Youtube comments of TheVilla Aston (@thevillaaston7811).
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). (20,000 casualties).
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@analystanalyst7652
Get lost.
Part One.
'A hero was needed by the British and there he was.' Your words.
Total rubbish. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC with broadcasts such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on. Britain mobilized it population more than any other major belligerent, more than Russia, a lot more than the USA . That is what British Propaganda was about.
'When he should have been taking the Scheldt Estuary (as a result of this poor move a great many Canadian troops, once again, paid the price as they did in Dieppe)' Your words.
Total Rubbish. British forces (My own father among them), and Polish forces also took part in the Scheldt campaign. The Canadian government, and the Canadian military leaders then in Britain lobbied hard for Canadian troops to be given the lead role for Dieppe.
Part Two to follow...
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@stetomlinson3146
'Read any decent history book about the battle for Normandy, and beyond. Montgomery was totally out of his depth.'
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
LONDON 1977
Page 53
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
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@phillipnagle9651
'Beside the already mentioned failure to capture Scheldt Estuary when it was undefended, there was his failure to close the Falaise pocket, there was the Market Garde fiasco, there was his failure to close the "Bulge" pivoting on the northeast corner, there was his inability to break out from the beaches and capture Caen. As a matter of fact, when it came to Europe, his performance went from ordinary to bad. Your words.
Its a definite no.
The Scheldt Estuary was by no means undefended when Antwerp was liberated. The Germans were in force on the South bank of the Scheldt at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
The Bulge:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
US General Robert W Hasbrouck:
Caen:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
If Montgomery's performance went from ordinary to bad, whee did the performance of Bradley, Eisenhower, and Devers go to?..
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@krixpop
'... more than 1/4th of the RAF was Polish and Czech pilots.
One in four !'
Nope.
2,936 RAF and Fleet Air Arm aircrew took part in the Battle of Britain. This total included 145 Poles, 127 New Zealanders, 112 Canadians, 88 Czechoslovaks, 32 Australians, 28 Belgians, 25 South Africans, 13 French, 10 Irish, 7 Americans, and one each from Jamaica, the British Mandate of Palestine, and Southern Rhodesia.
'The Polish and Czech pilots that fought for you, England ?
You extradited them to the USSR'
Nope.
They all offered the chance to stay in Britain.
'Then the entire East Europe would fall under Soviet control. 10 pre-War Democratic countries , were gifted to the USSR by you , England'
Nope.
Russia invaded them and kept them. What was Britain supoosed to do?
Put its 1 million 21st Army Group against the 6 million Red Army?
Over to you for that one...
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@TheEvertw
Montgomery: Part Two
France 1944 (Operation Overlord)
The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings.
Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals.
Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78. If a US general had been in charge of the land campaign, American historians and the US media would hail Normandy a one of the greatest victories in military history. Instead, Montgomery’s performance has been subject to a level of hair-slitting scrutiny far, far greater than any attention ever paid to any US commander.
Market Garden
With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to deploy the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhower had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of.
The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan. There is a body of opinion that the weather, which defied allied forecasts was the decisive factor in Arnhem not being taken:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
EISENHOWER
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
CHURCHILL
German General Karl Student gave the weather as the main cause of the failure at Arnhem.
Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
US historians have sought to airbrush Eisenhower and Brereton from the history of Market Garden to ensure that responsibility is heaped on the British, and on Montgomery in particular. This process culminated with the infamous film, ‘A Bridge Too Far’, which is filled with falsehoods and American cliché images of the British.
The Bulge
Montgomery had warned Eisenhower about the dangers involved in his broad front strategy of spreading out allied forces too thinly. When the German attack in the Ardennes began, Bradley lost his head and refused Eisenhower’s instruction to move his headquarter s back, Hodges, the US 1st Army commander went AWOL. Montgomery had the only major reinforcements available to the allies (XXX Corps). Montgomery cancelled Operation Veritable and moved quickly to sort out the northern half of the bulge. His actions drew this comment from Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
The German offensive petered out and Montgomery, as he later admitted, unwisely held a press conference about the battle which was seized upon by German propaganda, changed, and re-broadcast with an anti-American slant which but hurt American commanders, looking to take offence, seized on and accepted with bothering to check on its provenance. This is attested to by Chester Wilmot, who actually attended that press conference:
‘My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.’ His words.
And also, by one of Montgomery’s harshest critics, Tedder:
‘ When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
The Rhine
Montgomery gave a masterclass in planning and execution of a plan with the crossing of the Rhine at it widest point and against the most formidable opposition that the Germans could still offer. Bradley had already crossed the Rhine at its narrowest point against far weaker opposition That Bradley then crowed about this (as did his his subordinate Patton as well) reflects badly on both of those US officers.
This from Eisenhower:
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
And a more recent opinion:
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
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@phillipnagle9651
Not really...
Caen:
”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout."
"In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort."
"The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“
US General Omar Bradley.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Patton? Deserted the battlefield during HUSKY for headlines in in the unimpotant Palermo?
He then went on to physically assault Sicilian peasants, and some of his own soldiers, and thus got himself passed over for army group command? He was sidelined until the outcome of OVERLORD was no longer in doubt, and then raced through hot air across the undefended part of France, and then made a muck of the Lorraine campaign? He then raced towards Bastogne at about one mile per day, and arrived there after the German advance Westwards had been stopped. He finished the war by instigating Task Force Baum, to rescuse his son-in-law about six before the end of the war, at a cost of 288 casualties?
What a CV?..
And this from a bloke who was only in the war past the point where the Grmans could no longer win, and with the German army irretrievably commited in Russia, and with that army being increasing short of manpower, supplies, and modern equipment.
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@TheEvertw
Montgomery: Part One
The First World War.
Unlike almost all US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experience. Montgomery fought on the Western Front in the First World War, where he was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO for his efforts. The citation for this award in the London Gazette stated: "Conspicuous gallant leading on 13th October, when he turned the enemy out of their trenches with the bayonet”.
France 1940.
Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940 in command of the 3rd Infantry Division. He trained and led his division superbly, closing the gap on the allied left at Dunkirk after the sudden surrender of the Belgian Army and then leading his division back to Britain intact. Alanbrooke noted the outstanding performances of Montgomery and Alexander in France and marked both men down for higher command in the future. However, Montgomery was sidelined for some time afterwards due to his outspoken criticisms of the handling of the campaign in France.
North Africa
Appointed to command of the ground forces in ‘Torch’, Montgomery was moved across to command Eighth Army after the death of Gott. In his first big command, Montgomery acted quicky and decisively as he reorganized and rejuvenated Eighth Army to make it fit to take on and defeat the Axis forces led by Rommel. There is plenty of evidence of Montgomery’s effect on his new command, here are some:
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight.’
DE GUINGAND
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
ALANBROOKE
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
CHURCHILL
Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops.
Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (7.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia.
Montgomery may have been fortunate to benefit from increased resources being available but he made his own good fortune with the thoroughly professional way in which he set about his task. Further, Montgomery showed how the allies could beat the Germans in the future: thorough preparation and concentration of resources, which paid off in Normandy and would have paid off in the autumn of 1944 in the advance on Germany if Eisenhower had heeded these lessons instead of allowing political considerations to dictate strategy.
American hacks like Stephen Ambrose claim that Montgomery was over praised because Britain needed heroes at that time. That is total rubbish. The whole thrust of government propaganda, the works of filmmakers and of writers was to emphasize the collective effort and the deeds of the man in the street rather than the deeds of generals or politicians. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched were: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC chipped in with output such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on
Sicily (Operation Husky)
Here, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was alongside the US General Patton’s 7th Army. The was the last occasion that those two generals were of equal status as Patton went on to assault two of his own soldiers and some Sicilian peasants and thus get himself passed over for army group command. Before the operation started, Montgomery strongly recommended to the land forces commander Alexander, that Patton’s lunatic plan to land in small numbers at a several places around the Island should not take place but that landings should be concentrated in the South East of the Island.
Montgomery's plan worked. As with Alamein, casualties were low, Patton went AWOL until he was enticed back into the battle by Montgomery by allowing Patton to capture Messina. An event later portrayed by Hollywood as a race between the two generals to be first to reach that place.
Italy
Allied landings in Italy after Husky comprised Operations Avalanche, Slapstick and Baytown which were widely separated. Montgomery argued that resources should be concentrated on Avalanche and that Baytown would not divert German forces away from anywhere else. Montgomery was proved right and he later stated that he was ‘glad to leave the ‘dog's breakfast’ when he left on the 23rd December 1943 to take up his appointment as allied land forces commander of Operation Overlord.
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@davidtuttle7556
The combined banks of the Scheldt amounted to 100 miles in length, ALL of which had to be cleared before Antwerp could be used. The fortifications at its mouth were some of the strongest in Europe, the Germans still on the South Bank in force, at the Breskens Pocket.
Clearly, the Germans attached great importance to denying Antwerp to the allies, by tenacity with which they fought in the Scheldt, amount of aerial attack they subjected Antwerp to, and the fact that Antwerp was the goal for the German Ardennes offensive at he end of 1944. There was never going to be a 'speeding up the build-up of Allied Units for the assault on Germany' by capturing the Scheldt. Even if the entire 21st Army Group could have been put to that task, it would still have taken a month to capture the estuary, and another three to four weeks to clear the waterway of mines - as actually did happen. Meanwhile, the Germans would have been given even more of what they most wanted, time and space to rebuild their forces, after their defeat by Montgomery in Normandy.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591
‘When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten’
P 592
‘days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P126
‘from Normandy to Holland. In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt,¹ since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it.
Monty's aversion to such administrative and command incompetence has been characterized as ill-bred, even demented. Certainly, to those who did not appreciate Monty's professionalism, his unceasing campaign to get Allied command in North-west Europe on a sound footing seemed at best wearying, at worst egotistical, even megalomaniacal. Eisenhower became, in the eyes of many sympathetic historians, the 'long-suffering', forbearing Supreme Commander arbitrating between prima-donnas. Eisenhower's own view of his task, as spelled out in his 'put-down' of 13 October to Monty, was 'adjusting the larger boundaries to tasks commensurate to the several groups operating in these several areas, assigning additional support by air or reinforcements by ground and airborne troops, when [there is] a general pool, and shifting the emphasis in maintenance arrangements'.
St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October. '
A summary of Channel and North Sea Ports Liberations:
Dieppe. Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944.
Le Havre. Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944.
Boulogne. Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944
Ostend. Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
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@phillipnagle9651
How ridiculous can this get?..
The very person that decided not close the Falaise Gap (Bradley), confirmed that he did not close the Falaise Gap.
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
His words.
Americans set themselves up to fall with this, in their haste try to re-write history. And for no really big reason. 40,000 escaped from the Falaise Pocket, with vitually none of their equipment. The Germans lost 440,000 in Normandy, and out of 2,400 tanks, they crossed to Seine with 120 of those machines. Any of those surviving German troops that got sent to the Eastern Front probably that their luck had changed.
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@johnlucas8479
Montgomery met Bradley on the 17th August, and spoke about Montgomery’s proposal that 40 allied divisions should move together towards Germany. Montgomery went away from that meeting in the belief that Bradley had agreed with that proposal.
Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August and proposed that, given the allied logistic situation, half of the allied divisions in Europe could kept on the offensive, if they were priotitized over the remaining divisions, but if no such prioritisation took place, then the whole allied advance would grind to halt. Montgomery proposed that the British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army could advance in the North to the Ruhr with such priotization. Failing that, Montgomery agree to the US 1st, and US 3rd Armies advancing into Germany, South of the Ardennes. Eisenhower did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
By the time that Eisenhower met Montgomery again on the 10th September, Eisenhower had taken on the role of allied land forces commander, and he again refused to concentrate allied resources into a plan that keep at least as sizeable part of allied resources on the move. He did however, agree to a limited undertaking, MARKET GARDEN, which was designed to give the allies a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to take the allies to the Ijsselmeer in the hope that such a move would degrade the German V-2 rocket campaign against Britain. The evidence is clear that it was not an attempt to reach Berlin, and that it was not expected to end the war in Europe soon…
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery had received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
There can little doubt that if Arnhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the Ijsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN:
‘21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’
Thanks go to you for drawing attention to this.
MONTGOMERY
ALAN MOOREHEAD
HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’
79 years later, it is clear, given situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, and with the benefit of hindsight, that Mongomery’s appreciation of the allied situation at that time, and what should be done moving forward was the correct one.
The seems to be allied understanding of the German situation from evidence from allied forces, and from intelligence sources presented a (correct) picture of German armies in the West…
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
At that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces in the area North of the Ardennes than had been in Britain after Dunkirk.
The logistical situation was already easing as the allies moved into September, with the allied armies already getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day…
Dieppe was liberated on the 1st September, and was operational four days later to give the allies another 3,000 tons per day, enough for the 1st Canadian army. Ostend was operational by the 28th of that month. October saw Le Havre (exclusively for US use), operational on the 13th, and Boulogne became operational on the 22nd. Calais became operational during November.
Further, the road and rail network in the allied rear was improving by the day.
By how much the war would have been shortened, and how far the allies would have got into Germany in the late Summer, and Autumn of 1944, due to a sensible concentration of allied resources is a matter that cannot be determined. That such a concentration of resources would have been the correct decision, is be beyond dispute.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan of how the OVERLORD campaign would unfold, and gave the allies a huge victory. Only those that want split hairs can find serious falt with that plan. Eisenhower squandered the fruits of Montgomery's victory by adopting a plan that put political considerations ahead of military considerations, a plan that could have been devised by a fourteen-year-old.
Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front ‘strategy brought the allied advance to a halt, and gave the Germany the continuing use of the Ruhr until well into 1945, and in a broader sense, gave the Germans what they most needed after their catastrophe in Normandy, time, and space to rebuild their armies in the West. A look at German production in the Ruhr after Eisenhower’s fateful decision, and the make-up of the German forces in the Ardennes attack, make this clear.
The immediate beneficiary of the ‘Broad Front’ mistake was Nazi Germany. The longer-term beneficiary was the USSR, who went into the Yalta conference knowing how much of Germany they could gobble up, and also, due to US leaders failing to recognize the importance of the Italian campaign, in a commanding position in the Balkans.
Harsh but fair.
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@johnlucas8479
'This is what Alan Brooke (Montgomery Boss) said
"Triumph in the West" Arthur Bryant page 232
"October 5th 1944
"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made of Antwerp in the first place."
Clearly, it was recognized to late that Antwerp was the key for a successful drive into Germany, either by Montgomery single thrust or Eisenhower broad Front.'
Not really…
There is no reason infer that Alanbrook’s words (which he wrote, rather than spoke), appertained to anything other than the situation that developed as a result of the limited MARKET GARDEN undertaking, and the loss of the opportunity to advance towards Germany with a much larger force before then.
In regard to decision making for allied strategy after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, Alanbrook's words are in these extracts:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P262-263
‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’
‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’
…
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
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@ronryan7398
‘Really? He won in Sicily? Patton had to come to his rescue.’
Not really…Patton tried to foist a lunatic plan on the allies of landing all around the island. Good sense prevailed and Montgomery’s plan to concentrate resources in one place was a triumphant success. Patton deserted the battlefield to take the unimportant town of Palermo and then had to be coaxed back to the real battle with the offer of being allowed to take Messina.
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
The British couldn't get off the beaches at Normandy despite facing the least opposition.
The least opposition was at met by the US forces Utah Beach, were some of the beach exits were totally undefended. The US forces at Omaha Beach were met by the stiffest beach opposition but their problems there were made much worse by poor preparation. The far better prepared British 2nd Army met average opposition at Gold, June and Sword Beaches but were quickly ashore and able to deal with the only major counter attack of the day, in front of Caen by the German 21st Panzer Division.
‘The Americans and Canadians faced stiff opposition and were both on the move before the British.’
Definitely not, Gold, Juno and Sword Beaches quickly joined up the American setback at Omaha Beach left the allies unable to form a whole front for over a week.
‘He didn't take the Scheldt when it was practically undefended and then the Canadians, not the British, had to slug it out for months after.’
The Scheldt was never practically undefended, The German 15th Army was there in force before the 21st Army Group got to that place, particularly the Breskens Pocket. The Scheldt was taken by Canadian, British and Polish forces, under the command of Montgomery.
Arnhem? I guess we don't have to say anymore about Arnhem and his "90% successful operation"
Arnhem freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on Britain, stretched the German forces front by another 50 miles and left the allies well placed to attack the Rhine later in the war.
‘(He was an egomaniacal asshole to boot)’
You met him when?..
When the Americans were trapped in Bastoigne all Monty could do was make excuses why he couldn't relieve them despite being 100 miles closer than Patton was. Get your facts straight. And it's KNOW-nothing not NO-nothing. If you want to celebrate a British general go with Bill Slim.
Montgomery was never tasked with reaching Bastogne. He was tasked with sorting out the American mess in the North and stopping he Germans reaching the Meuse after Bradley and Hodges lost the plot.
Here is a German view of Montgomery’s actions:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
Re you Arnhem comment, it's any more, not anymore.
‘I wouldn't be too hard on the Americans either. They fought the Germans and beat the Japanese by themselves. (Talk about a two front war)’
Britain also fought the Japanese and fought the Germans for six years, a year of which on their own, with the Germans 20 miles away for four of those years. (A real two front war). As far as who did what in the Second war goes, we rule.
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@Petal4822
Not really...
Half of the 14,000 tanks supplied to Russia were British. This should be set against Soviet tank production of 105,000.
The numbers of aircraft supplied ws 18,000, of which 7,000 came from Britain. Soviet aircraft production amounted to 143,000.
The boots came from Britain - 15 million pairs. The wheeled vehicles amounted to one third of Russian vehicles - in February 1945.
Russia was invaded by Germany, Britain was bombed, blockaded, and it had the Germans 21 miles away for four years. The USA was 3,000 miles from any threat to its homeland.
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'If it was Monty's plan then why wasn't he involved in the battle?'
Montgomery started he battle at his advanced headquarters, 12 miles behind the GARDEN start line, and was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands. Allied land forces commander, Eisenhower was in Normandy, nearly 400 miles away, First Allied Airborne Army commander, Brereton stayed in Britain for almost the entire operation.
Montgomery was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. MARKET GARDEN involved one of those armies. Bradley was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. Bradley was no more involved in the Lorraine Campaign, Aache, and the Hurtgen Forest, than Montgomery was with MARKET GARDEN.
What do people expect? Montgomery to have been in the lead tank?
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@Christian van Laak
The German bombed Warsaw on 1st September 1939 and went to bomb, Rotterdam, Belgrade, London, Coventry, Namsos, Plymouth, Birmingham, Liverpool and so on.
How ridiculous can this get, Cuxhaven was a port, Wilhemshaven was a principal German naval base.
The Nazi Regime was the most vile in history - murdering on an industrial scale after they had invaded country after country. Only an imbecile would think that they were not responsible for the war.
The idea that Britain caused the First War War is absurd. Germany led events up to the start of the war and then bit off more than it could chew and got defeated. Tough.
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@cliveengel5744
Slow, cautious, won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the Rhine.
Britain out of the war in 1940 tied down a million German troops, two thirds of the German air force, forced the Germans into their submarine building programme, stopped the Germans from being able to trade outside of mainland Europe, and by intervening in the Balkans, helped to cause a fatal five week delay to the start of Barbarossa. The Royal Navy dealt with the German, Italian, and French fleets, and it accounted for three quarters of the 785 German and Italian submarines destroyed during the war.
The RAF destroyed German superiority in the air war with victory in the Battle of Britain. Never again would Germany be as strong in real terms in relation to its tasks and its enemies as it had been in the early summer of 1940. From then on its personnel and equipment decreased in quality and numbers.. Germany attacked Russia in 1941 with just 2,400 aircraft, and from 1940 until 1944 , its only new major combat aircraft was the fw-190. Half of the German fighter aces from the entire war fought in the Battle of Britain.
The campaign in the Mediterranean prevented the Germans from reaching the Middle East oilfields, it prevented a East West Axis link up, it prevented Germany from importing from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up 9one million tons of allied shipping.
Bletchley Park took on initial work by Polish codebreakers and created the most comprehensive codebreaking operation in history.
Missing in action does not apply to the lateUSA. They were never in action, what with their country beimng three thousand miles from the nearest enemy. Americans saw more of Halleys Comet than they saw of German bombers.
That is why their film makers have to steal other countries history.
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'A single road wide open to flank attacks, both sides. Monty checked out before the battle and went dark. '
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
'I believe Monty would've been smashing in the Quartermaster Corps but not as a combat General.'
So what roles should have been given to Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers?
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@nickdanger3802
'Source?'
Try these:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P189/190/191
" May 15th. Went straight from home to St. Paul's School to attend Eisenhower's final run-over plans for cross-Channel operations. The King, P.M., Smuts and all Chiefs of Staff were present. The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a co-ordinator,
a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all qualities of a commander in one man? May be I am getting too hard to please, but I doubt it."
Monty made excellent speech. Bertie Ramsay in-different and overwhelmed by all his own difficulties. Spaatz read every word. Bert Harris told us how well he might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the two other Services. Leigh-Mallory gave very clear description. Sholto Douglas seemed disappointed at the smallness of his task, and so was I. Then Humfrey Gale and Graham on Administration, followed by Grasset on Civil Controls of France. A useful run-through. The King made a few well-chosen remarks. After lunch he presented the C.B. to Bradley and two other decorations." " Back to War Office and finished up with Monty dining quietly with me. He was in very good form and bearing his reponsibilities well."
' If I was asked to review the opinion I expressed that evening of Eisenhower, I should, in the light of all later experience, repeat every word of it. A past-master in the handling of allies, entirely impartial and consequently trusted by all. A charming personality and good co-ordinator. But no real commander. I have seen many similar reviews of impending operations, and especially those run by Monty. Ike might have been a showman calling on various actors to perform their various turns, but he was not the commander of the show who controlled and directed all the actors. A very different performance from Monty's show a few days previously.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING
Page 542
On Monday, May 15, three weeks before D-Day, we held a final conference in London at Montgomery’s Headquarters in St. Paul’s School. The King, Field-Marshal Smuts, the British Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the expedition, and many of their principal Staff officers were present. On the stage was a map of the Normandy beaches and the immediate hinterland, set at a slope so that the audience could see it clearly, and so constructed that the high officers explaining the plan of operations could walk about and point out the landmarks.
Page 543
Montgomery then took the stage and made an impressive speech. He was followed by several Naval, Army, and Air Commanders, and also by the Principal Administrative Officer, who dwelt upon the elaborate preparations that had been made for the administration of the force when it got ashore.
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P 588/589
As in April, Monty ran through the tasks of the four armies, as well as those of the commandos and airborne troops. Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D + 90', outlining again the manner in which the British and Canadians would 'contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead' while the American forces, 'once through the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula, and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British Second Army. As Bradley recalled, 'the British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road toward Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was toward Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
This strategic vision of the Normandy campaign filled the assembled audience with a sense of pride and anticipation, as it had Monty’s own Chief of Intelligence when Monty first laid down his post-D-1 strategy soon after changing the COSSAC plan. As the American
Official Historian noted after an interview with Brigadier Williams in 1947:
Thinks as early as January or February 1944 there is this idea of a swing from the American side towards the Seine. Remembers a map showing line out from Caen running South East and a line up the Cotentin and two lines direct down south of the Cotentin and one down and around the corner and one straight down to cut the neck of the Brittany Peninsula and one straight line down inside the Loire. 'After Cherbourg Peninsula (Monty never said Cotentin) cleaned up we shall be formed up the same way. I [Williams] plotted this on my own map. Felt an immense thrill.'
Monty stepped down. 'It went off superbly, I thought, on that occasion,' his Military Assistant, Colonel Dawnay, later recalled. `Monty was at his best. He was a supremely confident man—it was astonishing how confident he was. '
In a letter of 16.5.44 the American Deputy Theater Commander, General John Lee, wrote [To Montgomery]: 'Your clear and convincing estimate of the situation at St Paul's yesterday would merit in West Point language "a cold max".
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@Heathcoatman
Primary sources (do I know what that term means?)
Who can say?.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
P174/5
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P199
Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation, attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success."
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 586
In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding
independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was,
says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders."
P 120.
Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.
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@solomongrundy4905
'You forgot to mention that Monty had 2X the infantry, (all well-trained, excellent morale), 2X the number of tanks, 2X artillery, 3X anti-tank guns, 2X armored cars. Planes were about equal. Now add Monty's virtually limitless resources vs. Rommel's lackthereof, and his lengthy supply lines. Add Ultra Intel, and what would you expect? A five-year-old could command the Allied forces and win.' Your words.
You should take a look at the odds for US victories in Europe, or the Pacific. US commanders also had access to Ultra, and decoded Japanese messages in in the Pacific. Could five-year olds win those battles?
Just yes or no will do.
The Germans had to bring supplies from Italy to North Africa. Britain was bringing supplies around the Cape to Suez.
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@solomongrundy4905
Even some British commanders, including Air Marshal Tedder wanted to see Monty fired, especially after his ineptness during Goodwood. Ike almost did it. Why? Because Monty was a bumbling, egotisical plodder. Still thinking like a WW1 general and that cost LIVES.
What ineptness? GOODWOOD took place due to the delay in the US build up in Normany, and in order to keep the bulk of German armour in front of British Second Army. It was just part of Montgomery's victory in Normandy, which finished 12 days ahead of schedule, with 20% fewer than expected casualties.
Those people who were supoosedly trying to get rid of Montgomery during the Normany campaign shut up like lights being turned off when the size of the victory in Normandy becam e clear.
As for Tedder:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push’
I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
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Or how about this john:
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 216
‘The more I studied the problem the less it liked it; without going into technical details, we were not properly balanced for this task. Whilst I was thinking it over, the telephone rang and a Staff Officer from the Twenty-first Army Group said that Field Marshall Montgomery was on his way to see me. A few minutes later he entered my caravan and said, ‘Jorrocks, I am not happy about Bremen. ‘Nor am I sir’, I replied. ‘Tell me about it’, he said. So, sitting in my map lorry I described the problem to him and made certain suggestions. He said not a word until I had finished. After a short pause while he considered the problem on the map, he said, ‘We will do A, B, C, and D. ‘These four decisions were vital – and Bremen was finished.
I have deliberately mentioned this because it was typical. Montgomery was not my immediate Commander, but he always kept in such close touch with the battle that he knew when and where ‘the shoe pinched’. He then went down to see the Commander on the spot – in this case, me – and listened to what he had to say. He then made up his mind immediately. As he drove away I knew that he had probably already forgotten about Bremen and would already be considering the next problem.
That was what made him such a superb battle commander.’
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@johndawes9337
Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave. He lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
He hates Britain, and Britons, especially Montgomery.
He has called Churchill a drunk, Carrington a coward, XXX cowards, my Uncle a coward, Montomery a rancid runt, and many other things. He is a sucker for any opinion about the war that agrees with his views, no matter how far removed from those events the author is. This being the likes of Antony Beevor, Nial Barr, William Weidner, and so on...
Over the last five or six years he has regularly copied my turn of phrase. In this , I am not remotely flattered.
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@phillipnagle9651
'I am describing what happened. Montgomery made strong but ineffectual efforts to capture Caen ( a day one objective) that were rebuffed with heavy casualties. You can quote whomever you wish, it doesn't change what happened.'
But you cannot quote anyone to back up what you claim.
There is no evidence that any firm timing commitment was made in regard to Caen, or any any other Overlord objective, apart from the Seine, which was scheduled for D+90. The allies got there by D+78.
Have you evidence in regard to timings? By evidence, I mean testimony from people who were there, or contemporary documents.
As for 'heavy casualties'...How do you define heavy casualties?
31,000 in two months, spread among 3 armoured divisions, 11 infantry divisions, 5 armoured brigades,
and 3 tank brigades.
This against an enemy comprising 7 infantry divisions, 8 panzer divisions, and 3 heavy tank battalions.
If you rate this as heavy casualties, what are you comparing it to?
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@richardthelionheart6924
Yea, America started all this, and its gathered pace since Reagan got elected in 1980. As far as the war is concerned, Ameicans dont seem to be able to feel good about themselves unless they do other countries down. You only have to look at the number of lead comments posted by Americans on YouTube items about Montgomery, or Dunkirk, or Alamein, and so on.
There was no Battle of Britain, or Stalingrad for the USA. The war was 3,000 miles from their mainland. So they seem to want to make it about this General, or that General, and so on. As if it somehow levels things up.
If anyone looked at American comments on here without knowing anything about the war, I doubt that they would even work out that the USA and Britain were allies. Those comments seem to show more appreciation of Nazi Germany than Britain...or Russia.
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@jeffreyhutchins6527
Montgomery made no commitment regarding Caen in his planning for Normandy. The only commtment he made was to be at the Seine by D+90. He got there by D+78. With 22% fewer than expected casualties.
As for the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
Omar Bradley: A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Brian Horrocks: Corps Commander. Page 53.
What have Bradley and Horrocks got in common?.. They were actually there.
As for Percival at Singapore and McAuliffe at Bastogne. Any comparison between the two situations is absurd. Percival was thousands of miles from any help and had no means of knowing what strength the Japanese had. McAuliffe knew that three allied army groups were behind him and that as soon as the weather turned, overwhelming air power would be avaible to help him.
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@solomongrundy4905
Yes. I would need a lot more than just opinion.
The Panzer Army Africa started the Second Battle of El Alamein with 104,000 men (50,000 of them German). The Germans then took all of the Italian motor transport and fled for all they were worth.
The distances involved were huge. Alamein to the First supply port Tobruk was 375 miles. Tobruk to the next supply port, Benghazi was another 305 miles.
Both sides had been twice up and twice back before Alamein. Montgomery did not make the mistakes previously made by both sides. He ended the war in the North African desert.
As for Patton, he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to seek personal glory by taking Palermo, because it was the Island's capital city. The problem was that the real battle was at the other side of the Island:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
US General Maxwell Taylor.
'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
US General Lucian Truscott.
Patton personally assaulted Italian peasants, and two of his own soldiers, and got himself passed over for army group command in the campaign in North West Europe.
In Normandy, as a single army commander he was not in the battle until it was three parts over, and most of the Germans had been pinned down by British Second Army.
Of the allied break out in Normandy:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
And onwards to Germany...
DEFEAT IN THE WEST
BY MILTON SHULMAN
LONDON
SECKER AND WARBURG 1947
CHAPTER XXIII
THE RETREAT
'THE most spectacular and most significant advance, once the Seine had beencrossed, was made by Second British Army in their break-out from their bridgehead at Vernon. In less than four days their armour dashed about 250 miles to capture Amiens, Arras, Tournai, Brussels, Louvain and Antwerp.'
So there you have it, Patton in France was nothing special.
And onwards:
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
THIRD ARMY
'Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.'
'Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.'
'Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.'
'Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. He [Patton] discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.'
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@smellygoatacres
‘Montgomery didn't defeat Rommel. His loss to kill ratio was disastrous vs Rommel.’ Your words.
Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942):
195,000 allied troops, 4,810 Killed (2.5%). 116,000 Axis troops, 2,400 – 9,000 killed (2% -7.8%).
Operation OVERLORD (06 June – 30 August 1944):
2,052,299 allied troops, 36,980 killed (1.8%). 640,000 Axis troops, 23,019 (3.6%).
‘You wouldn't follow that man into battle’ Your words
From US General Walter Bedell Smith:
‘22 June 1944
Dear General [Montgomery],
I have just received from a most reliable and intelligent source a report on attitude and state of mind of American troops in action. The writer is completely unbiased, and his report contains the following paragraph, which I hope will give you as much pleasure as it has given me:
Confidence in the high command is absolutely without parallel. Literally dozens of embarking troops talked about General Montgomery with actual hero-worship in every inflection. And unanimously what appealed to them beyond his friendliness, and genuineness, and lack of pomp was the story (or, for all I know, the myth) that the General Visited every one of us outfits going over and told us he was more anxious than any of us to get this thing over and get home/ This left a warm and indelible impression.
The above is an exact quotation. Having spent my life with American soldiers, and knowing only too well their innate distrust of everything foreign, I can appreciate far better than you can what a triumph of leadership you accomplished in inspiring such feeling and confidence.
Faithfully
Bedell’
From US General Omar Bradley:
‘Even Eisenhower with all his engaging ease could never stir American troops to the rapture with which Monty was welcomed by his’
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
'You wouldn't follow that man into battle knowing your odds of being killed were 10:1.' Your words.
How would a person follow that man into battle know what their odds were of being killed?
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@rsmithajd
Germany slaughter the British?.. With what? And how were they going to get here?
'I think the British were the weakest link in the allies.....'
You do not think, your comments make that clear.
'the Canadian and Australian forces fought good'
Yep, alongside Britain, across SIX years of war
'but British sucked at every battle they were in'
You mean apart from the Battle of Britain, the war at sea, East Africa, Crusader, Alam el Halfa, Alamein, Husky, Italy, Normany, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the Bulge?..
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@alanle1471
Many of the German formations that fought in the Bulge were created in the Autumn of 1944. After Eisenhower had given the the Germans the two things they most wanted then, time and space.
Montgomery warned that Eisenhower that his policies would leave the allied forces too thinly spread out, one of Bradley's subordinate commanders, Patton specifically warned about the danger in the Ardennes just before the German attack.
Come the battle, Bradley lost control of events, Hodges went to ground. To his credit, Eisenhower seems to have learned by previous mistakes, he went straight to Montgomerey, who postponed Operation Veritable and sorted out the northern half of the bulge. The American troops on the ground seem to have acquitted themselves well.
Here is Alanbrooke's observation on the battle.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
German commanders had given the German plan at best a 5% chance of success.
The later successful campaign was British, Canadian, French and US.
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@tspoon772
Rubbish.
Stop stating things up about Polish people that you cannot back up.
_______________________________________________________________________
Who went war for what reasons:
Germany attacked Poland.
Italy attacked France.
Japan attacked the USA.
Russia was attacked by Germany.
The USA was attacked by Japan.
Great Britain (And France) went to war on behalf of Poland.
_______________________________________________________________________
Australian forces in North Africa (Including Egypt) were called home by their government in order ro meet a perceived threat to their homeland.
_______________________________________________________________________
The idea that Britain was on he verge of starvation is absurd.
Food in Great Britain in 1941:
UK crops harvest: 53.164 million tons
Cereals, Potatoes and Sugar Beet: 6.5 million tons
Cattle, Calves, Sheep and Lambs:13.109 million
UK Milk production: 1,222.8 million gallons
Total food imports: 14.654 million tons
Lend-Lease food imports (7.4% of total food imports): 1.078 million tons
UK Processed food production:20,314 million tons
Total food consumption (UK): 19.996 million tons
Foodstuffs lost at sea enroute to Britain: 787,200 tons (5.3%) of the intended 15 million tons of food imports in 1941.
We can do 1939, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945 if you wish...
_______________________________________________________________________
UK war finaces were built around UK taxation, government borrowing at home and overseas, trading in Sterling Credits, and after British Dollar reserves were almost exhausted by cash and carry purchases from the USA, US Lend-Lease, which amounted to 11% of Britain's wartime needs, and not forgetting the generous gifts from Canada.
_______________________________________________________________________
All clear now?
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@patriciapalmer1377
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, almost no command experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He was a politician in an army uniform.
He presided over a slow campaign in Tunisia. He devised a very poor plan for the invasion of Italy despite warnings from Montgomery that the dispersal of forces would lead to major problems, which it did.
He mainly kept of Montgomery's way in Normandy and as result the allies had all but cleared France by D+87, giving the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad.
Eisenhower took over as allied land forces Commander on the 1st September 1944,and the whole allied advance stalled. He was warned:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
'The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."'
The is it is, US poltical considerations dictating Eisenhowers military decisions.
From Alanbrooke's Diary:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
And more...
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@johnburns4017
Czechoslovakia, Autumn 1938.
If Britain did not agree to German demands, Czechoslovakia would be invaded straightaway. Germany would not even allow the Czech government to attend the conference. Britain was going to save the Czech's how? The Fench did not want it, and they actually had an alliance with Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement found favour in the US press, and with the US government - 3,000 miles away.
Dunkirk, Spring 1940.
Britain was taking bullets as it evacuated 110,000 French troops, mostly in British ships, and even extended the evacuation by another day to take away more French troops. And all this after the French war effort had folded like a house of cards.
Italy / Southern France, Summer 1944.
Like the French were going to pass up the chance to liberate their own soil as the stupid American leaders stopped the chance to finish Italy in 1944, allowed the Germans to move troops to Normandy and the Eastern Front, as the invasion of Southern France achieved nothing that could not be left to a later date, and damaged the West's position in the Balkans in the post-war years.
The Netherlands, Autumn / Winter 1944 to Spring 1945.
The Dutch government in London urged the Dutch people to obstruct German transport before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, which was designed to take allied troops to the Lower Rhine and the Ijsselmeer and not to Berlin. an operation that Montgomery attended to from just 12 miles behind the start line, while Eisenhower was in Normandy, and Bereton was in Britain.
Cleveland, Ohio, USA, Summer 2023.
Big Woody (aka Para Dave) needs professional help.
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@dennisweidner288
'A fair assessment'
British 2nd army at Caen tied down 6.5 of the 8 German armoured divisions in Normandy, leaving the US 2nd Army free to take the major port that the allies needed - Cherbourg, followed by a break to the south. Capturing Caen, or not capturing Caen made little difference to outcome of the campaign. Montgomery delivered victory in Normandy by D+78, 12 days ahead of schedule, and this with the delays to the allied build up caused by the great storm of 19th -20th June.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’
'From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story':
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
Any questions?
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@garyholschuh8811
‘Could you imagine being a German commander going up against a British army commanded by Montgomery?’ Your words.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war”
German General FW von Mellenthin
“Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse”
"The Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery fire they usually fell back-even after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them. To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.
German General Günther Blumentritt.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
German General Hasso von Manteuffel.
‘All the way from Dunkirk to the Philippines, to North Africa, to the Netherlands’ Your words.
Err…Dunkirk saved 338,000 troops-ultimately leading to Hitler’s defeat. The campaign around that ended in disaster, but Britain only contributed 10% of the troops involved. North Africa, ended in a defeat for the Axis as big as Stalingrad. The Netherlands was liberated.
As for the Philippines…it was an American defeat with no British involvement.
‘the British and Montgomery were just in the way when it came to winning the war in Europa!’ Your words.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US General Omar Bradley.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
US Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck.
Field Marshal Montgomery arrived the following day. It was my first personal meeting with him, although I had seen him in staff meetings in London before Normandy. He was impressive, a perceptive, quick-minded man, incisive in his judgments. I could understand why he had been so popular with’ the Eighth Army in North Africa. I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years.
US General James M Gavin.
As for that ‘endless supply of equipment’ . It amounted to 16.5% of Britain’s war needs across the war years.
As for the USA…It was not in the fighting until Germany had lost all of its advantages in technology and being the aggressor against countries that were behind it rearmament, or until the Germans had been stopped from getting war materials from outside of mainland Europe, and it was irretrievable committed in Russia. The USA was three thousand miles from its nearest enemy, suffered zero attacks on its mainland from its enemies. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers did not have a day of personal combat experience between them. This showed as they presided over bog ups in Tunisia, Italy, Normandy Metz, the Bulge and the Hurtgen Forest. Devers contributed next to nothing to the allied victory.
Ah,ah,ah...Before decide to reply, consider what the chances are that you will know more about this subject than me.
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@jpmtlhead39
'AT the time of El Alamein, Rommel wasnt even in África, to have a real command of his forces. He Just left some "directives" how to respond to the brittsh attack, that he knew It was abaut to come.'
The same question applies: Rommel was outnumbered two to one at Alamein. Does defeat there make him a bad general?
Its a simple question, a 14 year old could work it out.
And in Arnhem, the "brilliant" Montgomery, with the famous 4 Victoria crosses awarded (postum), tryed to gained a Moral Victory, on the total hummiliation of Market Garden. The Biggest Paratroopers operation of the war. His total lack of awareness and intelegence, made the perfect storm, for the poor paratroopers. A very real, bridge to far.
A "brilliant" plan, from a "brilliant" general
The MARKET plan was down to the head of the FAAA, US General Lewis Brereton.
Btw. Why is an hispanic like you taking an interest in real countries? Spain was not in the war, apart from helping the Nazis.
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@broncoteno7181
Have it your own way.
When did the British 'beg America to save them'?..
'Can you name any successful British only WWII campaigns?'
Can you name any successful American only campaigns in the Second World War?
'The British lost every battle other than Battle of Britain (arguably still a loss)'
The idea that the Battle of Britain was 'arguably still a loss' is absurd.
The Germans went into the Battle of Britain with 2,550 aircraft in order to to give Germany the aerial superiority it would need for an invasion of Great Britain. When the Battle of Britain ended on 31st October, 1940, Britain had won a resounding victory, the most important allied victory of the entire war, in which Germany lost 1,977 aircraft. The German airforce would never be as powerful again in relation to its opponents, and the tasks it faced, as it was in the summer of 1940, both in quality and quantity. Half of the German fighter Aces of the entire war fought in the Battle of Britain. By the middle of the SIX war (1942), four of the six aircraft types that the Germans used in the battle were obsolete - a state of affairs that their own Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937 had predicted. Just over eight months after the Battle of Britain ended, Germany invaded Russia with just 2,400 aircraft.
Before you decide to answer this comment, consider this... What do you think the chances are that you will know more about this subject than me?
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hdfoster5507
' the lives of 3,996 US, and 11,000-13,000 Brits & Poles with 6,450 captured, all elite fighting men.'
The dead of MARKET GARDEN amounted to 2,224, out of 17,000 killed, wounded, and captured.
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From the US Official History:
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
Page 156
In the eyes of the 8zd Airborne Division commander, Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin, possession of the ridge represented the key to success or failure. "With it in German hands," General Gavin was to note later, "physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it." General Gavin believed that if he held this ridge, the British ground column ultimately could succeed, even if his airborne troops should be driven away from the bridges. The high ground also represented a ready airhead for later operations.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
You need to look further than Antony Beevor.
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Why should Eisenhower have fired Montgomery? Eisenhower approved MARKET GARDEN, which freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
In any case, Montgomery's appointment came from the Imperial General Staff in london, not Eisenhower.
As for Patton, what did he ever do?
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@Tigerhead83
Your claim regarding allied supplies is absurd.
At the end of the OVERLORD campaign, the allied armies were tother, receiving 14,000 tons of supplies per day. That equated to about 20 divisions being able to advance, while the other 20 or so divisions were in holding role.
At Alamein, there were 10 allied divisions. That 100,000 tons you noted would have given each Division 10,000 tons per day. That would have needed about 3,300 3-ton trucks to carry every single day to carry that lot. That, x10 would amount to 33,300 trucks. With two men each truck, that would have amounted 60,000 men plus support stuff. And all that for one day of supplies. What happened on next day? The whole allied army only amounted to 195,000.
Apart from fuel, which came from the Persian Gulf, allied supplied had to come from Britain, via the Cape. 100,000 tons would have needed about 15 merchant ships per day. With a two month voyage (60 days), that would have tied up about 900 merchant ships.
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@KrisBurns22
'You really think after Russia left the battlefield in WW1 Britain and france could stop Germany without the American expedition force ???'
The US contribution to the allied war effort in the First World War was miniscule, and did not even make any sort of impact until September 1918 with the Meuse–Argonne offensive, which has been described thus:
'The offensive was the principal engagement of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in World War I. It was one of a series of Allied attacks, known as the Hundred Days Offensive, which brought the war to an end. It was the largest and bloodiest operation of World War I for the AEF even though, given the scale of other battles on the Western Front, its size was limited and the operation itself secondary, being far from the main offensive axis.'
The sacrifice of British, French, and Russian troops, along with the Royal Navy blockade of Germany did for the Kaiser. The USA turned up when it was time for the victory parades, and the sharing out of the spoils of victory.
Harsh but fair.
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@John14-6...
Perhaps its because, unlike the likes of Bradley, Devers, and Eisenhower, Montgomery fought in the front-line in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact. That the campaign in 1940 ended in defeat, is nothing to do with Montgomery, he was not an allied decision maker at that time.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and concentrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
For OVERLORD, Montgomery undertook to get the allies to the River Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
He then cleared the Scheldt, the only nailed on allied success in the Autumn of 1944.
He went on to sort out the American debacle in the Northern half of the Bulge, he directed the real crossing of the Rhine, and finished up by taking the surrender of North West Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, effectively ending the war.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
The Bulge:
‘He went on in the Bulge, provisionally commanding the US 12th Army Group, and managed to irritate the Americans (again) in a press interview (‘In his book The Longest Winter, Alex Kershaw says, “The picture Montgomery gave of the battle was of massive American blundering: only when he had been brought in to command the armies holding the northern shoulder had catastrophe been averted.”’
Of the US 12th Army Group, Montgomery was actually brought in to command the US 1st army (Hodges) and the US 9th army (Simpson). US 3rd Army (Patton) remained under US command.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, US 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, German 5th Panzer Army.
And the press conference:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 637
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
'My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.'
All this can be found on-line. Why don’t people like this Alex Kershaw check first?
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@johndawes9337
Corrigan was born in 1942, that would have made him about three when the war ended.
What a CV.
Operation Veritable...
Para Dave (bigwoody) copied his stuff from Wikipedia, but failed to include the bit that noted that VERITABLE was due to take place when the ground would have been frozen, with the operation being postponed because Montgomery had to go down to sort ot out the American mess in the Northern half of the Bulge.
My father took part in VERITABLE, he was nearly killed on board a Terrrapin amphibious vehicle during that battle (Para Dave no doubt thinks 'if only'...). He had nothing insightful to say about the battle, but he did remark on the weather, and flooding conditions in battle , and the devastation caused by bombing of Goch, and Kleve.
Kleve is of course, what we would call Cleves, as in Anne of Cleves, the fourth wife of Henry VIII. It should not be confused with the Cleveland area of Yorkshire, or Cleveland, Ohio, USA, said to be the Gay Capital of the USA.
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David Olie
Normandy and France 1944.
As allied land forces commander Montgomery created the plan for Overlord which targeted allied forces at the Seine by D+90 – which was achieved earlier than those 90 days. The only channel port specifically targeted was Cherbourg which US forces took 10 days behind schedule. Le Havre was liberated on 12.09.44, Dieppe on 01.09.44, Boulogne 22.09 .44, Calais 01.10.44. The North Sea port of Antwerp was liberated 04.09.44. Of the Atlantic ports, Brest was liberated 19.09.44, Saint Nazaire, La Rochelle and Lorient were not liberated until VE Day.
The allied divisions employed on D-Day were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
Montgomery’s astute leadership created conditions that led to almost complete destruction of German forces in Normandy, coping with, and turning the concentration of German forces in front of British and Canadian forces and the great storm of June 1944 which destroyed the shoddily installed US artificial harbour and damaged the properly installed British artificial harbour.
A performance that drew this comment from Eisenhower:
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’
Also:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
Regarding the Falaise Pocket and the subsequent breakout, this is what the US General Bradley had to say:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
British expertise dominated the planning for D-Day and Overlord with artificial harbours, PLUTO, assault armour and a vital deception plan.
Events prior to that entirely vindicate the British stance regarding any attempt to invade France before June 1944. In 1942, General Marshall badgered for an invasion of Europe but was only able to offer two US divisions for such an enterprise to go with the available seven British Divisions, the necessary landing craft were not available, the U-boat war was not won, the Luftwaffe was still too powerful to preclude overwhelming allied air superiority. Put this against 25 German divisions in France that would have dealt with any allied incursion without taking any resources away from the Russian front.
In 1943, as in 1942 the shipping for a full scale cross channel invasion was not available. Even the agreed start date for Overlord of 1st May 1944 had to be put back until June 1944 due to need to provide the necessary shipping for the troops at Sword and Utah beaches which Montgomery added to the Overlord plan at the beginning of 1944.
The charge that Churchill was reluctant to support a cross channel invasion is nonsense. As evidenced by what was stated at that time:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 24 Nov 42
‘2. It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon “Round-Up”. “Torch is no substitute for “Round-Up”, and only engages thirteen divisions as against the forty-eight contemplated for “Round-Up”. All my talks with Stalin, in Averell’s presence, were on the basis of a postponed “Round-Up”, but never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe in 1943 or even 1944.’
As for Teheran, These are Churchill’s words:
‘Before we separated Stalin looked at me across the table and said “I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime Minister about ‘Overlord’. Do the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff really believe in ‘Overlord’? I replied, “Provided the conditions previously stated for ‘Overlord’ are established when the time comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel against the Germans every sinew of our strength.” On this we separated.’
What reasonable person can argue with that?
I will be back to deal with the remainder of rubbish spouted by the little shit in due course.
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Back to France 1944 (Yawn).
‘nine American division involved in the D-Day invasion’
The allied divisions employed on D-Day (06.06.44) were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
The number of allied divisions landed by 02.07.44 was:
British: 11, Canadian: 1, US: 13.
Mobilization:
Across SIX years of war, Britain, the British Commonwealth and British Empire mobilized 9 million people into in land forces. This figure of course excludes auxiliary, naval and air force personnel.
As for the USA, the following would seem to explain that 55% reduction in divisions:
file:///C:/Users/A%20User/Desktop/Misc%20Leisure/90-Division%20Gamble.html
ROTFL.
GDP
Total British GDP in the SIX years of war amounted to $2,622 billion with approx. $200 billion spent on the war.
Lend-lease
To Britain amounted $21.6 Billion (Net) between 1941 and 1945.
Aircraft Production (1939-45)
Britain: 131,000, Germany: 119,000, USA 300,000.
Peak allied aircraft strengths in Europe (December 1944) amounted to 14,500 British, 12,200 US and 15,800 Russian machines. The opposing German Strength amounted to 8,500.
Trump
Word is that he is busy trying to get Russia back into the G8 – as of course he owes Putin for fixing the US presidential election. Also, he is waiting for an answer from Canada as to when they burned down the US capital.
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Irishseven100
And more:
‘Final numbers leave not doubt French and Brits were not “equals, side by side” :
The 400,000 allied forces on 26th May were about half-half between French and Brits (200,000 each)
Almost all Brit soldiers were evacuated, only 2 thirds of French soldiers were evacuated (about 200,000 vs about 140,000).’
Misleading.
Any in-balance between the numbers of troops that were embarked was due to British base troops being evacuated before the bulk of allied forces had reached the Dunkirk perimeter, and that the French had no embarkation policy until Churchill intervened in embarkation matters on 1he 31st May.
Over 100,000 of the French troops that evacuated were taken away by British ships.
‘Less than 5,000 Brit soldiers lost their lives protecting the evacuation. More than 15,000 French soldiers died.
Almost no Brit soldier was captured. Almost all the 35,000 captured soldiers were French.’
Misleading:
Of the 861 ships involved in the evacuation, 693 were British. British ships returned to Dunkirk after the British withdrawal to bring away another 26,000 French troops.
The great bulk of the air cover for the evacuation was supplied by the RAF.
All clear now?..
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Admiral Somerville sent an officer to see the French comander at 9.30 in the morning with this message:
'It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your
fine ships to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on to the end, and if we win, as we
think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that
our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer, we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose, we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:
(a) Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the
Germans and Italians.
(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port.
The reduced crews will be repatriated at the earliest moment. If either of these courses is adopted by you, we will restore
your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full
compensation, it they are damaged meanwhile.
(c) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships
should not be used against the Germans or Italians unless these break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies—Martinique, for instance— where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.
If you refuse these fair offers, I must, with profound regret,
require you to sink your ships within six hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders of His Majesty’s
Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.'
The French commander Gensoul, refused to see that officer so the above message was sent by messengers to Gensoul. Britain tried all day to get an answer without success and then opened fire at 5.45pm.
Why were the deaths murders?
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@ErikExeu
'Fantastic. I have never seen such made up excuse before. He "drew all the veteran German troops and numbers on him intentionally to help the American". You use quatation marks, can you provide the source for this fairytail?'
Sure...
US General Omar Bradley:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
Field Marshal Alanbrooke:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th [1944].
‘Then Dinner with the P.M., Ike and Bedell Smith’
‘Next morning [28th] Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talk with the Supreme Commander.’
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
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@MemekingJag
'But the fact alone that the Polish commander expressed concerns about the plan, and was thereafter scapegoated, publicly or not, is a stain on Monty's military record.'
Montgomery criticized the perfornce of the Polish parachute force, he did not blame them for the outcome at Arnhem. There is a difference. Prior to criticizing theperfornce of the Polish parachute force, he awarded medals to individual members of that force for their actions at Arnhem.
Who can say if Montgomery's criticism of the Poles was justified? Not me. Probably, only those that were there can judge.
MEN AT ARNHEM
GEOFFREY POWELL
Pen and Sword Books 2004
P164
'The night had been a misery in every way.
At irregular intervals from the late evening onwards, clusters of mortar bombs had fallen among and around us, harming no one but preventing sleep, at least for me. Others, between spells of sentry duty, had collapsed exhausted into oblivion. Four times enemy patrols had roused them from their stupor as the night exploded into noise and light, with red tracer whipping the trees and white flares blossoming overhead. No one had been hit, but losses there had been. On stand-to rounds I had found the Polish trenches empty except for Peter, their corporal, crouched grimly behind his Bren. The rest of the party had vanished in the early hours, sensing perhaps that they had attached themselves to an unlucky unit. Peter explained nothing, but his embarrassment was clear; it was both unfair and pointless to press him for details when either pride or sense of duty had kept him there to fight on among strangers.'
The Polish commander expressed concerns about COMET, but was silent regarding MARKET GARDEN. In any case, Sosabowski and the other airborne commanders reported to the commander FAAA, US General Lewis Brereton not Montgomery.
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'-Montgomery's victory in El Alamein was nothing to write home about. Rommel was short on fuel and half of his armored force were useless Italian tanks. Of course Monty won the battle, any commander with such an advantage is going to win, isn't he? Your words.
Appointed to command of the ground forces in ‘Torch’, Montgomery was moved across to command Eighth Army after the death of Gott. In his first big command, Montgomery acted quicky and decisively as he reorganized and rejuvenated Eighth Army to make it fit to take on and defeat the Axis forces led by Rommel. There is plenty of evidence of Montgomery’s effect on his new command, here is some:
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight.’
DE GUINGAND
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
ALANBROOKE
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
CHURCHILL
Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops.
Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (6.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia.
Further, Montgomery showed how the allies could beat the Germans in the future: thorough preparation and concentration of resources, which paid off in Normandy and would have paid off in the autumn of 1944 in the advance on Germany if Eisenhower had heeded these lessons instead of allowing political considerations to dictate strategy.
'-Montgomery bungled his pursuit of Rommel - almost any other general, with more fuel, more troops, chasing a defeated foe, could have brought the Afrika Korps to bay. He just herded the enemy along.' Your words.
Cairo to Tripoli by Road is 1600 miles. The same London to Moscow.
Rommel outran his supply lines. Montgomery did not make that mistake.
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'-Montgomery's only objective was to capture the town of Caen. He and his forces were repelled three times and when they finally entered the town the Germans had already left for a higher defense position. He was supposed to drive toward Germany in the left flank of the allies and caused more delays for the Americans to get to Germany.
-Montgomery utterly failed in Market Garden. Lots of things went wrong but ultimately Monty needs to take the blame here. And Monty’s refusal to admit that German panzer divisions were in Arnhem was all on him. Market Garden was Monty’s brainchild. How do you forgive him for that mess?' Your words.
France 1944 (Operation Overlord)
The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings.
Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals.
Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
Market Garden
With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to depoly the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhowert had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of.
The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan. There is a body of opinion that the weather, which defied allied forecasts was the decisive factor in Arnhem not being taken:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
EISENHOWER
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
CHURCHILL
German General Karl Student gave the weather as the main cause of the failure at Arnhem.
Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter.
Where is the ego in that?
Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened.
Where is the ego in that?
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
'colossal defeat'?..
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@kenmazoch8499
'nearly 14,000 casualties is not rubbish and the troops there most surely did not think so.'
14,000 out of 195,000. You should compare that with the Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, and Metz... amongst others.
'if the attack had been made as an armored assault, with engineer and infantry support, rather than the other way around, the casualties would have been some 20-30 percent less,'
And you know this because?..
'cig alan brooke, saw to it lumsden did not have a job afterward.'
You do of course mean CIGS Alanbrooke.
Not really, Lumsden, had several jobs after he was sacked by Montgomery.
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@M_A65
Oh well, its your funeral...
'Good job you beat the undersupplied, undermanned, and exhausted axis who had far less than he had.'
Such a situation applied to every single US land victory during the war. Which one do you want?
'When he failed at market garden he just played everyone else.'
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), the Lorraine Campaign (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). The threat of V2 Rocket attacks on London, alone justified MARKET GARDEN.
Where is there evidence that Montgomery 'just played everyone else'?
'In Sicily Patton showed him up exposing how inept he was.'
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
'I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.'
US General Maxwell Taylor.
'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.'
US General Lucian Truscott.
'On the western front he spent two months to plan the crossing of a river, while Patton made a fool of him by just crossing under the cover of darkness successfully.'
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406:
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties’
'His career in WW2 was full of more quagmires and failures than successes.'
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and concentrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
For OVERLORD, Montgomery undertook to get the allies to the River Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
He then cleared the Scheldt, the only nailed on allied success in the Autumn of 1944. He went on to sort out the American debacle in the Northern half of the Bulge, he directed the real crossing of the Rhine, and finished up by taking the surrender of North West Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, effectively ending the war.
Where does the loss of a single division at Arnhem sit with that lot?
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@jpmtlhead39
1/10 for effort.
'got to do with everything.
You can only have a proper battle, if you have weapons and logistics to do so.' Your words.
OK. So Urquhart being out gunned, and oiutnumbered , losing at Arnhem made him a bad general?
And Britain dindt had the means, to engage the German army, only by Herself. Everybody knows that.' OK. So how does that make Montgomery 'The most overated general in Military history'?
'You have many examples, of brilliant german generals, Without the means to do what They intended to do.'
OK, so how many of them won when the odds were not in their favour? How many of them won without incurring hefty casualty figures?
Example: At Alam el Halfa, Rommel outnumbered Montgomery by 6 to 4. Yet Montgomery won. Does that make Rommel a bad General?
Example: At Alamein, Rommel was out numbered by 2 to 1, and lost. Does that make Rommel a bad General? Of course not .
For Alamein, allowed himself to be mauvered into a position whereby he had all but outrun his supply lines, and he found himself with the sea on his left, and the Qattara Depression on his right, and thus no room to outflank his opponent. The cardinal sins of warfare in the desert. Does that make Rommel a bad General?
Btw. Montgomery won at Almein with less than 7% casualties. Compare that to US casulty figures in their battles with the Germans...
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'Any overal field commander of Market Garden should be on top of the main points. Proven by the Germans in 1940 using seaplanes in Rotterdam. And by the capture of the Orne bridges at D Day.'
Apart from Eisenhower, in his role as Supreme Commander, and as allied land forces commander, there was no overal field commander of Market Garden until Brereton's MARKET forces linked up with Dempsey's GARDEN forces, at which point, Dempsey would be he overall field commander. By then, the type of things you have mentioned, would have been decided by the FAAA. Montgomery had no final say in FAAA planning for MARKET.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
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@gerhardris
OK. Its your funeral.
'placing Market Garden in all aspects under one agressive overall commander of US forces. Preferably Patton with a few of his staff.'
Why? What had Patton ever done?
'And to make clear that anything needed such as flighingboats or whatever that was difficult to get could go through him. Direct line to Eisenhower and Churchill would work wonders.'
Err... Montgomery had a direct line to Eisenhower, albeit, Eisenhower was in Granville in Normandy. Before, and during MARKET GARDEN, Churchill was travelling to, attending, and coming home from the OCTAGON conference at Quebec, in Canada. In any case, why would Churchill have involved himself in such a limited matter as MARKET GARDEN?
'Yet, granted logistics permitting to have both the Schelde as priority and MG as a nice to have. Then Monty's plan of MG would with the benefit of hindsight probably have worked. As would the subsequent thrusts into Germany the broad front being in supply after Antwerp was open.'
Rubbish.
Opinion has it that even if the allies could have turned the entire 21st Army Group towards the Scheldt, opening up the estuary would have taken a month. You name the date, say 4th September, 1944? Then, as Admiral Ramsay had warned, there would be a three week campaign to clear the estuary of mines. That takes until almost the end of October. Thus, MARKET GARDEN, that was devised to take advantage of German weakness in the wake of the German defeats in Normandy and Belarus would have been overtaken by events.
'The newly formed FAAA (first allied airborne army under Brereton) was placed under command of the 21st Army Group thus under Monty.'
But as the evidence shows, command of the FAAA by 21st Army Group did not extend to 21st Army being able to control any detail of Brereton's plan. It did lead to Brereton agreeing to FAAA units taking part in INFATUATE.
The USAAF man, Brereton would not even yield to his own airborne forces commanders in regard to the air plan for MARKET:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
'have Bradley in charge of Pattons former command. All on the defensive.'
Then you would be back to something like Montgomery's proposals to Eisenhower on the 23rd August, based on the then current supply situation: that First Canadian Army, and US Third Army be stopped to allow British Second Army, and US First Army to advance in the North. OR, that First Canadian Army, and British Second Army be stopped to allow US First Army, and US Third Army to advance in the South. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed, time and space to rebuild their forces in the West.
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@diogocatalano9557
'Montgomery was anything but Spartan.' Your words.
This is the first definition of 'Spartan' that I found on-line:
'showing or characterized by austerity or a lack of comfort or luxury.'
Montgomery lived and worked in three caravans during his time as an army/army group commander. He did not drink, he did not smoke. In the 1944-45 campaign in North West Europe, he was always nearer the front than Eisenhower, his fellow army group commanders, Bradley and Devers, and the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, Lewis Brereton. Example: at the time of MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery about 12 miles behind the start line for GARDEN, and then in Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England.
_______________________________________________________________________
'As if that weren't enough, he had a habit of lying exaggeratedly to avoid losing his position. Even when things were going wrong, he reported facts that were completely different from reality.' Your words.
Really, when did that happen?
_______________________________________________________________________
'He was very lucky not to have been fired by Eisenhower.' Your words.
Eisenhower was not in a position to fire Montgomery. Eisenhower was in the US Army, Montgomery was in the British Army.
_______________________________________________________________________
'he was a closet pedophile'
Where is there evidence of this?
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@aesop8694
As an army and army group commander, Montgomery won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, The Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
As a single division commander, Montgomery had performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940. Montgomery served in the front line in France in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He made a mess of US operations in Tunisia, having to seek help from Alexander, he made a mess of the invasion of Italy. He kept out of the way in Normandy and the Germans suffered a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Eisenhower took over the land battle in September 1944 and the allies went nowhere.
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If Hitler had 'waited 2-3 years(instead of 1939)or focused on Britain rather than the Soviets, probably all be speaking German as our 2nd language'
If Hitler had waited until 1941 or 1942 to start the war, Germany would have been up against Britain and France, both of who's rearmament programme would have been far more complete. What is to say that in 1941 or 1942, the French Army would have collapsed in the way that it did in 1940? By then Britain would have been more able to commit a lot more troops to to the fighting in France. Belgium and The Netherlands would also been far better prepared to resist a German attack.
If Hitler had decided to attack Russia in 1939, German forces would still have to had to got through Poland to get to the Soviet Union. If Germany had attacked Poland, Britain and France would still have been obliged to go to war, unless there was no Anglo/French/Polish agreement. Probably the only way that this would have happended would have been if Hitler had slackened the pace of his moves in the East, against Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In that case, German forces would have been even further from Russia than they were in 1939.
In 1937, German technocrats had warned Hitler that then German weapons technology would be obsolete by 1943. A warning that by largely proved to be correct. German treasury officials warned about the long-term unsustainability of German armaments spending as the war approached. Hitler then gambled on a short war, and lost.
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@imperialcommander639
'Anyone visiting the battlefield will be struck by the strategic value of the Groesbeek Heights, which form some of the highest ground in the Netherlands.' Your words.
Get real. Groosbeek is 112 ft above sea level.
I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands, Drielandenpunt, at the Town of Vaals in Limburg. Its 700 feet above sea level. Even Deelen, North of Arnhem is 282 feet above sea level.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994.
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
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@johnhallett5846
Its a definite no.
The North End of Arnhem Bridge was still allied hands when XXX Corps linked up with the US 2nd Airborne Division on the early morning of the 3rd day, with whole of that day to reach Arnhem Bridge, a 14 mile run. If Nijmegen Bridge and City had been allied hands, XXX Corps would have been there in... three hours?
The Intelligence on German capability was seen by Eisenhower, Brereton, and Bradley was well as Montgomery.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
A reason why we get so many ill-informed comments on here from the US is that Americans have convinced themselves that the USA is good at fighting military campaigns, because of the outcome of the world wars.
The prosaic reality is that in both conflicts, the USA was thousands of miles from any threat to its homeland, it had modest import needs, its allies bore the brunt of the Central Powers and Axis attacks when those enemies were at height of their powers and the USA outnumbered most of its opponents.
Instead of accepting this reality, Americans like to think that this US commander was better than that allied or enemy commander, this US tactic or strategy was better than that allied tactic or strategy, and so on.
That is how we end up with rubbish comments on YouTube that have zero basis in reality, like: 'the Germans feared Patton', 'Eisenhower masterminded D-Day,' 'the Battle of the Bulge could have cost the allies the war', 'the USAAF bombed accurately', and so on and so on.
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MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. The threat of V2 Rocket attacks on London, alone justified MARKET GARDEN.
MARKET GARDEN’s 17,000 casualties should be compared to other allied operations at that time: Aachen (20,000), The Lorraine Campaign (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
Just over 2k troops were killed in MARKET GARDEN, not 17k. Get it right next time.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Sicily:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
Pages 319-320
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
P322
Alexander, embarrassed that he had given Patton permission to bolt in the opposite direction, now lamely offered to put the American division under Monty's direct command, explaining why he had given Patton permission to split off the major portion of his Seventh Army in its drive to Palermo: 'Would you like to have one American Div front under your command now for operating in your northern sector? Seventh Army should take advantage of Italian demoralization to clear up the west of the island and at least seize Palermo, from which port they can be based, and if Germans are too strong for you Seventh Army can take over a sector in the north from St Stefano to Troina.¹
Had Monty been the glory-seeking British bigot of Patton's imaginings, he would undoubtedly have taken up Alexander's offer. Instead Monty insisted the American division stay under Patton's command, no doubt as a gage in ensuring, belatedly, that Seventh Army face eastwards and not westwards: 'Re American div. Would like one to operate eastwards on North coast road, but suggest it should remain under Patton,' he signalled back.²
¹ Alexander Papers (WO 214/22), PRO.
² Ibid.
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Normandy:
The diary that you quoted was not written by Montgomery, from D-Day to VE Day, it was a series of notes composed by members of Montgomery’s staff. On the 4th August date that you noted, Alanbrooke wrote to Montgomery:
‘I am delighted that our operations are going so successfully and conforming so closely to your plans. For the present all the 'mischief making tongues' are keeping quiet; I have no doubt they will start wagging again and am watching them.’
Montgomery planned for British Second Army to protect the US First Army whilst it spread out to take the key port – Cherbourg, the Cotentin Peninsular and then further afield from the earliest days of his planning for OVERLORD.
Caen disappeared as a D-Day objective with the jettisoning of General Morgan’s OVERLORD plan.
On this matter, the evidence is clear:
C-in-C's Directives (21 A Gp/1062/2/C-in-C): 21.03.1944
It is very important that the area to the S.E. of CAEN should be secured as early as Second Army can manage.'
This, from an attendee at Montgomery’s briefing to allied leaders at St Paul’s School, West London on the 15th May 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’
From Montgomery’s directive: NO mention that Caen had to be taken on D-Day.
The claim that Caen not being captured on D-Day ‘stalled the entire Normandy campaign’ is absurd. Caen was far less important objective than Cherbourg. Whatever importance capturing Caen had for the allies began to subside almost from the first day of OVERLORD as the Germans played into Montgomery’s hands by beginning to mass almost all of their armour at CAEN.
The scale of the German armour at Caen was noted by Alanbrooke to Montgomery on the 28th July, 1944:
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front.” ‘
As for Eisenhower the military leader...
He made a poor job of the allied campaign in Tunisia, he, and, in turn Alexander failed to grip the situation in Sicily, and then went on to make a muck of the invasion of Italy by, not for the last time failing to concentrate allied forces, in this case by undertaking AVALANCHE, BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK at the same time. In North West Europe, he failed to concentrate allied forces for a push into Germany when he took over as allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944, prolonging the war well into 1945. He dithered at the start of the German push in the Ardennes, and failed to support in his race against time to stop the Russians from getting into Denmark.
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'He's a jerk like Wellington! From the moment he has not had the opportunity either to cling to positions previously established by him, that he does not have a balance of power in his favor, these guys are tacticians of operetta! As far as Wellington is concerned, study his "campaigns" from Portugal and Spain and up to Waterloo ... he only clung to positions established by him but without the slightest tactics worthy of the name. When in Montgomery, the only times he was told to "move", he broke his face seriously. As the Americans progressed around him, after the disembarkation, he was blocked for a month in front of Caen and let's not talk about the disastrous operation of Arnhem which ended in a massacre of English soldiers launched in an operation towards which he did not want. take into account movements of SS armored units' Your words.
The vast bulk of German forces in Normandy were ranged in front of British 2nd Army at Caen, including 84% of the German armour, so the US forces could break out.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
Learn some history before posting on here.
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0/10 for knowledge of the subject. 0/10 for effort.
Your words in ‘single quotes’
‘He might have done OK in N. Africa, but once his command got to Europe after D-Day it was veritable total disaster. HE wanted the credit and glory for victory over Germany, but his campaigns showed he was incapable of it. Look at the results.’
OK let’s look at the results: As allied land forces commander, Montgomery undertook to get the allies to the River seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78. And this, with the interruption to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of June 1944. In doing so, he clocked up 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and gave the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad.
Bedell Smith later stated that “no one else could have got us across the Channel and into Normandy”.
Eisenhower stated that “ 'I don't know if we could have done it without him”.
‘Operation Market-Garden was his baby and turned into a veritable rout for the Allies. ('Never mind those two Panzer divisions near Arnhem, we're going in.') Took the American 101st Airborne to rescue a portion of British troops that they could.’
MARKET GARDEN a ‘rout’? That operation extended allied held territory by nearly 60 miles, what sort of rout was that? German General Karl Student thought the airborne landings were a great success. US 101st Airborne were nothing to do with the main evacuation of troops from Arnhem. They did take part in Operation Pegasus on the 22-23rd October 1944, when 138 allied servicemen were brought back from German held territory. However, unlike the Hollywood version of that event, the operation involved the Royal Engineers, the Royal Canadian Engineers, the Dutch Underground, and he Belgian SAS, as well as US troops.
‘Afterwards, he still thought he could out-fight Patton to Berlin, and resorted to diverting supplies/materiel from Patton to his own forces, leaving the American general fuming. Patton was short-shrifted so the British could save face thru 'Monty'. Not really. There is no evidence that Montgomery saw any reason to ‘out-fight Patton’. Why should there be? Patton was a single army commander. Montgomery was an army group commander from a different country, in a different part of the front, and was higher up the allied chain of command.
‘Patton could have made a beeline for Berlin three months after D-Day, but the U.S. just had to play second-tier footsie with the Russians and British, to give the especially the latter political cover in an attempt for their failure to adequately take on German forces earlier on.’
Three months after D-Day, Patton was 100 miles from the Rhine, and unlike his fellow allied army commanders, Crerar, Dempsey, and Hodges, he had completely stopped. At that point, his superior officer, Bradley, allocated him an additional 1,500 tons of supplies per day from the US 12th Army Group allocation of 7,000 tons of allied supplies per day. This 1,500 tons as taken from the supplies for Hodges’s US 1st Army. Quite separately, 21st Army Group received 7,000 of allied supplies per day, for Montgomery to distribute between British 2nd Army, and Canadian 1st Army.
‘Monty's insistence on participation in decision-making beyond his abilities is the core reason the European war went on as long as it did.’
The European war began 03.09.1939, and ended 08.05.1945. Which bit did Montgomery extend?
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@robertgoines1831
What sort of idiot would post this:
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
0/10.
Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England.
The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter.
Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden.
Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue.
None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition.
The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
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@Willzy800
‘Compared to Patton? Even Bradley thought he was a nuisance. Montgomery was far more experienced than any allied commander.’
Yep.
Of the other senior commanders in the North West Europe campaign of 1944-45, Bradley, Devers, and Eisenhower, they did did not have a single day of personal combat experience between. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943.
Montgomery had fought with distinction in the front line in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO. As a single division commander, Montgomery had performed with distinction in the roles allocated to him and his troops in the allied defeat in France and the Low Countries in the Summer of 1940. Of particular note was his troops night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. We ordered to do so, by the high command, he brought the forces home, almost intact.
Much the same could be said of Alexander. Alanbrooke saw both commanders close up in France, and he could see that both could be relied upon in times of crisis.
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David Olie
Casualties
British and Colonial deaths for their 72 months of combat amounted to 383,786 military plus 60,595 British civilian deaths. The number of Colonial civilian deaths is not known. In addition, the Dominions lost the following military deaths: Australia, 40,040. Canada, 45,383. India, 87,032, New Zealand, 11,929. South Africa.
Here is an American view on how Britain waged war and its casualties:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=opDuw4OZ3QI (39 minutes 37 seconds onwards…)
Aircraft Production 1939-45
Britain 131,000, Germany 119,000, Russia 158,000, USA 300,000.
Italy
The campaign in Italy tied down 25 German divisions, the landings at Salerno and Anzio made zero difference to the timing for Overlord. As for the idea that the USA was going to fight in the Far East rather in Europe:
‘Memorandum for Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King
Subject: Instructions for London Conference, July 1942
16 July 42
9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that the defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatre and in the Near east. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably of without firing a shot or losing a life.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Commander-in-Chief.
Misc.
Nothing on Frederick the Great, Frederick Forsyth, the War of Jenkins Ear, Gone with the Wind, the death of Elvis or the lunatic proposition that a broad front strategy prevented German disobedience after the war.
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Chris Wilson.
'Montgomery won the battle only because of the significant contribution of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, something he never acknowledged.' Your words.
EIGHTH ARMY
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER
To be read to All Troops
1. When we began the Battle of Egypt on 23 October I said hat together we would hit the Germans and Italians for six right out of North Africa.
We have made a very good start and to-day, 12th Nov., there are no German and Italian soldiers on Egyptian territory except prisoners.
In three weeks we have completely smashed the German and Italian Army, and pushed the fleeing remnants out of Egypt, having advanced ourselves nearly 300 miles up to and beyond the frontier.
2. The following enemy formations have ceased to exist as effective fighting formations:
Panzer Army. 15 Panzer Div.
21 Panzer Div.
90 Light Div.
164 Light Div.
10 Italian Corps. Brescia Div.
Pavia Div.
Folgore Div.
20 Italian Corps. Ariete Armd. Div.
Littorio Armd. Div.
Trieste Div .
21 Italian Corps. Trento Div.
Bologna Div.
The prisoners captured number 30,000, including nine Generals.
The amount of tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, transport, air-craft, etc., destroyed or captured is so great that the enemy is completely crippled.
3. This is a very fine performance and I want, first, to thank you all for the way you responded to my call and rallied to the task. I feel that our great victory was brought about by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire rather than by anything I may have been able to do myself.
4. Secondly, I know you will all realise how greatly we were helped in our task by the R.A.F. We could not have done it without their splendid help and co-operation. I have thanked the R.A.F. warmly on your behalf.
5. Our task is not finished yet; the Germans are out of Egypt but there are still some left in North Africa. There is some good hunting to be had further to the West, in Libya; and our leading troops are now in Libya ready to begin. And this time, having reached Bengasi and beyond we shall not come back.
6. On with the task, and good hunting to you all. As in all pursuits some have to remain behind to start with; but we shall all be in it before the finish.
12.11.42 B. L. Montgomery
General, G.O.C.-in-C,
Eighth Army.
His words.
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Irishseven100
Despite my previous reply being deleted twice, we go on:
‘Evacuation was decided on 26 May 1940 by the British alone. At that moment the French military HQ was not expecting that decision and were instead planning a counter-attack in Arras. Eden specifically ordered the head of the British Expeditionary Force, Lord Gort, not to tell the French and the Belgian about the evacuation.’
Rubbish.
THE WAR IN FRANCE
AND FLANDERS
1939 - 1940
BY MAJOR L. F. ELLIS
C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.
LONDON: 1953
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
Pages 173-175
On returning to his Command Post Lord Gort found a personal message from Mr Eden:
I have had information all of which goes to show that French offensive from Somme cannot be made in sufficient strength to hold any prospect of junction with your armies in the north. Should this prove
to be the case you will be faced with a situation in which safety of B.E.F. will be predominant consideration. In such conditions only course open to you may be to fight your way back to west where all beaches and ports east of Gravelines will be used for embarkation. Navy would provide fleet of ships and small boats and R.A.F. would give full support. As withdrawal may have to begin very early preliminary plans should be urgently prepared. You should also consider urgently security of Ostend and Dunkirk to which latter port Canadian Bde group is being sent night 26th/27th. Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud tomorrow afternoon when whole situation will be clarified ...
This was followed by another message to say that the Canadian Brigade would not be sent. Lord Gort reported in turn to the Secretary of State that plans for a withdrawal northwards had that morning been agreed with the French, but that news from the Belgian front was disquieting. He concluded 'I must not conceal from you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will be lost.'
Another message came from Mr Eden:
Prime Minister has had conversation with M. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fully explained to him the situation and resources French Army. It is clear from this that it will not be possible for French to deliver attack in the south in sufficient strength to enable them to effect junction with northern armies. In these circumstances no course open to you but to fall back upon the coast in accordance terms my telegram . . . M. Reynaud communicating General Weygand and latter will no doubt issue orders in this sense forthwith. You are now authorised to operate towards coast forthwith in conjunction with French and Belgian Armies.
The policy of evacuation seemed thus to have been accepted on the highest political level. Moreover, the Howard-Vyse Mission at French Headquarters informed the War Office that after receiving a copy of General Blanchard's order for withdrawal, quoted above, General Weygand had 'consequently sent for Admiral Darlan to study re-embarkation'. Unfortunately, inability to take a prompt decision and to give clear orders again resulted in misunderstanding, for neither General Blanchard nor the Admiral in charge of the Dunkirk area was told by the French High Command that evacuation was intended. General Blanchard was left to believe that a final stand was to be made on the Lys and so he failed to realise the need, much less the urgency, to plan any further withdrawal.
