittedly was not there:
‘The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
BY NORMAN GELB 1994 CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED
P406
‘Regarding Hollywood, I do agree with you about U571, although they do acknowledge HMS Bulldog and the British in the credits.’
Yea, but only after pressure from Britain, and the film makers having found out that David Balme was actually still alive. 15 Enigma encoding machines were captured from U-boats in the war. 13 were captured by the Royal Navy, 1 by the RCN and 1 by the USN – in June 1944, after D-Day. Just imagine if the story had been the other way around and the British had stolen the story, what the reaction would have been in the USA.
‘I not sure about Saving Private Ryan as I have visited the graves of the 2 brothers the Movie was based on, it may not be 100% accurate.’
The gratuitous slur on Montgomery, words to the effect: ‘the British are booged down in front of Caen, Montgomery is overrated.’ What rubbish, as if front line would privy to things like that.
If US film makers want to make films about US people then that is fine, but it is evil to puff themselves up at Britain’s expense.
‘Patton is reasonable accurate as its focus only on what actions Patton was involved in and clearly not a complete record of Patton actions in WW2.’
The whole thing was designed to promote a chauvinistic US story, without any care as to how British history was trampled on. The race to Messina that only existed in Patton’s head, the complete falsehood that Bradley was responsible for the Normandy strategy, the complete falsehood that Patton was stopped because his supplies were needed for the Market Garden build up. And probably a few more that I have forgotten.
‘I image the sane for British Movies for example "Sound Barrier" are also not 100% accurate’
In so far as the US reneged on an agreement to share technology regarding the sound barrier and that the first instance of breaking the sound barrier was attributed to the serial liar Chuck Yeager, then yes, the film is inaccurate.
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J Wilson
The Falaise Gap.
Far from being an example of ‘Monty’s lethargy, it was a miscalculation by US General Bradley. As he acknowledged:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
Montgomery and Eisenhower.
Montgomery went into Normandy as allied land forces commander with a clear plan and won a huge victory, ahead of schedule. Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander at the beginning of September, when the Germans had less tanks and artillery pieces on the western front than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy gave the Germans time and space to re-build their forces, and launch the Ardennes offensive.
Montgomery had, on the 23rd August proposed to Eisenhower that the allies should prioritize a thrust in the North to grab the Ruhr. Failing that, an advance in the south should be the priority. Either way, such a decision should be made. Eisenhower did neither.
The Ruhr.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P510
‘the Ruhr-Aachen area which was producing 51.7 per cent of her hard coal and 50.4 per cent of her crude steel? Without these basic resources the output of arms and ammunition would be drastically curtailed, if not crippled. The armies in the East might be supplied for a time from the mines and factories of Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but these could not nourish a war on two fronts. If the Ruhr and the Rhineland could be captured or neutralised, it would matter little what armies Hitler might keep in the field in the West, since he would not be able to provide them with the means of continuing the fight.’
Supply.
At the beginning of September, the allies were receiving 14,000 tons of supplies per day, 12,000 tons was enough to supply an advance by British 2nd Army and US 1st Army, leaving US 3rd Army and on a defensive stance with 2,000 tons. 3,,000 tons per day that could delivered via Dieppe by the middle of the month would suffice for the 1st Canadian Army. Further, Le Havre was operational in October and other channel ports were to become available in the Autumn and winter.
An additional 500 tons per day were being flown in to feed Paris was redirected to 21st Army Group as the food situation in the French capital eased. These were the only additional resources given to Montgomery before Market Garden.
Planning.
All planning for the airborne ‘Market’ part of the operation was led by the US General Brereton, who held his first planning meeting on the 10th September, 1944, after Browning had flown back to England from meeting Montgomery in Belgium about Market Garden, which Eisenhower had approved earlier that day. Brereton oversaw a plan that placed drop and landing zones too far from objectives and failed to include a second lift on the first day. That Montgomery had no final say on airborne matters is evidenced by the following:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
A copy final Market Garden plan was found by the Germans on the body of a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider in a US combat area.
XXX Corps.
Linked up with US 2nd Airborne Division on morning of the third day, having coped with the 12 hours taken to build a new bridge at Son. The ideas that XXX Corps failed to keep pace with what was achievable regarding time or that another commander could have done significantly better than Horrocks are old wives’ tales
Urquhart.
What bearing did any lack of airborne experience have on Urquhart’s part have on the outcome of the fighting at Arnhem?
Gavin failed to be in possession Nijmegen city or Bridge when XXX Corps arrived there.
Maxwell-Taylor failed to secure Son Bridge.
Eisenhower and Bradley did have a single day of personal combat experience between them.
Losses.
The ‘staggering losses’ at Market Garden you mentioned amounted to 17,000 and should be compared with allied failures at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,00 casualties).
The Poles.
Montgomery wrote to Alanbrooke on the 17th October criticizing the performance of the Poles for their performance in Market Garden. Browning did the same on 20th November, when he wrote to Weeks. Neither Montgomery or Browning scapegoated the poles for the outcome of Market Garden.
The weather.
Market Garden was given the go-ahead on a weather forecast of four clear days from day one. This did not materialize, only two of the nine days of operation had good weather.
Eisenhower had this to say on the Market Garden weather:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather.’
German General Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
The Scheldt.
