Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Bernard Montgomery: The Spartan General" video.
-
Irishseven100
And more:
‘Final numbers leave not doubt French and Brits were not “equals, side by side” :
The 400,000 allied forces on 26th May were about half-half between French and Brits (200,000 each)
Almost all Brit soldiers were evacuated, only 2 thirds of French soldiers were evacuated (about 200,000 vs about 140,000).’
Misleading.
Any in-balance between the numbers of troops that were embarked was due to British base troops being evacuated before the bulk of allied forces had reached the Dunkirk perimeter, and that the French had no embarkation policy until Churchill intervened in embarkation matters on 1he 31st May.
Over 100,000 of the French troops that evacuated were taken away by British ships.
‘Less than 5,000 Brit soldiers lost their lives protecting the evacuation. More than 15,000 French soldiers died.
Almost no Brit soldier was captured. Almost all the 35,000 captured soldiers were French.’
Misleading:
Of the 861 ships involved in the evacuation, 693 were British. British ships returned to Dunkirk after the British withdrawal to bring away another 26,000 French troops.
The great bulk of the air cover for the evacuation was supplied by the RAF.
All clear now?..
5
-
4
-
@MemekingJag
'But the fact alone that the Polish commander expressed concerns about the plan, and was thereafter scapegoated, publicly or not, is a stain on Monty's military record.'
Montgomery criticized the perfornce of the Polish parachute force, he did not blame them for the outcome at Arnhem. There is a difference. Prior to criticizing theperfornce of the Polish parachute force, he awarded medals to individual members of that force for their actions at Arnhem.
Who can say if Montgomery's criticism of the Poles was justified? Not me. Probably, only those that were there can judge.
MEN AT ARNHEM
GEOFFREY POWELL
Pen and Sword Books 2004
P164
'The night had been a misery in every way.
At irregular intervals from the late evening onwards, clusters of mortar bombs had fallen among and around us, harming no one but preventing sleep, at least for me. Others, between spells of sentry duty, had collapsed exhausted into oblivion. Four times enemy patrols had roused them from their stupor as the night exploded into noise and light, with red tracer whipping the trees and white flares blossoming overhead. No one had been hit, but losses there had been. On stand-to rounds I had found the Polish trenches empty except for Peter, their corporal, crouched grimly behind his Bren. The rest of the party had vanished in the early hours, sensing perhaps that they had attached themselves to an unlucky unit. Peter explained nothing, but his embarrassment was clear; it was both unfair and pointless to press him for details when either pride or sense of duty had kept him there to fight on among strangers.'
The Polish commander expressed concerns about COMET, but was silent regarding MARKET GARDEN. In any case, Sosabowski and the other airborne commanders reported to the commander FAAA, US General Lewis Brereton not Montgomery.
4
-
@M_A65
Oh well, its your funeral...
'Good job you beat the undersupplied, undermanned, and exhausted axis who had far less than he had.'
Such a situation applied to every single US land victory during the war. Which one do you want?
'When he failed at market garden he just played everyone else.'
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), the Lorraine Campaign (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). The threat of V2 Rocket attacks on London, alone justified MARKET GARDEN.
Where is there evidence that Montgomery 'just played everyone else'?
'In Sicily Patton showed him up exposing how inept he was.'
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
'I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.'
US General Maxwell Taylor.
'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.'
US General Lucian Truscott.
'On the western front he spent two months to plan the crossing of a river, while Patton made a fool of him by just crossing under the cover of darkness successfully.'
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406:
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties’
'His career in WW2 was full of more quagmires and failures than successes.'
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and concentrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
For OVERLORD, Montgomery undertook to get the allies to the River Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
He then cleared the Scheldt, the only nailed on allied success in the Autumn of 1944. He went on to sort out the American debacle in the Northern half of the Bulge, he directed the real crossing of the Rhine, and finished up by taking the surrender of North West Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, effectively ending the war.
Where does the loss of a single division at Arnhem sit with that lot?
4
-
4
-
@diogocatalano9557
'Montgomery was anything but Spartan.' Your words.
This is the first definition of 'Spartan' that I found on-line:
'showing or characterized by austerity or a lack of comfort or luxury.'
Montgomery lived and worked in three caravans during his time as an army/army group commander. He did not drink, he did not smoke. In the 1944-45 campaign in North West Europe, he was always nearer the front than Eisenhower, his fellow army group commanders, Bradley and Devers, and the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, Lewis Brereton. Example: at the time of MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery about 12 miles behind the start line for GARDEN, and then in Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England.