Lord Gort suffered from no such handicap. A week before, he had been clear in his own mind that if the French failed to close the gap in their front he might be forced to retreat to the coast. The War Office and the Admiralty had been led to realise this too, and had been preparing for such a possible contingency. And now that the attempt to close the gap was abandoned the Government saw that the contingency had become a reality. At once, they told Lord Gort: `You are now authorised to operate towards coast forthwith' and at the same time they told the French Government that the policy must therefore be to evacuate and orders to this effect had been given to Lord Gort. There was no ambiguity here, nor any room for misunderstanding of British intentions. Had the French High Command made known the decision to French commanders in the field with equal
promptitude and clarity, much subsequent trouble would have been avoided.
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Irishseven100
And more:
‘But up until the 31st of May, and even after that, on the field in Dunkirk, the attitude of the British commander Lord Gort was unabashedly in favor of British soldiers and against the French. There are many actions from Gort, before and after Dunkirk, that give plenty of reasons to French commanders not to trust the Brits. For the sake of this answer, I will show just one : Gort did not write “we want to embark French soldiers but their officers don’t let them”. He wrote “every Frenchman embarked is at cost of one Englishman”. See his secret telegram to the War Office on 29 May below:’
Rubbish.
This is the wording of Gort’s telegram to CIGS (That is Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to save you looking it up);
‘IMMEDIATE
O(B) 14 68 29/5
PERSONAL C IN C TO CIGS
I HAVE RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM BRIG SWAYNE THAT GENERAL GEORGES WISHES EMBARKATION TO BE DONE BY MYSELF AND FRENCH 1st ARMY WITH MUTUAL CO-OPERATION AND SUPPORT. I AM QUITE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE. BUT SUPPORT BY WHICH IS IMPLIED RESOURCES IS ALL ON OUR SIDE STOP.STRONGLY URGE THAT FRENCH SMALL PARTIES OF FRENCH HAVE ALREADY BEEN EMBARKED BUT EVERY FRENCHMAN IS AT COST OF ONE ENGLISHMAN STOP MY INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT SAFETY OF B.E.F. IS PRIMARY CONSIDERATION STOP. REMAINS OF 1st FRENCH ARMY ON ARRIVAL WILL DESERVE EMBARKATION BUT BY NO MEANS ALL THOSE NOW IN THIS AREA MAY I BE INFORMED EARLY WHAT THE POLICY REGARDING THE EMBARKATION OF FRENCH SHOULD BE’
This telegram shows that French troops were already being embarked by the 29th May. Gort was understandably seeking clarity on embarkation policy, in light of instructions that he had previously received. No reasonable person could interpret this message as having any other meaning.
‘Evacuation was initially planned for only 2 days, and only for Brits.’
Evacuation was only expected to be able to take place over 2 days. That is quite different to planning for a 2-day evacuation. At that point, there was no knowing what the attitude of the French would be to such an evacuation.
‘During the first 4 days (from 26th to 29th May), only Brits were evacuated. French soldiers were turned down.
The first French soldiers were evacuated only on the 5th day, on 30th May, after more than 70,000 Brit soldiers had already been evacuated.’
Rubbish. Ad Gort’s Telegram to the CIGS of the 29th May makes clear.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
The invasion of France. The evidence is clear...
US General Marshall turned up in London in Mid 1942 with some gung-ho plan (SLEDGEHAMMER) to invade France in 1942, which Alanbrooke and Churchill quickly dealt with.
'Former Naval Person to President 8 July 42
‘No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend “Sledgehammer” as a practical operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported “The conditions which would make “Sledgehammer” a sound, sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur. They are now sending their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.’
At the Casablanca (SYMBOL) conference, despite intense US pressure, Alanbrooke was able to get the plan to invade France in 1943 delayed until 1944. His argument being helped by the poor performance of Eisenhower in command of Tunisia which meant that North Africa would not be cleared until May 1943.
This from a person who would become a close associate of Eisenhower:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 395
‘At this distance of time, there can be no possible doubt that Brooke was right. Not only did we have no hope in 1943 of sufficient picked and trained troops, with a vast armada of shipping and landing craft for a cross-Channel invasion; even more important, we should not possess until the end of the year the air strength which, wisely used in advance of an assault on France, would ensure its success. It seemed clear to me that our right policy was to clear North Africa first, to take Sicily as a springboard for operations in Italy, the weak spot of the Axis, and to cause in the coming months the maximum devastation of German productive capacity.'
At the Third Washington Conference (TRIDENT) in May 1943, a target date of 1st May 1944 was set for the invasion of France.
On taking over as allied land forces commander for invasion of France in January 1944 (By now OVERLORD), Montgomery completely changed the OVERLORD assault plan, to include British Second Army in the initial assault in Normandy, which mean adding two more assault beaches (UTAH and SWORD), a one-month delay to target date for D-Day, now to be 1st June 1944, while the required additional landing shipping was acquired. The date in June when the tides, moon, etc., would be at their best would be the 5th June. As we all know (Possibly not Para Dave), bad weather on the 5th meant that D-Day took place on the following day.
Again from Tedder, one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 505
‘On 21January 1944, we foregathered at Norfolk House under Eisenhower’s chairmanship to compare or impressions. Montgomery, who was to command all the ground forces in the initial stages of ‘Overlord’ said at once that the planned assault by three divisions was insufficient to obtain a quick success. We must take a port at the earliest possible moment. He pressed that the proposed area of assault in Normandy be extended to include an area of the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsular. The American forces should be placed on the right and he British to the left, the former to capture Cherbourg, and then drive for the Loire ports, while the British and Canadian forces would deal with the enemy’s main strength approaching from the east and south-east.’
‘He suggested an assault by five divisions plus one airborne division. The area from Bayeux to the east should be British and to the west should be American.’
‘Eisenhower agreed with Montgomery that the assault should strengthened and that Cherbourg should be taken rapidly.’
‘He thought too that the Combined Chiefs of staff should not lay down too exact a charter of arrangements for command. He proposed that Montgomery should be left in sole charge of the ground battle.’
So there we have it, there is zero evidence that Churchill tried to stop an invasion of France.
No doubt Para Dave will field his William Weidner and his Carentan being a British D-day objective, his Martin Van Creveld and his superb study logistics, his Antony Beevor and his nonsense, and so on…none of whom took part in a single day in the Second World War.
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Kerry Dennison
What debacle in Normandy?
Montgomery committed to get the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
'if you read the history of the generals and the European campaign many of them were very quickly relieved and replaced for far less failures' Your words.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@WardenWolf
Not really...
British Aircraft in the Berlin airlift:
Avro Lancaster 2, Avro Lincoln 1, Avro York 209, Avro Tudor 5,
Avro Lancastrian 15, Bristol Type 170 Freighter2,
Douglas DC-3 (Dakota) 107 (All brought, and paid for),
Handley Page Hastings 32,
Handley Page Halifax / Halton 41,
Short Sunderland 12,
Vickers VC.1 Viking 2
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MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON
1986
P64
'General Browning, Corps Commander of the three and a half divisions designated to participate in the carpet-drop on Zon, Vegel, Graves, Nijmegen and Arnhem, is supposed to have remarked to Monty that Arnhem might be a 'bridge too far'. This is inherently unlikely, since Browning saw Dempsey, not Monty, on the day the revised 'Comet' operation, re-named Operation 'Market Garden', was resurrected.'
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William Swan
‘Montgomery spent much of his career lecturing military theory’
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. Montgomery performed with distinction in France in 1940, in trying circumstances, with his superbly trained division closing the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation, and then bringing his division home almost intact. By the time that Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower eventually got into the war, Montgomery had already forgotten more about fighting wars than the three of them collectively were ever going to know.
Operation Goodwood was launched because delays in the US advance to the west, in order to keep German forces away from the US troops. Two thirds of the tanks supposedly knocked out at Goodwood were operational again within days.
‘"Operation Market Garden", which was highly out of character for him in its daring and risk in the face of great uncertainties. It was a deeply flawed operation, almost certainly conceived by Montgomery to prove that he had the same flair as Patton.’
What did Montgomery have to prove in regard to Patton? Montgomery was an army group commander in a different army. Paton had pratted himself by hitting Sicilian peasants and some of his own troops. The V2 attacks on Britain alone justified Market Garden.
The Remagen bridge was captured by Hodges, not Patton.
‘it is thanks to Chamberlain that Britain did not become involved in a war before it was capable of defending itself, and was in fact capable when war broke out. I wonder how many people know that immediately after giving his notorious "Peace in our time" speech for the benefit of the Germans, Chamberlain immediately ordered many measures to prepare Britain for war?!’
Hardly, when Chamberlain went the Munich conference, Britain had already, but far too late, begun to rearm. Before Chamberlain went to Munich the service chiefs told him that Britain could not be ready for a general war before 1941. When Chamberlain left office in 1940, there were still one million people unemployed in Britain.
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@solomongrundy4905
'Monty was badly embarrased at Caen because HE BOASTED HE'D TAKE IT IN 24 HOURS.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery made no commitment regarding the capture of Caen.
This from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders at St Paul's School, 15th May, 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen'
The only promise that Montgomrry made in regard to timings for Normandy was to get the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
'He demonstrated his lack of skill there by sending tanks ahead without infantry support. This led to massive tank losses for the Brits.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery's tank losses were in line with other senior allied
commanders, Bradley and Devers, compared to the opposition that they faced. When German armoured forces were up agaist allied tank forces, one on one, the Germany generally had the best of it.
'He screwed up at Falaise' Your words.
Not really...
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From US Army General, Omar Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
His words.
More to follow...
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When Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August 1944, Montgomery told Eisenhower that the allies supply situation could only sustain half of its forces in attack at that time, and that in order to keep the allied advance going, two of the armies in the North (British Second Army, and US First Army) should be prioritized for resources, (while the Canadian First Army, and the US Third Army were stopped) as they were the best position to hurt the Germans by attacking the Ruhr. Montgomery went on to state that failing that, the US First Army and the US Third Army should advance towards the Saar region, with British Second Army and the Canadian First Army stopped to make this happen. He went on to state that he would abide with Eisenhower’s decision, provided such a prioritizing of resources took place.
Eisenhower did neither, and when took over as land forces on the 1st September, the whole advance ground to a halt .
Montgomery and Patton were never equals after HUSKY. Patton attacked Sicilian peasants and two of his own soldiers, and was then passed over for army group command in favour of his subordinate Bradley. Patton missed out on D-Day, and the battle in Normandy until it was two parts over. Montgomery went on to command allied land forces in OVERLORD, and remained as an army group commander until the end of the war, being promoted to Field Marshal rank in that period. There does not seem to be much evidence that Montgomery ever gave Patton much thought. Why would he have? If anything, Montgomery was Patton’s nemesis.
As for Rommel. He prospered when he took part in the battle of France in 1940, where so much was in the German’s favour, and then in North Africa in the period there that the British were under resourced, and still trying create a large modern mechanized army. He eventually outran his supplies, and was defeated by Auchinleck at Alamein, and then by Montgomery at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, at other points various in North Africa, and in Normandy, where, like in North Africa, Montgomery, did not give him the slightest opportunity to alter the overall course of the battle. Rommel was severely wounded in Normandy, when his car was attacked by RCAF Spitfires, and he then took no further part in the war, until death later in the same year. As for Rommel and Patton, they never faced each other in battle at any time during the war.
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@johnburns4017
'Britsh pathfinders were captured with their radios and they listened in to everything thing. Even they couldn't believe Monty chickened out unlike a real Field Marshall Walter Model' Para Dave.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started. Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
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@lyndoncmp5751
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
THIRD ARMY
Introduction
Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.
Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.
Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north.
Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.
Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history.
Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be.
He discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.
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@aleksazunjic9672
US industry was not having to deal with air raids, an enemy that was 20 miles from its homeland, 40% of needs having to be imported, and having a war thrust upon it at almost no notice. Nobody, but nobody tells Britain about industrial production in the Second World War.
The Sherman was no more use than contemporary British machines in the tank's prime task, fighting enemy tanks. The Sherman had a very high fuel consumption, a high profile, and made its crews nervous about being assigned to it due to its propensity to burn out if hit. Hence its German nicname, Tommy Cooker. It would have been better if the Russians had sent over the plans to the T-34/85, the tank that Germans really feared. It is an old wives tale that the Sherman had some sort of crucial impact on the war.
In any case, as far as Desert War was concerned, the key weapon was the anti-tank gun. The 88mm for the German, the 6 pounder, and the 17 pounder for the British.
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@Jerry-sw8cz
'elevated to this post based on myths spread about his personality and military achievdements...'
Myth?
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and contrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, Eisenhower failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
Why was in the myth Montgomery about Montgomery's achievements prior to his elevation to army group command?
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@troyturner6083
'you have a nonsence argument. The way to finish Germany was to steam roll Germany and thats what happened. Fighting in the med only helped British interests. Thats why the major powers didnt do it'
The way to finish Germany was stop its ability to concentrate is forces agaist a single allied invasion. As happened with the campaign in Italy, which tied down 50 German divisions. Divisions that would otherwise have been facing allied forces in France.
As it was, the land campaign in North West had a modest margain of allied superiority in troops. What would have happened if those 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans had been pitted against operation Overlord? Think it through next time.
Further, by not getting into the Balkans, the Western allies fought the war in the west, exactly as Stalin wanted it fought, leaving Russia clear to take over in the Balkans. Stalin could see the greenhorn Roosevelt coming. He could hear him as well, word is he had a squeaky wheel on his wheelchair.
Still, not all Americans were as dumb as Roosevelt:
'A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away, not into nothing, but into much less than it could have been. …not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war. …
Stalin knew what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he most wanted was to keep us out of the Balkans. … It is easy to see therefore, why Stalin favoured ANVIL at Teheran…but I could never see why as conditions changed, the United States and Britain failed to sit down and take at the overall picture. …There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British minds, but…the American top level planners were not interested. …I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we had lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans. …Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced.'
US General Mark Clark. His words.
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@MemekingJag
'He pissed off allied commanders, and resorted to overly cautious and ineffective advances, and almost WW1 attrition warfare. He was focused more on the seat at the negotiation table than the most effective methods to pursue war. He claimed he'd break through in Operation Goodwood, and then waved it off as 'actually it was a pinning diversionary attack' when it failed.'
It seems that Montgomery did everything he could to avoid WW1 attrition warfare. He based his planning on the use of firepower rather than manpower, particularly with the use of artillery. At Alamein, he continually changed the point of attack, every time his forces met with fierce resistance. He predicted 8% casualties, the total was under 8% casualties. In Normandy, wih the vast bulk of German armour ranged in front of 2nd Army, he carried out a number of limited attacks to keep the Germans away from US forces, all with limited numbers of casualties, of which GOODWOOD was but one.
Whether he 'pissed off allied commanders' or whatever else, is of little interest to me. The realiity seems to be that Montgomery was a thoroughly professional soldier who fought as a junior officer with distinction in the First World War, as a single division commander in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as a single army commander in North Africa and Sicily, and as an army group commander in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
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@michaelhenry7638
Nope. The MARKET air plan was down to the the US General Brereton, head of the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army, to save you looking it up). Montgomery had no final say on MARKET. On his, he evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@nickdanger3802
Anzio, ah yes, were US General Mark Clark left his forces (British and US), so that he could be the first into Rome, for one of those big Hollywood moments, so beloved by Amereicans
Alan Whicker a war correspondent with the British Army's Film and Photo Unit and was present during the fighting, later said:
'After breaking out of Anzio, Alexander's plan was for the Fifth Army to drive east to cut Kesselring's escape route to the north and trap much of his Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. The operation started well, but then suddenly, when leading troops were only six kilometers from closing their trap at Frosinone, the Fifth Army was re-directed and sent north towards Rome. The trap was left open. General Mark Clark was so eager that the world should see pictures showing him as the liberator of Rome, that he allowed the armies of a delighted Kesselring to escape.
He had ignored the orders of Field Marshall Alexander in a decision as militarily stupid as it was insubordinate.
This, vain-glorious blunder, the worst of the entire war, lost us a stunning victory, lengthened the war by many months and earned Mark Clark the contempt of other American and British generals. They saw an operation that could have won the war in Italy, thrown away at the cost of many Allied lives, because of the obsession and vanity of one man.
If General Mark Clark had been in the German Army, Hitler would have had him shot.'
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIHeJ-kE2YI&ab_channel=Archive_Archive
25 minutes onwards.
Fancy some more on Amnzio?..
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@nickdanger3802
'Memories of the US Fifth Army’s experience at Salerno in September, when a furious German response had almost thrown the Americans back into the sea, were fresh in everyone’s mind.'
Salerno, probably gets the accolade as Eisenhower's biggest bog up of his war. A high accolade, given th e number of bog ups that would be in contention for that war.
You know, dispite clear warnings of what would happen because of his decisions: putiing Mark Clarke in change of AVALANCE (Salerno), the stupidity of dispersing allied forces to BAYTOWN, 300 miles from Salerno, and even further away SLAPSTICK at Taranto. That the Italians would not rise up. Those warnings were fulfilled to the letter.
On second thoughts, you should watch the whole of Whicker's war. As you are an American , it should be a new experience for you :there is no Brad Pitt or Tom Hanks in it, no computer generated images, no Gettysburg Address. It is just a bloke who was there telling it how it was.
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@Johnny Carroll
'The captured plans: it is likely that is was an 101st AB signals officer attached to Brownings 1st AB Corps that crashed landed, and he had operational documents for the 101st but not the whole Corps. This explains why Browning had no radio contact with the 101st.
The timeline also shows that Bittrich reacted faster than when Model received the information. Quote ‘A Bridge Too Far’: “Student had never felt so frustrated. Because of his communications breakdown, it would be nearly ten hours before he could place the secret of Market-Garden in Model's possession”.
The Germans were quick to realise the scope of the Operation. If anything the plans, allowed the Luftwaffe to target the landings over the next few days. They arrived at the right time but missed the landings because of the delay with the weather.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@ToolTimeTabor
1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary quotes, supplied on here by Johnny Carroll:
‘1335 - Glider element, under command of Capt. D. Allsop lands. Flak negligible. Landing zone is a potato field, very soft, and dry. Majority of gliders have crash-landed. Commence to unload.
1410 - Sky full of Dakotas - streams of coloured parachutes in the air.
1500 - Capt. Allsop’ s glider unloaded - move to rendezvous.’
1515 - Report to Commanding Officer, Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. Glider and parachute personnel coming in continuously.
1530 - Squadron HQ complete except for one glider load carrying Lieut Wadsworth and 2 Jeeps. Casualty list - 4 O.R.s’.
1540 - Tac HQ under command Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. moves out, preceded by "C" Troop and followed by "D" Troop and Support Troop. "A" Troop report to Divisional HQ. Route is North and then East along track which runs north of railway line but parallel to it in the direction of Arnhem.'
The German Battalion Krafft was in action by 14.40
According to Middlebrook, the recce squadron was due to depart for Arnhem Bridge at 3pm, but left at at.3.35 (noted as 3.40pm in the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary).
If the troops that landed by parachute, had landed in the gliders with their vehicles?
Those troops would have been on the ground at 13.35 pm? With the majority of gliders having ‘crash landed’ into ‘a potato field, very soft, and dry’, it beggars belief that the vehicles would not have taken more time to unload from gliders. Graeme Warrack stated that Horsa glider interior was about the same size as a London Underground train passenger car. A glider lands with its nose in soft ground with its tail in the air, a glider lands with all of its undercarriage smashed, and so on. In almost any case, it seems a likely outcome that the cargo might have shifted and or been left in a state, making it harder to extract from the glider, thus extending the departure time. Perhaps the delay to the departure would have been less if the remainder of the squadron troops had landed with the gliders. Who can say?
Why did troops land separately? How should I know?
Middlebrook noted that the squadron troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the glider landings in Sicily. I find Antony Beevor’s claim that those troops wanted the honour of landing by parachute to ludicrous, unless his claim is backed up reliable evidence.
Was it a space saving decision?
From a web site ‘Key Military’
BASH ON! GOUGH’S RECCE MEN
‘The squadron travelled to Arnhem on Sunday, September 17 in two parties, one parachuting from Dakotas, the other in gliders. One glider carried a jeep and trailer together with the reserve petrol supply and a hamper of 2in mortar bombs – a heavy and combustible cargo. Others carried less-frightening loads, including 20mm Polsten guns – a simpler and cheaper Polish derivative of the Oerlikon cannon. Two Polstens, each jeep-towed, formed an antiaircraft section, but their heavy rounds and fast rate of fire – between 250 and 320rpm – made them lethal defensive weapons against infantry and light armour. They were included the support troop, commanded by Lieutenant John Christie.’
If the squadron troops had landed with their vehicles, they would have saved a walk from DZ-X to LZ-S. 20 minutes or so? Perhaps those troops could have helped to save time with the unloading of Jeeps. If so, would it have been enough to get the squadron into Arnhem without encountering the Battalion Krafft? Unless there is reliable evidence as to how much quicker it was for six men to unload a Horsa glider than three men. Who can say?
What if Gough’s troops had made it to Arnhem Bridge before the Germans?
Middlebrook notes that the Grabner Squadron included 22 armoured cars and half-track armoured personnel carriers. I can hardly bare to type the next bit: Para Dave has pointed out that the Germans had 20 mm cannons.
Up against that force would have been 16 jeeps armed with machine guns and 48 men.
As far as I can see, Gough’s actions in the landings on the 17th September are a footnote in the Arnhem story. The biggest specific issues in regard to Arnhem seem to have been the MARKET air plan, and events at Nijmegen Bridge. But of course, all this is hindsight by someone (me) who was nowhere these events, and does not even have any military background.
For, all those persons involved in MARKET GARDEN made reasonable decisions based on the information available to them at that time. In the case of Major Gough, it hard to see how he could have assessed whether sending his troops in by parachute would be crucial to the outcome at Arnhem, and that it seen by people in the future to be crucial to the outcome of the MARKET GARDEN undertaking.
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@johnlucas8479
Comparisons of casualties for MARKET GARDEN, AACHEN, METZ, and the HURTGEN FOREST are noted by me as a response to a multitude of comments (99% American) about 17,000 killed in MARKET GARDEN, which I then correct to 17,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Those American posts normally go on to state that Montgomery should have been in front of a court martial, or in the case of Para Dave, that he should have shot himself.
Responsibility (not blame) for MARKET GARDEN, must surely start with Eisenhower, who, as you know, was both supreme commander and allied land forces commander by the time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed. If Eisenhower does take any responsibility for MARKET GARDEN then he is off the list for NORMANDY, the RHINE and so on. Which one do want? Brereton would seem to have been able to veto proposals by Montgomery for the deployment of airborne troops (as evidenced by his veto of use of airborne forces on WALCHEREN),and was clearly involved in the planning for MARKET. And yet, in American histories, films, moronic American comments on YouTube, Brereton, the head of the FAAA hardly ever gets a mention. No doubt there is a Brereton memorial library, or something similar, in some US state. As the person who proposed MARKET GARDEN to Eisenhower, and as the commander in the area where the operation took place, Montgomery takes his share of responsibility for MARKET GARDEN, something he always accepted. As to this stuff about Browning and Gavin at Nijmegen, for me you would have to have been there, and I was not there, and nor were you.
As someone who was not there, and who has zero military experience, I am in no position to pass judgement, leading to blame, on MARKET GARDEN, and similar events. As far as I see, the decision to undertake MARKET GARDEN was a reasonable one, given the circumstances of those times, which included the perception (which was backed up by solid evidence) - that the Germans were not strong enough to withstand the operation, the need to counter the V2 rocket attacks on Britain, the need, on Britain’s part to keep the war moving, and the desire by allied leaders to see the FAAA in action.
As to the new insights you mentioned, Churchill’s words were in print in the early 1950s, Eisenhower’s before then, Gavin’s words were in print by the late 1970s. Even Martin Middlebrook (who was not around at the time of ARNHEM), and the quote from Staff Sergeant Joe Kitchener, were published 38 years ago.
There is more…
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
Page 204
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying the operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
We have no regrets.’
I hold the same view today, when the survivors are scattered all over the world, some of them still in the Army; when Arnhem is a busy and architecturally attractive post-war city with most of its scars healed. A new bridge spans the Neder Rhine. Sometimes a Dutchman finds a mortar splinter in his garden, and people on their Sunday walks come across spent British ammunition in the pine woods and the polder-land by the river.’ His words.
Here is an opinion from someone who was there :
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
First published in the United Kingdom by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
This White Lion Edition 1973
Xll Great Argument
P 214
‘With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days later with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’ His words.
A high proportion of the comments on YouTube items about MARKET GARDEN / ARNHEM, are posted by Americans. As are comments on YouTube items about Montgomery – usually linked to MARKET GARDEN, CAEN and so on.
Why is this so? For the USA, there was no Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Blitz, Moscow, Leningrad, or Stalingrad. They have production figures for lorries, loans, reverential works about their war leaders.
Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube see the likes of MARKET GARDEN, or Russian excesses in occupied GERMANY, and so on, as somehow evening up the score, like their people made a difference or a unique contribution on a one to one basis. Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube are just thick. Who can say?
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'The entire purpose of Market Garden was to win the war, not capture a few miles of territory in the Netherlands. Montgomery's claim that Market Garden was 90% successful is simply fallacious.'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48-49
'In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: "I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic."
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.'
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P419
It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
The need to counter V2 attacks on Britain influenced the decision to include Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN plan.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course [An advance to the Rine via Wessel instead of Arnhem]. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
'Eisenhower's directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.'
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@iemjgf
'Positive intelligence provided by Prince Bernard of SS units in the area was ignored. '
The SS man Prince Bernard was shown the door by both British and US intelligence services.
Anything purporting to come from the Dutch underground at that time was routinely ignored, due to the German 'Englanspiel' penetration of the Dutch underground at that time.
MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in that.
'The correct plan would have been to take the Scheldt and open up the port of Antwerp. The Navy thought this was the best idea'
Taking the Scheldt would have taken a month, even starting in early September even if the entire weight of 21st Army Group could have been brought to bear on the matter. There would still have been the three week delay in making Antwerp operational while the Scheldt was cleared of mines. This would still have left the V2 rocket campaign against London unattended to.
Major Brian Urquhart presented his case to his superiors, but it was far from conclusive. The aerial photographs he presented (if such a presentation ever took place), were far from being a smoking gun in intelligence evidence.
'I believe that someone should have been held to account for the needless deaths of our fine young men.'
And why would you believe that?..
MARKET GARDEN was an undertaking to take allied forces to the Ruhr, to stop V2 rocket attacks on London, to stop German reinforcements reaching the German 15th Army. The undertaking was given the go-ahead by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Brereton on the basis that it was most likely to succeed.
who should be held to account? And on what basis should they be judged? The outcome? If so, then hindsight would apply. The decision making to go-ahead? If so, then any judgement would have on what the decision makers knew at that time. Any comparative judgement against other allied failures in that period? AACHEN cost 20,000 casualties, METZ cost 45,000 casualties, the HURTGEN FOREST cost 55,000 casualties. Who gets held to account?.. The one senior person with involvement in MARKET GARDEN, AACHEN, METZ, and the HURTGEN FOREST was Eisenhower.
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@stephenburke5967
Wall to wall rubbish.
The ‘Market’ plan that covered how, when and where the airborne forces were to be landed, and how they fought was the responsibility of the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, the US General Brereton.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P127
‘The first major planning conference -on Operation MARKET convened in England late on 10 September, only a few hours after General Eisenhower in a meeting with Montgomery at Brussels had given his approval.’
‘Once the ground troops overran the airborne divisions, command was to pass to the 30 British Corps. Responsibility for the complex troop carrier role fell to the commander of the IX Troop Carrier Command, General Williams.’
P132
‘’Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.’
‘Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day.’
As to whether Montgomery had any say in Brereton’s plan, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
‘General Urquhart had warned planners that the dense forests around their landing zones would hamper their communications"which it did dramatically".’ Your words.
Where is this on record?
‘I must add the Dutch underground pleaded with London for weeks prior to Market Garden to blanket bomb the dense forests around Arnhem, Nijmegan and Lent as the Germans had put a corden around the forests with no civilian access therefore no casualties.’
I never heard of it. Where is this on record?
‘The Dutch underground had pinpointed these areas as the hiding areas of the two Panzer divisions that London were informed about but this was ignored.’
All communications purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time were routinely disregarded due to the German ‘Enlandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that regard.
‘it prolonged the war and caused further needless deaths in the theatre of war and infact caused the Russians to advance first into Berlin and the problems that caused in later years with needless deaths and hardship from the segregation of Berlin until the fall of the Wall in November 9th 1989.’ Your words.
How could Market Garden have prolonged the war? It was no bigger than a number of other allied operations at that time, none of which succeeded. If anyone caused the Russians to be in Berlin first, it was Eisenhower, with his broad front policy, which stopped the allied advance, leaving Churchill and Roosevelt with no cards to play at the Yalta Conference, and later, Eisenhower’s unilateral decision to contact Stalin to tell him that Western forces would not attempt to reach Berlin.
‘Intelligence told the planners that two Panzer divisions were in the area around Arnhem’
Your words
A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that the Germans facing British 2nd Army was "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
‘Monty knew the weather would hamper supplies’ Your words.
Nope. Market Garden was launched on the basis of a weather report on the afternoon of the 16th September, 1944, which predicted four days of good weather.
‘The road networks approaching their bridge objectives were far to narrow for quick decisive advance and this planning mistake was alone unforgiving of Montgomery.’
But XXX Corps advanced 50 miles in two days (with 12 hours lost due to the Bridge at Son being blown up), arriving at Nijmegen at the start of the third day, only to find that that the US 82nd Airborne Division had failed to capture Nijmegen Bridge.
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@jonathanbrown7250
'Both blamed others for the defeats, and both defeats arguably extended the war, though in McClellan's case, it might have been by years.'
As far as Montgomery was concerned, there is little evidence hat he blamed others for things that went wrong.
Its hard to make a case for prolonging the war. It was over in nine days, and the process of consolidation the front afterwards was not long.
Eisenhower's decision making was a lot more to do with prolonging the war. As allied land forces commander, Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan. He took the allies to the Seine by D+78, instead of the scheduled D+90, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944, with no plan, and squandered Montgomery's victory as the allies advanced just 45 miles by D+180.
It could have been different. Montgomery began the conversation about the way ahead after Normandy on the 17th August. When, he and Eisenhower finally met on the 23rd August, Montgomery told Eisenhower that the allies with 14,000 tons of supplies per day only had the resources to advance with two of the four allied armies. Montgomery proposed that Canadian 1st Army and the US 3rd Army be halted so that British 2nd Army and US 1st Army could push on to the Ruhr asap while the Germans were in a state of disarray. The Ruhr being easily the most important industrial area of Germany. Montgomery went on to state that he would halt British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army, so that all available resources could be given to Bradley to advance south of the Ardennes with the US 1st and 3rd Armies, providing a decision was made on a single thrust advance into Germany. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole advance ground to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed: time and space to rebuild their forces.
The result was the allied setbacks at Aachen, Arnhem, the Hurtgen Forest, and Lorraine.
Beyond that, the Germans were able to launch their Ardennes offensive, which caused 90,000 allied casualties. An offensive that Montgomery warned about, as did, just before the event, one of Bradley's subordinate commanders, Patton.
Montgomery may, or may not have been right to propose MARKET GARDEN. He was, however, unquestionably right as to how the allies should have advanced after Normandy.
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@mgt2010fla
'The Bismarck wasn't damaged until the night before by Swordfish so it wasn't damaged when the US plane, a PBY, sighted the Bismarck it was under control although damaged in the bow and leaking oil by a hit from the PoW!'
Bismarck's prime mission ended with the hit it took from Prince of Wales causing a fuel leak that stopped its Atlantic raiding mission. Lutjens's continued radio transmissions led the Royal Navy to him. The RAF flying boat that spotted him had one US serviceman onboard and therefore to imply that the USA had some sort of crucial role in its destruction is absurd.
'The distance didn't stop the JIN from attacking Pearl Harbor and invading and attacking Alaska! '
It must have been terrifying in Alaska. Thank god Britain was such a backwater with regard to enemy activity!
'Where did 50 of those destroyers come from!'
Err.. It was 46 actually. By May of 1941 not even 30 of them wee fit for action - by which time British escort construction had rendered their presence all but a burden on manpower. I believe that it was said of the US President Nixon: 'Would you buy a used car from this man.' The same might be said of the US President Roosevelt: 'Would you buy a used destroyer from this man.'
'Also, the US move the escort line to reach Iceland and US sailors were killed before the US entered the war!'
US goods, occasionally in US ships. A good way of protecting US Markets.
'The Atlantic Charter made Germany the primary enemy, but the Japanese made the Americans hate them and the US was losing men and land to the Japanese.'
Why would Americans hate Japan in September 1941?
'why have ships in the Atlantic at all?'
Who can say?
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME I THE GATHERING STORM
BOOK I The Fall of France
Chapter 1: The National Coalition
P5
‘Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyed in European theatre, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces, who also disposed of all of the German battleships, cruisers and destroyers, besides destroying or capturing the whole Italian Fleet.’
There was of course the exeption of the German cruiser Blucher which was sunk by the Norwegians but apart from that what reasonable person can take issue with the words of the outstanding war leader of the Second World War.
You must try to do better...
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ronald smith
Wall to wall rubbish.
If anyone lost France, it was the French. Britain supplied about 10% of he allied land forces campaign.
As too who were the first to retreat:
15th May 1940. Reynaud telephoned Churchill and said that it was all over and that the Battle was lost.
16th May. Churchill flew to Paris. He met French leaders at the Quai d’Orsay. As the meeting went on, they ccould see French officials burning archives in the garden.
16th May 1940, Dowding wrote to Churchill. His letter ended:
‘I believe that, if an adequate fighter force is kept in this country, if the fleet remains in being, and if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we should be able to carry on the war single handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But, if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the
final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,
Air Chief Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Fighter Command, Royal Air Force.’
21st May 1940. British forces attacked German formations at Arras and then on the 22nd, Gort was ordered to attack German forces as per the Weygand Plan.
25th May 1940. British troops fell back, with the French towards the coast.
On the 25th May in response to the failure of a French attack from the Somme, Gort informed Blanchard of his intention to withdraw to the coast. On the 26th may Gort and Blanchard drew up plans for the withdrawal to the coast.
26th May 1940. (6.57pm), an Admiralty signal put
Operation Dynamo in hand.
Later on the 26th, the decision to evacuate the BEF was taken and this decision was passed onto the French Government on that same day.
At 1pm on the 27th, a War Office telegram to Gort instructed him that henceforth his task is to evacuate the maximum force possible.
28th May 1940. Belgium capitulated at 1 hours’ notice leaving the BEF to cover the undefended left of the Allied flank.
29th May 1940. Before any complaint or request was received from the French, Churchill ordered that the French should have a full share in evacuation and that they should have full access to British shipping during the evacuation.
31st May 1940. Churchill flew to Paris for a meeting with the French Government at the French War Office at the Rue Saint-Dominique. At that meeting, attended by amongst others, Reynaud, Petain, Churchill and Attlee, Churchill pointed out that at up to that point, French forces had been given no orders to evacuate.
4th June1940. Operation Dynamo ended with approximately 220,000
British troops and approximately 110,000 French troops evacuated. A total of 861 allied have taken part in the operation of which 693 are British. Over 100,000 French troops have evacuated by British ships.
All clear now?
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'If you note the scene from the PATTON film wherein Patton is playing traffic cop to his lines of armor, then gets shut down by Bradley (and Eisenhower! ) , Patton correctly guesses that it was Montgomery swallowing up all available fuel and supplies.' Your words.
Its a definite no. No fuel supplies were diverted to Montgomery from Patton.
'Montgomery had persuaded Churchill to use the "V2 missile sites" as an excuse and persuade Roosevelt to turn the allied offensive over to Montgomery for this reason ....' Your words.
Read this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
For Monty now to cancel the British part of 'the main effort' of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem—Nijmegen axis had been Monty's own proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind
Eisenhower's directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back:
Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want.
To Eisenhower Monty also signalled, recording his disquiet:
Have studied your directive no. FWD 13765 carefully and cannot see it stated that the northern advance to the RUHR is to have priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually 19 US Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could you send a responsible staff officer to see me and so that I can explain things to him.
'The Poles caught the brunt of it and were decimated....!!' Your words.
21.1% of 1st Airborne got back to safety, 42.5% of the glider pilots got back to safety, 88% of the Poles got back to safety.
But who else was there to play " hero" for England's armed forces ??
What evidence is there that 'England's armed forces' needed anyone to play " hero"?
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@johnburns4017
From Big Woody (aka Para Dave):
‘The evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered?’ Para Dave.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started . Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg, twenty miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
Whether Eisenhower was a ‘pathetic pratt’ or not is probably a matter of opinion. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was in Granville in Normandy, 400 hundred miles from his field armies, even further away from the FAAA.
'The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Para Dave.
Wilmot went on to state:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation, which should, and could, have been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West.’
A British caution in regard to casualties is entirely understandable, given that Britain, with a population of 47 million had been at war for FIVE years, in just about all parts of the world. Whereas the ‘American reluctance to concentrate’ ran in defiance of clear headed military planning, and therefore there can be no excuse on the part of the USA.
And over the page in Wilmot's work…
‘Ambitious American generals, like Patton and MacArthur, habitually represented their progress and prospects in the rosiest light, for they believed that they were then likely to be given greater resources. Reinforcing success ' is sound military practice, provided that the success is advancing the strategic plan, but, in war as in life, the Americans tend to value success for its own sake.’
Ouch!
Interestingly, the above quotes are taken from the chapter headed THE LOST OPPORTUNITY in THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE by Chester Wilmot.
‘Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany” Para Dave.
Perhaps de Guingand was right. Perhaps Eisenhower’s ‘SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing ‘a some Germans’ Para Dave.
Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles’ Para Dave.
As I have to hand, the works of the seemingly trusted Chester Wilmot, let us see what he has to state:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXIX. THE AUTUMN STALEMATE
P 631
‘with every division trying to make a breakthrough, the artillery support was dispersed, and [Manton S] Eddy was able to gain only fifteen miles in eight days. The German line sagged, but did not break, for at no point was it subjected to an overpowering onslaught. Meanwhile, the enveloping attack against Metz, also made on a broad front, was similarly checked by skilful and stubborn defence. Even after a week of heavy fighting, the city was not encircled.’
P 634
‘after a bitter month which had taken heavy toll of his infantry, Bradley's troops were only eight miles deeper into Germany.’
As I am in a good mood...a lesson for Para Dave for the future... If you are going to cite Chester Wilmot, its best to go to his works, rather show a few of his words that have been included in some comic book US history.
‘As the Dutch poster Oddball SOK stated on this board *Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944.So tell me, how come ?How come the Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Monty/Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in September, not in October and not in November.’ Para Dave.
This has got be one of the most stupid YouTube comments I have read in a long while… And considering the number of idiotic YouTube comments posted by Para Dave, that is quite an accolade.
Its actually hard to see whether Oddball SOK or Para Dave is responsible for this throwaway comment. However, let us examine this claim…
The Scheldt. The 15th Army evacuated across the waterway (a 45 minute journey) between 5th September and the 20th September 1944. An evacuation that took place with German and Dutch shipping already in place, with both banks in German hands, with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and which took place at night and on bad weather days.
The Scheldt. Liberated by the 21st Army Group in a series of landings for operations in which ‘tanks and troops’ were ferried across the estuary and landed on hostile shore with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and therefore closed to allied shipping.
So how do these compare?..
What else with this ferrying of 'tanks and troops over rivers/canals?'..
MARKET GARDEN? The Germans used bridges already in their hands to help to get forces to the battle area, including the Arnhem (later, John Frost) Bridge which they recaptured it, rather than ferrying troops. There was no major German river assault at Nijmegen, or anywhere else in that operation. The allies were able to ‘ferry’ troops across the Rhine from Oosterbeek to allied lines. By allies, in this instance, I do of course mean British, Canadian, and Polish forces.
Anyone know where else were the Germans ferrying tanks and troops in that period? I do of course mean more than just the odd tank and troops across a Dyke here or there... If there is such an instance... we can take a look the circumstances.
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@richmcintyre1178
'Monty was not a good strategist. He had the Intel and ignored it. His big moment was more important.'
When did this happen?
He "won" in Africa because the US gave him 500 tanks and the Navy supplied him well beyond what the Germans could match. Just a terrible commander.
They weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun, not the tank. The British 6 pounder versus the German 8.8cm.
The isituation facing Montgomery in North Africa, the middle of 1942, was far more challenging han a matter of supply. With four divisions against Rommel's six divisions, Montgomery won at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to re-build the Eighth Army, as people who were there later testified:
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD 1951
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery.'
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GR Joe
MARKET GARDEN never envisaged reaching Berlin by Christmas. As evidenced by Arthur Tedder when interviewed by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated 'that
the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.'
GARDEN was devised the FAAA, headed by the US general Lewis Brereton, over who, Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
'The whole planning and the operation itself shows the short comings of the
bureaucratic top comand structure of the British.'
If any top command had shotcomings, it was the US top command: their failure to see the importance of the campaign in the Mediterranean, theit linatic plan to invade France in 1942, Eisenhower's dipersal of the forces in the invasion of Italy. Eisenhower, and his US colleagues failure to understand the stategy for Normandy, Eisenhower's failed broad front strategy, which led directly to US Ardennes debacle, via Aachen, Lorraine, and the Hurtgen Forest. And then crowning foul up, when Eisenhower and Bradley made an absolute meal of encircling the Ruhr, then allowing too many allied formation to the south and then neglecting to support the allied forces in the North, which nearly alllowed the Russians to get into Denmark.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower and his vast bureaucracy was 400 miles behind the front, in, as usual, the the biggest chateaux he could find, with his signals taking up to three days to reach front-line commanders. His communications were so poor, his message would have reached the front more quickly if he had stayed in London. Later in the Autumn, he even had to get his chauffeur to telephone a US commander to find out if a particular attack had gone ahead.
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@Keimzelle
ROTFL
'What exactly was the picture the German commanders had?'
Er... They had a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan with two hours of the onset of the operation, after they had found a copy of the plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US landing zone.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
Antony Beever should have read a few books.
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@richmcintyre1178
'Patton was paying bonuses to men who scronged enemy supplies' Where is this on record?
Patton did not reveal to Eisenhower and Bradley at that time that one of his corps had captured 110,000 gallons of petrol.
'He still had an army to feed and positions to defend so yes he was still receiving supplies but not the amount needed to attack.' But none of his supplies were being diverted for MARKET GARDEN.
Pattons seems to have been driven by personal ambition, rather than what might be best for the allied cause, based on available evidence:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Patton was 100 miles from the Rhine at the time of MARKET GARDEN. His armies were facing the Saar, whereas the armies of Dempsey and Hodges were facing the far more important Ruhr.
Montgomery had already offered Eisenhower the chance to halt Crearer and Dempsey, leaving Hodges and Patton to continue the advance, at at meeting on 23rd August:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P512
'It was vitally important that a firm and clear-cut decision should be made at once, for it was long overdue. But Montgomery had no opportunity of discussing the problem with Eisenhower until August 23rd when they met for the first time in a week. Montgomery then put the issue bluntly. " Administratively," he said, " we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success." '
Eisenhower did neither, and everyone stopped. Montgomery was proved right.
The Germans agreed with Montgomery:
'German general Gunther Blumentritt on Montgomery from 'The Other Side Of The Hill by B. H. Liddell Hart page 355:
All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. They agreed with Montgomery's view that this could best have been achieved by concentrating all possible resources on a thrust in the north"'.
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@TimKitt
From the 1st September 1944 decisions about which targets to go for were made by Eisenhower.
What was the allied supply situation at that time?
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591-592
‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." ² This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@TimKitt
'They are going to need a port sooner rather then later'.
But how much sooner?
The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign. When Montgomery met Eisenhower on the 23rd August, Montgomery said words to effect that that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken to use the available resources to keep the allies advance on the advance.
The Germans were suffering a defeat as big as Stalingrad in France.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
'When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.'
Post war research into the German situation at that time showed that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces North of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk.
Eisenhower accepted neither of Montgomery's proposals, all of the allied were thus under resourced, and the entitre allied advance groind to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed: time and space to rebuild their forces.
The Germans seemed to agree with Montgomery's view of things:
Field Marshall Von Runstedt:
“the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.”
Hasso Von Mantueffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army:
“I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.”
Gunther Blumentritt:
"Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."
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@johnlucas8479
‘Your state " The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign.’
That seems to have been the case… but I might not be right. Given the evidence of the information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen, that would seem to be a reasonable view.
‘It's all well and good to looking at post war research to make claims’
But in my case, I cited information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen.
‘How far do you think the 2nd British and 1st US Army can go with supply lines stretching back to Cherbourg and Normandy beaches.’
Who can say? Not Me.
What is known, is that with a lot less resources, a month after Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, British forces got to a mile from Rhine at Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN undertaking,. Albeit, with Dieppe operational by 5th September to provide resources for the First Canadian Army. Ostend was captured on the 9th, Le Havre on the 12th, Boulogne on the 22nd, and Calais on the 30th.
23rd August – 5th September…
I have not seen any estimate how long it would have taken to make any changes to allied military affairs needed to enable two of the four allied armies together as per Montgomery’s proposals on the 23rd August, have you? If Eisenhower had agreed to Montgomery’s proposals, and preparations for such an advance had taken until 5th September, there would have the certainty that Dieppe would be available to supply the First Canadian Army as it continued with the liberation of Channel and North Sea Ports.
What is known, is that Eisenhower turned down Montgomery’s offer to stop the British and Canadian forces in order that US forces could advance, provided that a decision was made about a way forward that was based on making the best use of allied resources at that time. Also, that Eisenhower cited political reasons for not agreeing to any of Montgomery’s proposals regarding the way forward.
I have not been any military organization, much less planned, or taken part in any war. But it seems to me that Montgomery knew a lot more about war than Eisenhower did, particularly about what happens when armies suffer huge defeats.
Montgomery had been a front-line soldier in the First World War, and had seen the defeat of the German army in 1918. He had been on the wrong end of the allied defeat in France in 1940, and he had led the pursuit of Axis forces in 1942 and 1943.
Eisenhower did not have single day of personal combat experience to his name, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He seems to have had no reference point from personal experience to judge his decision making against.
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@johnlucas8479
'Not everyone agrees with your assessment of Eisenhower ability. This from amen that know Eisenhower during the war'
But what assessment have I made?
I stated this:
'Eisenhower got a very important decision wrong because he put US considerations ahead military considerations.
I might not be be right.'
My words, now read this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
I also stated this:
'Anyone with even the smallest amount of combat experience would have more of that experience than Eisenhower. My mother had probably seen more of the enemy than Eisenhower at that time. But, all other factors being equal, then who would be the better choice for making military decisions?..' My words. My question was about Eisenhower and Montgomery, not Eisenhower and my mother.
Eisenhower may, or may not have beeen an able military commander. How should I know?
All that I have stated is what seems to have been Eisenhower's motive for turning down Montgomey's proposal for the advance to Germany, and put to you a question about the relevence of personal combat experience in assessing a military leader.
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@johnlucas8479
'Also, how many of the 49 transport companies were available between the 23rd August to 4th September when they were needed to support the rapid advance from the Seine to Antwerp?'
I don't know. I can go back to the relevent volume in the HMSO history of the war, but from memory, I dont think it contains precise dates in regards to the availability each transport company at that time. Beyond that, for more detailed information it might be a question of going to the MOD library, or something like that.
All that I did was answer you question: ‘were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’, with the information that I have, that by the 26th September, 21st Army Group was operating with 59 transport companies.
Perhaps 43 of those transport companies arrived on the 25th September... Its not very likely, but I do not know the details.
But I stand by the opinion that I have aleady stated, that given what I know of the situation that faced the allies on the 23rd August, for me, Montgomery's proposal would have been the correct way forward. But that is an opinion based on incomplete information, and it is the opinion of someone with no military experience. Someone may yet produce evidence that would cause me to change my opinion.
All that I would add, is that given what seems to be Montgomery's track record on logistics, it does not seem very likely to me that Montgomery would made such a proposal, even in broad terms, with out having some idea as to how the logistics might work.
The chase after Alamein, where Montgomery made sure that the logistics properly assessed for the 1400 mile advance across North Africa, rather than some risky gung ho chase for glory, the day after battle ended. His detailed plan for OVERLORD, with allied build up being at the centre of his planning, his advice to Eisenhower on the 11th September, 1944, that MARKET GARDEN would have to be cancelled due to logistic matters, the massive preparations for PLUNDER in March 1945, and so on...
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Hardly...
Montgomery ripped to bits the the lunatic plan to land all around Sicily and instead, concentrated resources to land all the forces together, in one place. The outcome was a an allied success, despite Patton deserting the battlefield o seek personal glory in Palermo.
Caen had little bearing on the outcome of Overlord, which saw Montgomery beat the scheduled completion date of D+90 by 12 days, and with 22% fewr han expectd casualties.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@finallyfriday.
'The US crossed the Rhine In one day at 2 points. Monty took 6 more months planning Plunder and finally crossed the Rhine. And with limited succes even though by now the wars was basically over.'
Not really...
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD 1954
P759
‘Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.
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@johnburns4017
'He not only didn't take Caen which was a day 1 objective and it was wide open for the taking (as was the approach to Antwerp) He putted around and didn't take it in a month. finallyfriday.
Caen never had date attached to it by Montgomery. Far from being undefended, it had the German 21st Panzer Division in front of it - which proceeded to carry out the only major German counter attack of the day, as it drove towards the coast between SWORD and JUNO beaches.
The approaches to Atwerp (The Scheldt) were far from undefended, the fortifications at Flushing were some of the most formidable in Europe, and the Germans were in force on the sothern bank, at the Seaward end of the estuary, in the Breskens Pocket. The idea that the Scheldt was there for the taking is absurd. The Germans were always going to fight fanatically to deny Antwerp to the allies, as evidenced by their V weapons campaign against that city, and that he ogjective of their ardennes offensive was Antwerp.
'While the US took most of France, Monty couldn't get off the beach.' finallyfriday.' finallyfriday.
As we all know, the vast bulk of the German forces in Normandy was rangd against British 2nd Army. The plan was always for the US 1st Army to take Cherbourg, the major port in the region and to swing round trap the German forces between the two armies. It was the slowness of the US build up that caused Montgomery to undertake a series of operations in the Caen in order to keep the Germans tied down.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
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Tim 0neill
During 4th September, 1944, from his headquarters in Granville, Normandy, issues a directive to Montgomery (at Saulty. Hauts-de-France) and Bradley (Château-Thierry Hauts-de-France), ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes (21st Army Group and two corps of First U.S. Army) “to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”
On the evening of 4th September, as soon as he learned of the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”
‘The state of Eisenhower's communications was such that his 'Most Immediate' signal, sent from Granville on the evening of September 5th in reply to Montgomery's proposal about Berlin, did not reach the Field-Marshal's H.Q,. near Brussels until after breakfast on the 7th. Even then the signal was not complete and the missing paragraphs did not arrive for another two days!
The final part of Eisenhower’s 'Most Immediate' did arrived at Montgomery’s headquarters until 9.15am on the 9th September and read:
The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has now been destroyed. Must immediately exploit our success by promptly breaching the SIEGFRIED LINES crossing the RHINE on a wide front and seizing the SAAR and the RUHR. This will give us a stranglehold on two of Germany's main industrial areas and largely destroy her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take.
On the same day (9th), Montgomery received a 'Secret' cable from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMS-TERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels Airport on the 10th, their first meeting since Eisenhower had taken over command of the allied land campaign, 10 days earlier. Eisenhower noted the outcome of that meeting:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces. The target date for the attack was tentatively set for September 17, and I promised to do my upmost to for him in supply until that operation was completed. After the completion of the bridge-head operation he was to turn instantly and with his whole force to the capture of Walcheren Island and the other areas from which the Germans were defending the approaches to Antwerp. Montgomery set about the task energetically.’ His words.
Sources: Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe. Nigel Hamilton, Monty The Field Marshall 1944-76. Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe.
Where is there evidence of Montgomery disobeying orders?
Why can't people like this Edward Chandler check thing out before coming up with half-baked attempts at history?
Why do gullible idiots like Para Dave buy into this Edward Chandler nonsense?
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@larryvanmillion
'the u.s blunted the northern thrust by the time monty was tasked to clean up the lines.'
Not according these people:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
'what major battle did the brits have in the north bulge ?'
So what is this about? Montgomery? Or Britain?
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@kenmazoch8499
'but the canadian, us and french forces, while they did cut down the rear echelon troops in theater, none disbanded any full divisions or brigades/regiments. some units back at home were, as were several british units at home, no combat units in theater were.' Your words.
But 'the canadian, us and french forces', were not in the fighting to the same extent that British forces were. The British Army was in Norway, France, Greece, North Africa, Italy and the Far East, before France - Germany 1944-45.
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@rbilleaud
OK. Lets us examine what you stated:
'Montgomery was an incompetent fool' your words.
Here is what some other people stated:
"Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse”
German General Günther Blumentritt.
"General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander"
US General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
"small, very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier--or so it seems--I have met in this war."
US General George S Patton.
"British troops under Montgomery's command had smashed the German corps under General Rommel at El Alamein. During the Normandy landing Montgomery had ably commanded the Allied forces and their advance to the banks of the Seine. Montgomery was above medium height, very agile, soldierly, trim and created an impression of a lively and intelligent man."
Russian General Georgy Zhukov.
Notice that these words are all from other Army Group or single army commanders and, with the exception of Eisenhower all of them, like Montgomery, had personal combat
So much for him being an incompetent fool.
Shall we go on?
If so, we pause to note that neither Nigewl Hamilton Richard Mead are old enough to have served in the war...
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Montgomery had served with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO.
In trying circumstances, in France in 1940, in command of a single division Montgomery had performed with distinction as he trained his division to the highest pitch of efficiency. His work proved its worth as he led his troops on the famous night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. When so ordered, he brought his division back to Britain almost intact.
As a single army commander, in his first major command, he reorganized 8th Army, won against Rommel with inferior numbers at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to end the war in North Africa as a contest at Alamein. For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up Patton’s lunatic plan to land all around the island to shreds and concentrated allied forces in one place, the campaign was over in six weeks. Montgomery finished OVERLORD ahead of schedule (D+78, instead of D+90), with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Montgomery sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine with six divisions suffering just 1,200 casualties, and saved Denmark from Soviet occupation.
Of his American colleagues, Bradley, Eisenhower and Devers did not have a single day of personal combat experience between them. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943.
Any questions?
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@jpmtlhead39
'from the lend lease program 80 % was food. Brittain was starving to death. No to mention,oil.
And tanks,airplanes,guns,everything you need to not starve and fighting a War.
If were not for the US Help,maybe the language in brittain,was another today.'
Your words.
Its a definite no.
The food import figures for 1941 are typical:
1941 total food imports: 14.654 million tons
1941 food imports from the USA: 1.073 million tons. (7.3% of the above total).
Oill came from the Middle East, Central America, as well from the USA.
Britons speak English, as Americans do, because Germany had no means of defeating Britain, regardless of anything supplied to Britain from the USA.
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The allied forces at all three areas of operations were under pressure after the Germans retrieved a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan from a dead US soldier, in a US glider, in a US drop zone. There were far more German troops in the vicinity of Arnhem, than in Nijmegen, and therefore, the 1st Airborne drop zones were bound to come under more pressure than those of the US airborne forces.
The evidence is clear, planning for and ultimate responsibility for the MARKET plan rested with the head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton. 1st Airborne had been in action in Sicily and Italy before MARKET GARDEN, putting the division on a par with the US 101st Airborne division in terms of combat experience.
General Urquhart saw action in Sicily and Italy before MARKET GARDEN, of his time in Arnhem, Brigadier, later General Hackett stated: ‘There could have been no one in the 1st Airborne Division without the highest regard for Roy Urquhart, both as an officer and as a man. I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.’
General Browning saw action in both World Wars and was and in 1941 was appointed as the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the newly created 1st Airborne Division. And yet, for political reasons, Browning was passed over for command of First Allied Airborne Army, as the appointment was given to US General Lewis Brereton, who had zero airborne warfare experience.
(What's your source that there was a 1000 German tanks in the Reichswald?
Don’t know who’s source TIK was.
Was it the same guy who said Monty would take Caen on D-Day? Just asking.)
Which guy said Monty would take Caen on D-Day?
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@dongilleo9743
‘It seems like one major criticism of the broad front strategy was that it spread Allies forces out too thinly from the English Channel to Switzerland. If you are concentrating Monty's narrow front 40 divisions in the north, wouldn't that by necessity require the rest of the front to be thinly held, like the Ardennes were prior to the Bulge? If the rest of the front is static and thinly held, with no threat of an attack, wouldn't Germany be able to concentrate all of it's best forces and reinforcements to oppose the narrow front? By August, Germany was scrapping together men to man the Siegfried Line, and building Volksgrenadier divisions. In September the Germans were able to scrape together enough men and material to stop Market-Garden.’
But the material point is that when Montgomery proposed the narrow front strategy in August 1944, the German Army had suffered a defeat in Normandy that was as big as Stalingrad. When British forces entered Amiens at the end of August, they captured German documents showed the state of German forces in the West. This information was later proven to be accurate as it is known that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces north of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk. The German forces that attacked in the Ardennes in December of 1944 were created and equipped in the period when the allied advance had ground to a halt.
It was one thing for German forces to overcome (just) a limited undertaking like MARKET GARDEN, quite another to have been able to resist a concentrated thrust of allied divisions to the Ruhr. Here are some views on the matter.
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
German General Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
German General Gunther Blumentritt
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. Instead he [Eisenhower] hesitated, then backed Montgomery when it was too late'
Ralph Ingersoll.
79 years later, no one knows for certain if a concentration of allied forces in a thrust into Northern Germany in September 1944 would have shortened the war. However, it seems to be clear that given the situation that the allied leaders faced at that time, the thrust into Northern Germany would have been the correct decision.
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@ErikExeu
'The whole idea was extremely stupid. The British should have focused on to clear up the access to Antwerpen and to trap von Zangens army. But these were too small things for Montgomery. His only objective was to take resources from the Americans. Well, then we can perhaps agree MG was 90% succesful.'
Not really...
MARKET GARDEN presented an opportunity to get the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine, while they believed that the Germans in disarray after Normandy, and to stop the flow of German resources into the western part of the Netherlands for V2 rocket attacks on Britain, and before the Germans could recover from their deat in Normandy.
There is opinion that to 'clear up the access to Antwerpen' (The Scheldt), would have been a very difficult task and it could taken up to a month.
Meanwhile, any chance of getting across the Rhine at that time would have gone, and the V2 rockets would have continued to fall on Britain.
Montgomery had given Eisenhower the opportunity to take resources from the 2st Army Group and give them to the 12th Army Group, when they mt on the 23rd August 1944.
A note of caution:
Anyone can form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever on the decision making of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Browning, Gavin, and so on, based on what is now known about the outcome of those decisions. Far, far harder, is to form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever, based on what we know of the circumstances that those people faced at that time.
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@dakotaxd3727
What legal obligation?
This from Wikipedia:
After Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the United Kingdom and France declared war on September 3.[2][3] To assert Canada's independence from the UK, as already established by the Statute of Westminster 1931, Canada's political leaders decided to seek the approval of the federal parliament to declare war.[1][2][4][5]
1. Fortin, Steve (6 February 2008). "Is "declaration of war" an antiquated expression?". The Maple Leaf. Department of National Defence of Canada/Canadian Forces. 11 (5): 6. Archived from the original on 23 September 2012. Retrieved 23 May 2011.
2. Rossignol, Michel (August 1992). "Parliament, the National Defence Act, and the Decision to Participate". Public Works and Government Services Canada. Retrieved May 23, 2011.
3. "1939: King prepares Canada for war with Germany". CBC Digital Archives. Retrieved May 23, 2011.
4. Granatstein, J. L. (September 9, 2009). "Going to war? 'Parliament will decide'". The Globe and Mail.
5. "Canada and the World: A History — 1939 - 1945: The World at War". 5. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada. Retrieved May 23, 2011.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120923053600/http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=4106
' the only Canadian declaration of war dates back to the Second World War. “In 1939 Britain declared war on September 3, but Canada waited, to emphasize its autonomy. Parliamentary debate (September 9) preceded the order in council declaring war (September 10). A similar procedure was followed when Canada declared war on Italy in 1940.'
Why don't people check first?
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@nickdanger3802
'Correction to my previous comment; "in all 338,000 troops were rescued from Dunkirk, a third of them French. Ninety thousand remained to be taken prisoner and the BEF left behind the bulk of its tanks and heavy guns."'
Recovery from the Battle of France was swift. By the end of August 1940, Britain was able to send half of its tank fleet to the Middle East. By early 1941, Britain had twomillion fully armed men in Britain.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P245
‘As the months of July and August passed without further disaster we settled ourselves down with increasing assurance that we could make a long hard fight. Our gains of strength were borne in upon us from day to day. The entire population laboured to the last limit of its strength, and felt rewarded when they fell asleep after their toil or vigil by a growing sense that we should have time and that we should win. All the beaches now bristled with defences of various kinds. The factories poured out their weapons. By the end of August we had over two hundred and fifty new tanks!’
Maganificent words, from the outstanding leader of the outstanding country of Second World War.
And all this, from a population that was under aerial attack, blockade, and with the enemy 21 miles away after June 1940.
Contrast this with coercion used by Germany and Russia to keep their populations on-side, and the USA, arsing around, 3,500 miles from any hint of trouble.
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On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter.
Where is the craving for glory in that?
Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened.
Where is the craving for glory in that?
Where is there shred of reliable evidence (contemporary documents, utterances by Montgomery), that 'Monty's main objective was to get HIS troops over the Rhine before Patton'?
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CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
Where is the ego in that?
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@Jonathanbegg
'The Alamein strategy was not his. It was Auchinleck's.'
Not really...
Read this:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
P22
‘Recently there has been discussion whether or not General Montgomery ‘adopted’ as his own the plan evolved by his predecessor for the action that was shortly to be fought – actually within a little more than a fortnight of his taking over command – in defence of the Alamein position.
I cannot conceive that General Montgomery is likely to have been interested in other people’s ideas on how to run the desert war; and in my own conversation with General Auchinleck, before taking over command, there was certainly no hint of a defensive plan that at all resembled the pattern of the battle of Alam Halfa as it was actually fought.
…as I have already indicated, the actual pattern of the battle was exclusively Montgomery’s.’
Watch this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QlDkjzsYV8&ab_channel=PatrickRushton
15 mins, 55 seconds.
As for Arnhem...the V2 attacks on Britain alone justified the attempt.
As for propaganda:
The whole thrust of government propaganda, the works of filmmakers and of writers was to emphasize the collective effort and the deeds of the man in the street rather than the deeds of generals or politicians. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched were: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC chipped in with output such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on.
Montgomery gained attention because he won battles.
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A great post robm9999.
In the American view of the war (Their1942-1945 diet version), its the USA this, USA that. Such as they mention anyone else at all, the British were cowering cowards until the USA turned up. Russia was as bad as Nazi Germany and only sustained by Lend-Lease supplies, US Lend-Lease supplies, British and Canadian supplies to Russia are disregarded.
The Canadians were completely ignored, and the British relegated to some sort of quaint sideshow in the Hollywood film 'The longest Day.' Hollywood went on to steal British history in the film U-571, and to steal Canadian history in the film Argo.
The Canadian part in the war is well liked in Britain. They were with us from the start, and they punched well above their weight in their war effort.
Its just pours out of the USA, as if on a conveyor belt:
Books, films, TV documentaries, lectures... all for an uncritical, chauvinistic audience.
The lectures about the likes of TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD, MARKET GARDEN, and so on usually start off with character assasinations of the British commanders involved, while US commaders are spoken of in uncritical, reverential tones.
Ditto, the books, which usually have stars and stripes graphics, and photos of US Generals in tin helmets. They then move on to include character assasinations of the British commanders involved, while US commaders are spoken of in uncritical, reverential tones. The statistics and contemporary documents they cite have normally been in the public domain for about six decades.
The films usually show the British as scheming upper class idiots, Dick Van Dyke style 'gorblimey guv' cockneys, and English rose women falling for the tough, down to earth Americans (a-la, the slapper Kay Summersby).
A few, of the many films to watch out for: Saving Private Ryan, Patton, The Winds of War (Cheesefest), the War and Remembrance (Cheesefest), U-572 (Goes without saying), Anne Frank: The Whole Story, Ike Countdown to D-Day, a Bridge Too Far, Mussolini The Untold Story, Band of Brothers, Pearl Harbour, and so on, and so on. This list is almost endless.
Needless to state in all this, there is a dig at Montgomery at every possible opoortunity.
The upshot of all this... the likes of nickdanger3802, and Para Dave (bigwoody)
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@valerieclark4580
Fault? where did it start? Where did it end? What judgements are being made about people's actions at that time?
Eisenhower: with no combat experience, and little command experience, he failed to make best use of the opportunity that was presented to the allies at the beginning of September 1944, by failing to adopt a forward strategy made best use of the available resources, that led to a series of under resourced operations, of which MARKET GARDEN was but one?
Brereton: with no experience of airborne operations, he created the MARKET airborne plan which failed to meet key airborne forces requirements in order to protect the airforces involved in the undertaking? He then went onto to write his wartime diary after the war?
Browning and Gavin: Between them, decided not to capture Nijmegen bridge on the first day, as discussed here. What fault lies there?..
The US soldier that took a complete set of the MARKET GARDEN plan in a US glider to the combat zone, only to be killed when the glider crashed in a US combat zone: How much fault lies with him?
For me, any opinion about how people acted at that time can only be set against the circumtances that those people were in at that time. I have not been in a war, nor have I attempted to plan and execute an airborne operation. This makes me a bit averse to attributing fault. How about you?
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"Those stories are indeed doing the rounds, that he also received a medallion for the Battle of the Scheldt, the Distinguished Conduct Medal. He would have captured 93 soldiers there. He refused [the medal] because of General Montgomery. But you cannot find anything about all of that. Major fought in Zeeland, and undoubtedly he would have been competent. But about his medal we read nothing. And do not be mistaken; if someone came ten minutes too late to the evening roll call, then that is in the reports. Or that they get new shoes on Tuesday. And then there would be nothing noted down about the medal for Major? Would be really weird, I cannot imagine that."
Dirk Staat, conservator of the Dutch National Military Museum
'In truth he had received seven days off as thanks for his heroic deed, which he spent in Belgium, prior to the award ceremony. "But the little car didn't want to start", wrote Major. "That's why I came back too late, and what's worse: I wasn't present to receive the distinction from Montgomery."'
Tony Atherton (May 7, 2005). "Divergent portraits of war". The Ottawa Citizen. canada.com.
Get it right next time...
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@johndawes9337
Here is an American opinion about lies told by Generals:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 489
‘German losses would be difficult to count with precision, not least because the Americans tended to inflate them. (Patton at times concocted figures from the whole cloth, or assumed that enemy casualties were tenfold the number of prisoners taken.) A U.S. Army estimate of 120,000 losses in the month following the launch of HERBSTNEBEL was surely too high, and Bradley’s claim of more than a quarter-million was preposterous. One post-war analysis put the figure at 82,000, another at 98,000. The official German history would cite 11,000 dead and 34,000 wounded, with an intermediate number captured, missing, sick, and injured.’
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andrewmay7284
I found this, make of it what you will...
'Lord Carrington again...
the Germans would blow this immense contraption we were to be accompanied by an intrepid Royal Engineer officer to cut the wires and cleanse the demolition chambers under each span. Our little force was led by an excellent Grenadier, Sergeant Robinson, who was rightly awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his action. Two of our tanks were hit not lethally - by anti-tank fire, and we found a number of Germans perched in the girders who tried to drop things on us but without great effect. Sergeant Robinson and the leading tank troop sprayed the opposite bank and we lost nobody, When I arrived at the far end my sense of relief was considerable: the bridge had not been blown, we had not been plunged into the Waal (In fact it seems the Germans never intended to blow the bridge. The demolition chambers were packed with German soldiers, who surrendered), we seemed to have silenced the opposition in the vicinity, we were across one half of the Rhine."
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men: reached it. When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay."
"The pursuit had ground to a halt. The war was clearly going on. We spent the winter of 1944 in Holland, first near Nijmegen where the Germans had flooded the land between the two great rivers, and there was little activity."
The meeting of the 82nd men and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge at the village of Lent where the railway embankment from the railway bridge met the north running road running off the main road bridge. The 82nd men did not reach the north end of the actual road bridge, the Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry got there first from the south.
Historians get confused. There are two bridges at Nijmegen. a railway bridge to the west and and road bridge to the east. They are about 1km apart. The 82nd men rowed the river west of the railway bridge and seized that bridge. The railway bridge was not suitable for running tanks over of course. After seizing the north end of the unimportant rail bridge the 82nd men moved along the railway embankment north to where the embankment meets the road approach to the road bridge at Lent.
Heinz Harmel (played by Hardy Kruger in the film A Bridge too Far), the 10th SS Panzer Division commander who was between Arnhem and Nijmegen, says it was the British tanks who raced across the bridge seizing the bridge. Harmel did not know of that three Tiger tanks that had crossed the Arnhem bridge running south, the German communications was disjointed. Harmel stated that there was little German armor between Nijmegen and Arnhem. That was not correct. The three powerful Tiger tanks would have made scrap metal out of the British Shermans. By the time the Guards tanks crossed Nijmegen bridge Johnny Frost and the British paratroopers at the Arnhem bridge were being overrun because of the long delay in seizing the Nijmegen bridge.
Only 4 tanks were available at the north end of the bridge to secure it. No tanks were available to run on any further to Arnhem and any that did would have been sitting ducks on the raised road. The Guards tanks were split up and spread out over 20 miles, supporting the 82nd all over the place around Nijmegen. Which was supposed to have already been taken by the 82nd. All over Nijmegen, Mook, Groosbeek, Grave etc. Some even had to go back down the road towards Eindhoven when Panzer Brigade 107 tried to cut the road.
Only five British tanks were able to cross the bridge that night, and two of them were damaged. 4 tanks initially went across then Carrington's lone tank followed, guarding the northern end of the bridge by itself for nearly an hour before he was relieved by infantry.
Nor did the 82nd take the southern end of the bridge in Nijmegen town. Lt Col Ben Vandervoort of the 82nd was in the southern approaches to the bridge, alongside the Grenadier Guards tanks as the Royal Engineers were removing charges on the bridge. Vandervoort and his men never went onto the bridge to take it. He remained at the southern approaches to the bridge with the rest of the 82nd and also the Grenadier Guards infantry, as Sgt Robinson and his four tanks raced on up the main road, up onto the bridge, and across it. Vandervoort was full of praise for the tankers of the Grenadier Guards. Here are his own words: "The 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was attached to the famed Guards Armoured Division on Tuesday 19th September. We were honoured to be a momentary part of their distinguished company....The clanking steel monsters were a comfort to the foot slogging paratroopers.....Morale was high....For soldiers of different Allied armies it was amazing how beautifully the tankers and troopers teamed together. It was testimony to their combat acumen as seasoned veterans, both Yanks and Tommies...The battalion had fought with tanks before, but never in such lavish quantities. The tanks were the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, the Grenadier Group as a whole being commanded by Lt Col Edward Goulburn....Col Goulburn, a perceptive commander, more or less turned individual tanks loose and let them go. The Guards tanks gave us all the tank support we needed. Some Shermans and their crews were lost as we went along. Usually it happened when the tank was employed too aggressively."
After 2 days fighting, split up, spread out and disjointed, the Guards Armored Division had to regroup, re-arm and re-fuel. It was simply not possible for them to have moved onto Arnhem that night. The task the five tanks that crossed the bridge were given was to defend the bridge and consolidate against enemy attacks. Moffat Burris of the 82nd is mistaken, there was not a 'whole corps' of tanks ready to go.
General Browning, of the 1st Airborne Army, who parachuted into Nijmegen and seeing the bridge untaken told General Gavin of the 82nd on the evening of 18th September that the Nijmegen bridge must be taken on the 19th, or at the latest, very early on the 20th. The Nijmegen bridge was not captured on the 17th because there was a foul up in communication between General Gavin and Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR of the 82nd Airborne. Gavin allegedly verbally told Lindquist during the pre-drop talk to take a battalion of the 508th and make a quick strike to the bridge on the 17th and to "move without delay" but Lindquist understood it that Gavin had told him that his 508th should only move for the bridge once his regiment had secured the assigned 508th's portion of the defensive perimeter for the 82nd Division. So Lindquist didn't move his battalion towards the Nijmegen bridge until after this had been done, and by that time it was too late.
This misunderstanding/miscommunication, which had disastrous ramifications for the overall Market Garden operation, has been the subject of much debate and controversy ever since.
This was passing the buck, in an attempt to shift blame due to the 82nd totally failing to take the Nijmegen road bridge, casting aspersions on the British tankers who's job it was to defend the bridge and prevent the Germans from taking it back. Had the 82nd done the job it was supposed to have done, the bridge would have been taken 3 days before and XXX Corps would have reached Arnhem and relived the beleaguered British paras.
Sources:
It Never Snows in September by Robert Kershaw.
The Battle For The Rhine by Robin Neilands.
Reflect on Things Past by Peter Carington.
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Magry (a Dutchman).
Poulussen (a Durchman), Lost at Nijmegen.
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@Synaptic_gap
Not really...
Amsterdam was then, and still is, nowhere near the Scheldt. Its about 65 miles North of the Scheldt.
“The failure to seize Antwerp and its approaches at the beginning of September 1944
comes down through the years as one of the greatest errors of the Second World Warand thus Germany gained the vital time it required to organize a coherent defense in
Holland and Belgium by the failure of the Allies to exploit their success at
Antwerp."
Antwerp was actually captured on the 4th September 1944. At that point, the Germans were still in strength on the South Bank of the Scheldt, with a concentration of forces in what became known as Breskens Pocket. Many of the assets needed to assault the estuary were still West of the Seine.
The Scheldt estuary is a hundred miles long on both banks, and every part of those banks had to be in allied hands before shippping could use that waterway. Given what is known about the German attitude to the Scheldt and Antwerp, there can be little doubt that even if the whole of 21st Army Group were turned on the Scheldt, it would have taken weeks to overrun the estuary. Admiral Ramsay stated that it would take three weeks to clear the estuary of mines. That is what happened in November. The same would have applied in October, or September.
Further, almost every day, more road and rail links were being brought into use. Dieppe and Ostend were in use by the middle of September. The Germans got their respite for time and space to rebuild their forces by Eisenhower's failure to prioritize an attack in either the North or the South. Montgomery had gone into Normady with a clear plan - which cleared France in 90 days. Eisenhower took over with no plan, and the whole thing went to pot, with the allies advancing just 45 miles in the next 90 days.
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@Synaptic_gap
'Primaily it was the a disregard of intelligence that led to Market Gardens failure, not just that recieved from the Dutch underground, but Ultra reporting as well that indicated the true nature of Wermacht forces in Holland. Despite these reports and the numerous senior members of Montgomery’s staff and the
SHAEF staff who counseled against conducting the operation as planned, Montgomery
refused to consider changing or canceling Operation Market-Garden.'
The intelligence picture was was seen Eisenhower, Bradley and all the top commanders in SHAEF reports:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
N.B. 16.09.44 was a day before MARKET GARDEN was due to start.
Montgomery did not even see the MARKET part of the plan until 15th September.
Montgomery received an urgent request from sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke: on the 9th September asking what could be done about V2 attacks on Britain. It read:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.'
So, on what grounds was Montgomery to stop MARKET GARDEN?
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@lyndoncmp5751
This General this, that General something else seems to be an American thing, judging by what can be seen and heard on YouTube. Compare the number of YouTube comments by Americans about Montgomery with comments by Britons on items about the likes of Eisenhower, Bradley, Bradley’s subordinate, Patton, and others.
Perhaps its all that they got in regard to the war? After all, the USA was not in the war until after Germany and Italy could longer win. Japan could never have won. Their homeland was 3,000 miles plus from any hint of danger. They have no Battle of Britain, or Stalingrad. Their troops faced danger at the front, but so did the troops of every other country involved. Britain, Canada, and Russia mobilized more of their respective populations. Even their production figures have to be set against the fact that the USA is one largest countries in the world, it has an abundance of raw materials, not a single enemy aircraft dropped a bomb on the US mainland. Relative to its circumstances, Britain’s war production effort was far more impressive. Probably, the war production figures for Canada, and of Russia, was also more impressive.
Maybe, Americans think that comparing this General to that General, and so on, somehow evens up the score? Who can say?..
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@davemac1197
Absolutely...
With the Arnhem book, any negative for US forces is understandable, or only to be expected, or the fortunes of war, or, and, as in most cases with him, its all the fault of the British.
With him (A Briton), railway goods wagons become box cars, pigs become hogs, Mustang fighters become P-51s, Achillies tank destroyers becomes the M 10 Achilles, and so on, and so on. Doubtless the Autumn has the Fall.
He is utterly shameless in his pursuit of US book sales, and getting himself onto the US lecture circuit.
As far as I am concerned, he brings nothing new to the subject of Arnhem. He even half admits that in his acknowledgements. He cites the Cornelius Ryan archive, which any one can visit on-line, and the unused material acquired by the US author Rick Atkinson.
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'He won one Battle....ONE! Against a foe who was cut-off from his supply lines and with very little Fuel for his
Army' Your words.
At ALAM EL HALFA, (Eighth Army)
4 divisions, defeated the (Panzer Army Africa) 6 divisions. Montgomery also won at the Second Battle of El Alamein, Battle of El Agheila; Battle of Medenine; Battle of the Mareth Line, Battle of Wadi Akarit; Hskey, Overlord, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Rhine.
'Against a foe who was cut-off from his supply lines and with very little Fuel for his Army. Add to that he had a huge advantage in man-power, in Arms, in Munitions...everything!' Your words.
According to those that were actually there, there was far more work to be done than building up supplies:
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
Alanbrooke
Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
Churchill.
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
De Guingand.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery."
German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin.
'Because of Monty the Falaise Gap wasn't closed' Your words.
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From US General Omar Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
'and they ended up being the very soldiers who cost him (and 20,000 soldiers) in Market Garden.' Your words.
MARKET GARDEN casualties amounted to 17,000. This figure should be compared to other undertakings at that time at at AACHEN (20,000 casualties), LORRAINE (45,000 casualties), and the HURTGEN FOREST (55,000 casualties).