The idea that the Scheldt could attacked and cleared straightaway after the capture of Antwerp has little basis in reality. The necessary forces for an assault on the estuary were not in place and the Germans were in control of the Breskens Pocket. Brereton had already rejected a suggestion by Montgomery to use Airborne forces at the Scheldt due to the terrain and flak. Whenever an attack took place on the Scheldt, the estuary would have been mined by the Germans – adding three weeks to the timescale of any assault.
The idea that VIII Corps and XII Corps could have been channeled down the same road as XXX Corps is absurd.
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@jwilson9273
‘Monty was supposed to seize Caen by D+4…it took two months.’
Your words.
What Montgomery was supposed to do was to be at the Seine by D+90.
He made it by D+78.
Here are the words of an eye witness to Montgomery’s briefing to allied leaders on 15th May 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’
If you wish to quote Chester Wilmot, that is fine by me:
‘On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that XV U.S. Corps
could have driven straight on from Argentan to Falaise on the 13th or
14th. Contrary to contemporary reports, the Americans did not capture
Argentan until August 20th, the day after the link-up at Chambois.’
And Horrocks:
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 53
one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without ‘equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
And DeGuingand again:
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
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@larrytestmi5976
Falaise:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book.
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Chapter 3
The Falaise Pocket
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Omaha:
The US DD Tanks were launched three miles out at sea. At the other beaches they were launched a few hundred yards from the beach. The US Army took no specialized armour to Omaha Beach. The shore bombardment at Omaha was shorter than at the other beaches.
D-Day Beach casualties: Utah 589, Omaha 3,686, Gold 1,023, Juno 1,242, Sword 1,304. Stephen Zaloga, "The Devil's Garden.
Caen (Cann):
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
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William Swan
‘So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden, and needlessly, too. It was among the worst military operations ever, ranking right alongside Montgomery’s “Operation Goodwood” at Caen, Winston Churchill’s hare-brained and lethal interventions at Calais and in the early Norwegian Campaign, and Gen. Mark Clark and Major Gen. John P. Lucas’s colossal stuff-up at Anzio.’ Your words.
Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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William Swan
‘1. Market Garden occurred because Patton, Bradley, and other American generals had complained bitterly and at great length about Montgomery dragging his feet in the battle for Caen, Montgomery’s appalling “Death Ride of the Armoured Divisions” during Operation Goodwood, and his tardy closure of the Falaise Pocket. Montgomery, notoriously arrogant and conceited, was desperate to redeem himself by displaying verve and strategic flare. He therefore proposed the advance from the Belgian border to Arnhem. The actual distance was 70 miles, (120 km). Even if successful, it would greatly extend the front with Nazi Germany, and the distance that supplies and reinforcements had to travel through “bandit country” from Channel ports. Dwight Eisenhower gave Montgomery the go-ahead to allow Montgomery to save face. That’s what the whole desperate, bloody, tragic farce was about: saving Montgomery’s damn pride.’ Your words.
Market Garden occurred because Montgomery and Eisenhower saw an opportunity to exploit perceived German weakness at the beginning of September 1944. At that point, the Germans had only 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces in the western front, less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. When the British tanks drove into Amiens on the 31st August they discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West. A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that Germans facing his British 2nd Army were "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
Eisenhower had rejected Montgomery proposal at their meeting on the 23rd August that allied resources should be concentrated either in the North (Dempsey / Hodges, under Montgomery) or in the South (Hodges / Patton, under Bradley) so that the advance could continue into Germany. However, at the beginning of September, Eisenhower made the First Allied Airborne Army available for operations in the North. Before Eisenhower and Montgomery met on the 10th September at Brussels, Montgomery received an urgent request to undertake an operation that would hinder German V2 rocket attacks on London, which had begun on the 8th September. Market Garden could be undertaken without denuding other armies of resources, it could have taken the allies to the Ruhr and hindered V2 attacks on London. That is why it went ahead.
As weeping at the Oosterbeek Cemetery…each as they will. This is what General Urquhart stated:
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD
1958
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying:
The operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
We have no regrets.’
I hold the same view today, when the survivors are scattered all over the world, some of them still in the Army; when Arnhem is a busy and architecturally attractive post-war city with most of its scars healed. A new bridge spans the Neder Rhine. Sometimes a Dutchman finds a mortar splinter in his garden, and people on their Sunday walks come across spent British ammunition in the pine woods and the polder-land by the river.’
His words.
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William Swan
‘3. Due to the terrain, all heavy vehicles had to drive along a single road. This is against military doctrine and common sense. When a leading vehicle was destroyed, it blocked miles of vehicles behind it, so they could be attacked, in turn.
4. Much of the road was mined. The planners did not make nearly enough allowance for the many hours that would be wasted, while mines were cleared. The column was so painfully slow that the Germans could even mine the road ahead and lay ambushes, as it inched forward, (or didn’t).
5. Due to soggy, low-lying land, many stretches of the road through Eindhoven and Nijmegen to Arnhem were causeways. Vehicles silhouetted against the sky were picked off by concealed artillery, anti-tank guns, and panzerfaust teams. (By then, the Luftwaffe was a minor problem.)’ Your words.
But XXX Corps at Grave at 8.30 on the morning of the third day, with the entire day available to reach the troops at Arnhem Bridge. The points you mentioned had not stopped this. The problem was that the US 82nd Airborne Division had not taken Nijmegen City or Nijmegen Bridge.
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William Swan.
‘6. The Allied commanders had received false information that German troops along the road north would be second rate. They fought extremely well, and stubbornly. As TIK points out, during Operation Market Garden the German ability to form ad hoc military formations (the "Kampfgruppen") proved to be supremely effective - and not just at Arnhem!’ Your words.