_______________________________________________________________________
'As if that weren't enough, he had a habit of lying exaggeratedly to avoid losing his position. Even when things were going wrong, he reported facts that were completely different from reality.' Your words.
Really, when did that happen?
_______________________________________________________________________
'He was very lucky not to have been fired by Eisenhower.' Your words.
Eisenhower was not in a position to fire Montgomery. Eisenhower was in the US Army, Montgomery was in the British Army.
_______________________________________________________________________
'he was a closet pedophile'
Where is there evidence of this?
4
-
4
-
Irishseven100
Despite my previous reply being deleted twice, we go on:
‘Evacuation was decided on 26 May 1940 by the British alone. At that moment the French military HQ was not expecting that decision and were instead planning a counter-attack in Arras. Eden specifically ordered the head of the British Expeditionary Force, Lord Gort, not to tell the French and the Belgian about the evacuation.’
Rubbish.
THE WAR IN FRANCE
AND FLANDERS
1939 - 1940
BY MAJOR L. F. ELLIS
C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.
LONDON: 1953
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
Pages 173-175
On returning to his Command Post Lord Gort found a personal message from Mr Eden:
I have had information all of which goes to show that French offensive from Somme cannot be made in sufficient strength to hold any prospect of junction with your armies in the north. Should this prove
to be the case you will be faced with a situation in which safety of B.E.F. will be predominant consideration. In such conditions only course open to you may be to fight your way back to west where all beaches and ports east of Gravelines will be used for embarkation. Navy would provide fleet of ships and small boats and R.A.F. would give full support. As withdrawal may have to begin very early preliminary plans should be urgently prepared. You should also consider urgently security of Ostend and Dunkirk to which latter port Canadian Bde group is being sent night 26th/27th. Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud tomorrow afternoon when whole situation will be clarified ...
This was followed by another message to say that the Canadian Brigade would not be sent. Lord Gort reported in turn to the Secretary of State that plans for a withdrawal northwards had that morning been agreed with the French, but that news from the Belgian front was disquieting. He concluded 'I must not conceal from you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will be lost.'
Another message came from Mr Eden:
Prime Minister has had conversation with M. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fully explained to him the situation and resources French Army. It is clear from this that it will not be possible for French to deliver attack in the south in sufficient strength to enable them to effect junction with northern armies. In these circumstances no course open to you but to fall back upon the coast in accordance terms my telegram . . . M. Reynaud communicating General Weygand and latter will no doubt issue orders in this sense forthwith. You are now authorised to operate towards coast forthwith in conjunction with French and Belgian Armies.
The policy of evacuation seemed thus to have been accepted on the highest political level. Moreover, the Howard-Vyse Mission at French Headquarters informed the War Office that after receiving a copy of General Blanchard's order for withdrawal, quoted above, General Weygand had 'consequently sent for Admiral Darlan to study re-embarkation'. Unfortunately, inability to take a prompt decision and to give clear orders again resulted in misunderstanding, for neither General Blanchard nor the Admiral in charge of the Dunkirk area was told by the French High Command that evacuation was intended. General Blanchard was left to believe that a final stand was to be made on the Lys and so he failed to realise the need, much less the urgency, to plan any further withdrawal.
Lord Gort suffered from no such handicap. A week before, he had been clear in his own mind that if the French failed to close the gap in their front he might be forced to retreat to the coast. The War Office and the Admiralty had been led to realise this too, and had been preparing for such a possible contingency. And now that the attempt to close the gap was abandoned the Government saw that the contingency had become a reality. At once, they told Lord Gort: `You are now authorised to operate towards coast forthwith' and at the same time they told the French Government that the policy must therefore be to evacuate and orders to this effect had been given to Lord Gort. There was no ambiguity here, nor any room for misunderstanding of British intentions. Had the French High Command made known the decision to French commanders in the field with equal
promptitude and clarity, much subsequent trouble would have been avoided.
4
-
Irishseven100
And more:
‘But up until the 31st of May, and even after that, on the field in Dunkirk, the attitude of the British commander Lord Gort was unabashedly in favor of British soldiers and against the French. There are many actions from Gort, before and after Dunkirk, that give plenty of reasons to French commanders not to trust the Brits. For the sake of this answer, I will show just one : Gort did not write “we want to embark French soldiers but their officers don’t let them”. He wrote “every Frenchman embarked is at cost of one Englishman”. See his secret telegram to the War Office on 29 May below:’
Rubbish.