'He's a defensive Commander and he's not comfortable when his army is called on to the offense.' Your words.
You have used the present tense. Actually Montgomery died in 1976.
Montgomery chased Rommel 1,400 miles across North Africa, with hundreds and hundreds of miles between supply ports before Rommel could stand and fight. In Normandy...
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower.
Any questions?..
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@ninjakid6
'Big Woody That’s not an adequate reply to my point.'
You will not get one. On here, Big Woody also uses the name Clone Warrior. He (or she) is about 17 years old and lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Here is an example of his handiwork:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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@nickdanger3802
Right ho...
'Throughout May and June, both before the German-French armistice and after it, Mr. Churchill sent to the President many personal telegrams containing specific requests for aid.'
Shall we see what happened to those requests?.. Please, please say yes.
Look on this as a sort of Hors d'oeuvre, in case you say yes...
'forty or fifty of your old destroyers'
That did not happen in July 1940, the ships (46 in total) only started ariving in October of that year, after the USA had been granted base facilities in a signicant number of Commonwealth and Empire locations. By May 1941, not even 30 were fit for sea, by which time, the Flower Class Corvette building programme (10 of which were transferrred to the USN in 1942) had largely solved the problem.
This from Churchill regarding the condition of those destroyers:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P533
‘Prime Minister to First Sea Lord 14.XII.40’
Let me have a full account of the condition of the American destroyers, showing their many defects
and the little use we have been able to make of them so far. I should like to have the paper by me for consideration in the near future.’
This from the hater of Britain, one Lynne Olsen:
'One British admiral called them the "worst destroyers I had ever seen" '
Fancy some more?
Remember, I never bluff.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
'they ignore these enormous provisions'
Para Dave (aka bigwoody)
Shall we look at those 'enormous provisions' as well?..
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@nickdanger3802
Let me help you some more:
'the British needed for their struggle at sea: they asked the Americans to give them motor torpedo boats for Channel fighting and seaplanes for Atlantic patrol: they wanted the United States Navy to make a show of power by sending units to the Mediterranean and to Iceland: they asked the United States Government to consider whether it was ready to take steps leading to the abolition of the 'combat zones'—for it was a reinforcements of their carrying capacity in dangerous waters that they needed, not only of their fighting strength. They needed at the same time immediate help for the battles they might very soon have to fight on their own soil against invading German armies. They asked for American aircraft for the R.A.F and American rifles, machine guns, field guns and mortars to replace some of the equipment that the B.E.F. had lost in France and to arm the Home Guard.'
Motor Torpedo Boats
656 built for Britain. 102 of those 656 boats built in the USA. None in use by Britain until 1942.
A fat lot of use they would have been in 1940.
Showing of Strength
That didn’t happen apart from US troops moving into Iceland after British troops had bravely brought the place in to allied hands.
Aircraft (Sold to Britain)
What? Apart from what was on order to the British and French governments, which had to be bought, paid for, and collected.
Rifles (Sold to Britain)
500,000 First World War .300 Lee Enfield Rifles that were passed to the Home Guard. Possibly, both of my grandfathers were issued with them. Hope not.
Field Guns (Sold to Britain)
500 French First World War ‘soixante-quinze’ were placed around the 11,073 miles British coastline. Even allowing for concentration at key points on the coast, they were hardly cheek by jowl.
Mortars
Let me know how many the USA sent to Britain in 1940, and 1941, and we can compare that number to the 29,284 mortars that Britain produced in that same period.
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@akgeronimo501
R
'The broad front, by the way, a bone thrown to England, was designed to not allow the Germans to reorganize. They were pushed everywhere.'
Your words.
Get real. Eisenhower's broad front gave the Germans just what they wanted, time and space to rebuold their forces and defences. 'A bone thrown to England.'
You cannot be serious...Montgomery offered to stop British forces and let the USA armies advance together, south of the Ardennes, providing a decision was made to concentrate allied resources.
The germans agreed that a concentrated allied thrust would have been the best policy:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
Gunther Blumentritt
And also, it seems, at least one American who was there:
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. Instead he [Eisenhower] hesitated, then backed Montgomery when it was too late'
Ralph Ingersoll.
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‘A Can-Loan 1st Gordon Highlanders Para Vet of Arnhem, taught 2 generations of Canadian Officers Infantry the dangers of "my man will do it" disease. Monty did not double-check his staff. His bloody-minded "make my plan work" top-down manner gave him a staff unwilling to raise inconvenient truths. Hence:’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Montgomery had already cancelled COMET because of advice from his staff. His decision to include Arnhem in MARKET GARDEN was taken after consulting his staff.
‘1. Monty & his staff Ignored the Inconvenient Truth of plain RAF Photo Recce showing a full Panzer heavy Division. Couldn't contradict Monty's of an empty Drop Zone.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
The ‘Photo Recce’ can be seen on line. Far from showing a ‘full Panzer heavy Division.’, they are grainy overhead shots of a few heavily camouflaged German Mark lll tanks from a training battalion. The tanks can probably only be discerned experienced photo interpreters.
Montgomery had no had no final on the airborne MARKET plan. On this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘2. Monty & his staff inexcusably failed or refused Net In, Test, & Exercise their Radios. No command or control save slavish devotion to Monty's Plan which was entirely grounded on the assumption of an empty Drop Zone’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
The problems with radios were confined to the FAAA (That is the FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, to save you looking it up). As I have already pointed out FAAA was not part of Montgomery’s forces.
‘3. Monty was inflexible because he was deafened by no Communications, and therefore blind. Guards Armour refused to seek or seize let alone to maintain the initiative because they knew of Monty's obsessive compulsive control freak nature. Radio up and just do it unless ordered to stop? That would take an O'Conner, or a Slim at the top. Oh, and working radios.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
XXX Corps reached Grave at 8am on the morning of the 3rd day, 50 miles from the start line. This with a 12 hour delay due to the Son Bridge having been blown up. How was that a failure to’ maintain the initiative’?
‘Sure, there are always 378 other factors. Usually rasied as excuses or fog. But these 3 all by themselves killed a golden opportunity, and relegated Mony to 3rd tier general everywhere but England. What's Monty's equivilent of Slim's ? The vainglorious tripe in Monty's autobiography on has to be some of the worst vainglorious stuff & nonsense ever published. There was no excuse for Monty's gravest blunder, Arnhem.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Three factors that could help to explain the failure at Arnhem could be:
The Germans finding a copy of the compete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US Landing zone at the very beginning of the operation.
The unexpected onset of adverse weather, as cited by Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Student.
The failure to capture Nijmegen city and bridge before the arrival of XXX Corps on the morning of the 3rd day.
As for Montgomery..
As a single division commander Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, his night march with the 3rd infantry division to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian surrender was a foretaste of his outstanding career as an army / army group commander. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa, and Sicily.
As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Scheldt, and the Rhine. No other allied commander came close to matching Montgomery’s career.
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What is untold about Dowding?.. Its been around for sixty odd years.
'Unfortunately, Hugh Dowding was neither a member of the 'upper crust' nor was he a 'social animal' which was so important to the Brits, and that really explains his unpopularity and removal as head of Fighter Command. To add insult to injury, when the RAF wrote the official history of the Battle of Britain, Sir Hugh Dowding was not mentioned even once. The British should forever feel shame for that slight to a man to whom they owed so much'
Not really...
Dowding was due for retirement before the war had even started. His retirement was thus delayed three times, the last occasion being during battle itself. The 'official history of the Battle of Britain' was published in 1943, a time when all govrnment messages to populace emphasized the collective effort rather than the roles of individuals. The document only mentioned one person by name - Hermann Goering. Further, Dowding was made Baron Dowding of Bentley Priory in June 1943, as soon as the enormity of his victory became clear, making him only the second RAF person to receive such an honour. Later, he had a mainline locomotive named after him, a statue outside the RAF church of St Clement Danes, and the RAF School of Aerospace Battle Management is named the Dowding Centre.
Dowding was portrayed in the 1969 film 'The Battle of Britain', while he was still alive.
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'Let's stay serious and objective! Montgomery won El Alamein because the German military situation was busy turning around.'
Montgomery won at El Alamein because his previous victory at Alam el Halfa ensured thst the battle be foight where he wished it to be fought. He then reorganized and retrained the Eighth Army to make it fit for battle and then resisted political pressure to attack before everything was in place. for just 13,500 casualties he ended the war in North Africa as a contest.
'The Allied submarines sank the Italian ships responsible for bringing essential supplies to the Afrika Corps while, at the same time, the Allies ensured a predominance in supply and airspace ... these "special" circumstances, everything was in place to obtain victory ...'
So what was Monmtgomery supposed to do? Say stop, let the Africa Corps get all of their supplies so that everything is equal and we can ensure that there are no stupid comments on YouTube 79 years later?
'Let us recall that, during the landing of June 6, Montgomery was stuck for a month in front of Caen while the Americans were progressing elsewhere and the same failed miserably in Arnhem.'
Montgomery drew the overwhelming bulk of German forces onto his front at Caen, including 84% of German armour. Montgomery delivered victory by D+78, instead of the scheduled completed date of D+90, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and delivered in Normandy, a defeat for the Germans as big as Stalingrad.
The failure at Arnhem freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German V2 attacks on Britain, stretched the German defences another 50 miles and gave the allies an excellent starting point for attacking the Rhine in the following months.
Other allied operations have failed more miserably than that.
What was your country doing while all this was going on?
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
Market Garden:
There is no evidence of British political interference in the matter of MARKET GARDEN. It too small an undertaking to gain any notice outside of the senior military figures involved in the war in Europe.
Churchill and Alanbrooke were travelling to, attending, and travelling home from the OCTAGON conference in Quebec from before MARKET GARDEN was even proposed, through to the last days of the operation. VCIGS Nye signalled to Montgomery on the 9th September to ask what could be done to stop the Germans from launching V weapons at Britain from the western part of the Netherlands. No reasonable person could take a desire to protect British citizens from rocket attacks as political interference.
Montgomery was as entitled to his opinion on the outcome MARKET GARDEN as anybody else was, or is. He stated this:
'in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’S unrepentant advocate.’
The ex-SS man, and Nazi Party member, Prince Bernhard, was rightly shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s, in the wake the Lockheed scandal.
How would Antony Beevor know that Montgomery “never wanted to admit that he had been responsible for something going wrong?” I have not seen any evidence that Beevor and Montgomery ever met.
As far as I am concerned, given the situation that allies found themselves at that time, the decision to launch MARKET GARDEN was a quite reasonable one. The rocket attacks on Britain, justified the MARKET GARDEN undertaking, quite apart from the information that allied military saw in regard to available allied logistics, and the state of the German armed forces at that time.
There is no reliable evidence that ‘Montgomery refused to listen when Eisenhower's HQ expressed concern about German strength around Arnhem’, apart from what General Bedell Smith later claimed he said to Montgomery in a private meeting on the 12th September. This would seem to be a strange claim, seeing that Bedell Smith was sent to see Montgomery to offer more resources to ensure that MARKET GARDEN could be started on the 17th September. Also, given what seems to have been known to SHAEF at the that time:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
Stephen Ambrose, like Antony Beevor, had zero Second World War experience. Google him. He has been labelled a liar and a plagiarist.
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
Hamish Hamilton Ltd. 1946
P 214
Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine. In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
N.B. Tedder was one of Montgomery’s harshest critics.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
Any comparison between bad weather for MARKET GARDEN and the German attack in the Ardennes is spurious. Bad weather was a setback for airborne forces during MARKET GARDEN. Bad weather was an aid to the German advance in the Ardennes. Think it through next time.
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@akgeronimo501
R
'The British Army has struggled, in the main, in the offense. All the way back to the American revolution. Even Lord Wellington would look to the defense. I'm not sure the issue, but it exists. They certainly struggle with large muscle movements. Examples are Sicily, Normandy, the pursuit of the Germans was difficult for them.'
ROTFL
The only mistake in the American sideshow was to send a bunch of Krauts out there.
End of.
In sicily, Patton threw his toys out of Pram and then cleared off from the battle to grab headline with the totally unnecessary attack on Palermo and had to be enticed back into the battle by being given the prize of Messina.
End of.
Normandy. Yea with 84% of German armour facing British 2nd Army, leaving the US forcres to (eventually) tobreak out, all as a campaign plan Montgomery had worked out and briefed Allied leaders on before D-Day.
Even then, the British 2nd Army breakout was just as swift as the US breakout, as evidenced by Eisenhower:
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
His words.
End of.
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Montgomery was nothing to do with Bastogne.
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), the Lorraine Campaign (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). The threat of V2 Rocket attacks on London, alone justified MARKET GARDEN.
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@Heathcoatman
‘t's actually quite funny watching this and seeing yet another British attempt to lay blame elsewhere. The common excuse is alluded to here, that General Gavin didnt prioritize the Nijmegen bridge over the Groosbeek heights. The Heights had to be taken first. Had the Germans held the heights they could have just decimated any troops fighting in and around the bridge. It's not up for debate among military scholars at all. The heights first.’ Your words.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994.
P xiii
The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.’
The Groesbeek Heights are 100 ft above sea level.
‘1st, Montgomery held up the Canadian armored formation that was running up the coast just before they reached the Schelde. Had they capped the Schelde, it would have trapped the majority of the 15th Army on the peninsula, approximately 70,000 Germans. Instead this narrow access was left open, and many of the units that put pressure on the bridges came from this area. Big oops nobody ever talks about (because it was Montgomery's fault, and we never criticize Monty, right?).’
Your words.
It’s a definite no. The Canadian First Army, was tasked with clearing the Channel Ports. No allied forces were in a position to contest the German 15th Army move in the Scheldt.
‘General Browning felt that his HQ unit was needed near Nijmegen with the first drop. What? With the extreme shortage of transport units, Browning's HQ ate up almost a battalion's worth of air transport......for an HQ unit......on day 1. No wonder Gavin didnt have enough troops for both the bridge and the heights.’ Your words
It’s a definite no. Browning’s gliders were taken from 1st Airborne’s glider allocation, leading to two Companies of the South Staffords being left behind.
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Heathcoatman
‘lets looks at his 'accomplishments'. Widely hailed as the 'winner of 2nd El Alamein' he showed up about a week before the battle as a replacement. The defenses were already set and his forces grossly outnumbered Rommel's. That victory is mainly due to the ANZAC forces who held the line a month before Monty even got there, allowing the reinforcements that followed to dig in in great defensive positions. That victory was sealed before Monty was ever a factor, but he's the hero of El Alamein (pause to let chuckles subside).’
It’s a definite no. Montgomery arrived in Egypt in Mid-August 1942. The Second Battle of Alamein began at the end of October and early November of that year. At the First Battle of Alamein, Eighth Army comprised one Australian Division, one Indian division (two brigades), one New Zealand Division, one South African Division, and three British divisions. All clear now?
‘Then there's Sicily, where Monty was Monty, dragging his feet, moving at a snails pace while the Americans took Palermo AND Messina against the bulk of the FJs, then ole' Monty claimed himself the hero again.’ Your words.
Read this:
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
Pages 319-320
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.'
'Then there's Caen. targeted to be captured by June 7th, taken well into July with the typical Monty excuse of 'it was hard, they fought back'. Your words.
There was no target date for Caen. The Only target date that Montgomery set was the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
‘Then there's MG, a bad plan to start with then executed poorly while Patton's tanks sat facing open country without any fuel. Good call.’ Your words.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P589
It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division.’
‘If you want to argue Monty with me, please do, I've only scratched the surface here.’ Your words.
Bring it on
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@chestersleezer8821
MARKET GARDEN was undertaken to give the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine before the Winter, and to stop the launching of V weapons against Britain from the western part of the Netherlands, by reaching the Ijsselmeer (Commonly referred to at that time as the Zuider Zee). MARKET GARDEN was on too small a scale to be able to achieve anything else.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: ‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
VCIGS, General Nye to Montgomery,
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up.
MONTGOMERY
ALAN MOOREHEAD
HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946
P 214
‘With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days latter with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.
The 1945 21st Army Group report ion MARKET GARDEN:
21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.
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@chestersleezer8821
''The Allies would have been better to focus on the Scheldt estuary and so opening the port of Antwerp giving a much shorter supply line for them. But Monty got his way finally and well we know the history of Operation Market Garden and the Germans reinforced their island garrisons, and the Canadians "sustained 12,873 casualties in an operation which could have been achieved at little cost if tackled immediately after the capture of Antwerp. This delay was a grave blow to the Allied build-up before winter approached.' Your words.
Such a decision to prioritize the Scheldt was Eisenhower's to take. By that time he was both Supreme Commander and allied land forces commander at the time of Arnhem.
The Scheldt would have been a major undertaking, whenever an attack commenced. Even before MARKET GARDEN, the Germans still controlled the Breskens Pocket on the south bank of the estuary, and also the defences at the mouth of the estuary, considered to be some of the most formidable in Europe. Many of the sssets needed for an operation in the Scheldt were still west of the River Seine. The banks of the Scheldt estuary were together, 100 miles long, and every single mile needed to be in allied hands before Antwerp port could be brought into use.
The Scheldt was taken by Canadian, Polish and British forces, my own father among them. My uncle too, if the naval bombardment forces are included. The total allied casualties amounted to 20,873, of which, 6,367
were Canadian.
Any questions?..
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Montgomery Ardennes Press Conference...
This from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 636– 637
‘In a press conference given on 7 January, Montgomery described how Eisenhower had placed him in command of the whole northern front. He emphasized that the repulse of the German onslaught had been an Anglo-American effort, but somewhat unfortunately went on to describe the battle as ‘most interesting. I think, possibly, one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.’
Montgomery expressed his admiration for the fighting qualities of the American soldier and how grieved he was to see uncomplimentary articles about Eisenhower in the British Press. However, the subsequent handling of Montgomery’s statements by the British newspapers and by the B.B.C. caused a crisis. The Prime Minister telephoned several times to Eisenhower, who said that Bradley was most upset. He proposed to award the Bronze Star to Bradley with a citation drawing attention to his fighting qualities, and to the work of the American armies bearing the brunt of the German offensive. At a meeting on 9 January, the Supreme Commander remarked that censorship was a two-edged weapon. Anything withheld by the censors immediately acquired news value, and the Press, by inuendo or other means, invariably circumvented it. It seemed to him that he reaction of the American Press to the statements in the British newspapers would be to exaggerate the United States point of view. There would be no end to the statements which the Press of the two countries would make in reply to each other. He also remarked: ‘For two and a half years I have been trying to get the Press to talk of “Allied” operations, but look what has happened.’
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.
Any quwstions?
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Land Forces 1939-45
Australia 751,729
Britain 3,510,309
B. Indian Ocean 6,500
Canada 730,625
Cyprus 30,000
East Africa 200,000
Fiji 3,050
British Guiana 42
Hong Kong 2,200
India 2,455,779
Kenya 98,240
Malaysia 1,500
Nepal 250,280
Newfoundland 4,005
New Zealand 128,905
Nigeria 121,652
Sudan 20,000
South Africa 334,000
Southern Africa 77,767
West Africa 200,000
West Indies 10,000
Any questions?
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@randylucas2458
Ah so you have no evidence that 'Market Garden happened to shut Monty up because while Patton was shooting all over the place Monte was missing the limelight'
As for wastage of men, ammunition, fuel. Perhaps you should compare Market Garden (17,000 casualties) with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties), and so on, and so on...
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robert colboourne
'he is over- rated.'
Yea, by Americans for decades, as they attack Montgomery from every direction: Hollywood, crap web sites, chauvisistic historians and so on. All of them splitting hairs about all of his actions whilst breezing over bog up after bog up by US commanders. If Eisenhower or Bradley had devised the Normandy campaign, there would have been films, TV mini series, statues, reverential lectures on the US lecture circuit, books by the Lorry load, with copies in some pupose built library in some Mid-West US state, and so on and so on.
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Roland Whittle
Here is an American view on Sicily…
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact, he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
And another American source:
The Axis powers had known before the landings on Sicily that Patton was in command of American ground forces in the western Mediterranean, and knew he led Seventh Army on Sicily. But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.”
https://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm
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@GregWampler-xm8hv
Its a definite no.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander, and Allied Land Forces Commander. Montgomery did not even have jurisdiction over the airborne divisions in that undertaking until they made contact with XXX Corps during the MARKET GARDEN operation.
The idea British are jealous of Americans is absurd.
Britain was the only one of the five major belligerents (Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia) that went to war on behalf of another country, all the others attacked other countries or were an attack. The USA is excluded from this group of nations as its homeland was never under threat and therefore it does not deserve to a place at this group.
Britain was the only major country to fight from the beginning to the end of the war. The only country to fight Germany and Italy on its own - for an entire year. The only country to fight in every part of the war: North West Europe, Italy, North Africa, Central Africa, the Balkans, Asia and the Pacific. On its own Britain out-produced Germany. All this from a country that is the size of the US State of Oregon and for four years was 20 miles from the enemy.
As far a who did what in the Second World War is concerned, WE RULE.
'the Americans at this stage provided the overwhelming majority of men and machines.'
The statistics at that time were...
British 21st Army Group:
Men 829,640. Vehicles 202,789.
US 12th Army Group:
Men1,222,659. Vehicles 235,682.
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@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85
From Para Dave (aka bigwoody):
'Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.80 HQ 21 Army Group,14 April 1944 ,B.L. Montgomery, CiC ."the whole of aggressive tactics would be to retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds of the enemy. To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to wait till D plus 1 would be to lose the opportunity, and also to lose the initiative."'
Considering what went on at OMAHA beach, and slow American build-up, some might say that things went pretty well. I wonder what Mr D'este thought while he was in of it in Normandy in 1944?
'Even Alan Brooke had to be reaching for a bucket when hearing that.'
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P244
[Alanbrooke letter to Montgomery: 28.07.1944]
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
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@johnlucas8479
That Brereton had the final say in airborne matters seems to have been accepted by a number of people:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It beggars belief that given what happened with Walcheren, and that Eisenhower almost always sided with his fellow American commanders, particularly after 1st September, 1944, that Brereton could not stopped MARKET if he so chose.
Montgomery words only covered matters appertaining to the l Airborne Corps, which Montgomery had been given the use of prior to MARKET GARDEN. His words:
'I had been allotted the First Allied Airborne Corps and on the 3rd September, the day we liberated Brussels., I had asked its commander (General Browning) to come and see me, so that we might discuss the general axis of the thrust towards the Rhine and the best areas in which to drop the
airborne divisions.'
It seems that Montgomey had been obliged to seek the help of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as the USAAF and RAF transport units for MARKET GARDEN, when he met Eisenhower on the 10th September. Even within the operation itself, it seems that l Airborne Corps forces only came under the command of British Second Army when they linked up with XXX Corps.
No doubt davemac will know the precise details of these matters.
No one on YouTube knows what would have been outcome if Montgomery said yes, and Brereton said no. The available evidence that I have seen seems to show that Brereton's view would have prevailed every time.
Slightly off topic...
Montgomery's words in his memoirs regarding his mistakes with Arnhem, and the Scheldt should contrasted with the lack any admission of fault in the contents of the memoirs written by Bradley, and Eisenhower.
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@johnlucas8479
Lets try again...
It would be good to see and read more about INFATUATE, and the rest of stuff about the Scheldt.
My Father was on INFATUATE, my Uncle also, if you count the naval bomardment. 97% of the YouTube stuff about the Netherlands in 1944 is about MARKET GARDEN.
But this not about INFATUATE itself, its about who had the final say on airborne operations at that time, with INFATUATE being good evidence as to who had that say.
This, from Brereton's 'wartime diary':
'ASCOT, 11 September 1944 (D-Pus-94). Everywhere the Germans are retreating. trying to reach the protection of the Siegfried Line and their prepared defenses. Our big problem Is supply. Our armies are consuming enormous quantities of ammunition. fuel, and food.
The First Army captured Liege three days ago and is at the Luxembourg-German border. The Third Army has reached the Moselle and made a junction with the Seventh Army coming up from the south. The British and Canadians in the north liberated Brussels and Antwerp a week ago and were close to the Dutch border. The stage is set to deal the enemy a knockout. Our airborne forces are available for a bold stroke in the enemy's rear. Ten operations are planned:
OPERATION COMET, desired by the Northern group of armies on the Rhine bridges from Arnhem to Wesel to facilitate an advance on the Ruhr from the north.
OPERATION INFATUATE, a landing on Walcheren Island to aid in opening the port of Antwerp by cutting off or harassing the German retreat across the Scheldt Estuary.
OPERATION NAPLES I, an operation behind the Siegfried 'Line to the east of Aachen.
Operation NAPLES II, a bridgehead over the Rhine in the vicinity of Cologne.
MILAN I, breaching the Siegfried Line at Trier.
MILAN ll, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Neuwied and Coblenz.
CHOKER I, to assist in breaching the Siegfried Line at Saarbrücken.
CHOKER II, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Maine and Mannheim.
Operation MARKET, to seize the vital bridges across the Maas, Waal, and Lower Rhine and establish a corridor through Holland and into Germany for the British Second Army.
OPERATION TALISMAN, in the event of German surrender to seize airfields in the Berlin area to facilitate the establish. spent of a SHAEF force there and the seizure of the German naval base at Kiel.
I refused Operation INFATUATE because of intense flak on Walcheren. difficult terrain which would prevent glider landings, excessive losses likely because of drowning, non-availability of U.S. troops, and the fact that the operation is an improper employment of airborne forces.'
His words.
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@Paravleugel
'for Montgomery to beat Rommel he had to be a genius.' Your words.
As Montgomery beat Rommel at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, and the Mareth Line, that makes him a genius? Auchinleck, who also defeated Rommel was a genius?
'It was Rommel who chased the Allied Forces through the whole of North Africa.' Your words.
Wavell chased the Axis Forces through the whole of North Africa.
Auchinleck chased the Axis Forces through the whole of North Africa.
Rommel 'chased the Allied Forces through the whole of North Africa', outran his supplies, and was manouvered into fighting allied forces with the Mediterranean Sea on his left, and the Qattara Depression on his right.
'Caen and Arnhem were mentioned by me to prove my point that he made lots of mistakes' Your words.
Caen. What sort of mistake was Caen?.. Montgomery undertook to get the Allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 20% fewer than expected casualties, while giving the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad.
Arnhem. Montgomery made mistakes, Eisenhower made mistakes, Brereton made mistakes. So too, did their subordinate commanders.
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ukmediawarrior
'Once ashore Monty had control and had told his superiors Caan would fall on day one. Instead it fell over a month later. Monty, always the one to grasp political victory from the jaws of a military defeat swiftly changed his story to say he had always intended for his forces to hold down the Germans at Caan to let the Americans break out, lol.'
Its a definite no. Montgomery hoped for an early capture of Caen, but gave no firm undertaking as to when it would fall. With the massing of German armour there, the importance of Caen in allied planning quickly faded. The key targets for OVERLORD were principally Cherbourg, and then the other Brittany ports. To that end, Montgomery's aim was to use British Second Army to protect the US First Army while it went after those targets. The massing of German armour at Caen meant that the way to protect US First Army operations was to keep those German forces at Caen, and away from the US First Army. If the Germans had deployed their forces differently, then Montgomery would have changed his planning accordingly.
'It wasn't the British who wanted to attack through Belgium and Holland into the Rhur, it was just Monty's plan that initially Ike refused, but after Monty went off to Churchill and complained political pressure was brought to bear on Ike who changed his mind.'
Its a definite no. The allied plan was always to attack towards the Rhur in the North after OVERLORD. The precise route could only be decided when the allies got to that point. There is zero evidence of Montgomery wasking Churchill to intercede in operational matters. In regard to MARKET GARDEN, before and during that operation, Churchill was travelleing to, attending, and returning from the allied OCTAGON conference in Quebec City, Canada.
'Despite several warning from the Dutch Resistance and the Allied Armies own recon flights that the Germans were a much bigger threat than had been initially assumed, the operation pushed on as no one wanted to tell Monty no.
Its a definite no. At that time all information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground was routinely disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that respect. The only known recce photos German forces in the Arnhem area before MARKET GARDEN, can be seen on-line and are grainy overhead shots of a few tanks of a training unit that had been heavily camouflaged. What was seen by Montgomery, was seen by Eisenhower.
'It wasn't lack of supplies that had damned the operation, it could never have succeeded in the first place.'
The operation came within an ace of complete success. Eisenhower, Churchill, Gavin, Montgomery, and the German commander, Student cited the weather as the main reason that Arnhem was not taken...
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
P174/5
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C. 1993
P199
Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation,
attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained,
there was no doubt that we should have attained full success."
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 586
In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding
independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was,
says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." Gavin, op. cit., p. 120.
¹Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we
should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by
Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
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@solomongrundy4905
Montgomery and Dieppe
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE 1951.
P457
The assault was originally fixed for July 4, and the troops embarked at ports in the Isle of Wight. The weather was unfavourable and the date was postponed till July 8. Four German aircraft made an attack upon the shipping which had been concentrated. The weather continued bad and the troops disembarked. It was now decided to cancel the operation altogether. General Montgomery, who, as Commander-in-Chief of South-Eastern Command, had hitherto supervised the plans, was strongly of opinion that it should not be remounted, as the troops concerned had all been briefed and were now dispersed ashore.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
P487
FIVE DAYS before the Prime Minister and Brooke returned to England, the landing in France for which the un-informed had been clamouring was made at Dieppe. Planned by Lord Louis Mountbatten's Combined Operations Staff, and officially described as a reconnaissance in force, its objectives were the capture of a Channel port, its retention for a day in the face of attack and a successful re-embarkation with data for a full-scale landing later. It had been authorised by the Chiefs of Staff in the spring and fixed originally for July. That it was purely experimental in scale and purpose was due in part to Brooke's restraining hand. When owing to un-favourable weather it had to be postponed, the officer responsible for the military side, Lieutenant-General Montgomery, had recommended that it should be abandoned in view of the security risks in remounting it. But because of American and Russian feelings and the importance of obtaining data for later landings, the Prime Minister had favoured proceeding with the operation—the most important yet undertaken by Combined Operations. To spare the French, the preliminary air bombardment was omitted from the final plan, while General Montgomery, appointed to overseas command, had ceased to have any connection with it.
'“THE PEOPLE WHO PLANNED IT (Dieppe) SHOULD BE SHOT” -W. Churchill, Aug. 1942.' Your words.
Where is this on record?..
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@nickdanger3802
The Germans retrieved a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in an US landing zone, within two hours of the start of the operation.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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Not really…
Montgomery showed his appreciation of logistics at almost every stage of his time of army / army group command: in his build up for Alamein, the chase across North Africa after Alamein, in his skilful handling of allied armies in Normandy and planning his masterclass at the Rhine.
Even at the time of Market Garden, his view of how war should be fought was clear. With both army groups getting 7,000 of supplies each per day, there was enough to continue the advance of 20 divisions. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in late August, Montgomery stated that the thrust in the north, envisaged before D-Day, would leave the allies able to surround the Ruhr and stop German war production. To do this meant stopping 1st Canadian Army and the 3rd US Army to let British 2nd Army and the 3rd US Army advance together. Montgomery went on to state that if Eisenhower was not prepared to do this, then Montgomery would offer to stop Canadian 1st Army and British 2nd Army so that US 1st Army and US 3rd Army could advance into Germany in the less important southern route, provided a decision was taken to properly use the available resources.
Eisenhower did neither, and the entire allied advance ground to a halt. All this after Montgomery had inflicted a defeat on the Germans in Normandy as big a Stalingrad and with the Germans having fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the Western Front than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space.
Stopping the whole of 21st Army Group to clear the Scheldt would have changed nothing. There was still 100 miles of estuary banks to clear, the Germans were still in strength in the Breskens Pocket and the heavy fortifications at the mouth of the Scheldt were still intact. Further, the mine clearance in November took three weeks, and it would also have taken three weeks in September.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan and cleared France in less than 90 days. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander with no plan and went nowhere in the following 90 days.
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@michaelcampbell7494
'Many thought that the German army was capable of another offensive before the battle of the bulge. Obviously that was also wrong.' Your words.
But surely the Bulge was an attempt at a major offensive, was it not? If so, why would the many thought that the German army was capable of another offensive have been wrong?
'The Allies had every advantage and didn't need to take the risk of Market Garden.' Your words.
From Britain's point of view the attempt to hinder V2 rocket attacks on London, alone justify MARKET GARDEN...Or perhaps you think that British civilian lives were of no consequence?..
'That operation needlessly cost the lives of thousands of Allied troops.' Your words.
See above.
Over by Christmas? Famous last words expression also from 1914.' Your words.
what else had you mentioned as coming from 1914?
'The largest condemnation of Monty was the complete failure of Market Garden.'
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@johnpeate4544
From Para Dave / Big Woody:
‘♦One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all’
Para Dave.
Montgomery was at his tactical HQ at Hechtel 10 miles from the start line for MARKET GARDEN. At the end of operation he was at Eindhoven.
♦Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare’ Para Dave.
‘♦The V-2s were still being launched’ Para Dave.
But at a reduced rate, with almost any reduction justifying the staging of MARKET GARDEN.
‘♦The massive deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for suppliesfor an operation that size’ Para Dave.
Its definite no. MARKET GARDEN could be mounted with the existing allied supply numbers. That is why Eisenhower authorized the deferment of the Scheldt clearance while MARKET GARDEN took place.
‘♦Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.’ Para Dave.
Err no. MARKET GARDEN casualties occurred in Parachute units, airlanding units, air force units and ground forces.
‘♦The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation,exposure and disease.’ Para Dave.
German reprisals against the people in the German occupied part of the Netherlands for Dutch support for MARKET GARDEN ended long before the winter set in. MARKET GARDEN Freed far more Dutch people than died in the hunger winter.
‘♦And all of the Netherlands live stock was sent/driven to the Reich as the Wehrmacht fell back. The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the Germans for assisting the allies.’ Para Dave.
German reprisals against the people in the German occupied part of the Netherlands for Dutch support for MARKET GARDEN ended long before the winter set in.
‘♦Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as Montgomery boasted’ Para Dave.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48-49
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
‘♦Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army’ Para Dave.
Err…no. The allies would have to wait six more months to cross the Rhine, thanks to Eisenhower’s policies.
‘♦400,000 Dutchmen - thu out the War were sent to work as slave laborers for the Reich in defense industry or on bunker/tunnel projects’. Para Dave.
A figure that was doubtless not made larger when MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Dutch population.
‘♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later *"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success’. Para Dave.
Berhardt was a former member of the SS who was rightly shown the door by both British and American intelligence. Later, only his royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
Its Christmas Day on Sunday week. Perhaps Santa will bring Para Dave some vouchers for him to spend on time lying on a psychoanalyst’s couch.
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@seth1422
1) Don’t give us that crap. I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands. It is at Vaals in Limburg – ‘Drielandenpunt’ – where the borders of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium meet. Even that is only a thousand feet.
The Groesbeek heights are about a third of the height of ‘Drielandenpunt’ and are six miles from the Nijmegen Bridge I have also been in at the Groesbeek heights, as was my farther, in his case in the Winter of 1944-45. Many years later we discussed the point about Groesbeek and its proximity (or lack of) to Nijmegen. The high ground north of Arnhem is as high as Groesbeek and is nearer to Arnhem Bridge. Yet 1st Airborne sent troops to Arnhem Bridge on the first day. Gavin did not do likewise in regard to Nijmegen.
2) Changes nothing. Gavin failed to act against Nijmegen Bridge on the first day.
3) The evidence shows that, as anyone would expect, senior officers met, but the last word on airborne matters was down the airborne commanders.
4) Nope. He wanted agreement. The last word was his – as can be judged by what actually happened, in drop zones and in the number of lifts on the first day.
5) But battle by battle Montgomery showed his way was superior.
‘Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
‘Montgomery was not my immediate Commander, but he always kept in such close touch with the battle that he knew when and where ‘the shoe pinched’. He then went down to see the Commander on the spot – in this case, me – and listened to what he had to say. He then made up his mind immediately. As he drove away I knew that he had probably already forgotten about Bremen and would already be considering the next problem.
That was what made him such a superb battle commander.’
Sir Brian Horrocks.
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled. He well understood the personal equation of the British soldier, and the morale of his remained high, in spite of frustrations and losses that could easily have shaken troops under a commander in whom they did not place their implicit trust.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
Notice how I quote people who were actually there. Unlike the prick Big Woody who quotes just about anyone who writes sonething likes and that he can find on Wikipedia.
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John Cornell
'Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ' Fondly quoted by Big Woody.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
His words.
Oh, and while I am about it, from the same source:
P419
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland. '
His words.
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@michaelkenny8540
But again (yet again), Para Dave (bigwoody) is mistaken. The Red Ball Express was a supply route for US. British, and Canadian forces had their own supply routes and supply organizations, with the 3-ton, 4x4 lorry as the principal vehicle type. There was a brief period when US Army helped with the Red Lion supply which delivered 500 tons of supplies per day to 21st Army Group. Three British transport companies, delivered suupplies to US forces between 6th August and the 4th September 1944.
US 6th Army Group supplies were seperate from 21st Army Group, and 12th Army Group.
Its all on record if Para Dave would bother to check, with the best accounts being in the official British histories of the war (of course). Even the US official histories would be good enough for this.
Le Havre was liberated by British and Canadian forces, and then immediately given over for the US forces to use. No doubt a Hollywood film will be made, in which Le Havre will be liberated by US forces led by Brad Pitt, Tom Hanks, and so on.
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'Political calculations and pressure came into play as well. By late summer, 1944, Hitler's V-1 and V-2 rockets were raining down on targets in Europe and the U.K. There was intense political pressure from the British public upon PM Churchill to do something to end the missile attacks. Overrun the launching sites, for example, many of which were in Dutch territory along the North Sea and in the Ruhr industrial heartland. This pressure was probably also brought to bear upon Ike by President Roosevelt and his advisors as well, indirectly if not directly.'
V2s were a very real threat to British people.
'History has shown that trying to slog into Germany through the Scheldt Estuary was a costly blunder. General George Patton, had he been allocated the gasoline and supplies he had requested, which instead went to Monty's fatal gamble, 3rd Army could have punched across the Rhine months ahead of schedule and into heartland Germany.'
But no fuel or supplies were taken away from Patton for Market Garden.
'That's all speculation now, but it is hard to envision Patton doing as poorly as Monty or conceiving a plan so badly flawed as his.'
Who can say? Patton was never senior enough to be involved in such a decision.
'The British had many great and able senior officers, but Monty himself was vastly overrated.'
Montgomery perfomed with distiction as a single division commander in trying circumstances in France in 1940. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa and Sicily. As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
Unlike Eisenhower, Bradley and Devers, Montgomery had personal combat experience - in the First World war. He was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO.
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@lufasumafalu5069
'and you are not there' Your words.
As you so rightly state, I am 'not there'.
'and never intetviewd vets from both sides.' Your words.
You are right there. I have spoken to two people who at Arnhem, both were of whom were British. Spoken to, not interviewed. I ain't met any Germans that were there.
You have intervied who, about this subject? As I thought, nobody.
Like me, you are reliant upon what other people have written about this subject.
Cornelius Ryan was in France at the time of MARKET GARDEN, but was not at Arnhem. Therefore, any opinions he expressed, if he did so, on the fighting at Arnhem are next to worthless. As far as passing judgement on fighting in Arnhem was concerned, you were either there, or or you were not.
Anyone can trot out the statistics, dates, contemporary documents etc. But all of that has long since been done.
'go home kid , try to read some history books instead of playing call of duty'
To be able to call me kid you would need to 70 years of age or older. Are you of that age?..
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Yes wimbardi laksono, the Royal Navy performed with distinction throughout the Second World War. British sea power, and the expertise and courage of its men blunted German land victories in Norway, France and Greece by extricating large numbers of troops from those places. The Royal Navy defeated the German surface fleet, almost all of its sub-surface fleet, with 67% of all U-Boats destroyed being accounted for by British forces. It accounted for the Italian Navy, the neutering of the French fleet, and for keeping the Japanese fleet from the western part of the Indian Ocean. Britain supplied the bulk of the naval and merchant shipping for TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD, and so on. Even after all this, Britain was still able to put together the British Pacific Fleet. A marvellous effort.
And all this, from a nation of just 46 million, a bit more if you rope in the contribution of the Commonwealth and Empire. From a nation that, in addition to the above, had to escort the shipping for its substantial import needs. The nation that, more than any other, had stuck to international naval treaties, and then had to cope with the consequences as so often, ship for ship, it was up against more modern and more powerful adversaries. A marvellous effort.
A few points of detail:
The loss of the PRINCE OF WALES, and REPULSE took place in the South China Sea, not the Pacific Ocean. The losses took place three days after the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOUR. The idea that lessons from the PEARL HARBOUR attack could be absorbed in three days is absurd. In any case Pearl Harbour was an attack on ships in a sheltered anchorage. The attack on PRINCE OF WALES, and REPULSE to ok place at sea. If anyone should have been learning lessons, it should have the US Navy from the marvellous Royal Navy attack on the Italian Navy at TARANTO. Battleships sunk in a safe anchorage. The Japanese did, as TARANTO led to PEARL HARBOUR.
At the time of the BATTLE OF MIDWAY (June 1942), Britain had the carriers ARGUS, EAGLE, FORMIDABLE, FURIOUS, ILLUSTRIOUS, INDOMITABLE, and VICTORIOUS available. A marvellous effort after nearly three years of war.
As for US in the Pacific…it was sledgehammers to crack walnuts.
Guam (30 miles x 8 miles), 60,000 US troops v 23,000 Japanese troops.
Saipan (14miles x 7 miles), 71,000 US troops v 32,000 Japanese troops.
Iwo Jima (5miles x 4 miles), 110,000 US troops v 21,000 Japanese troops.
Etc, etc.
What is the fuss all about?
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@davemac1197
This from Horrocks on whether clearing the Scheldt shold have taken place before MARKET GARDEN:
'Was Monty correct in, carrying out the Arnhem operation, which meant advancing sixty to seventy miles into Holland ? Would it not have been better if, after Brussels, 21st Army Group had turned north-west and cleared both sides of the Scheldt estuary to open the port of Antwerp which could then have been developed into a main base area, thus curing many administrative headaches.
I can only give you the opinion of a corps commander who was on the spot and has since made a study of the problem. Had he adopted this course, as many critics think he should have done, the port of Antwerp would certainly have been open to Allied shipping earlier than it was. But how much earlier it is not easy to say, because the campaign to clear the Scheldt estuary would certainly have been difficult.
The ground could be flooded at will by the Germans, while Walcheren could not be captured until it was flooded. Large German forces would have been cornered south of Breskens and could have put up a stubborn resistance in this difficult country where it was almost impossible to deploy large numbers of our troops. If we had devoted all our resources to clearing Antwerp in September it would have been impossible later on to carry out the swift advance up to the lower Rhine at Arnhem, because by then the German defences would have been given time to solidify. We were able to make this deep penetration only because General Student's Parachute Army was still moving down from Germany.
In my opinion Monty was right. We had advanced rapidly up the coastal plain while the Germans were still disorganised. His eyes were focused on the big prize to bounce a crossing over the Rhine and cut off the industrial heart of Germany, thus finishing the war in 1944. While there was still any chance of this succeeding he would have been wrong to deflect his resources to a subsidiary task.
The clearance of the Scheldt estuary would certainly have eased the administrative situation, but would it have shortened the war by even one day? On the information available, Arnhem was a justifiable gamble.'
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Wall to rubbish.
The only political pressure on Eisenhower came from the US :
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 261
‘Under relentless pressure on Eisenhower from George Marshall and others in Washington to get those airborne divisions into the fight, the plan had been slapped together in less than a week. The First Allied Airborne Army, also created at War Department insistence, and the corps headquarters that preceded it had drafted and discarded eighteen operational plans in the past forty days.’
Montgomery wanted to keep the war moving , preferably in the North, where the Ruhr is. Failing that, Montgomery offered to halt 21st Army Group and allow Bradley to advance further south provided that a decision to move forward somewhere was made. Hardly and act of self interest, was it?
Your comparison with Galipoli is absurd.
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'The drops began landing at ~12:30 that day.
It was not until ~15:30 nearly three hours later that Major Gough's men formed up and departed for Arnhem. Unfortunately, by this time, the Germans had established defensive positions that allowed them to repulse the Jeep mounted forces. The consequence being, nobody was getting to Arnhem, except on foot. This was a CRITICAL failure!'
But according this bloke Middlebrook, glider landings (LZ-S, and LZ-Z) took place between 13.00 and 13.40, and parachute landings (DZ-X) took place between 13.50 and 14.08.
That could truncate the time to unload Jeeps, for troops to muster and for the force to set off for Arnhem down to 52 minutes. If Middlebrook is correct, to layman such as me, it does not seem to be that unreasonable. But of course, I have not taken part in an airborne landing at brigade scale in wartime. Doubtless, Antony Beevor has such experience...
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@ToolTimeTabor
If Gough's squadron was to avoid the German Battalion Krafft, it seems it would have to have left the landing grounds at about 1.30pm. But the parachute troops (Among them, Gough's men?), did not start to land until 1.50pm.
As to why Gough's troops landed by parachute... Perhaps it was as Antony bloody Beevor's dubious claim that those troops landed by parachute as a matter of pride. Matin Middlebrook merely notes that those troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the airborne landings in Sicily.
Beevor did not put his claim into print until 2018.
Middlebrook's work was described by the Arnhem Fellowship as (And I quote):
'Probably the best general history ever of the battle. Written for the 50th anniversary and the author was able to speak with around 500 veterans.'
I know who’s version I would trust out of Beevor and Middlebrook. What say you?
Gough’s men were 35 minutes behind schedule for their departure to Arnhem Bridge. Before attempting to pass judgement on this delay, it would be good to see if information could be found regarding how the gliders carrying the jeeps landed. Based on eye witness testimony, there were problems with some of 1st Airborne glider landings. Colonel Graeme Warrack witnessed one such incident, albeit involving Hamilcar, rather than a Horsa. Middlebrook notes that two of Gough's gliders crash landed. Was time spent helping with these crashes, to free people in the gliders, and the glider cargoes? Perhaps a slightly heavy landing rather than a crash for a glider led to more time being needed to unload the glider. Who knows I don’t.
Was 50 minutes for mustering Gough’s too short a time frame? I have not been in such an undertaking, so I could not possibly know. Perhaps other people on here do know.
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@blastulae
‘I say that because none of Monty’s subordinate generals were any better than, except in personality.’
Your words.
But on what evidence do you base that opinion? On the assumption that you are comparing those American counterparts…
Montgomery had served with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. In trying circumstances, in France in 1940, in command of a single division Montgomery had performed with distinction as he trained his division to the highest pitch of efficiency. His work proved its worth as he led his troops on the famous night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. When so ordered, he brought his division back to Britain almost intact. As a single army commander, in his first major command, he reorganized 8th Army, won against Rommel with inferior numbers at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to end the war in North Africa as a contest at Alamein. For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up Patton’s lunatic plan to land all around the island to shreds and concentrated allied forces in one place, the campaign was over in six weeks. Montgomery finished OVERLORD ahead of schedule (D+78, instead of D+90), with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Montgomery sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine with six divisions suffering just 1,200 casualties, and saved Denmark from Soviet occupation.
Bradley, Eisenhower and Devers did not have a single day of personal combat experience between them. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. Bradley made a mess of his part on D-Day, and fell to pieces in the Ardennes, and then made a meal of encircling the Ruhr. Eisenhower made a mess in North Africa, having to go to Alexander for help. His planning for AVALANCHE and BAYTOWN nearly ended in disaster. When appointed himself as allied land forces commander in September 1944, his schoolboy broad front strategy gave the Germans just what they needed, time and space to reorganise. Devers did little of note with his DRAGOON sideshow and in the remainder of his time in Europe. By the time that any of them got into the fighting, the Germans were totally committed in Russia, and across all fronts the Germans were short of men, equipment and supplies.
Below that: Crerar and Dempsey both fought in the First World War and performed competently as single army commanders. Hodges, Patton and Simpson did have personal combat experience, Gerow and Patch did not. Hodges went to ground at the start of the Ardennes, Patton got passed over for army group command, it seems due to his personal behaviour, and regularly put his personal agenda ahead of the common good.
‘British 11th Armoured Division captured Antwerp on September 4, with its port 90% intact, thanks to the Belgian resistance. Its CO didn’t proceed to clear the estuary, nor did his corps CO order it, nor his army CO nor did Monty. So all were equally inept.’ Your words.
The Scheldt estuary banks were 100 miles long, the Germans were in forces at the Breskens Pocket, and many of the forces that would be needed for an attack on the estuary were not in place, due to the pace the British 2nd Army advance across Belgium and France.
‘Ike had no choice but to put US troops north of the Bulge under Monty’s command, as they were cut off from the other US armies. But the fool attacked from the tip of the Bulge, rather than cutting it off at the base, as Patton urged Bradley to do.’ Your words.
As for who did what in Bulge…
Here is a German view:
Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to
engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’ His words.
And an American view:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
And a modern US take on Montgomery in the Bulge:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
(1hr, 6 minutes, 32 seconds).
‘Everything else you posted supports my point that Gavin was just following Boy’s orders. So again I ask, how is it Jumpin’ Jim’s fault? With his reduced forces, he couldn’t secure the heights, the bridge south of town and seize those across the Waal. Nor did Browning order him to try. Au contraríe, he ordered him to hold the heights first.’ Your words.
Again:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 157
‘Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops. With only so many troops at hand, General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and Maas-Waal-Canal bridges-thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column-then Nijmegen.’
There it is, from the US Army history of the war, Gavin thought that the Groesbeek Heights should be taken before Nijmegen Bridge.
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'monty after demanding market garden failed to show up and direct - getting his picture painted' Big Woody (aka Para Dave)
'By a curious coincidence, both Montgomery and Bradley, the two Allied army group commanders of the Normandy campaign, happened to be sitting that day [01.09.1944] for portraits at their respective headquarters. Bradley near Chartres was being painted by Cathleen Mann, who was married to the Marquess of Queensberry. Meanwhile Montgomery, wearing his trademark outfit of grey polo neck sweater, corduroy trousers and black, double-badged beret, was sitting for the Scottish portraitist James Gunn. His tactical headquarters and caravan were in the park of the Château de Dangu, halfway between Rouen and Paris.'
Source: Antony Beevor.
'and before you pop off i'll pst the link' Para Dave
Any idea what link that would be?... The American schoolboy's book of history? How the USA won the war, the Hollywood way?
'Monty even admitted it was a mistake - after the war of course' Para Dave
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
1958
Published by The World Publishing Company
2231 West 110th Street, Cleveland 2, Ohio
P 267
'I remain MARKET GARDEN S unrepentant advocate.'
Para Dave is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Perhaps he should nip down there and get himself a copy - if they have not sold out.
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@johnlucas8479
Yep, Para Dave uses the name Big Woody as well. Whichever name he uses, its the same stuff: Everything that goes wrong is Montgomery's fault', Carrington (who Para Dave calls Scarrington), was a coward, XXX Corps were cowards, my uncle was a coward, and so on and so on. He gives utter credence to post war writers like Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, some bloke called William Weidner, a Dr Barr, and so on, and so on, rolling out their academic credentials, as if they give some these people some sort of insight into the thoughts of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, and so on. According to Para Dave, this William Weidner has stated that Carentan was a British objective in the Normandy campaign. That is a new one on me.
What do these writers bring to bring to the subject?..Every time they quote decision makers, thy are referring those people's own works, or to interviews with Chester Wilmot, Liddell Hart, etc. Nearly all of the useful statistics they trot out have long since been in the public domain, usually since about five years after the war ended. Even the Ultra Secret has ben in the public domain for not far short of 50 years.
There is another guy, one Rick Atkinson. I have exchanged emails with him, he seems to be a nice person. But what is new in his works?...The number of paper clips used by SHAEF in 1944? The VD rates for troops in liberated Luxembourg?
Evey time a book about MARKET GARDEN is published by these people, its always the definitive account, the final word, or whatever.
I have the Antony Beevor definitive account of MARKET GARDEN, or whatever it is supposed to be, here. What is its big claim? That people in the occupied part of the Netherlands endured privations in the Winter of 1944-45 and through to VE-Day. Yep, a big secret - that only came out as recently as 1945. What a waste, of his time writing this, what a waste of my time to read it, what a waste of the trees used for the paper to print it on. Still, its not all bad...it makes a good door stop.
Lyndon CMP states a lot of things that I agree with. You now state things that I agree with.
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@johnlucas8479
‘I have read all the source you quote from. here an other quote for your records
"The plan agreed between Dempsey and Browning for MARKET was for the American 101st Airborne Division to be dropped to secure the bridges north of Eindhoven;"
Rostron, Peter. The Military Life & Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC: Monty's Army Commander (p. 190).’ Your words.
So what does this add to the understanding of decisions regarding airborne landing at Zon Bridge?
Also, is there a contemporary source to support what the author stated here? Further what are the credentials of Peter Rostron? I would doubt that he would have been there at that time. From his photograph, he looks to be a lot younger than me. Who can say?
‘As to your comment relating to Brereton and the 2 lifts, you know my position and the sources I used to support my position, especially the reference to the weather. Both the source you mention in your comments makes no reference to the weather conditions on the day or the fact that Williams was responsible for both Operation Dragoon and Operation Market Garden as well as D-Day and Operation Husky. He was the most experience airman with regards to airborne operation. Ask you self this question: "If Williams plan for 2 lifts on D-Day for Operation Dragoon, why did he only plan for a single lift for Market Garden? Clearly, he had a very good reasons behind his decision. One factor was the weather, morning fog as reported by 21st Army Group.’ Your words.
Not really… What I consider to be reliable sources, have stated the opinion that the lack of two air-lifts on the first day of MARKET GARDEN was a contributory factor in the Arnhem not being taken, and that Brereton was ultimately responsible the lack of two lifts on that first day. For me, it is a reasonable assumption, that any such opinion would not have been stated if two lifts were not doable.
‘You blame the American for running down the British War effort, yet you are quick happy to rundown the US effort at every chance possible. Are you any different?’ Your words.
I note what I consider to be pertinent facts and reliable testimony. If people consider that as running down the US war effort, so be it. Whatever, there are so few of us trying to fight back against a tsunami of American chauvinistic books, films, TV programmes, press articles, lectures, social media items, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on. It all seems to have he same message - We are America, we are better than you.
‘You known my position regarding Market Garden, which is "The Operation was high risk, but the potential benefit if successful was worth the risk of Failure." In hindsight should the operation have been cancelled due to the issues with the air plan, you can argue both ways.’ Your words.
I have previously agreed with the opinion that in the circumstances at the time, MARKET GARDEN was a worthwhile undertaking.
‘You quote Brereton refusal to permit an airborne drop on Walcheren Island. If you thing about it, It a relative small island and heavy fortified, we don't know what support was to be provided to the air drop. Would it be another Arnhem with the airborne force effectively destroyed before relief arrived. Who knows. All you need to read the accounts covering the attack on Walcheren Island to realise dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea.’ Your words.
Opinions after the event are two a penny. What accounts from people that were there apart from Brereton, make clear that ‘dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea?’
My father took part in the assault on Walcheren, an event he considered to be more scary than his landing on D-Day. We never discussed this particular point, but I can only think that he would have considered the help to the amphibious landings from an airborne landing could have been very helpful.
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Wall to wall rubbish.
The basis for Montgomery proposal to concentrate allied resources into a single thrust into Germany was based on:
An assessment of the state of the German armed forces at that time, which showed, amongst other things, that the Germans had fewer artillery pieces and tanks north of the Ardennes than Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk, and that therefore, the time to strike into Germany was right then, and that the place to hit the Germans was in the Ruhr.
With the allied armies together, getting 14,000 tons of supplies per-day, the right way forward was for the Canadian 1st Army, and the US 3rd army to be stopped and the available supplies to be concentrated on British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army. To hit the Germans while they were on the floor, and to end German war production capability by capturing the Ruhr.
Based on the available evidence, the idea that Montgomery proposed that the advance be carried forward under his command for reasons of national prestige is a nonsense. When Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery proposed the above noted strategy, but went on to state that failing that, Eisenhower should halt Montgomery’s armies and advance in the South with Bradley’s armies.
The evidence is clear, it was the USA that bought politics in to military decision making.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954.
P520
[at the meeting on the 23rd August] "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON. 1959.
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
The press conference on 15 August 1944. Where is that on record?
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@johnlucas8479
'Your statement "The Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North." when did they say they agreed?'
No, I typed typed that the Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North. My words, my opinion, based on this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
This is in full, what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine""
Surely you do not think that I meant every single German, do you?..
There might be Germans who took a different view.
If so, it would be good to see those views.
As for General Carver... I would be interested to know if his words were words were written at the time, or were they words based on hindsight?
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@johnlucas8479
More than the stuff about who did what at Nijmegen, Browning, Brereton, and so on, there can never be conclusive proof about what should have been done after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy
As previously noted, the German opinion that I have seen, is that the allies should have concentrated resources on a single thrust towards Germany at that time, in the North. Given what the allies knew about the state of enemy, its forces in the West, and the German crisis on the Eastern Front, the reluctance of Eisenhower to concentrate the available allied resources is hard to account for.
The state of allied logistics at that time, with the allied forces getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day, would have allowed 20 allied divisions, each with up to 500 tons of supplies per day to continue the allied advance with the remaining forces held back from such an advance until such time as material circumstances changed.
Events in the latter part of 1944 seem to have happened broadly as Montgomery and Alanbrooke had warned about, with the allies not being strong enough anywhere to force a breakthrough into Germany. The upshot being that the Germans were given what they most needed: time and space to rebuild, and re-equip existing forces, and to create new forces in order counter attack in the West. Perhaps there was a direct line from the US casualties in the Bulge to Eisenhower’s decision making in the previous Summer, who can say?
Politics and the War in France in 1944.
As far as I can see, Eisenhower should have been planning for the post Normandy campaign by having a clear view on where the allies should advance and by making decisions to keep the Germans off balance, as (as Montgomery had in Normandy), and being able to direct allied resources to where they were most needed.
Eisenhower seems to have put non-military factors ahead of military considerations far too often, particularly after he decided to take over as allied land forces commander from the 1st September 1944. Perhaps, by that time, as the US was increasing established on the continent, they were done with the allied alliance?
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pages 262-263
‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’
‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’
…
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
Arnhem.
Arnhem seems to be almost a red herring in regard to the matter of the broad front versus a narrow(er) front. MARKET GARDEN was a limited undertaking by comparison to Montgomery’s proposals as to how the war should be carried forward, and was undertaken after Eisenhower had spurned the chance to opt for a thrust into Germany when the German forces were at their lowest ebb. The evidence that I have seen is clear in regard to the intended scope of MARKET GARDEN:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that
‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
Montgomery sought personal glory?
There seems to be little evidence to support the (mainly American) view that Montgomery proposed a consolidation of allied resources into a narrower thrust towards Germany in the Summer of 1944, in order to gain personal glory. On the contrary, when Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery stated (these not his exact words), that the allies should advance in the North because that was where the most vital parts of German industry were located. He also stated that he would agree to stop 21st Army Group to allow 12th Army Group to advance in the South, provided that a decision was made to narrow the allied advance to a realistic size. Further, after this time, Montgomery continued to advocate the appointment of a separate land forces commander after Eisenhower had taken that role for himself, to the point that he would accept Bradley being appointed land forces commander, provided that such decision was made.
In conclusion, if conclusions can be reached.
From the point that Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander, the war in North West Europe, with his ‘broad front’ strategy the war continued for another eight months. What the (Western) allied casualties were in that period, I do not know. Whether a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have ended the war sooner, cannot proved. However, based on the evidence that I have seen regarding the situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, in my opinion, a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have been the best strategy for the allies to adopt at that point.
Footnote.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pages 436-437
On page 372 of Eisenhower's " Crusade in Europe " he refers to a conversation which took place between us on the day this diary-entry was written. I feel certain that he did not write down at once the statement which he attributes to me, and I can only assume that, when he came to write it, he did not remember clearly what I had said. According to him, when we stood together on the bank of the Rhine on March 25th, I said to him :—" Thank God, Ike, you stuck by your plan. You were completely right, and I am sorry if my fear of dispersed effort added to your burdens. The German is now licked. It is merely a question of when he chooses to quit.
Thank God, you stuck by your guns." When this statement is considered in connection with what I wrote in my diary that evening, it will be clear that I was misquoted. To the best of my memory I congratulated him heartily on his success and said that, as matters had turned out, his policy was now the correct one; that, with the German in his defeated condition, no dangers now existed in a dispersal of effort. I am quite certain that I never said to him, " You were completely right," as I am still convinced that he was " completely wrong."
I am convinced that Alanbrooke was correct in his memory, regarding this matter.
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@johnlucas8479
The matter of Berlin was noted by me only in regard to the goals for MARKET GARDEN. Montgomery, Eisenhower, and Tedder noted that MARKET GARDEN was only intended to get the allies across the Rhine. You pointed out the the 21st Army Group report on MARKET GARDEN noted that the ultimate goal of that undertaking was the Ijsselmeer (incorrectly noted as the Zuider Zee in that report)
That Montgomery was looking for the Western allies to eventually get to Berlin before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN is not in dispute. My guess is that on the 18th September, Montgomey belived that MARKET GARDEN would succeed - giving the allies a bridgehead across the Rhine, and sealing off the Western part of the Netherlands. Thereafter, a new plan would take advantange of the gains made by MARKET GARDEN and look to take the allies to the Ruhr, and beyond - to Berlin. Depending on the situation that presented itself at the end of MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery would have proposed that the allies push on into Germany, or possibly pause, while the Scheldt was cleared. Or possibly both. A wholly successful MARKET GARDEN might have given that degree of choice. Who can say?
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@johnlucas8479
That Berlin was in Montgomery's thinking before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN, and later in the war is not in dispute.
I merely pointed out that it was not a stated goal for MARKET GARDEN. The goals for which seemed to be get the allies across the Rhine, as stated by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Tedder. Also, according the 21st Army Group MARKET GARDEN report, the untimate goal was the Ijsselmeer (noted as the Zuider Zee in that report) - as previously pointed to me by you. Hence, my opinion that MARKET GARDEN has not much to do with the main Broad Front v Narrower Front stuff.
My opinion is that with MARKET GARDEN reaching the Ijsselmeer, and the Rhine, there would have been further discussion, based on the situation after MARKET GARDEN regarding the position of allied forces, and the evolving supply situation. Who can say?
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started . Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During Market Garden, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, wat at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
What do people expect? That Montgomery drive up to Nijmegen in the lead tank?
Bradley was not in the front at Aachen or Metz.
Of course, unlike Bradley and Eisenhower, Montgomery had personal combat experience. He fought in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
As for Montgomery's personal courage...
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained. Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently. Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized.'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
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@gerhardris
'yes, like I said Monty had the important talent to get lots more stuff than other generals. Which too is an important asset.'
How so?
Where was this apparent in France, and in Britain in 1940?
By the time that Montgomery arrived in North Africa, the flow of resources from Britain was already in hand, while Auchinleck was in command of 8th Army.
For Italy, he was given scant resources for BAYTOWN, and SWITCHBACK.
He held out for more resources for OVERLORD, and got some, not all of them, by making a thoroughly professional plan for the OVERLORD campaign.
'Monty wasn't a good chess player or good at quickly grabbing out of the box opportunities when these presented themselves.'
Based on what happened with Alam el Halfa, Alamein,and OVERLORD, Montgomery would seem that Montgomery proved himself to be an excellent chess player, as on each occasion, he made the enemy fight the battle he wanted them to fight.
As for grasping opportnities...
Who did so in the allied high command?
'Proof: botching Antwerp/ Schelde aan botching Market Garden. Both formally fully on his plate.'
By the time of Antwerp/ Schelde and MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower had appointed himself to be allied land-forces commander, instead of Montgomery. The buck stopped there.
In any case, how was Antwerp and the Scheldt botched?..
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@lauriepocock3066
This from 9th September 1944:
'VCIGS, General Nye, [in the absence of Alanbrooke]
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
The V1 flying bomb, and the V2 rocket came from the same German specification issued to the German Army, and the German Air Force: The ability of a pilotless aircraft to deliver a one ton warhead on London.
The German Army developed the V2, the German Air Force developed the V1.
This is what Albert Speer, head of the German armaments production had to say on the matter of the German atom bomb.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJCF-Ufapu8&ab_channel=SergioIQ
3hrs, 15 mins, 54 seconds onwards.
As a layman, the opinions of Bradley and Eisenhower on Montgomery make little impression on me. Those two US commanders had little in the way of military accomplishments to their name. Neither of them even had any any personal combat experience, Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943.
MARKET GARDEN seems to have conformed to Eisenhower's misguided broad front strategy. It was actually a limited undertaking that took no supplies away from Bradley - his armies carried on with their activities throught the MARKET GARDEN undertaking. The only additional forces involved were parts of the FAAA.
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@Joseph-lj4sp
'One thing you kinda glossed over with Normandy stuff is that before D-Day there was correspondence between him Ike and Churchill that make it seem like at least the latter two were under the impression that Caen was supposed to fall in a couple days.'
What correspondence? I have never seen it.
The undertaking that Montgomery gave for Normandy was for the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
As regards Caen. This, from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders on the 15th May, 1944, at St Paul's school, West London:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen .'
On Montgomery's strategy for Normandy:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From US General Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
From US General Dwight D Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe.
And Alanbrooke to Montgomery, 28/07/23:
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
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@wintersking4290
But how big a failure was it?..
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at AACHEN (20,000 casualties), METZ (45,000 casualties), and the HURTGEN FOREST (55,000 casualties).
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@rob5944
'produce the post where I bad mouthed cancer suffers' Big Woody.
OK:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1dz3pqbRaw&lc=z22nynu4atrhwxlnjacdp4325nlpx1skqtxs4nq3whdw03c010c.1525899193752468&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
Big Woody 3 years ago (edited)
‘From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este
After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assesesed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily"said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt .Grudging admiration of Patton was even expressed by Adolf Hitler,who referred to him as "that crazy cowboy General"’
Big Woody 3 years ago
'Trevor Dupay numbers weren't close to the US Army archives - the guy had 5 wives and committed suicide,doesn't sound real solid unfortunately,
TheViila Aston 3 years ago
‘As for this bloke Dupuy, it seems that he actually served in the war and during his life was a professor at Harvard University. He wrote or co-wrote 50 books. Why would he make this sort of stuff up?
Regarding his suicide, this is what I found: ‘Dupuy committed suicide by gunshot at his home in Vienna, Virginia on June 5, 1995; he had learned three weeks earlier that he had terminal pancreatic cancer.’ Judge him how you will, I won’t.’
Big Woody 3 years ago
‘My mother in law died of pancreatic cancer and so did a co-worker,i probably should have sought their views on the subject then.'
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Rubbish.
Whether or not the Germans were actually interested Persian oil in neither here nor there. The allies could not afford the possibility of that happening, nor could they afford the possibilty of a link up of the East and West members of the Axis.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
CHAPTER 2. GLOBAL WAR
P32
The prospect of the two industrial empires of Japan and Germany drawing freely upon the vast resources of rubber, oil, and the other riches of the Netherlands Indies was too black a picture to contemplate. The Middle East, of course, had to be held; if it should fall and the German U-boats were able to proceed through the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, it was doubtful that India could be saved. Moreover, Middle East oil was a great prize.
The Mediterranean campaign also prevented the Germans from being able import resources from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up one million tons of allied shipping. It led to 50 German divisions being tied down in Italy and the Balkans.
Any attempt to invade France before 1944 would have led to disaster without giving any assistance to the USSR.
Imports from the USA amounted to 16.5% of Britain's needs across the war years.
5.5% bought, paid for and collected. 11% Lend-Lease, mainly collected, and reconciled at the end of the war.
All clear now?
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@mgt2010fla
'Lie! Lie! Lie! Patton went to Brittany then east and north and still beat Monty, the Ground Commander, to close the Gap! Monty went due north and Patton went across north and east in France to the German border! You are a fuking liar! Read Max Hastings, the Cambridge Don, and he tells the truth! Ambrose, Atkinson, et al all back it up! '
Your words.
This is what the US General Bradley had to say on the 'Gap':
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
'"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise"'.
His words.
Where did Hastings, Ambrose and Atkinson serve in the Second World War?..
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@mgt2010fla
'Cambridge, Oxford, same thing to me! '
I thought it might be.
'I was pointing out that he is one of the best historians, anywhere, on the battles in the ETO!'
But Eisenhower, Bradley, DeGuingand, Montgomery and others who were there have all written accounts. Chester Wilmot who was also there has writen what is possibly the definative account of the campaign in Western Europe. The Enigma secrets, which only slightly modified the story of events came out in the mid-1970s. What does Histings bring to the party that is new?
'the British would not have won the war vs Germany without the US!'
No one would have won without Britain hlding out in 1940. Not Russia they would have been attacked earlier. Not the USA - how would they have got there?
'Because they protect minors in the US so I've never seen his name, but, he would at least 85 years old by now.'
But Europe does things differently, so, to an extent does Britain. How would such a story have been kept under wraps. Dont guees - find an answer.
'Monty didn't open any of the Channel ports heading northwest, and, was almost canned for running his mouth! ' He opened up Dieppe, Le Havre and Boulogne.
'His aide Freddie de Guingand saved Monty from being sent home in disgrace.'
Hardly in disgrace - he would have got a hero's welcome for telling the US.
''Monty apologized to Eisenhower and after that Monty was given the job of guarding Bradley's flank and securing the Danish border to keep the Russians out!'
While the USA helped itself to everything in the Ruhr that was not nailed down.
'While Monty was preparing another set piece battle to jump the Rhine, Bradley, with Courtney and Patton, beat Monty over the river! '
Read this:
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower.
MUST DO BETTER...
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@dougdenhamlouie
OK. So you made it up Montgomery being threatened with the sack.
As for the rest...your words in 'single quotes '.
'The only thing you did well was the merlin engine and the 17lb antitank gun.'
Who can say? Perhaps also the Spitfire, the Wellington, the Mosquito, the Lancaster, the Meteor. Perhaps, also the Churchil tank, the Universal Carrier, the Cromwell tank, the Comet tank, the six pounder gun, the 25 pounder gun. Perhaps also the armoured aircraft carriers, the Hunt class escorts, the Tribal class destroyers. Perhaps also, the Cavity Magnatron, the proximity fuse, the world's first electronic computer.
Who can say...
'When we took over Britain was on the ropes leaving everything you had in France.'
The USA never took over. Recovery was swift in regard what was left in France. By the end of August 1940, we were able to send 250 tanks to the Middle East. By early 1941, we had two million fully armed men in Britain...It was not likey they show it in Hollywood films.
'From Dec 7 1941 we cranked up our industry and sent ya our rejects.'
Yea, having bled Britain and France white. Meanwhile, on its own, Britain out-produced Germany.
'The early Sherman tommy cookers we sent you had the rotary B17 engines. Your tankers loved them compared to every one of your shitty tanks.'
Err...fraid not. My father was in a tank division that used both Churchill and Sherman tanks. The first thing that anyone sent to the Shermans did was to write their last will and tetament.
'We did not like em. Even the Grant was a big hit. So we sent em to you.'
And why not? The USA had no use for them, they were not doing any fighting.
'My dad flew with the 15th 333 and liked flying the spitfire Mk V and IX until he got the P51.'
And he then liked the Spitfire even better.
'So when my dad was in England...did he fuck your slutty Grandmother. Is that the deal?'
Both of my grandmothers were in the 50s during the war, and neither lived the West of England, were the US Army wasted space. Doubtless, a few slags went with Americans, its the same in every country. Word is, the American level of performace was like that of their tanks, very disappointing. Still, as anyone Briton who has visited the USA can testify, American birds are easy. As soon as they hear that British accent, they are soaking wet. Even easier, were the US farming girls who came over every year on the US 4H scheme. We all used to make a diary note of their arrival date. Perhaps your wife was one of them?
'Want to know my revenge?'
Nope, I could'nt care less.
'I'm going to shoot a feral hog tonight with a thermal sighted AR15 6.5mm I built last week.'
What sort of revenge is that?
'I'm betting you can't even own a .22.'
I hope not. We have just about the lowest gun crime rate of any major country, because we have the strictest gun ownership laws. I wish they were stricter. Even our police are unarmed. This pandemic has cost a lot of American lives. But think how many have been saved with the US schools beimng closed. None of those weekly campus mass shootings...
0/10 for competence.
10/10 for giving me a good laugh.
Got any more pearl's of wisdom?
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Eisenhower
'In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.'
US General Bradley
`You see from the very start when I was under the command of the Marshal I got clear and definite orders what I had to do. From Bradley and my own people I never get any orders that make it clear to me what I have got to do.
US General Simpson
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.
The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. There has been much talk of using Montgomery to 'tidy up in the 'bulge' we would have done the same thing"
German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin.
Fancy some more?..
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@Answer Questions
-Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched.
-The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
-The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden.
-The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place.
-The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place.
-Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden.
-The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower.
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@Answer Questions
'Monty did crap in the ardennes puhleeeze,What he won he won in NA with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.'
Montgomery's actions in the Ardennes drew this comment from Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Winning with 'overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support' applied to every single US vicory in Europe. Which ones do Americans want?
'Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.'
What a load of rubbish.
'he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.'
Who cares?
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@angloaust1575
The only source for the lunatic story that Montgomery was detained by US troops is 'Killing Patton' by some hack authors called Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard.
Montgomery's only visit to the Bulge battle area is well documented . He travelled from his headquarters in Zonhoven in Belgium to Hodges's headquaters at Chaudfontaine in Belgium on the 20th December 1944. A distance of of approximately 45 miles. He arrived at Hodges's headquaters at 1pm, stayed for three hours and then returned to Zonhoven and there exchanged cable messages with Eisenhower.
Montgomery's activities in his visit to the First Army HQ are well known.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 448
‘At 12.52 p.m., a SCHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshall Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Twelfth Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army.
P449
‘Having been alerted to the impending command change at 2:30 Wednesday morning, he dispatched a major to Chaudfontaine for a “bedside conference” with Hodges who was roused from his sleep to learn that four British divisions were moving towards the Meuse to secure he riverbanks and bridges. Roadblocks also had been built on the Brussels highway with vehicles and carts.
‘The field marshal himself arrived at Chaudfontaine at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday in a green Rolls-Royce flying a Union Jack and five-star pennant from the front fenders, accompanied by outrider jeeps with red-capped MPS. As usual he was dressed without orthodoxy in fur-lined boots, baggy corduroy trousers and as many as eight pullovers. “Unwrapping the bearskin in which he was enveloped,” Iris Carpenter reported, “he picked up his box of Sandwiches, his thermos jug of tea and his situation map chalked over with his grease pencil, and marched inside.’
‘Politely declining Hodges’s offer of lunch—“Oh, no, I’ve got my own” — he propped his map on a chair and said calmly “ Now let’s review this situation…The first thing we must do is to tidy up the battlefield.”’
‘Three hours later they had both a plan and an understanding. Hodges and his staff appeared tired and dispirited, British officers later reported, but determined to hold fast.’
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Krackerman
Britain out of the war in 1940 tied down a million German troops, two thirds of the German air force, forced the Germans into their submarine building programme, stopped the Germans from being able to trade outside of mainland Europe, and by intervening in the Balkans, helped to cause a fatal five week delay to the start of Barbarossa. The Royal Navy dealt with the German, Italian, and French fleets, and it accounted for three quarters of the 785 German and Italian submarines destroyed during the war.
The RAF destroyed German superiority in the air war with victory in the Battle of Britain. Never again would Germany be as strong in real terms in relation to its tasks and its enemies as it had been in the early summer of 1940. From then on its personnel and equipment decreased in quality and numbers.. Germany attacked Russia in 1941 with just 2,400 aircraft, and from 1940 until 1944 , its only new major combat aircraft was the fw-190. Half of the German fighter aces fro the entire war fought in the Battle of Britain.
Bletchley Park took on initial work by Polish codebreakers and created the most comprehensive codebreaking operation in history.
doverton sturdee has noted the key details about D-Day and Normandy. I would merely add that Britain also supplied almost all of intelligence, support for behind the lines operations, the all important weather information, and two artificial harbours.
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From Para Dave (aka bigwoody), seemingly aimed at Montgomery:
'-Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 (338,000,British,Dutch,French Troops in all evacuated)
-Greece, Crete & Hong Kong in 1941 (3700 captured in Greece, 12,274 captured in Crete,10,000 captured in Hong Kong)
-Tobruk and Singapore in 1942 (28-33,000 captured at Tobruk ,81,000 captured in Singapore)'
0/10
Norway. Did not involve Montgomery.
Netherlands. Did not involve Montgomery.
Belgium and France, Dunkirk. Montgomery was only a single division commander.
Greece, Crete & Hong Kong. Did not involve Montgomery.
Tobruk and Singapore in 1942. Did not involve Montgomery.
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@kniespel6243
Ah...
So you did not see what Montgomery did at Caen and Market Garden.
Let us look st some of the words from people that were around then
Caen:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen’
From Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand.
Market Garden:
‘Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter’
From Montgomery, by Alan Moorehead.
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
From Crusade in Europe by Dwight D Eisenhower.
‘It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.’
From Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand.
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
From The Second World War, by Winston Churchill.
‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces—another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces!’
From a statement by German General Karl Student supplied by Basil Liddell Hart in 1949.
‘Why was Montgomery not given adequate troop and logistic support at least one more division?’
From On to Berlin, by US General James M Gavin.
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@kniespel6243
Oh well, its your funeral...
‘On 21January 1944, we foregathered at Norfolk House under Eisenhower’s chairmanship to compare or impressions. Montgomery, who was to command all the ground forces in the initial stages of ‘Overlord’ said at once that the planned assault by three divisions was insufficient to obtain a quick success. We must take a port at the earliest possible moment. He pressed that the proposed area of assault in Normandy be extended to include an area of the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsular. The American forces should be placed on the right and he British to the left, the former to capture Cherbourg, and then drive for the Loire ports, while the British and Canadian forces would deal with the enemy’s main strength approaching from the east and south-east.’
Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Arthur Tedder – a ‘vet’
”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.
In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.’
US General Omar Bradley – a ‘vet’
The Battle of the Beachead was a period of incessant and heavy fighting and one which, except for the capture of Cherbourg, showed few geographical gains. Yet it was during this period that the stage was set for the later, spectacular liberation of France and Belgium. The struggle in the beachhead was responsible for many developments, both material and doctrinal, that stood us in good stead throughout the remainder of the war.’