‘8. Accurate Dutch information about German armoured units refitting near Arnhem should have been heeded, but was neglected because German intelligence was known to have captured and turned many British agents and members of the Dutch resistance. Allied intelligence was rotten. The quantity and quality of intelligence must weigh heavily when any operation is considered.’ Your words.
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
The aerial photography was far from clear – it can be seen on line.
Given all that, what were Eisenhower, Montgomery and Brereton supposed to do? Go or not go?
I could not say, could you?
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@etangdescygnes
William Swan
‘Yes. You are right. Dwight Eisenhower should have prioritised the Scheldt. The statement you quote is: "...Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches ...". It doesn't say Montgomery was "...ordered to...". There is a strong implication from this, and the admission of Sir Brian Horrocks, Commander of XXX Corps that he always regretted his decision not to press on from Antwerp to close off the Scheldt, that the British commanders could have persuaded Eisenhower to prioritise the Scheldt, if they had wished - but Montgomery didn't wish it, not right after Antwerp had been captured, and not later.’ Your words.
But by this time, Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and Land Forces Commander. Such a decision had to be his. In Normandy, during Montgomery’s tenure as Land Forces Commander, Montgomery had worked to a clear plan with the capture of the port of Cherbourg as the clear priority. Eisenhower had no such plan and the entire allied effort suffered.
‘Instead, Montgomery pushed his lethally flawed "Operation Market Garden" to redeem himself after his reputation had been seriously hurt among the American generals by his leaden feet at Caen, his appalling "Death Charge of the Armoured Divisions" during Operation Goodwood, and his slowness in closing the Falaise Gap, married to a desire to display the same kind of flare and dash as Patton, his most bitter critic.’ Your words.
Where is there reliable evidence that Montgomery wanted ‘to redeem himself after his reputation had been seriously hurt among the American generals by his leaden feet at Caen’? By evidence, I mean, his words, either spoken or written. Why would he? Montgomery had delivered victory in Normandy by D+78 ahead of the scheduled completion date of D+90, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and by giving the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad. Why would Montgomery have been worried about US commanders? Bradley and Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat between them. Bradley’s subordinate commander Hodges seems to have been largely anonymous. Bradley’s other subordinate commander, Patton had been passed over for Army Group command, possibly to his personal behaviour, and his Third Army was not even operational until 2nd August.
As for Caen, possession of that place had little effect on the outcome of Overlord. The Germans massed the vast bulk of their forces there, including 84% of their armour, just as Montgomery had intended. This led to the American breakout (Operation Cobra) facing next to no opposition, as evidenced by people who were there:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
Alanbrooke.
‘I feel I must write and congratulate you on what seems likely to be one of the most decisive battles in the world’s history.’
‘It has in every way justified your strategy and tactics, which I will remember you expounding long before we left England. How we were to bear the brunt of the battle for the first few weeks by constantly attacking the enemy, never giving him any rest , and never letting him have the chance of regaining the initiative. All this this to take the pressure off the Americans so that they might achieve what they did achieve and are achieving.’
Richard O’Connor.
As for the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Sir Brian Horrocks.
‘flare and dash’:
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
Notice that the sources I have quoted are people that were at the time, not historians writing about events that they had no personal knowledge of.
‘Obviously you can hold any opinion you wish, but it is my own belief that Market Garden was driven by Montgomery, for Montgomery, against all sound and wise military practices, and Eisenhower nodded because he had to hold the alliance together. Yes, Eisenhower had ultimate authority and must take the blame for saying "Yes", but Market Garden was rushed and fatally flawed. For the unnecessary deaths and maiming, I squarely blame Montgomery. You can blame whoever you wish!’
Your words.
Eisenhower and Montgomery stuck by their decision. Montgomery later stating: ‘As I was the Commander-in-Chief in that part of Europe, I must be responsible’. Unlike the US General Brereton, who was responsible MARKET, and over whom, Montgomery had no jurisdiction, and who, after the war, concocted a wartime diary in order to try to exonerate himself for things that went wrong.
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William Swan
‘9. As TIK points out, it was falsely believed that the ground south-west of the Rhine bridge at Arnhem was unsuitable for airborne landings, forcing the primary landings to occur 7 to 14 km (4.35 to 8.70 miles) away, (not “9 to 14 miles”). This was against military doctrine, and gave German officers time to organise the defence.’ Your words.
OK. But FAAA devised the air plan.
‘10. A German, Hans Koch, found the entire Allied plan for the operations at Arnhem in a pocket of an American officer’s uniform. He had died when his glider crashed. The American had carried the plans in violation of an explicit order not to do so. Koch made his discovery within 15 minutes after the first glider landed at midday on 17 September 1944, and rushed to Model’s headquarters. Model probably saw the plan within two hours of the first Allied landing.’ Your words.
Yes, as confirmed by the German General Karl Student:
"a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’ His words.
‘11. The British radios were virtually useless for communication between units on the ground, and for communicating with supporting aircraft. Yet good radios were essential for dispersed landings, and the British had planned to advance eastwards through Arnhem along three routes parallel to the river, simultaneously. Any chance of coordinated action that remained after the Germans had captured the plans, was torpedoed by the hopeless radios. Yet any senior officer who had bothered to make the relevant enquiries would have discovered how bad the radios were, long before the operation started! There should have been courts martial for such shoddy leadership!’ Your words.