This is the wording of Gort’s telegram to CIGS (That is Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to save you looking it up);
‘IMMEDIATE
O(B) 14 68 29/5
PERSONAL C IN C TO CIGS
I HAVE RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM BRIG SWAYNE THAT GENERAL GEORGES WISHES EMBARKATION TO BE DONE BY MYSELF AND FRENCH 1st ARMY WITH MUTUAL CO-OPERATION AND SUPPORT. I AM QUITE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE. BUT SUPPORT BY WHICH IS IMPLIED RESOURCES IS ALL ON OUR SIDE STOP.STRONGLY URGE THAT FRENCH SMALL PARTIES OF FRENCH HAVE ALREADY BEEN EMBARKED BUT EVERY FRENCHMAN IS AT COST OF ONE ENGLISHMAN STOP MY INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT SAFETY OF B.E.F. IS PRIMARY CONSIDERATION STOP. REMAINS OF 1st FRENCH ARMY ON ARRIVAL WILL DESERVE EMBARKATION BUT BY NO MEANS ALL THOSE NOW IN THIS AREA MAY I BE INFORMED EARLY WHAT THE POLICY REGARDING THE EMBARKATION OF FRENCH SHOULD BE’
This telegram shows that French troops were already being embarked by the 29th May. Gort was understandably seeking clarity on embarkation policy, in light of instructions that he had previously received. No reasonable person could interpret this message as having any other meaning.
‘Evacuation was initially planned for only 2 days, and only for Brits.’
Evacuation was only expected to be able to take place over 2 days. That is quite different to planning for a 2-day evacuation. At that point, there was no knowing what the attitude of the French would be to such an evacuation.
‘During the first 4 days (from 26th to 29th May), only Brits were evacuated. French soldiers were turned down.
The first French soldiers were evacuated only on the 5th day, on 30th May, after more than 70,000 Brit soldiers had already been evacuated.’
Rubbish. Ad Gort’s Telegram to the CIGS of the 29th May makes clear.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
@MemekingJag
'He pissed off allied commanders, and resorted to overly cautious and ineffective advances, and almost WW1 attrition warfare. He was focused more on the seat at the negotiation table than the most effective methods to pursue war. He claimed he'd break through in Operation Goodwood, and then waved it off as 'actually it was a pinning diversionary attack' when it failed.'
It seems that Montgomery did everything he could to avoid WW1 attrition warfare. He based his planning on the use of firepower rather than manpower, particularly with the use of artillery. At Alamein, he continually changed the point of attack, every time his forces met with fierce resistance. He predicted 8% casualties, the total was under 8% casualties. In Normandy, wih the vast bulk of German armour ranged in front of 2nd Army, he carried out a number of limited attacks to keep the Germans away from US forces, all with limited numbers of casualties, of which GOODWOOD was but one.
Whether he 'pissed off allied commanders' or whatever else, is of little interest to me. The realiity seems to be that Montgomery was a thoroughly professional soldier who fought as a junior officer with distinction in the First World War, as a single division commander in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as a single army commander in North Africa and Sicily, and as an army group commander in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
ukmediawarrior
'Once ashore Monty had control and had told his superiors Caan would fall on day one. Instead it fell over a month later. Monty, always the one to grasp political victory from the jaws of a military defeat swiftly changed his story to say he had always intended for his forces to hold down the Germans at Caan to let the Americans break out, lol.'
Its a definite no. Montgomery hoped for an early capture of Caen, but gave no firm undertaking as to when it would fall. With the massing of German armour there, the importance of Caen in allied planning quickly faded. The key targets for OVERLORD were principally Cherbourg, and then the other Brittany ports. To that end, Montgomery's aim was to use British Second Army to protect the US First Army while it went after those targets. The massing of German armour at Caen meant that the way to protect US First Army operations was to keep those German forces at Caen, and away from the US First Army. If the Germans had deployed their forces differently, then Montgomery would have changed his planning accordingly.
'It wasn't the British who wanted to attack through Belgium and Holland into the Rhur, it was just Monty's plan that initially Ike refused, but after Monty went off to Churchill and complained political pressure was brought to bear on Ike who changed his mind.'