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower – a ‘vet’
My father was a ‘vet’ of the fighting at Caen. He remembered the bitter fighting there against the mass of German forces.
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@johnlucas8479
Great, that that will do very well. The final piece in the evidence chain in regard to the aims in regards to MARKET GARDEN. And to think...I already had the evidence. Clearly two pairds of eyes were better than one in this case.
An attempt to cut off communications between Germany and the Low Countries, and as a consequence, damage German attacks on Britain with V2 rockets did, in my opinion, entirely justify the MARKET GARDEN undertaking. Justify, because statistics in regard to the death an destruction those weapons caused, and the first hand accounts I have heard regarding their effect, some of them from members of my own family.
I note that the wording states 'dominate the country to the north as far as Zuider Zee'. That would lead to a question, which I am not going to dwell on, as to whether the allies being in control of the land as far North as say Deelen Airfield, would allow that domination, or whether the allies would have needed to reach the Zuider Zee, or some point between.
N.B. Of course, by 1944, the Dutch had renamed the Zuider Zee as the IJsselmeer, after the completion of the Afsluitdijk in 1932.
Pleased as punch I am.
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In, as far as Market Garden failed to take Arnhem. Montgomery's seem to be in line with Churchill, Eisenhower, the official US Army history of the European campaign, and the German General Student:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
P174/5
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P199
Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation,
attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained,
there was no doubt that we should have attained full success."
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P 586
¹In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding
independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was,
says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." Gavin, op. cit., p. 120.
¹Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we
should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by
Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON
1986
'St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October.
`I personally have no doubt from a purely administrative point of view that, based as we were on the Channel ports, it would have been possible to carry out successfully the operation which Field-Marshal Montgomery desired:' Letter to The Times, 24.2.47.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P591-P592
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@jbjones1957
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
MARKET ground commanders made a request for two lifts on the first day. Those people were experienced soldiers, who were working with experienced soldiers. It beggars belief that those people would have made those requests if such a thing could not have been done. All that you have done is to state the sequence of events on the day. As best I can judge from what has been written is that the commander of the FAAA, USAAF General Brereton decided that the the airborne plan would prioritize the convenience of his air forces over the needs of the airborne soldiers. If the American, Brereton had put a two lift plan together, that was scuppered by the weather, then he was in the clear. As it was...
'Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality
Sunset:
Ritchie, Sebastian; (S2 page 201) “On 17 September sunset occurred at 18.11 p.m. and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 p.m.”'
Thanks. That will do nicely, when it comes to the Hollywood myth, so beloved by Americans, that XXX Corps sat around drinking tea immediately after Nijmegen Bridge had been captured, when they supposedly could have been pushing on to Arnhem straightaway.
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@johnlucas8479
‘On September 4th when this was 1st presented as an extension of COMETit was clear to all there at the meeting that the Scheldt was to be opened as part of the Operation.’ Para Dave / Big Woody.
What meeting on 4th September can Para Dave be on about?..
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton, met at Chartres, on the 2nd September.
Montgomery, Bradley, Hodges, and Dempsey met at Dempsey’s headquarters on 3rd September 1944. Eisenhower, the allied land forces commander did not attend. However, Eisenhower did find time to go to the Allied victory parade in Paris on the 8th September, and then on the 9th, visit Brest, and then Versailles.
Meanwhile…V2 rockets started landing on London on the 8th September. On the 9th September
the VCIGS, General Nye sent this message to Montgomery:
‘Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM.’
Montgomery and Eisenhower met in Brussels on the 10th September, their first meeting since Eisenhower had become allied land forces commander. At that meeting, Eisenhower authorised Montgomery to undertake MARKET GARDEN.
And the meeting on the 4th?...Anyone can chip in with evidence.
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@Keimzelle
'That's the most laughable argument ever.' Your words.
So what does Antony Beevor bring the subject, or any Second World War subjects that he writes about?..
He was not there, so there is no first hand experience. He was not even on the subject in time to eyeball the key people involved, that had been done by the likes of Chester Wilmot, Liddell Hart, and so on, even Cornelius Ryan. How many quotes that he uses are from his own interviews?.. All the key facts and contemporary documents that have a bearing on the story have been in the public domain for many decades.
I heard him spouting off about his Arnhem book in a YouTube item about how his book brings to light the sufferering of the Dutch people after Arnhem. Yea, new history that has only been known about since Operation Manna was all over newsreels in 1945. Brilliant, said no one.
Beevor got himself chucked out of Russia for trying to tell the Russians his version of Stalingrad. Pity we do not do the same thing in Britain. He will never get slung out of the USA, he writes the sort of shallow stuff they love. It gets him on to book carousel stands in shops in airport departure lounges, and onto the US lecture circuit.
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@11nytram11
Just to recap. Big Woody (aka Para Dave), has called XXX Corps cowards, Carrington Scarrington, Montgomery every name under the sun. He has disparaged cancer sufferers and he has stated that hates me. Where does all the hate come from?
As for Alanbrooke, he took part two world wars, he saw Alexander and Montgomery perform with distiction in difficult circumstances in 1940, and knew that they were men to be trusted. That trust was fully justified. He was proved right on most of the big issues facing the allies during the war, whilst having to deal with Churchill, the know nothing Eisenhower, and the poor judgement of Marshall.
As for Alanbrooke's diary, the idea that it was written after the war is absurd. Brereton's diary as written after the war, Butcher's diary was doctored after the war.
As for the Mediterranean, victory there freed a million tons of shipping for use with Overlord. The Italian campaign tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans - divisions that would otherwise have been facing Overlord or the Russians. No British interests were served by continuing the war in the Mediterranean in 1943, but European interests would have been seved if the Russians had been kept out of the Balkans. But thanks to the bozo Roosevelt who probably thought he was being all very clever by ganging up with the Stalin against Churchill, the Western allies ended up fighting the war just the way that Stalin wanted them to.
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MIchael Basford
Who was were during MARKET GARDEN.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started. Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
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Michael Basford
Rick Atkinson:
Based on an email exchange I have had with Rick Atkinson, he is a nice enough person, but his work is in places either slapdash, or crafted in order to mislead.
Montgomery’s sittings for the second portrait of Montgomery by James Gunn seem to have ended on the 1st September, the last of 14 sittings on consecutive days. There is no record of any sittings after this time. Montgomery wrote to his son’s guardians the Reynolds, on the 10th September, stating: ‘The portrait is completely the cat's whiskers; it will without doubt be the great picture of the year at next year's Academy’. And again on 20th September to the Phyllis Reynolds: ‘The portrait is completely the cat's whiskers; it will without doubt be the great picture of the year at next year's Academy’. MARKET GARDEN took place 17th to 25th September 1944. Why don’t people check first?
Antony Beevor:
‘After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles.And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.’
There was in fact no material benefit for MARKET GARDEN that came out of promises made to Montgomery by Bedell Smith, on the 12th September. It was on the basis of those promises that MARKET GARDEN even went ahead. Antony Beevor claims that General Bedell-Smith and Strong stated their fears about German strength on the 12th September, presumably in the same meeting.
It would seem odd to have made offers of more resources in order to get things moving, and then to state that it would not work... if the words were spoken. I do not know either, but it seems to smack of the arse covering / re-writing of history so often undertaken by Americans.
Kenneth Strong stated that Bedell-Smith and Strong saw Montgomery about this matter on the 15th, not the 12th, but that Strong was not present in the meeting. Montgomery made no mention of such a meeting. Of course he would not have mentioned it, would be the obvious response. But neither did Eisenhower, Alanbrooke, Chester Wilmot, or one Sebastian Ritchie, in a recent work that seems to be relied on in YouTube comments.
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@richmcintyre1178
Its still a definite no.
At the time each Army Group was getting 7,000 of supplies per day. That is 7,000 tons for 21st Army Group (Montgomery), and 7,000 tons for 12th Army Group (Bradley).
Bradley intially divided his 7,000 tons by sending 5,000 tons to his subordinate Hodges, and 2,000 tons to his subordinate Patton. Before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, Bradley shifted and additional 1,500 tons per day from Hodges to Patton. He also sent 4 divisions from Hodges to Patton. This arrangement lasted until after MARKET GARDEN had finished. There is no record of supplies being transferred from Patton to 21st Army Group.
An additional 500 tons per day had been flown in by air to help feed the civilian population of Paris. This was sent to 21st Army Group for MARKET GARDEN as the French civilian authorities were able to take over the supply needs of the City.
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@laurencetilley9194
'Monty gained 60 miles. at Patton had gained 400 miles'
Get real. Montgomery took almost all of the German forces on the British 2nd front in Normandy,
so that Bradley could use his subordinate commanders, Hodges and Patton to break out.
As evidenced by Bradley:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
And when the time came for the break out and chase across, British 2nd Army were no slouches,
as evidenced by Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
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@johnlucas8479
‘Bayeux to Rouen on the Seine River is 156 klms. Bayeux to Antwerp is 533 Klms. For each 100 trucks need to supply a division from Bayeux to Rouen would require 328 trucks to supply the same division from Bayeux to Antwerp.’
How so? Would that pre-suppose that transport resources for the advance from Bayeux to were being used to full capacity? Would that also pre-suppose that the same size of force advanced from Rouen to Antwerp was the same size of force that had advanced from Bayeux to Rouen?
‘Question were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’
Who can say?..
British Second Army transport companies in France increased from six to 49 by the 26th September, with another seven to follow.
That meant an increase from 360 Lorries to 3,000 Lorries, with another 420 to follow.
N.B. Most of those transport companies used the British Army spec 4x4 3-ton lorries: the AEC Matador, the Austin K5, the Bedford QL, and the Crossley Q-Type, as well as Canadian Military Pattern vehicles.
Further, two of those transport companies, that were using 6x6, 10-ton lorries (Leyland Hippo) at that time were issued with 5-ton trailers to be towed by those lorries.
The Canadians were running another 10 transport companies.
‘If he uses aircraft from the USAAF and RAF Transport Commands to make up the difference that FAAA would not have the planes available to launch any Airborne Operations. Each proposed Airborne Operation would stop the air resupply missions.’
Perhaps you are right. But with an advance by British Second Army, and US First Army, put in hand after Eisenhower and Montgomery had met on the 23rd of August, what role would there have been for airborne drops?
‘For 2nd Army to maintain the same level of supplies at Essen compared to Rouen. Each 100 Truck at Rouen the 2nd Army would need 446 trucks at Essen.
I just looking at the numbers.
Either Montgomery thrust would stop at line Antwerp to Aachen until additional ports are operational which will not occur until October, or the number of Divisions would need to be reduced to maintain the pushes in the case of 2nd Army of the initial 9 Divisions at Rouen less than 3 could be supported on a drive from Antwerp to Essen. The US 1st Army 9 Division at Seine less than 6 at Aachen would be in a position to push onto Essen.’
In my opinion, you are reaching conclusions without knowing the full story. Besides that, I think that you would do well to consider what you think what conclusion would have justified a narrow-thrust attack, and what conclusion would have rendered a narrow-thrust attack a failure.
There can never be a definite conclusion to this matter.
I stand by my opinion: that based on what is known of the situation facing the allies at that time, as they understood it, a decision to adopt Montgomery’s proposal regarding the advance towards Germany in the late Summer and Autumn of 1944 would have been the correct decision.
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@johndawes9337
'Monty ignored the Air Marshalls and even lied he told them IKE agreed with him.Also told IKE that air marshalls agreed and liked his plan.'
bigwoody / Para Dave.
The Air Marshals (erroneously termed 'Air Marshalls' by Para Dave):
'MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48-49
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine. In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.'
Eisenhower:
'CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
Eisenhower's note to Montgomery, 16.09.1944, after he had seen Montgomery's
OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE M 525, which covered Arnhem:
'16 September, 1944
Dear Monty,
Your M. 525 has just arrived here and I must say that it not only is designed to carry out most effectively my basic conception with respect to this campaign but is in exact accordance with all the understandings that we now have...
Best of luck.
Sincerely
(Signed) Dwight D. Eisenhower'
As you know: Portal was promoted to the rank of Air Marshal in 1940, and Tedder was promoted to the rank of Air Marshal in 1942.
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@ColdWarVet607
As far as Rommel, Patton, and the Kasserine Pass were concerned, you are mistaken, it was Patton who did not take part in the battle. Rommel saw the action right through.
‘Monty "The Butcher" as he is know,’ Your words.
Really? Who would term Montgomery a butcher, apart from you?
‘OMG, the most massive F'up, waste of precious resource and life in all of WWII.’ Your words.
Hardly… MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at AACHEN (20,000 casualties), METZ (45,000 casualties), and the HURTGEN FOREST (55,000 casualties). Mark Clarke’s abandonment of allied forces in order to grab personal glory by capturing ROME cost the allies the chance to finish the war in Italy in 1944.
‘The Normady Beach invasion plan was very near a failure, did not come close to achieving it objectives on that day or even in the following weeks or months, thanks again to Monty’ Your words.
Montgomery undertook to get allies to the River Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, and with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
‘My knowledge comes not from Wikipedia, someones video or some alleged "historian" who just regurgitates what others write. It comes from my Father who assaulted Omaha fought his way out and fought his way across Europe, as well as other relatives and the countless soldiers in my WWII factory town I grew up with, telling me their stories be the Pacific or Europe.’ Your words.
My father went right through, 1939-45. D-Day to VE day, via SWORD Beach, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Reichswald, the Rhine, to Lüneburg Heath. Didn’t make him an expert on Montgomery, Eisenhower, and so on, he never claimed to be. What special insight did your father have on Montgomery, Eisenhower, Patton and spo on?..
My whole family went through it, as did my school teachers, my friends parents, older work mates, and so on. In all situations, in all parts of the world. As far as I can see, British civilians experienced more danger than most US servicemen. Even my village was bombed. Plenty of people there could remember the raids. How bombs fell on your town?..
‘Not interested in debating wiht Monty loving wikipedia fools, so dont write me, I wont read it.’ Your words.
Its too late for you...
You are out of your depth. Accept it, and move on.
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@franklino1083
Normandy
Montgomery was tasked with getting allied land forces to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78. Far from escaping, in Normandy, the Germans suffered a defeat as big as Stalingrad.
As far as the invasion beaches were concerned, British 2nd Army actually landed at GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD. British 2nd Army had to cope with the only major German counter attack on D-Day, as the 21st Panzer Division drove from in front of Caen towards the cost between JUNO, and SWORD beaches. As far as the US 1st Army was concerned, it encountered a major problem OMAHA Beach, which was exacerbated by Bradley’s poor command, but had the biggest luck of all on D-Day, as it encountered almost no opposition at UTAH Beach.
Market Garden
Montgomery had no final jurisdiction over FAAA, from which, the decisions that cost the Allies Arnhem emanated from. Market Garden a disaster?.. Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
The Rhine
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties’
‘not a fan of this pompous guy and Percival!’ Your words.
Why would anyone be a ‘fan’, or not a ‘fan’ of the likes of Harris, Montgomery, Percival, Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers or any of these wartime commanders. They all had to make decisions that were governed the circumstances that they found themselves in. To be a ‘fan’, or not a ‘fan’, a person would have to have a opinion. What would an opinion be worth from someone who was neither there, or had been in a comparable situation?
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@USAACbrat
No.
The evidence is clear in regard to the Montgomery's auhority ot undertake Market Garden:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. '
US General Dwight D Eisenhower. His words.
As far as Market Garden was concerned, Berlin was not the target, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics confirmed:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 49
In fact by 10September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
Eisenhower's broad front policy gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space to reoganize and rebuild their forces. As the Germans themselves confirmed:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved"
German General Kurt von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really
strong striking force with which to break through to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open."
German General Günther Blumentritt.
'Monty's need for glory'? He had already offered to stop 21st Army Group and leave all of the available resources to put into a US drive in the South, providing Eisenhower made a decision regarding a single thrust strategy instead of his broad front lunacy. A proposal that hardly displayed a 'need for glory'.
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@BaronsHistoryTimes
-Montgomery was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands, Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England. Model was Oosterbeek when the landings started, but soon fucked off, as anyone else would have. Only an imbecile would try to claim that Student was an 'Air Born General' in September 1944.
-The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden.
-Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched.
-The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
-The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place.
-The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place.
-Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden.
-The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower.
-The SS officer Prince Bernhard, was shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s. Nobody is interested in his vile comments.
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@ToolTimeTabor
‘Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. TIK ignores the reality of the situation as he is a Monty fanboy The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.’- Para Dave / Big Woody.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
N.B. This is SHAEF information, not 21st Army Group information.
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@iemjgf
'The Market Garden fiasco was around 5 days. Where would Patton have been in 5 days?' Your words.
Why ask the question?.. We already know the answer.
No allied resources were taken away fronm Patton for Market Garden. He resumed his advance before Market Garden was even conceived.
By the 11th September, Patton was still West of Metz, about 100 miles from the Rhine.
General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, recalled in1979: “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’” His words.
'With regard to the allocation of vital supplies I would have thought that Eisenhower called the shots? ' Your words.
Perhaps you are right. But he seemed to have stopped at the allocation of 7,000 tons per day for each army group: 21st Army Group (Montgomery), and 12th Army Group (Patton). Leaving, in Bradley's case, the decision to Bradley to give 5,000 tons per day to US 1st Army (Hodges), and 2,000 tons per day to US 3rd Army (Patton).
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'1. 2nd to Messina, and allowed the Germans to evacuate to Italy'
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
'2. never took Caen per his plans, but later insisted that was his plan all along,'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
'3. Market Garden'
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
'4. Failed to promptly capture the Scheldt estuary ..a huge mistake'
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
'5. Claimed he saved the situation at the Bulge , but it was Patton who sniffed it out and skillful redeployed'
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
US General Robert W Hasbrouck.
'5. Last to cross the Rhine' (5a?)
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘ The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
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Have it your own way...
The First World War
Unlike almost all US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experience. Montgomery fought on the Western Front in the First World War, where he was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO for his efforts. The citation for this award in the London Gazette stated: "Conspicuous gallant leading on 13th October, when he turned the enemy out of their trenches with the bayonet”.
France 1940
Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940 in command of the 3rd Infantry Division. He trained and led his division superbly, closing the gap on the allied left at Dunkirk after the sudden surrender of the Belgian Army and then leading his division back to Britain intact.
North Africa
Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops.
Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (6.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia.
Sicily (Operation Husky)
Here, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was alongside the US General Patton’s 7th Army. The was the last occasion that those two generals were of equal status as Patton went on to assault two of his own soldiers and some Sicilian peasants and thus get himself passed over for army group command. Before the operation started, Montgomery strongly recommended to the land forces commander Alexander, that Patton’s lunatic plan to land in small numbers at a several places around the Island should not take place but that landings should be concentrated in the South East of the Island.
Montgomery's plan worked. As with Alamein, casualties were low, Patton went AWOL until he was enticed back into the battle by Montgomery by allowing Patton to capture Messina. An event later portrayed by Hollywood as a race between the two generals to be first to reach that place.
Italy
Allied landings in Italy after Husky comprised Operations Avalanche, Slapstick and Baytown which were widely separated. Montgomery argued that resources should be concentrated on Avalanche and that Baytown would not divert German forces away from anywhere else. Montgomery was proved right and he later stated that he was ‘glad to leave the ‘dog's breakfast’ when he left on the 23rd December 1943 to take up his appointment as allied land forces commander of Operation Overlord.
France 1944 (Operation Overlord)
The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings.
Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals.
Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78. If a US general had been in charge of the land campaign, American historians and the US media would hail Normandy a one of the greatest victories in military history. Instead, Montgomery’s performance has been subject to a level of hair-slitting scrutiny far, far greater than any attention ever paid to any US commander.
Market Garden
With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to deploy the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhower had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of.
The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan.
Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
US historians have sought to airbrush Eisenhower and Brereton from the history of Market Garden to ensure that responsibility is heaped on the British, and on Montgomery in particular. This process culminated with the infamous film, ‘A Bridge Too Far’, which is filled with falsehoods and American cliché images of the British.
The Bulge
Montgomery had warned Eisenhower about the dangers involved in his broad front strategy of spreading out allied forces too thinly. When the German attack in the Ardennes began, Bradley lost his head and refused Eisenhower’s instruction to move his headquarter s back, Hodges, the US 1st Army commander went AWOL. Montgomery had the only major reinforcements available to the allies (XXX Corps). Montgomery cancelled Operation Veritable and moved quickly to sort out the northern half of the bulge.
The Rhine
Montgomery gave a masterclass in planning and execution of a plan with the crossing of the Rhine at it widest point and against the most formidable opposition that the Germans could still offer. Bradley had already crossed the Rhine at its narrowest point against far weaker opposition That Bradley then crowed about this (as did his his subordinate Patton as well) reflects badly on both of those US officers.
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Montgomery won at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, El Agheila,
Medenine, Mareth Line, Wadi Akarit, Husky, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the Rhine.
Montgomery had fought in the front line in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. As a lowly single division commander in France in 1940, in trying circumstances, he perfomed with distiction, closing he gap on the allied right caused by the Belgian surrender, and in bringing his division home almost complete.
Where is the joke in that?
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@infectious420
Montgomey took over command of Eighth Army in August 1942. His first army command...
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
Alanbrooke
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
Churchill.
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
De Guingand
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. There has been much talk of using Montgomery to 'tidy up in the 'bulge' we would have done the same thing"
German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin
Notice that all of the above peopler that I have quoted have one thing in common...They were actually there.
At Alam el Halfa, Montgomery's four divisions beat Rommel's six divisions. Where is the joke in that?
At Alamein, Montgomery ended the war in Africa as a contest, with just 13,500 allied casualties out of 200,000 troops. Where is the joke in that?
Montgomery went 1400 miles across the desert to defeat Rommel at El Agheila,
Medenine, Mareth Line, and Wadi Akarit. Where is the joke in that?
For Husky, he won the argument against the US plan for landing troops all around the island, with his plan for concentrating allied landings in one place. The campaign ended in a matter of weeks. Where is he joke in that?
For Normandy, Montgomery undertook to get allied armies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, givimng the Germans a bigger defeat than Stalingrad. Where is the joke in that?
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ ... ‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.'
Eisenhower
Where is the joke in that?
The Scheldt was a month long campaign, covering 100 miles of shoreline and some of the most formidable shore defences in Europe. Where was the joke in that?
The Northern half of the Bulge was a mess of the US commanders own making, which Montgomery had to sort out.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
German Genral, Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
US General Robert W Hasbrouck
Where was the joke in that?
and the Rhine...
‘Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."’
Chester Wilmot
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
Eisenhower
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
US author Norman Gelb
Where is the joke in any of that?
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@manosdelfuego1
Not really…
‘One battalion took the brunt of the casualties instead of multiple units within the division.’
Your words.
But the figurers do not really seem to bear this claim out:
1st Airborne fatalities were: First Parachute Brigade: 209, Fourth Parachute Brigade: 294, 1st Airlanding Brigade: 325, Divisional and attached units: 346.
‘The 1st Airborne pretty much ceased operations as a full unit after Arnhem while the 82nd was able to hold its ground until well into November.’ Your words.
They do not compare.
1st Airborne was at the wrong end of Brereton’s air plan, and was attacked in far greater numbers by SS Panzer forces than either of the US airborne divisions. US 82nd was relieved by XXX Corps, starting the 3rd day of the operation, XXX Corps never reached 1st Airborne. Further, British forces filled out the Nijmegen bridgehead and began transferring forces there, after the completion of the Scheldt campaign for the push into Germany to the Rhine.
Even 76 later, it seems to be hard for a layman (me) to make a case for any delay in an attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge. There was a delay, and look what happened. Here is one view, from a professional soldier:
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994.
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’
‘The overreach was on Monty, it was his plan and Browning, he failed to appreciate the situation tactically.’ Your words.
The head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton had the final say in all airborne operations at that time. Just prior to Market Garden he had vetoed a plan to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island in the Scheldt. Further, as far as Brereton having the final on Market planning is concerned, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘The plan would have been more sound and effective had the objective been Nijmegan. Once Nijmegan was secured it could've been used as a lynch pin to secure Arnhem and turn into the Ruhr.’
Your words.
So, what should Eisenhower and Montgomery have done to try to stem the V2 rocket attacks on Britain:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
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John Voltaire
'Monty is that he is a coward for dodging responsibility for the train wreck that was Market Garden,'
Where is there evidence that Montgomery dodged responsibilty for Market Garden?
If market Garden was a train wreck, what are the Siege of Metz and the Battle of Hurtgen Forest to be described as?
'dropping the entire thing on Gen. Sosabowski, the one person who pushed back realizing that this will lead to senseless deaths.'
Where is there evidence of this?
Montgomery criticized Sosabowski's work at Arnhem. That is quite different from blaming Sosabowski for the entire operation. In any case, why would he? Market Garden was largely successful.
'Additionally, Eike was going to fire him because Monty would not do anything unless it was pretty much a guaranteed win.'
First, Ike (Eike) could not fire Montgomery. Montgomery was in a different army and was accountable to the CIGS. Eisenhower could only request that he be replaced.
Second. Montgomery was thorough. A thoroughness saved many allied lives. Unlike Eisenhower and most US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experiece - in the First World War and this experiece undoubtly influenced in approach to war.
'It's same as a boxer choosing his own opponents'
Why is it? Montgomery was appointed to command 8th Army in Africa, Sicily and Italy and his battle plans all met with agreement by other allied commanders. For D-Day, the landing location was chosen and Germans the put nearly all of their forces in front of he British 2nd Army. In the Bulge, Eisenhower asked Montgomery to take command of the northern armies.
'His victory in Africa was due more to lack of resources and stretched supply lines of Germans than efforts by the Brits.
If 'lack of resources' means that Montgomery's victory was devalued then that also applies to every single US victory in Europe during the war. They only ever fought German forces that had a 'lack of resources'.
Which one do you want?
'Hitler never really cared for Africa especially after Barbarossa started.'
That is nothing to do with Montgomery.
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'Monty was a nasty piece of work--obsessed with his own image, much like MacArthur, but without MacArthur's talent (and Mac was no Patton or Slim or O'Connor). He was embarrassed because he had focused on taking Antwerp while ignoring the undefended Scheldt estuary until it was too late and the Germans occupied it in force--as Antwerp fell.’
Deferring an attack on the Scheldt was agreed by Eisenhower, who by September 1944, as well as being Supreme Commander, had taken over from Montgomery as allied land forces commander.
Eisenhower later acknowledged that he had agreed to Market Garden ahead of the Scheldt:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
Further, the need to degrade the German V-Weapon attacks on Britain and Belgium from the western part of the Netherlands was a major driving force behind the launching of Market Garden. Obviously no American can relate to this.
‘Taking the Ruhr, let alone Berlin, was utterly impossible without Antwerp as a functioning port--so Monty's later story made no logistical sense, whereas Ike's story was quite sensible and consistent with every other strategic decision he made throughout the war. Ike was always very attentive to his logistics.’
In September 1944 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group were each receiving 7,500 tons of supplies per day. Enough to sustain 20 divisions for a combined thrust against the Ruhr by the British 2nd Army and the US First Army. Opposing those 20 divisions, along entire Western Front the Germans could muster fewer tanks and artillery pieces that Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
‘Churchill and Britain needed a hero in late 1942 and after sacking Auchinleck and then winning at El Alamein, Churchill and Brooke (always Monty's sponsor) built Monty up far beyond his real talents, and then everybody was stuck with the great "hero" and his great ego: a decent general for 1918 set-piece battles but not for highly mobile combined arms offensives in 1943-44.’
Churchill and Britain needed victories in late 1942. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. Montgomery became well known through he enthused his troops and by winning battles.
‘It was no fluke when Patton beat him to Messina in Sicily, or when Rommel was able to salvage what was left of his forces after Alamein and reconstitute his army in Tunisia, when a vigorous pursuit (think, Patton or Guderian) would have left him without a functioning force.’
Correct. It was no fluke:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
'Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
If there was any chance Market-Garden could have worked, it would have been with the two Army Groups reversed, with either Patton or Hodges (not that Hodges was so great by late 1944, but think Collins' corps and Ridgway's airborne troops) with the pedal to the metal. Monty, Dempsey, and Horrocks were NOT the people to lead such a bold, combined arms, "time is of the essence" operation deep into enemy territory on a single axis. But Monty in the North and Bradley to his South was forced by logistical necessities recognized back in 1943, and they were what they were.
But all of the major set backs happened to the Airborne forces which were under the command of the US General Brereton and over which 21st Army Group had no direct jurisdiction: The choice of landing zones and the decision to delay an attempt to capture Nijmegen Bridge. XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on the third day, in time to reach the troops at Arnhem Bridge, only to find that Nijmegen was still in German hands.
‘The only real question is whether Ike recognized the futility of all this and acquiesced in Churchill's and Montgomery's pressure for the sake of Allied unity, knowing that with Monty-Dempsey-Horrocks in charge its chances were slim to none, but at least the casualties would be British and the responsibility of the Brits who were forcing it on him--or did he talk himself into thinking against all reason and his usual cautious nature, that it might work?’
What futility? Eisenhower had this to state about Market Garden:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
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@toekneekerching9543
From Big Woody (aka Para Dave):
'Thicko Monty just displayed his single thrust @ OMG.A concept so idiotic that pretty much everyone in Allied HQ blasted it. I mean it ended up like 1940 Norway,the Netherlands,Belgium,France,Dunkirk - complete routes.That's why the GIs had to get it sorted.....AGAIN.Hey tell the board Little Villa how mum took some Gerries prisoner.' His words.
The single thrust:
The Germans agreed that a concentrated allied thrust would have been the best policy...
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
Gunther Blumentritt
And also, it seems, one American who was there:
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. '
Ralph Ingersoll.
The 'GIs' (In particular Eisenhower) gave us [the allies] AACHEN, the HURTGEN FOREST, METZ, an under resourced MARKET GARDEN, and the ARDENNES - the ARDENNES where Montgomery had to postpone VERITABLE and then come down and sort out the Bulge. And damn right Montgomery should have told the world how it was. I can only mavel and the restraint that Montgomery showed in that press conference.
Capturing Gerries...doubtless Americans have stories of US civilians dealing with Germans in the US homeland. It must have been scary, what with the Germans being a mere 3,000 miles away.
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@jpmtlhead39
And how was Germany going to defeat Britain without a Navy that was capable of taking on the Royal Navy. In the Summer of 1940, Germany had 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers to face the Royal Navy’s 14 battleships and battle cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 58 cruisers, and 120 plus destroyers. By September 1940, the Germans had two prototype landing craft, each capable carrying 45 troops, that was it for the entire war. The rest of any invasion force would have to have been conveyed in barges. Germany had no heavy bomber fleet in 1940, and its air force as a whole was up against the then most powerful air defence system in the world. Britain was routinely reading German armed forces communications, and would go on to read German high command signals.
By the end of August 1940, Britain was able to send half of its tank fleet to the Middle East. By early 1941, Britain had two million fully armed men in Britain.
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@knightblade0188
It is well known that Montgomery insisted on two more divisions, and two more beaches (UTAH and SWORD) being added to the initial D-Day assault plan, and, that Eisenhower, and others agreed with him on this matter. However, according to the author, Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery went much further in his planning, and was the only allied commander to address the matter of how the battle of Normandy would be fought. The original plan was for the Normandy assault to be carried out by the US First Army driving south on a single front and panning out east and West. Montgomery completely changed things by adding the British 2nd Army, and placing it between the Germans and the American forces, to allow Bradley to break out to West, the capture the most important objective of all, the port of Cherbourg, and also, the Britany ports, and thus allow the allies to win the battle of the build-up. Caen was a good to have, but it was not vital.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th.
‘Then Dinner with the P.M., Ike and Bedell Smith’
Next morning [28th] Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talk with the Supreme Commander.
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
However, Eisenhower later stated:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
And Bradley later stated:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
Montgomery committed the allies to getting to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
Normandy casualties (06.06.44 to 31.08.44), and outcome.
226,386, out of 2,052.299 troops (11%). Ended the war in North West Europe as a contest.
This compares to:
Alamein (13.5%). Ended the war in North Africa as a contest.
The Somme (25%). Stalemate.
Market Garden. MARKET (34%), An allied strategic failure.
The Hurtgen Forest (46%). A German defensive victory.
Where the Normandy casualties (of which the fighting at Caen was a constituent part), justified? I guess it comes down to what people regard as reasonable. Who knows, I don’t.
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Michael McCotter
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.
The 21st Army Group report on Market Garden noted:
'D -1 16 Sep 1630 hrs. Lt-Gen BRERETON decided to proceed with op MARKET'
On what basis should MARKET GAEDEN have been cancelled?..
It seems that neither Dempsey or Brereton said no can do. The weather forecast was good, the intelligence picture was probably of concern, but it was far from conclusive. The urgent request from London for action against V2 rocket launches from the Netherlands had to be attended to.
Montgomery later stated that he should have insisted on certain changes to the MARKET plan, a very noble thing to do, given the overwhelming evidence that he did not have the power to insist on those changes.
P.S. There is another TIK follower from Alaska...
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Michael McCotter
Oh well…
At this point we seem to have a reached a consensus, due to the lack of any evidence posted so far that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan.
As to what date Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, in my previous comment I noted what other people had stated in YouTube comments about that date. Let us recap on what I stated:
‘It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.’ My words.
Young Big Woody(aka Para Dave on YouTube comments) has taken it upon himself to get up-tight about this, as if I had as if I claimed that this is an irrefutable fact. How would I know, I have not read the book. ROTFL.
Para Dave goes to paste substantial (by YouTube standards), amounts of quotes which all of which may or may not be quotes from this august work by Buckingham. Its not that clear.
Here is one that Para Dave notes a page for, like the rest, It is nothing to do with who had he final say on the MARKET airborne plan, or what date Montgomery saw that plan.
‘ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations’
How is this Buckingham supposed to know?.. I doubt that he can cite actual experience of those events, according to what I can find on-line, he is a tutor at the University of Glasgow. I doubt if that University employs tutors who are in their nineties. There could be any number of reasons why ‘both US Airborne formations’ were in the front line for as long as they were…lack of allied troop numbers?, they were considered to be effective units?, and so on. British 6th Airborne was retained in the front line for a longer period after D-Day that the US Airborne divisions were after MARKET GARDEN. Why don’t people check these things?..
Notice that young Buckingham states ‘the Failure of MARKET’ rather than the failure of MARKET GARDEN.
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So its still the case that we have not seen any evidence in these comments that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan. Or as to when Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, if it was not on the 15th September.
Chester Wilmot, who, unlike Ambrose, Atkinson, Barr, Beevor, Buckingham, Hamilton, Hastings, Weidner, and so on, was actually there went on to state this view in regard to MARKET GARDEN:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation’.
Sitting here, 78 years later, it would seem that British caution about casualties was understandable, given Britain’s manpower situation after five years of war. The American reluctance to concentrate resources is hard to account for, given the success of a such a policy when it was put into effect by the Germans in 1940, by Montgomery in North Africa and Normandy, and by the Russians in 1944. By the time that Eisenhower made the mistake of appointing himself as allied land forces commander, in September 1944, dispersal of resources had failed when Eisenhower and Alexander allowed Patton to abscond from the battlefield in Sicily and Eisenhower had spread out the allied forces in invasion of Italy.
As far as what Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton should have been told to do is concerned…it was really an American matter as who should command American forces. One of the opinions posted here by Para Dave would seem to indicate an opinion that there was something wrong with the performance of the US 12th Army Group. Seemingly, Montgomery was of the opinion at the beginning of December that Patton would have been a better choice to lead US forces in the North, rather than Bradley’s other subordinate commanders, Hodges and Simpson.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
‘F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December.’
Notice that I have quoted what was stated at that time, not Nigel Hamilton’s opinion.
Reinforce in the North, reinforce in the South? Montgomery said then that Eisenhower should do one or the other. He did neither.
This what others, who were there had to say:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
Gunther Blumentritt
And also, it seems, one American:
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas.'
Ralph Ingersoll.
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@nickdanger3802
'1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway, Belgium and France (over 300,000).'
Yea, so pointless... Norway left the Germans with just one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers and five destroyers to cover an invasion of Britain. Belgium and France left Britain with the bulk of the personnel from the BEF. Leading to Britain holding out in 1940, and condemning Germany to a two-frnt war, and in turn ultimate defeat.
That will do nicely.
''1941 Greece, Crete and Libya. 1942 Tobruk and Dieppe (Canadians). 1943 Leros. 1944 Arnhem.'
Greece came out of the Balkans campaign, which imposed a fatal five week delay on Barbarossa. Libya (and Tobruk) were part of North African campaign, which stopped the Germans getting to the Middle East, to the Japanese, to imports from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up a million of shipping.
Dieppe was a genuine attempt to provide help to the Russians by drawing more German forces westwards. The is nothing pointless in that.
Leros was a genuine attempt to help to establish the allies in the Balkans, and thus, forstall Russian incursions into the Balkans. Arnhem was a genuine to stop V2 attacks on Britain, amongst other laudable goals.
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@davidhimmelsbach557
'The Bocage never reached the President. The Pentagon LONG decided that they wanted to be in the EAST because most of the intense fighting figured to be along that axis.' So you have changd your mind having previously stated this:
'This issue was a MAJOR bone of contention between FDR and WC. Winnie jammed it down FDR's throat.'
'This is utter nonsense. British RAIL would solve the criss-cross -- same as they did during the actual event. It didn't matter WHERE a unit was stationed, British Rail got the boys to their port and ships. British rail capacity was so great that D-Day was no 'biggie.' All that was necessary was the elimination of some commuter trains.'
Err...There was no British Rail in 1944. The railway were run by four compaies, the Great Western Railway, the London Midland Scottish Railway, The London & North Eastern Railway and the Southern Railway. The railway network, far from having redundant capacity was under severe strain as peacetime norms for maintence were ignored, the huge demands already being made on the system with maximum effort on the home front, damage caused by enemy action and so on.
'BTW, during this period, Britain was totally locked down. You could NOT MOVE ANYWHERE. You were not to even use public transport. All of the Allied armies were using a fist-full of truck convoys -- and the roads became strictly ONE-WAY under British MPs. This was martial law.'
Nope. The only special regulations in place were on the south coast, mainly from the Thames through to West Cornwall, and this was only for a brief period from May through to D-Day. Public transport remained in place throughout this period. Wartime regulations were in place regarding freedom of movement, but this was not martial law.
'British civilians treated the lock-down as a national 'holiday.' But, of course. Said lock-down was brief. It does not show up in common war histories.'
Absolutely not. Work continued as before and afterwards, including on the South Coast, despite the temporary cordon imposed on on those areas.
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@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85
'Again - no sources except your ample backside.Ignoranus,Patton's objectives were Palermo and when he got that him,Bradley and Lucian Truscott were tired of Monty's faffing and took Messina also.After all the brandy adled Winston thought it would be better to take Italy instead of France - WRONG.You would have to take sicily as it stood in the way.And just read the post above you poultroon.Bernard had 4 full yrs to come across the 30 mile channel.It took the GIs coming 3,500 miles - you're welcome'
Big Woody (aka Para Dave).
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
P319 320
Leaving part of his forces in the Caltanisetta area Patton now split off the rest to race in the wrong direction. While the Axis commanders Guzzoni and Hube had been withdrawing all German and the remaining fighting Italian units back towards Mount Etna, Patton had wrested permission from Alexander to split off the majority of his Seventh Army into a drive in the contrary direction. General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
Ouch!
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Its Americans that want it both ways. Heaping the failure at Arnhem on Montgomery and the British. E.G. The thicko comment from Eodyn7. And then denying the British, the credit for sorting out the Northern half of the Bulge, Normandy, Sicily, North Africa, and so on.
About 90% of the comments on here are attempts by Americans to denigrate the British war effort - and you are one of the most prolific in regard to comments.
The USA was only in the fighting against Hitler from 1943, by which time Hitler could not possibly win the war, thanks to the efforts of Britain and Russia. The USA was 3,500 miles from the nearest threat to its homeland and civilian population. And yet American come on to YouTube and have the bare faced cheek to try to tell Britons all about what they think that Britain did wrong in the war.
I do not know this TIK is, or what his credentials are, but his presentations are necessary.
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@nickdanger3802
'The broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II wiki'...
would have done well to have included this:
P512
'Montgomery had no opportunity of discussing the problem with Eisenhower until August 23rd when they met for the first time in a week. Montgomery then put the issue bluntly. " Administratively," he said, " we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
Hardly the words of someone who was 'wanting to beat Patten to Berlin'.
Meanwhile, what sort of tit head would post this on a thread about MARKET GARDEN:
'Almost daily in the Desert bernard wouldn't confront the DAK,letting them escape,not chancing a black eye after every one else propped him up,Air Corp/ULTRA/RN,the USA with massive influx of men.artillery/armor/food/fuel'
Firstly, no sensible commander would have risked the fruits of the victory at Alamein during a 1,400 mile plus advance across the desert by taking chances against an enemy that, when the odds were even, proved itself to be better than the British army, and much better than the Red Army, and much better than the US army, when it eventually joined in the fight.
Secondly, as far as the war in the desert was concerned, the US provided almost zero fuel (that came from the Persian Gulf), almost zero food, because the modest amount of US suplies went to the civillian population, and all the military were already well provided with food throught the SIX year conflict. The only US artillery there were 90 'Priest self propelled howitzers, which were converted to use the British 25 pounder gun asap. The US Stuart and Lee/Grant tanks were mainly bought and paid for. The Shermans were an improvement on what went before, but not much, and they seem not have been liked by the crews. In any case, the key weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun: the German 88, and the British 6 and 17 pounder weapons. Anyone care to state what US troops took part in the desert campaign?...
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WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P486
‘On November 9 Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of at least knowing that his country had at least turned the
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950.
P352
‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Western bourgeois political and military historians are trying to prove that the Red Army only achieved its superiority in material thanks to the material assistance rendered by the USA and Britain.
I do not wish to deny this completely and make out that this aid did not exist. It did help the Red Army and the war industry to a certain extent, but, all the same, it should not be regarded as more significant than it actually was.
Our material superiority over the enemy was gained thanks to the advantages of the Soviet social system, the heroic struggle of the Soviet people, guided by the party, at the front as well as in the rear.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 196-197
Nevertheless, for years after the war bourgeois historiography has asserted that it was the Allied deliveries of armaments, materials, and foodstuffs that had played a decisive role for our victory over the enemy.
As for the armaments, what I would like to say is that we received under Lend-Lease from the United States and Britain about 18,000 aircraft and over 11,000 tanks. That comprised of a mere 4% of the total amount of armaments that the Soviet people produced to equip its army during the war. Consequently, there is no ground for talk about the decisive role of the deliveries under Lend-Lease.
As for the tanks and aircraft supplied to us by the British and US governments, they, to be frank, did not display a high fighting qualities; especially tanks which, running on petrol, would burn like torches.
Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 460
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@nickdanger3802
Marshal Zhukov...
'Western bourgeois political and military historians allege that the Soviet army was able to achieve its superiority in material owing to Anglo-American assistance.
This is far from true.
I do not wish completely to deny its value though as in some degree it did help the Soviet army and our war industry. However, it did not amount to much and hence cannot be considered of much significance.
We gained our material superiority over the enemy thanks to the advantages of Soviet social order and through heroic, tremendous efforts of the Soviet people led by the Party, both at the front and in the rear.'
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 466
'As far the armaments, what I would like to say is that we received under the Lend-Lease Act from the United States and Britain 18.7 thousand aircraft, 10.8 thousand tanks and 9600 artillery pieces. All that comprised 12, 10.4, and 2% respectively of the total amount of armaments that the Soviet army was equipped with during the war. Undoubtedly, that was of definite significance, but really there is no ground for talk about a decisive role.'
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 684
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@mgt2010fla
‘Why do you put time periods of how far someone went but only when Monty had all the fuel and supplies. How far did Patton go from Brittany? Devers from southern France?’
Your words.
Devers was supplied from ports in Southern France, and therefore his supply situation was nothing to do with supplies for allied forces in other parts of France. Elsewhere, supplies were equally divided between 21st and 12th Army Groups.
‘I'll tell you what, name any military operation that was successful with a 90% success rate? The Germans getting to Moscow? The Germans getting to the Russian oil fields? The Germans taking Stalingrad? Kursk? German subs off Britain? Germans defeating the RAF? The Germans getting to Suez? Malta? The Bulge? The Japanese at Pearl Harbor? The Japanese at Kohima/Impal? The Battle of the Atlantic? I could do this all day! Do you know what you call a battle 90% effective? DEFEAT!’
Your words.
Why would you claim that?
‘By the time Monty screwed up at MG the US forces still didn't have supplies and this gave Germans a change to build up their defenses, still! No MG, the US waltzes into Metz, Hurtgen, Lorraine, et al! Monty's grab for glory killed a lot of Americans! At Metz, Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, and et al.’
Your words.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Bradley had resumed his advance at Aachen with US 1st Army (Hodges) and into Lorraine with US 3rd Army (Patton).
No MARKET GARDEN did not get US forces any more supplies. Eisenhower had decided on a broad front strategy, with all allied forces getting equal shares of supplies. It left the allies to be weak everywhere, leading to a lot of British, Canadian, and US troops getting killed. How US 12th Army Group supplies were divided between the US armies commanded by Hodges and Patton, was a decision that was made by Bradley.
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@mgt2010fla
‘Beevor stated in Armageddon: Monty didn't care about Antwerp because he had his own channel ports. The US had 75% of the men in the fight so they needed a new source of supplies! By not opening Antwerp he could force Ike to give him the green light!’ Your words.
Not really… The 75% figure noted here did not occur until February 1945. In September 1944 the figure was 59%
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
PART ONE
BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE
CHAPTER I
The Road to Germany
P5
Despite an acute shortage of ports, Allied build-up in men and materiel had been swift. By the afternoon of 11 September a cumulative total of 2,168,307 men and 460,745 vehicles had landed in Normandy. General Eisenhower, who had assumed direct operational command in the field on 1 September, controlled on the Continent 26 infantry divisions (including 1 airborne division) and 13 armored divisions (not including a number of cavalry groups and separate tank battalions). Of this total the British and Canadians had furnished 16 divisions (including 1 Polish armored division), while the Americans had provided 23 (including 1 French armored division).’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 1954.
Page 608
‘Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. 10 Sept 44
I should be grateful if this [table of divisions in the West, dated 1.9.44] could be brought up to date.
2. You do not seem to have credited the British, or perhaps the Americans, with the number of Army tank brigades, two of which together should count as the equivalent of a division.
3. Even without this it would seem that, taking Italy and France together the British Empire has thirty-four divisions and the United States thirty divisions.’
N.B. Of the 30 US divisions that Churchill noted, 4 were in Italy, and 3 were in the South of France. Seven from thirty leaves the 23 divisions, noted by Charles B. MacDonald.
N.B. C.I.G.S. = Chief of the Imperial General Staff. To save you looking it up.
Further, Beevor failed to note that US forces had exclusive of Le Havre and Rouen when they became operational in early October 1944.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The Technical Services
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS:
OPERATIONS IN THE WAR
AGAINST GERMANY
CHAPTER XIII
Rear Area Support on the Continent:
Operations
P412
‘Rouen had been captured on 30 August, but here too the Germans held the Seine estuary and the port of Le Havre. After a stubborn defense involving much damage, Le Havre fell to the British on 12 September. Despite the damage, this port was a valuable prize for reasons of geography. The plans officer of G-4, SHAEF, noted that every 5,000 tons discharged there instead of at south Brittany ports would save the equivalent of seventy truck companies in vehicle turnaround time.⁴º Although Le Havre and Rouen were in the British zone, Maj. Gen. Charles S. Napier, the British officer in charge of movements and transportation at SHAEF, recommended on 11 September that they be turned over tonthe U.S. forces, since Dieppe and Calais had also fallen into British hands.’
N.B. Le Havre and Rouen became operational in early October.
‘You make sounds like you know something but my guess you have read one book, which you don't source, and it's all one sided!’ Your words.
You are free to guess in any way you wish.
‘Again, my sources are Beevor, Hastings, Ambrose, Ryan, the US Army historian SLA Marshall, plus some lesser authors, who are sourced!’ Your words.
OK. Why not show me how these people contradict what I stated?.. Over to you.
Antony Beevor. Born after the war ended. In and out of the peace time army inside four years.
Max Hastings. Born after the war ended. A newspaper man who reported from the Falkland Islands War. What evidence is there that either of these people interviewed any of the senior people involved in the events they write about? What relevant statistics do they cite that have not been published before?
Stephen Ambrose. Like Beevor and Hastings, zero Second World War experience. Google him. He has been labelled a liar and a plagiarist.
Cornelius Ryan. Reported from Patton’s HQ when eventually joined the war in North West Europe. Be sure to let me know where he contradicts anything I have stated.
This SLA Marshall… I do not know anything about him. I found this on-line:
His former collaborator [David H] Hackworth described Marshall as a "voyeur warrior", for whom "the truth never got in the way of a good story"
‘You can rant and rave all you want, give me sources that know what they are talking about! You aren't one!’ Your words.
You are free to express your opinions as you wish.
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@asmodeus0454
But what does Max Hastings bring to the subject?
All the key information has been in the public domain for decades. All the key people involved had had their say, and are long since dead, there must be virtually no one alive now who was at Arnhem. How many documents and facts are quoted that have not appeared before? How many one on one interviews did Hastings conduct?
As far as the troops at Arnhem are concerned, Martin Middlebrook built his 1994 work: 'Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle' around the testimony of those that were there. He interviewed 500 veterans. Even then, nearly thirty ago it was probably almost too late.
Beevor, Buckingham, Barr, Hastings, and so on, have all churned out stuff about MARKET GARDEN. Each in turn is hailed as difinitive, or the last word, or some such . The subject just gets raked over, again and again and again. There is always a dig at Montgomery, Brererton, Browning, Gavin, and so on, with none of them now able to answer back. In many cases these writers state opinion as if it is fact.
Antony bloody Beevor justified his effort by claiming to have unearthed evidence about the suffering of the Dutch people in the Winter of 1944-45. Yea...its only been known about since the newsreels and press coverage in May 1945 of OPERATION MANNA.
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@ronb5714
Celtic supporters might well argue that Jock Stein had been more successful. Bill Nicholson had won more trophies.
I don't know. But how does club management relate to International management? An international team comes from a a number of different clubs, the manager gets them for a few days. How does that sit with Revie's intense management style?
I remember Revie's first match for England. It was against Czechoslovakia in a Euro qualifier. England came out in the bog awful Admiral strip, obviously a link to Revie at Leeds. The words of Land of Hope and Glory were printed in the match programme in a goache attempt at patriotism. Wembley Stadium had aquired a weak logostyle like on the front of a SodaStream package. Come the match, England won three-nil. With the next match, against Portugal, it was back to business as usual, with a nil-nil draw.
He tried it all: Weekend get togethers for 100 plus players, cancellation of the First Division programme before mid-week England matches, dossiers, and so on. Nothing seemed to work.
England had some good options in midfield. Colin Bell was at the peak of his career until he got sythed down by a Man Utd player in a league cup tie. Gerry Francis was really good player. Brooking and Tony Currie also there.
Revie placed far too much importance on Kevin Keegan, who did next to nothing for England during Revie's time. Overall, judging by TV interviews with players, and how the team performed, Revie seemed to have too much baggage from his Leeds days.
Perhaps the FA should been as radical in 1974 as they had been when they appointed Alf Ramsey, and gone for Clough.
Revies might have been the only person who could have eased the likes of Bremner, Giles, and Hunter out of Leeds. Perhaps Revie's appointment was a tragedy for England, and for Leeds. Who can say?
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@ronb5714
'Liverpool under Bill Shankly never worked on set pieces. Shanks' logic was "If we don't know what we're going to do, how will the opposition?"'
This from the National Football Museum:
'Bill Shankly is the formidable Scottish manager credited with transforming Liverpool FC into one of Europe's leading clubs.
During a playing career that began at Carlisle United, but saw him established as full Scotland international while at Preston North End, Shankly was known as a 'firm but fair', hard-working Right Half. A commitment to working hard in training, focussing on ball-retention, fitness and set-pieces showed itself during his early management career at Carlisle, Grimsby Town, Workington and Huddersfield Town'.
Any idea that Liverpool with their perchant for fitness, work-rate, and aggressive tactics did not worry about set pieces is absurd.
'It's a fallacy to suggest that, because England didn't do well, England weren't capable of doing well.'
But it never happened. One major trophy in 57 years, and that was won on home soil. England are by a distance, the biggest underachievers in world football.
'It's also a fallacy to suggest that players who didn't do well with England weren't capable of doing well with England. Kevin Keegan may have only had a moderately productive England career, but he won trophies galore with Liverpool, then headed to Germany and won the Balon d'Or twice.'
But they never showed, dispite having pleny of chances:
Keegan, 63 caps.
McDermott 25 caps.
Ray Kennedy 17 caps.
And that is just Liverpool...
Whatever the players have done in club football, their efforts rarely translates into success in the international game.
'You do make an interesting point about team-building however. Don Revie asked to have the league programme suspended the weekend before international matches. The FA and Football Association refused to support him.'
Not so. I well remember what was one of the first, if not the occasion that the FA did this was in October 1976, because Aston Villa arranged to play a friendly against Glasgow Rangers.
Symptomatic of the short-sighted approach of the authorities who oversaw English football's decline.
Yea, if the FA were a commercial undertaking, they would have closed it down decades ago.
Revie's England were the worst England team in modern times. Worse even than Iceland debacle.
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Harry Sung
'Then British badly needed a hero for propaganda purposes.'
No they did not. The whole thrust of British 'Propaganda' was to emphasise the collective effort and the role of ordinary people in the war effort, rather than generals, admirals and politicians.
Example: The First official history of the Battle of Britain published in 1943 did not even mention Dowding, the head of Fighter Command.
Example: The films being shown in cinemas: 'Went The Day Well', 'The Foreman Went To France', 'The Way Ahead', 'Millions Like Us' , and so on, and so on.
Example: Government posters wording: 'We' 'Us', 'Together' etc, etc.
Example: The BBC: Workers Playtime', 'Music While You Work', JB Priestly, and so on, and so on.
'His Market-garden plan is his figment of imagination, totally useless and impractical, arrogant and stupid.'
The government was demanding action against V2 rocket attacks on London from the Netherlands was not 'impractical, arrogant and stupid.'
Get something right next time.
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@Keiji555
' I don't know anything about Dirk Staat's history, his papers, or his credentials. If you can show me his expertise, accessible papers, and other such things, so that I can understand who the source is, then I may be willing to concede.'
Dirk Staat is the curator of the of the Dutch National Military Museum. His day job is to be a cleaner at his local branch of McDonald's Hamburgers. For his education until he was sixteen, an ederly lady who lived next door taught him to count up to 10 while his mum and dad spent all day in the nearest pub. His papers, back copies of his local newspaper starting in 1976, are in a shed in the backyard of his basement flat. If you knock on his door and ask him he let you see them. Provided of course, that he is not at work, or at the Dutch National Military Museum. Word is, he heard about Leo Major by overhearing two old wives talking while they were eating McDonald's Hamburgers as he cleaned the floor near to them.
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@Keiji555
Another one:
'This is where his heroism begins – he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal , the second highest award for British Commonwealth soldiers. But this is also where the myth begins. Legend has it that he refused to accept the medal from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery because he considered him 'incompetent', 'in no position to hand out awards' because of his cautious strategy. In reality, in gratitude for his heroic act, he had been given seven days off, which he spent in Belgium prior to the award ceremony. “But the little car wouldn't start,” Major wrote. “It made me return late, and even worse, I wasn't there to receive a decoration from Montgomery.”'
Wouter Bax October 29, 2008 , 00:22
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." ’ Para Dave.
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’ -notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. All this after five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ’ Para Dave.
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
‘From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’ Para Dave.
‘Now how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?’
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’ Para Dave.
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ‘Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ ’ Para Dave.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand was Montgomery’s Chief of Staff. Max Hastings, is that bloke with the Hank Marvin glasses that they call the ‘golf club members bar bore’, who thinks he knows more about the history of warfare than the rest of the world put together.
‘How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ’ Para Dave.
Max Hastings should have checked first:
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies’ Para Dave.
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located at Granville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands. Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’ Para Dave.
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty, who was not interested in the estuary’. How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak’ Para Dave.
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion. This is what Churchill stated in a note to Roosevelt:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 15 Dec 43
9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
Not a word about Montgomery’s military accomplishments’. Why do people not check first?..
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.’ Para Dave.
Who knows?.. Whatever role was, or was not given to Patton, it was nothing to with Montgomery - they were in different armies. Where Patton was, or was not, was down to his US army superiors, Eisenhower, and Patton. As to whether Eisenhower should have reinforced Patton, then that is a matter to be considered in regard to Eisenhower, not Montgomery. Montgomery had in already, in effect stated to Eisenhower: Go with me in the North (Dempsey/Hodges), or go with Bradley in the South (Hodges/Patton), but choose one. He chose neither, and the whole Allied advance ground to a halt, due to a series of under resourced piecemeal efforts.
'might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton'. Here are some German views…
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
This is what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine""
As for Patton, and MARKET GARDEN… based on his previous behaviour, he would probably have turned left at Nijmegen and then headed towards the Dutch Capital, The Hague, just as he had done in Sicily with Palermo, and in Normandy, with Paris. Plenty of opportunities there for press photo calls and newsreel footage. Still, perhaps that was an American thing, rather than just a Patton thing. What with Mark Clark leaving allied forces in Italy in the lurch so that he could capture Rome. But back to Patton, if he had tried his Sicily nonsense of attacking Sicilian peasants in the Netherlands, he would have been given a right hander back. Then we could have seen how big and tough he was. Also, The Netherlands was nowhere Oflag XIII-B, and so it would seem that the Task Force Baum ‘operation’ to rescue his son in law would have cost a lot more than the 282 casualties that were incurred when the ‘operation’ took place in 1945.
'Patton the real doer' . Here are some German views…
Here is Von Mellenthin regarding Patton's forces compared to the Germans in the Lorraine:
Panzer Battles, page 317
"On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared.
Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry
and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks. While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively, Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground, had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm"
www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/4/
'German commanders again found Patton’s generalship to be hesitant during the Lorraine Campaign, just as their counterparts had in Tunisia and Sicily. These men included some of Germany’s top armored commanders, Eastern Front veterans who had led troops during such fierce battles as Kharkov and Kursk. As the German armies withdrew east from the invading Allies, these commanders patched together a semblance of the flexible defense they had used against the Soviets, using mobile reserves and trading space for time and survival.'
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@nickdanger3802
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Horrocks's, Corps Commander. Page 53.
...And these people were actually there...
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@Synaptic_gap
But it was Montgomery who addressed the supply issue when he and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August 1944. Montgomery put it bluntly, that 12th Army Group and 21st Army Group were each getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day, which allowed for two of the four allied armies to continue the allied advance. Either US 1st Army and British 2nd Army should push on into Germany in the North, with Canadian 1st Army, and US Third Army stopped. Or, Canadian 1st Army and British 2nd Army should be stopped, and US 1st and 3rd armies should advance into Germany in the South. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance slowed right down. Of the four army commanders, Crerar, Dempsey, Hodges, and Patton, only Patton made a muck of his supply situation.
The idea that Montgomery had a 'casual disregard for logistics' is absurd.
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Meraki
'In terms of intelligence, he was provided clear evidence of the reality of the German location and strength and had he been willing, he could have had much more precise intel on the location and numbers of antiaircraft batteries, provided by the Dutch underground'
Any information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in this regard.
'The aerial photography can be seen on line. Unlike the Hollywood film 'A Bridge Too Far', which includes a photograph of post war AFV, disguised as Second World War machines, shown in clear at a nice oblique angle, the actual photographs were grainy overhead shots, which, only after a considerable amount of enhancement showed what seemed to be a few Mark III tanks that identified as belonging to the Hermann Goering Division Training and Replacement unit.'
Whatever else Montgomery saw, was also seen by Eisenhower, and other senior allied commanders:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
Notice that the last SHAEF Intelligence Summary is dated as one day before the onset of MARKET GARDEN.
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@Bialy_1
'Fact that gen. Sosabowski during planing of the operation pointed most of the big flaws of this plan and was not only ignored by Mountgomery but he was happy to blame him for his own faults and lie that gen. Sosabowski and his soldiers were fighting badly... gen.'
There is no evidence that Montgomery and Sosabowski met during the planning for Market Garden. Why would they have? Sosabowski reported to Browning and Brereton.
on 17 October 1944 Montgomery wrote to Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, referring to Arnhem: ‘Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you might like to send them to join the other Poles in Italy.'
Right or wrong, Montgomery was entitled to his opinion, but seemingly he made no specific mention of Sosabowski.
Perhaps Sosabowski might have helped his cause if he had not declined the offer to lead an airborne division, ruling his troops out of taking part in D-Day and then held out for the totally unrealistic aspiration of his brigade being dropped into the Warsaw during the up-rising there.
'Sosabowski died in poverty because of all that lies and British was doing everything to hide truth about him and his men in this whole operation.'
Not really, Sosabowski, like thousands of Poles, was given a home in Britain under terms of the Polish Resettlement Act 1947. The British government was under no obligation to do so. There was camp full of them in my area until they were allowed settle here. There were so many of them, they had, and still have, Polish language services in the local Roman Catholic Church.
And all this before a million of them came over in the early 2000s like a plague, driving down wages , not queing at bus stop and so on. The sooner they fuck off home the better.
'Dutch TV showed document about it and ofc noone in Britain saw it or is interested in facts but because of that document Dutch made decision to ignore British wishes and made recognition of Gen. Sosabowski and his man actions...'
What British wishes? The Dutch award was postumous. Britain had already made him an Honorary Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
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Blame?
Montgomery had no final say on the MARKET airborne forces and plan.
The operation was launched on a weather forecast of four clear days.
The Germans captured a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan from a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US combat zone.
Where is the blame in all that?
By September 1944, Eisenhower was both supreme commander and allied land forces commander. does he only get to be ultimately responsible for the best bits.
Tragic failure?..
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
The Chamberlain government ended its policy of appeasement in March 1939, when Hitler broke the Munich agreement of September1938, by occupying the whole of Czechoslovakia, leading to Britain and France giving a undertaking to Poland go to war if Poland was attacked by Germany. Britain and France declared war on Germany on the 3rd September 1939, two days after Germany had attacked Poland. Winston Churchill took up the post of Prime Minister on the 10th May 1940. The period 1938 to the Summer of 1940 saw Britain create the then most formidable air defence system in the world. It worked. That, along with the then world’s largest Navy and Merchant Marine, the fortitude of the British people, and Winston Churchill’s leadership ensured that we are not ‘speaking German today’.
‘I have to believe that having already breeched the Atlantic wall at Normandy at great cost, the allies would have been better served by applying what they'd learned and strategically attacking the Siegfried Line at key locations head on than by "going around their butt to get to their elbow"’. Your words.
In that case you are in agreement with Montgomery, who went into Normandy with a clear plan: hold on the left (British 2nd Army), break-out on the right (US First Army). Charged with getting the allies to the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78, and with 22% fewer than expected casualties. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander on 1st September 1944 with no plan, and the allies went nowhere.
‘the 101st and the 82nd bore the brunt of Market Garden's casualties’
Airborne forces casualties
1st Polish Parachute Brigade 378
US 82nd Airborne Divison 1,430
Us 101st Airborne Division 2,118
British 1st Airborne 6,462
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@davemac1197
You have made some really good points here. There is little that I can add
Troop numbers:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 1954.
Page 608
‘Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. 10 Sept 44
I should be grateful if this [table of divisions in the West, dated 1.9.44] could be brought up to date.
2. You do not seem to have credited the British, or perhaps the Americans, with the number of Army tank brigades, two of which together should count as the equivalent of a division.
3. Even without this it would seem that, taking Italy and France together the British Empire has thirty-four divisions and the United States thirty divisions.’
De-Guingand and Market Garden:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation.'
Bridging Equipment.
One Robin Neillands in The Battle for the Rhine 1944, (A book I have read but I do not own a copy of), noted in words to the effect that the front end of XXX Corps was choc-a-block wih Bridging equipment.
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@donberry7657
The Mediterranean and North Africa
Victory at Alamein ended the war in North Africa as contest, after both sides had twice been within sight of victory. Following Alamein, Eighth Army pursued Rommel for the better part 2,000 miles. From Alamein, Tobruk is 400 miles away, Benghazi is 700 miles, Tripoli is 1,400 miles and Tunis is 1,800 miles. It would have foolhardy to risk the gains of Alam-el-Halfa and Alamein on some gung-ho charge without getting logistics right and risking some anti-tank ambush. Both sides had already been backwards and forwards. Montgomery did not repeat the mistakes of then, recent past.
As far as allied equipment was concerned, ‘American tanks, guns, trucks, and ammo’, the Stuart, Lee, and Grant were of limited use. The Sherman was just about a match for the Panzer IV. However, they key weapon in North Africa was the anti-tank gun, and the allies overwhelmingly use the British 6-pounder gun. Imported trucks were mainly Canadian. In terms of ammunition, Britain was at that point approaching self-sufficiency.
For TORCH, the US refused to land troops in the Mediterranean, and then made heavy weather of their advance across to Tunisia. For HUSKY, sanity prevailed as Montgomery’s planning saw Sicily fall in a few weeks. For Italy, the greenhorn Eisenhower insisted on taking over allied planning, leading to a disastrous dispersal of allied forces in AVALANCHE, and BAYTOWN, leading to the allies almost being driven back in the sea at Salerno.
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Don Berry
North West Europe
Whatever Patton did, had little effect of German opinion. He did not even rate a German dossier before D-Day. In any case his advance across part France was matched by the other allied forces, as Eisenhower noted:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
Montgomery commanded allied forces in France, and by D+90 had cleared France. Eisenhower took over, and, in the next 90 days, the allies moved forward just 45 miles, as, like in Italy, Eisenhower dispersed the allied effort.
As for ‘the Bulge, the taking of Remagen, crossing the Rhine’: the Bulge was utterly predictable, and was predicted.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P 366
‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
‘admirably aggressive’ Your words.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P259
It was early afternoon on Thursday 28 December when Eisenhower's train finally pulled into Hasselt station. According to Mrs Summersby's diary entry, written on Eisenhower's return, Eisenhower was peeved even before the meeting by virtue of the extended journey, just as Bradley three days before: 'E. and staff had a long and trying journey, delays on account of fog. On arrival in Bruxelles, E. found Monty was at Haselt [sic], had to proceed by train as the conditions on the roads made driving impossible.' ¹ Eisenhower's security staff had insisted on sending a large squad of guards, which made the interminable journey tediously claustrophobic. `At every stop—and these were frequent because of difficulties with ice and snowbanks—these men would jump out of the train and take up an alert position to protect us,' Eisenhower himself chronicled.²
Monty was therefore somewhat surprised by Eisenhower's royal arrival—as he told `Simbo' Simpson when the latter flew over to Monty's headquarters the following day. 'He said it was most impressive. The train drew into the station and immediately teams of machine-gunners leapt out, placed their machine guns on both platforms at each end of the train, and guards leapt out and took up every possible vantage point. No question of letting any German assassination troops get at the Supreme Commander. Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.'³ Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security’
As for the Rhine:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITEDn1994
P406:
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties’
So there you have it: thorough planning and clear headed thinking beats gung-ho every time.
As for the ‘legendary drive through Germany of the American 3rd Armored’
The was over there, Patton seems to have used it partly for family reasons. The US drive to the South left Montgomery hard pressed to keep the Russians out of Denmark.
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@donberry7657
The Air War
The US air plan: unescorted daylight bombing, was defeated, as the USAAF withdrew from the bombing of Germany in the autumn of 1943. The Flying Fortress needed 10 men carry 4-6,000lbs of bombs into Germany, and then more often than not had to bomb its target blind, using radar. They would have been better off using Mosquitoes.
The bomber command offensive proved to be sustainable throughout the war, and came closest to delivering a knock-out blow to the Germans:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJCF-Ufapu8&ab_channel=SergioIQ
131 mins, 40 seconds.
The Far East
‘Compare the surrender of Fortress Singapore to American defiance at Corregidor.’
OK. At that time, Britain was also fighting in North Africa, the Germans were also 21 miles from mainland Britain, trying to blockade British imports, and were bombing Britain from the air. The Battle for Singapore lasted eight days.
At that time, the USA was fighting nowhere else, the Germans were 3,000 miles from mainland USA. The Battle for Corregidor lasted one day.
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‘Maybe the American commander did make a wrong (and crucial decision) but the British were habitually obsequious when dealing with the Americans and also myopic to the point of total blindness by any fault on thier own part.’
There no sense in that. If the British were ‘habitually obsequious when dealing with the Americans’ then surely they would not have not found any fault with the actions of the US forces. And if the British are ‘myopic to the point of total blindness by any fault on thier own part', why is there a succession of documentaries about the likes of Market Garden on YouTube, most of them British.
This was evident by their refusal to learn from tactics or weapons used successfully against them.
How was it evident? As Britain created a much larger modern army between 1940 and 1942/3 many of the lessons from earlier in the war were applied, particularly the concentration of firepower, as at Alamein and in Normandy. As far as the management of the war was concerned, Britain with its marked emphasis on air and sea power judged matters far better than Germany, which had started wars with Britain, Russia and the USA without acquiring the means to defeat them.
‘The poles were the obvious choice as scapegoats.’
Not really, they were criticised for their performance at Market Garden not for iits sccess or failure. And their argumentative sod of a leader Sosabowski, had refused to integrate his airborne force with the rest of the allied forces.
‘Of course I may be biased.’
Yes you are, and you are uninformed.
As a kiwi living in England in the early 2000s when a memorial to NZ losses in WW2 was finally erected, a question I was often asked by English colleagues. "Was NZ in the war?"
Often asked? I doubt it. In any case, Anzac day has been commemorated in Britain since 1916.
"Lest we forget" is clearly not a part of thier culture.
Nor in other countries, about 90% of Americans do not know that anyone else fought the Nazis, including New Zealand.
‘Claiming credit for the achievements of others and blaming failure upon thier allies was also habitual even when dealing with Commonwealth troops;’
Like when?
‘Whatever else, the defence was a brilliant example of German improvisation (a supposed weakness) and the battle an example of almost unbelievable courage by all the allied airborne troops. Great docco.’
What supposed weakness?
I will point out that this Big Woody, who has previously used the YouTube name ‘Para Dave’ is a 16 year old from Cleveland, Ohio, USA who suffers from acute Anglophobia, calls all and sundry Britons cowards and claims that the USA saved Australia and New Zealand from invasion by Japan.
Btw. Its their, not thier
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@davemac1197
'Brian Urquhart's story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.'s story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.'
Also, am I right in thinking that there is no record of the aerial recce flight that Brian Urquhart claimed to have commissioned, ever taking place?
A bloke that posted comments on YouTube, who used the name Dave Rendall, claimed to be Brian Urquhart's nephew. A claim that I stated that I was sceptical of. That notwithstanding, he stated that his Uncle never briefed General Browning on German armour in the Arnhem, and that Urquhart did not take part in MARKET because of a leg injury, rather than nervous exhaustion.
The whole Brian Urquhart stuff in the Cornelius Ryan book 'A Bridge Too Far', and the film of the same name was all too neat. From memory, the photos in the film showed post-war German tanks neatly framed in oblique angle photos.
I think it was this Sebastian Richie that stated that there would not have been oblique angle photos unless the pilot was briefed to photograph a specific location. There seems to be little reason to doubt what this Sebastian Richie stated on this point.
I suppose that examples of aerial recce, oblique angle photos of specific places are shots are the shots taken by Squadron Leader Hill RAF of German Radar installations Bruneval, France in December 1941, and later at Domburg in the Netherlands. In each case, Hill was working to a specific brief.
What were RAF recce pilots supposed to do for a Brian Urquhart brief to try to find German tanks in the Arnhem area in 1944? Fly up and down wooded areas at low level until they found tanks? How long would that have taken? How long before the aircraft were shot down? How many recce flights could have taken place before the Germans became suspicious?
Why can't these people like Nick Danger think before they post on here?
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@davemac1197
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
'"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.'
This is what Alnbrooke wrote in his diary for the 5th October, 1944, in the edition that I have:
'October 5th. A conference by Ike at 11.30 of his Army Group commanders. Ike ran the conference very well. It consisted first of all of statements by Army Group commanders, followed by the Air and Navy. Ike then explained his future strategy which consisted of the capture of Antwerp, an advance to the Rhine in the north and south, forcing the Rhine north and south of the Ruhr, capture of Ruhr, followed by an advance on Berlin either from Ruhr or from Frankfurt, depending on which proved most promising. Meanwhile Devers in the south to threaten Munich as a cover plan. During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that (access to) Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay."
" I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely. Ike nobly took all blame on
as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem.¹ The atmosphere was good and friendly in spite of some candid criticisms of the administrative situation."
" After lunch I flew back, doing the journey Paris-London in one hour and ten minutes. Found Gammell in the office and had a long interview with him to discuss plans for Istrian operations."
" After dinner called up by P.M. to go round to him. All he wanted was to discuss with me my visit to Eisenhower and to hear the gossip. I found Portal there fixing up final details for the trip to Moscow which are now settled." '
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pags 291-292
I shall 'examine' the rest of Para Dave's 'stuff' in due course...
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
From Para Dave:
'An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p419 .The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front.The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. *Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again'
Rick Atkinson. Aged 69. Direct experience of the North African campaign, zero.
Alamein:
1,029 allied tanks, 547 axis tanks 1.88 to 1.
Operation Cobra:
2,451 allied tanks to 190 axis tanks. 12.9 to 1.
I caanot see what Para Dave in on about. As far as I am concrned, 1,029 to 547 tanks at Alamein is fine by me. I wish it had been 2,049 to 547.
As for the air war in North Africa:
'Not until 'Maori' or 'Mary' Coningham left and was succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst did RAF techniques improve, but Tedder's policy of applying the heavy bombing effort to the enemy's rear installations and supply lines was brilliantly successful, as Rommel's nightmare at Benghazi was soon to show. 'I punched him on the nose,' Monty afterwards pithily acknowledged; 'Tedder bit his tail.' Yet if the drubbing at Alamein and the vulture-like pursuit had shattered Rommel's nerve and forced him into premature evacuation '
Nigel Hamilton. Aged 69. Direct experience of the North African campaign, zero.
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The Hillsborough people were warned about pursuing cases against Duckenfield and Mackrell in a criminal court.
In a Coroner's court, verdicts are arrived at on the balance of probability. In the case of Hillsborough, the court only had to be 51% certain that the victims were unlawfully killed. In a criminal court, the burden of proof is much higher. There, a jury must be certain of their verdict beyond reasonable doubt.
Duckenfield has been to court three times and has not been convicted. Duckenfield has admitted his culpability. In the name of sanity, what else is to be done?..
As far as Mackrell is concerned, the law was, and is clear. Mackrell could only be judged on the basis of Health and Safety law as it stood in 1989, not as it stood at time ofthe trial. He was found guilty and fined, in line with how the law dealt with these matters at the time of the Hillsborough tragedy. The case against Mackrell is over.
The Hillsborough people were warned, they did not heed that warning.
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@benbarber2369
'his horrendous Market Garden campaign'
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@GiacomoLockhart
Err... no, Montgomery never acquired the the title of Supreme Commander. At all times Montgomery was accountable to Eisenhower. More so at the time of Market Garden than previously. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander throughout the campaign in Europe, and from 1st September 1944 had taken over from Montgomery as Allied Land Forces Commander. If the Max Hastings book does not mention that fact then you should ask that author for your money back.
Eisenhower's broad front strategy, enacted when he took over as Allied Land Forces Commander from 1st September 1944, took the allies nowhere in three months and cost 20,000 casualties at Aachen, 45,000 casulaties at Metz and 55,000 - and led to the Battle of the Bulge. Also during that period Market Garden cost 17,000 casualties and took the allies to the top end of he Siegfried Line.
Montgomery's tenure as Allied Land Forces Commander from D-Day (that was the 6th June 1944 btw) to 31st August 1944 and cleared the whole of France, and inflicted a bigger defeat on Germany than Stalingrad.
Perhaps I should start reading books about Market Garden, doubtless I have been sidetracked by the works of Alanbrooke, Churchill, DeGuingand, Eisenhower, John Frost, John Hackett, Leo Heaps, Lipmann Kessel, Martin Middlebrook, Cornelius Ryan, Graeme Warrack, Chester Wilmot and Roy Urquhart.
If you are lucky (or perhaps unlucky in your case) John Cornell will tell you about allies intelligence and those German troops at Arnhem.
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@GiacomoLockhart
Your wors in 'single quotes':
‘Montgomery was in charge of Op Market Garden. He was supreme commander - small "s" and "c". Fact.’
Anybody, but anybody, care to try to tell me where Montgomery was described as supreme commander or Supreme Commander in any situation in 1944-45?
‘Monty's failure meant that Ike's broad front strategy was then adopted’
Get real. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy was in place before Market Garden was even devised. One of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton had already resumed his offensive towards the Saar and another of his subordinate commanders, Hodges was moving towards Aachen.
That was the point of Market Garden, It left he broad front strategy intact. The only new forces involved were airborne divisions from the First Allied Airborne Army. The only additional suppliers were 500 tons per day (enough for one division) for a limited period before the onset of Market Garden.
‘everyone (except Monty) knew that Market Garden had been a failure.’
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P419
It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
'Since Ike's strategy lasted until the end of the war - and not merely the 9 days that Market Garden did - there can be no comparison of casualty figures. You fatuously compare a few days with the remaining 9 months of war. That is just plain dumb.’
Get real, I have left out loads: the Bulge, Operation Queen and so on and so on.
‘The Battle of Aachen, which lasted 2 weeks and 9 days, resulted in 2,000 US dead and c.5,000 casualties, totalling 7,000, not 20,000, and, once again, was due to stiff German resistance, not Ike's broad front strategy.’
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign p. 185
Chapter 10. Aachen and the River Roer
P.224
‘The recent battering at Aachen had had occupied the first Army for a full month and cost 20,000 casualties and yet at no point had Hodges got more than twelve miles into Germany.’
N.B. Best you look further than Wikipedia next time.
‘that cannot be laid at the door of Ike's broad front strategy’
Get real.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1959
CHAPTER 10. HITLER’S LAST THROW
P 340
November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.
At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.
As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.