But the problems were not confined to British radios. If people should have been court martialled, who should that have been?
‘12. The airborne troops lacked sufficient motorised transport and artillery. Even more bicycles would have helped.’ Your words.
Fifty-two 6-pounder and sixteen 17-pounder anti-tank guns. About 110 Jeeps. What should the totals have been?
‘13. The plan depended on airborne troops and supplies being delivered in successive waves during the first three days, due to a lack of aircraft. This made the operation vulnerable to bad weather, and that’s precisely what happened! Essential drops were delayed much too long.’ Your words.
But Market Garden was launched against a weather forecast of four clear days from the 17th September.
‘14. If Market Garden had succeeded, it might have led to a rapid advance to Berlin across the northern German plain. By failing, it extended the Allied flank 70 miles along the Rhine, forcing sectors to be thinly held by inexperienced troops, and stretching supply lines further. This situation created the opportunity for the Germans’ Ardennes Offensive, the “Battle of the Bulge” ’ Your words.
Are you attempting to pass judgement on the outcome of Market Garden with hindsight? Or are you trying to pass judgement on the decisions made by people at that time, based on their situation at that time? As far as the cause of “Battle of the Bulge” is concerned. That was surely down to Eisenhower’s Broad Front strategy, which stopped the allied advance, giving the Germans what they most needed, time and pace to rebuild existing forces and to create new forces – which were used in the Ardennes. Montgomery warned about a German counter attack, as did one of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton. Aachen, the Hurtgen Forest, Market Garden, Metz and so on all suffered from being under resourced due to the Broad Front strategy.
Alan Moorehead, who was with allied armies at that time noted:
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’
His words.
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@johnlucas8479
You omitted Aachen in your list of casualties and timescales
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign
P 224
‘The recent battering at Aachen had had occupied the first Army for a full month and cost 20,000 casualties and yet at no point had Hodges got more than twelve miles into Germany.’
As for German casualties, depending on where the figures came from, those fogures might need to be treated with caution…
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 489
‘German losses would be difficult to count with precision, not least because the Americans tended to inflate them. (Patton at times concocted figures from the whole cloth, or assumed that enemy casualties were tenfold the number of prisoners taken.) A U.S. Army estimate of 120,000 losses in the month following the launch of HERBSTNEBEL was surely too high, and Bradley’s claim of more than a quarter-million was preposterous. One post-war analysis put the figure at 82,000, another at 98,000. The official German history would cite 11,000 dead and 34,000 wounded, with an intermediate number captured, missing, sick, and injured.’
Where does all this start and finish?..
D-Day - 10,000 casualties in less than 24 hours, maximum allied advance, five miles, approx.
Casualties set against time, distances, outcome?
Market Garden stretched the already overstretched German forces another 50 miles, freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on Britain and left the allies well placed to advance to the Rhine in the months that followed. William Swan sat in the Oosterbeek Commonwealth cemetery and wept. Perhaps William Swan could pass on what happened when he visited cemeteries in Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, or what he might think and when he visits those places.
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@johnlucas8479
William Swan stated this:
‘So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden, and needlessly, too. It was among the worst military operations ever, ranking right alongside Montgomery’s “Operation Goodwood” at Caen, Winston Churchill’s hare-brained and lethal interventions at Calais and in the early Norwegian Campaign, and Gen. Mark Clark and Major Gen. John P. Lucas’s colossal stuff-up at Anzio.’
So, he was the one that began making comparisons...
I merely compared the casualties at Market Garden with the casualties incurred it the same theatre of war, in some other operations, during Eisenhower's tenure as allied land forces commander. The actions noted by William Swan would seem to have been a more disparate collection than the the ones I noted.
Where do other factors come in, in the tear jerking stuff?..
This?:
'So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden'?
At Arnhem, a very high percentage of casualties were those persons that were taken prisoner, rather than maimed and killed. How does that ratio compare the rest of Market Garden, and other operations?
And, or this?:
'and needlessly, too'?
Does this come down to whether commanders were right to launch an operation, knowing what they knew at that time? Who can say?..
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@finallyfriday.
Part Two.
You stated that Montgomery was not a fighter...
After being sidelined due his outspoken criticism of the campaign in France, Montgomery was was apppointed to command British forces in Torch, but was immediately re-assigned to command Eighth Army on the death of General Gott. In the desert he told his troops:
'The defence of Egypt lies here at Alamein and on the Ruweisat Ridge. What is the use of digging trenches in the Delta? It is quite useless; if we lose this position we lose Egypt; all the fighting troops now in the Delta must come here at once, and will. Here we will stand and fight; there will be no further withdrawal. I have ordered that all plans and instructions dealing with further withdrawal are to be burnt, and at once. We will stand and fight here.
If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.'
His words.
And this, in his first major command. Notice his use of we and us instead of you.
Unlike US comanders, who always grabbed themselves the biggest mansion, castle, or chateaux they could find, Montgomery, as an army commander, and as an army group commander lived and worked oit of three caravans. Last time time I looked they could still be seen at the Imperial War Museum in London. You should go there one day, you might learn something.
There was no hanging about at SHAEF for Montgomery. If peoople wanted to see him, they had to go a lot closer to front line.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fwqAQ1-ixE&t=121s&ab_channel=mrgreen1066
0.09 seconds onwards.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTUC79o4Kmc&lc=UgyzeTPA0DgNrj1Ya5R4AaABAg.9JpkSvfkI669KEqyZMJfoa&feature=em-comments
1,hr, 4 minutes, 31 seconds onwards.