Its a definite no. The allied plan was always to attack towards the Rhur in the North after OVERLORD. The precise route could only be decided when the allies got to that point. There is zero evidence of Montgomery wasking Churchill to intercede in operational matters. In regard to MARKET GARDEN, before and during that operation, Churchill was travelleing to, attending, and returning from the allied OCTAGON conference in Quebec City, Canada.
'Despite several warning from the Dutch Resistance and the Allied Armies own recon flights that the Germans were a much bigger threat than had been initially assumed, the operation pushed on as no one wanted to tell Monty no.
Its a definite no. At that time all information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground was routinely disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that respect. The only known recce photos German forces in the Arnhem area before MARKET GARDEN, can be seen on-line and are grainy overhead shots of a few tanks of a training unit that had been heavily camouflaged. What was seen by Montgomery, was seen by Eisenhower.
'It wasn't lack of supplies that had damned the operation, it could never have succeeded in the first place.'
The operation came within an ace of complete success. Eisenhower, Churchill, Gavin, Montgomery, and the German commander, Student cited the weather as the main reason that Arnhem was not taken...
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
P174/5
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C. 1993
P199
Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation,
attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained,
there was no doubt that we should have attained full success."
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 586
In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding
independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was,
says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." Gavin, op. cit., p. 120.
¹Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we
should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by
Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@johnpeate4544
From Para Dave / Big Woody:
‘♦One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all’
Para Dave.
Montgomery was at his tactical HQ at Hechtel 10 miles from the start line for MARKET GARDEN. At the end of operation he was at Eindhoven.
♦Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare’ Para Dave.
‘♦The V-2s were still being launched’ Para Dave.
But at a reduced rate, with almost any reduction justifying the staging of MARKET GARDEN.
‘♦The massive deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for suppliesfor an operation that size’ Para Dave.
Its definite no. MARKET GARDEN could be mounted with the existing allied supply numbers. That is why Eisenhower authorized the deferment of the Scheldt clearance while MARKET GARDEN took place.
‘♦Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.’ Para Dave.
Err no. MARKET GARDEN casualties occurred in Parachute units, airlanding units, air force units and ground forces.
‘♦The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation,exposure and disease.’ Para Dave.
German reprisals against the people in the German occupied part of the Netherlands for Dutch support for MARKET GARDEN ended long before the winter set in. MARKET GARDEN Freed far more Dutch people than died in the hunger winter.
‘♦And all of the Netherlands live stock was sent/driven to the Reich as the Wehrmacht fell back. The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the Germans for assisting the allies.’ Para Dave.
German reprisals against the people in the German occupied part of the Netherlands for Dutch support for MARKET GARDEN ended long before the winter set in.
‘♦Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as Montgomery boasted’ Para Dave.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48-49
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
‘♦Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army’ Para Dave.
Err…no. The allies would have to wait six more months to cross the Rhine, thanks to Eisenhower’s policies.
‘♦400,000 Dutchmen - thu out the War were sent to work as slave laborers for the Reich in defense industry or on bunker/tunnel projects’. Para Dave.
A figure that was doubtless not made larger when MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Dutch population.
‘♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later *"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success’. Para Dave.
Berhardt was a former member of the SS who was rightly shown the door by both British and American intelligence. Later, only his royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
Its Christmas Day on Sunday week. Perhaps Santa will bring Para Dave some vouchers for him to spend on time lying on a psychoanalyst’s couch.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@michaelkenny8540
Just remind ourselves, Big Woody also goes by the name of Para Dave on YouTube.
As well as stating his hatred of Montgomery, he has called XXX Corps cowards, Carrington a coward, Churchill a drunk, my uncle a coward, and so on. He has also, unforgivably, disparaged cancer sufferers.
He is sucker for any chancer author who tries to pass him (or her) self off as an historian Among these are:
William Weidner, who it seems, thought that Carentan was a British D-Day objective.
He also, it seems had to pay for the publication of his own works.
Clay Blair Jr., who manufactured an autobiographyof Omar Bradley after he had died.
The proven plagiarist and liar Stephen Ambrose.
And a bunch of other US books about the war, with covers showing photos of generals in tin helmets, and the usual stars and stripes graphics.
Anthony Beevor, Max Hastings, and a bunch of other chancers that write stuff for gullible Americans. The sort of stuff you see on carousel stands in airport shops.
Perhaps one day, Para Dave will discover girls.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1