P 341
‘The offensive which Eisenhower had ordered in October, which Patton had anticipated by his attacks south of the Ardennes and which Bradley, after waiting a fortnight for the weather to clear, had launched on a far too wide front in mid-November was now petering out. Except for the capture of the Metz forts, it had achieved nothing; neither the drive on the Saar nor the drive on Cologne got the Americans anywhere or even engaged the German reserves.’….more to add
As Montgomery had warned Eisenhower when he refused to concentrate, the Western Allies were now in a “strategic straight-jacket”. They were bogged down and reduced to the trench warfare it had always been their objective to avoid.
‘For D-Day, Montgomery was made C-in-C 21st Army Group (that was the name of his command btw), not Supreme Commander. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander (capital "S" and "C") from December 1943.’
Thanks for letting me know about Montgomery’s title. My father mentioned it once when he told me about his army briefings before he set out for D-Day. But I thought na, that can’t be right. Thanks for putting me straight.
Btw. You failed to mention, or did not know that Montgomery was also allied land forces commander.
‘Finally, I note that you do not challenge the fact that Hastings was highly critical of Monty's plan. In fact, he said of it that it was a "rotten plan".’
Who cares? Hastings was nowhere near the events those events. He was not even born until after the war had ended. He was a journalist in Vietnam and later in the Falklands War. That was it.
It seems to get a bit better with this Robert Kershaw, he has at least had some military experience, but he is still far too young to have been in the war. As for Anthony Beevor, like the other two he is too young to have been involved in the war, he as in and out of the army in less than four years. He writes history to level of works seen in book racks in shops in airport departure lounges – American airport departure lounges. I have seen him spouting his nonsense in YouTube clips, its like dung dolloping out of a cow’s backside.
All three of them are being wise after the event.
Here is Martin Middlebrook, another post war historian, on Arnhem:
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
CHAPTER 21
The Reckoning
P441
Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.
Your contribution: 1/10 for effort.
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@GiacomoLockhart
'not Alanbrooke, Churchill, De Guingand, Eisenhower or Chester Wilmot'
Yea, right ho, or wrong in your case.
Alanbrooke offered no opinion on Market Garden itself merely confining himself to a diary entry after that operation, noting his opinion to the effect that Montgomery should prioritized the Scheldt over Market Garden.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Winston Churchill's opinion on Market Garden was:
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
De Guingand's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Eisenhower's opinion on Market Garden was:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Wilmot's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this. And in this case of course, your father did not meet him.
Not a mention of Montgomery's ego hear, or of him being supreme commander hear. Its a pity we cannot here what you have to say, we could do with a laugh. Doubtless your family have to here your drivel.
You are a cretin, James Bogle. Whether you were in the British or not is of no consequence as you nothing about the events in question here. However, if you were in the army, that fact would only lend credence to American criticism's of the army in YouTube comments.
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@KrisBurns22
'Without US supplies during the early stages of WW2 Britain would have been starved into submission.'
'NORTH AMERICAN SUPPLY
BY H. DUNCAN HALL
LONDON: 1955
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE AND LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO
P3
In the first fifteen months of the war the United Kingdom supplied 90-7 per cent. ( in terms of value) of British Commonwealth supplies of munitions from all sources. Canada supplied 2-6 per cent., the rest of the Commonwealth 1.1 per cent., and purchases in the United States 5.6 per cent.'
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
For British Food... 1941 for example.
UK crops harvest: 53.164 million tons.
Cereals, Potatoes and Sugar Beet: 6.5 million tons
Cattle, Calves, Sheep and Lambs: 13.109 million
UK Milk production: 1,222.8 million gallons
Total food imports: 14.654 million tons
Lend-Lease food imports: (7.4% of total food imports),1.078 million tons
Processed food production: 20,314 million tons
Total food consumption (UK): 19.996 million tons
Foodstuffs lost at sea enroute to Britain: 787,200 tons (5.3%) of the intended 15 million tons of food imports in 1941.
We can run through the figures for any other years of the war if you wish...
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
'It was the American destroyers that guarded the convoys of American goods keeping 🇬🇧 in the fight.
Not really. Guarding the sea lanes and convoys bringing supplies to Britain was overwhelmingly carried out by the Royal Navy, with good support from the RCN.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P5
‘Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyed in European theatre, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces, who also disposed of all of the German battleships, cruisers and destroyers, besides destroying or capturing the whole Italian Fleet.’
'Not to mention the P-40’s, Sherman tanks, and most importantly gas sent to 🇬🇧 in Africa'
The P-40 was unfit for operations in North West Europe, and was therefore sent to the Middle East. The Sherman as slightly better than British tank types in 1942, but was only just a match for the German Mark IV. The Key weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun, and the British used British anti-tank guns.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
P440
' The relative importance of Egypt as opposed to Abadan was a subject to which I had given a great deal of thought. All the motive-power at sea, on land and in the air through-out the Middle East, Indian Ocean and India was entirely dependent on the oil from Abadan. If we lost this supply, it could not be made good from American resources owing to shortage of tankers and continuous losses of these ships through submarine action. If we lost the Persian oil, we inevitably lost Egypt, command of the Indian Ocean and endangered the whole Indian-Burma situation.'
Do know about US gas supplies to Africa. What would gas have been used for?..
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
If you picked up your views during your education, you should ask the college for your money back.
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
'Churchill could use this accusations to put more pressure on Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk to cooperate with Stalin, because it could be argued that one of his most valuable assets, Sosabowski's elite brigade, was no longer useful to the Allied war effort.' Your words
Do you actually think that there was ever any realistic chance that the the Polish Airborne
Brigade was was going any sort asset in dealing with Stalin? That the Brittish, and the Americans - who would have to provide transport, could have conveyed a brigade of troops across German held territory to Warsaw is absurd.
'But that wasn't the only lousy behavior from our unfaithful "allies". When you have allies like that, you really don't need enemies! Churchill was just as dishonest and mendacious as Montgomery and the traitor Chamberlain who betrayed Poland in 1939. Polish soldiers should never have fought alongside this treacherous army!'
Yea, so unfaithful that they went to war on behalf of Poland in 1939, they housed, fed, clothed many thousands of Poles to the tune of about £200 million in 1940s money, and then those Poles were allowed to settle in Britain under the terms of the The Polish Resettlement Act 1947.
If Britain is so obnoxious to Poles, then perhaps the million Poles that migrated to Britain in the 2000s should fcuk off home, so thatwe can all can understand what care workers say, and people can queue at bus stops again.
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@dmbeaster
'Your version is typical British obfuscation. Unfortunately, Montgomery's memoir preserves the evidence that his number one reason for proposing Market Garden was a path to Berlin. It was Eisenhower who dismissed that notion, but approved Market Garden based on much more limited objectives, as he makes clear in his memoir.'
Se below.
Eisenhower also never passed the buck on the failure of Market Garden to Montgomery - he accepted joint responsibility for the mistake, which had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort.
'Accepting responsibility went with the job, along with the cars, the champagne, the big chateau, the big parade in Paris, and first crack at the female drivers.' On what basis do you claim that MARKET GARDEN 'had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort'?..
'It is a certainty that Montgomery never gave up on his dream for Berlin based on something Eisenhower said and thought - he said nothing to that effect at the time. In the time frame, Montgomery never retracted his expectation to drive to Berlin.'
And why not?.. Montgomery was proved to be right. It as only cock-sure American politicians like Eisenhower, and Roosevelt who, in 1944 thought that Berlin did not matter.
'In a typically dishonest fashion, he subsequently pretends that Eisenhower's more limited objectives was allegedly his own idea.'
Not really...
Montgomery spoke with Chester Wilmot about Market Garden's objectives in 1946. I have quoted this already. Montgomery work 'Normandy to the Baltic' appeared in 1947, with no mention of Berlin in relation to Market Garden...Eisenhower's memoirs did not appear until 1948.
'But Montgomery's "path to Berlin" rationale was preserved in his own letters to Eisenhower proposing Market Garden.'
Which letters?.. The first time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed was when Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels on the 10th September 1944.
'There is no honest way to spin it any differently.'
Any spin has come from chauvinistic Hollywood films, US TV proframmes, and a bevy of US authors who have re-written history.
Harsh but fair.
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@johnlucas8479
‘The point I was making is the important of having Antwerp operational ASAP for the future war effort.’
But Antwerp was not vital for a twenty division thrust into Northern Germany to cut off he Ruhr from the Rest of Germany. This could have been accomplished with existing supply quantities. Quantities that were soon to be added to by the availability of Dieppe and Le Havre.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944." ‘
‘With the benefit of hindsight clearly the opening up of Antwerp should have been Monty priority. But at the time Monty though he could do both.’
With the benefit of hindsight, the allies should have had a workable to attack Germany as soon as it was clear that the battle of France was coming to an end. That would have entailed Eisenhower getting out of the way of the work of professional soldiers and thus allowing clear headed thinking to prevail over US self-interest.
‘Image the problems the Germans would have faced with Antwerp Operation by end of Sept, Monty Launching Operation Market Garden with the 1st Canadian Army supporting 2nd Army. 1st US Army attack to Hurtgen Forrest and Aachen as well as 3rd US Army attacking Lorraine simultaneous and all well resourced.’
But how was the Scheldt to be cleared by the end September? The amphibious forces were not in place for an attack on Walcheren, the Germans would still have mined the estuary – which would still have taken three weeks to clear.
The idea that the Scheldt could have been taken in a week is absurd.
‘Maybe if these operation Germans may not have been able to mass the Troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive.’
The way to stop the Germans from massing troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive would have been to do what the Germans last wanted us to do – as noted above.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
The Ruhr was there was there for the taking when the battle of France ended, as the Germans well knew:
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine"'
German general Gunther Blumentritt
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
The time to act was at the beginning of September, based on decision that should have been made before then. At that Model had only 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. Model had barely sufficient tanks to refit one armoured division.
Even if an attempt to clear the Scheldt had been made at this time, many of the assets needed for an assault were some way from being ready to deploy there, the Germans still held the Breskens Pocket, which would have precluded the use of the estuary. Further, the clearance of mines would still have taken three weeks. The moment to would have gone, the Germans would still have gained the time they wanted to re-equip their forces.
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@johnlucas8479
What did the allies know?
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris, the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared: " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”’
What did Montgomery propose?
When Montgomery met with Eisenhower on the 23rd August (1944), he stated:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
What did Eisenhower decide to do?
He rejected Montgomery’ advice and proposal to concentrate resources, as had worked well in North Africa and Normandy. At that meeting on the 23rd August, Eisenhower rejected the sensible course of action, to concentrate resources in the North of allied front, and the option to put all allied forces there under the command of 21st Army Group on political grounds, stating to Montgomery that "The American public, would never stand for it”.
What happened?
When Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander (01.09.44), the allied advance ground to halt, with each army taking on under-resourced undertakings, all of which failed (apart from the attack on the Scheldt). All of this gave the Germans time and space to stabilize their western front, stabilize their eastern front and to re-build forces, many of which were later used in their counter attack in the Ardennes in December 1944.
Again, Chester Wilmot provides the important information:
‘German records reveal that, of the divisions which took part in the Ardennes counter-offensive in December, very few were in existence as fighting formations during September. The training of the new Volksgrenadier divisions had only just begun, for the bulk of the troops who were drafted to them and to the depleted infantry units in the West during the autumn had been called up only in the last week of August. The spearhead of the Ardennes attack, Sixth SS Panzer Army, was not
formed until September and its divisions were not fit for battle until November.’
Eisenhower’s failure to create a plan suited carrying the war forward by capturing the Ruhr, an area that was producing 51.7 per cent of Germany’s hard coal and 50.4 per cent of Germany’s crude steel? Across the Germany economy the period September, October, November saw the Germans produce 1,764 tanks. Assault gun production rose from 766 in August to 1,199 in November. Rifles, machine guns, mortars artillery, ammunition etc continuing to be produced in substantial numbers.
Other poor American thinking in 1944 was the decision to withdraw US troops from Italy for Dragoon, which had little effect on the war in France but signalled to Germany a slackening off of US interest in Italy – leading Germany to withdrawing troops from that front and doubtless allowing the Germans to further prioritize North West Europe and the east over Italy.
Alanbrooke noted in Triumph in the West:
‘The situation awaiting the C.I.G.S. in Italy was dominated by three factors. The first was the withdrawal from General Alexander’s command, at the instance of the American Chiefs of Staff, of seven American and French divisions at the very moment when victory seemed within his grasp and their descent, on August 15th, on the South of France, where during the next few critical and decisive weeks they could play little or no part in either the Italian or the Overlord campaign. The immediate effect of their appearance on the Riviera had been, as Brooke had foreseen, the despatch by Hitler—sure now that no further landing on either the Italian or Dalmatian coast was to be feared—of three crack divisions from Italy to Northern France.’
Beyond that, there was publicity surrounding the Morgenthau Plan served stiffen the resolve of the Germans – moving the Nazis, the armed forces and the population as a whole closer together.
Any questions?
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@johnlucas8479
‘So was you are saying Monty know on 23rd of August that there was a supply shortage and he start the push for a single northern thrust.’
Your words.
Of course. Any real soldier could have seen that the supply situation and the need to exploit the defeat of the German army in France dictated a concentration of resources. Of course, Eisenhower failed to see that.
‘Then once Antwerp was capture intact, clearly getting Antwerp operational ASAP the supply problem would be resolved. So why did Monty Directive M525 dated 14th Sept place the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary after the capture of Boulogne and Calais. Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
‘Clearly Montgomery made a poor decision about Antwerp, as he wasted resources, men and time when he should have focusing the 1st Canadian Army on clearly out Antwerp at the same time as he focus on Market Garden.’ Your words.
I cannot see what point you are trying to make here.
‘As you claim Monty had little involvement with Market Garden and he was focus Not on opening Antwerp, so were was Monty focusing on.’ Your words.’
Where have I claimed that ‘Monty had little involvement with Market Garden’? I have posted evidence that Montgomery had no final say on the Airborne part of the operation. But that is quite different to having ‘little involvement’ in the operation.
‘By the 9th of September the German forces in front facing 2nd British Army was already being re-built so that operation Comet was cancelled.’ Your words.
But Comet involved only 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade. That should not lead to a conclusion that Market Garden should not have gone ahead, based on what the allies knew of German strength.
‘If the Ruhr was so important the direct approach would have been Wesel / Aachen direction, so why did Monty directed 2nd Army North towards Arnhem?’ Your words.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
‘While Italy and Dalmatian were important from a British point of view, clearly was you are claim the quickest way to defeat Germany was the capture of the Ruhr. The Italian Campaign was not going lead to the capture of Ruhr. So why should USA continue to support a secondary theatre that would not lead to a quick ending of the War in Europe.’ Your words.
As I have shown, the lack of USA interest in the Italian campaign had no consequential benefit the fight in North West Europe. The campaign in Italy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans, and maintaining troop levels there could have aided the collapse of Germany and could have aided the western allies in the post-war world.
This is what US General Mark Clark stated on the matter in June 1944:
“The Boche is defeated, disorganised and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit our success. Yet, in the middle of this success, I lose two corps headquarters and seven divisions. It just doesn’t make sense.”
Later (in 1951) Clark reflected:
‘A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away, not into nothing, but into much less than it could have been. …not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war. …
Stalin knew what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he most wanted was to keep us out of the Balkans. … It is easy to see therefore, why Stalin favoured ANVIL at Teheran…but I could never see why as conditions changed, the United States and Britain failed to sit down and take at the overall picture. …There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British minds, but…the American top level planners were not interested. …I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we had lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans. …Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced.’
‘Morgenthau Plan was agreed by USA, UK and USSR, so that no repeat of what happen at the end of WWI would occur.’ Your words.
Churchill was pressurized by Roosevelt into agreeing the Morgenthau Plan, but this plan was rejected by the government and it was put aside by Truman. But by then, the damage was done. Whether the USSR as in agreement was of little consequence, Germans were already fearing what the Russians would do as they overran German territory.
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John Cornell
From the Liar...
'Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy. Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometres to Caen'
There is no sense in that. Minsk to Caen has Berlin roughly in the middle - between the two. This could easily be construed as a comment that Germany's day were numbered, they were facing enemies on two fronts, and so on and so on. Further, Caen was the most important and best known town in the allied bridgehead, that it was in the British sector would have been of little importance to people 1,400 miles away. Further, surely it would have been Eisenhower’s name that those Russians would have known rather that Montgomery. After all, US propaganda had spread the word far and wide that Eisenhower was the supreme commander of the expedition. The fact that he did next to nothing towards Overlord's success would not have been known to those Russians.
If this Gelb oppo can produce evidence that the road sign was aimed at Montgomery then so be it. Until then, Gelb's interpretation can only be described as dubious. Notice how the Liar accepts Gelb's interpretation hook, line and sinker.
If, in the unlikely event that evidence shows that this sign was aimed Montgomery, then the Russians can fuck off. Britain was fighting Germany on its own while the USSR was allied to Germany.
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@John Burns
Big Woody is a liar, and this is why:
Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
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...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
From now on I refer to Big Woody as The Liar.
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@johnburns4017
This from Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
Part One
‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete’ His words.
By April 1945, the war was long since over as any sort of contest. In any case, the situation was absolutely nothing to crow about, The USA is, and was, huge compared to Britain in land area, population, ego, and bad taste. Untouched by war before and after its its brief period in the fighting,
and having bled Britain and France white, its teenage citizens now have got the bare faced cheek to try to tell others about the war. There was no Battle of Britain, or Battle of Moscow for the USA. American war stories are boring, their supposed efforts and privations on their home front pale by comparison with the home fronts in Britain, and Russia. No wonder their film makers steal other countries history, and their writers are constantly trying to do other countries down.
‘From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.’ His words
Total Rubbish:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P492
‘The countries of the sterling area were with us: they adopted the same kind of exchange control policy as we did and were willing takers and holders of Sterling. With others we made special arrangements by which we paid them in sterling, which could be used anywhere in the sterling area, and they undertook to hold any sterling for which they had no immediate use and to keep dealings at the official rate of exchange. Such arrangements were originally made with the Argentine and Sweden, but were extended to a number of other countries on the Continent and in South America. These arrangements were completed after the spring of 1940, and it was a matter of satisfaction – and a tribute to sterling – that we were able to achieve and maintain them in circumstances of such difficulty. In this way we were able to go on dealing with most parts of the world in sterling, and to conserve most of our precious gold and dollars for our vital purchases in the United States.’
And of course, the USA did not take advantage of the situation, perish the thought…
P506
‘The President sent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold we had gathered there. The great British business of Courtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of the United States Government at a figure much below its instrinic worth.’
‘*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts’ His words.
The last time I saw Andrew Roberts on TV, he was getting taken apart by a couple of Indian historians, who demolished his lunatic views on the state of India at the time of independence.
‘p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse’ His words.
This clown Roberts must be out of his mind. The is no record of any desperation on the part of Britain to seek involvement from US forces. A German invasion in 1940 was almost certain to fail. A German invasion in 1941, 1942 and so on…bring it on.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P278
‘We have seen how our many anxieties and self-questionings led to a steady increase in the confidence with which from the beginning we had viewed the invasion project. On the other hand, the
more the German High Command and the Fuehrer looked at the venture, the less they liked it. We
could not, of course, know each other’s moods and valuations; but with every week from the middle of July to the middle of September, the unknown identity of views upon the problem between the German and British Admiralties, between the German Supreme Command and the British Chiefs of Staff, and also between the Fuehrer and the author of this book, became more definitely pronounced. If we could have agreed equally well about other matters, there need have been no war. It was, of course, common ground between us that all depended upon the battle in the air. The question was how this would end between the combatants; and in addition the Germans wondered whether the British people would stand up to the air bombardment, the effect of which in these days was greatly exaggerated, or whether they would crumple and force His Majesty’s Government to capitulate. About this Reichsmarshal Goering had high hopes, and we had no fears.’
Likewise, a sudden Russian collapse…Churchill did not think so, and he called the shots.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE. 1950.
P352
‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
It took four years for Britain and the late USA, easily the two biggest shipbuilding countries in the world to build up invasion force, supported by the world’s two largest navies, massive air forces, round the clock bombing, Britain reading German codes, the populations of the occupied on the allies side. Even in the very, very, unlikely event that Germany got the best of Russia,, how long would they have needed an invasion force to compare with Overlord? Hitler would have dead long before any such to pass. In which case, the Germans would have made peace, which was exactly what they did in 1945.
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@johnburns4017
Part Two...
‘p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well’
Really?..
In his great work ‘THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE’, Chester Wilmot makes no mention Portal in the narrative, nor does he mention him as a source:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON SOURCES
‘I am under a great obligation to those who have helped me and particularly to: Air Chief Marshall Lord Dowding; Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder; General W. Bedell Smith, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, General Sir Frederick Morgan, Major-General K. W. D. Strong and Brigadier E. J. Foord (all of SHAEF) ; Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Major-General Sir Miles Graham, Brigadier
R. F. K. Belchem, Brigadier E. T. Williams, and the late Col. J. O. Ewart (of 21st Army Group) ; Air Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, who was Chief of Staff to the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Admiral Sir George Creasy, who was Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay; General Sir Miles Dempsey and Col. L. M. Murphy (of Second British Army); the late Lieut.-General George S. Patton, Lieut.-General W. H. Simpson, Major-General Clift Andrus, Major-General H. W. Blakeley, Major-General James M. Gavin, Major-General C. H. Gerhardt, Major-General R. W. Grow, Brigadier-General E. L. Sibert, and Col. B. A. Dickson (of the U.S. Army); General Sir Evelyn Barker, Lieut.-General G. C. Bucknall, General Sir John Crocker, Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, General Sir Richard O'Connor (all of whom commanded corps in Second Army) ; Major-General C. M. Barber, Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, Lieut.-General Sir Richard Gale, Major- General Sir Percy Hobart, Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, Major-General D. C. Spry, General Sir Ivor Thomas (all of whom commanded divisions in Second Army) ; Major-General G. W. Lathbury, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, Brigadier K. G. Blackader, Brigadier B. A. Coad, Brigadier J. W. Hackett, Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey, Brigadier S. J. L. Hill, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde, Col. A. Jolly, Lt.-Col. R. M. P. Garver, Major A. D. Parsons, and Dr. J. M. Stagg. Finally, I must express my gratitude to the many anonymous staff officers—British, Canadian and American—who prepared the operational studies, historical narratives, and After-Action Reports upon which I have drawn extensively in the preparation of this book.’
And this is just from the allied side. Now compare this with the sources cited by clowns like Beevor, Roberts, Weidner, and so on…
‘p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there’
Not really…
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE 1951.
P162
‘Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 15 Apr 42
I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be:
(a) The loss of Ceylon.
(b) Invasion of Eastern India, with incalculable internal consequences
to our whole war plan, including, the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma.
2. We had hoped that by the end of April the American Pacific Fleet would be strong enough to reoccupy Pearl Harbour and offer some menace to the Japanese which they would have to consider seriously.’
From the minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee and American representatives General Marshall, and Mr Hopkins:
P285
‘At the moment we had no sure knowledge of the United States’ naval intentions and movements in the Pacific. The first essential in that area was to get superiority over the Japanese in seaborne aircraft. We ourselves would very shortly have three aircraft-carriers in the Indian Ocean, and these might be joined in due course by the Furious.’
‘He’ [Mr.Hopkins] ‘had sensed public opinion both in America and in the United Kingdom, and had found it disturbed as to what the United States Navy was doing.’
ROTFL. As you can see, Britain was bloody terrified about coping in the Indian Ocean on their own.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave:
'Asked the Dutch they always appreciated the Big boys who didn't get bounced into the channel.They didn't appreciate fighting the Gerries as Bernard and the Burns family scurried for the boats'
The Dutch folded in four days, (17th May 1940) having previously tried to take a neutral stance.
The Dutch Royal Family and others then found sanctuary in Britain, from where the Free Dutc h forces and the Dutch government in exile were organized in London. The Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg governments in exile signed the Benelux Customs Union agreement in London in 1944. What did they listen to?.. The BBC Dutch Service, and Radio Oranje - from the BBC, on which Queen Wilhelmina broadcast to the Dutch people on 34 occasions.
Young Para Dave should come with me to the Scheldt when he is old enough, its usually free drinks for the British, all night. He might even get a half of lager to himself.
If Para Dave wants, we can go through the what happened with Belgians, the Danes, the Norwegians, the French, and the rest...He has not got a fcuking clue...
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’
This is no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, and Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
‘Fancy some more?’
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when he (or she) pulls the trigger.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."’
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’. Notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
'Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it'
‘The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt on its own. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
'From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
No how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’
Why go to Max Hastings, when you can get it straight from de Guingand:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
'How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
The old div, Max Hastings, the Golf club bar bore, reported on the from the Falklands war, and then appointed himself an expert all things Second World War. He should have checked first.
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
'How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
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Bullet-Tooth Tony
Who mentioned Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and France, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete,Hong Kong, Libya, Tobruk, Dieppe, Singapore?..
Not me, not you. Why would we, in a comments section about Market Garden?
Why would any sane person?
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@doubleaught7540
The aerial photography can be seen on line. Unlike the Hollywod film 'A Bridge Too Far', which includes a photohraph of post war AFV, disguised as Second World War machines, shown in clear at a nice oblique angle, the actual photographs were grainy overhead shots, which, only after a considerable amount of enhancement showed what seemed to be a few Mark III tanks that identified as belonging to the Hermann Goering Division Training and Replacement unit.
Any information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in this regard.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
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@phillipnagle9651
'Hodges and Patton were held up because of extremely long supply lines because of Montgomery's failure to take the Scheldt Estuary when it was lightly defended so the allies could make use of the port of Antwerp.' Your words.
Not really...
The Scheldt was never lightly defended. German troops were South of the Estuary, particularly, at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the heaviest in Europe. The Germans were always ready to mine the estuary The estuary banks totaled 100 miles, every single part of which, had to be in allied hands before Antwerp port could be used. If Hodges and Patton had placed any reliance on Antwerp being available when they broke out of Normandy, then that would seem to have been irresponsible, as the allies had no way of knowing when Atwerp port would be available when the break out started.
'To make it worse, Eisenhower gave supply priority to Montgomery so he could launch the ill fated Market Garden. Montgomery had the stupidity to lose an airborne division while failing to do his primary job of opening the port of Antwerp.' Your words.
The priority of supply given to support Market Garden, was 500 tons of supplies per day, enough to support one division in an offensive mode. This lift capability had previoisly been used to feed the civilian population of Paris, rather than support allied ground forces.
Montgomery's primary job at that time was toundertake MARKET GARDEN, as confirmed by Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
'At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words.
'His failure cost a lot of Canadians their lives when they had to go in and take the Scheldt Estuary and cost the the allies a great amount of time and men.' Your words.
The capture of the Scheldt involved British, Canadian, and Polish troops.
'Of course British mythology does not allow such facts to be put forward.' Your words.
And what mythology would that be?
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@phillipnagle9651
'An absolute lie! The 6th Panzer SS Army. the main German force was stopped cold with zero help from the British.' Your words.
Really?.. Montgomery was British.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army. His words.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
Field Marshall Alanbrooke
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@jamesondonnell4054
There seems to have been nothing slow about Montgomery's actions in regard to the Bulge. Despite being further North , he was on the case straightaway:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
Alanbrook observed in his diary:
‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
A more recent view on Montgomery in the Bulge:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
'The lead comment being: 'Montgomery was a better battlefield manager than Bradley'
Eisenhower hesitited for a week before acting. When he finally turned up to see Montgomery, he arrived in an armoured train. Bradley, through his stubborness got himself sidelined in the battle. Hodges seems to have some sort of mental breakdown at the beginning of the battle.
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers, did not have a single day of personal combat experience between them. How were they supposed to judge the effect their own battlefield decisions?..
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@jamesondonnell4054
Montgomery in North Africa:
Despite pressure from Churchill to attack as soon as possible, Montgomery stood his ground. In his estimation, Eighth Army needed reviitalizing and retraining. The build up of forces there had already started under his predecessor, Auchinleck. In any case, Montgomery, with four divisions, defeated Rommel's six divisions at Alam el Halfa.
If number were the sole sole solution, then there would have been no crisis in mid 1942. Alamein was the most important event in a process of creating a modern army with a mass of conscripts after the French defeat in 1940.
Montgomery effect on the Eighth Army has been widely acknowledged by those that were there:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
CHAPTER ll
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
PART TWO
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery."
The outcome: With allied casualties at less than 8%, Alamein ended the war as a contest. The allies had had already been there and back twice. Montgomery made certain that there was no third time.
Post war assessment has it that when Montgomery left Italy for his Overlord appointment, Eighth Army was the most formidable army formation in the world.
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@jamesondonnell4054
Sicily:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
Pages 319-320
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
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@jamesondonnell4054
Normandy:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. ” ’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 53
‘ to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.
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@jamesondonnell4054
sorry I’m not taking other peoples eye witness at the time writing about Montgomery who knew nothing of him.'
Of the people that I have cited, Eisenhower knew him, Alexander knew him, Bradley knew him, Churchill knew him, DeGuingand knew him, Horrocks knew him, Alanbrook knew him, Truscott almost certainly knew him, Maxwell-Taylor knew him.
Eye witness are almost always flawed and not to mention Montgomery was notorious for being a glory hound and was arrogant beyond belief, you bet your ass the second he realized that he was beaten there he played it off and took the high road to show that he was just doing his job and not racing.
'You also forget Montgomery change the plans not because he wanted a combined allied attack, which is a political way of getting what he wants, but an invasion in which his forces will get all the glory. Which is also something he was notorious for'
And yet US General Omar Bradley had this to say:
“While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.
In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.
While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them.
The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
THE AMERICAN LIFE MAGAZINE 1951.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met on the 23rd August, Montgomery offered to subordinate 21st Army Group to Bradley's forces provided an decision was made regarding where the allies should attack into Germany. Hardly the offer of someone who was seeking 'all the glory.'
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@jonreese7066
'That Montgomery was overrated'.
Why overated? He fought with distiction in the First World War (unlike Braley, Devers, and Eisenhower, who did not have a single day of combat experience between them), being awarded the DSO. He performed with distiction in very demanding conditions, in France in 1940, whist in command of the 3rd Infantry division, closing the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation, with the famous night march, and then brought his division home to Britain, almost intact.
In his first army command, in North Africa, he defeated Rommel's superior numbers at Alam el Halfa, he then gave the allies a compete victory at Alamein, ending the war there as any sort of contest. For Husky he canned Eisenhower's lunatic invasion plan, and he landings succeeded. He warned Eisenhower about what would go wrong in Italy, and it went wrong just as he had warned. He gave the allies victory in Normandy by D+78, instead of the scheduled D+90. He sorted out the American mess in the Northern half of the Bulge. He gave a masterclass in planning for the crossing of the Rhine. And that is overrated?..
Ah, yes, and Market Garden...
...it freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
'He did a lot of self promotion'. Yea, and American commanders maching around wearing tin helmets, and six guns in holsters was just routine stuff.
'He pushed Market Garden despite the risk so he can claim to have gotten to Berlin'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
And Tedder was one of Monmtgomery's harshest critics.
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@lacuevadeadulam
On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter.
Where is the ego in that?
Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened.
Where is the ego in that?
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@bruceburns1672
Utter, utter tripe.
Just look at the evidence.
Example: BMC / British Leyland went on to be privatised and went from a major manufacturer of vehicles, to being owned by a widow living in Bavaria, to its factories being used as warehouses, as its machinery was taken to the Far East.
Example:British shipbuilding: Who ever heard of British ships bring built abroad? ...Until the Tories threw the industry to the wolves. Now we have to buy our ships from Romania.
Example: British Aerospace being allowed to flog off it part in Airbus... as the French, the Germans, and the Spanish 'thank you very much, that'll do nicely'.
Example: Westland: a British success, until it was flogged off to the Italians. Now, they tell us what happens.
Example: British Airways. At the time it was flogged off, it was the world's leading international airline. Noo look at it...
Example: British Gas. Now it hads to rub alongside the French. As if British companirs could do that in France. Still you have to hand it to the Tories. Fancy them being able to sell the British people what it already owned.
And so on, and so on...
All roads lead back to Thatcher, and her get rich quick policies, designed to win 350 seats at General elections, regardless of the consequences for the country. It has blown up in everyones face as her acolytes Cameron and Johnson have led the UK to the brink of disaster, with the lunatic Brexit vote, and the alienation of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.
What a mess. In the case of Cameron and Johnson, what an Eton Mess.
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'Montgomery’s failure at Arnhem was his second time. The first time was at Caen during the Normandy campaign, the place where was supposed to be taken over on D+1, but actually happened on D+31. This is why after Operation Market Garden, we did not hear much from Montgomery any more, who basically retired, or was forced to retire ever since.' Your words.
The only undertaking that Montgomery gave about Normandy was to be at the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78. After Market Garden, Montgomery cleared the Scheldt (The only allied victory in the Autumn of 1944, sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine, and then saved Denmark from being occupied by the Russians.
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@johndawes9337
How about those Second World War US generals we hear so much about?..
Eisenhower, he had zero personal combat experience and was bald. Bradley was quite different; he was bald and zero combat experience. Devers was different again, he had a full head of hair, and zero combat experience.
Then there was one of Bradley’s subordinate commanders in North West Europe, Patton. He, who when he was Bradley’s commander in Sicily, left the battlefield during HUSKY to seek personal glory in Palermo, assaulted Sicilian peasants, and assaultd two of his own soldiers.
Then there was one Mark Clark, who left British and US forces in the lurch to gain personal glory unoccupied Rome.
Or how about Marshall, he was usually right behind his forces, about 2,500 miles behind them. On one of the few occasions that he went within a couple of hundred miles of the enemy, he turned up in London in 1942 with a lunatic plan to invade France during 1942.
Or how about the Far East…where, in Alanbrooke’s words, the Americans used sledgehammers to crack walnuts. Example: Iwo Jima, that, with the big US hand on chest moment, flag raising scene. Where 110,000 US servicemen faced up to 21,000 Japanese. Those figures make the allied preponderance of troops at Alamain look like bare bones stuff.
And yet there is an almost endless stream of Hollywood films, TV programmes, books, lectures, symposiums and so on that treat those US commanders in an totally uncritical light, using hushed, reverential tones to describe the people, and their actions. In all cases, British commanders involved in the same matters are subjected character assassinations, their actions dissected in in hair-splitting terms, and without any reference to the context for the actions that they took.
All this stuff about generals seems to be an American thing. The USA was never in the war during the critical days of 1940 and 1941. They have no Battle of Britain, or Battle of Moscow. The US Second World War story is boring, tedious by comparison, its all about zero threat to the US mainland, the production figures for vomit bags, other countries owing the USA money, histrionic images of US Generals marching around in tin helmets, US leaders elbowing their way to front when the time came for the surrender ceremonies.
Perhaps they think that all these attacks Montgomery, Alexander, and so on, somehow evens up the score? Who can say?..
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@michaelsarkisian1047
‘based on WHAT? If we had invaded at Messina as Patton wanted, we would have cut off the German army in Sicily, and wouldn't have had to deal with them as we worked our way up Italy. Instead Montgomery's plan allowed them to escape to Italy.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no. Neither the original plan, or the final plan for HUSKY (That is the plan for invading Sicily, to save you looking it up), envisaged landings at Messina. The landings were entirely successful, but things went wrong when Patton cleared off to take the unimportant City of Palermo. He then had to be enticed back into the battle by the promise being the person to lead the capture of Messina.
‘And then Market Garden, ONE road, what idiot plans a major assault with only one road available ? We were already knocking on the border of Germany, and had we used those paratroops to secure an airfield in Germany or a foothold on the Rhine’ Your words.
It’s a definite no. The GARDEN forces covered the ground necessary to make MARKET GARDEN work. The plan went wrong with the MARKET airborne plan, over which, Montgomery had no jurisdiction. The MARKET GARDEN plan actually envisaged securing an airfield and a foothold on the Rhine.
‘we could have been in Germany before Market Garden was scheduled to start’. Your words.
It’s a definite yes. If Eisenhower had heeded Montgomery’s advice when they met on the 23rd August 1944, to use the available Allied resources in a single drive in to Germany while the German armies were in tatters. Either in the North, using Montgomery with Dempsey’s and Hodges’s armies, or in the South using Bradley with Hodges’s and Patton’s armies. He did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt. Thus, Eisenhower gave the Germans what they most needed, time and space to rebuild existing forces, and to create new forces.
‘And let's not forget his arrogance about the intel coming from the resistance in the Low Countries , and ignoring it’. Your words.
It’s a definite no. At the time of Market Garden, all ‘itel’ purporting to come from the Dutch Underground was routinely ignored was routinely ignored due to the German ‘Englandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Underground during the previous year. Market Garden was no different to any other matter at that in that regard.
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‘Monty’s forces captured Antwerp Sept 4 1944. Supplies for the European theater didn’t start flowing through the port until late November. Why? It took 3 months for the Canadians to clear German forces through the Scheldt River 20:41 estuary’ Your words.
Not really…
Due to the pace of the allied advance from Normandy, many of the assets needed for the clearance of the Scheldt were still West of the River Seine. The banks of the Scheldt are over 100 miles long, and the entire lot needed to be in allied hands before ships could discharge their cargos at Antwerp. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe. The Germans were still on the South side of the estuary, at the Breskens pocket. Further, the period of time you noted included a three-week minesweeper campaign to clear the estuary of mines. This would have applied whenever the land battle had been completed.
‘Because Monty didn’t pay any attention to this huge problem and gave the Canadians scant resources to complete the job. He was too busy with his genius Market Garden operation which was partially successful. Monty was not the man who should receive the mass of supplies since his ego was incredibly inflated compared to his abilities.’ Your words.
Not really…
It was Eisenhower that gave the go-ahead for MARKET GARDEN to take place before the opening of the Scheldt, as he later admitted:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
‘Maybe if Eisenhower had given the fuel and supplies to Third Army they could have achieved something quickly. But that would mean stopping four other armies and giving most everything to one army.’ Your words.
Not really…
At the time of MARKET GARDEN, US Third Army was 100 miles from Rhine. Any attack on the US Third Army front would not have taken allied forces into any vital part of the German homeland, unlike in the North, where an advance into Germany would taken the allies to the Ruhr.
‘How quickly did Monty pursue Rommel?’ Your words.
In North Africa, Montgomery pursued Rommel’s forces 1,350 miles to Tripoli between 03.11.42 and 23.01.43. A pursuit that took place along a single main road, in some of most extreme conditions in the world, with hundreds of miles between re-supply points. Alamein to Tobruk is 375 miles, Tobruk to Benghazi is 310 miles, Benghazi to Tripoli is 600 miles. Between supply points there was virtually no means of living of the land.
‘How quickly did Monty take his army from Sicily through the Italian boot to the allied bridgehead barely hanging on outside Naples?’ Your words.
If the allied bridgehead outside of Naples was ‘barely hanging on’, then that was down to Eisenhower, and his planning, as, not for the first or last time, he split allied resources, as he sought to bolster the prestige of the US army by sending Montgomery to the pointless diversion of operation BAYTOWN, and the even more pointless diversion that was operation SLAPSTICK, in which the 1st Airborne Division was transported to Taranto on the decks of four Royal Navy cruisers, one Royal Navy minelayer, and one USN cruiser. This left scant allied forces spread out over hundreds of miles, and Eighth army needing to cross any number of rivers to bridge and cross as the Germans escape northward, thanks to Eisenhower taking charge of the campaign.
‘No one trusted Monty to move his army quickly and achieve all he promised. He had let his allies and compatriots down too many times.’ Your words.
Montgomery delivered complete victory in North Africa, and in Normandy. If anybody let allies down it was Patton, when he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to gain personal glory at Palermo, and again when he headed towards Paris instead of enveloping German forces in Normandy. Or how about Mark Clark leaving British and US forces in the lurch as sought personal glory in Rome?
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@nickdanger3802
Its a definate no.
whilst Britain was buying large amounts of 100 octane from the US, that wasn't the only source of supply. They were also importing it from Abadan in Iran, Trinidad, Curacao and Aruba in the Caribbean and producing it in 2 British refineries, Billingham and Stanlow.
Government records show that in August 1940, planned and actual imports between May 1940 and April 1941 would amount to 27.8 million tons of oil, of which 6.3 million tons would come from the US.
1,324,000 tons of this would be aviation fuel, of which 205,900 tons, 16% of the total, would come from the US.
Britain later cut back on imports from the Middle East in favour of increased imports from the US, because the sea route was shorter, but the RAF was not dependent on US fuel for the BoB.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain in the English Historical Review.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain -- Bailey CXXIII (501): 394 -- The English Historical Review.
Abstract
Aviation historians have advanced the supply of 100-octane aviation fuel as a critical and recognisably American contribution to the Battle of Britain during the critical events of 1940. A study of the contemporary Air Ministry records in the Public Record Office indicates that this assertion can be challenged. This challenge can be made both on the grounds of the aircraft performance benefit involved, as indicated by contemporary RAF testing, and on the national origin attributed to 100-octane fuel supplies. These records demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of aviation history, the supply of 100-octane fuel to the RAF in time for use in the Battle of Britain must be attributed to pre-war British planning and investment during the rearmament period of the late nineteen- thirties.
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
Overture: 1932-40
P13
‘There were some instances where one could sense a firm’s long-term selfish interest at work, and on the other hand there were some remarkable examples of unselfish collaboration between rivals. I think, perhaps, that the most remarkable of these was the collaboration between I.C.I. and Shell and Trinidad oil companies in designing and setting up a 100-octane petrol plant in Heysham.’
100 octane fuel only increased performance below about 15,000 ft, and most of the fighting was at that level or above. By far the bigger improvement was the switch to constant speed propellers for Fighter Command aircraft, that began to happen in July 1940.
100 Octane fuel had actually been developed by the French before the war and Britain had used it in Schneider Trophy competitions before the war.
N.B. Never, ever, ever let me see you trying to invent a US angle on the Battle of Britain again. 2,936 Fighter Command pilots took part in the battle, eleven (yes, that's 11) were American. Happy to acknowledge those eleven, one of whom was killed, none of whom had a confirmed 'kill', none of whom were Ben Affleck..But that's it.
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Auchinleck, who commanded Eighth Army before Montgomery was also able to see intercepted German messages, as did US commanders, when the USA eventually joined the war against Germany.
So allied victories had nothing to Auchinleck, Eisenhower, Bradley, and their subordinate commandders like Hodges, Patch, Patton, Simpson, etc?
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@mvies77
‘When you speak of a theatrical movie, it is well known virtually none, unless they are a documentary, and even then it is affected by bias, portray events accurately due to dramatic license, etc. So well made simply meant, quality actors, cinematography, etc. It was just an example of a part of the total mass of info on the subject.’
The film is chauvinistic US tripe, designed to belittle Britons. Americans love it and believe it to be true.
‘As far as your citing Eisenhower, etc. The quote I read and also saw as part of a documentary on Montgomery questioning the true purpose of the actions goal as to opening a supply route for the allies. The question concerned the opening of the routes location and where it truly lay. It quoted Eisenhower as livid at Montgomery, with his staff meeting with Montgomery's staff and finally walking out after accusing the British of betrayal.’
But where is there reliable evidence that Eisenhower was livid with Montgomery in 1944? There might be some. Eisenhower met with Montgomery at Conde-sur-Noireau on 23rd August, when Montgomery stated that there was not enough resources to maintain the allied advance across the whole front and that therefore a decision had to be made to prioritize one advance. Preferably that advance should be made in the North, by British 2nd Army and US 1st Army with Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army halted. Failing that, British 2nd Army and Canadian 1st Army should be stopped and the allied advance be concentrated in the South by US 1st and 3rd Armies. Eisenhower chose neither and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
At the beginning of September, Eisenhower made the FAAA available for use by 21st Army Group – the only allied close enough to Britain to be able to make use of this force. At this time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the western front than Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
On September 10th, Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels. Eisenhower again failed change his broad front strategy he did approve Market Garden, which would be carried out without denuding either of the US armies of their existing resources.
Where is the betrayal?
‘Morale? There were soldiers whom died and were captured and interred unnecessarily due to the intel that was ignored because Montgomery would not wait.’
But how does Arnhem differ from other allied failures in the Autumn of 1944? Or indeed any other situation where soldiers are captured? Where is there evidence that Montgomery acted with impatience?
‘The Polish General was charged with the failure of the action taking the blame, when according to the documentary it was Montgomery.’’
Sosabowski was not charged with any blame for Arnhem not being captured. He took criticism regarding his performance, but that is quite a different matter.
‘Everything I have seen and read states it was a faulty plan from the top and as usual the infantry, etc paid the price due the ego of Montgomery whom was a thorn in Eisenhower's side.’
What have you read? Where is it proved that any price was paid due to Montgomery’s ego? There were a number of good reasons why the operation was launched. The need to hinder V-2 launchings alone justified the undertaking. Martin Middlebrook, author of Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle stated:
‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’
If Montgomery was a thorn in Eisenhower’s side then so be it. Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat experience and did not command above brigade level before September 1944. His was political appointment and he should never have been put in charge of the allied land campaign.
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Its a definite no.
Britain (and France), went to war on behalf of Poland, in spite of multiple offers of a peace deal by Hitler. The treaty with Poland only covered an attack on Poland by Germany, not an attack by any other country. The British Government went into this undertaking in 1939 despite being aware that the country could not be ready for a general war until 1941.
2,936 Fighter Command pilots took part in the Battle of Britain, 145 of them were Polish. The Polish squadrons only took part in the second half of the battle. The idea that Polish saved our ‘butts’ in the Battle of Britain is absurd.
The governments of Britain and the USA were no position to be able to condemn the massacre of Polish soldiers at Katyn by the Russians, when he news came out in 1943. Such a condemnation would have meant agreeing with the Nazis at a time when Russia was bearing the brunt of the war on land.
There is no evidence that Władysław Sikorski was murdered. Why would anyone risk trying to murder him in a plane crash? He was not important enough to warrant such treatment.
General Sosabowski was not blamed for the failure at Arnhem. Rightly or wrongly he was criticized from his performance, and the performance of his troops at Arnhem. But that is quite a different matter from blame for overall operation.
Churchill tried repeatedly to get help from Russia and the USA for assistance in airlifting supplies to the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw up-rising, without success until the very end.
Poland was not betrayed at the Yalta conference. By the time of the conference, Poland was almost wholly in Russian hands, and Britain and the USA had zero leverage on Russian actions.
The omission of a Polish squadron from the 1946 victory parade in London, while other Polish military units were invited to take part was a regrettable mis-judgement on the part of the government of the day, but this was more than made up for the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act.
Britain fed, clothed, and housed many thousands of Polish people during the war. It is surely not unreasonable that those Poles that were able should have joined in with the fighting where they could.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
1954.
P563
The burden lay on British shoulders. When their homeland had been overrun and they had been driven from France many Poles had sheltered upon our shores. There was no worth-while property belonging to the Polish Government in London. I said I believed there was about .£20,000,000 in gold in London and Canada. This had been frozen by us, since it was an asset of the Central Bank of Poland. Unfreezing and moving it to a Central Polish Bank must follow the normal channels for such transfers. It was not the property of the Polish Government in London and they had no power to draw upon it. There was of course the Polish Embassy in London, which was open and available for a Polish Ambassador as soon as the new Polish Government cared to send one—and the sooner the better.
In view of this one might well ask how the Polish Government had been financed during its five and a half years in the United Kingdom. The answer was that it had been supported by the British Government; we had paid the Poles about .£120,000,000 to finance their Army and diplomatic service, and to enable them to look after Poles who had sought refuge on our shores from the
German scourge. When we had disavowed the Polish Government in London and recognised the new Provisional Polish Government it was arranged that three months' salary should be paid to all employees and that they should then be dismissed. It would have been improper to have dismissed them without this payment, and the expense had fallen upon Great Britain.
All clear now?..
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'"Further, it was the USA that pressed for Overlord."
Well you actually get something right...Churchill was gonna delay it till the fall. By which time both Overlood and Dragoon had taken place and Paris was liberated.'
You Berk. Overlord was a agreed at Trident in May 1943 within the following year. The Quebec Conference in August 1943 approved 1st May 1944 as D-Day. The only delay to this was due to the need to acquire additional landing craft for Sword and Utah beaches.
Any comparison between Overlord and Saipan is absurd.
Overlord was years in planning for an assault on a continent - involving 7,000 ships, 6,000 aircraft and 157,000 troops on the first day alone, rising to one million by early July 1944. Two artificial harbours, pipelines under the sea and so on and so on. If you think it was a 20 mile crossing you should get your Geography teacher to show you a map.
Fancy some more - you seem to, so try this:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=opDuw4OZ3QI
39 minutes 37 seconds onwards..
As I stated, as far as the second world war is concerned, we rule.
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@silesianslonskoeagle
For almost any subject on the war in Europe, there is a Polish hard done by story, a vital Polish contribution story, or a Polish story about what Britain did to Poland during and after the war, posted by some Polish person, or some person of Polish descent.
So dont tell me, let me guess... this the one, where but for the Polish forces, the battle in Normandy would have been lost.
Never, ever, do these people mention that Britain (and France) actually went to war on behalf Poland, that Britain gave sanctuary to 200,000 plus Polish people, and then allowed them settle in Britain after the war.
No, it s all about Britain and the supposed lack of recognition of the Poles in the Battle of Britain, Kaytyn Massacre, the death of Sikorski, 1946 victory parade, Sosabowski working in a West London factory, and so on.
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Here is the General Marshall Speach as I found it. Which stats have I missed?
'I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position. But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.
There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.
I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?
Thank you very much.
'
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@moonshinerman
Its still a definite no.
There is not a shred of evidence that Montgomery considered Patton to be a rival of him. Why would he? Patton was junior to Bradley, was in another army, and was at the other end of the Front. However, at one point, Montgomery asked Patton to be moved North, to command US forces next to his armies.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
'Monty did not think highly of either Hodges or Simpson, the First and Ninth US Army Commanders. If only Bradley would transfer Patton to the Ardennes or preferably to Ninth US Army's sector, then Monty was sure all would be well—F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December. 'He [Monty] said that he always intended that General Patton should come North as part of General Bradley's command'
Hardly the act of someone who considered Patton to be a rival was it?..
The intro to A Bridge Too Far is nonsense. It also claims that Hitlers was still winning the war in 1944.
As for Messina...
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact, he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
Your best bet is to stop relying on chauvinistic Hollywood films for your history.
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@nickdanger3802
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
Cheer up. I might get bored with this.
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seth1422
‘doesn't he still do the bulk of his sales in the UK?’
I have no idea what his sales are in Britain or the USA either in total or in relative terms. Nor would I know where to check.
‘the unhealthy assumption that the world is conspiring against the UK due to base vanity and greed,’
Not my assumption. My belief is that the USA is chauvinistic in the extreme in these matters (modern history) and that the US media and American authors (and Beevor) do not care who they trample on to make money out of this mood.
Here is one example of many:
"I did not feel good" about suggesting Americans captured the Enigma code rather than the British. It was a distortion... a mercenary decision to create this parallel history in order to drive the movie for an American audience,"
- David Ayer, Screenwriter U571.
At least this this bloke had the decency to own up - albeit some years later. As far as this matter is concerned, for me I would not now trust anything that comes out of Hollywood any more than I would trust something that came from Stalin’s Russia.
The idea that proximity fuses and so on took the edge off of any desire from people in Britain, and in Belgium to see action against v weapons is absurd. But Americans with their homeland 2,500 miles from danger probably could not care less. Market Garden served to keep the war moving forward and would have cut the Germans off from many launch sites in The Netherlands. If Montgomery had said to Eisenhower – were going into the Netherlands instead of towards Germany one can easily imagine the response of Bradley and Devers, and their subordinates such as Patton. Muddled thinking started with Eisenhower and his aversion to concentrate forces.
‘Admiral Cunningham never stopped being furious with him over the Scheldt. Dempsey didn't trust his judgement. Harris couldn't forgive him for his dissembling over Goodwood. Churchill was uneasy with him and thought he was a "cad". And even Alanbrooke, his most important defender, constantly lived in fear of what he would screw up next.’
If Cunningham was furious with Montgomery then he should not have been. The decision to attempt the Scheldt or Arnhem had to be Eisenhower’s. The buck stops there. Harris furious with Montgomery? Where is that recorded? Churchill called Montgomery a Cad? Where is that recorded? Not in Churchill’s history of the war. I know, I have been all over it. All the mentions of Montgomery were positive.
Example:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
As for Alanbrooke, what screw-ups?
As an aside, I recommend you look up the bibliographies of the key authors TIK uses in his analysis. Middlebrook, Poulussen and Neillands in particular.’
From memory Martin Middlebrook concluded that Market Garden was a reasonable undertaking given the circumstances prevailing at that time and that the main reason why Arnhem was not reached was that US 82nd Airborne Division failed to take Nijmegen Bridge when it should have done. The whole subject has been done to death – like the rest of the Second World War. All of the key people involved are dead. The books they wrote are all available – and along with contemporary documents must form they must form major part of the story of these events. The documentaries that spoke with the key people were all made by the BBC and ITV in the 1960s and 70s. In modern times the only new information that has come out is the release by the government of codebreaking secrets in 1976.
The likes of Beevor and so on go over old ground and bring almost nothing new to the subject apart from splitting hairs, and splitting the split hairs, passing off opinion as fact based wholly on hindsight.
‘Oh, and I should point out that Beevor does discuss the delay of Warren's battalion of the 508th departing for the bridge on the first day…’He was nothing if not energetic and aggressive in his command style throughout his career, sometimes to a fault.’
I could not care less as all that matters is that Gavin failed at Nijmegen. Most historians and people like Beevor seem to take this view. I have an opinion that Gavin probably could not believe his luck when he got the chance to re-write history when he was asked to work on the film ‘A Bridge TooFar’.
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seth1422
'British military researchers Sir Samuel Curran and W. A. S. Butement invented a proximity fuze in the early stages of World War II under the name VT, an acronym of "Variable Time fuze".'
Brennan, James W. (September 1968), The Proximity Fuze Whose Brainchild?, 94 (9), United States Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 72–78.
As for the rest of it. Montgomery could not get on with Tedder, Harris could not get with Leigh Mallory, Patton did not rate Bradley, and so on - who could care less. Its been raked over so many times. All Beevor and his like are doing is going over old ground with only hindsight to bring into play as they pass judgement without any proper context.
Him and the rest and the US media should shut the fuck up and do something constructive.
Even my father has lost interest and he went right through 1939-45, D-Day to Luneberg Heath. I'll wager that there is a good many of that generation who feel the same.
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@richardthelionheart6924
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON
1983
PART ONE
Alamein: the Decisive Battle
P3
'General Alexander has won a great victory in the Egyptian desert—there is no other way to describe his matter-of-fact announcement of the destruction done to the Axis army,' commented Morley Richards in the Daily Express at midnight on 5 November. The Daily Telegraph went even further. 'A Military Correspondent recently returned from Egypt reported: "I am now in a position to state that Gen. Alexander, who succeeded Gen. Auchinleck as C-in-C, Middle East, in August, is in the field with the Eighth Army. With Gen. Montgomery as his right-hand man, he personally planned and directed the British offensive."' Even The Times, devoting its first leader to the 'Victory in Egypt', scarcely mentioned Montgomery. 'No doubt remains that the victory in North Africa for which the country has waited so many weary months has been achieved at last. From the start of General Alexander's great offensive there has been confidence about his operations, a sense of completeness in the planning'—and the battle itself was extolled as a 'classic operation' which reflected 'the highest credit on the Commander-in-Chief. . .. Already we are launched upon a more powerful tide of victory than we have yet known, and for that General Alexander, with the officers and men of the three services who have shared in his great triumph, have abundantly earned the gratitude of their country and all the United Nations.'
P4
In America there was one man at least who was quite clear about the Alamein victory. 'It is a thrilling and far-reaching accomplishment. When I visited General Montgomery some two months ago,' Wendell Willkie told newsmen, 'I was convinced the present results would follow in a short time. Montgomery told me he would eliminate Rommel. He is apparently well on the way.'
C. V. R. Thompson reported from New York: 'that there is little talk about America's elections today; it is all about the defeat of Rommel. Montgomery has driven the election off America's front page.'
It seems that Americans, including Para Dave, had a problem with Montgomery being given star treatment then perhaps they should have started on their own media.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part One:
Eisenhower has to take final responsibility as by then, as well as being Supreme Commander, he had appointed himself as allied land forces commander. This with little command experience in battle, and with zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction over the Market plan which was under the command of the US General Brereton. Of this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
Political pressure from Churchill, if such a term can be used, was applied via the War Office - regarding the possibility of what could be done to hinder V2 rocket attacks on London. a quite reasonable request, given the numbr of civilians that were dying.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Will you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?”
Obviously no American can possibly relate to this, their homeland was 3,000 miles from any trouble. Not that such a distance stops them from passing judgement on those that were in the real war. As for the Ameicans and Market Garden, the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army - to save you looking it up), was an American led idea, and US Generals Marshall and Arnold were keen to see it made use of.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part Two:
Montgomery contended that the plan was 'attended by considerable risks.'
The key decisions that stopped the allies from taking Arnhem, all came from the FAAA:
The distance of the landing zones from the bridges;
No second lift on the first day;
A US soldier deciding to take a complete set of plans, leading to those plans being found by the Germans on his dead body, in a US glider, in a US drop zone within 2 hours of the start of the operation.
The decision not to attempt to take Nijmegen bridge on the first day.
The intelligence was seen by all senior officers, and was inconclusive:
1st Parachute Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
A lack of air support was due to the weather being good for operations on only four days of the operation.
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@refuge42
Churchill on the outcome of OVERLORD:
'By August 30 our troops were crossing the Seine at many points. Enemy losses had been tremendous: 400,000 men, half of them prisoners, 1,300 tanks, 20,000 vehicles, 1,500 field-guns. The German Seventh Army, and all divisions that had been sent to reinforce it, were torn to shreds. The Allied break-out from the beach-head had been delayed by bad weather and Hitler's mistaken resolve. But once that battle was over everything went with a run, and the Seine was reached six days ahead of the planned time. There has been criticism of slowness on the British front in Normandy, and the splendid American advances of the later stages seemed to indicate greater success on their part than on ours. It is therefore necessary to emphasise again that the whole plan of campaign was to pivot on the British front and draw the enemy's reserves in that direction in order to help the American turning movement. The object of the Second British Army was described in its original plan as "to protect the flank of the U.S. armies while the latter captured Cherbourg, Angers, Nantes, and the Brittany ports". By determination and hard fighting this was achieved. General Eisenhower, who fully comprehended the work of his British comrades, wrote in his official report: "Without the great sacrifices made by the Anglo-Canadian armies in the brutal, slugging battles for Caen and Falaise the spectacular advances made elsewhere by the Allied forces could never have come.'
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@voyagerelegance7907
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and concentrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
For OVERLORD, Montgomery undertook to get the allies to the River Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
He then cleared the Scheldt, the only nailed on allied success in the Autumn of 1944.
He went on to sort out the American debacle in the Northern half of the Bulge, he directed the real crossing of the Rhine, and finished up by taking the surrender of North West Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, effectively ending the war.
Where does the loss of a single division at Arnhem sit with that lot?
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave
'Fancy some more?' From Big Woody /Para Dave, that is like a threat from a dead sheep.
*Denis Havlat: ROTFL.
‘Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless.’
The Luftwaffe bombing raids, at night, after they had been shot out of daylight skies over Britain, were carried out by a few hundred medium bombers, with an increasing attrition rate, as Britain began to get the better of X-Gerät, and as British Night Fighters were increasing being fitted with RDF. Of course, from early May 1941, the bulk of the German bombers were sent to the East, coinciding the enormous increase in RAF strength in terms of quantity and quality of machines and manpower’
‘Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete’.
But the Axis were never strong enough to inflict an outright defeat on allied forces, and by the end of the year, had lost most of their gains in 1941. Greece and Crete were defeats, but the German involvement in the Balkans cost the Axis a vital five weeks for Barbarossa.
‘German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships.’
At the 31 December 1940, Britain had 20,854, 000 tons of shipping under its control. At the 31 December 1941, Britain had 20,693,000 tons of shipping under its control.
‘Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free. In 1941 the United States delivered 4,473 aircraft either directly to Britain, to British overseas commands, or to British colonies and dominions.’
Wrong. The figure included 1,712 delivered to Britain from North America: Canada and the USA.
‘British production of aircraft in 1941 had been 20,094 units; whereas the colonies and dominions produced around 15 percent of this number.’
Wrong. The 20,094 units were produced in Britain. Production in the colonies and dominions was in addition to this total.
‘Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.’
Yep, from overseas, not just the USA.
In 1941, Lend-Lease amounted to 1% of British military needs.
*https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/john-curtin-the-leader-who-turned-australia-to-the-united-states-20171122-gzqc46* -The contempt shown for Britain's much-bruited naval prowess was epitomised by Japanese torpedo bombers destroying HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in a matter of 10 minutes off the cost of Malaya as the Japanese infantry overpowered all before it. In response, Curtin put the nation on a total war footing and there were warnings of invasion. At the same time, he memorably wrote in the Melbourne Herald: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with Britain." "We know the problems that Britain faces. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy."
What a mistake that was – to think that the USA was a benign influence on Australia.
It seems, he may well have regretted those newspaper words.
‘By 1943, when the threat of Japanese invasion had passed, Curtin increasingly returned to a commitment to the British Empire. Downplaying nationalism, he said that Australia comprised "seven million Britishers". He saw the United States as a predatory economic and military power that would threaten Australia's own ambitions in the Pacific. Australia moved closer to New Zealand, and suggested a lesser role for the United States after the war.’
Curtin: A Life. Pymble, New South Wales (1999): David Day, HarperCollins.
*Rick Atkinson
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,633 What Churchill called the American "prodigy of organization" had shipped 18 million tons of war supplies to Europe,equivalent to the cargo in 3,600 Liberty Ships or 181,000 rail cars from 800,000 military vehicles to footwear.U.S munitions plants had turned out 40 Billion small arms ammunition,56 million grenades,500 million machine gun bullets & 23 million artillary rounds .By 1945 the USA had built 2/3 rds of all ships afloat and was making half of all manufactured goods in the world including half of all armaments.The enemy was crushed by logistical brilliance,yet the War absorbed barely 1/3rd of American gross domestic product.
"prodigy of organization"?...
Britain then had a population of 47 million.
The USA had a population of 148 million, approximately 3.15 larger than Britain’s population.
Therefore, it would be reasonable to think that US production was 3.15 larger than that of Britain.
Examples:
US production of aircraft amounted to 324,000.
British production of aircraft amounted to 131,549. 131,549 x 3.15 = 414,379.
US production of destroyers amounted to 349.
British production of destroyers amounted to 240. 240 x 3.15 = 756.
US production of artillery pieces amounted to 257,390.
British production of artillery pieces amounted to 124,877. 124,877 x 3.15 = 393,362.
Of course, Britain was under fire for the length of the war, and had to import 40% of its needs, whereas the USA was 3,000 miles from the nearest enemy, and had few import needs.
By 1945 the USA had built 2/3 rds of all ships afloat. This boast invites examination…
*The idiot Andrew Roberts.
‘Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse’
By early 1941, Britain had two million fully armed troops in Britain. The navy was getting new ships every week, to run a fleet of averaging 14-15 battleships and battlecruisers, seven-eight carriers, 60 cruisers and hundreds of destroyers and escorts.
For the air force, Fighter Command was getting on the for twice the size that it had been in 1940. Bomber Command was getting to a size that by May 1942, meant that it could mount a 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. A episode, later stolen by US film makers in a 1969 pukefest called ‘The Thousand Plane Raid’.
Britain had the world’s most advanced air defence system, an ever growing network of informants in Europe, and it was routinely reading German military ‘Enigma’ signals.
As for the Germans, they were up to their necks in it in Russia, losing a million men there in 1941.
The German Navy could field one battleship, two battlecruisers, no carriers, seven cruisers, a smattering of destroyers and escorts, and not a single landing craft.
Their air force had increasing aged aircraft in decreasing numbers to attack Britain with.
Just about the only information that they were getting from Britain was what the British wanted them to know.
A sudden Russian collapse?
Britain needing very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion? It does not seem like it to me.
Nor to Winston Churchill…
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P245
‘As the months of July and August passed without further disaster we settled ourselves down with increasing assurance that we could make a long hard fight. Our gains of strength were borne in upon us from day to day. The entire population laboured to the last limit of its strength, and felt rewarded when they fell asleep after their toil or vigil by a growing sense that we should have time and that we should win. All the beaches now bristled with defences of various kinds. The factories poured out their weapons. By the end of August we had over two hundred and fifty new tanks!’
P276
‘Having traced the German invasion preparations steadily mounting to a climax, we have seen how the early mood of triumph changed gradually to one of doubt and finally to complete loss of confidence in the outcome. Confidence was in fact already destroyed in 1940, and, despite the revival of the project in 1941, it never again held the imagination of the German leaders as it had done in the halcyon days following the fall of France.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950.
Chapter XXVll: The Mounting Strength of Britain
P463
‘We felt ourselves strong to defend our island, and able to send troops aboard to utmost limit of our shipping. We wondered about the future, but after all we had surmounted, could not fear it.
Invasion had no terrors’
* No experience of the Second World War.
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@michaelkenny8540
Just remind ourselves, Big Woody also goes by the name of Para Dave on YouTube.
As well as stating his hatred of Montgomery, he has called XXX Corps cowards, Carrington a coward, Churchill a drunk, my uncle a coward, and so on. He has also, unforgivably, disparaged cancer sufferers.
He is sucker for any chancer author who tries to pass him (or her) self off as an historian Among these are:
William Weidner, who it seems, thought that Carentan was a British D-Day objective.
He also, it seems had to pay for the publication of his own works.
Clay Blair Jr., who manufactured an autobiographyof Omar Bradley after he had died.
The proven plagiarist and liar Stephen Ambrose.
And a bunch of other US books about the war, with covers showing photos of generals in tin helmets, and the usual stars and stripes graphics.
Anthony Beevor, Max Hastings, and a bunch of other chancers that write stuff for gullible Americans. The sort of stuff you see on carousel stands in airport shops.
Perhaps one day, Para Dave will discover girls.
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@georgesenda1952
When Eisenhower eventually ventured out to meet Montgomery, he went to the meeting by armoured train.
As relatd by General Simpson:
'Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.'³ Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures. '
The author Nigel Hamilton stated of Montgomery:
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained.⁴ Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently.⁵ Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized. Bradley's and Eisenhower's caution in view of the rumour of enemy assassination teams struck Monty as excessive'
³ General Sir Frank Simpson, Wason interview, loc. cit.
⁴ Lt-Colonel 'Kit' Dawnay, interview of 24.8.78.
⁵ Lt-Colonel Trumbull Warren, interview of 9.11.81.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had fought in the frontline during the First World War, being wounded twice,and being awarded the DSO.
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@georgesenda1952
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans have had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
Field Marshall Alanbrooke.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
'GIs actually contained Bernard in a barn when he had his driver try to run a road block in the Ardennes'
Para Dave (aka bigwoody)
The story about Montgomery being detained by US soldiers is utter rubbish. No credible histories of the Battle of the Bulge include this story. Only a gullible idiot would believe that story.
Montgomery's activities in his visit to the First Army HQ are well known.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 448
‘At 12.52 p.m., a SCHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshall Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Twelfth Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army.
P449
‘Having been alerted to the impending command change at 2:30 Wednesday morning, he dispatched a major to Chaudfontaine for a “bedside conference” with Hodges who was roused from his sleep to learn that four British divisions were moving towards the Meuse to secure he riverbanks and bridges. Roadblocks also had been built on the Brussels highway with vehicles and carts.
‘The field marshal himself arrived at Chaudfontaine at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday in a green Rolls-Royce flying a Union Jack and five-star pennant from the front fenders, accompanied by outrider jeeps with red-capped MPS. As usual he was dressed without orthodoxy in fur-lined boots, baggy corduroy trousers and as many as eight pullovers. “Unwrapping the bearskin in which he was enveloped,” Iris Carpenter reported, “he picked up his box of Sandwiches, his thermos jug of tea and his situation map chalked over with his grease pencil, and marched inside.’
‘Politely declining Hodges’s offer of lunch—“Oh, no, I’ve got my own” — he propped his map on a chair and said calmly “ Now let’s review this situation…The first thing we must do is to tidy up the battlefield.”’
‘Three hours later they had both a plan and an understanding. Hodges and his staff appeared tired and dispirited, British officers later reported, but determined to hold fast.’
The only source for the false story that Montgomery was detained by US troops is 'Killing Patton' by some hack authors called Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard.
Montgomery's only visit to the Bulge battle area is well documented . He travelled from his headquarters in Zonhoven in Belgium to Hodges's headquarters at Chaudfontaine in Belgium on the 20th December 1944. A distance of approximately 45 miles. He arrived at Hodges's headquarters at 1pm, stayed for three hours and then returned to Zonhoven and there exchanged cable messages with Eisenhower.
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@Jerry-sw8cz
Not really…
Montgomery with four divisions, defeated Rommel who had four divisions at Alam-el-Halfa.
Montgomery re-invigorated and re-organized Eighth Army to make it fit for battle, as evidenced by eye witnesses:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P464
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
With the Qattara Depression on the left, the sea on the right, the only way was to attack the German through the German minefield. The battle was won with just 13,500 casualties and the victory at Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest.
Any questions?..
‘If not my country already occupied and it's population would be completely cleansed from the surface of this planet. Western allies namely Britain and France have 95% responcebility for WW2 and my country still is yet to receive war reparations. Regardless of your opinion on the subject.’
Your words.
Responsibility for the Second World War rests with Germany. Germany attacked other countries. France and Britain could have easily stayed out of the war in 1939. But no, they went to war on behalf of Poland. What is your country, and what reparations are they due?
Now can you please stop deflecting from Market Garden? I would certainly appreciated that. Or may be you actually have nothing to add to that complete utter failure Market Garden was and that is why you try to catch me on my words and constantly deflect to el Alamein.
‘Now can you please stop deflecting from Market Garden? I would certainly appreciated that. Or may be you actually have nothing to add to that complete utter failure Market Garden was and that is why you try to catch me on my words and constantly deflect to el Alamein.’
Your words.
You are the one that brought up Alamein. As for Market Garden…
It liberated up to 20% of the Dutch population, hindered German attempts to launch V Weapons at Britain, stretched meagre German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well-paced to strike into the Rhineland. The 17,000 casualties incurred should be compared to outright allied failures in the same period at : Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
Canadian troops in Europe were first, part of British 2nd Army, then when the Canadian First Amy was formed, over half of its strength was made up of British and Polish troops. It then formed part of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Canadian troops were alongside British troops from D-Day until 1945. My own father saw Canadians in Normandy, the Scheldt and the Reichwald. In the last stages of the war, the Canadian forces were mainly left to mop up in the Netherlands while British forces advance into Germany.
Before you decide to compose an answer to me, ask youself this question: What are the chances that Brian Heffron will know more about this subject than TheVilla Aston?..
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@johnlucas8479
Nope.
The evidence is clear, Arnhem was added to Market Garden because of the
V2 attacks on London.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
Comet weas cancelled due to stiffening German resistance. Market Garden was a beefed up version of Comet intended to overcome stiffer German resistance. The V2 rocket campaign against London put Arnhem as in the new plan. Otherwise, Market Garden would have taken a diferent direction to Comet.
As far as what order the Channel and North Sea Sea ports were attacked, the final decision must have been Eisenhower's, if he chose to exercise his authority, as land forces commander from 1st September 1944 onwards.
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@therealkillerb7643
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
'Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.
Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.
Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north.
Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.
Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history.
Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be.
He discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.'
www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/4/
Patton: The German View
'Patton, for his part, fully intended to make an unrelenting push to the Rhine after Normandy. He succeeded for a short time, brazenly gambling that the speed of his advance and Allied air superiority would keep the Germans too off balance to attack his unprotected flank. But Third Army’s advance was soon slowed by gasoline and ammunition shortages as Third Army reached the bank of the Moselle River, giving the Germans time to organize their defenses. Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause, and Third Army established a bridgehead across the Moselle on September 29—before halting again to wait for supplies. The fortress city of Metz did not fall until December 13, holding up Third Army long enough for the Germans to make an organized withdrawal behind the Saar River, setting the stage for the Battle of the Bulge.
The Germans, unaware of the Allies’ supply issues, credited their counterattacks throughout the withdrawal for Third Army’s seemingly hesitant advance. Lieutenant General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans and the French, [and that our] troops…have fought beyond praise.” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’
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@johnburns4017
I wonder where it all comes from with Para Dave and his hatred of Montgomery?..
Montgomery was dead over 20 years before he was born. I never seen any evidence that Montgomery ever visited Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Eisenhower made a muck in Tunisia, the invasion of Italy, and North West Europe after August 1944.
Bradley messed up in Normandy, the Hurtgen Forest, the Ardennes, the Ruhr. Devers did little. Below them, Hodges went to pieces in the Ardennes, Patton said a lot, did little, and so on, and so on.
That lot should be occupying his time, not a commander in a different army, from a different country.
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@johnburns4017
‘This from an Australian poster
Patton beat Monty to Messina going around the whole island. He also broke out of Normandy at operation cobra. Those 15 miles at bastogne was also made while pivoting in the middle of an attack on the Siegfried line. Listen, Monty was an infantry commander. He was not skilled in maneuver warfare. Patton was a calvary man and knew how to push and exploit breakthroughs. Monty got jealous, put together a stupid plan for his ego and got good men killed. Add on top of that what would have happened if Monty did cross the Rhine (the slaughter of xxx corp) and you should realize how horrible of a commander Monty truly was. Alexander was way better and he at least knew his role as a subordinate to the Americans.’ Via Para Dave.
AH!!!!!!!!!!!! That’s a hammer blow…How can anyone ever recover from that?...Still, lets have a go:
Sicily…
Patton absconded from the battlefield, and had to be lured back to the fight with the promise of being first into Messina. He got there having faced almost zero opposition, and finding time to assault Sicilian peasants, and couple of his own soldiers.
Operation Cobra…
Started and finished before Patton was even in the battle in France.
Jealousy of Patton…
This Australian seemed to have known what was in Montgomery’s mind. Perhaps he met Montgomery who then confided in him. I have no such experience, having to base any view on the relationship between the two, on the common place observation that Montgomery was in a different army, has higher in command after Sicily, and was in a different part of the front after Patton eventually joined fighting in North West Europe. Still, its not all bad…Montgomery actually requested that Patton take over a part of the allied from line from Hodges. But of course, that request would have gone through Patton’s superior officer, Bradley.
XXX Corps across the Rhine…
Given the limited ambitions of MARKET GARDEN, and the state of German forces at that time, it would seem hard to see how the Germans could have put in a stint that would have led to ‘the slaughter of xxx corp’. They were unable to do such a thing in the months after MARKET GARDEN.
Alexander
Like Montgomery, and unlike Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers, Alexander had personal combat experience, like Montgomery, he was awarded the DSO in the First World war. Like Montgomery, Alexander had performed with distinction in very difficult circumstances in France in 1940, in a situation that was none of their making. Like Montgomery, Alexander had to cope with American commander’s self-centred behaviour in Sicily (Patton), and in Italy (Clark) – when the American commander left British and American troops in the lurch to seek personal glory in Rome - horrible.
...This was easier than swatting flies.
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In Noth Africa, Montgomery's forces advanced 700 miles from El-Alamein to Benghazi in nine days - 700 miles. In the desert, with one intermediate port, Tobruk. With one road, and one rail line. Both of which had suffered from multiple demolitions from the retreating Axis forces. 700 miles is London to Berlin. Compare all that to US forces in Tunisia, after they had faced the Vichy French...
Italy... Montgomey's meagre forces were spread around Sothern Italy, due to Eisenhower's BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK. After Montgomery had warned about the consequences of those undertakings.
Normandy...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
Ike, Brad, Beetle, Lightening Joe, etc., atc. Are we supposed to believe that people who comment on YouTube actually knew these people?
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@etangdescygnes
'Montgomery did well at Second El Alamein, but I think his leadership in Normandy, Zeeland, and Market Garden was bad. And yes, Eisenhower must take the ultimate responsibility for Montgomery’s bungling, as the SCAEF!'
What bungling?
For Overlord Montgomery undertook to reach the seine by D+90. He got there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and inflicting a defeat as large as Stalingrad on the Germans. All this, with the disruption to the allied build-up caused by the great June storm and him being badgered by glory hungry, know nothing US Generals. Since then, Montgomery's conduct of the Battle has been subject to hair-splitting criticism. If it had been a US commander delivering such a victory, there would have been a library of books, statues, museums, Hollywood films, TV mini-series, and not a day would have gone by without a lecture on the subject, somewhere in America.
As for Zeeland, I take it you mean the Scheldt. That was hundred miles of riverbank and shoreline to clear, with the German in force the Breskens Pocket before the approach of 21st Army Group. That the Germans considered the Scheldt to be highly important is obvious, they were never going to give it up without a major fight.
Maket Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German front another 60 miles, hindered V2 attacks on Britain and left the allies well plced to assault the Rhine later in the war. The casualties incurred compare wel to allied defeats at Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest in the same period.
'it has been stated that the obliteration of Caen on Montgomery’s orders, and Operation Goodwood, were mistakes. It has been suggested that it would have been wiser to send infantry units skirting around the eastern edges of Colombelles and Caen in predawn twilight, where they would have been far from the German guns ranged along the Dives, would have found cover, and could have turned westwards to infiltrate Colombelles and Caen in many separate places as the sun rose behind their backs. It would have been the job of the armour and artillery to then similarly skirt along the eastern edge of the built-up areas, to screen the city from German attacks across the plain between the Orne and Dives. Once secured, Caen would have provided a route to hook around the western end of the Borguébus Ridge, and supplies could have been brought from the beaches by both lorries and boats, (along the Orne). Such an operation probably had a much greater chance of success, and would have spared many civilian lives and much destruction of property. There is no reason to think that it would not also have kept the Germans pinned in place.'
Has this come from that charlatan Antony Beevor?
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Dod o
Big Woody is a liar, and this is why:
Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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@nickdanger3802
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
Shall we look at who was closer to the front in North West Europe: Bradley, Eisenhower or Montgomery?..
Please say yes... make my day.
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korbell
Here is the link to that Big Woody forgery.
YouTube item:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead Comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
25th reply.:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This was his source, as well he knows:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
RAM, July 28 2010
This will be waiting for Big Woody, every time he posts a comment on YouTube.
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@akgeronimo501
The medical figures are important. Remember no one is more important than a medic when you need one.