When Montgomery went to see Hodges at his headquarters in the US bulge crisis, Hodges offered Montgomery a sit dowd meal. Montgomery, said no words to the effect, I've got a flask of sandwiches and coffee, I'll eat those and we can then get down to work.
The Germans surrendered to Montgomery it was in a tent on Lüneburg Heath. That is were the Army was.
...it ain't like they told you in the Hollywood films.
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@charleszhaowang
Good for Monty! I might have exaggerated when I talked about his retirement. But here are few facts:
‘- Reaching the Seine earlier than the schedule, the real cause for that is Operation Cobra - the
Normandy breakout, led by Bradley, Patton, US 3rd Army, and Falaise encirclement, where the incompletion of the encirclement was also attributed to Monty’s fault.’
No. Drawing almost all of the German armour (84%) onto the British Second Army front, allowing the US First Army to capture Cherbourg to help to ensure that the allies won the battle of the build-up, and then to break out towards central France. Operation Cobra took place 25–31 July 1944. US Third Army, led by Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton joined the battle on 2nd August, 1944.
Bradley was responsible for any failure to complete the ‘Falaise encirclement’, as he later acknowledged:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
And also, another participant:
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Sir Brian Horrocks’ Corps Commander. Page 53.
‘- Michael Wittmann, SS Panzer Ace, single handedly halted the advance of an entire British armed division during the Falaise encirclement.’
No. The action took a week after D-Day (13th June). Wittmann was killed on the 8th August.
‘- The Scheldt, after Operation Market Garden, the Scheldt actually became secondary objectives, compared to the Allied’s advance toward Germany.’
No. Due to Eisenhower’s mistaken policy for the all of the allies to advance at the same time, the Scheldt became the allies first objective after Market Garden, until the Scheldt was cleared.
‘- Northern part of the Bulge, yes, good for Monty, and British was lucky, did not bear the brunt of the German offense. But remember this, when Monty demanded for more control of the campaign, Bradley threatened to resign, and Eisenhower threatened to talk to Churchill.’
But Montgomery commanded two US Armies in the Bulge, so how was Montgomery lucky?
As far as control of the land campaign was concerned, Montgomery wanted a single, competent commander, preferably himself, but, failing that, he would accept Bradley as land forces commander, providing a decision to appoint a single commander was made.
‘- Saved Denmark from Russian occupation, actually this is a big point, imagine if that happened, the outcome of WW II would be very different, and Hitler and the Allied would probably reach Moscow for the second time.’
To imagine that, would be to imagine the greatest criminal in history, Hitler, getting way with his crimes.
‘With huge hindsight, regardless the internal squabbling within Allied themselves, the biggest mistake of WW II is actually the failure to contain Communism. The entire Cold War history of the past 60 years or so has proven this point. Unfortunately that is just the way it is.’
If so, then the key actions that allowed that to happen were American: failure to support actions to block the Russians in the Balkans, Eisenhower’s broad front policy that stopped the allied advance in the West, Roosevelt trying to do a deal with Stalin behind Churchill’s back, Eisenhower stopping the allied forces from advancing towards Berlin.
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@jwrosenbury
‘Which part?
All of it.
The destruction of enemy forces is what Montgomery sought. When he met Eisenhower on the 23rd August 1944, Montgomery stated that allies were not strong enough to advance on a broad front, and that in order to keep after the Germans, a decision should be made to concentrate the available resources on one part of the front. 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group were each getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day and this allowed for 20 divisions to continue the advance with the remaining forces put on a defensive footing. Montgomery advocated that British 2nd Army and US 1st Army should advance together towards the Ruhr, in order to most effectively stifle German war production, with Canadian 1st Army, and US Third Army put on a defensive stance. Failing that, Eisenhower should go with the US 1st Army, and the US 3rd Army, with British 2nd Army and the Canadian1st Army put on a defensive stance. Montgomery offered to abide by either decision, provided that such a decision was made.
The available allied intelligence seems to have favoured Montgomery’s point of view:
SHAEF intelligence report: 26.08.44:
" Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
Eisenhower chose neither of the options presented by Montgomery.
Political considerations seem to have come from Eisenhower, rather than Britain:
In answer to Montgomery's proposal to halt the 1st Canadian Army and the US 3rd Amy
Eisenhower stated:
"The American public would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
‘Or the part where British intelligence ignored warnings of German armor for political reasons? Oh, it couldn't be that part. I left that out since it was a minor supporting detail.’ Your words.
The intelligence regarding German armour was inconclusive:
A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that the Germans facing his British 2nd Army were: "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 of 13.09.44stated that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
The aerial photo reconnaissance showed little in the way of armoured vehicles – those photos can be seen on line.
Anything purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was routinely ignored due to the German ‘Englandspiel’ penetration of the Underground, and Market Garden was no different to any other matter at that time in this regard.
‘Even the best generals aren't perfect, and Monty wasn't the best general. He was only mid-grade.’ Your words.
You base this opinion on what evidence?..
‘Admittedly he was the best the British had, but that's damning with faint praise. Slim was maybe better, but Burma was a totally different operation requiring different skills. He rated great as generals go.’ Your words.
The best that Britain had?.. Who are they being compared to?..
Opinion: German generals usually seem to have performed well. But were seldom more successful than the anyone else when the odds were not in their favour. A good many of them seem to have been involved in war crimes, and, in some cases they were rather to close to German crimes against humanity.
Opinion: Russian commanders were faced with the unhappy problem of fighting on their own territory and, perhaps, partly due to political pressure, were profligate with Russian lives
By the time that the US Amy finally saw action against the German Army, the Germans were irretrievably committed to a two front war and were short of manpower and weapons, particularly up-to-date weapons.
Facts: Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower had never seen a day of personal combat, Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943.
Alanbrooke, Alexander, Auchinleck, Gort, Maitland, Montgomery, Slim and Wavell had all seen action in the First World War, and all been involved in under-resourced campaigns when the German Army were at the height of its power.
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@nickdanger3802
‘Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success"’
Bernhard, the SS man, and Nazi Party member, got shown the door by both the British and US in the Netherlands. He was given refuge in Britain after the Netherlands folded in four days in 1940. Only his royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
‘Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen’
If the Russians were sharing doubts about any one person, much more likely those doubts were about Eisenhower, as the Americans made sure that the know nothing bald bloke’s ceremonial role as supreme commander was trumpeted around the world. Perhaps the Russians were showing solidarity with the British. The two countries that had done most to bring about the defeat of Nazi Germany. If, however, there is an implied criticism of Britain, then the Russians can fcuk off. Britain (including Montgomery) were fighting the Germans while the Russians were in an alliance with Nazi Germany. Whatever, Norman Gelb made a berk of himself on this point.
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@onylra6265
Not really...
My questions to you were:
One: How do you know what was in Montgomery's mind regarding Market Garden?
in reply to your claim that: 'It was the brainfart of Monty, in service of his bruised ego'
All you have done is to show that Montgomery was prepared to state that he had made a mistake in thinking that the Canadian 1st Army could clear the Scheldt Estuary on its own.
How does that relate to your claim of him having a bruised ego?
"I have not been afflicted with any feeling of disappointment over this"
Where is this on record that Churchill stated this?...
'and backed to the hilt by arch-bungler Churchill.' Your words.'
I asked you, where is there any evidence that Churchill had any direct involvement in Market Garden? Montgomery proposed Maket Garden on the 10th September, 1944,. At that time, Churchill was attending the OCTAGON conference in Canada.
Why was Montgomery's promotion to Field Marshall 'spiteful'? That promotion was in line with the same promotions of Alenbrooke, Alexander, and Maitland -Wison at that time. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradley, they all had personal combat experience, followed by command at various levels, up to senior command. In Montgomery's case, he had been awarded the DSO in the First World war, he had perfomed with distinction, under trying circumstances in Frace in 1940, when in command of a single division. As a single army commander, he had won in North Africa and Sicily. As an Army Group commander, he had won in Normandy. By contrast, Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience (he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943), he had never commanded a division in the field, and had not directly commanded an army in a campaign. If a comparison were to be made between the merits of Eisenhower being made a Five Star General and Montgomery being a Field Marshall, based on their respective military achievments, as far as I can see it was a case of Eisenhower being over promoted.
As for the 'arch-bungler Churchill', he led Britain for 62 of its 72 war. At the end, Britain, British Commonwealth and Empire territories were free of Axis control, at a cost of less than 700,000 war dead.
Of the other major war leaders, Hitler, ended the war dead, with Germany in pieces and occupied and millions of Germans dead. Mussolini was was out of power and dead. Tojo ended the war dead and with Japan in pieces and occupied. Stalin occupied Eastern Europe, but at a cost of 27 million Russian dead. The other war leaders from around the world do not really compare. Roosevelt, for example, was in charge of a country that was thousands of miles from its nearest enemy, was untouched by war, and was not in conflict with Germany when it was at the height of its power. I would take Churchill over this motley collection of individuals.
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@onylra6265
Rick Atkinson's Guns at Last Light p224-5, offers no evidence to support his claim that Churchill promoted Montgomery to the rank of Field Marshall "as a solace". Churchill's six volume history of the war makes no mention of the promotion, nor does Montgomery in his memoirs, or in his 1947 work Normandy to Baltic'. Chester Wilmot does not mention it in 'The Struggle for Europe'. Anyone can guess what the motivation was for the comments that Atkinson noted by Ramsay and Bradley's subordinate, Patton.
Perhaps Ramsay was put out at not being promoted to Admiral of the Fleet. Who can
say? Based on current evidence I could not say...and neither can anyone else.
As Bradley's subordinate, Patton. Iin a note to his wife, he wrote: 'I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say?' No word about the desirability of the war ending as soon as possible, only his personal situation. Perhaps he also saw Montgomery's promotion as a possible impediment to his quest for personal glory. Who can say?..
As for Antony Beevor, I have not read the work you noted. Why would I have? I do not look for history books in the book carousel stands at airport departure lounges. If it is like his others efforts, it will bring nothing new to the subject. Why would it?..All the key people were dead before he started work, all the key evidence has long since been found. Unless key evidence in the VD figures for troops in newly liberated Luxembourg or some such stuff. Still, as if he needs to worry about what I state. He knows how to pander to his chauvinistic American readership and the lucrative US lecture circuit. I hope he get to read this, but I could not be that lucky.
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'Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.'
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers personal combat experience, zero. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers in planning military campaigns, sod all. Brereton experience of airborne operations, zero. So much for them, and their nancy boy US CV's.