Yea, that's why Americans have to carry a bunch of credit cards to pay for an ambulance. But back on topic, this should let you know all you need know:
The Emergency Medical Services, Volume 1: England and Wales, Edited by Dunn, Cuthbert, L. London: HMSO, 1952
The Emergency Medical Services, Volume 2: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Principal Air Raids on Industrial Centres in Great Britain, Edited by Dunn, Cuthbert L. London: HMSO, 1953
The Royal Air Force MedicalServices, Volume 1: Administration, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1954
The Royal Air Force Medical Services, Volume 2: Commands, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1955
The Royal Air Force Medical Services, Volume 3: Campaigns, Edited by Rexford-Welch, S. C. London: HMSO, 1958
The Royal Naval Medical Service, Volume 1: Administration, Coulter, Jack L. S. London: HMSO, 1954
The Royal Naval Medical Service, Volume 2: Operations, Coulter Jack L. S. London: HMSO, 1956
The Army Medical Services, Administration, Volume 1, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1953
The Army Medical Services, Administration, Volume 2, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1955
The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 1: France and Belgium, 1939-40, Norway, Battle of Britain, Libya, 1940-42, East Africa, Greece, 1941, Crete, Iraq, Syria, Persia, Madagascar, Malta, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1956
The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 2: Hong Kong, Malaya, Iceland and the Faroes, Libya, 1942-43, North-West Africa, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1957
The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 3: Sicily, Italy, Greece (1944-45), Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1959
The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 4: North-West Europe, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1962
The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume 5: Burma, Crew, Francis A. E. London: HMSO, 1966
The Civilian Health and Medical Services, Volume 1: The Civilian Health Services; Other Civilian Health and Medical Services, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1953
The Civilian Health and Medical Services, Volume 2: The Colonies, The Medical Services of the Ministry of Pensions, Public Health in Scotland, Public Health in Northern Ireland, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1955
Medical Services in War: The Principal Medical Lessons of the Second World War, MacNalty, Sir Arthur A. London: HMSO, 1968
Medicine and Pathology, Edited by Cope, Sir Zachary London: HMSO, 1952
Surgery, Edited by Cope, Sir Zachary London: HMSO, 1954
Casualties and Medical Statistics, Edited by Franklin, William M. London: HMSO, 1972
Medical Research, Edited by Green, F. H. K. and Major-General Sir Gordon Covell London: HMSO, 1953
Enjoy!
So his Atkins writes stories rather than history?..
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@akgeronimo501
Not really R...
An American undergoes a lengthy, period of treatment at a swish US hospital. One day he is called into a meeting there, where his consultant states that he has some bad news, and some good news for him. The consultant goes on to say that the bad news is that patient's insurance will not cover the cost of the treatment and so, as per the small print in the insurance plan, the hospital will not be continuing with the treatment, and will be taking his life's savings, his car, and in six months time, his house and its contents to make good the financial shortfall. And also, if those monies are still not enough, his wife and daughter will have to go on the game until the account is squared.
The patient stunned, can only say: 'so what is the good news?'. 'Ah', the consultant replies, 'you have now got alzheimer's - so go home and forget all about it'.
'Nice now what did any of them say?'
I don't know, I have not read them.
'Did they mention needing C-47 to evacuate their wounded?'
I cannot say? Perhaps they mentioned the amount of medical facilities that Britain made available to US forces (Example: Netley Hospital), the amount of US casulalty evacuation and repatripation that British ships undertook.
Shall we have a look ?..
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@akgeronimo501
R
‘None of that included Morphine or the grandaddy of them all Penicillin.’
How do you know?
‘The ones fighting at the time were getting on hundred percent of their supplies from the US.’
How do you know?
‘You do know that Democrats lied to congress about lend lease?’
No, I don’t know. How do you know?
‘The Republicans wanted the "allies" to repay whatever was "loaned". This is why no one knows the exact amount of things sent.’
How so? Britain knows exactly what was sent to us. You have seen the figures. Why would leaders in the USA not know what was sent? If they did not know what was sent, how could they work out what should be repaid? According to what I have seen, decades later, another Republican, Donald Trump, had not repaid a girl dance troops called the ‘USA Freedom Kid’ for appearing at one of his rallies. Perhaps Donald was preoccupied with looking at the backside of the oldest of those girl, he forgot to get his cheque book out.
‘"Supplanting it [42 production] in 1943 would be thirty thousand tanks- more than three per hour around the clock, and more in a year than Germany would build from 1939 to 1945." Even better.’
Even better than what? Germany produced 67,000 tanks, Britain and Russia produced 140,000 between them.
My apologies for the length of this, but it is important for framing.
"More than 12 percent of the British population now served in the armed forces; with national mobilization nearly complete, severe manpower shortages loomed if the war dragged on, particularly if it required storming the glacis of Festung Europa across the Channel. British deaths already exceeded 100,000, with thousands more missing, 20,000 merchant mariners lost, and 45,000 dead in the United Kingdom from German air raids. Salvation lay here, in America. The green and feeble U.S. Army of just a few years earlier now exceeded 6 Million, led by 1,000 generals, 7,000 colonels, and 343,000 lieutenants. The Army Air Forces since mid-1941 had grown 3,500 percent, the Army Corps of Engineers 4,000 percent. A Navy that counted eight aircraft carriers after Pearl Harbor would have fifty, large and small, by the end of 1943. More cargo vessels would be guilt this year in the United States-liberty ship now took just fifty days, from keel laying to launch- than existed in the entire British merchant fleet. Just today, perhaps as a subtle reminder to Churchill before his arrival, Roosevelt had publicly announced that 'production of airplanes by the United States' - 86,000 in 1943 now exceeds that of all nations combined. Of the 48 billion in war supplies provided by the United States to its allies, two thirds would go to Britain."
Its too late, the crisis was in 1940, when the USA was nowhere to be seen.
Rick Atkinson… I exchanged emails with him on points in his book ‘The Guns at Last Light’ - after Big Woody made the mistake of quoting from that work. Atkinson seems to be a nice guy.
You seem to be making the same mistake.
‘Just stop, you little asses were kicked and you dad had to come get the Bully out of your yard. So again, all that is required is a thank you. In fact Churches in England should be required to fly the Stars and Strips on Sundays.’ The Red Flag would be more appropriate, after all Britain and Russia defeated Germany. How are you getting with those stats for British imports of medical supplies?
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WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 395
'To General Marshall the continuation of warfare in the Mediterranean was a sign of British Lukewarmness towards the full-scale assault on the Reich through France, which alone could secure the defeat of the main enemy. In Alan Brooke’s eyes the continued lack of American reinforcements to Europe and the preoccupation with Admiral King’s operations in the Pacific, signified America’s lack of perception.’
‘At this distance of time, there can be no possible doubt that Brooke was right. Not only did we have no hope in 1943 of sufficient picked and trained troops, with a vast armada of shipping and landing craft for a cross-Channel invasion; even more important, we should not possess until the end of the year the air strength which, wisely used in advance of an assault on France, would ensure its success. It seemed clear to me that our right policy was to clear North Africa first, to take Sicily as a springboard for operations in Italy, the weak spot of the Axis, and to cause in the coming months the maximum devastation of German productive capacity.’
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Big Woody has also used the name Para Dave on here. He is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
As Big Woody he has called Carrington a coward, XXX Corps cowards, Montgomery every name under the Sun, he has disparaged the US author Dupay because he caught cancer.
Even on here:
'Winston was too bi-polar,half genius half mad.'
'So he brings in Monty who plies him with brandy' Not a shred of evidence.
'Bill Slim', 'Richard O'Connor', they only get mentioned by him in an attempt to deflect attention away from his childish obsession with Montgomery, which he has no doubt picked up from chauvinistic Hollywood films and the works hack US historians ,and the likes of Antony Beever, who like most of his sources were nowhere the war.
'Cpl Gadway or USMarineRifleman0311' Yes, I remember them / him. I did not know he / they had been outed as imposter(s).
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@billybuzzard4843
A reasonable question.
This might be an answer...
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summaries were seen by Senior allied commanders, including Bradley, Brereton, Devers, and Montgomery.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
Montgomery then devised operation COMET to take bridges at various bridges in a line up to, and including Arnhem, with British 1st Airborne, and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade.
In the face of reports of stiffening German resistance, and in answer to an urgent war office request to know what could be done to stem V2 rocket attacks on London, Montgomery cancelled COMET, and on the 10th September got Eisenhower's approval to MARKET GARDEN,
which added two more airborne divisions to the same plan as COMET. D-Day for MARKET GARDEN was set for the 17th September.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The aerial recce photos for MARKET GARDEN can be seen on line an comprise a series of high level, overhead aerial shots.
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@OneHitWonder383
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@michaelcampbell7494
Dieppe.
Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944.
Ostend.
Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
Le Havre.
Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944.
Boulogne.
Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944.
It was Montgomery who tried to address the logistics situation when he pointed out Eisenhower at the end of August 1944 that unless a decision on priorities regarding supplies for the allied armies was made, the whole advance would grind to a halt.
At that time, the two allied army groups together, were getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day, enough for half of the allied forces to continue the advance into Germany. Montgomery stated to Eisenhower, that Canadian First Army, and the US Third Army should be stopped, and British Second Army, and US First Army should advance into Germany via the Ruhr. Failing that, British Second Army, and Canadian First Army should be stopped, and the US First and Third Armies should advance into Germany via the Saar.
Eisenhower chose neither option, and the whole advance ground to a halt.
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@nickdanger3802
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Chapter 5
The Advance to Brussels and Antwerp
Page 80
‘Although the order for us to halt came from my immediate boss, General Dempsey Commander of the Second Army, I am certain that it did not have the blessing of Field-Marshall Montgomery. I think it was a direct result of the Broad Front policy insisted on by Eisenhower, mainly for political reasons. Montgomery had stressed to me over and over again, ‘Never let up the pressure Jorrocks, or the Germans will recover. They are very good soldiers. Keep at them day and night!’.
For the second mistake I must at least take part of the blame. When the 11th Armoured Division had been ordered to capture Antwerp, ‘Pip’ Roberts had asked me for a definite objective; an armoured division was not the ideal formation with which to capture a large town – even with he help of the Belgian resistance. I replied, ‘Go straight for the docks and prevent the Germans destroying the port installations.’ My reason for this was that I still retained painful memories of the delays imposed on the Eighth Army during their advance along the North African coast; the Germans always destroyed the port facilities and thus slowed down the unloading of our supplies. Marvellous to relate, Roberts captured the docks in full working order, including those on the north bank of the Scheldt. This was an almost unbelievable stroke of luck, for the sluice gates and the dockside equipment, all electrically operated, could easily have been put out of action. Here the Belgian ‘Armée Blanche’ appeared in force. With their assistance, the 159th Infantry Brigade assaulted the many concrete emplacements surrounding the German H.Q. in the park.'
His words.
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@nickdanger3802
"First and foremost, they note that they have written off the main body of Lend-Lease"
Too right. The USA made money hand over fist in the war, bleeding Britain, France and Russia white, while they, and other countries made sure that he USA was safe and smug, 3,000 mles from the nearest enemy.
It was cheap foreign policy for the USA.
Then, a few generations later, their descendants have got the bare faced cheek to on here trying to tell others how it was and to demand some sort of thank you for events that took place decades before they were born. The USA should be thanking others for sorthing things out before the USA turned up and elbowed its way to the front at the victoty parades.
Fcuk off.
In any case, Lend-Lease had little effect on the war in the Middle East, as in regard to goods sourced from the USA, goods paid for exceeded Lend-Lease goods until the end of 1942.
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@Curmudgeon2
‘Let's remember, Ike and the Senior British Officers wanted him relieved in Normandy. Churchill said no, but only because the British press had built him up to be this great General.’
Your words.
As far as I can see, Montgomery kept his job in Normandy because he was easily the most competent senior allied commander there. Eisenhower had made mess of planning the Italian campaign, Bradley, and Devers had not planned any sort of campaign. None of those three even had any personal combat experience to bring to the problem.
This from the supposed ring-leader of any attempt to get Montgomery removed from the command of allied land forces:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th.
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
More to follow...
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Andrew Adams
‘Yes he did a good job as a Division Commander in France in 1940, but I think that he actually peaked at that position.’
Your words.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 107-08
' In taking over the 1st Division I was for the first time having the experience of having Alexander working under me. It was a great opportunity . . . to see what he was made of, and what an admirable commander he was when in a tight place. It was intensely interesting watching him and Monty during those trying days, both of them completely imperturbable and efficiency itself, and yet two totally different characters. Monty with his quick brain for appreciating military situations was well aware of the very critical situation that he was in, and the very dangers and difficulties that faced us acted as a stimulus on him; they thrilled him and put the sharpest of edges on his military ability. Alex, on the other hand, gave me the impression of never fully realising all the very unpleasant potentialities of our predicament. He remained entirely unaffected by it, completely composed and appeared never to have the slightest doubt that all would come right in the end. It was in those critical days that the appreciation I made of those two commanders remained rooted in my mind and resulted in the future selection of these two men to work together in the triumphal advance from Alamein to Tunis.'
So there you have it. Alanbrooke saw Montgmomery (and Alexander), in the eye of the storm in 1940 , and knew that they were men would perform when the chips were down.
More to follow...
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Andrew Adams
‘He got lucky in North Africa. He got there when the British Army finally was up to strength and had a huge amount of new equipment and supplies that they had not had before. They also had, had time to do some training up with their new equipment. He made out his battle plan and then Ultra delivered him the German's complete battle plan. Also, Rommel had previously had access to all British plans, disposition of forces and supply situation...that had ended by then.’
Your words.
‘He actually wanted to use his original battle plan until his senior subordinates convinced him to change it to counter the intercepted German plan.’
Your words.
Montgomery’s predecessor as Eighth Army commander had enjoyed a marked advantage over the Axis in men and equipment numbers, and had been receiving ULTRA information, but the troops under his command had been broken up into too many smaller units, and there was a major morale problem:
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery.
The only disagreement between Montgomery and his subordinate commanders, took place during the battle, and was about where the point of attack should be in order to create the breakthrough for the armoured reserve.
‘He had his plusses and minuses, but he definitely got promoted above his skill level.’
Your words.
If that is so, god help the allies if Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower had been left to get on with things.
‘Look at Good Wood and Market Garden and the casualties there.’
Your words.
GOODWOOD (Good Wood) casualties were little different in scale to other allied operations in Normandy: Saint-Lô, BLUECOATS, and so on. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
‘Also remember, Rommel was not nearly as wonderfully smart as he is give credit for...he did not or could not think strategically, only tactically.’
Your words.
Perhaps you are right? Who can say? Not me. I never met him, nor have I taken part in a war.
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@Clone Warrior
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more aircraft for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more ground forces for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
There is ample evidence that Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower in August 1944 that there were not enough supplies to maintain an advance by all allied forces. He stated this to Eisenhower on 23rd:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
His words.
H was right, Eisenhower’s poor decision making gave the Germans victories at Aachen, Arnhem, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, as well as giving the Germans the opportunity build up forces for the Ardennes.
As for who was where. As usual, Montgomery was up with his armies, Eisenhower was in Normandy, Brereton was in England. What evidence is there that Montgomery did not fully cooperate with First Allied Airborne Army? Montgomery proposed, and got approval for Market Garden on the 10th September, he Briefed Browning on the same day, Brereton convened a meeting (In England) on the same day. If the airborne army was not in a position to carry out Market then Brereton should have said stop. What was the airborne army there fo in late 1944 , if not to carry out major operations at short notice.?
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@warspite1807
'No, Student was not delivered plans for the entire operation.It was a one page SUMMARY for the 17th Airborne Corps if the memory serves me well, and delivered not on the first day, but the second. By that time all German forces were already tactically engaged or heading for objectives so this didn't make any difference.'
Your words.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@warspite1807
‘The plan was not to go to the coast...that was 'promoted' later by some people in British command, and it takes some thinking to realise why The bridges at Arnhem do cross the Rhine, but the roads north lead nowhere important from military strategy point of view The 52nd Lowland was supposed to be in the first day lift!’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Arnhem was confirmed as being in the MARKET GARDEN plan because of the urgent request from London for Montgomery’s forces to do something to stop V2 rocket attacks on London. Stiking out to the IJsselmeer would stop V2 rockets from reaching their lauchins areas in the Western provinces of the Netherlands.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course [an advance towards the Rhine at Wessel]. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
‘on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.¹
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back:
Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want.
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@warspite1807
For MARKET GARDEN, XXX Corps comprised one armoured division, two infantry divisions, and one armoured brigade. The wooded highlands you refer to were of little consequence. The highest point is only a few hundred feet above sea level, and it is in an area used by the Dutch Army, and by the German Army in 1944 to rest armoured formations. It was of little consequence beyond the plan to capture Deelen airfield. From Arnhem, allied forces would have struck out North West to the Ijsselmeer, and, or East towards Germany.
Based on the available evidence, what you have claimed is a load of rubbish.
First Airborne’s build up plan was clear, Day 1, First Airlanding Brigade to secure the landing ground grounds, First Parachute Brigade to capture the Rhine Bridges. Day 2, Fourth Parachute Brigade to take the higher ground to the north of Arnhem . Day 3, The 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade to land to the South of the main Arnhem Bridge. Day 5, by which time, it was expected that 1st Airborne would have linked up with XXX Corps, the 52nd Lowland Division would be flown in, if Deelen Airfield was in allied hands.
There is no myth surrounding the 52nd Lowland Division. It was never formally part of the FAAA army, and it ended up performing a number of roles after MARKET GARDEN. My own father saw it in INFATUATE in late October of the same year. It was never going to be flown into Deelen Airfield until XXX Corps had linked up with 1st Airborne. Its intended role in MARKET GARDEN ended up being a footnote in that story.
Far from marching to the sound of guns, Hackett was ordered, against his original orders, to detach part of his force to support the advance to the Arnhem Bridges by the acting divisional commander Hicks.
As far as MARKET GARDEN objectives were concerned, the evidence is clear, go give the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter months set in.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
It was also, by including Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN plan, Montgomery’s answer to the need to curtail German V2 rocket attacks on London by stemming the supply of those rockets from Germany to the western provinces of the Netherlands.
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He chose to dismiss Bletchley Park's warning of the German defenses available as informed by the Dutch.'
Nobody dismissed warnings of German defences. Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery all saw the same intelligence information, which was not a complete picture.The Dutch did not inform Bletchley Park. Bletchley Park was facility for breaking German codes, not evaluating information supplied by allied sources.
'Over the expressed misgivings of Bradley and Patton'
Patton was too junior to be consulted. Bradley stated that it should go ahead due to the potential gains that could be achieved.
'temporarily abandoning his strategy of advancing toward Germany on a broad front to totally destroy the German Army in the west which ultimately proved successful.'
The point is that Market Garden did change Eisenhower's stategy, if such a term can be used. The ground forces only involved XXX Corps, which could be sustained from 21st Army Group supplies and the First Allied Airborne Army which was sustained from Britain. The US 12th Army Group had supplies to sustain either its 1st Army or its 3rd Army. Bradley stupidly chose to sustain his 3rd Army instead of pushing his 1st Army through the Aachen gap to double the forces that the Germans in the North would be facing. Eisenhower's strategy cannot be considered successful. Montgomery took the allies from Normandy to the German border in three months. Eisenhower took seven months to advance across half of Germany. During that time the Germans were able to launch the Bulge offensive and were able to put most of their resources in he East - the Russian advance was by a distance the most important cause of he German collapse. That is what happens when you allow a bloke like Eisenhower, with almost no command experience and with zero personal combat experience in charge.
'The goal of ending the war in '44 actually, by Market Garden's failure, guaranteed that it would not.'
Esisenhower's dithering in August 1944 cost the allies the chance of ending the war in 1944 . Market Garden was too small an undertaking to change that.
'The commencement of the Ardennes Offensive, aka the Battle of the Bulge, three months later could have completely turned the tide of the war on the western front completely around. Had it not been for the German critical shortage of fuel and the heroic stand of Gen McAuliffe and his 101st Airborne at Bastogne, Operation Autumn Mist would have succeeded.'
There you have it. TheGermans had no fuel, even their own comanders gave it a 5% chance of success. Montgomery warned that a broad front strategy would leave the allies vulnerable to a counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinates, Patton warned about an attack in the Ardennes. How right they were.
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@danwelch8547
Normandy.
‘If Normandy had been left in Monty's culpable, errr capable hands, he still would have been mired near Caen when he died. He had an opportunity to break out of Normandy with Operation Perch but Monty gonna monty. No, Normandy was -- and the subsequent pursuit made possible -- by Bradley slogging through bocage and Patton brilliantly exploiting the breakthrough. Again, Monty could not finish the deal at Falaise when presented the opportunity.’ Your words.
Normandy as a whole:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
US GENERAL DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
In his offensive of early July he had attacked along the entire front from St Lo to the sea and, since this dispersal of his strength was accentuated by the nature of the country, he had been unable to gain a clear success anywhere. For COBRA, however, he had accepted Montgomery’s suggestion that he should concentrate a powerful striking force on a 6,000 yard front, five miles west of St Lo.’
CHESTER WILLMOT
Normandy, Falaise in particular:
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
‘to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND
‘When presented with the opportunity of using the Port of Antwerp, Monty montied.’
Your words.
Not really...
The port of Antwerp was captured 4th September, 1944. However, both banks the Scheldt Estuary as still in German hands and a campaign of at least three weeks plus time for mine clearance would be needed to clear the estuary. Meanwhile the opportunity to take the war into Germany slipped away, as evidenced by the German General Gunther Blumentritt:
‘”The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.""
His words.
And also Eisenhower:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
'
His words.
‘Exactly what battles did Monty actually win?’
Your words.
As an army commander: Alam el Halfa, the Second Battle of El Alamein, Medenine, Sicily. As an army group commander: Normandy, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and or course sorting out the northern half of the Bulge.
‘The folly that the most timid Allied general would lead a bold stroke through Holland was delusional.’
Your words.
What was timid about Montgomery? Certainly not in the aftermath of El Alamein, or the Normandy breakout. His task of handling the 3rd British Division in the trying circumstances of France in 1940 would never have been given to ‘timid’ commander. Montgomery was thoroughly professional soldier whose approach to war was influenced by his experiences in the First World War (Unlike Bradley and Eisenhower, he had personal combat experience) and British manpower constraints. Thorough prepartion of forces, careful planning and battle management wins almost every time. As Montgomery's record proved.
Any questions?
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@danwelch8547
‘1. Alam Halfa -- The defensive plan he won by executing Dorman-Smith's plan? Or the non-existent counterattack whereby he completely failed to annihilate a worn down enemy with no fuel?’
Err…neither.
The ‘defensive plan’:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
CHAPTER lll TWO BATTLES
ROMMEL AT ALAM HALFA P22
‘Recently there has been discussion whether or not General Montgomery ‘adopted’ as his own the plan evolved by his predecessor for the action that was shortly to be fought – actually within a little more than a fortnight of his taking over command – in defence of the Alamein position.
I cannot conceive that General Montgomery is likely to have been interested in other people’s ideas on how to run the desert war; and in my own conversation with General Auchinleck, before taking over command, there was certainly no hint of a defensive plan that at all resembled the pattern of the battle of Alam Halfa as it was actually fought.
…as I have already indicated, the actual pattern of the battle was exclusively Montgomery’s.’
‘The ‘non-existent counterattack’’:
Which quite rightly did not take place, as it was exactly what Rommel wanted Montgomery to do.
Rommel complained to Kesselring, "The swine isn't attacking!"
THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45.
CHAPTER 11.
‘2. Alamein -- the battle he could not lose because Torch was going to force Rommel to retreat anyway? And yet Monty nearly lost anyway?’
No, Rommel had no brief to retreat, as no German general had. The forces that opposed Torch were Vichy French. Alamein was goin to be won by 2nd November, the Anglo/America Torch landings began on the 8th November.
‘3. Medenine -- Really? The battle he fought after he allowed Rommel to retreat, unmolested and uncontested, for 1,500 miles? A battle not needed if he had destroyed PanzerAmee Afrika?’
No, not really. 1,500 miles left plenty of opportunity for the Axis to regroup, surprise Eighth Army and turn the tables – the allies had been twice up and twice back already. Montgomery did not allow this to happen a third time and was then able to easily defeat the, by then, reinforced Axis forces at Medenine.
‘3. Normandy -- The original plan was to break out in the east before the Germans could reinforce. Monty won the battle of the buildup at every step but could not break through. He had an open German flank during Perch and one understrength panzer company routed his forces. The western breakthrough was attempted only after the eastern breakthrough failed. And failed. And failed. Claims that the western breakthrough was the original plan are revisionist history.’
Is this 3 or say 3A? If it is revisionist history, it started on the 15th May 1944 at St Paul’s School when Montgomery briefed Allied commanders on Overlord. There he clearly stated that the main effort in the opening phase would be west - to capture Cherbourg. That is what happened. Shall we go through those quotes again?
‘4. The Scheldte should have been cleared immediately upon the seizure of the port of Antwerp. Every available resource should have been dedicated to that end. Instead of throwing 1st Para Army at a target defended by remnants of two panzer divisions, 1st Para should have been thrown at the Scheldte as both infantry and paras. The Germans should not have been given a moment to recover.’
If so, then Eisenhower is the cause of that. By the 4th September 1944 Eisenhower had appointed himself as allied land forces commander in place of Montgomery. What a mistake that was. Be that as it may, such a decision had to be his. In his directive of the 4th September he targeted the Rhine, the Ruhr and Antwerp.
Not just Antwerp.
‘It's amazing how your litany of successes conveniently overlooks the big failures. Or the credit due others (Dorman-Smith, Bradley, etc).’
What failures? What credit goes to the later IRA helper Dorman-Smith / O'Gowan?
What credit goes to Bradley?
All clear now?..
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@tomsexton3625
'YOUR DESCRIPTION SLAPPED TOGETHER IN ABOUT A WEEK CERTAINLY DESCRIBES THE PLANNING'
Its the description by one Rick Atkinson, not me.
But surely the idea was to try to get Germany defeated asap in order to keep the Russians as far east as possible. To that end, Market Garden was a modest undertaking, a sixty mile dash with one armoured corps and three airborne divisions. Even the inclusion of Arnhem in Market Garden was only down to the need to try to curb V2 attacks on London.
As for Patton. He as not senior enough to be part of the big decisions, those decisons were down to Bradley, Devers, Eisenhower and Montgomery. When Patton stopped at the end of August 1944, he was a hundred miles from the Rhine, let alone Berlin.
Eisenhower's broad front policy set the stage for the Bulge, Montgomery warned him about giving the Germans time and space, and the vulnerabilty of Eisenhower's spread of forces to a German counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinate commanders, Patton later warned about the danger of a German attack in the Ardennes.
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@Idahoguy10157
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591-592
‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained.
At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@johnmcguigan7218
‘Monty got rid of the Polish general because he refused to accept responsibility for the Arnham debacle.’
Your words.
Not so.
Montgomery wrote to the C.I.G.S., Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that: ‘the Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’ His words.
That is quite a different matter from blaming Polish troops for Arnhem not being taken.
N.B. C.I.G.S. is the initials for Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to save you looking it up.
‘When given any opportunity, Monty always chose to blame others for his mistakes.’ Your words?
Really? When did he do that?
‘You're right that Nigel-Hamilton's biography is 3 volumes’
Your words.
I suspected that there might be three volumes when I saw them on my book shelf.
‘But by the time you get to volume 3, it should be clear to anyone that living with Monty's character had been a trying experience for his biographer.’ Your words.
Its of little interest to me how it was difficult Montgomery for Nigel Hamilton. If Montgomery was difficult to deal with, I set even more store by what Hamilton stated about Montgomery’s behaviour in his professional life. Example:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P93
‘Browning's insensitivity to Urquhart's feelings as a defeated airborne commander mirrored the general insensitivity on the part of British commanders to the changed battlefield situation—that the days of great advances were over.
Urquhart's reception at Monty's Tactical Headquarters was very different on 27 September. Browning's lack of expressed interest in what had actually happened at Arnhem reflected the Grenadier Guardsman's notion of taciturn command on the one hand, social conventions on the other. But when Urquhart stepped out of his car at Eindhoven, where Monty had set up his new Tactical Head-quarters, there was no icy reserve or immaculate turn-out to belittle the airborne commander. Instead he was greeted by Monty's twenty-three-year-old ADC, Captain Henderson, 'who was worried because two of Monty's pets—rabbits or squirrels or canaries—had escaped. At any rate I was well received and put in a caravan. And then I sat down outside Monty's caravan where there were a couple of chairs, and Monty came out and someone produced a map and I went through the battle with him’
What is important for me with Montgomery is, was he any good at his job? His successes far outweighed his failures. His overall record on casualties was outstanding. He certainly had the confidence of the people who worked for him, whether he met them or not. If he was insensitive people alongside him, and those above him, then so what, so long as it did not affect the safety of his troops.
All this stuff about this general or that general seems to be an American thing. There are hundreds of comments from Americans on YouTube items with stuff like ‘my grandfather said this or that about this or that General’, or ‘my great uncle had no time for Monty’. Montgomery was my father’s commanding officer from D-Day to VE Day. We talked extensively over many years, about his experiences in those times. And guess what, he almost never mentioned Montgomery. Why would he? He never met the bloke.
‘If you want a colorful portrayal of Churchill's bloviating faults, just read Nigel-Hamilton's 3 volume biography of Roosevelt as war leader. N-H rightfully considers Roosevelt to be the real genius of the war.’ Your words.
Churchill was by county mile, the outstanding leader of any of the major belligerent power in the Second World War. He led his country’s war effort for five years of the SIX-year war, with his country blockaded at sea for a large part of that time, with Britain under aerial attack from aircraft and rockets, and with Germans 21 miles from the British homeland for four of those SIX years. Churchill’s leadership sits alongside Britain’s fantastic SIX-year war effort, as it fought in every major theatre of war from the third day of the war to the last day of war. Britain was the only country fight Germany on its own. On its own, Britain out-produced Nazi Germany. Relative to its circumstances, out-performed every other industrial power, including the USA.
Roosevelt sat in his capital city, 3,000 from any enemy, with zero aircraft bombing the US homeland. He was deaf to pleas for help from the French Premier Reynauld in 1940, he went out of his way to belittle Churchill at every opportunity when he and Churchill met Stalin. He was quick to lecture other countries about colonialism, whilst overlooking the USA’s colonial possessions. He opposed special interests, unless of course, they were US special interests.
‘There was little anyone could do to control Stalin, but Roosevelt hoped that the new world order following the war would be able to constrain his ambitions. Unfortunately, his biggest failing was his choice of vice president. Truman simply didn't have Roosevelt's vision or temperament.’ Your words.
Hope? With Stalin? Perhaps the best thing to done would have been to have got allied forces as far East as possible in North West Europe, and as far North and east as possible in the Balkans, and then shown a united front at inter-allied conferences. Roosevelt ensured that none of this happened.
Before you decide to answer this comment. Ask yourself this question: What do you think that the chances are that you know more about Britain during the Second World War than I do?
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@johnmcguigan7218
'those men have PhD and have studied that not fanboi rooting interests'
Big Woody (akaPara Dave).
‘Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.148-49 The Governor of the Bank of England,Montagu Norman wrote in 1941: "I have never realized so strongly as now how entirely we are in the hands of American friends over direct investments and how much it looks as if with kind words and feelings,they were going to extract these one after another."’ Para Dave.
How right Montagu Norman was…
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P506
The President sent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold we had gathered there. The great British business of Courtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of the United States Government at a figure much below its intrinsic worth.
FIGHTING WITH FIGURES
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE
HMSO 1995
P219
‘the pressure on the British economy was so great that assets in North America were sold off cheaply’
P225
10.8 External divestment
Total (1939-45) £4.198 billion.
No doubt, the Devisenstellen outfit were in awe of what the USA had done in regard to getting assets on the cheap.
‘Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.157 On march 8,1941 passed Congress the new measure insured that even when Britain's cash was exhausted the shipments kept coming. The President extracted for the British thru lend lease the most generous terms a U.S. legislature would allow, much preferable to the straight loans of World War 1,which Britain alienated U.S opinion by failing to repay’ Para Dave.
Yea, and this after the USA had bled Britain and France white during First World War, and then cooked up the world-wide financial of 1929 – which directly led to Germany being unable to pay Britain and France totally justified reparations, and to Hitler getting elected.
‘The Second World War 1939-45,p.85,By Maj.Gen. J.F.C.Fuller Britain was placed in a such a desperate situation as she must have accepted a negotiated peace with out American economic support she could not continue the struggle.’ Para Dave.
The known Fascist J.F.C. Fuler actually stated this:
‘Should that base [Gibraltar] be lost, the whole of North Africa would pass into German and Italian hands. Spain could then be forced into the war; Turkey could then be pinched out; the road to Russia through Armenia and Georgia could then be opened; and, finally, Britain placed in so desperate a situation that American ardour in her support might cool to zero. Had these things happened, and they were not impossible, England must have accepted a negotiated peace’
…but of course, that did not happen.
‘Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.46 In the last 9 months of 1941 Britain received over 2,400 aircraft and 951 tanks from the USA. The 14 billion(2009 dollars) in lend-lease aid by the time of Pearl Harbor helped Britain was in the over all financial and food situation’ Para Dave.
In 1941, that $14 billion equated to £191.86 million. Set against central government expenditure in that period of £4.929 billion.
‘Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.181-83 Churchill considered the Dec 7,1941 attack "a blessing.....greater good fortune has never happened to the British Empire." Churchill wrote in his memoirs: saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful. One hopes that eternal sleep may be like that"’ Para Dave.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950
P486
‘On November 9 [1940] Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of at least knowing that his country had at least turned the corner.’
Clearly, Churchill considered that by November 1940, Britain had turned the corner.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950
P352
‘less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
Clearly, Churchill considered that the war in Russia would be decisive.
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@johnmcguigan7218
'Here is how it is getting on little villa' Big Woody (aka Para Dave)
DENIS HAVLAT
'Even with the deliveries received from the United States, Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships.' His words.
Let us look at what Denis Havlat has stated:
‘During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island’
That bombing campaign ended on the 10th May 1941. Just over a third of the year. It was described MRD Foot as ‘militarily ineffective’. No doubt, MRD Foot forgot more about the war in his lifetime than Denis Havlat will ever know about it.
‘Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa’
Hardly, CRUSADER, launched by Claude Auchinleck in the latter part of 1941, had, by 30th December 1941 taken the allies to El Agheila in Libya. Why don’t people look at maps first?
‘British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete’
As the American historian, Victor Davis Hanson noted, these, and other overseas setbacks in the early years of the war were all ‘manageable defeats’.
The likes Greece, and Crete were defeats that were mitigated by getting troops away, due to British sea power. They were defeats that were not going to lead to a direct threat to the British homeland.
‘the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships.’
From 10.04.1940 to 17.03.1941., the total shipping losses were 1,677,000 tons.
From 18.03.1941 to 06.12.1941., the total shipping losses were 1,134,000 tons.
Further, by the end of 1941, Britain had effectively won the battle of the Western Atlantic, with losses in the Western Approaches plummeting to tiny amounts in that area.
In the same period, Britain completed 2,274,000 tons of new merchant shipping, leaving a net loss of 845,000 tons of shipping. Any judgement as to the effect of this deficit would have to be put against how much spare capacity had been in British merchant shipping stocks, and what reductions were made to British imports in this period.
At the start of 1941, Britain had 3,0031 (16.337 million gross tons) vessels of 1,600 gross tons and over under its control, by the end of 1941, that figure had changed to 2,962 (16.023 million gross tons). To the above figures should be added the merchant shipping that was built in 1941 on Britain overseas, in Canada, Hong Kong, and the United States of America, amounting to 77,300 gross tons – crucial.
To be continued...
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@johnmcguigan7218
More from Para Dave's Denis Havlat stuff:
'Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free' Denis Havlat.
Yea, so free, Britain had to hand over all of its assets in the USA to the USA for loose change and hand over all of its gold and dollar reserves, starting straightaway in 1941with these items amounting to £1.663.23 million in real money, about $8,316.15 in funny money. So free that until the end of 1942, imports from the USA that were paid for in cash exceeded imports from the USA via Lend-Lease.
‘Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.38’ Denis Havlat.
Domestic production of tanks amounted to 4,841 tanks and 109,552 military trucks. Which, in 1941 were going to be used where, apart from North Africa?..
As early as August 1944, Britain was able to send half of its tank fleet to North Africa. Even the 63,000 wheeled vehicles lost at Dunkirk should be set against the production of 216,207 military wheeled vehicles in 1940, let alone the production figures for 1941.
To be continued...
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@johnmcguigan7218
Para Dave and Denis Havlat continued:
‘In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats’ Denis Havlat.
In 1941, the total for food stuffs destined for Britain that were lost at sea, amounted to 787.2 thousand tons. (5.3%), of the intended 15 million tons of food imports in 1941.
‘this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.’
Denis Havlat.
Total Rubbish. The careful control of the national diet, due to state control of most food supplies, led to what was actually improving public health.
‘40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.’
It was 1.078 million tons of Lend-Lease food represented 7.4% of the total food imports from around the world of 14.654 million tons. That 1.078 million tons of Lend-Lease food amounted to 4.6% of the total food consumption of 23.021 million tons. My parents, and so many of their relatives, friends, people who I have known were adults during the war years. None of them ever mentioned vitamin tablets, nor can I find any mention of them anywhere else.
‘Besides the deliveries sustaining the British population and industry, American aid contributed decisively in stopping Rommel’s advance in North Africa. By 24 October 1942 American deliveries to North Africa and the Middle East amounted to 900 medium tanks, including 300 Sherman tanks that were of better quality than anything the British had before, as well as ninety 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns 800 light tanks, 25,000 trucks and jeeps, over 700 twin-engine medium bombers, and nearly 1,100 fighters.44’
The ‘25,000 trucks and jeeps’ was actually 25,500 motor vehicles of all kinds, imported from around the world, including the important contribution of Canadian built vehicles.
In any case, the decisive weapon in North Africa was the anti-tank gun, and allied forces under of Wavell, Auchinleck and Alexander used British built anti-tank guns.
‘The percentage of military equipment supplied to the British armed forces from American sources was 11.5 percent in 1941 (1% Lend-Lease), 16.9 percent in 1942’
Again…until the end of 1942, imports from the USA that were paid for in cash exceeded imports from the USA via Lend-Lease.
Next up is Neil Barr, and his PHD...
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@ralphbernhard1757
Get it right...
'About half-past seven on the morning of the 15th I was woken up with
the news that M. Reynaud was on the telephone at my bedside. He spoke in English, and evidently under stress. “We have been defeated.” As I did not immediately respond he said again, “We are beaten; we have lost the battle.”
I said, “Surely it can’t have happened so soon?” But he replied, “The front is
broken near Sedan; they are pouring through in great numbers with tanks and armoured cars”—or words to that effect. I then said, “All experience shows that the offensive will come to an end after a while. I remember the 21st of March, 1918. After five or six days they have to halt for supplies, and the opportunity for counter-attack is presented. I learned all this at the time from the lips of Marshal Foch himself.” Certainly, this was what we had always seen in the past and what we ought to have seen now. However, the French Premier came back to the sentence with which he had begun, which proved indeed only too true: “We are defeated; we have lost the battle.” I said I was willing to come over and have a talk.'
Winston Churchill, his words. He took the call, Wikipedia did not take the call.
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@Johnny Carroll
'The split was predetermined by the loading plan, the weight restrictions of the Horsa gliders and the space inside to allocate equipment with personnel. The Recce Squadron had 22 Horsa and 8 C-47s allocated to them for 181 men and 27 armed jeeps plus trailers and supplies. They needed more gliders. You’re timings are also optimistic, when in reality and on the ground the timings was much longer.'
Your words.
According to one Martin Middlebrook, this recce squadron comprised of three troops, each of eight jeeps, with two troops to be sent to Arnhem Bridge, along with an additional four jeeps carrying troops who were designated to remove German explosives from the Bridge. These four jeeps and their troops did not arrive. Also, that the recce squadron jeep drivers travelled by glider with their jeeps.
‘According to Beevor's research, Major Gough and his men were paratroopers and they did not take kindly to riding into battle in gliders.’ Tool Time Tabor.
This bloke Middlebrook notes that these troops were trained as paratroopers after the airborne operations in Sicily, and he makes no comment on their attitude to travelling by glider.
What does this bloke Beevor bring to the subject?.. His 'Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges' was published 74 years after the event. Just about everyone involved has had their say, and are now dead. Most of the key documents have been long since published, other authors seem to have carried out more thorough research.
‘CPT Graebner crossed the Arnhem bridge sometime between 18:00 and 20:00 when Frost's men arrived to secure the north end of the bridge. It was these forces under Graebner that proved instrumental in defending the delayed attack on the Nijmegen bridges later that evening by the 82nd Airborne. So, it is not unreasonable to suggest that had Major Gough's men moved off the drop zones in the first 30-60 minutes that they might have advanced before German defenses setup and secured the bridge before Graebner's men crossed it heading south towards Nijmegen.’
Tool Time Tabor.
But those 16 Jeeps, assuming they all reached Arnhem Bridge, were supposed to be able to stop that German Battalion? Also, later in the evening, after 20.00 would mean an attack to capture Nijmegen bridge in the dark. Did this happen?
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@Johnny Carroll
'Can you explain what was Montgomery doing isolated in his caravan from 10th September to the 24th September?'
Your words.
Who can say? Not me. I have not seen a day-by-day account of his activities.
On the 11th September he was sending a signal to Eisenhower regarding more resources for MARKET GARDEN. On the 12th, he was conferring with US General Walter Bedell Smith about additional resources and support for MARKET GARDEN, most of which, it seems, did not materialise.
On the 15th, he was seeing the MARKET plan for the first time, I think, according to one Sebastian Ritchie. According to Bedell Smith, and Major-General Kenneth Strong, on the same day, Smith was trying persuade Montgomery to alter the MARKET GARDEN plan. At one point, he was moving his advanced headquarters from Everburg to Zonhoven. General Simpson arrived on the 22nd and attended a conference at Versailles on his behalf. Perhaps, at other times Montgomery was attending to other MARKET GARDEN matters, and also to operations at the Channel Ports and the preparations for clearing of the Scheldt.
A member of Montgomery’s staff, Brigadier Richardson, was cut off for 36 hours during a visit to the front at Nijmegen on Montgomery’s behalf. Dempsey’s Chief of Staff was in an aircraft that was shot down. Dempsey advised Montgomery not to visit the front. Were you were trying to imply that Montgomery should have been up there on Nijmegen Bridge alongside Carrnigton and the others?..
Montgomery’s papers are stored at the Imperial War Museum, and microfilm copies are available to view. I doubt that those papers will show Montgomery to be sitting on his hands during the period that you asked about. Do you share that doubt?..
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@ToolTimeTabor
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’
John Frost was at Arnhem, not Nijmegen, but I'd take his opinion over the likes of Antony Beevor.
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@ToolTimeTabor
17.09.1944
13.00 – 14.18:
The Recce Squadron landed at DZ-X and LZ-S. One glider had cast off its tow rope over England, two gliders crash landed, presumably at LZ-S.
Trooper Arthur Barlow stated that his vehicle started off ‘at least half an hour late’, without stating the intended start time. However, Martin Middlebrook noted that the intended start off time for the squadron was 3pm, that it left at 3.35pm (from DZ-X), and that it encountered enemy troops at 3.45pm.
14.40 – 15.30:
Battalion Krafft was in action against British force, and established its defensive line to block the Northern ’Leopard’ route to Arnhem Bridge.
So, if the recce squadron had left on time, it would still have run into the German forces.
Beevor is talking through his backside, yet again, this time, trying to shift the reason for Nijmegen bridge not being taken on the first day from the actions of US forces onto British forces, with added, unfounded implied accusation of the recce squadron of having a Colonel Blimp mentality.
Word is, Beevor slung out of Russia, doubtless after tried to tell the Russians all about how Stalingrad would have been lost but for tins of Spam, or some such Lend-Lease old wives’ tale that Americans lap up.
This from Wikipedia, of all places:
‘General Gavin's orders to Colonel Lindquist of the 508th were to "move without delay" onto the Nijmegen road bridge. Lindquist's 508th started jumping at 13:28 with 1,922 men. The jump was perfect with the regiment 90% assembled by 15:00. The commander of 3rd Battalion wrote later that..."we could not have landed better under any circumstances". The 508th was still sitting around when Gavin asked them at 18:00 if they had got to the bridge yet.’
The source of this information is cited as ‘Operation Market Garden. Then and Now. Vol. 1’, by one Karel Margry.
As far as I can judge, this 508th outfit landed about 3 miles from Nijmegen, probably a bit longer by road. A bit different to 8 mile run from DZ-X to Arnhem bridge. An hour or so of marching would have got them to Nijmegen by about 4pm, with the Battalion Krafft arriving there sometime after 6pm. Perhaps the 508th would have had time to brew to coffee before the Germans arrived if they had arrived there sooner. Who can say?
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@blastulae
‘Because Browning insisted on securing the heights before seizing the Waal bridges. But even if the fear of this imaginary threat originated with US intel, Browning credited it.’ Your words.
And so it seems, did the US General, Gavin:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 157
‘Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops. With only so many troops at hand, General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and Maas-Waal-Canal bridges-thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column-then Nijmegen.’ His words.
‘How anyone can blame Gavin, when he was obeying his corps CO, right there on the spot with him, is beyond me. He sent scouts into the woods, determined no German armor was there, then despatched the only battalion he could afford toward the bridges.’ Your words.
‘Bear in mind that he and Browning had only half the force they were supposed to have, due to Monty and Boy’s brain dead planning, or lack thereof. They went ahead with the hare-brained scheme even after learning from the USAAF that C-47s couldn’t tow two gliders that far. And that two SS armored divisions were at Arnhem.’
Your words.
But the Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, the US General Brereton final say on all aspects of MARKET. On this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘Given the single road, the idiotic operation should never have been approved on that basis alone’
Your words.
But on what evidence do you state that opinion? Ground forces were at Grave on the early morning of the third day of the operation, in time to reach airborne forces at Arnhem, only to find that the Nijmegen city and bridge were in German hands.
but Ike wanted to get along with Monty. The only good that came of the fiasco was that Ike was free to ignore the egomaniacal fool thereafter.’
Your words.
How do you know what Eisenhower’s motives were for approving MARKET GARDEN?
His words in regards to the matter are as follows:
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.’ His words.
As for ignoring Montgomery thereafter, within days of the German attack in the Ardennes, Montgomery was asked by Eisenhower to command US 1st and 9th Armies. Montgomery was later tasked with organising the main Rhine crossing with PLUNDER and VARSITY.
‘Monty should have been fired after failing to clear the Scheldt estuary into Antwerp, but coalition warfare is a bitch. Besides, with whom to replace him? None of his army COs were any more capable. His army, corps and division COs at Antwerp also failed to clear the lower Scheldt.’
Your words.
But the Scheldt estuary was cleared. So why would you offer the opinion that Montgomery should have been fired? Further, ‘None of his army COs were any more capable.’ What leads you to state that opinion?
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@johnlucas8479
Does 'page 24 Market garden Now and Then [Then and Now] "' provide a source for that sharp exchange'? Ah, ah, ah... before you state it...I know that Chester Wilmot did not provide a source for the words that I quoted.
However...I'd wager that Chester Wilmot was a lot closer to the subject than this Karel Margry... Shall we run through their respective CVs?..
Further, there is more on the subject of who had the final word on MARKET:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
This seems to have been OK for this Rick Atkinson, and his Pulitzer Prize, or whatever it is. And also, the US official history of the campaign.
Even more than this, there is the evidence of Brereton's final say in all airborne matters at that time. Example: Brereton's refusal to permit an airborne drop on Walcheren Island.
All reasonable people that read these comments can understand that you are not an idiot like Para Dave. However, you are continuing an American 50 year plus campaign, led by Hollywood, and hack US historians of running down Britain's war effort at every possible opportunity in order to pander to American chauvinistic emotions. The decisions and actions of the likes of Montgomery, Alexander, and so on are examined to a degree that they do not in any way apply to Eisenhower, Bradley, and so on. Hairs are slit, the slit again in regard to Arnhem, Caen, and so on... without regard to the circumstances those people faced at those times.
Whereas American shortcomings are washed over, and American leaders are portrayed in glowing terms, and spoken of in hushed, reverential terms, as if they belong alongside Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and so on.
And all this muck, from a country that I, and doubtless many others, naively thought of as our closest allies...
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@johnlucas8479
TheVilla Aston quote what he claims are reliable source say two lifts was doable. So, I ask him this question, “Do those sources provide sufficient information for you to made an independent assessment as to whether a second lifts was doable?
Not really...
I have no miltary experience, and as a consequence, I have not been involved planning major airborne operations. Therefore I tend to rely on the opinions of people who were there, or who have comparable military experience.
If those people cite the lack of a second air drop on Day 1 of MARKET GARDEN as a reason why Arnhem was not taken, then I am inclined to believe them. After all, there would be no point in citing the lack of a second air drop on Day 1, as a reason why Arnhem was not taken, if a second drop could not be undertaken, would there?..
I cannot remember what sources you cite in support of your claims. Young Para Dave cites a list of authors with their PhDs, Pulitzer Prizes, and so on. The problem is almost none of them were even born before the war ended. Almost all of them did not get to interview the key people, almost all of the key facts, and the relevent documents have long since been published. Beevor, Barr, Buckingham, and so on...Every time they being out a book on Arnhem, or MARKET GARDEN as as a whole, they are always the definitive account, or the final word, or whatever.
Long experience of knowing people from from those times, and reading the words of people from those times has convinced me of one unavoidable point. You were either there when the bullets were flying, and the bombs were going off, or you were not. Therefore, unless those words are contradicted by known facts then the words of the people involved are more or less final.
I was not there. Where you?
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@johnlucas8479
Its a definate no.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.'
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING1994
P17
‘This was Roy Urquhart’s first airborne operation, but he felt that the combination of the lift spread over three days and the distance from his landing areas to Arnhem would prevent his division from carrying out its task. He asked Brereton and Williams if the Arnhem force could have two lifts on the first day, as had been envisaged for the recent Operation ‘Comet’. His request was refused.’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.
It beggars belief that the airborne forces commanders would have pressed for two lifts on the first day if such a thing was impossible. What would be the point? Also after the event, what would be point in noting the lack of a second lift, if such thing had been impossible? It would have been as pointless as if Gavin had stated in later years that MARKET would have workd out if the transport fleet had included Lockheed Hercules aircraft instead of Douglas Dakotas.
I am in little doubt that if there is certainty that two lifts on the first day were not doable , American films, TV programmes, books, lectures, and Antony bloody Beevor would have heaped this onto Montgomery on an industrial scale, probably to rival the amount of material produced in the USA on the assassination of John Kennedy.
'You and Lyndon both blame Brereton for the fact that a single lift occurred on the 17th.' Your words. I would not use the word blame. A wrong decision need not lead to blame.
Brereton was the head of the FAAA. It stands to reason that he takes responsibilty for FAAA decisions, whether they are right or wrong. Of course, with Americans, the stadard procedure is that everything that went right was due to the USA, and everything that went wrong was due to the British.
Btw. Where was this Rithie during the war?
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@johnlucas8479
Thank you for confirming that Brereton would not have been required to change his plans during any one day regarding the number of airlifts, seeming to make his decision to not undertake a second lift even less defensible. With the option to postpone by 24 hours, Brereton could have had a two airlift plan ready for the start of the day on the 17th September, with the whole of plan also in place for use on the following day.
Of course, the same document notes that the advace by the ground troops would be at ' 'Z' hour ', like to be 1 hour after ' 'H' hour '. Further evidence that Brereton had control full of the airborne plan and his decisions would prevail.
‘Some comments blame the failure of Operation Market on the shoulders of Brereton and Williams because they claim the Air Plan was faulty and Brereton and Williams were responsible for all key decisions and that even Montgomery was unable to persuade Brereton to include a second lift.’
Your words.
As far as Brereton and his staff had the final word on the MARKET air plan, the evidence is clear:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
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@Clone Warrior
OK.
So how does my not having been in the forces invalidate anything that I have stated?
How does you having trained in the Brecon Beacons, Nothumberland, Cumbria, Dartmoor and the West of Scotland, and having knowledge of an operation in Afghanistan make you any more well informed about Market Garden? Examples, whether or not Montgomery deferred to Brereton on the air plan, how many tanks got across Nijmegen Bridge on the 21st September 1944, and so on and so on, and so on.
We've had plenty of people on here claiming special knowledge because they were in this or that outfit, usually at least 50 years after the war, in operations that were tiny compared operation in North west Europe in 1944-45. They have all been found out. My father went right through 1939-45, D-Day to VE Day. He was in the Netherlands at the time of Market Garden but was was not a part of it. He was not any better informed about Market Garden than a layman, he never claimed to be. But I'd take his opinion on the subject a lot more seriously than I would yours.
As I recall, you are up to your neck in that nonsense with the idiot Big Woody, claims that John Burns, John Cornell, Giovanni and me are all one and the same, as well as that spiteful cloning of the John Burns YouTube name.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really…
The quotes that I posted from Charles B. MacDonald, Chester Wilmot and Rick Atkinson show clear evidence that Brereton had the final word on the ‘Market’ air plan and I made this clear in my comment. All of your stuff about pure speculation detracts not one iota from that point.
As far as Brereton’s ‘Market’ air plan goes, He seems to have sided with the USAAF airmen and created an air plan that suited them at the expense of what was most needed by the troops to meet their objectives: as many troops as possible landed on first day, and some to land as near to their principal objectives as possible. If Brereton had put a plan together that had two air-lifts on day one that was only thwarted by the weather he would have been free from criticism. If he had created a plan that included a landing next to Arnhem Bridge, as Richard Gale and possibly others advised, and landings at Nijmegen Bridge and Zon Bridge he would have been free from criticism, even if those landing had incurred high casualties.
It beggars belief, 75 years later, that two five-six hour round trips could not have been could have been fitted in on the first day if the will to do so had been there. Americans have been quick to point the finger at XXX Corps for supposedly being risk adverse, usually with un-founded tripe about stopping for tea and the like. There is clear evidence of the American Brereton being risk averse to the point of undermining the entire Market Garden operation.
As I someone who was not there, given the six year endurance of Britain and the four year endurance of Russia, I find hard to be understanding of the American Brereton as he buggered around in his mansion at Sunninghill Park cooking up the ‘Market’ plan.
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@johnlucas8479
Montgomery saw Eisenhower on 23rd August to propose a single thrust into Germany. Preferably in the North, towards the Ruhr and Aachen, as the Ruhr-Aachen area was producing 51.7 per cent of Germany's hard coal and 50.4 per cent of Germany's crude steel? The Alllies might not have known of these exact figures but they well knew that the Ruhr was by a distance, the most important industrial region in Germany.
Failing a decision to go in the north, Montgomery offered to halt 21st Army Group so that Bradleys armies could go forward in the south.
Allied leaders knew that a total of 14,000 tons were being delivered to both army group per day. Another 500 tons per day that was being deivered by air to Paris for use by the civilian population in the immediate aftermath of the libration of that city would soon be available to the army groups. 14,500 would support an advance of 20 divisions with the remaining forces held back.
At that time SHAEF Intelligence stated " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
Eisenhower turned down Montgomery's proposal for political reasons stating: that it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry, and that: "The American public, would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war.
The matter of US politics interferring with military matters had been on Alanbrooke's mind as he confided to his diary on the 9th August:
it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
On the 4th September, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”. Esenhower again said no when the two met on the 10th September, he did however, approve 'Market Garden' which could be attempted without diverting resources from elsewhwere.
Even as Market Garden was being planned, the allies had the knowledge that Le Havre (for use by US forces) and Dieppe (3,000 tons per day) would soon be available for use.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Market Garden would almost certainly have not taken place in the way that it did if Eisenhower has decided to back a single thrust into Germany instead of his politically motivated broad front strategy.
Montgomery, the professional, was already looking to way forward into Germany in the middle of August, meeting with Bradley on the 17th to try to agree a way forward - a waste of Montgomery's time as it turned out.
Montgomery offered Eisenhower options: Stopping Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army to let British 2nd Army and US 1st Amy go forward. Or stop 21st Army Group and let US 12th Army go forward.
Eisenhower, the amateur, opted to stay at his chateaux in Normandy with his hand up Kay Summersby's skirt and sipping vintage champagne (my preferred option).
Montgomery had been through two world wars and had already seen German collapses in France in 1918, in North Africa in 1942 and in Sicily in 1943. Eisenhower had no such experience. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad, ahead of schedule. Eisenhower took over and squandered the benefits of all of the work that Montgomery had done by allowing politics to dictate military strategy.
Montgomery was without doubt right, given what the allies knew in the Summer of 1944. He was even more right when it was later discovered that at the beginning of September the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces across the entire western front that Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
Montgomery's view was later corroborated by German commanders after the war.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
US film makers, US hack historians and US thickoes commenting on YouTube seem to be forever putting the case the US moved quickly while the British plodded. The above shows otherwise.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Its hard to make a case for any changes you noted taking place on the 18th August as Eisenhower and Montgomery did not meet until the 23rd August.
That meeting could have with a number of outcomes. Eisenhower might have agreed to a single thrust but still have decided to appoint himself as land forces. Eisenhower might have opted to make Bradley land forces commander and given Bradley carte blanche to advance as he wished. Given Bradley’s bog ups in Normandy and later, in the Ardennes that might have been another of Eisenhower’s poor decisions. Eisenhower might have made the correct decision and let Montgomery continue as land forces commander and then done what he should have done, not be swayed by US public opinion and given Montgomery carte blanche to advance as he wished. There may have been other possible outcomes from that meeting.
If Montgomery had been allowed to continue as land forces commander and had been allowed to run the war on the ground in his own way one can only guess what would have happened. Given his track record for thorough planning, and with the authority and backing of Eisenhower, things might well have roughly as they did until, say 4th September with the capture of Antwerp and Bradley’s subordinate, Patton had reaching the Moselle, presumably by which time, Montgomery is ready with his plan to reach the Ruhr. This plan might well have seen Bradley’s subordinate Hodges being further supported as he reached the Siegfried Line on the 10th September. By this time that British 2nd Army could already have been advancing east in conjunction with the US 1st Army. Time would have surely also been available for Canadian 1st Army to complete the clearing of Dieppe which could handle 6,000 tons per day, with Ostend already in allied hands.
With the Germans having to try to counter the surge of British 2nd Army and US 1st Army towards the Ruhr, when the War Office enquired about what could be done about the V-2 campaign against London, Montgomery could have pointed to the allied campaign to cut of the Ruhr dragging German forces to the east and he would still have had the option to look to use the First Allied Airborne to further hinder German supplies reaching the Western part of the Netherlands.
The chapter in ‘The Struggle for Europe’ by Chester Wilmot that covers the period after Arnhem is titled ‘The Lost Opportunity’. A title that seems rather apt.
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@jonathanbrown7250
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P589.
'It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true.'
At time of Market Garden, 2st Army Group (Montgomery), and 12th Army Group (Bradley) were each getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day. Bradley first chose to split his allocation by giving 5,000 tons to US 1st Army (Hodges), and 2,000 tons to US 3rd Army (Patton). Bradley changed these numbers to 3,500 tons for each of his armies before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived. The only additional resources given to Montgomery before MARKET GARDEN were a daily airlift capacity of 500 tons which had previously been used to feed the civilian population of Paris after its liberation.
Patton faild to disclose to his collegue Hodges and his superiors, Bradley and Eisenhower, and pesumeably his country's allies, that he had captured 110,000 tons of fuel, enough to take his army to the Moselle.
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Jonathan Brown
'Anyone else get a George McClellan vibe from Montgomery? '
Not me. As I understand it George McClellan was an American Civil War Union General.
Montgomery was part of an army that had been forced into a major war, which, by its own estimation, started two years before it could be ready for such a conflict. An army that was forced to try to be able to defend Britain after the collapse of France, and which was drawn into a series of actions in rapid succesion, right across the globe.
Montgomery's main opponent was the Whermacht, which, man for man, unit for unit, in all circumstances were it stod any sort of chance, showed itself to be the best in world, as the French, the British, the Russians, and the US all found out to their cost. Montgomeery had a clear need to find a way of defeating the Germans, while keeping his casualties to a minimum, due to British manpower shortages. In this, he without doubt succeded.
What were George McClellan's circumstances?
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@jonathanbrown7250
As far as the evidence goes, it was not thought that MARKET GARDEN would shorten the war, it was not a paticularly large undertaking, had faily limited objectives.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that
‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
MONTGOMERY
ALAN MOOREHEAD
HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946
P 214
‘With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days latter with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter. '
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Patrick Botti
'One point that has been raised by historians is that neither Germany nor Italy had sufficient capabilities to man and operate the French fleet, had they seized control of it.' Your words.
That may, or may not be true, but in 1940 that could not be judged. The main thing was to put the ships beyound Axis use, in which case such questions did not matter.
'Of course, history proved that the Germans could not be trusted since they tried to seize the fleet, invading Toulon.' Your words.
And before Toulon...
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
P205
'Article 8 of the Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet, except that part left free for safeguarding French Colonial interests, “shall be collected in ports to be specified and there demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control.” It was therefore clear that the French war vessels would pass into that control while fully armed. It was true that in the same article
the German Government solemnly declared that they had no intention of using them for their own purposes during the war. But who in his senses would trust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and the facts of the hour? Furthermore, the article excepted from this assurance “those units necessary for coast surveillance and minesweeping.” The interpretation of this lay with the Germans. Finally, the Armistice could at any time be voided on any pretext of non-observance. There was in fact no security for us at all. At all costs, at all risks, in one way or another, we must make sure that the Navy of France did not fall into wrong hands, and then perhaps bring us and others to ruin.’
In over 50 years I have not met anyone who has not seen the attack on the French fleets as anything but a very unwanted but nevertheless necessasry act. No one celebrates the action. The French Navy had some really good ships, particularly Dunkerque, Strasbourg, Richelieu and so on. It would have been irresponsible to allow the chance of them being put to use by the Axis. Until the fall of France, the Royal Navy had been looking forward to working with the French Navy to defeat the Axis fleets.
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@patrickbotti2357
When France was overrun by Germany in June 1940, Britain agreed to effectively release France from their half of a mutual obligation not to seek a separate peace on two conditions: that German pilots in French custody be transferred to British custody, and that the French Fleet would be put beyond German use. The pilots were not transferred to British custody, at up to the time of Mers Kebir there was no reliable evidence that the French Fleet would be put beyond German use unless action was taken.
The published terms of the Franco/German armistice showed that no reliance could be placed on the terms of that armistice in relation to the French Fleet.
The French Navy was the fourth largest in the world, in submarines it was even stronger than the Royal Navy. It also contained some excellent modern ships. That fleet in Axis hands, then, or some time in the future would have given Britain a huge problem. French promises, about which they may or may not have been in a position to honour, and considerations like how long it would take the Axis to put those ships to sea were neither here not there. Those ships had to be put beyond Axis use.
De Gaulle’s famous broadcast to France from the BBC on the evening of his first day in Britain contained these stirring words:
‘France is not alone. She has a vast Empire behind her. She can unite with the British Empire, which holds the seas, and is continuing the struggle. She can utilise to the full, as England is doing, the vast industrial resources of the United States.’
What Admiral a pity that Admiral Darlan could not have led his fleet to the Americas, from where he could have led the French war effort, with the enthusiastic support of Britain and the USA. If he had, he might well have been seen as the leader of the new France, instead of getting shot in North Africa. De Gaulle said no to Vichy and quite rightly went on to be seen as a world leader, with airports and ships named after him.
'Brits were extremely bad at this game of geopolitics.' The words of the South African neo-nazi Ralph Bernhard.
Yea, so bad that Britain ruled for two hundred years, and even after two world war it is still in almost all the top clubs. The world speaks English, the world takes its time from Britain. All this from a country that does not even getting into the top 30 with regard to land area.
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@lyndoncmp5751
Seemingly more from this clown Weidner...Second World Way experience: Zero.
'-(Chapter 10: General Montgomery's Bitter Pills, page 312) I would submit that Prime Minister Churchill and the CIGS Allen Brooke were culpable in this ruse as well, as they were committed to ensuring the press showed the British in the best possible light. Having the Americans close the Gap, could well have finished the war early and showed the British to be struggling with manpower and unable to compete in a mechanized, mobile war, where the Americans truly were the masters.'
How ridiculous can this get: Even the bloke who actually failed to close the Falaise Gap - Bradley, admitted that he had failed to close the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
And also, another actual participant:
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Sir Brian Horrocks’ Corps Commander. Page 53.
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@lyndoncmp5751
And more nonsense, not sure if its William Weidner's nonsense or Big Woody (aka Para Dave)'s nonsense.
'-American commanders Eisenhower and Bradley covering for Montgomery in the interest of harmony in the allies camp.'
ROTFL. Covering for what, delivering victoty in France, ahead of schedule and with fewer than expected casualties.Btw: Eisenhower personal combat experience: zero, Bradley personal combat experience: zero,
'Why? Certainly, Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton by both American and British press and the innuendo that Monty's troops weren't doing their part.'
ROTFL. 'Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton'. Yea like anyone is supposed to know that. In any case, Montgomery had long since seen Patton off - who had disgraced himself in Sicily by assaulting Sicilian peasants and US soldiers, getting himself passed over for Army Group command by Bradley and having to sit out the invasion of France while Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery sat at the top table.
'-Montgomery's campaign shortcomings which led to this result were manifested in his failure to capture Caen and the Port of Antwerp on the allied timetable'
Err... Caen had no timetable, it was only one point in the Battle of Normandy, which finished ahead of schedule. There was no timetable for the Port of Antwerp, it was catured on the 4th September 1944.
'his carefully orchestrated "showcase" British 2nd Army crossing of the Rhine (when elements of Patton's 3rd Army and General Courtney Hodge's U.S. 1st Army were already across). Montgomery's crossing, which was augmented by U.S. Airborne troops, resulted in some 5,000 allied casualties.
Yea...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P759
'Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."
And a post war view:
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB 1994
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED
1994
Chapter 21. P406:
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
That was Montgomery's Operation Plunder. Shall we move on to Brereton's Operation Varsity?..
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@marknieuweboer8099
Not really...
As far as the advance into Germany was concerned, MARKET GARDEN was intended ro end with the capture of Arnhem.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces'
His words.
Anhem was added to MARKET GARDEN on the 10th September 1944, in response to an urgent request from the War Office regarding what could be done to hinder, or cutail V2 rocket attacks on London.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
'on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared. By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.'
Englandspiel may have ended before MARKET GARDEN, but British caution would seem to have been wholly understandable, given what had happened. Further, the activities Christiaan Lindemans, and the understandable mistrust of the SS man, Prince Bernhard by British and US intelligence services continued to complicate intelligence matters involving the Dutch after MARKET GARDEN had finished.
The troops on the ground made some use of help from the local population. Given that the Germans found a copy of the MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone at the very start of the operation, it is hard to see how any tardiness on the part of British troops in using information supplied by the local population had any real bearing on the outcome of the operation.
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@johnlucas8479
From Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen#cite_note-Spanjaard-6
On 18 September, Model sent reinforcements from Arnhem to keep the Waal Bridge out of the Allies' hands. Because elements of the British 1st Airborne Division were still in control of the Arnhem bridge at the time,[24] the 1. Kompagnie SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung commanded by SS-Untersturmführer Werner Baumgärtel and the 2. Bataillon SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 under leadership of SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling crossed the Rhine at Pannerden as the 500 man strong 'Kampfgruppe Euling', used the still intact Waal Bridge and dug in at the Hunnerpark.[6] These reinforcements enabled the SS to regroup under the command of Sturmbannführer Leo Reinhold, who set up his headquarters on the north Waal bank. Fallschirmjäger Oberst Henke prepared the Railway Bridge's defences. The two roundabouts and beltway were reinforced during the next 48 hours. The Americans would have to wait for the XXX Corps' help in taking the bridges, even though according to the planning, they should have been captured before the British arrival.[22]
[24] Saunders, Tim (2008). Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781783461141. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
[6] Spanjaard, Aard (2013). Historische route De slag om Arnhem: langs de sporen van operatie Market Garden 17-26 september 1944. Delft: Uitgeverij Elmar. p. 145. ISBN 9789038922775. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
[22] Saunders, Tim (2008). Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781783461141. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
Oddball and Screwball claim that the Pannerden Ferry was in use through September, October, and November. Its had to why with the Arnhem Bridge in German hands.
It seems that with both Huissen and Pannerden Ferries firmly in German held terrtitory, it seems that between 17th and 20th September (probably mainly the 18th and 19th), the Germans were able to move four tanks, some artilley pieces, and 500 troops southwards? You concur?..
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@seth1422
‘The Guards Armoured’s Coldstream Group was still needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings. Once on the north bank, much of the British armour and infantry had to be used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged. By the time the Nijmegen bridge fell on D plus 3, it was early evening and it would be dark before an armoured column could be assembled to march on Arnhem. North of Nijmegen the enemy had tanks and guns and infantry of two SS Panzer divisions, in unknown but growing strength, established in country ideal for defence.’
‘At the village of Ressen, less than t
hree miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen.’
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign p. 185
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freebeerfordworkers
Yep
From memory, my school curriculum in the school years before pupils made choices for O and A levels comprised: English, Maths, Science, a foreign language, Music, Art, Woodwork, RE, Civics, Technical Drawing, Geography, History, and PE.
5.5 hours per day, five days per week., that is about 2 hours per week per subject, although the likes of English and maths got more time than other subjects. I thing the likes of Geography and History got an hour a week. 43 or so, school weeks in a year, would mean 43 hours of History per year, for three school years, after which, History, and some other subjects became optional.
What do these who make these throw-away comments, like what is, and is not taught in school about the potato famine think should happen instead? Cancel some of the English and Maths in order to make room for potato famine studies?
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@johnlucas8479
Not really…
‘1) Went are you going to provide any evidence that two lifts on the 17th was Doable, when morning fog on the 17th restricted takeoff until it cleared at 0900 hours. I what evidence not rehash of extract from Historians were they provide no evidence that a second lift was actual doable. Prove a extract from a Historian that has provide evidence that 2 lifts was doable.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.’
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING1994
P17
‘He [Urquhart] asked Brereton and Williams if the Arnhem force could have two lifts on the first day, as had been envisaged for the recent Operation ‘Comet’. His request was refused.’
P443
…’Air Chief Marshall Scarlett-Streatfield, produced a combined 38-46 Group report on Arnhem which reads: ‘In future operations against an organized enemy, it may be found necessary to complete the entire lift within a matter of hours, landing every essential unit or load within a matter of hours, landing every essential unit or load before the enemy can assess the situation, and not relying on airborne reinforcement or resupply.’¹ It was the blueprint for the successful airborne landing across the Rhine in March 1945.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision’
Seemingly, The airborne division commanders considered that two lifts on one day could be done, otherwise, why would they ask for them? You ask for proof that ‘2 lifts was doable’, but offer no proof that 2 lifts was not doable. US FAAA commanders stating that 2 lifts could not be done is not proof. What can be allowed is that if two lifts had taken place, and Arnhem was not taken then Brereton is in the clear. If two lifts had planned for but a second lift was thwarted by the weather, then Brereton is in the clear. But neither of these happened. Perhaps if Brereton had presented his MARKET plan to Montgomery and Eisenhower and words to effect ‘here is the airborne plan, but we can only go with one lift on day one, so we do not consider that MARKET can work’, he would be in the clear. Is there any evidence that this type of opinion was expressed?.. This: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mowr70IhL6E&t=1040s&ab_channel=FoundationofWayneCommunityCollege
is the standard American ‘tts all the fault of the British’ fare, so beloved by you and your American mates in YouTube comments, but at 16 minutes, and five seconds gets it somewhere near right about Brereton.
‘2) Were your evidence that Brereton was involved in selecting the Arnhem DZ/LZ , as these site were selected by the RAF for Operation Comet.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
Yep, this this in particular is about Zon. There is zero chance that decision making on Zon DZ/LZs was any different to decision making for Arnhem DZ/LZs,
and that Brereton was not involved in this process.
‘3) How would additional resource assist Operation Market Garden?’
Who can say? I cannot. I have to rely on the opinion of others…
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P589
‘When Eisenhower placed the Airborne Army at Montgomery’s disposal on September 4th, he was committing his strategic reserve, the only major force he could throw in to clinch the victory that had been won in France. But he did not make available to Montgomery the supply resources necessary to ensure that the maximum advantage was drawn from the commitment of this precious reserve.’
ON TO BERLIN
BATTLES OF AN AIRBORNE COMMANDER
1943-1945
JAMES M, GAVIN
LEO COOPER LONDON. 1979
P184
‘Why was Montgomery not given adequate troop and logistic support at least one more division?’
‘4) "Gavin had "got the stick out" and advanced on Nijmegen Bridge on day one". Have you any evidence that proves with 100% certainty that if 1/508 Bn did not stop short of the bridge that they would have capture both end of the Bridge or is it just speculation?’
I have not got 100% certainty on this matter, and neither have you, who would have? There can be little doubt that those troops would have stood a much better chance of taking Nijmegen Bridge on day one if they had made an attempt to take the bridge. The reality was that the Bridge was in German hands when XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen.
‘5) "Bradley had made a worthwhile effort to work with Market Garden". Well TheVilla Aston what you mean by worthwhile effort. Any attack by 12th Army Group during the period of Market garden could be considered a worthwhile effort because either
1) it would stop the Germans from moving troops and equipment from the 12 Army Group Front to Arnhem or
2) it would force the Germans to split their reserves between Arnhem and 12th Army Group Front.’
Worthwhile, meaning Bradley stopping his subordinate Patton, and giving another of his subordinate commander, Hodges, fuller backing for thrust through the Aachen gap, or moving his forces across to support Dempsey. What Bradley decided to do was to split his supplies equally between Hodges and Patton. What happened, Metz failed, Aachen failed, Arnhem was not taken. As far as this stuff is concerned, all roads lead back to Eisenhower… If Americans would but admit it.
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John Lucas
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody), 'larf', 'wright at him'. An example of what can go wrong in US schools? Or a weak attempt by a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, to imitate British pronuciation of English words?
And you, John Lucas, being half-way sensible...
Para Dave to me: 'you clearly blamed the Gavin and the GIs for years, agreeing with TIK to get your boy off the hook .'
As I have noted on here, many times before...
Based on the evidence I have seen, Gavin took the decision not to prioritize the capture of Nijmegen Bridge on Day One of MARKET GARDEN. As a result, XXX Corps were unable to reach Arnhem Bridge in time to link up with British forces there. Does that mean Gavin made a bad decision? How am I supposed to know?
That might have been an entirely reasonable decision given the cicumstances that Gavin found himself in at the time. Who can say? I cannot.
Does that mean I attach blame to Gavin? How can I? I was not in that war, not in any war to date, I have not even been a member of any armed forces. All I can rely on is what I have read, and what I seen, and have I heard. Most of what I have read from sensible sources (meaning, not Beeevor, Hastings etc.) I have quoted in YouTube. I have been in Nijmegen, and the Groesbeek heights, for all the help that was. I have known one person who was at Nijmegen at that time, who offered no opinion on those events. So blame? Definately not from me.
Perhaps Para Dave has knowledge from personal experiece that guides him in composing his outbursts.
And while I am about it:
'on September 4th he told IKE that opening up the port of Antwerp was part of the plan' Para Dave.
'told ' would suggest verbal communication. Do you know where there is evidence that Eisenhower and Montgomery spoke to each other on the 4th September 1944?
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Not really...
Browning.
Browning had considerable airborne experience, starting November 1941, when he was appointed GOC 1st Airborne, he qualified as a pilot, as was involved in airborne forces operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Europe. The story Major Brian Urquhart’s involvement in Browning’s intelligence seems to be nowhere as straightforward as presented by Cornelius Ryan. There is a comprehensive record of allied reconnaissance flights at that time at time, and there is no note of a flight going ahead at Urquhart’s request. Browning’s decision to take a headquarters to Groesbeek was no more last minute than anything else connected with MARKET GARDEN. It seems to have considered to have been a poor decision, but there seems to be no real opinion that it cost the allies Arnhem.
Motives for launching Market Garden.
The only documented impetus behind the launching of MARKET GARDEN, as far as Arnhem was the need to counter the launching of V2 Rockets at London from the western provinces of the Netherlands, which had begun on the 8th September 1944, two days before MARKET GARDEN was approved, causing the War Office to send this message to Montgomery on the 9th: “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?”
In regard to the operation as a whole, Eisenhower later stated: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
Air lifts.
The decision to undertake one lift per day rested with the head of the FAAA US General, Lewis Brereton. This has been considered to be one of the key reasons why the allies failed to take Arnhem.
Intelligence.
This is how allied leaders were briefed:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The weather.
The weather held good for only two of the nine days of the operation, severely limiting the ability of the allies to use their air asset. When it could get to the targets, the RAF blasted German forces, as it around the Oosterbeek perimeter near the end of the operation. Eisenhower, Churchill, Montgomery, and the German General Karl Student cited the weather as key reason why the allies could not capture Arnhem.
The Poles.
Montgomery and, later criticized the attitude and the performance of the Polish forces during MARKET GARDEN. The did not blame them for the failure to take Arnhem.
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@RoastedOpinions
OK...
MARKET GARDEN
What was needlessly complex about the plan? Any build up of additiona forces was undertaken by the FAAA as part of MARKET, over which Montgomery had no final say. MARKET was put with existing forces (XXX Corps) for GARDEN. Additional support promised for GARDEN by Eisenhower on the 12th September 1944, never really happened.
HUSKY
was a two army undertaking. Montgomery commanded Eighth Army, US Seventh Army was commanded by US General Patton. The first, and last occasion that these two commanders were of equal status in an allied campaign. Both of these commanders reported to General Alexander, and thence to General Eisenhower. How can it be stated that Montgomery undertook needlessly complex plans, and spent too muchtime accumulating supplies in that campaign?
GOODWOOD
Was one of a number of individual battles in the OVERLORD campaign, undertaken according changing circumstances during that campaign. In the case of GOODWOOD, the plan was to stop any drift westwards of German forces from the British front to the US front, due to slowness of the US build-up and as a consequence the delay in the US breakout. How could such a plan be needlessly complex and take too much time to accumulate supplies?
ALAMEIN
How would the time difference Auchininleck's and Montgomery's planned offensives add to bloodshed in Malta and Crete in the Autumn of 1942? The RAF was in in the process of winning the air battle over Malta, and Greece was wholly in Axis hands at that time. Besides, can any who was not there state that Auchinleck's plan would not have taken longer than Montgomery's 11 day battle?