Browning fought, and commanded in two world wars, Urquart had been in action prior MARKET GARDEN. His performance at ARNHEM was commented on by Brigadier Hackett: 'I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.' His words. Lathbury had peformed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as well taking part in HUSKY.
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Nick Danger
'Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.'
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers personal combat experience, zero. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers in planning military campaigns, sod all. Brereton experience of airborne operations, zero. So much for them, and their nancy boy US CV's.
Browning fought, and commanded in two world wars, Urquart had been in action prior MARKET GARDEN. His performance at ARNHEM was commented on by Brigadier Hackett: 'I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.' His words. Lathbury had peformed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as well taking part in HUSKY.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
'There you go - that's how important LZs are,Geronimo a former US Para tried telling these slappies.If 1st Para were properly supplied they wouldn't have taken Arnhem but they could have fought off the encirclement and performed a tactical retreat with a lot less losses. But that's Monty again a no show during the largest air drop up until that point of the war - any other Army he's either removed or shot'
How stupid can any one person [Para Dave] get. Brigadier Hicks ccreated the horseshoe shaped perimeter to try ensure 1st airborne were not entirely surrounded. Several major things combined to hinder his plans, including the Nijmegen Bridge nor being in US hands when XXX Corps arrived on the scene during the morning of the third day, and the Germans finding a copy of the MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier at the start of the operation.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart.
Was does an idiot like Para Dave expect?.. That Montgomery be in the lead XXX Corps tank? Nobody asked that that Brdley be i the lead US tank into Arnhem.
Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
That is what you call 'no show'.
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@nickdanger3802
'Why would a US soldier have the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" since the only people who would need or have access to the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" would be Browning and his useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
The Germans would not need the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" to know where the British were or that they would be resupplied by air drop, would they?'
Oh well, its your funeral...
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@nickdanger3802
Yea... far more important than getting the entire MARKET GARDEN plan as soon as the operation started.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
Cheer up... I might get bored with doing this. You can but hope.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
Part one (of two).
0/10 for effort. 0/10 for knowledge of the subject.
‘This just keeps getting earier and easier. BTW how is it Monty got driven into the ENGLISH channel,and never got Dunkirked after the GIs arrived? Read Monty's confession’
Yea right ho…
Like Montgomery, a single division commander in 1940 was responsible for the outcome of the allied strategy in 1940. The ‘GIs arrived’… with an advance guard to Northern Ireland in the middle of 1942. With the outcome of the war already settled, in the skies over Britain in 1941, and in front of Moscow in 1941. Still, there was plenty of time for the big victory parades that the Americans love so much.
‘Monty's misadventures - where was he when this debacle started coming apart everywhere almost immediately? Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses at the Belgian border until the Troop support and supply flights went over at 2:30 in the Afternoon?Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why didn't Monty or the Others think to put the bridging equipment up front?17 bridges over 12-13 canals might have come in handy ON TIME don't you think? All 4 Senior British officers and not one thought of this glaring over site - that explains why the RN & RAF was much better led than anything Monty came up with. Try reading what the top officers in the Alliance had to say’
Oh dear…To whom it may concern…
MARKET GARDEN was timed against the start of MARKET. All enquiries on that one to be sent to the heirs of the US General Lewis Brereton. The Son Bridge was 20 miles from the GARDEN start line was blown up by the Germans within a short time of the US airborne forces landings at ONE end of that bridge. XXX Corps got a Baily Bridge to Son and installed it – all in 12 hours. Seems like a marvellous effort. It is widely known that XXX Corps had copious amounts of bridging equipment as far forward as any reasonable assumption about likely needs could be made. ‘glaring over site’ US 82nd turning up at Nijmegen without assault boats might be seen as a glaring oversight. Who can say?..
‘Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." ’
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’ -notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. All this after five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ’
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
‘From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
‘Now how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?’
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
‘Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ ’
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand was Montgomery’s Chief of Staff. Max Hastings, is that bloke with the Hank Harvin glasses that they call the ‘golf club members bar bore’, who thinks he knows more about the history of warfare than the rest of the world put together.
‘How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ’
Max Hastings should have checked first:
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
Part two (of two).
0/10 for effort. 0/10 for knowledge of the subject
‘How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies’
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’. How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak’
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion. This is what Churchill stated in a note to Roosevelt:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 15 Dec 43
9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
Not a word about Montgomery’s military accomplishments’. Why do people not check first?..
‘Fancy some more little villa?’
ROTFL. Coming from Para Dave, this is like being taunted by a dead sheep.
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@paulmazan4909
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
1954.
Chapter IX The Martyrdom of Warsaw
P 123
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 25 Aug 44’
‘As Stalin’s reply evades the definite questions asked and adds nothing to our knowledge, I propose a reply on the following lines:
[Begins.] “We earnestly desire to send U.S. aircraft from England.
….
‘President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 26Aug 44’
‘I do not consider it would prove advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join in with you in the proposed message to Stalin.’
As best as I can see, to fly the Polish airborne brigade into Poland would have entailed several hundred aircraft, most of them American, between eight and nine hundred miles, a big chunk of it over German controlled territory. Unarmed aircraft, each with a crew of four, that would have had to rely on using Russian airfields to get the aircraft home, via another eight or nine hundred mile flight partly across German controlled territory. What about a fighter escot of Mosquitos and Mustangs? How was that to be managed?..
Three million Poles, six million Poles dead, its still down to the Germans, they chose to do the killing.
'Roosevelt and Churchill were not going to go to war with Russia over Eastern Europe but that is not to say they had no means of challenging Stalin. Both were pouring war supplies into Russia and had that as a bargaining chip they never used. Conveniently ignoring, despite the promises of the Atlantic Charter, the fact that Russia was allied with Germany and invaded and took one third of Poland in 1939, switched sides and would do so again as soon as the war ended.' Your words.
Get real. The whole of allied Lend-Lease to Russia amounted to less than 5% of their needs. By August 1944, nothing was going to stop Stalin from doing what he wanted to in Eastern Europe. The idea that Britain and the USA were in any sort of position to threaten Russia in regard to Poland is absurd.
As for events in 1939, you now state that 'The agreement was to open an offensive to draw German troops to the west and releave pressure on the Poles.'
But it was all over in Poland in 36 days, 34 if you take it from when Britain and France declared war on Russia. The French call up was behind schedule, the BEF was 10% of allied forces. What could Britain and France realistically have done?
As for Arnhem, the figures speak for themselves:
1st Airborne:
Dead; 1,174 (13.1%). POW; 5,903 (65.8%). Evacuated; 1,892 (21.1%). Total; 8,969.
Glider pilots:
Dead; 219 (17.3%). POW; 532 (42.5%). Evacuated; 532 (42.5%). Total;1,262.
Polish brigade:
Dead; 92 (5.4%). POW; 111 (6.6%). Evacuated; 1,486 (88.0%). Total; 1,6.89.
So there you have it:
21.1% First Airborne evacuated, 42.5% Glider Pilots evacuated, 88% of Polish brigade evacuated.
And you really think that the Poles were left to it?..
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Bullet-Tooth Tony
'the pratt said he'd go to Berlin' Big Woody (aka Para Dave).
Assuming Para Dave means that he is claiming that Montgomery intended to go to Berkin..
Let us examine the available evidence in regard to this matter
(Evidence meaning testimony of people who were actually there, and contemporary douments. As opposed to some oppo spouting off many decades after the event)...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
.MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that
‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN:
‘21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’
Thanks go to the American John Lucas for drawing attention to this item in the 21st Army Group Report.
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@johnlucas8479
Err…I make it three questions.
'1) how do you define success'
For me it probably depends on the circumstances pertaining to each undertaking.
Examples:
Dunkirk.
After the French collapse, and the Belgian collapse, Britain managed to extricate the BEF from an almost impossible situation. A success that would have massive consequences in the years ahead.
The Battle of Britain.
A huge British victory in the most important battle of war – anywhere. Victory that condemned Hitler to waging a two-front war and thus securing his ultimate defeat.
The Balkans.
British forces ejected from Greece and Crete but, albeit unintended, the campaign caused a fatal five week delay to Operation Barbarossa.
The Battle of the Atlantic.
Mostly fought by the Royal Navy which dealt with the German surface fleet and two-thirds of its submarine ensuring that 90% of shipping bound for Britain arrived unmolested.
The North African Campaign.
Prevented a German – Japanese link up and German access to imports from outside of mainland Europe. Ultimately ensured oil supplies from the Middle East and freed up one million tons of merchant shipping.
Ultra.
The Poles first broke into Enigma, the French provided intelligence to the Poles that saved them three years of work. Britain took on this work and created a comprehensive code breaking organisation that coped with up-grades to Enigma, broke into the infinitely harder German Geheim Schreiber (Secret Writer), as well as Italian and Japanese naval codes.
2) what do you mean on their own’
Who can say? Every British or US undertaking in Europe had some involvement from other parties.
For the USA, that meant the use of Great Britain as a base for joint operations in Europe. The Royal Air Force providing more than 50% of the air forces, the Royal Navy provided 79% of the warships and 67% of the landing shipping.
Three) ‘Do the following examples meet your criteria of success:’
I would answer as follows:
1) 101st Div defence of Bastogne:
It was one division in action for one week. Not nice if you were, but there but bigger events were playing out in other places at the same time.
2) Capture of Cherbourg:
The capture of Cherbourg was behind schedule, was heavily influenced by the massing of German forces in front of the British Second Army further to the East. The assault involved 30 Commando and troops from the division my father was serving in at that time.
3) Capture of Bridge at Remagen by 9th US Arm Div:
Who can say? According to Eisenhower it was piece of good fortune.
4) The encirclement of the German 15th Army in Ruhr Valley of 1st, 3rd and 9th US Armies:
It involved US 1st, 9th and 15th Armies. Also support from 21st Army Group. It was less than a month from VE Day, it was bordering on a mopping-up operation.
Britain was in the war from its first day to the last. Britain fought in every theatre of war, fought Germany on its own for a year. Relative to its circumstances it out-produced every other major belligerent in the war. Nobody, but nobody, tells Britain about who did what in the war. Certainly not the USA, which was 3,000 mils from any hint of danger to its homeland, was only in the second half of the war in Europe and had the benefit of several years of being able to observe the war and to prepare for conflict.
Harsh but fair.
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@nickdanger3802
Ah yes, day one...
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands.'
Ouch!
It was all going to be so easy for you, John Lucas, Big Woody/Para Dave, westpoint snell and the others, when you breezed onto YouTube comments a few years ago. Everything that went wrong was going to be the fault of the British.
What happened?.. Your Hollywood/Stephen Ambrose/ Bill O'Reilly, etc., and their chauvinistic claptrap came up against real history, and lost.
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