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John Cornell
Yea, the German collapse left them with less tanks and artillery to defend the entire Western Front than Britain had to defend Britain just after Dunkirk. The Allies needed leadership and viable plan that was capable of taking advantage of the German's dire state. Instead they got Eisenhower and his broad front policy.
As for the Scheldt in early September 1944:
The Germans were in force on the south bank, the defences on Walcheren were already some of the most formidable in Europe and the estuary would still have taken five weeks to clear. By any reckoning it would have been seven to ten weeks to before Antwerp could be used.
As you so rightly noted:
'We see what happened when the Germans had time to consolidate, regroup and re-arm. They managed to strengthen for Market Garden in just two weeks. Goodness knows how much stronger they would have been had the clearing of the Scheldt been done first, giving them even more time.'
As for my father, he was in the 79th Armoured Division. He was on D-Day (Sword Beach), Normandy, the Scheldt, the Reichwald and the Rhine. He was not on Market Garden or the Bulge. That did not make him an expert on the campaign in Europe, he never claimed to be. He never really took that much interest in that stuff.
If it is of interest, my Uncle was an RN Gunner who's ship took part in D-Day
(Utah Beach) and the attack on Walcheren. Before that he had been in the Indian Ocean, and in the Mediterranean for Husky.
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Don Stapp
Get lost.
Britain declared war on Germany in 1939 - to aid another country. Apart from France, no other country did that. All the rest attacked other countries, were attacked, or had war declared on them.
From 1939, through the fall of Poland, France and so on through the war in Russia, Britain could have a deal any time it wanted one, without a single German soldier ever landing in Britain.
Britain carried on, the major country to fight the full six years of the war. Not forgetting of course, the solidarity shown by Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Affica.
All clear now?
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@johnlucas8479
‘You quoted the dates the various ports were captured, but failed to state the dates the ports became operation.’
Not mentioning those operation dates for those ports was a deliberate decision by me because I looked to see what can be judged by a lack of evidence as to how long Montgomery’s proposed advance with British Second Army, and US First Army would take to prepare for, and then to mount, and how fast, and how far such advance could achieve.
Whether military people, and civilian authorities could provide reliable timescales for when ports would be usable after their liberation, I do not know. However were they able to do so, then perhaps allied military leaders might have been able to take those matters into account as an advance continued.
‘So, if Dieppe provide the resource for 1st Canadian Army to continue to operate against the channel ports. Then the 1st US and 2nd British Army would be depended on Cherbourg and Normandy Beaches until the end of September.’
But the British Second Army, and the US First Army would have been operating with greater share of allied resources at that time.
‘As to change the Military affairs I have no idea, I simple looking at when additional capacity would be available. On the 23rd of August’
As of the 23rd August, here were no additional resources available, hence Montgomery’s proposal to re-distribute allied the then available resources in such a way as to keep the allied advance moving.
‘2nd British Army had 10 Divisions and 1st US Army had 9 Divisions at total of 19 Divisions. The reason Montgomery stop at Antwerp on the 4th of September was that due to German collapse 2nd Army outran its supplies lines. The same problem also thing happen to both the 1st and 3rd US Army. The Armies were moving faster than the supply organization could keep up.’
Then perhaps, all the more reason to concentrate allied resources to where they could do most damage to the enemy?..
‘From Montgomery own accounts clearly, the Germans were staring to recovery by early September. The reason he canceled Operation Comet was due to increasing resistance in front of 2nd Army.’
Again, perhaps, all the more reason to concentrate allied resources to where they could do most damage to the enemy?..
‘As to Eisenhower citing political reasons all your need to read the outage in UK Press when Bradley was made Army Group Commander on the same level as Montgomery. I doubt the British press or Government would accept Montgomery reporting to Bradley.'
In that case, the telling point seems to be that Eisenhower was prepared to ignore opinion in Britain, but he was not prepared to ignore opinion in the USA.
‘I agree Montgomery had more combat experience than Eisenhower, but lack of combat experience does not rule out his ability to lead the ground war. In the PTO Admiral Nimitz also had no combat experience lead a successful naval and island-hopping campaign.’
Anyone with even the smallest amount of combat experience would have more of that experience than Eisenhower. My mother had probably seen more of the enemy than Eisenhower at that time. But, all other factors being equal, then who would be the better choice for making military decisions?..
‘Remember Montgomery WW1 experience after he was wounded was a general staff officer and at end the war as chief of staff of 47th Division.’
But that leaves Montgomery way ahead of Bradley, Devers, and Eisenhower in combat experience. As someone with no experience of war, a far I am concerned, you have either been in it, or you have not.
‘My personal view when the German Army collapse in August 1944 senior officers look back to famous 100 days (August to November 1918) think that the same thing was happening again and that one large push across the whole front will end the war in 1944.’
Perhaps? The numbers regarding the allied supply situation at that time do not seem to be in dispute. The evidence regarding what the allied leaders knew about the state of German forces that I have seen, seems to show that a reasonable view was taken of that information. Did the allies underestimate the ability of the German army to recover from setbacks, and the determination of the Germans defend their homeland? Who can say?..
Not me.
Since the war, information that has come to light seems to show that the allied assessment of the German material situation was broadly correct.
Also, since the war a number of German commanders have stated their view that an advance in the north of the front along the lines that Montgomery proposed would have been the best option. There is nothing conclusive about that, but it must be well worth taking account of.
Hordes of people on YouTube, most of them Americans, post opinions regarding this or that aspect of the war in North West Europe, based on hindsight. As far as I am concerned the key question is nearly always, what view should be taken of the decisions made at that time based on the situation faced by those decision makers at that time.
Would a narrower thrust of a limited number of allied divisions to the Ruhr and beyond have succeeded, and shortened the war or not? I don’t know, how can anybody know? Would a narrower thrust of a limited number of allied divisions have been the correct decision to take at that time given the situation that the allies faced? Its a definite yes for me.
My personal view is that Montgomery was the most professional and experienced of the senior allied military leaders, and that was prepared to consider tough decisions that others would not do so, if necessary, regardless of what might have been seen as British interests, regardless of his own personal prestige, and that Eisenhower got a very important decision wrong because he put US considerations ahead military considerations.
I might not be be right.
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@11nytram11
'Sitting on your ass usually will do that,1,500 miles he never caught rommel with every advantage - BIG advantages as he faffed and made up stories'
Big Woody/Para Dave.
Montgomery. 8th Army, Alamein to El Agheila, 850 miles in 20 days, on one major road, across the desert. The first port of any size, Tobruk was 450 miles from Alamein, the Martuba airfields, another 100 miles further on. The only way that Rommel got clear was to take all of the Italian transport, and to personally fly to Germany to beg Hitler to allow an evacuation by sea.
Compare this with the American, nancy boy efforts in the wake of Torch, Bradley's subordinate, Patton, and his punching his way through nothing, after others had done the heavy fighting in Normandy, and so on.
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@renard801
From Para Dave / Para Dave:
‘Slappy so which one of theses guys who all state the same thing is wrong.Brooke,Tedder,Ramsay?Unlike you they were there’
‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
How does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed
Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the
Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
Anyone care to state if this, Neil Barr and Rick Atkinson where there?
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@coachhannah2403
Not really...
FAAA was to be sustained by air until its link up with XXX Corps (That is the ground ‘GARDEN’ force for the undertaking, to save you looking it up), and even before the operation, the only resources diverted to the build up were 500 tons per day, by air that had previously been used to supply the civilian population of Paris in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of that city. This was set against the additional resources that were already arriving from Dieppe (liberated 01.09. 44), Ostend (Liberated 09.09.44), and Le Havre, solely for US use (Liberated 12.09.44). All this was in addition to the 14,000 tons per day that was being equally split between Bradley’s and Montgomery’s armies.
Also, the idea that the rest of the allied advance ground to a halt to accommodate MARKET GARDEN is yet another US myth. Bradley’s subordinate commander Hodges was continuing it advance towards Aachen. Bradley’s other subordinate commander, Patton, had outran his supplies on the 31st August and stopped, and then resumed his advance a few days later, before MARKET GARDEN was even mooted.
An eye witness, Alan Moorehead, noted:
'With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days latter with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.'
As for Bradley's subordinate commander, Patton, his own offensive towards Metz failed and clocked up casualty figures that were far in excess of MARKET GARDEN. An offensive, that even had it succeeded, would not have gone to nowhere of importance compared to the Ruhr.
Patton, had been passed over for army group command, probably because of his inability to control himself when he personally attacked Sicilian peasants and his own soldiers. He seems to have desired personal glory ahead of success for the allied cause, as he noted in his diary before D-Day: . “I fear the war will be over before I get loose". Not, I hope it goes well, or whatever. No, only his personal ambition.
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@derekhooker7086
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
P 354
‘On April 9th, the Marshall memorandum was presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
“Started C.O.S. at 9 a.m. as Marshall was due at 10.30 a.m. He remained with us till 12.30 p.m.
and gave us a long talk on his views concerning the desirability of starting a western front next September and that the U.S.A. forces would take part. However, the total force which they could transport by then only consisted of two and a half divisions, no very great contribution! Furthermore, they had not begun to realise what all the implications of their proposed plan were’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P288
‘General Marshall had advanced the proposal that we should attempt to seize Brest or Cherbourg, preferably the latter, or even both during the early autumn of 1942. The operation would have to be almost entirely British. The Navy, the air, two thirds of the troops, and such landing craft as were available must be provided by us. Only two or three American Divisions could be found.’
P391
Former Naval Person to President 8 July 42
‘No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend “Sledgehammer” as a practical operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported “The conditions which would make “Sledgehammer” a sound, sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur. They are now sending their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.’
What sort of turd would try to deny that Marshall wanted to invade Europe in 1942?
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@seth1422
'As far as your interpretation of Operation Infatuate, you have your dates, times, personalities, and command structure mixed up.'
Not really...
The material point being, as Brereton made clear, that as with Market, the final word on who did what, when and where was not down to Montgomery.
'you have your dates, times, personalities, and command structure mixed up.'
Who can say? Walcheren has always been of interest to me. In this case memories related by people who were there add to that interest.
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@nickdanger3802
"until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old."
Fight on the beach's speech'
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P486
‘On November 9 Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of at least knowing that his country had at least turned the corner.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE 1950.
P352
‘None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
N.B. Never, ever quote Churchill at me,
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CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
Where is the ego in that?
One drop, two drops, Montgomery had no jurisdiction over the air plan.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@NorwayT
Have your own way...
‘If it was at all to succeed, securing the bridges and the only artery resupplying them ASAP and with force, should have been drilled into every commander.’
Montgomery stated to Dempsey that the ground forces attack should be ‘rapid and violent, without regard to what is happening on the flanks’.
How the airborne forces were briefed was down to the US General Brereton.
‘This whole operation seemed hastily thrown together, and relied too much on luck and weather and way too little on the generally very precise observations of the Nederlands verzet, the Dutch Resistance.’
Market Garden was the type of operation that the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) was created for, with troops and air forces able to work together.The key points that stopped Arnhem from being taken were all associated with FAAA. All communications at that from the Dutch Resistance were routinely ignored, due to the German ‘Englandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Resistance. Market Garden was no different to any other situation in that regard.
‘I believe that Operation Market Garden should serve as a warning to battlefield commanders of the dangers of following the whims of Prima Donnas competing for the big prize, in this case being first into Berlin.’
But what hard evidence is there that Market Garden was devised on a whim? As for anyone being a ‘Prima Donna’, the best evidence I can find of this is here:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Here is one of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton, thinking only about himself, rather than the war.
‘Such politics unfortunately still plague the top tier of military planning in NATO’.
We are all entitled to our views. I would think that the big lesson is that it would have be to go into such a time as September 1944 with a plan based on military considerations, rather than political considerations.
Montgomery had said to Eisenhower on the 23rd August that the allies could not sustain an advance across the front and that the allies should hold on the right and push on the left, or hold on the left or push on the right.
Having offered to stop 21st Army Group, what else was he supposed to do?
Eisenhower’s replied that ‘it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."
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@MrInkblots
Let me be clear...I have NOT read either 'Stalingrad' or 'Berlin'. Nor, at this time, have I any intention of doing so.
I would GUESS that both 'works' dwell on on Russian atrocities at length without putting such Russian behaviour against the appalling and unprovoked treatment meted out on Russia and other Eastern European countries by the Germans. That Beevor bangs on about the hideosly overstated (by Americans) contribution of Lend-lease by citing selectived statistics out of context. That Beevor dwells on Russian penal batallions, the Red Army's sometimes callous treatment of its troops and the Russian population without referring to the Russian traits endurance and patriotism - which transcends politics.
As far a 'Berlin' is concerned, what is in that work that was not covered by Cornelius Ryan in his 1966 work, 'The Last Battle'?
Beevor was born in 1946 and was in and out of the peacetime army in under four years. As far as I can see, he brings nothing new to subjects he writes about. This shifty looking individual sits in interviews pontificating about subjects that have long since been done to death before any of his digits struck a keyboard.
If his 'works' are left to sit in book carousels in airport shopping outlets alongside the works of Harold Robbins, Jeffrey Archer and Jackie Collins then that is fine. Just so long as they are not mistaken for history.
If you want to read about the war, why not read the works of people who were actually there. You could start with 'The Struggle for Europe' by the your fellow countryman Chester Wilmot. Look at his biography, read what he wrote, consider the people that he personally interviewed, and the bibliography he referred to. There are are plenty of others beside Chester Wilmot...
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Tim 0neill
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P536
‘On the evening of September 4th, as soon as he learned of the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”
P537
‘On September 4th, before receiving this proposal, Eisenhower issued a fresh directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes (21st Army Group and two corps of First U.S. Army) “to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”’
‘The state of Eisenhower's communications was such that his ' Most Immediate ' signal, sent from Granville on the evening of September 5th in reply to Montgomery's proposal about Berlin, did not reach the Field-Marshal's H.Q,. near Brussels until after breakfast on the 7th. Even then the signal was not complete and the missing paragraphs did not arrive for another two days!'
[9th September].
P543
the first V.2s, which had landed on London on the 8th, were launched
from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office inquired [of Montgomery] whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany.'
line
Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels Airport on the 10th September. Eisenhower noted the outcome of that meeting:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
Chester Wilmot was a BBC reporter and author who reported on from the front line from D-Day to VE Day. He had direct experience of the events that he wrote about, and he was in position to be able to interview many of the major participents in those event during the early post war years.
Dwight D Eisenhower was allied supreme commander for the campaign in Europe, and had appointed himself allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944.
Big Woody (aka Para Dave) is a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, who has a thing about Britain, and Montgomery in particular. Tragic.
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@mikemazzola6595
“Well, to begin with, because Montgomery stopped other possibly better options for use of available forces and logistics. Such as clearing the Scheldt Estuary so Antwerp could revitalize the full combat power of the Western Allies by resupply.”
A decision to prioritize Market Garden had to be Eisenhower’s, who, as we all know, from the 1st September 1944 was both Supreme Commander and Land Forces Commander. Eisenhower confirmed this when he stated:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
“It is interesting that the U.S. First, Third, and Seventh Armies all made it across the Rhine before Montgomery's grandiose "Operation Plunder" could be executed. Even Churchill's celebrated relief of himself in the Rhine occurred after Patton had done the same thing.”
Why is it interesting? The Rhine crossing by Montgomery’s armies faced far more difficulties than any of the others, including the width of the river and the level of German opposition. Its outcome was of far more importance than the other crossings. This is Eisenhower’s view on Operation Plunder:
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
His words.
Notice that Eisenhower notes only two other Rhine crossings. Also, where is it recorded that Churchill relieved himself in the Rhine?
“And, speaking of the Germans thwarting Market Garden, I felt including that option in the list of three for why Market Garden failed showed TIK's intellectual honesty. Taking it a step further, what would have happened if a narrow front fed by "Hell's Highway" had just barely made it across the Rhine? I have read sober assessments in the past that recognized the exploitation of Market Garden would have, at best, been bottled up not far across the Rhine in a Remagen type situation. Or at worst a considerably larger force than 1 Para Division would have been cut off and stranded with a good chance of being forced to surrender. The Allies were probably fortunate that Market Garden failed.”
But what opposition was going to bottle up an advance? In the immediate aftermath of a victory the 52nd Lowland Division was due to land at Deelen airfield. Both VII and VIII Corps were to advance on either side of XXX Corps. Further, the adverse weather and allied communications problems that had aided the Germans at Market Garden were never going to last. A US advance towards Aachen would have added to German problems. Even without having Antwerp available, Allied logistics still allowed for an 18 Division advance.
“The regrettable fact is that it was attempted at all. Montgomery admitted as much after the mistake in delaying the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary became so apparent. For that blunder, maybe Montgomery and Eisenhower should share the blame for Market Garden, and they often do.”
What was regrettable about using additional forces to move the war on? As well as this, the need to hamper German V-Weapon attacks on Britain from the western part of the Netherlands justified the Market Garden initiative. What Montgomery actually stated was ‘I must admit a bad mistake on my part I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.’ That is not a statement that it had been wrong to undertake Market Garden.
“Eisenhower's broad front strategy was the only one really viable in the face of still powerful German combat capabilities.”
On the 27th September, 1944, Model had 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces along the entire western front. This was less armour and artillery than Britain had immediately after Dunkirk.”
“This was demonstrated later when Plunder gave Montgomery the last laugh over Field Marshal Model.”
I am not sure that last laugh is a term to be used. My father took part in Plunder, he never mentioned hilarity in regard to that undrtaking.
“Model committed suicide surrounded in the Ruhr pocket after Eisenhower's broad front strategy encircled the Ruhr from BOTH the North and the South. Market Garden would not have likely achieved this by itself.”
Eisenhower’s broad front strategy squandered the initiative gained by tying down German forces in Italy and the German losses in Montgomery's victory in Normandy. Market Garden (15,000 casualties), Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties) were a direct result. As was the German attack in the Ardennes – using forces and equipment that were created in the autumn of 1944. A single thrust into Germany in August / September 1944 would have deprived the Germans of the Ruhr and brought the war to an early end. Montgomery went into Normandy with a plan and delivered a victory to rival the Russian victory in Stalingrad in under 90 days. Eisenhower took over with no plan and delivered nothing in the next 90 days.
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@mikemazzola6595
Eisenhower and Montgomery
Eisenhower was Land Forces Commander from the beginning of September. In that role politics should have given way to military sense. Eisenhower had little experience of commanding at a high level, zero personal combat experience and it showed. Montgomery went into Normandy with a plan and cleared France in 90 days. Eisenhower took over with no plan and went nowhere. The battle in the west could, and should have been over as a contest in 1944. Montgomery proposed that all available resources should be put into a northern thrust in August, as had been agreed before the invasion. Failing that, Montgomery proposed that all resources should be put into a thrust with the southern armies. Eisenhower did neither, and everything the allies the then tried suffered. Eisenhower’s decision making led to 140,000 casualties in failed US piecemeal attacks on the Siegfried Line during his tenure as Land Forces Commander. Perhaps his total lack of personal combat experience contributed to his poor decision making? Likewise with Bradley? Who knows?
Market Garden
Market Garden was a chance that was worth taking - as judged at the time, and with hindsight, the V-Weapon attacks on Britain alone justified the undertaking. No American can identify with this. Their homeland was 3,000 miles from any external threat. Further, the combined chiefs of staff where urging that use be made of the First Allied Airborne Army. The was no ‘opportunity squandered by the hapless failure of Market Garden’, there was no other proper plan to continue the war at that time. Market Garden did not take resources away from other undertakings, 21st Army Group was the only force within effective range of the Airborne Army. The idea that Dams that were 70 miles away were going to be opened in September 1944 to give the Germans a couple of weeks respite is hard to credit.
The Rhine
‘The Seventh Army was across the Rhine at essentially the same time as Plunder.’ And Plunder took place in ‘essentially the same time’ as all the other Rhine crossings.’
So why did you draw attention Plunder taking place after crossings that had taken place further down-stream?
Here is a modern American view:
The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
From Ike & Monty: Generals at War
By Norman Gelb 1994 Constable and Company Limited
Chapter 21. P406.
I am very familiar with Churchill’s six volume history of the war. In volume VI, Chapter XXIV ‘Crossing the Rhine’ deals with his visit to see the Rhine crossing. There is no mention of him relieving himself in the Rhine. Churchill make a nuisance of himself at the crossing? Who can say? Eisenhower turned up to watch as well. Churchill was by a country mile the outstanding war leader in any country during that SIX year conflict. If he turned up for such an occasion then so be it.
The Hurtgen Forest
It was an allied failure that cost 33,000 casualties (September to December 1944) and ultimately 55,000 casualties. Poor ‘generalship’? Who can say? Eisenhower spread his forces right across the front, told them all to attack at the same time and as a result everything suffered. He squandered the initiative that the British had previously built up over a couple of years.
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@mikemazzola6595
Total rubbish.
A general of the stature of Eisenhower oversaw the failure at Arnhem, the defeats at Aachen, Metz, the Hurtgen Forest and the avoidable German attack in the Ardennes. All this stuff about the various national economies is nothing to do with Eisenhower's poor performance.
If Market Garden was a military mistake then Eisenhower must bare ultimate responsibility. That goes with the job along with the the châteaux, the cars, and first crack female drivers. Based on his performance he would not have known a military strategy from hole in the road. Montgomery remained Market Garden's unrepentent advocate and Alanbrooke made his comments on Market Garden with hindsight, in his diary which as not published until he late 1950's.
That stated, let us see some more of Alanbrooke's diary from those times:
‘ “November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.”
“At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.2”
“As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.”
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.” ‘
How right he was.
This Friday coming sees the 75th anniversary of VE Day. Britons, quite rightly will get the day off. Germans, Italians and Japanese should have to work. Russsians should only have to work for half the morning and Americans should get a half day off.
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@ToolTimeTabor
This was the general picture regarding allied knowledge of the enemy as far as I can find it:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P523
‘When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
According to another YouTube contributor, one Dave Rendall, who claims to be a retired army officer, and also Brian Urquhart’s nephew, At FAAA, no-one below Browning was ULTRA cleared. If that be true, then any ULTRA information would have to have been verified by another source, this information could not be verified so it was not passed on.
The aerial photography can be seen on line. Unlike the Hollywood film 'A Bridge Too Far', which includes a photograph of post war AFV, disguised as Second World War machines, shown in clear at a nice oblique angle, the actual photographs were grainy overhead shots, which, only after a considerable amount of enhancement showed what seemed to be a few Mark III tanks that identified as belonging to the Hermann Goering Division training and replacement unit. Which turned out to be the case.
Any information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in this regard.
As for all this Browning / Gavin stuff, for me you have to have been there to know what was what. I was not there.
As far as the Groesbeek Heights are concerned
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994.
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.’
‘Any army that ever held Nijmegen held the Heights’. What sort of idiot would make such a comment? Perhaps a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA? The Groesbeek Heights are little more than 100 ft above sea level and are anywhere between five and six miles from Nijmegen Bridge. The brief account I have read of the 1591 Siege of Nijmegen makes no mention of the Groesbeek. Why would it?, given the geography involved.
I have been to the Groesbeek Heights, there is a museum there dedicated MARKET GARDEN and VERITABLE. My father was in the Netherlands in 1944 and early 1945. He did not take part in MARKET GARDEN, but he did take part in VERITABLE, hence my visit. Standing there, you are not bearing down on Nijmegen - how could you at such a distance, and at such a low level?
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
"Three American divisions were to be grounded and their transport used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group."
But of course those divisions were not grounded.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
‘Additional resources were not provided for Montgomery, or for Hodges, because Eisenhower still thought in terms of advancing to the Rhine on a broad front with a succession of thrusts, of which Montgomery’s was merely to be the first.’
The additional 500 tons of supplies ferried to 21st Army Group in the week before Market Garden were previously use to supply the civillian population of Paris, not 12th Army Group.
In the same period:
Dieppe was operational by 5th September delivering 3,000 tons per day, increasing to 6,000 to by the end of the Month.
Le Havre, exclusively for American use, was providing 3,200 of supplies from the 13th October.
Ostend was liberated on 9th September, Calais was liberated on 30th September.
Back to CHESTER WILMOT:
'The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later.'
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Raymond Reaney
The final word on the 'Market' air plan belonged to the US commander of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), Lewis Brereton. He made no to an attempt to make a second landing on the first day, he also had the final word on where the airborne troops would land. Dragoon, in August had included two drops on itd first day. That Market was a month later made no difference to the ability of the allies to land twice on day one of Market. That the fog did not lift until 9am on day one does not let the American FAAA commander, Brereton out, he had no plan for a second landing on day one that was displaced by the weather. The idea that the American FAAA commander Brererton was bound by decisions on landing ground at Arnhem made for Comet would seem, to have been absurd.
The Germans had a copy of the entire Market Garden plan as soon as the operation started, due to a copy of the plan being found on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US combat zone.
The film, 'A Bridge Too Far, produced by the American Joseph E Levine fails to include any mention of the American FAAA commander, Brereton, and wrongly shows a German soldier getting a copy of the Market Garden plan from a British glider.
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@johnlucas8479
John Lucas
‘Operation Comet involved British 1st Parachute Brigade with the objective the Arnhem Bridge. Operation Market Garden involved 1st British Airborne Division with the objective the Arnhem Bridge. Simple common sense and logic would indicated that the landing zones for Market Garden would use the same DZ as Comet, especially for the 1st Parachute Brigade. It would have been absurd not to use Comet landing ground if the objectives of the 2 Operations were the same.’
Not really…
It seems that MARKET GARDEN replaced COMET because changing circumstanced led to the decision that a much larger force would be needed for each of the major objectives. With a division to be landed at Arnhem, it beggers belief that that the whole plan, including the location of the landing zones was not reassessed by Brereton.
‘As your claim of 2 airlifts on the 17th. Provide the evidence that at no point 2 lifts was not considered by Williams for Market.’
But I have made no such claim about anyone regarding two lifts.
What I stated was this:
‘That the fog did not lift until 9am on day one does not let the American FAAA commander, Brereton out, he had no plan for a second landing on day one that was displaced by the weather.’
So… Can anyone supply evidence that when it got to the morning of the first day, Brereton said “sorry, no can do with that second lift that was planned for latter today because of the unexpected change in the weather”, or words to that effect?..
‘As to the capture plan I refer to Karel Margry "Operation Market Garden Then and Now" page 173’
OK.
I however, have to make do with this:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
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@johnlucas8479
Perhaps you could help with this one, not from one of your comments:
'From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.'
How is 'misused' defined. I would expect to see evidence of those Airborne Divisions being wanted elsewhere but retained in the Netherlands in spite of those needs if this claim could be believed.
What is a 'considerable amount period'? Is 25.09.44 to 11.11.44 'considerable amount period'?
'suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.'
But there are no figures cited. Either for the two airborne divisions, or for XXX Corps units that were there as well, by way of comparison.
As it happens, the figures for the two US Divisions were:
US 82nd 1,682 (Killed, wounded and missing)
US 101st 1,912 (Killed, wounded and missing)
What rubbish some people write.
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@johnlucas8479
As far as opinion on people actions is is concerned, I quote the people who were there.
They nealy all had their say in the 1940s and 1950s.
As for the rest, Chester Wilmot was there, he went right through. His reports from the front are in the BBC archives. He interviewed the key people immediately after the war, found all the key evidence, apart from Ultra, which seems to have changed the story of events to no great extent. Britain and the USA have long since released their official histories of the war.
Cornelius Ryan was there, but waited too long before he began to write. Also, he was a nasty little Mick.
This bloke Buckingham was nowhere the events he writes about, he never interviewd the key people. All the evidence has long been available since before he started writing. Yet he has the bare faced cheek to call his work the complete story of Arnhem or some such rubbish. Ditto one Antony Beevor. He was in and out of the army inside four peacetime years. Then there is William Weidner, or whatever his name is, and so on, and so on. What have any of them brought new to subject?: The VD figures for troops in Luxembourg?, the colour of the carpets at Eisenhower's headquarters?
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@johnlucas8479
‘The questions I would ask are:
1) Why were the 2 Division retain after the operation as both were highly trained specialised units and only light weight infantry division compare to normal Infantry division.
2) Why not fly in the 52nd Lowland Division to relieve at least one division. Being a fresh full strength division would provide more troops and firepower than an airborne division. Their also the 6th British Airborne Division was also at full strength and available. So why not use the two fresh British Divisions.’
Misuse is define as "to use wrongly or incorrectly, to treat badly".
No not sure about concern for US casualties, I think it was more that Montgomery wanted control of US troops, in the same way prior to Market Garden he push for control of the US 1st Army as part of his single thrust agenda. After the battle of the Bugle his push to retain the 9th US Army.’
Not really…
Its all about this oppo Buckingham suggesting that Montgomery and Browning being less concerned about US casualties than British casualties without offering a shred of evidence to back up his outrageous and suggestive comment, which no doubt Americans will lap up. As far as I can tell, there is a widespread belief from people who were there (unlike this Buckingham) that Montgomery went to great lengths to minimise casualties in his commands, For example, with his multi-national army at Alamein. Michael Caver (who was there) mentions this in his work ‘El Alamein’.
I don’t know about the 6th Airborne Division, I thought that I read somewhere that they were in the frontline from D-Day to into September 1944, and were then withdrawn for training for the Rhine crossing. But this might not be right. As for the 52nd Lowland Division, surely that cannot be right?
Were they not in the Scheldt? Even my own father mentioned seeing them on South Beveland. I will have to check this out.
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@johnlucas8479
Buckingham.
Buckingham, Beevor, Barr and co can post the statistics, dates, etc., they wish. But almost all of them have already been published. They have to refer to others who went before them in regards to interview with the key people of that time. None of them were there so they do not get to pass judgement on those that were there. Further, any speculation like this Buckingham did with ‘concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations’, based on what is shown in the posted her, has not a shred of evidence to back up this outrageous speculation. Still, its not all bad, it seems that this Buckingham stated that Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until 15th September 1944.
RAF Transport Command and Market Garden.
As for Hollingshurst: As the RAF, unlike the USAAF was a separate service, therefore the RAF units assigned to MARKET were not formally part of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA). However those RAF units came under the command of the commander of the FAAA, the American General – Brereton. On this, the evidence is clear:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 128
General Brereton had assumed command of the First Allied Airborne Army on 8 August 1944. He was
given operational control of the following: headquarters of the XVIII U.S. Corps (Airborne), commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway; headquarters of the Ist British Airborne Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. F. A. M. Browning, who served also as deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army; the IX U.S. Troop Carrier Command under Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams; and two Royal Air Force troop carrier groups (38 and 46) . American airborne troops under General Brereton's control were the veteran 82d and I0Ist Airborne Divisions and the untried 17th Airborne Division,
the latter not scheduled to participate in MARKET. British troops at his disposal were the 1st Airborne Division and the 52 Lowland Division (Airportable), plus special air service troops and the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, the latter to serve in MARKET under command of the 1st Airborne Division.
Chester Wilmot.
Chester Wilmot noted the intended role of the 52nd Lowland Division at Arnhem so, as there was nothing secret about most of MARKET GARDEN in 1952, it is reasonable to interpret Wilmot’s remarks regarding the 4th Parachute Brigade as a criticism of the decision not attempt to drop it South of the Arnhem bridge rather than any lack of knowledge of the broad terms of the plan for Arnhem.
‘Do you discount all sources by writers because they were not present or did not interview participants. As new documents are release or archives are open up, or documents translated later writers have the benefits of this new material to incorporate into their work which will enhance our understanding.’ Your words.
Not all. I have quoted from some of these oppos in YouTube comments. The problem is, the interviews have been published before, as have most of the statistics and the contemporary documents. Just what do these people like Barr, Beevor, and Buckingham, bring to the subject? Certainly not personal experience of the events they write about. And yet, as can be seen, that does not stop them from wild speculation, passing judgement on those that were there. Horrible.
Market Garden weather.
‘No one can provide evidence regarding the morning of the first day, because none exists. if two lifts were plan the final decision was made the night before and the decision would be to go or postpose for 24 hours or cancel the operation. Not do what you suggest delay one lift and cancel the second, because of the impact on D-Day +1 Operations.’ Your words.
The idea that there was no option to alter operations on D-Day+1 (and D-Day) would seem to be absurd. The weather delays the first lift, and they can’t change the timing? Surely this happened on D-Day+1 when the 4th Parachute Brigade lift was delayed. What seems to be certain is that the US General, Brereton had no plan in place for a second lift on D-Day that was scuppered by the weather.
Montgomery.
I never quote any retrospective opinion offered by Montgomery. The footage of the Dr. Harold R. Winton talk is of interest to me because he puts a slightly different opinion in regard to Montgomery than the usual moronic, chauvinistic American view on the subject. He was not there, whether he is correct or not I would not care to state.
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@nickdanger3802
Your question:
'BA 6th AB and US 82nd and 101st landed on D Day with 1st AB in reserve.
So how was it the 82nd and 101st got tagged for MG, but not 6th AB?'
Clearly, this was because King George VI, Churchill, Alanbrooke, Montgomery, Browning, Gale, the United Grand Lodge of England, and Vera Lynn were all in it together to make sure that British 6th Airborne would be able to put their feet up, have an easy time of it, with all of the work loaded onto the US 82nd, and 101st Airborne divisions.
It had nothing to with the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions being withdrawn to England in the middle of July 1944 and the British 6th Airborne being still in the front line at the beginning September 1944.
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CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris, [25th August 1944] the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared: " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
FYI. SHAEF was Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
For British, Canadian and US forces.
And the purely Britisg arrogance is where?..
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@sebastianwrites
‘Why are we commemorating Dowding? He did not wish to assist our allies the French in the face of the Nazis advance, which is not just cowardice - but it doesn't make any sense!’ Your words.
Dowding’s first duty was to the air defence of Britain. His letter of 16th May stated this:, and I quote:
‘Sir,
I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls which have recently been made upon the Home Defence Fighter' Units in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent.
2, I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be victorious in France and Belgium, but we have to face the possibility that they may be defeated.
3. In this case I presume that there is no-one who will deny that England should fight on, even though the remainder of the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans.
4. For this purpose it is necessary to retain some minimum fighter strength in this country and I must request that the Air Council will inform me what they consider this minimum strength to be, in order that I may make my dispositions accordingly.
5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country was 52 Squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the equivalent of 36 Squadrons.’
His words.
You can call Dowding a coward if you wish. I will not, I have not been in a war, perhaps you have been in one?..
I call Dowding, a man who was thinking clearly in fast moving, and desperate times.
‘Germany had to go through France to get to us, to put all that we have - apart from the fact it was the right thing to do - into supporting our allies made sense. Reserving our troops instead made it easier for Germany to take France... who knows they may have even been stopped at France? Instead, they gained France, and with it more supplies and useful defensive position to launch an attack on Britain!’
Your words.
Get real. Germany attacked France on the 10th May 1940. In the early morning of the 15th May, the French Premier Reynaud spoke to Churchill on the telephone and told him that the war was lost. Churchill flew to Paris on the 16th (The day of the above noted letter) and met with the French government in the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay. As they sat in the meeting, they could see French civil servants burning secret files in the garden. Britain did reserve its troops, they were there, as the French fell apart around them.
‘Dowding was just absolutely wrong!!! It is this sort of attitude which prevails to do, of people just looking after their own, which is why there are "million" innocent dead in Syria who were just fighting for their freedom 'and' very nearly won, but Assad when Damascus was on the verge of falling pleaded for the help of Putin! Putin did 'exactly' what we should have done, but instead joined on the side of Assad - the enemy of democracy - who then went onto to slaughter, even more than he had before the Syrian people. People look back at this and 'think' what heroes we were... well if we were heroes then, we are 'utter' cowards now who stood aside while Assad and Putin dropped napalm on children in their schools in Syria and burnt them screaming to death. "If you don't learn the lessons of history, you are doomed to repeat them."’ Your words.
The idea that events in Syria in the 21st Century are connected to Dowding’s actions in 1940 is absurd.
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@kenmazoch8499
‘the real reason was monty wanted to take over the ground campaign and be the hero who won the war, and everything else be damned.’ Your words.
Where is there a shred of evidence to back up this claim. By evidence, I mean documents, testimony of words spoken by Montgomery. An opinion is not evidence.
There is, however, reliable evidence of one matter that did influence decision making in regard to Market Garden:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
‘during the afternoon [9th] a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.¹
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.’
‘monty thought this would be a backdoor operation, by-passing the main german forces. he also took advantage of the pressure ike was under from the chiefs of staff to use the 1st allied airborne army in a major op ( and alanbrooke would have kept monty informed of) monty, at that time, did not care about antwerp.’ Your words. This is just opinion.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 261
‘Even Montgomery seemed exasperated by the frantic cycle of concocting and scuttling plans to sprinkle paratroopers across the continent. “Are you asking me to drop cowpats all over Europe” the field marshal had reportedly asked his subordinates.’
‘in fact, the german 15th army crossed the scheldt and was a major factor in the defeat of the op. monty was just trying shift the blame to others, as always.’ Your words.
Again: XXX Corps were at Grave in the early morning of the third day, in enough strength, and with enough time to reach Arnhem Bridge. The German 15th Army was unable to stop this.
‘both dempsey (co 2nd army) and smith (ike's chief of staff) tried to get monty to change the plan.’ Your words.
Dempsey argued for the operation to be confined to the area north to Nijmegen, rather than including Arnhem. There is no reliable evidence that Smith tried to get Montgomery to change the MARKET GARDEN plan. On the contrary, there is evidence that Smith promised more resources to Montgomery for MARKET GARDEN, when the two met on the 12th September, 1944:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P547
‘On the 12th Bedell Smith flew to Montgomery's H.Q,. and, with Eisenhower's authority, promised to deliver 1,000 tons a day to Brussels by road or air.’
‘cutting off the 15th army never entered into the picture, monty ignored ike about antwerp. monty was counting on a bridgehead over the rhine, ike would not be able to stop him.’ Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
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@kenmazoch8499
‘actually, it is well documented that monty tried during the entire campaign to be named land force commander.’
Not really…
Montgomery tried repeatedly to get a land forces commander appointed for the period after his appointment in that role ended on 31st August 1944. When he met Eisenhower on the 23rd August, he stated that as the allies had logistics only for half of its forces to advance then the right course of action was to halt Canadian 1st Army, and US 3rd Army, and advance in the north with British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army together to take the Ruhr. Failing that, Montgomery would stop his armies, leaving Bradley to advance with the two US armies in the South, provided that a decision was made to make proper use of the available resources. Thereafter, when he raised the matter of an land forces commander, he stated that he would accept Bradley as land forces commander, provided that land forces commander appointment was made. Hardly the attitude of someone hoping to be ‘the hero who won the war, and everything else be damned’, was it?..
‘some circumstantial evidence that the germans intercepted the broadcast and made it worse. Montgomery Ardennes press conference’. Your words.
It’s a bit more than circumstantial evidence…this from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 636– 637
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.
15th September 1944.
Where is the evidence that Bedell Smith warned Montgomery about German strength in the Arnhem area, and advised Montgomery to increase the forces for the Arnhem landings?
Major-General Strong in ‘Intelligence at the Top’(1969) mentions a meeting between Bedell-Smith and Montgomery but states that he (Strong) was not present and he does not mention a date for that meeting. Chester Wilmot, who was advised by Strong and Bedell-Smith for his work, ‘The Struggle for Europe’ does not mention such a meeting, Nor did Nigel Hamilton, a critic of MARKET GARDEN, mention such a meeting in the third volume of his three part biography of Montgomery. Antony Beevor, who sells books by criticizing Montgomery does mention the meeting. Sebastian Richie, in ‘Arnhem: Myth and Reality’, so often quoted by people, and also by Big Woody, merely notes that Montgomery saw the airborne (MARKET) for first time on 15th September.
Horrocks stated that at the capture of Antwerp, his forces had 100 kilometres of fuel to hand, and another 100 kilometres of fuel about 24 hours behind. That amounts to about 120 miles of travel for XXX Corps. He also stated that he could have ‘bounced’ the Rhine, cut off all the Germans in the Netherlands, and ‘got round behind the Ruhr’. 120 miles of fuel might have got XXX Corps to the Ijsselmeer to cut off German forces in the Netherlands, it would not have got ‘round behind the Ruhr’.
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@manosdelfuego1
'Eight thousand brave British soldiers, some of the absolute best soldiers the British Army had, lost their lives at Arnhem.' Your words.
Err...fraid not.
The dead were:
1st Airbourne: 1,174, Polish Brigade: 92, Glider Pilots: 219. Total: 1,485.
That total includes: Killed in action, died or wounds, drowned in the evacuation, shot in attrocities, shot in escape attempts.
Deaths in air operations over Arnem, RAF and air dspathers: 231.
USAAF: 27.
Any questions?
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@the_imposter_knight5752
Your Priggish attitude and comments cut no ice with me.
Urquhart was hiding. Seems to imply cowardice. Do you think he was a coward?
So what was he supposed to do? Climb down from the up-stairs of that house and get himself captured? How was that going to help anyone?
‘Hackett refused to go to Arnhem.’ Again, are you implying cowardice?
If Urquhart’s book is your reference for this claim, then you are wrong. Hackett was told that he was to lose one third of his brigade to another task without being told anything about the overall situation except he had been passed over for command of the division in favour of Hicks. All this after a trying day in which Hackett’s command had been delayed in its departure from Britain, his command came under fire as it landed, and he then had to attempt to carry out its brief without a third of his command. The late night meeting at divisional HQ led to Hackett stating he needed a plan that showed how his forces would work with the forces already moving towards Arnhem. He wanted clarity. I think I probably would have done if I had been in that situation.
‘Cometh the hour, cometh the man and Hackett wasn’t that man.’
Why? Because he was a coward?
‘it infuriated me that Barlow was in the wrong place at the wrong time because the situation demanded someone take control’
Why does that infuriate you? Are you related to Barlow?
As far as I know, none of these people are still around to be able to reply to your attempted smears against them.
As far as I, a layman can judge, what was decided in the heat of battle in Arnhem had little bearing on the outcome of the outcome. That outcome was decided by the poor Market air plan, the decision not to try to assault Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, with the Germans getting a hold of the entire Market Garden plan on the first day thrown in for good measure.
As for any lack of moral fibre – you can shove that attempted insult where the sun does not shine.
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@the_imposter_knight5752
I must have read, anywhere between 15 and 25 works that that cover Market Garden, and many of them state opinions about why Arnhem did not succeed. As far as I can recall, not one of them blames Brigadier Hackett for the failure to take Arnhem.
Here is one: Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle, by Martin Middlebrook. This lists 10 reasons why the author thinks that Arnhem failed. Not one of those reasons is anything to do Brigadier Hackett and the 4th Parachute Brigade.
General Urquhart likewise: no mention of Hackett as a reason why Arnhem failed.
Let us remind ourselves as to where this started, with my speculation to another person in this comments section as to whether the 4th Parachute Brigade casualties might have been affected by the Germans getting hold of the plans for Market Garden on the first day, enabling them to contest the 4th Parachute Brigade landing on the following day.
You then waded to state some sort of theory that those casualties were down to Hackett’s actions and that their high casualties were mainly Prisoners or War.
How ridiculous can this get? Here are the words of an actual eye witness to that landing:
GRAEME WARRACK
TRAVEL BY DARK
First published by the Harvill Press Ltd 1963
1 THE BATTLE OF ARNHEM
P22-23
‘Three o’clock was now the hour for fixed for the landing, so Lt Col. Henty Preston, the A/Q; Lt Col. Ian Murray, the Glider Pilot CO, and I went off to the landing zone to meet them.
The enemy had infiltrated into the area and established machine-gun section posts round about, so there was a good deal of activity going on. At about 3 o’clock I arrived at the RAP which Capt. Graham Jones, MO to the Border Regiment, had established at the landing zone. As the second lift came in there was a considerable amount of shooting and the situation was very different from our peaceful landing on the previous afternoon. Then, as the 4th Parachute Brigade came in, we heard the noise of even more violent action coming from the direction of Ede.
Graham Jones and his sergeant, Thomson, dealt with casualties as they arrived and evacuated them to the dressing station at Wolfhesze.’ His words.
Further, 4th Parachute Brigade casualties were only the highest in regard to fatalities. Their losses as prisoners of war (and evaders) were 1,115 (67.2%). The figures for First Parachute Brigade were only slightly lower (66.6%) and were exceeded by the First Parachute Brigade at (80.2%).
Anyone can read the books and use hindsight to state, because of this, that happened, because of that, this happened, and so on, and so on. You, me, the turd Anthony Beevor, Martin Middlebrook and anyone else.
What I will not do is use hindsight to pass judgement of the legitimate decisions of the people involved, when the bullets were flying, the bombs were dropping, the people were dying, and so on and so on. I am not qualified to do so, I was not there. Perhaps you were there, perhaps you do consider yourself to be qualified to pass judgement.
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@bessarion1771
'Literally in the letter you posted he said " this brigade performed very badly here and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives (.) " Which was a bold faced lie and Montgomery KNEW it was a lie. What a filthy gutless way to assault the allies.' Your words.
Literally, what Montgomery stated may have been a lie, it may have been the
truth. Wh can know? I don't. It was definately an opinion. He was entitled to his opinion, especially in a private letter to a colleague.
Montgomery's opinion would seem to be in line with one Geoffrey Powell, who, in his memoir of Arnhem stated of Polish troops put under his command in the Oosterbeek perimeter:
MEN AT ARNHEM
GEOFFREY POWELL
Pen and Sword Books 2004
P164
'At irregular intervals from the late evening onwards, clusters of mortar bombs had fallen among and around us, harming no one but preventing sleep, at least for me. Others, between spells of sentry duty, had collapsed exhausted into oblivion. Four times enemy patrols had roused them from their stupor as the night exploded into noise and light, with red tracer whipping the trees and white flares blossoming overhead. No one had been hit, but losses there had been. On stand-to rounds I had found the Polish trenches empty except for Peter, their corporal, crouched grimly behind his Bren. The rest of the party had vanished in the early hours, sensing perhaps that they had attached themselves to an unlucky unit. Peter explained nothing, but his embarrassment was clear; it was both unfair and pointless to press him for details when either pride or sense of duty had kept him there to fight on among strangers.
The thought of what would have happened if the enemy had attacked from this direction against a position held by the one solitary man was chilling. It was a mistake to trust strangers. I had learned yet another lesson: rely only on those you knew.'
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@bessarion1771
Your post:
"Like Browning, Montgomery, despite his postwar admissions, outrageously made the Poles the scapegoat. In a scathing letter to the chief of the imperial general staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, he characterized them as gutless. “I do not want this brigade here again,” he said, and suggested they be sent to join their comrades in Italy. To this day, the unfortunate stain upon the honor of these brave men has yet to be officially erased."
How is this Montgomery's words?
This is quote I have seen from Montgomery:
`Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’
as far I can see those words might also have been written by Montgomery if Arnhem had succeeded, but Montgomery considered that this or that unit had perfomed badly.
For Montgomery to have scapegoated the Poles for Arnhem, I would need to see quote of proven provenace, to read something like:
'Arnhem failed because of the performance of the Poles'
Do you have such a quote?
As it happens, it is on record that Montgomery blamed the weather, a lack of backing from Eisenhower, and Montgomery's own mistakes, for Arnhem not being taken.
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Jeff Zimmerman:
'Edit: To those persisting in the falsehood that Montgomery didn't gaffe at the press conference of 7th December (Note - I never stated nor implied he meant his statement as criticism - nevertheless it was widely taken as such): Monty is quoted in numerous sources as stating, "“As soon as I saw what was happening, I took certain steps myself to ensure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over the river.”'
Your words:
This from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 636– 637
‘In a press conference given on 7 January, Montgomery described how Eisenhower had placed him in command of the whole northern front. He emphasized that the repulse of the German onslaught had been an Anglo-American effort, but somewhat unfortunately went on to describe the battle as ‘most interesting. I think, possibly, one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.’
Montgomery expressed his admiration for the fighting qualities of the American soldier and how grieved he was to see uncomplimentary articles about Eisenhower in the British Press. However, the subsequent handling of Montgomery’s statements by the British newspapers and by the B.B.C. caused a crisis. The Prime Minister telephoned several times to Eisenhower, who said that Bradley was most upset. He proposed to award the Bronze Star to Bradley with a citation drawing attention to his fighting qualities, and to the work of the American armies bearing the brunt of the German offensive. At a meeting on 9 January, the Supreme Commander remarked that censorship was a two-edged weapon. Anything withheld by the censors immediately acquired news value, and the Press, by inuendo or other means, invariably circumvented it. It seemed to him that he reaction of the American Press to the statements in the British newspapers would be to exaggerate the United States point of view. There would be no end to the statements which the Press of the two countries would make in reply to each other. He also remarked: ‘For two and a half years I have been trying to get the Press to talk of “Allied” operations, but look what has happened.’
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.
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Jeff Zimmerman
'If Monty really considered Market-Garden to be an actual war-winning scenario, then he comes off as even less competent.' Your words.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P48-49
In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
'I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.'
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
'This was hardly the only instance of that war where a senior military leader undertook such a self-serving plan'
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
Eisenhower's directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
'Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.
What is self serving about responding to request to try to stop German rockets from raining down on London?.. Or perhaps Americans do not think that trying to stop those rockets was a worthwhile undertaking?..
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@airborngrmp1
'In fact, it can be argued that the nimble Allied leadership adapted to the reality of massed German armor in the Caen sector remarkably well' Your words.
Who, apart from Montgomery 'adapted to the reality of massed German armor in the Caen sector'?
It seems, not Eisenhower, or perhaps even his American collegues?
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously.'
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@johnlucas8479
But of course, the us of capital letters for the words DAY and NIGHT is yours. The original document uses lower case for these words in that place in the original document.
Without me going through the whole thing again, where does it state that this order came from Montgomery? In any case, this wording would imply intention rather than an outright ban. A reasonable guess would be to avoid the road being clogged up due to accidents, which would doubtless have ben much more likely at night. My own father was nearly killed in an comparable incident at night during that time, in Belgium. Bridging equipment for the Son Bridge was probably moved at night, and it It beggars belief that on the spot decisions could not have been about movements at night. There may well have been different judgements about movements at night in territory thought to be in allied hands, rather than movements at night in territory thought to be in enemy hands. Who can say?
Travelling by night or not travelling by night, XXX Corps was at Grave on the early moring of the third day. And we all know what happened then...
Still, if there was an outright ban, then that further lets out the XXX Corps troops on the Nijmegen Bridge on the evening of the third day.
Which one do you want?
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@gpwnedable
'Ah yes, David Irving, the famous Holocaust denier and Nazi apologist.'
And also, an incompetent historian. He had to pay then, record damages to Commander Jack Broome RN, because, motivated by money, he wrongly accused Broome of cowardice, in his 'book', 'The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17'
Word is, Irving had not even checked to see if Broome was still alive before the 'book' was published. Come the court case, Broome was able to call up the admiralty signals relating to PQ-17, and then wipe the floor with Irving.
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Total rubbish.
100 octane fuel was developed by the French, and was used by Britain in Schneider Trophy races before the war. The fuel only added between 10 and 15% to aircraft perforce below 15,000 ft, with almost all combat taking place at well above that height. Far more important to Fighter Command aircraft performance was the variable pitch propellor which was being fitted to aircraft before, and during the Battle of Britain. Further, the modest benefit that 100 octane fuel gave was negated when the Germans developed their own version of that fuel.
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
Overture: 1932-40
P13
‘There were some instances where one could sense a firm’s long-term selfish interest at work, and on the other hand there were some remarkable examples of unselfish collaboration between rivals. I think, perhaps, that the most remarkable of these was the collaboration between I.C.I. and Shell and Trinidad oil companies in designing and setting up a 100-octane petrol plant in Heysham.’
His words.
The Battle of Britain was the most important battle of the war. Everybody wants a piece of it. Nine (Yes, that is 9) US nationals flew as Fighter Command pilots during the battle. Beyond that, the battle was not, is not, and will never be anything to do with the USA. Try to cope.
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@johnlucas8479
All I could do is give an opinion based on what I have read, about events nearly 76 years ago. So what?
For me it would be Brereton's air plan, the failure to agree the the RAF proposal to mount two airlifts on the first day, poor choices of landing sites, the failure take on board suggestions from Montgomery:
'General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days. '
The Guns at Last Light, Rick Atkinson. P262.
When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.'
The Struggle for Europe, Chester Willlmot. P588.
Once the operation as underway, the failure of the US 82nd Airborne Division to secure Nijmegen before XXX Corps arrived.
The rate of advance of XXX Corps does not come in to it as they were in contact with US 82nd in a time that would have left them able to link up with British troops at Arnhem Bridge if the 82nd had handled things differently.
Finally, regarding the idiot comment, 'And Monty never showing up on the field of battle':
What rubbish. Supreme Comander and Allied Land Forces Commander Eisenhower was at Versaiiles, 250 miles away. Brereton was in England. Montgomery was already at Eindhoven by the end of the operation. What would any reasonable person expect of a commander in charge of two armies? That he shoud be at the front line at Nijmegen alongside 2nd Army Commander Dempsey? Only a 17 year would think this.
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And that funeral...
‘Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "*...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."’’
OK, lets look at some other parts of Triumph in the West:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P 340
“November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.”
“At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.2”
“As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.”
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.”
P 341
The offensive which Eisenhower had ordered in October, which Patton had anticipated by his attacks south of the Ardennes and which Bradley, after waiting a fortnight for the weather to clear, had launched on a far too wide front in mid-November was now petering out. Except for the capture of the Metz forts, it had achieved nothing; neither the drive on the Saar nor the drive on Cologne got the Americans anywhere or even engaged the German reserves.
‘From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’
‘From a PHD at King's College
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
Two for the price or one here…
This from Ramsey:
‘Went to see Fred de Guingand, he was rather depressed at the state of the war in the west, saying that the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a lot of Germans and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany. He said in fact that the higher direction of the war had been bad in the last 2 months, that Ike's policy was only skin deep and anyone could deflect it. . . . He said that the American leadership had been bad, the Generals being too inexperienced. They did not know how to combine artillery with infantry, put all divisions in line and had no supports to leap-frog and make headway, that they were every-where too weak to break through and that they had utterly failed to reach their objectives—the Rhine. This was all very depressing but no surprise to me’ His words.
‘With Prejudice, by Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."’
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ DWIGHT D EISENHOWER, his words.
Tedder was also at the meeting on 10th September, perhaps he should have checked old diaries before writing this stuff.
‘Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp’
‘Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"’
Not really… SHAEF Intelligence summaries read as follows:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
Hastings is referring to meeting between Montgomery and Eisenhower’s subordinate, Bedel-Smith on the 12th September 1944. Before any idiot from say, Cleveland, Ohio, or some such place gets the idea that this Smith was trying to tell Montgomery not undertake MARKET GARDEN, then they should think
again, if that is possible. Smith merely suggested that one of the two US airborne division earmarked for the operation be moved up to Arnhem. He would have done better to suggested this to the US general Brereton as he had the final say on the airborne MARKET plan. Smith also spoke to Montgomery about a promise from Eisenhower to finally allocate more allied resources to MARKET GADEN, 1,000 tons per day to be delivered to Brussels, hardly an earth shattering amount, but hardly the act of some who might have doubts as the whether the operation should go ahead.
‘Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’
I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation’ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E, his words.
baa
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
None of this lets Brereton out. The three divisional commanders pressed for two drops,
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.
Your convoluted attempts to get Brereton off the hook do not cut it. It seems that people that knew about such matters showed that Brereton failed to use his resources as well as he could have, by not having a plan to have two drops on day one, and by not putting more troops nearer to their main objectives.
Further, he was quick to try pass judgement on the performance of XXX Corps, whose performance was would have been good enough to have saved the day at Arnhem, if Brereton had done his job properly.
I never met Brereton, perhaps you did? Based on what I have read, he seems to have been a unpleasant individual who Bradley had been glad to see the back of, and who was nowhere to be seen when things did not go well, and who was not above writing a diary after the war and to passing it off as a contemporaneous record of events during the war. Doubtless, none of this would have mattered if Brereton had listened to professionals during planning for Market Garden, or if Eisenhower had not over promoted him, doubtless, for narrow nationalistic reasons.
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@davidhimmelsbach557
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P130
'Responsibility for the complex troop carrier role fell to the commander of the IX Troop Carrier Command, General Williams. The overall commander was General Brereton.'
P132
'One of the more crucial decisions facing General Brereton and the staff of the First Allied Airborne Army was that of daylight versus night attack. Moving by day, planes and gliders would be exposed to more accurate flak. This was a serious consideration, both because the C-47 (Sky train) troop carrier planes were lowspeed aircraft possessing neither armor nor self-sealing gasoline tanks and because
marked increase had been noted recently in antiaircraft guns in the vicinity of the target area. On the other hand, moving by night invited greater danger from enemy aircraft. Although the enemy's daylight fighter force had been reduced almost to inconsequence, his night fighters had retained some measure of potency. In regard to the actual drop, it went without saying that a daylight operation
should provide a better drop pattern. To realize what could happen in the dark, one had but to recall the Normandy operation when drop sticks had scattered like windblown confetti.
A major factor governing selection of a night drop in Normandy had been a need to co-ordinate airborne and seaborne units. The plan for co-ordination of air and ground efforts in Operation MARKET GARDEN imposed no restrictions. Neither had the Allies at the time of the Normandy
drop possessed the unquestioned air supremacy they now had attained. It was an air supremacy that could be maintained through proximity of the target area to bases in England, France, and Belgium. Assured of a comprehensive antiflak program, General Brereton made his decision: by day.'
At the the time of Market Garden, the Dutch Underground had been penetrated by the German, leading to the German 'Englandspiel' deception of British intelligence. As a result, all contact perporting to have come from the Dutch Underground at that time was routinely disregarded. Market Garden was no different to any other situation in that regard.
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@davidhimmelsbach557
Before you bang on any more, you should know that I have already forgotten more about this subject than you will ever know. I have been on it for over 50 years.
Not only that, my Uncle was an RN gunner in a Royal Navy ship that bombarded UTAH Beach on D-Day, my father landed on Sword Beach on D-Day with a Churchill Tank Regiment, and he was a life long railway enthusiast. Further, he was in one of those ships 'circling round', in his case in the Channel, for two days, due to D-Day being delayed by 24 hours. It gets worse (For you), the stuff about telephone calls is nonsense. My mother was a telephone exchange supervisor in Surrey. There, only certain places were restricted. My paternal grand parents lived in one of the restricted area, Hove in Sussex.
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@davidhimmelsbach557
'But Brooke and Winston would NOT hear of it. The British were still shaken by Dunkirk, and so figured that there might be a Dunkirk II in their future. WInnie's confidence in Overlord was THAT low. It always had been. He's the reason that Overlord did not begin 5-1-1943 -- the date the AMERICANS wanted from the first.'
Nope. The Ameicans (Mainly General Marshall) wanted to invade France in 1942. The British pointed out that there was landing craft for just 5,000 troops and that Britain could only supply seven divisions for such an undertaking. When the Americans were asked how many divisions they could supply, the answer was two and a half. That is nine and a half divisions to take on 25 German divisions already in France. Further, the Battle of the Atlantic was far from won, and the bombing campaign against German infrastructure had only just began. In 1942, the USAAF had not droped a single bomb on Germany.
Any invasion attempt would have been crushed by the Germans without the need to take a single soldier away from the eastern Front.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P391
Former Naval Person to President 8 July 42
‘No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend “Sledgehammer” as a practical operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported “The conditions which would make “Sledgehammer” a sound, sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur. They are now sending their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.’
As for 1943, this from one of Eisenhower's closest coleagues:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 395
'At Casablanca he [Alan Brooke] had raised the question of a Second Front, suggesting that operations in Italy should be used to divert the Germans from the west in preparation for a full-scale invasion of France. Although this plan was officially adopted, Anglo-American differences reached a sharper pitch on this issue than any other major matter. To General Marshall the continuation of warfare in the Mediterranean was a sign of British Lukewarmness towards the full-scale assault on the Reich through France, which alone could secure the defeat of the main enemy. In Alan Brooke’s eyes the continued lack of American reinforcements to Europe and the preoccupation with Admiral King’s operations in the Pacific, signified America’s lack of perception.’
‘At this distance of time, there can be no possible doubt that Brooke was right. Not only did we have no hope in 1943 of sufficient picked and trained troops, with a vast armada of shipping and landing craft for a cross-Channel invasion; even more important, we should not possess until the end of the year the air strength which, wisely used in advance of an assault on France, would ensure its success. It seemed clear to me that our right policy was to clear North Africa first, to take Sicily as a springboard for operations in Italy, the weak spot of the Axis, and to cause in the coming months the maximum devastation of German productive capacity.’
As in the 1942, none of the key conditions for a successful invasion of France were in place.
'Had that date been used, the Nazis would not have had any Panthers -- and very few Tigers. They also would've been still reeling from Stalingrad. France would've still had only crippled German units recovering from the Eastern Front. The Sherman tank would've been easily the best tank in the world in May 1943.'
In May 1943 the best tank in the world was the T-34, as the Germans acknowledged. The Sherman was a fire hazzard to its troops.
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@johnlucas8479
This is what Student said about the bridges in 101st Area
In Christer Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944 Vol 1 Page 135” we find the following, while it applied to the bridges at Veghel, we can assume the second part would also apply to the Son Bridge.
“The fact that all these bridges had fallen into the enemy hands undamaged came as a shock to the German Paratroop General Student. “According to the plans for a further German withdrawal,” he recounted “all bridges had been prepared for demolition and were guarded by strong detachments and special demolition commandoes. Each bridge had a responsible bridge commandant who had orders to blow up the bridge in case of immediate danger.”
Does this Christer Bergstrom note a source for the General Student comment?
‘So there a strong possibility that even if 101st land south of the bridge the Germans would still have been able to blow up the Son Bridge. We would never know.’ Your words.
I agree, but the point in question here is who had the final say.
Also, Montgomery had the opportunity, to insist that his plan for 101st be carried out.
Operation Market Garden page 24
‘"General Taylor protested against such extreme dispersion of his division and was strongly supported by Brereton. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery, who agreed after a rather sharp exchange of views to let the matter be settled between Taylor and Dempsey. They meet at Montgomery HQ on the 12th, Dempsey was confident that his Army could slice through unaided to Eindhoven, they readily reach a solution. "
Clearly, Montgomery had the opportunity to no to Brereton.
Clear? How so?
Brereton’s ‘Diary’ shows him to have been in Ascot (Sunninghill) on the 11th September, in Paris on the 12th September. So when did the ‘rather sharp exchange of views’ take place? How did it take place? By dog and bone? Brereton noted that he was informed about those drop points by Browning, and then decided to send Taylor to see Montgomery about this matter. But on the 13th, safely back in Britain, he notes that the matter was settled with Dempsey, making no mention of Montgomery.
That Arnhem book by Sebastian Ritchie noted that Montgomery did see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.
It seems to have been stated somewhere that Montgomery refused to get involved with proposed alterations to the US airborne plans for D-Day. Would he have done so for MARKET, which was on a much tighter timescale? What seems not to be in doubt, is that Brereton had the final say on the use of airborne forces at WALCHEREN.
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How was Caen botched?..
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@mgt2010fla
‘The road gains for Marget Garden had already taken Nijmegen but lost it to the Germans after Arnhem was lost to the Germans. Had to pay for it twice, all on Monty!’ Your words.
Really?.. Where is it on record that the Germans recaptured Nijmegen after MARKET GARDEN.
‘Monty had no resources? I thought Britian supplied everybody all their supplies, guess they didn't like Monty either!’ Your words.
What led you to think that ‘Britian supplied everybody’, and to guess that ‘they didn't like Monty either!’?
‘Monty got through the same forest that kept Market Garden from getting to Arnhem the first time and was now empty as the German troops were now needed elsewhere!’ Your words.
Which Forest was that?
‘Monty's successes were a legend in his own mind, and those British who dream of when they were powerful. and no longer were, circa 1945!’ Your words.
So those people who were at Alam-el-Halfa, Alamein, the Mareth Line, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the crossing of the Rhine were imagining it?
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@pip393
Not really…
‘fictional history’
I quoted Patton’s own personal diary. Here it is again, via an American author:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
PROLOGUE
P 11
“I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say?”
Montgomery, Patton, Sicily, and Messina:
Here is an American view on the advance on Messina…
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
Pages 319-320
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
Notice that Nigel Hamilton has quoted two US Army officers.
All clear now?..
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@kevinhodgkinson9292
If your grandfather fought and died at the Somme, that would mean that your father was born no later March 1917?
The commander of the British forces at the Somme was Douglas Haig, who died in 1928, 11 years before the Second World War started. It hard to see what his role in MARKET GARDEN was. Perhaps you could explain?
Of the two commanders you mentioned, Montgomery fought in the front line in the First World War. He was wounded twice, and was award the DSO. Browning also served in the front line in the First World War, and, like Montgomery, was awarded the DSO.
If your father owed his rescue from Arnhem to the Polish troops, then that is new one on me. All of the accounts that I read, have noted that the withdrawal from the Oosterbeek was organised, and carried out by the 43rd Wessex Division, and the Royal Canadian Engineers. 2,398 troops took part in the withdrawal, of which 160 were Polish.
As far as blame is concerned...If such a term can be used, Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the German General, Student, blamed the adverse weather. Montgomery also noted a lack support from Eisenhower, and his own mistakes. I don’t know what opinion Browning expressed about the reasons for Arnhem not being captured, and judging by the contents of your comments here, neither do you.
Montgomery and Browning each criticized the conduct of Polish forces during the battle. Whether or not those criticisms were justified, that is quite a different matter from blaming the Poles for failure at Market Garden.
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@billballbuster7186
Yep.
The key weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun, with the German 8mm ruling until the point that the 17 pounder became available. The anti-tank gun numbers were less than 1.5 to 1 in the allies favour. Seemingly not an overwhelming advantage.
Montgomery reinvigorated Eighth Army, and his impact there seems to have quickly taken effect, as testified by people who were ACTUALLY THERE:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
CHAPTER ll
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery."
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@ronb5714
Who can say? Ramsey did not get league fixtures suspended, and yet his teams came 3rd in Euro '68, made the quarter finals of Euro 72, and only just failed to qualify for the 74 World Cup.
With England not having to qualify for the 66 and 70 World Cups, the midweek friendlies took on a lot of importance from a team building point of view.
When Revie was appointed in the Summer of 1974, it was already eight years since the World Cup win.
Many people (Me included) were ready to set aside their doubts about Revie in the hope that he would bring success back to the England team. How wrong we were.
There was the bog awful kit, the clumsy attempts to whip up patriotism, the dossiers, the lobbying of the FA for more money, the constant chopping and changing of the players, the over emphasis on Kevin Keegan, who was nowhere near a complete player to build a team around, and so on.
Judging by their performances, and interviews in later years, apart from the Leeds players and Keegan, none of the players liked him, or rated him.
Compare how Revie's England players spoke about him with how with how Ramsey's players spoke about him.
As far as I am concerned, Don Revie was to the England Manager job what Richard Nixon was to the US Presidency.
It was bit nasty when the FA failed to mark his passing away, but he did rather leave himself wide open for such a snub.
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@jeffersonwright6249
'in both cases through better coordination.'
FRANCE 1940:
The battle took place in France. France supplied the overwhelming number allied troops. The allied commander in chief was French. The head of the BEF, Gort did not even have a place on the supreme allied council.
MARKET GARDEN 1944:
The MARKET airborne forces were under the command of US General Brereton until such as they linked up the GARDEN ground forces.
'And alleviating the V2 threat was never OMG’s primary mission, was it?'
Who can say?..
VCIGS, General Nye to Montgomery, 9th September 1944.
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial [V2 rocket] volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Will you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
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Ncholas Walsh
‘In Sicily, nearly 12,000 where the more "reckless" Americans lost less than 9,000 men.’
Your Words.
But the US forces amounted six divisions, whereas the British forces amounted seven divisions, three armoured brigades, and one an additional infantry brigade. Two armoured being the equivalent of a division. Further, British forces were facing the bulk of the Axis forces on the island, including almost all of German part of the axis forces.
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P319-320
‘General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.’
It seems to have been an American thing…capturing capital cities regardless of the consequences for other allied forces. Patton absconding to Palermo instead of continuing the fight against the main axis forces, Patton heading towards Paris instead of helping with the wider envelopment of German forces in Normandy. Mark Clark leaving allied forces in the lurch to capture Rome.
Contrast this with Montgomery not attending the allied victory parade in Paris on 8th September 1944, while the likes of Bradley and Eisenhower found time to fit it in.
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Nicholas Walsh
'For all his brilliance at methodical warfare, he was simply not flexible enough to fight the kind of war that he needed to fight, which was fast paced, highly mobile, and reliant heavily on flexibility and improvisation.' Your words.
At Alam el Halfa, he led Rommel to defeat in a place he wanted him to end up - Alamein, where Rommel had the Mediterranean on his left, the Qattara Depression on his right, and the 8th Army in front of him. He had no chance on overlapping the British on either side. The only way out was backwards. Montgomery won with 7% casualties. Thereafter, Rommel had to retreat all the way back to Tripoli, 1,300 miles, and was given no chance to to make any sort of major stand on the way. He ended up with about 7,000 of his Alamein forces.
In Normandy, Montgomery gave the Germans a bigger defeat than Stalingrad, ahead of schedule, and with fewer than expected casualties, his careful planning coped with the destruction to the allied build up by the great storm in June, and the slowness US break-out.
Careful planning, clear headed thinking, and experience beats Hollywood Gung ho every time.
'a disaster in which is cautious approach ran headlong into the need to advance rapidly before German reinforcements could arrive.' Your word.
But XXX Corps had arrived at Grave on the morning of the third day, 50 miles from the start line, having been forced to start late on the first day, and having held up by 12 hours as the Son bridge was re-built. They got there and found that Nijmegen Bridge and City had not been captured by US airborne forces.
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What? And the Australians, British, Canadians, Chinese, French, Indians, New Zealanders, Polish, Russians, South Africans, and were not a brave generation that saved the world?..
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Sgt Rock
A Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
The seeds of failure were sown long before the Operation Market Garden was launched. Discord and disagreement had festered between the allied commanders Montgomery, Bradley and Patton since the campaign in North Africa.
Neither the Americans nor the Germans considered Monty to be a commander of any great ability, he was probably the most overrated allied commander during WWII. The Americans found him arrogant to the point of bumptiousness, bad mannered and ungraceful, what one American called ‘his sharp beagle nose, the small grey eyes that dart about quickly like rabbits in a Thurber cartoon.’
General Omar Bradley stated waspisly at one occasion:
‘Montgomery was a third-rate general and he never did anything or won any battle that any other general could not have won as well or better.’
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
After the invasion in Normandy Montgomery had promised to take Caen the first day, but had not done so even by the end of June.
Finding himself overshadowed and sidelined by the flamboyant, gun-toting Ol’ Blood n’ Guts George Patton was more than he could stand, so he went to Eisenhower and demanded his ‘own’ operation.
Tact was never a prominent feature of Monty’s character and he made no attempt to conceal his disregard of Eisenhower’s broad front policy, constantly criticizing it and demanding additional resources of troops and supplies for his own purposes.
Although ‘Market Garden’ was launched on September 17, it was already by then too late. The opportunity to drive north through a disorganized and retreating enemy had been lost.
Like the British General Sir Brian Horrocks put it:
‘We had made the cardinal mistake of underestimating our enemy – a very dangerous thing to do when fighting the Germans, who are among the best soldiers in the world. Their recovery after the disaster in Normandy was little short of miraculous.’
RAM, July 28 2010
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Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
The Chamberlain government ended its policy of appeasement in March 1939, when Hitler broke the Munich agreement of September1938, by occupying the whole of Czechoslovakia, leading to Britain and France giving a undertaking to Poland go to war if Poland was attacked by Germany. Britain and France declared war on Germany on the 3rd September 1939, two days after Germany had attacked Poland. Winston Churchill took up the post of Prime Minister on the 10th May 1940. The period 1938 to the Summer of 1940 saw Britain create the then most formidable air defence system in the world. It worked. That, along with the then world’s largest Navy and Merchant Marine, the fortitude of the British people, and Winston Churchill’s leadership ensured that we are not ‘speaking German today’.
‘I have to believe that having already breeched the Atlantic wall at Normandy at great cost, the allies would have been better served by applying what they'd learned and strategically attacking the Siegfried Line at key locations head on than by "going around their butt to get to their elbow"’.
In that case you are in agreement with Montgomery, who went into Normandy with a clear plan: hold on the left (British 2nd Army), break-out on the right (US First Army). Charged with getting the allies to the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78, and with 22% fewer than expected casualties. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander on 1st September 1944 with no plan and the allies went nowhere.
‘the 101st and the 82nd bore the brunt of Market Garden's casualties’
Airborne forces casualties
1st Polish Parachute Brigade 378
US 82nd Airborne Divison 1,430
Us 101st Airborne Division 2,118
British 1st Airborne 6,462
As for the Dutch....
A fifth of their population was liberated by MARKET GARDEN. Further, MARKET GARDEN did displace any plan to liberate the Netherlands. If the operation had not taken place, the Netherlands would have been bypassed until Germany had been forced to surrender.
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‘Yes, blame. Montgomery, in the private opinions of his peers, was an arrogant jerk who did not care in the least about what they had to say in any matter.’
At the time of MARKET GARDEN, who were Montgomery’s peers. Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat experience between them. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. Eisenhower had made mess of the only campaign he had commanded in, the invasion of Italy. Bradley had performed without distinction in Normandy, and would later be found wanting in the Battle of the Bulge. Montgomery had served with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. In trying circumstances, in France in 1940, in command of a single division Montgomery had performed with distinction as he trained his division to the highest pitch of efficiency. His work proved its worth as he led his troops on the famous night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. When so ordered, he brought his division back to Britain almost intact. As a single army commander, in his first major command, he reorganized 8th Army, won against Rommel with inferior numbers at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to end the war in North Africa as a contest at Alamein. For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up Patton’s lunatic plan to land all around the island to shreds and concentrated allied forces in one place, the campaign was over in six weeks. Montgomery finished OVERLORD ahead of schedule (D+78, instead of D+90), with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad.
‘Talking to him was like talking to yourself.’
You met him when?
He absolutely refused to hear any of the warnings given him concerning the roads, enemy strength, and his unrealistic time schedule.
This is what Montgomery and Eisenhower saw:
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The roads and the time schedule did cost the allies Arnhem, Brereton’s airborne plan did that.
.‘Without the massive manufacturing capabilities of the United States, our hard working men and women who built planes, tanks, trucks, ships, weapons and ammo, who sewed uniforms, grew and processed food and medicine, and who faced death in delivering it all in unprecedented amounts to Europe.... the allies didn't stand a chance at victory.’
Yea, the British just sat on the hands and did nothing. Its an old wives tale that relative to their circumstances, Britain out mobilized and outproduced every other major belligerent and in absolute terms outproduced the Germans in every year except one.
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@tlb2732
Not really…
What as Britain supposed to do? Its economy had been dragged down by the world-wide recession created by the USA. The USA that was happy to enjoy the benefits of world-wide trade but none of the obligations to help to maintain international order. Further, Britain had lost getting on for a million persons in the First World War. The French lost twice that number, and got half of their country smashed up. Both countries had had their exchequers emptied in the conflict. The people of both countries were seemingly permanently scarred by the war. Nobody in Britain or France was looking for another war. Example: Both of my grandfathers had the misfortune to serve on the Western Front in the First World War, each had three bothers that also served, each lost one of those brothers. Not much of note there, millions of families in Britain, France and Russia fared far worse than that. But when my father calmly announced to his father that he had joined the Army in June 1939, my grandfather tore into him, citing the horrors of the trench warfare. Further, the population of Britain, and probably of France were led to believe that a war would lead to bombing of cities on a monumental scale and that casualties would run into hundreds of thousands.
At the time of the Czech crisis, the heads of the armed forces told Chamberlain that Britain could not be ready be ready for a general war until 1941. Czechoslovakia was hundreds of miles away, how could Britain help?
The French were obligated to the Czechs by treaty, Britain as not. The French were looking for a way out, and asked Britain to get involved. What began as a dispute between Sudeten Germans and the rest of Czechoslovakia was quickly turned by Hitler into a dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Every time that negotiations took place, Hitler upped his demands, In the end, it was a question of either accepting the annexation of the Sudetenland or Hitler would invade Czechoslovakia. The only alternative would have been to strike a deal with Stalin to bring the Russians in. Doubtless that would not have found favour in the USA.
Chamberlain was at least able to get a public undertaking from Hitler that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe. An undertaking Hitler broke a few months later, thus demonstrating to the world that his word could not be trusted. Judging by newspaper content at that time, the Munich agreement found widespread favour in the USA.
Aachen, Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, Metz, The Bulge, all suffered from Eisenhower’s incompetence as a commander. The man took political decisions instead of military decisions. A fourteen year old could have come up with his idea of all of the armies attacking at the same time. Thorough planning and campaign management beats hands off every time. Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan. British 2nd Army to tie down the Germans and thus protect the US 1st Army while it liberated Cherbourg and other ports and broke out into the French interior. It worked.
Eisenhower took over as land forces commander with no plan and look what happened, the allies stopped all along the front. When Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery put it to him, there were only the resources to advance with half of the allied forces and therefore those forces should be concentrated in the North, because that is where the Ruhr is, and to this end, stop the forces in the South. Surround the Ruhr, and Germany cannot continue the war. Failing that, Eisenhower should stop the forces in the North (Montgomery) and go with Bradley southern forces. Eisenhower "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it. Presumably Eisenhower was already thinking ahead to his post-war career.
Eisenhower was nearly always far behind the front, usually in the biggest Château he could find. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was at Ranville in Normandy. A message he sent to Montgomery on the 4th September took three days to arrive. At one point he got his chauffeur, Mrs Summersby to telephone a front-line commander to find out the progress of an attack he had authorized. At a meeting with Churchill and Alanbrooke in the latter part of the year, he could not even state the number of divisions he would have for operations in 1945. At the same time he was trying to form a committee to be located at Versailles to devise allied strategy!
Eisenhower formed the First Allied Airborne Army so that opportunities or needs that presented themselves quickly could be pounced upon, and put an American airman, Brereton in charge of it. When the day came to use it, the FAAA was badly led. All they key reasons why Arnhem was not taken were down to the FAAA.
The Germans concentrated resources in France in1940 and won. They failed to concentrate resources in Russia in 1941 and lost. Montgomery concentrated resources in North Africa and won. Eisenhower failed to concentrate resources in Italy and got through by the skin of his teeth. Eisenhower failed to heed the lessons of the past and the allies got Aachen, Arnhem, Hurtgen Forest, Metz, the Bulge, and he Russians in Berlin.
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@tlb2732
Not really…
'I see clearly. Just like Montgomery, and just like Britain in general, you have your opinion and your views and will accept no other.'
The USA media and hack historians have created a n America this, America that, version of history, and Americans seem to be mystified when they people from other parts of the world not agreeing with them.
‘Why did you ask for my source if you had no intention of using it? Evidently, you don't want any knowledge of Poland's code breaking successes. Sounds to me like you don't want to know any facts other than those you think place your country on a higher plain than all others.’
But I asked you to pass evidence that the Poles tried to give Britain and France a copy of a German plan to invade Poland. Where is that evidence. The stuff about the Poles penetrating Enigma has been in the public domain for over 45 years.
How Chamberlainesque! Bury your head in the sand till everyone else stops talking. No surprise there. Yet another example of you Brits being unable and unwilling to see past your elevated noses. In the words of the Captain in Cool Hand Luke, "Some men.... you just can't reach".
Na, I doubt if anyone would have acted differently to Chamberlain at the time of Munich. Not Daladier, France had the biggest Army in the world at that time, and a treaty with Czechoslovakia, they did not act. Russia held back, they were closest to Czechoslovakia. Not the USA, they were content to make money from Europe, but not get their hands dirty.
‘I'll waste no more of my time corresponding with you except to leave you with a few more facts.’
Its probably for the best, you are not in my league.
‘1. Woodrow Wilson negotiated a lasting peace with his 14 points at the end of WWI that Germans would have accepted. Instead, Europe insisted upon the Treaty Of Versailles, which was the catalyst for WWII.’
Woodrow Wilson made a high handed speech on behalf of a country that had suffered little during the brief time that it had been in the war, and had made money hand over fist from the conflict. The French in particular, wanted a lot more from the Germans. Who can blame them? Germany had started on them, caused enormous French casualties and had wrecked a large area of France.
‘2. Chamberlain had many chances to stop Hitler while the Nazis were still weak and could be stopped, but failed to take the necessary actions to do so.’
Hitler was never going to stop, regardless of anything that Chamberlain did. The only time that Hitler might have stopped was when he went into the Rhineland in 1936. Chamberlain was not Prime Minister at that time.
‘3. Without Britain calling for U. S. help, Eisenhower wouldn't have been on European soil.’
Nope. Eisenhower was on British soil because Japan and Germany declared war on the USA.
‘4. The war would have been lost without U. S. manufacturing might which outfitted and supplied the Allied militaries across all fronts.’
Not in the case of Britain. Britain stated the war with the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest merchant marine, the world’s largest shipbuilding industry and Europe’s largest Automobile and aircraft industries. The Germans were never going to be in a position to successfully invade Britain after 1940. In 1941 Hitler pressed the self-destruct button by invading Russia. Imports from the USA amounted 16.5% of Britain’s needs: 5.5% bought and paid for, 11% Lend-Lease.
‘5. We'll be here next time you call.’
Really? In recent decades it has been the USA that has been calling Britain: Vietnam, where we said no, Yom Kippur, when we said no. Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on. In Iraq, Britain was the biggest supporter of the US, twice. What did we get for our trouble?, the French walked off with the bigger rebuilding contracts. In the Falklands War, the USA was very tardy about taking sides with Britain in the case of a clear breach of international law by Argentina. On the night of the Argentine invasion, the US ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick was socialising at the Argentine embassy in Washington. At the same time, the Argentine regime was throwing its political opponents out of aircraft at 20,000 feet with parachutes. Even at the end of the war, with 256 British dead, Reagan was still trying to get Britain to agree to some sort of 50-50 draw. What arrogance.
Fancy some more?..
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@donberry7657
'all that interested me here was the question of Monty,' Your words.
So why then, have you stated the following:
'And yes, as the Americans saw it the whole British command wanted us and the Commonwealth nations to do the heavy fighting, take the casualties, so they could rebuild and preserve their own strength to resecure the Empire post war.' Your words.
'Compare the surrender of Fortress Singapore to American defiance at Corregidor. Pretty clear our brass intended to fight this war with brass balls. And they did.' Your words.
'All while the 8th Air Force hit German factories in daylight despite the early beating they took? Goering himself said at wars end the minute he saw American escort fighters he knew they'd lost the war and that British night raids were ineffective, killing civilians that could evacuate or take it, but American daylight raids would spell the end.' Your words.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
'of Monty, my opinion on which is in agreement with Churchills view' Your words.
Do tell, where did Churchill express an opinion of Montgomery? I have not seen it in Churchill's six volume history of the Second World War, the contents of which, I am very familiar with.
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@donberry7657
And while I am about it?..
'America like Patton wanted to hit em hard head on, press, advance, never let them rest, retrench or regroup.' Your words.
If so, why did Eisenhower fail to concentrate allied resources at the beginning of September 1944 in order to chase the Germans back into their own country while they were pieces, and thus allow the Germans time to 'retrench' and 'regroup'?
'Personally I believe what infuriated Monty most was Pattons success .' Your words.
Really...
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P180
Monty had, however, continued to show concern about Bradley's front the more so because, in contrast to General Bradley's confidence, Monty did not think highly of either Hodges or Simpson, the First and Ninth US Army Commanders. If only Bradley would transfer Patton to the Ardennes or preferably to Ninth US Army's sector, then Monty was sure all would be well—F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December. 'He [Monty] said that he always intended that General Patton should come North as part of General Bradley's command'
Montgomery's fellow army group commanders, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers did not have a single day of personal combat experience between them.
Eisenhower made a mess of the invasion of Italy, and a mess of allied advance in September 1944.
He was 400 miles behind the front when he took over as allied land forces commander, after OVERLORD, and never got further East than Rheims in the entire campaign. At one point he had to get his 'chauffeur' Mrs Summersby to phone a forward HQ to find out if a particular US attack had gone ahead.
Bradley made a mess of finishing up his part in Normandy, and when his big moment came, in the Bulge, he got himself hopelessly out of position, leaving him sidelined in the battle. This left Eisenhower needing to bring in Montgomery to sort the US 1st and 9th armies in the North, and the US 3rd army to strike from the South.
Devers commanded the 6th army group in the backwater part of the allied front in the latter part of OVERLORD. Thereafter, he seems to have made little impression, good of bad.
Contrast this with Montgomery, (and Alexander) both of who had fought in the First World, and had done their jobs in France in 1940, in trying circumstances, as single division commanders. That the allies were defeated was no reflection on their work there. Alenbrooke saw them in action, and knew that they could be trusted when things got heavy.
As for Bradley's subordinate commander, Patton, read this:
www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/
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@imperialcommander639
An example of Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
The seeds of failure were sown long before the Operation Market Garden was launched. Discord and disagreement had festered between the allied commanders Montgomery, Bradley and Patton since the campaign in North Africa.
Neither the Americans nor the Germans considered Monty to be a commander of any great ability, he was probably the most overrated allied commander during WWII. The Americans found him arrogant to the point of bumptiousness, bad mannered and ungraceful, what one American called ‘his sharp beagle nose, the small grey eyes that dart about quickly like rabbits in a Thurber cartoon.’
General Omar Bradley stated waspisly at one occasion:
‘Montgomery was a third-rate general and he never did anything or won any battle that any other general could not have won as well or better.’
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
After the invasion in Normandy Montgomery had promised to take Caen the first day, but had not done so even by the end of June.
Finding himself overshadowed and sidelined by the flamboyant, gun-toting Ol’ Blood n’ Guts George Patton was more than he could stand, so he went to Eisenhower and demanded his ‘own’ operation.
Tact was never a prominent feature of Monty’s character and he made no attempt to conceal his disregard of Eisenhower’s broad front policy, constantly criticizing it and demanding additional resources of troops and supplies for his own purposes.
Although ‘Market Garden’ was launched on September 17, it was already by then too late. The opportunity to drive north through a disorganized and retreating enemy had been lost.
Like the British General Sir Brian Horrocks put it:
‘We had made the cardinal mistake of underestimating our enemy – a very dangerous thing to do when fighting the Germans, who are among the best soldiers in the world. Their recovery after the disaster in Normandy was little short of miraculous.’
RAM, July 28 2010
As you are not Big Woody I am sure you will agree that it is despicable.
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@nickdanger3802
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
So there you have it. Brereton had the final say on MARKET.
Eisenhower had the final say on MARKET GARDEN, as by the beginning of September 1944, he was both allied supreme commander and allied land forces commander.
By why be so glum?..
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
Be happy...two American Generals were ultimately responsible for MARKET GARDEN.
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Bil Slocum
What sort of idiot would post this:
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England.
V2 attacks on Britain were hindered by the increasing pressure that the allies were able to put on German communications after Market Garden.
As Antwerp was never a Market Garden objective, and as Eisenhower approved the deferment of the campaign to clear the Scheldt to allow Market Garden to go ahead, any attempt to put the inability to use Antwerp as the fault of Market Garden is absurd.
The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter.
Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden.
Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue.
None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition.
The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
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Big Woody is a liar, and this is why:
Read on and use the link...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opinion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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DennisCambly
Total rubbish.
The Canadians (Force J) landed at JUNO because their forces in Britain were concentrated in Surrey, Sussex, and parts of Hampshire, between the forces for Force G (GOLD) to their West and the forces for force S (SWORD) to their East hence, their main embarkation port being Newhaven. The US forces were concentrated in the West of England, hence they were sent to UTAH, and OMAHA beaches.
Eisenhower had no input whatsoever in which troops went to which beach, that decision was governed by geography,and Montgomery's plan for the OVERLORD land campaign.
'Montgomery and British top brass for what they did to the Canadians at Dieppe.'
Get real.
The Canadian government, and Canadian military leaders, lobbied hard for the lead role at Dieppe. Montgomery was already in the Middle East when the Dieppe Raid (JUBILEE) took place.
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Not really...
Montgomery had no final say so in the MARKET airborne plan. on this the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
'What ever happened to the idea that the person planning the operation is the person executing that operation on the ground!' Your words.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, wat at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
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@BaronVonHobgoblin
Not really...
All of the evidence in my previous comment shows that Montgomery had no final over the airborne plan, where, it seems that the key reasons why Arnhem was not captured can be found. The final decisions on MARKET belonged to the US General, Brereton. Brereton had already vetoed a request to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived.
'This is squarely a failure of planning on the part of General Montgomery. To blame anyone else is to undermine the principle of the chain of command and the military as a whole.' Your words.
The FAAA had been formed to bring together resources to be able to act quickly in the ever changing situation in August and September 1944, and afterwards. Montgomery got approval from Eisenhower to undertake MARKET GARDEN on the 10th September, but did not see the FAAA MARKET plan until 15th September, at most, two days before the start date for MARKET GARDEN of 17th. As I have already shown, there is clear evidence that Montgomery had no final say on what the FAAA decided to do.
'It’s all fine for you to sit comfortably in your chair and let Monty save his face.' Your words.
Save face from what? Ill-informed historians who have zero experience of the events they are passing judgement on?
'As a former soldier who might at one time have been asked to do something similar that position is more than unhelpful when looking towards the future.' Your words.
As someone who is not a former soldier, I can only look to contemporary evidence, and the words of people who were there, to form opinions regarding who did what . As far as apportioning blame for things that went wrong is concerned, I am not remotely interested in hindsight. Any judgement must be based on the circumstances prevailing at that time, and what people knew when they made their decisions. As far as MARKET GARDEN is concerned, I would start with Eisenhower, who by that time, was both supreme commander, and allied land forces commander. Eisenhower had already presided over the entire land campaign since the beginning of September, as it ground to a halt after Normandy. He agreed to MARKET GARDEN, as a limited effort to gain the allies a foothold East of the Rhine, using the only additional resources to the allies at that time, the FAAA. He later stated:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.’ His words.
Montgomery was under pressure that was not applied to US commanders. Declining British resources led Montgomery being pressured to keep the war moving, as forces under his command were being earmarked for transfer to the Far East. Further, the first German V-2 rocket on London took place on the 8th September, two days before Montgomery’s meeting Eisenhower regarding
MARKET GARDEN.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.’
The V2 rocket could be launched from a mobile trailer, and once it was airborne, was all but impossible to intercept. The launching of V weapons against Britain took place in the Netherlands, in sight of British troops, my own father among them. It was considered that the only realistic way of stemming the V weapon bombardment was to cut off the flow of weapons to the Netherlands.
‘Either the commander's intent and the associated tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders were selected.’ Your words.
What is your point? That the failure to take Arnhem was down to these factors?
MARKET GARDEN was launched on a weather forecast of four clear days, starting, 17th September, which turned out to be false. How does that fit with tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders being selected? The Germans captured a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan right at the beginning of the operation, from a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone. How does that fit with tasks, goals, and objectives were not made clear enough to the subordinate commanders or the wrong commanders being selected?
‘As a former soldier who might at one time have been asked to do something similar that position is more than unhelpful when looking towards the future. In fact such face-saving obstruction of a proper accounting of Monty’s responsibility is actively anti-soldier in its content!’ Your words.
But Montgomery’s responsibility for everything he did as an army commander, and an army group commander, including MARKET GARDEN, has been looked to hair-splitting detail, particularly by American authors, to an extent that they do not go into with US commanders, even to the point ascribing motives to his behaviour such as a desire to get to Berlin before Patton or some such rubbish, for which there is not a shred of reliable evidence.
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The operation took the allies over 50 miles to to the top of the Siegfried Line, leaving them well placed to cross the Rhine in the following year. Amongst other benefits where the curtailment of V Weapons being launched against Britain - something no American can relate to.
The operation incurred 15,000 casualties and should be compared to UG bog-ups in the same period such as Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties),
Eisenhower took final responsibility as, by September 1944 he was both Supreme Comander and by then had apointed himself to be land forces commander.
'They always thought that they were better than the rest of the Allies.'
Britain was the only major participant to fight for the entire six years of the war, the only major participant to go to war on behalf of another country , per head it out-produced every other major participant. It fought in every theatre of war.
Any questions?
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@tomcherry7029
Oh well, its your funeral...
Bradley published his memoirs in 1951. Fact. What Bradley had to state about his subordinate, Patton is of little interest to me.
As for Dunkirk. Who claimed it was a victory? All that I stated was that it 'hardly a disaster'.
Saving the troops gave the government the confidence to carry on with the war, in the certain knowledge that it had the start of a new army to be created while Britain was protected by the then largest navy in the world, and the then most poerful air defence system in the world.
In material terms, recovery from Dunkirk was swift. Britain lost 60,000 vehicles of all types at Dunkirk, yet production of these items in 1940 amounted to 188,000. By August of 1940, Britain was able to send half of its tank fleet to North Africa. By early 19410, there were two million fully armed troops in Britain along a million plus in the Home Guard.
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@tomcherry7029
‘so you are saying that England did not use the M4 Sherman tank, the P-51 Mustang, the Thompson submachine gun, or get anything through the little lease program?’
Your words.
No, I have argued against your claim that Dunkirk ‘was a absolute disaster’ (Your words) by pointing out why it was not an absolute disaster, due to consequences of saving the troops, and that the material losses were quickly made good. Further, in response to your question, ‘and where did they get the tanks and other arms to replace the arms lost’ in regard to losses incurred in France, I pointed out the production figures for British made tanks during the remainder of 1940. The Sherman tank was not in British service until the latter part of 1942, the Mustang fighter was not in British service until the early part of 1942. The Thompson submachine gun was in Britain earlier, but in tiny numbers, with supplies of the M1 and M2 amounting to 25,362 across the British Empire. By way on contrast, Britain produced 3,919,911 Sten submachine guns.
‘All of which was from the US and started in Dec of 1940. and let not forget how many Destroyers, the US shipped to the England’. Your words..
Err, not really… Lend-Lease was not enacted until Match 1941. In 1941 it provided 1% of British munitions, Lend-Lease supplies did not overtake cash purchases from the USA until late 1942.
As for Destroyers, it was 46, obsolete, rusting First World War vessels, which were collected by the Royal Navy from places in the USA and Canada. Ships that were traded for bases in almost anywhere that the USA cared to choose in the Atlantic, and the Caribbean. Barely 30 of those Destroyers were seaworthy by May 1941. These, and the remainder of those ships were disposed of asap, as the British and Canadian escort ship programme came on stream. About the only real contribution made by these ships to the war at seas was when HMS CAMPBETOWN was rammed into the Normandie dock at St Nazaire.
‘The "USA's nancy boy Second world war story" lmao daylight bombing of Gremany was done by the US because is was dangerous for the British.’
Unescorted daylight bombing of Germany was defeated as the USAAF withdrew from the bombing of Germany in the second half of 1943, after its defeat at Schweinfurt. The RAF night bombing campaign proved to be sustainable over six years of war.
And who was in command on D-Day and who appointed him? That would be General Eisenhower appointed by FDR Your words.
Command on D-Day was originally a British designated appointment. It was a British decision to pass this post onto the USA.
now let's talk casualties 6063 US, 2700 British and 946 Canadian and that is only D-day. Your words.
OK, let’s talk about casualties. You have stated figures for D-Day… The US First Army went into UTAH and OMAHA beaches, having decided not use specialize assault armour, leaving their troops vulnerable to being pinned down by German beach defences. They curtailed their shore bombardment far too early, and one of their officers panicked in the early stages of the assault of OMAHA, ordering the launching of DD tanks three miles out to sea, with the result that nearly all of them sank before they could reach the beach. The British Second Army made no such mistakes, as the casualty figures show. The US forces were unlucky at OMAHA, in running into part of a German Division on full alert as part of an anti-invasion exercise. However, that bad luck was balanced by UTAH being all but undefended, with one part of it literally unmanned. British Second Army at GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD beaches was able cope with an expected level of German defence and was able to deal with the only major German counter-attack anywhere on that day, as the 21st Panzer attacked forces at JUNO and SWORD beaches. Further, compared to the British 6th Airborne effort on the allied left, the US airborne landings were a shambles. Your media and your historians have lied to you. Try to cope.
‘If the US did not enter the was How long do you think England would of held out?’ Your words.
Almost indefinitely until the German Army was crushed by the USSR. Germany had a outside chance of being able to invade Britain in the Summer of 1940. Thereafter, the chances of Germany being able to invade Britain were all but zero, and were zero after Germany invaded Russia.
You were running out of planes, Tanks and being hit with V-1 and V-2. Your words.
Britain running out of planes? Britain produced 131,549 planes, Germany produced 119,307 planes, Russia produced 143,145 planes. Tanks, Britain produced 31,483 tanks, Germany produced 67,429 tanks, Russia produced 105,251 tanks. Its hard to see how a gap in 35,946 tanks was going to cost Britain the war, given Germany’s commitments in the East. As for the V1 and V2, they caused injury and death to civilians, as members of my own family could testify. From a military point of view, they were next to useless, the rockets could only be expected to hit somewhere in London, a target that was then 35 miles wide. Equally, the flying bombs could land almost anywhere after their fuel ran out. The Germans would have done better to put the resources into conventional bombers.
‘nimber of troops who fougjt in WWII buy county USSR 35 million, USA 16 million, Germany 13 million , the British Empire 8.5 million, Japan 6 million.’ Your words.
Not really…
The USA included its national guard, merchant marine, and coast guard.
If the equivalent figures for Britain are totalled up, the figure for Britain alone runs out at 7.7 million.
That, from a population of 47 million. If you times the 7.7 million figure to the then population of the USA, 131 million, you get a figure of over 21 million. That is how much more Britain mobilized than the USA. Further, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa together stumped up another 5.2 million troops.
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@nickdanger3802
Also...the German night Fighter force, which, in the case of the bf-110 Night Fighter, comprised a air crew of three. With a production of 3,090 machines, that equalled 9,270 single seat, daylight fighters. The Ju-88 Night Fighter, 3,901 built. With a four man crew that would equal 15,9604 single engine fighters.. And the Night Fighter defence system needed a far heavier investment in machines and manpower than the daylight air defences.
It was a good job that the British faced down the lunatic US intention to invade Europe in 1943, when the USAAF was having its arse handed to it on a plate by the Luftwaffe. Meanwhile the RAF was able to carry on its bombing campaign against Germany right through the war.
As for the German Navy, its ships had indeed been 'hounded to destruction or were bottled up in ports', thanks to the Royal Navy. German sailors were probably more likely to have been run over as they crossed the the road to enter Kriegsmarine port gates than they were of being hurt by the US Navy.
And all this, from a Britain, county of just 47 million people. Marvellous!
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@GiacomoLockhart
'I have read Horrocks, Monty, Kershaw, Hastings, Beevor, Burgett, Ryan, Middlebrook, Wilmot and some sources in German, among others'
OK. I have Montgomety, Middlebrook and Wilmot here. Take your pick.
I will type the first few words of text in a chapter...and you carry on from where I stop...
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John Cornell
'From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army'
What rubbish is this?..
Myth?...
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
CHAPTER ll
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
Alexander, Alanbrooke, Churchill and about 29 out of every 30 soldiers in the 8th Army talked about the effect Montgomery had on that army when he arrived.
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John Cornell
'From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 477 Brooke and the other chiefs of staff should never have allowed Churchill to dictate minor detail,nor to sack Generals and Admirals on a whim(the Air Marshalls got off lightly).Probably the worst example of picking the wrong man and backing him come what may,was in Brooke's constant support for Montgomery,who should have been dismissed once it became clear that he could not operate in a coalition environment,but whose retention soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War'
This Corrigan clown was born in 1942- making him 3/4 years old when the war ended. He was in the Gurkhas, but at the time of the Falklands, Corrigan was not even in the army. So much his close up knowledge.
Montgomery not able to operate in a coalition environment? I doubt if I could if I were him. A professional having to deal with a bunch of know nothings, without a day of personal combat experience between them. In any case, the politics and smooth relations was down to Eisenhower. He had fuck all else to contribute.
'soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War'. I don't think so. Montgomery was Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe in the 1950's. The new reality was the cold war. Who in allied circles was then going to bang about the war?
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@GiacomoLockhart
'You disparage everyone else's military service, even senior officers, if they disagree with you.' Your words.
'A professional having to deal with a bunch of know nothings, without a day of personal combat experience between them.' My words.
Eisenhower and Bradley had zero personal combat experience. Fact.
'Hastings was nowhere near the events those events. He was not even born until after the war had ended. He was a journalist in Vietnam and later in the Falklands War. That was it.' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decion makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'It seems to get a bit better with this Robert Kershaw, he has at least had some military experience, but he is still far too young to have been in the war.' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'As for Anthony Beevor, like the other two he is too young to have been involved in the war, he as in and out of the army in less than four years.
' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
'This Corrigan clown was born in 1942- making him 3/4 years old when the war ended. He was in the Gurkhas, but at the time of the Falklands, Corrigan was not even in the army. ' My words.
How does that experience give him the authority to judge decision makers and their decisions in the thick of war over 70 years ago?
In the case of Corrigan, his lunatic claim that 'National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army' is destroyed by the written account of Churchill, Alexander, DeGuingand and doubtless a good many others.
'So do tell us....what arm or service did you serve in?' Your words.
Why do you ask? You are the one claiming military experience, 25 years I believe. Why not tell us about it and how it qualifies you know, amongst other things, Montgomery's motive for launching Market Garden? Shall we remind ourselves of what you stated. Also, where in a British Army education did they use the term supreme commander?
I can hardly bear to type the words, but based on these exchanges you probably know less than Big Woody, if that is possible.
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@GiacomoLockhart
You have had your warning , several times over.
All of your opinions are clearly consistent with someone who has read a single modern version of events which you accept without question.
You used the term supreme commander where it clearly does not apply, you claim to know about what was in the mind of people who were involved in these events, you use the first thing you can find in wikipedia to try to back up ill thought through comments.
You dismiss the works of Alanbrooke, Churchill, DeGuingand, Eisenhower, Chester Wilmot and so on as 'boys' war comics'. Oh, and it seems, looking at your other defeat - to John Cornell, also the works of the US General Gavin.
On top of that, you claim a twenty five year in an army, without stating which army, and when cornered by real evidence, you come up with some cock and bull story about who your father knew.
You have had your chance to walk away and you have spurned it. From now on on, every time you come on hear, this is what you will get.
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@nickdanger3802
The Long Range Desert Group mainly used wheeled vehicles made in Canada. That is the Canada that at the started the war with a population of just 11 million people. The Canada, that of its free will joined Britain in the war against Germany from almost the start of the conflict. The Canada had had an outstanding military production record. The Canada that has not spent the seventy years plus since the end of the war, trying to ram what it did down peoples throats using a never stopping conveyor belt carrying trashy, chauvinistic films, TV programmes, and historical novels written by the likes of Stephen Ambrose and others.
The US Waco Glider could carry one Jeep or 13 troops. Therefore, the 740 Waco gliders supplied to Britain could carry 740 Jeeps or 9,620 troops.
The British Airspeed Horsa Glider could carry two Jeeps or 28 troops. Therefore, the 400 Horsa gliders supplied to the USA could carry 800 Jeeps or 11,200 troops.
The idea that it took hours to pry Jeeps that had been loaded into the Horsa gliders used in action is absurd. All that was required to unloaded those gliders was to undo eight spring loaded bolts and to cut a couple of metal cables using metal cutters that were supplied for each glider. Further, the AS.58 Mark II Horsa Glider featured a hinged cockpit section which reduced the modest amount of work required to unload the earlier types of this excellent glider.
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@nickdanger3802
Get lost. Those bases were not rented, and they were built by significant numbers and with significant amounts of British materials. Those bases enabled the USA to fight its war with Germany 3,000 miles from the US mainland.
Further, of the five main belligerent nations (Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia), Britain was the only one to go to war on behalf country - Poland. Of course, a number of other countries took part in the war, among them, the USA. However, the USA does not get to join the main group of belligerents as their homeland was 3,000 miles from any hint of danger to their homeland. Also, they only joined the war when they were attacked by other countries.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
None of this changes what I stated.
Themain five beligerents:
Britain. In the war from 03.09.1939 to 02.09.1945. Fought in every theatre of war, bombed and blockaded by the Germans. Fought the Germans on its own for a year, went to war on behalf another country - Poland.
Italy. In the war from 10.06.40 when it declared war on Britain and France. Surrendered to the allies 03.09 1943. Italy was fought over from then until the end of the war.
Germany. Invaded Poland 01.09.1935. Declared war on Poland, and multiple countries thereafter, including Russia and the USA. Had its country fought over in 1944 and 1945.
Japan. Declared war on the USA, Britain and others December 1941 Had it its homeland bombed (and nuked by the USA). Occupied in 1945.
Russia. Attacked by Germany, had the Western part of its country occupied for three years. Later declared war on Japan.
The rest:
Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa. Volunteered to join the fight from the start of the war. India was part occupied.
France. Like Britain, went to war on behalf of Poland, but bailed out in 1940 when it was occupied by Germany.
The odds and ends:
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland etc. All attacked and occupied by Germany, but did what they could.
The USA. Eventually joined the war in December 1941, when Germany, Italy and Japan declared war. Did not volunteer to fight for anyone else, its mainland was never attacked or occupied. Subsequent generations of US citizens have got bare faced cheek to try to tell everyone else all about it.
For simplicity, look on the war as an Olympic event:
Gold for Britain.
Silver for Russia.
Bronze for Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa.
Personal bests for the rest of the allies.
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Not really...
Casualties:
Fatal Casualties (%) Prisoners of war Evacuated safely(%) Total
and evaders (%)
1st Airborne 1,74 (13.1) 5,903 (65.8) 1,892 (21.1) 8,969
Glider pilots 219 (17.3) 511 (40.5) 532 (42.5) 1,262
Polish brigade 92 (5.4) 111 (6.6) 1,486 (88.0) 1,689
Total 1,485 (12.5) 6,525 (54.7) 3,910 (32.8) 11,920
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Arnhem casualties:
Fatal Casualties (%) Prisoners of war Evacuated safely(%) Total
and evaders (%)
1st Airborne 1,174 (13.1) 5,903 (65.8) 1,892 (21.1) 8,969
Glider pilots 219 (17.3) 511 (40.5) 532 (42.5) 1,262
Polish brigade 92 (5.4) 111 (6.6) 1,486 (88.0) 1,689
Total 1,485 (12.5) 6,525 (54.7) 3,910 (32.8) 11,920
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
Again, for the thicko Polak:
`[The] Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’
Where in there?.. is there any hint that Montgomery blamed the Poles for the outcome at Arnhem.
And while I am about it...
...It was not just the Poles that penetrated the secrets of Enigma. The French had a hand in it as well, and when the secrets came to Britain in 1939, there was still a considerable amount of work to do to make the reading of German coded messages a practical reality.
...Britain was not obliged by treaty to go to war with the USSR after it invaded Eastern Poland.
...The Battle of Britain was won by a far, far, wider margin than the contribution of the Polish pilots, whose kill claims do not match German records.
...It was impossible in the middle of 1943 for Britain and the USA to accuse the USSR of being responsible for the Katyn Massacre.
...General Sikorski was not murdered. He was not important enough.
...Sosabowski was pain in the backside, with not allowing his troops to take part D-Day being amongst his greatest hits.
...Churchill tried repeatedly, without success, to get Roosevelt and Stalin to cooperate in get help to the Poles involved in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.
...There was no chance, short of all-out war to make the Russians create a free Poland in 1945.
...The omission of Polish airmen from the 1946 Victory Parade in London was an oversight that is dwarfed by what Britain did for Polish exiles during and after the war.
All clear now?..
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@rob5944
bigwoody (aka Para Dave) is a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA who hates Britain, and all things British. Most of all, he hates General Montgomery. He dismisses the works of historians who died of cancer, and he is a sucker for any revisionist hack historian who writes something he agrees with. His favoured authors include one William Weidner, who, it seems, claimed that Carentan was a British D-Day objective, and one Anthony Beevor, who churns out bbok after book designed for the US market.
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@dmbeaster
"And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part—I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong." ("while" is emphasized in original - the comment font will not let me italicized it)
In other words, Market Garden was a mistake because it resulted in an inadequate force to secure Antwerp - the Canadian force was not enough. He could not do both at the same time, which was a mistake. Your interpretation is wrong. Your words.
Its a definate no.
Montgomery had already decided to leave the 1st Canadian Army to take the approaches to Antwerp as far back as late August 1944, when Eisenhower turned down Montgomery's proposals either to stop Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army so that British 2nd Army and US 1st Army could advance together into Germany, or to stop Canadian 1st Army, and British 2nd Army, while the US 1st Army, and the US 3rd Army advanced into Germany. MARKET GARDEN had no influence on a previous decision regarding the tasks facing the 1st Canadian Army.
From Montgomery's memoirs:
'In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed
from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and adminstrative resources necessary for the job it would have succeeded
in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of
the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN S unrepentant advocate.' His words.
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@dmbeaster
'Montgomery's memoir is absolutely clear that he proposed Market Garden as a path to Berlin.
"I decided to make one more approach to Eisenhower, in my efforts to get a sound plan adopted. I sent him the following message on the 4th September, the day we captured Antwerp and Louvain:
'I would like to put before you certain aspects of future operations and give you my views.
1. I consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin is likely to get there and thus end the German war.' "
Not really...
The 4th September signal was re-stating what Montgomery had already proposed on the 23rd August. That allied resources should be concentrated for one thrust into Germany. A thrust that would have involved up to 20 divisions. MARKET GARDEN was not even proposed until the 10th September, and was was on a much reduced scale than previous proposals, leaving MARKET GARDEN as no bigger undertaking than a numbr of allied operations at that time.
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter. ”’
Regarding MARKET GARDEN's objectives, I have already noted what one of Montgomery's harshest critics, Tedder, stated on the subject. This from Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up.
There can little doubt that if Annhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the IJsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany.
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@dmbeaster
'This is from the Market Garden chapter and describes his effort to get his plan approved. Eisenhower initially said "no" resulting in Montgomery's personal lobbying effort on September 10, which worked in a way. Eisenhower describes it the same way, and his response that the idea of getting to Berlin was nuts. Eisenhower approved it because he thought that it could get to the Ruhr, and end the war early. It was Eisenhower, and not Montgomery, who saw the plan as practical for a more limited objective.'
Your words
Tedder attended he meeting on the 10th September. Teder never hid his opinion of Montgomery, and yet his account backs Montgomery, as do the contemporary documents. This stuff about monty you're nuts or whatever it was joined the account many years later via Cornelius Ryan, or the plagiarist Stephen Ambrose, or whoever.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He made a muck of planning the invasion of Italy, he seemed to be incapable of undrstanding the Normandy campaign, and when he had appointed himself as land forces commander he brought the entire allied campaign to a halt.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.'
Unless Para Dave can supply a source for these words, they must be deemed to be his words, and therefore worthless.
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@rzafft
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 589
‘When Eisenhower placed the Airborne Army at Montgomery’s disposal on September 4th, he was committing his strategic reserve, the only major force he could throw in to clinch the victory that had been won in France. But he did not make available to Montgomery the supply resources necessary to ensure that the maximum advantage was drawn from the commitment of this precious reserve. Montgomery, it will be recalled, reached the Meuse-Escaut Canal, the start-line for Market
Garden, on September 10th without any logistic help from Bradley or Eisenhower, apart from some five hundred tons a day which had been delivered by air during the previous week.'
'It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September16th.'
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@johnlucas8479
'So your position is, as Supreme Commander Eisenhower was responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden. '
Eisenhower was ultimately responsible for the outcome of Market Garden.
It went with the job, along with the big Chateau hundreds of miles behind the front, the cars, the press conferences, and first crack at the female drivers.
If Arnhem had been taken, Eisenhower's name would have been all over the Hollywood films about about it. There would not have been mention of Montgomery.
'Then I can assume that you would argue that Montgomery should not receive any credit for the success of Operation Husky'
Montgomery did his job in Husky, including bribing Patton to rejoin the battle when he threw his toys out of his pram.
For Husky, unlike Market Garden, Eisenhower was not Allied Land Forces Commander.
'Operation Varsity and the Battle of the Bulge as the credit is due to Eisenhower as he was the Supreme Commander. Am I right.'
Not really...
The Bulge was entirely avoidable, with Montgomery warning Eisenhower about allied forces being spread too thinly and a warning from one of Bradley's subordinate commanders - Patton about a German attack in the Ardennes. Still, when it kicked off, Eisenhower did quite well, the first thing he did was to put the whole of the northern half of the bulge under Montgomery's command. As we all know, Montgomery quickly brought things under control.
Varsity as linked with Plunder went extremely well, as Eisenhower acknowledged:
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
His words.
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@johnlucas8479
If you look back, you will see that I stated that ultimate responsibility for Market Garden rested with Eisenhower in response to this comment from Sean Adams:
‘The blame for Operation Market Garden rest with Montgomery alone, plain and simple.’
His words.
Why is the term blame to be used? Market Garden failed to capture the Arnhem Bridge but it freed a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched German forces still further, hindered German efforts to reinforce and re-supply their forces in the remainder of the Netherlands, and their V-Weapon campaign against Belgium and Britain. If casualties are set against gains then Market Garden compares well with other operations at that time: Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest.
Blame applies where people and what they knew when decisions were made can be judged.
Hindsight can be easily applied to a situation but blame is quite a different matter.
Eisenhower created the First Allied Airborne Army (I believe, I do not know, against the advice of Bradley and Montgomery). Eisenhower turned down the opportunity to go into Germany with a combination of British 2nd Army and US 1st Army or by a combination of US 1st Army and US 3rd Army. His decision making or lack of decision led to the allies stopping along the entire front and allowing the Germans to recover from their defeat by Montgomery in Normandy.
Eisenhower created the overall situation, he approved Market Garden, he takes his share of responsibility. As does Brereton, who devised the airborne plan and over whom Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
As for Plunder/Varsity, Eisenhower learned the lessons of the past and wisely allowed Montgomery to plan and execute a complete victory as he had done at Alamein and in Normandy.
The US author Norman Gelb noted:
‘The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
As for Hollywood, look at what has happened: For decades Hollywood has distorted and stolen British history in order to promote a chauvinistic US version of history. Particularly the Second Word War in the likes of Patton, Pearl Harbour, Anne Frank: The Whole Story, Mussolini: The Untold Story, Objective, Burma!, Saving Private Ryan, and a good many more, with the perhaps the crowning turd being U-571, which years later drew this admission: "I did not feel good" about suggesting Americans captured the Enigma code rather than the British. It was a distortion... a mercenary decision to create this parallel history in order to drive the movie for an American audience,"
- David Ayer, Screenwriter U571
Its not just Britain and the Second World War. Argo (2018) showed blatant falsehoods about the parts played by Britain, Canada and New Zealand in saving Americans in Iran in 1979. The Patriot (2000) took a Nazi atrocity and falsely attributed it to Britain in the American War of Independence.
All this puts Hollywood alongside Stalin’s Russia and Nazi Germany in the distortion of history.
Hollywood has shown no interest in Plunder because Montgomery was in charge and it was successful. Hollywood has, however been all over the capture of Remagen Bridge which Eisenhower stated was due to good fortune.
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@johnlucas8479
‘My personal position regarding Operation market garden is that no individual is personally responsible for the failure just a combination of factors for example, single road, weather, distance from the objectives and the level of German resistance. I image the blame game started with TIK in blaming Gavin for the failure. After that each person than started to pass the blame on other individuals based on various decisions made without actual considering the underlying factors behind the particular decision or if any alternative decision was available.’
I do not really see blame as particularly appropriate. Lessons for the future maybe.
In my opinion, the decision to launch Market Garden was a reasonable one, given the circumstances at that time.
‘The push for the establishment of the 1st Airborne Army was by the British supported by Gen Marshall and Arnold. (Source Airborne Operations WW2).’
But the British only favoured a unified command of airborne troops. Eisenhower went much further by looking to integrate air forces into an allied airborne force, seemingly under pressure from General Marshall. Montgomery seems to have been doubtful of what use could be made of such a force:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 261
‘Under relentless pressure on Eisenhower from George Marshall and others in Washington to get those airborne divisions into the fight, the plan had been slapped together in less than a week. The First Allied Airborne Army, also created at War Department insistence, and the corps headquarters that preceded it had drafted and discarded eighteen operational plans in the past forty days.’
‘Even Montgomery seemed exasperated by the frantic cycle of concocting and scuttling plans to sprinkle paratroopers across the continent. “Are you asking me to drop cowpats all over Europe” the field marshal had reportedly asked his subordinates.’
The merits of broad front verse a single thrust can be hotly debated, as each approach has benefits and limitations. If you study the eastern front the Russian used both approaches at various times. The stopping of the Allies was due to supply shortest than Eisenhower decision making. Any advance into Germany would need the port of Antwerp to be operational whether its was a single thrust or Broad front. You raised a very interesting point.
But before Market Garden each army group was getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day, together, they were enough to sustain twenty division in attack with the remainder in a defensive situation. Later in the month (September) Dieppe would be available to add another 3,500 tons per day – enough to sustain the Canadian 1st Army in a renewed advance.
‘The 1AAA was allocated to 21st Army Group for the Operation, therefore theoretical under a normal chain of command Brereton would be reporting to Montgomery in the same way Dempsey. So why did Montgomery have no jurisdiction? Was one of the weakness of the Operation that there was no overall Commander or was the problem the short planning time of only 7 days did not allow for any one exercise the level of command required.’
Who can say? The evidence I have seen is clear in regard to Montgomery not being able to order the airborne forces.
When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 588
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days. Particularly for the British, the combination of too few men with too far to travel would soon prove fateful, even as paratroopers from the 1st Airborne Division collected their kit and hurried east in search of a bridge to seize.’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P 265
‘Operation Plunder/Varsity was on the 24th March which was successful, however 2nd March 9th Army requested a surprise crossing of the Rhine was there was little opposition but was vetoed by Montgomery (source Airborne Operation WW2) because of German resistance in 2nd Army Area. What would have been the outcome if Montgomery had said yes.’
Who can say? So late in the war, why take the risk?
‘As to Remagen bridge, yes it was good fortune or luck, point is they take advance of good fortune and some time the difference between success and failure is timing or luck. Dunkirk would not have occurred if the German High Command did not stop the Panzer Division. A lucky hit sunk the Hood and later a lucky hit by British Swordfish resulted in the sinking of the Bismarck. Luck sometimes plays it part in a battle.’
But Eisenhower still understood that Montgomery had (again) given a masterclass in planning and battle management.
As noted by an American author, who, admittedly was not there:
‘The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
BY NORMAN GELB 1994 CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED
P406
‘Regarding Hollywood, I do agree with you about U571, although they do acknowledge HMS Bulldog and the British in the credits.’
Yea, but only after pressure from Britain, and the film makers having found out that David Balme was actually still alive. 15 Enigma encoding machines were captured from U-boats in the war. 13 were captured by the Royal Navy, 1 by the RCN and 1 by the USN – in June 1944, after D-Day. Just imagine if the story had been the other way around and the British had stolen the story, what the reaction would have been in the USA.
‘I not sure about Saving Private Ryan as I have visited the graves of the 2 brothers the Movie was based on, it may not be 100% accurate.’
The gratuitous slur on Montgomery, words to the effect: ‘the British are booged down in front of Caen, Montgomery is overrated.’ What rubbish, as if front line would privy to things like that.
If US film makers want to make films about US people then that is fine, but it is evil to puff themselves up at Britain’s expense.
‘Patton is reasonable accurate as its focus only on what actions Patton was involved in and clearly not a complete record of Patton actions in WW2.’
The whole thing was designed to promote a chauvinistic US story, without any care as to how British history was trampled on. The race to Messina that only existed in Patton’s head, the complete falsehood that Bradley was responsible for the Normandy strategy, the complete falsehood that Patton was stopped because his supplies were needed for the Market Garden build up. And probably a few more that I have forgotten.
‘I image the sane for British Movies for example "Sound Barrier" are also not 100% accurate’
In so far as the US reneged on an agreement to share technology regarding the sound barrier and that the first instance of breaking the sound barrier was attributed to the serial liar Chuck Yeager, then yes, the film is inaccurate.
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John Cornell
'It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction.' Big Woody.
What utter rubbish - a 16 year old has read a comic book about the war.
Bradley crossed the Rhine on a fluke in the same month that Montgomery did. And, Montgomery had to cancel Operation Veritable - scheduled for the beginning of January in order for him to sort out the American mess in the Bulge.
'Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - Corelli Barnett'
Corelli Barnett. Second World War experience: with the British Army in Palestine 1945-48.
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@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’ How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
‘Fancy some more?’
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when Para Dave pulls the trigger.
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@richardmeo2503
Its a definite no.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591-592
'When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
Dont guess, check, and then post comments.
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@phillipnagle9651
'Are you that committed to British mythology or are you just plain incapable of reading a battle map. The 6th SS Panzer Army was always the lead army which was to take Antwerp. But if you feel better quoting a Nazi general who would have been annihilated had there been a counter attack from the north but was saved by the slow moving timid Montgomery, feel free.'
Get real. The US high command structure fell apart as soon as the Germans fell apart.
Hodges went missing for over 24 hours, Bradley made a Berk of himself by refusing move his headquarters, and was sidelined for the rest of the battle.
youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1 hour, 4 minutes onwards.
When Eisehower finally came out of hiding to meet with Montgomery, what a farce:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P259
Monty was therefore somewhat surprised by Eisenhower's royal arrival—as he told `Simbo' Simpson when the latter flew over to Monty's headquarters the following day. 'He said it was most impressive. The train drew into the station and immediately teams of machine-gunners leapt out, placed their machine guns on both platforms at each end of the train, and guards leapt out and took up every possible vantage point. No question of letting any German assassination troops get at the Supreme Commander. Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.' Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures.
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@johnvaleanbaily246
Not really...
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591-592
‘When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with littlehelp from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P126
‘from Normandy to Holland. In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt,¹ since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it.
'St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October.'
Channel and North Sea Ports Liberation:
Dieppe. Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944.
Le Havre. Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944.
Boulogne. Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944
Ostend. Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
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@lyndoncmp5751
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 591-592
‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time, Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
Notice the title of ths chapter from which this passage is taken.
Chester Wilmot was not oppo who was nowhere near the war, spouting off decades later. He was actually there.
It should also noted that Le Havre became operational on13.10.1944, exclusively for American use, and from which 61,731 tons of supplies were unloaded in October 1944, with the daily total increasing day-by-day.
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The RightStuff
All the Wikipedia stuff you have pasted is fine but would it not have been better if you had put say ‘single quotes’ against them?
The War in Russia started 22.06.41 and by the end of November that year the Germans were 1,000 miles from their homeland, having to man a near 2,000 mile front in some of the harshest weather conditions in the world. From start of the campaign up to that time the Germans had suffered one million casualties, a quarter of their attacking force. German technocrats had warned in 1937 that across the board, existing German military technology would be obsolete by 1943.
By that time the key Russian industries were located 1,000 East of Moscow.
What price a German victory then?
In 1942 Russia produced 25,436 aircraft, 24,446 tanks and 127,000 artillery pieces. The equivalent German figures were 15,409, 9,300 and 12,000.
The game was up for Germany.
As for Lend-Lease:
No US deliveries before the middle of 1942.
The Soviets started the war with over 28,000 locomotives and 600,000 rolling stock, suffering only limited losses to destruction or capture.
Lend-lease delivered 1,977 steam and Diesel locomotives (3.6% of the total soviet stock), 11,000 rolling stock items (1.8% of the total soviet stock).
US Lend Lease locomotives and rolling stock were used to deliver Lend Lease in Persia and mostly arrived from mid 1944 onwards.
Food: 1.75 million tons. Over 35 months = 50,000 tons per month or 1,642 per day over 1066 days.
About 1 Liberty Ship per week – to feed a population of 100 million plus.
Tanks, artillery aircraft and so on, go through the totals and see how Russian production and Le d-Lease numbers compare.
Russian GDP for the years 1941-45 stood at $1,913 billion. Total US Lend-Lease aid to Russia stood at $11 billion.
Even going the Wikipedia stats one thing that stands out is the fantastic British mobilisation and production effort.
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The RightStuff
your words in 'single quotes'
'1. Your numbers are fanciful. What is your source? Politburo?
'
For those 1942 Russian armaments production figures its:
(Kursk, The Greatest Battle, Eastern Front 1943. Lloyd Clark. Headline Review 2011.Chapter 6, Uneasy Calm, p180).
For railway assets its:
www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/russia-stands-alone-no-ww2-lend-lease.321273/page-4
The numbers are not sourced, but the number very similar those noted in Wikipedia – from one Weeks, Albert L. Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004.
take kit how you will.
‘2. The US was expected to feed 100 million Soviets? Exactly the Russian way: complain about being helped.’
But your contention is that US Lend-Lease was significant. The author you cited, one Robert Hill seems to have described US Lend –Lease as ‘Russia's life-saver’ – his words.
Do you think that 1.75 million tons of food spread amongst 100 million plus people over 3 years was significant?
'3. I don't know why you are crowing about wikipedia. I have original writings that I posted which are my own work. I credit other sources where appropriate. You on the other hand have no sources.
'
See point 1 above.
'4. An area where you are especially wrong is railroads. They were decimated by the Germans in the first few months. The Soviets had 29,000 locomotives at the start of the war. Source: "Russia and Serbia, A Century of Progress in Rail Transport". A Look at Railways History in 1935 and Before. Open Publishing. July 2008. Retrieved 9 June 2016....
*Second, "From June to December 1941 on the front-line railways objects Luftwaffe flew about 6 thousand air raids. During the war, was destroyed 16 thousand. Locomotives" http://eng.rzd.ru/statice/public/en?STRUCTURE_ID=4334 *
So out of your 20,000 locomotives, 16,000 were immediately destroyed by the Germans, leaving you 4,000. Soviets were virtually unable to replace locomotives themselves during the war - and only produced about 300. The US supplied nearly 2,000 locomotives. Therefore, of the 6,000 locomotives operating during the war in USSR, the US was responsible for 33% - a significant number.’
As far as the Russian site you cited is concerned, here are some of their statistics:
‘20 million railcars transported with soldiers, shells, military equipment, foodstuffs. If we build these echelons along the chain, then they can wrap the whole Earth 4 times at the equator. The trains went in a continuous stream, sometimes the interval between them was 600-700 meters.
During the defensive battles near Moscow, 333.5 thousand railcars were served for military transport.
In the course of the preparation of the Battle of Kursk, 14,410 echelons transported entire armies in full force.
2.5 thousand plants and factories were exported beyond the Urals. This made it possible in the shortest possible time to restore military and industrial potential.
18 million people were evacuated. To do this, it took more than 1.5 million cars.’
And all this with 4,000 Locomotives?
Notice that the site talks about rolling stock in the millions. Numbers of wagons of wagon loads, the site seems to be unclear on this point.
As for Locomotives, I note that no total number of these items is noted. If the figure is true, which I very much doubt, then the Russia lost 80% of those 20,000 Locomotives in six months. How the system kept running is anybody’s guess. The arrival of 2,000 US Locomotives from late 1944 onwards would have amounted to the replacement of 12.5% of Russian losses. Significant? Not for me.
A more significant statistic might have have to say 2,000 Locomotives arriving in 1941 to replace say 2,500 Russian losses or whatever the number was. How was the arrival of 2,00) Locomotives in the latter part of 1944 supposed to have been significant?
Of course, if the total number of Russian Locomotives at the start of the Russian war was the Wikipedia figure of 29,000 then those supposed 16,000 losses would amount to 55% of that total – in which case those 2,000 US locomotives would seem to be of greater significance. Which one do you want?
By way of comparison, Russia began the First World War with 20,071 Locomotives but by February 1917 that figure had reduced to 9,021 - a major contribution to Russia’s defeat and the Revolution. What happened in the period 1941-44? With supposedly less than half that number of Locomotives the Soviets moved a huge numbers of factories over thousands of miles, millions troops and delivered huge numbers of munitions, as well as delivering food and essentials to millions of Russians.
‘5. You must have failed economics if you want to compare or equate GDP to Military aid amounts supplied. lol. It doesn’t work that way. In any event, USSR had the lowest GDP compared to US, Germany and even little Brittan. And USSR was a mere 25% of the USA output.’
Have it your own way.
So what does a GDP comparison with the USA prove? Russia and the USA were not at war. The relevant comparison is surely between Russia and Germany – they were at war.
Let us use that Mark Harrison document (which I already have): 1941-45 Russian GDP was $1,643. 1941-45 German GDP was $2,002.
Of course, Russia was fighting on one land front Germany was fighting on two, then three land fronts, the Battle of the Atlantic and the air war in the west.
You should read this Harrison document – it’s a good read. Here is a snippet:
‘The pressure on resources was somewhat alleviated by foreign aid, which added approximately 5 per cent to Soviet resources in 1942 and 10 per cent in 1943 and 1944.’
‘6. Your GDP numbers are off - imagine that! For years 1941-44 combined by country: 1,300, for USSR; 1,404 for UK; 1,692 for Germany; 5,227 for USA. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/totalwar2005.pdf’
If you check you see that I noted figures for 1941- 1945. The war ended in 1945 – take my word for it. Harrison’s figures for Russian GDP show $1,643. Set that against Western aid figures and see how the figures compare.
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gerhard ris
'Any good general would have thought thru the entire campagne after D day already in 1943.'
Your words.
But Montgomery was not appointed to command the Overlord land campaign until January 1944. At which point he devised a plan to take the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and giving the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Thereafter, Eisenhower took over the direction of the land campaign as of 1st September 1944.
'Monty lied after the war that the object of Market Garden was the Ruhr.
Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
On the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
N.B. Tedder was one of Montgomery's harshest critics.
'Monty admitted that he wasn't aware that getting both sides of the Schelt (Schelde)was essential for opening up Antwerp.'
Your words.
Not the case. My father was in the Schelt campaign, and at that time he atended an Army briefing in which it was stated that every single mile of the estuary would have to be in allied hands before Antwerp could be used by the allies.
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@gerhardris
'the allies needed harbours of which Antwerp was the best you are the first one ever to contest that what as far as I know all historians agree on.'
Your words.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.1954
P 591-92
‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." ² This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time
Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@gerhardris
'Monty as soon as it was clear that Italy campagne was not going as hoped should have thought through all possible scenarios in the broadest sense.' Your words.
But Montgomery was not in charge of the campaign in Italy. Eisenhower was. Montgomery warned that dispersing allied resources into AVALANCHE, SLAPSTICK, and BAYTOWN would lead to serious problems. He was proved right.
Montgomery was in charge of land campaign for OVERLORD, for which he had a clear plan, to use British 2nd army to protect the allies from German attacks, in order to allow US 1st Army to capture Cherbourg and other French ports, leaving the allies to win the battle of the build up of resources. Which they did. Under his command, the allies cleared France in 90 days. After Eisenhower took over command, the allies went just another 45 miles and stopped. As in Italy, Eisenhower failed to concentrate allied resources, giving the Germans time and space to rebuild their forces.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience and little command experience. He had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was four hundred miles behind the front. He was so out of touch with events, at one point he had to get his chauffeur to phone a front commander to see if a particular attck had gone ahead. Politics, rather than military considerations seem to have governed his decision making.
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@gerhardris
'as said Eisenhower should take part of the blame. Anyway Monty as Eisenhower should have known about the Scheldt, Zuiderzee/Ijssellake/ afsluitdijk.'
Your words.
But what relevance does that have to the outcome of MARKET GARDEN?
'He incorrectly trusted Monty who came up with a plan that he was sold by primary resposible the one who concocted the plan without knowing the relevant facts he would have known when Monty had followed Sun Tzu.'
Your words.
What relevant facts were missing?
Intelligence?
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44 (one day before the onset of MARKET GARDEN):
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The aerial photography can be seen on line. Unlike the Hollywood film 'A Bridge Too Far', which includes a photograph of post war AFV, disguised as Second World War machines, shown in clear at a nice oblique angle, the actual photographs were grainy overhead shots, which, only after a considerable amount of enhancement showed what seemed to be a few Mark III tanks that identified as belonging to the Hermann Goering Division Training and Replacement unit.
Any information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground, unless it could be verified by other intelligence sources. MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in this regard.
Logistics?
Montgomery went ahead with MARKET GARDEN after being given undertakings in regard to logistics from Bedell-Smith that US 3rd Army would be halted, and that its transport would be transferred to US1st Army for operations in support of 21st Army Group. None of his happened.
‘Monty delegated it and tried to blame others for what he was respocible for. If you concoct a plan you and you alone are most resposible.’
Your words.
Not really. Montgomery had no final say over the FAAA and the MARKET plan. On this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@gerhardris
‘he hid even during the initial planning of his own plan. He let them worknit out whereas he should have been on top of it or appoint one in that * his * role.’
Your words.
You mean Montgomery? How so? When Montgomery briefed Dempsey on GARDEN on the 10th September, that plan was the same as the ground part of COMET. Where MARKET GARDEN differed from COMET was in the MARKET airborne part, which was to be three times the size of the airborne of COMET. Planning for MARKET was entirely in the hands of the US General Brereton’s FAAA. According to one Sebastian Ritchie, so often quoted by people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not get to see the MARKET until the 15th September, two days before the MARKET GARDEN start date.
‘Yet, Monty was out of his depth and to proudly arrogant to accept close aid of capable generals. Then he would have only to act the part and follow advice given.’
Your words.
Montgomery had planned Alamein, HUSKY, OVERLORD, the Scheldt, PLUNDER/VARSITY, and sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, after the US command structure fell apart – according to people who were around at that time. What did Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers ever do?
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
This, from Beevor:
ARNHEM
THE BATTLE FOR THE BRIDGES, 1944
Antony Beevor
PENGUIN BOOKS 2018
P1
'British troops were rather jealous that General George Patton's US Third Army had beaten them to a Seine crossing by six days.'
Americans will lap with sort of stuff.
How is he going to know what emotions British troops were experiencing at that time?..
Regarding his Arnhem book... He claimed in a YouTube clip to have unearthed new evidence – on the suffering of the Dutch people in the aftermath of MARKET GARDEN, which he wrongly attributes to that operation. Yea…new information that has only been in the public domain since May 1945, when operation MANNA was all over the newspapers and cinema newsreels. What a big find that was.
His other sources: Left over material passed on to him by the US author Rick Atkinson, and stuff from the Cornelius Ryan 'A Bridge Too Far' archive in a US university, which is on-line, so anyone can access that stuff.
Right throughout the book, he uses American terms. For the Mustang fighter, it is the 'P-51 Mustang', for the Achilles tank destroyer its the 'M-10 Achilles'. He describes an incident involving soldiers and a pig, using the American term 'hog'.
I remember seeing stacked up copies of his book on a clearance table in a branch of Waterstones, a few months after it was published. Marvelous!
The Spanish are really liking him after he told them all about the Spanish Civil War. He went down a storm in Russia when he told them all about Stalingrad.
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@davidrendall7195
Big Woody (it seems, he is sometimes also known as Para Dave on YouTube).
You can debate with who you want, but you should know that he has called Montgomery everything under the sun, XXX Corps cowards, Carrington a coward, my Uncle a coward, Churchill a drunk. He has desparaged a US author called Dupay because he caught cancer, and so on and so on about Britain and the war. He has even tried to blame Montgomery for the defeat in France in 1940.
This stuff is about his norm.
'I'm not a MacArthur or Clark fan either. Guys like O'Connor,Collins,Middleton,Krueger,Slim,Simmonds were much better than those knobs. Monty was shyt and almost cost an alliance and in fact did after the war.' His words.
Like he is supposed to know. He is no more better qualified than me to pass judgement on these people. I have not been in the military, and I was not in the war. Neither was
he . As best I can judge, he is about 20 years old. He has confirmed that he has not been in the US military, that he lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA, and that he hates me.
'Poulussen/Neilands write rags 70 yrs later and that gets traction?LMAO.' His words.
Yet this is the boy that lauds Beevor, Buckingham, one William Weidner, who it seems claimed that Carentan was a British objective on D-Day. What have these people all got in common.? They were all nowhere near the war.
'As you told Cornell I'm a user not a pusher. All these guys full of it c'mon you've been converted by carnival barkers if you believe that.' His words.
Do you know what he is on about?
'Beevors Books were released 3 -4 months before I could read it here state side. Hardly pandering to the American Market' His words.
So what does Beevor bring to these subjects...He was born after the war, he was in and out of Army inside four peacetime years, its seems with not even a patrol in Northern Ireland to his name. All the key people were long dead before he put digits on a keyboard, and had already been interviewed by real historians. Nearly all the key documents have long since been released. How many books had already been published about Market Garden before Beevor? 50+ maybe. What has Beevor, or Buckingham got of any importance that is new?..
'It's called research evidently the British like everyone to take their word for it. Right now I'm reading Winston's War by Hastings - very balanced .I had read Overlord/Armageddon also - I recommend them.' His words.
Hastings was at Saigon in 1975, the Falklands in 1982, that was about it. Beyond that he about like Beevor, but slightly less irritating to listen to.
'Read Willaim Weidner - Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap very well sourced. Again Monty may have been shot had Brooke not punched his ticket' His words.
Ah yes, Weidner and his Carentan being a British D-Day objective. Also it seems, his evidence for the Falaise Gap is Montgomey shouting out of his caravan at someone not to close the gap. As iff...
You throw credible evidence under the table to rescue a questionable commander.Prove them wrong,America has nothing to do with the fact the BEF didn't cross their own channel in 4 years. Does the UK always have blame assigned before your allies arrive? 3 miles in Monty's plan was getting blasted by Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans. TIK's hive of hallucination is one big echo chamber.' His words.
What rubbish. The BEF was dissolved in 1940, how was it supposed to cross the Channel afterwards? 'Monty's plan blasted' What rubbish.
There is a Dutch Poster on here somewhere who lived along the HighWay and studied the battle here is what he said.' His words.
'Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November' That Dutch Poster's words.
Nothing established in the rest of 1944. What cheek. British and Canadian forces cleared the Scheldt. They got themselves ready for Veritable, only to have it postponed while Montgmery went down to sort out the American mess in the Northern half of the Bulge.
'how come indeed' His words., whatever they are supposed to mean here.
Big Woody has been on another YouTube thread asking for a person who goes by the YouTube name of akgeronimo501 to come onto this thread - perhaps because he needs support.
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@davidrendall7195
I have not actually watched this film through and I have not read A Bridge Too Far for over thirty years. Are the '82nd Airborne's post-op reports from July 1945' on line?
I tend to trust the words of the people who were actually there, unless, of course, what they state can be disproved. Likewise, contemporary documents, unless they can be shown to be misleading. Statistics, etc fine. Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, this Buckingham bloke and so on, passing judgement on people and their actions decades before their time is of no interest to me and I largely disregard such opinions.
I think I remember that you stated on another thread, some time ago, that the oblique aerial photos of German armour in the Arnhem area were never actually taken? Have I got this right? All that seems available on line are overhead shots, with the German vehicles heavily, heavily, camoflaged.
I really only come here to shoot down thicko Americans who get their history from Hollywood, and uncritical, chauvinistic US authors. Overall, I would much rather see more coverage devoted to the less glamorous Scheldt campaign, which my own father took part in, and a bit less on Market Garden. But there we are, its not going to happen.
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@davidrendall7195
All I have seen is an RAF Air Historical Branch document by one Sebastian Ritchie which is on-line. It seems state that photos were of a thought to be of a unit called the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Training and Replacement Regiment with Mark III Tanks. It must have been a really lenghty process for people to scour the original prints from the negatives. Obviously, the copies in the pdf document are of no real help to the likes of me. From memory, some of these types shots were on display in the Airborne Forces Museum in Aldershot. Interviews with people like Constance Babbington Smith regarding Peenemünde give some insight to a layman like me of the difficulties involved in this work.
You made some very good points which I have not seen before in regard to Market Garden, including:
'You fly PR aircraft back and forth over the same spot for days on end, high and low level, the enemy might notice your intent.' A very good point.
'Some amateur sleuths have gone through the flight logs of RAF Benson and found no evidence of any low level PR flights purposefully sent to Arnhem in this period'.
A new point for me.
'I suggested some photos and reports from Dutch resistance were exaggerated to cover the secret of ULTRA. Greater things were sacrificed than 1stAB Div to keep the secret of ULTRA' For me, another interesting point.
'As Browning and the Airborne officer corps were not cleared to read ULTRA - Brian had to find a way of convincing them in another way. A common method was to send PR aircraft to double check ULTRA intel and provide legitimate disclosable evidence.'
I did no know that 'Browning and the Airborne officer corps were not cleared to read ULTRA'. I have read that any Ultra information that was passed down had be covered by another source, photography, prisoner interrogations etc.
From what I, as a layman can see, the available aerial photo intelligence for Market Garden was cause for concern. But should it have caused enough concern for decision makers to say no to Market Garden, when it was put alongside other information? Who can say? I could not. How did it compare say, with the intelligence available before other operations launched in a similar timescale?
As for Big Woody...make what you will of his comments.
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@davidrendall7195
A few things if I may:
The ll SS Panzer Corps.
I did not know that the II SS Panzer Corps was located in Alsace before it was sent to the Arnhem. Can this be referenced easily?
You stated this:
‘This is where Monty may be at fault - he definitely was ULTRA cleared and should have been aware of Bittrich's forces disappearing from the American front in Alsace and then ULTRA reporting him between Arnhem and Deelen a reasonable time fo travel allowance later.’
But Montgomery stated this in his memoirs:
‘The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew
it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was
quickly brought into action against the 1st Airborne Division’.
Brigadier Hackett
You stated this:
When Brigadier Shan Hackett (CO 4th Para Brigade, scheduled to drop at Renkum heath on D+2) saw the intel report he made his own assessment "This seems a very complicated way to commit suicide, we'll all be lucky to be alive in two days!"
But surely Brigadier Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade landed at Ginkel Heath, on D+1, did it not?
This is the quote I have read regarding Hackett’s assessment of Market Garden before it started, as related by one Captain Nick Hanmer:
‘Shan' Hackett said he didn't wish to disagree with the general but, in his opinion, if 50 per cent of us were alive and on our feet within two or three days of this operation commencing, we should consider ourselves fairly lucky. As it turned out, he was exactly correct; thirty-one officers from my battalion flew to Arnhem and fifteen were killed or died of wounds; none returned to British lines.’
The points you made about intelligence work are fine but what would interest me most would be what did the decision makers, Brereton, Eisenhower, Montgomery etc. see and what effect did that information have on their decision making in regards to Market Garden.
This is what I have found:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris [26th August 1944], the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared:
"Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
P598
The crucial factor, however, was not man-power but fire-power. So many weapons had been lost and so few had been replaced that in his three armies Model had only " 239 tanks and assault guns " and " 821 light and heavy cannon," less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. Model had barely sufficient tanks to refit one armoured division; the Allies on his front alone had the equivalent of twelve armoured divisions.
The SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 assured Montgomery that the Germans facing his British 2nd Army was: "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
A 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary of 13th September 1944.states that:
"the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
The questions that would spring to mind are:
Is there important written information available, that key people would have seen, that is not shown above?
Was the assessment of intelligence reports as good as it could have been?
When intelligence reports were placed alongside the other considerations such as weather forecasts, the state of readiness of allied forces, external pressures and so on, was the decision to go ahead by Brereton in his mansion at Sunninghill, Eisenhower in his chateau in Normandy and Montgomery in his caravans in Belgium the correct one?
Here are some views on the subject...
General Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
Roy Urquhart:
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD
1958
P204
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying:
The operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
Also, Brian Urquhart, as related by you:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dvv8GQIRYVU&lc=z230dp0ictretve4504t1aokgxpo54nbd50e0avc4emnrk0h00410.1572219754468033&feature=em-comments
‘Surprisingly given his role in warning of the dangers Uncle Brian always said the mission should have gone ahead regardless.’
The author Martin Middlebrook was not there but seems to have thought this:
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
P441
‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’
The author Antony Beevor not there, and I have zero interest in anything he has to state on the subject.
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J Wilson
The Falaise Gap.
Far from being an example of ‘Monty’s lethargy, it was a miscalculation by US General Bradley. As he acknowledged:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
Montgomery and Eisenhower.
Montgomery went into Normandy as allied land forces commander with a clear plan and won a huge victory, ahead of schedule. Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander at the beginning of September, when the Germans had less tanks and artillery pieces on the western front than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy gave the Germans time and space to re-build their forces, and launch the Ardennes offensive.
Montgomery had, on the 23rd August proposed to Eisenhower that the allies should prioritize a thrust in the North to grab the Ruhr. Failing that, an advance in the south should be the priority. Either way, such a decision should be made. Eisenhower did neither.
The Ruhr.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P510
‘the Ruhr-Aachen area which was producing 51.7 per cent of her hard coal and 50.4 per cent of her crude steel? Without these basic resources the output of arms and ammunition would be drastically curtailed, if not crippled. The armies in the East might be supplied for a time from the mines and factories of Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but these could not nourish a war on two fronts. If the Ruhr and the Rhineland could be captured or neutralised, it would matter little what armies Hitler might keep in the field in the West, since he would not be able to provide them with the means of continuing the fight.’
Supply.
At the beginning of September, the allies were receiving 14,000 tons of supplies per day, 12,000 tons was enough to supply an advance by British 2nd Army and US 1st Army, leaving US 3rd Army and on a defensive stance with 2,000 tons. 3,,000 tons per day that could delivered via Dieppe by the middle of the month would suffice for the 1st Canadian Army. Further, Le Havre was operational in October and other channel ports were to become available in the Autumn and winter.
An additional 500 tons per day were being flown in to feed Paris was redirected to 21st Army Group as the food situation in the French capital eased. These were the only additional resources given to Montgomery before Market Garden.
Planning.
All planning for the airborne ‘Market’ part of the operation was led by the US General Brereton, who held his first planning meeting on the 10th September, 1944, after Browning had flown back to England from meeting Montgomery in Belgium about Market Garden, which Eisenhower had approved earlier that day. Brereton oversaw a plan that placed drop and landing zones too far from objectives and failed to include a second lift on the first day. That Montgomery had no final say on airborne matters is evidenced by the following:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
A copy final Market Garden plan was found by the Germans on the body of a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider in a US combat area.
XXX Corps.
Linked up with US 2nd Airborne Division on morning of the third day, having coped with the 12 hours taken to build a new bridge at Son. The ideas that XXX Corps failed to keep pace with what was achievable regarding time or that another commander could have done significantly better than Horrocks are old wives’ tales
Urquhart.
What bearing did any lack of airborne experience have on Urquhart’s part have on the outcome of the fighting at Arnhem?
Gavin failed to be in possession Nijmegen city or Bridge when XXX Corps arrived there.
Maxwell-Taylor failed to secure Son Bridge.
Eisenhower and Bradley did have a single day of personal combat experience between them.
Losses.
The ‘staggering losses’ at Market Garden you mentioned amounted to 17,000 and should be compared with allied failures at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,00 casualties).
The Poles.
Montgomery wrote to Alanbrooke on the 17th October criticizing the performance of the Poles for their performance in Market Garden. Browning did the same on 20th November, when he wrote to Weeks. Neither Montgomery or Browning scapegoated the poles for the outcome of Market Garden.
The weather.
Market Garden was given the go-ahead on a weather forecast of four clear days from day one. This did not materialize, only two of the nine days of operation had good weather.
Eisenhower had this to say on the Market Garden weather:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather.’
German General Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, gave the weather as the main cause of
the failure.
The Scheldt.
The idea that the Scheldt could attacked and cleared straightaway after the capture of Antwerp has little basis in reality. The necessary forces for an assault on the estuary were not in place and the Germans were in control of the Breskens Pocket. Brereton had already rejected a suggestion by Montgomery to use Airborne forces at the Scheldt due to the terrain and flak. Whenever an attack took place on the Scheldt, the estuary would have been mined by the Germans – adding three weeks to the timescale of any assault.
The idea that VIII Corps and XII Corps could have been channeled down the same road as XXX Corps is absurd.
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@jwilson9273
‘Monty was supposed to seize Caen by D+4…it took two months.’
Your words.
What Montgomery was supposed to do was to be at the Seine by D+90.
He made it by D+78.
Here are the words of an eye witness to Montgomery’s briefing to allied leaders on 15th May 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’
If you wish to quote Chester Wilmot, that is fine by me:
‘On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that XV U.S. Corps
could have driven straight on from Argentan to Falaise on the 13th or
14th. Contrary to contemporary reports, the Americans did not capture
Argentan until August 20th, the day after the link-up at Chambois.’
And Horrocks:
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 53
one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without ‘equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
And DeGuingand again:
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
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@peterdoyle1591
Nationalists were oppressed? Or are oppressed ?...
Nationalists get to fly the Free State flag on public buildings.
Sinn Fein/IRA get to contest local, and national elections. And their candidates that win do not even have to swear alliegence to the state.
Sinn Fein/IRA? terrorists get to walk away from responsibility for the crimes that they have committeed, and they are given bits of paper that say so.
Some bloke gets a payout of thousands of pounds because he does not want to walk past a picture of the Queen in his place of work.
Sinn Fein/IRA started a thirty year terrorist war, leading to over three thousands deaths because Martin McGuinness did not get a bus driver job in 1970, or whatever it was. You can just see the French or the Americans putting up with that.
The Government puts in a Parades Commission that sides with the Nationlists every time, when it decides on who can march where.
If that was the lot given to the blacks in Apartheid South Africa, or to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, they would probably have thought that their luck had changed.
Gerry Fitt stated in the late 1970s that the Nationalist community had long since achieved all that it set out to achieve in the Civil Rights marches of the late 1960s.
John Hulme stated that the disadvantages suffered by the Nationalist community did not warant the taking of a single life.
Sinn Fein/IRA now play the female card, pushing Michelle O'Neil, and the little fat one out front, while the IRA man Gerry Adams and his fellow murderers pull the strings.
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@peterdoyle1591
Disadvantaged. That was all gone by about 1973, points for housing was in, the Cameeron report was in, local government was changed, they even had a border poll.
Meanwhile what were some of them doing?.. They were coming over here to kill people in Birmingham, Guildford, Woolwich, Aldershot, and so on, and so in, and so on.
Oppressed applies to black South Africans, the Palestinians etc...and now the loyalists in Northern Ireland. How the terrorist Gerry Adams blagged his way to being alongside freedom fighters at Nelson Mandela's funeral beggars belief.
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@marysullivan3326
'i certainly have no idea where thats coming from.'
It just pours out of the USA on a conveyor belt...Films, TV programmes, books, lectures, YouTube comments...All full of America this, America that.
Let us be absolutely clear, Britain was the only major power to fight from the first day, to the last day of the war. Britain fought in every major theatre of war, it was only country to fight Germany on its own. Britain was the only major power to go to war on behalf of another country (Poland) - all the others either attacked other countries, or were attacked by other countries. Britain out-mobilized every other country (even Russia). Relative to its circumstances, Britain out-produced every other country. On its own, Britain out-produced Germany. All this from a country that was uder air assault, a sea blockade, and for four years had the enemy 21 miles away. As far as who did what in the Second World War is concerned is concerned, we rule.
'Britain asked the US of A to join in the fight.'
When did that happen?
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Lyndon CMP. 11nytram11. Bullet-Tooth Tony.
Gents:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 189
Although later writers would extol Eisenhower's prompt and confident performance in the 'Battle of the Bulge', the truth is that Eisenhower reacted with amazing slowness and indecision for a supposed Land Force Commander. It was to take him three entire days before he convened a meeting of his Army Group Commanders—and five days before he even spoke to Monty on the telephone. By then Eisenhower's headquarters was in a state of extreme apprehension, with the Supreme Commander locked up in his office for fear of assassination.
P259
It was early afternoon on Thursday 28 December when Eisenhower's train finally pulled into Hasselt station. According to Mrs Summersby's diary entry, written on Eisenhower's return, Eisenhower was peeved even before the meeting by virtue of the extended journey, just as Bradley three days before: 'E. and staff had a long and trying journey, delays on account of fog. On arrival in Bruxelles, E. found Monty was at Haselt [sic], had to proceed by train as the conditions on the roads made driving impossible.' Eisenhower's security staff had insisted on sending a large squad of guards, which made the interminable journey tediously claustrophobic. `At every stop—and these were frequent because of difficulties with ice and snowbanks—these men would jump out of the train and take up an alert position to protect us,' Eisenhower himself chronicled.²
Monty was therefore somewhat surprised by Eisenhower's royal arrival—as he told `Simbo' Simpson when the latter flew over to Monty's headquarters the following day. 'He said it was most impressive. The train drew into the station and immediately teams of machine-gunners leapt out, placed their machine guns on both platforms at each end of the train, and guards leapt out and took up every possible vantage point. No question of letting any German assassination troops get at the Supreme Commander. Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.'Eis enhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures.
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@larrytestmi5976
Falaise:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book.
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Chapter 3
The Falaise Pocket
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Omaha:
The US DD Tanks were launched three miles out at sea. At the other beaches they were launched a few hundred yards from the beach. The US Army took no specialized armour to Omaha Beach. The shore bombardment at Omaha was shorter than at the other beaches.
D-Day Beach casualties: Utah 589, Omaha 3,686, Gold 1,023, Juno 1,242, Sword 1,304. Stephen Zaloga, "The Devil's Garden.
Caen (Cann):
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
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John Cornell
The Netherlands had population of about 8.8 million at that time. It seems that about 4.5 million were affected by the hunger winter, of which I believe that the figure for deaths due to malnutrition was 22,000.
Market Garden must have liberated somewhere in the region of 500,000 people in Asten, Eindhoven, Elst, Grave, Nijmegen, Uden, Valkenswaard and Veghel. This is apart from the many other places in North Brabant and Gelderland that were freed
Further, there seems to be no evidence anywhere that there would have an attempt to liberate the remainder of the Netherlands in 1944 if Market Garden had not gone ahead. Therefore to blame Market Garden for the Dutch hunger winter is a nonsense.
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@ralphbernhard1757
'Without this logistical support, the Eastern Front would have stabilized somewhere between Leningrad and the Black Sea.'
Total rubbish.
The start of December 1941 saw the Germans having to man a near 2,000 mile front, a thousand miles from their homeland, having lost a million men since 22 June that year.
US Lend-lease did even start arriving in Russia until the middle of 1942.
US Lend-Lease:
‘1,911 steam locomotives, 66 diesel locomotives, 9,920 flat cars, 1,000 dump cars, 120 tank cars, and 35 heavy machinery cars.’
…Which did not start arriving in Russia until late 1944
Russian railways had 28,000 locomotives and 600,000 wagons at the start of the war in the East, with minimal losses during the war.
‘4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.)’
Russia had a population of 160 million, how far would 4.5 million tons
of food have gone between 160 million people over 4 years.
By way of comparison, in 1941, with a population of 47 million, Britain received 1 million tons of Lend-Lease foodstuffs. In that same year Britain’s total food imports amounted to 15 million tons, agricultural crops yield amounted to 53 million tons, milk production totalled 101 million gallons and processed food production amounted 21 million tons.
American Lorries amounted to 5.4% of Russian supply vehicles in January 1943, 19% in January 1944 and 30.4% in January 1945. Studebaker.
Russians tank production during the war amounted 105,000, oil production amounted to 110 million gallons. Russia spent $350 million during the war.
The idea that the USA saved Russia is an old wives tale.
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William Swan
‘So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden, and needlessly, too. It was among the worst military operations ever, ranking right alongside Montgomery’s “Operation Goodwood” at Caen, Winston Churchill’s hare-brained and lethal interventions at Calais and in the early Norwegian Campaign, and Gen. Mark Clark and Major Gen. John P. Lucas’s colossal stuff-up at Anzio.’ Your words.
Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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William Swan
‘1. Market Garden occurred because Patton, Bradley, and other American generals had complained bitterly and at great length about Montgomery dragging his feet in the battle for Caen, Montgomery’s appalling “Death Ride of the Armoured Divisions” during Operation Goodwood, and his tardy closure of the Falaise Pocket. Montgomery, notoriously arrogant and conceited, was desperate to redeem himself by displaying verve and strategic flare. He therefore proposed the advance from the Belgian border to Arnhem. The actual distance was 70 miles, (120 km). Even if successful, it would greatly extend the front with Nazi Germany, and the distance that supplies and reinforcements had to travel through “bandit country” from Channel ports. Dwight Eisenhower gave Montgomery the go-ahead to allow Montgomery to save face. That’s what the whole desperate, bloody, tragic farce was about: saving Montgomery’s damn pride.’ Your words.
Market Garden occurred because Montgomery and Eisenhower saw an opportunity to exploit perceived German weakness at the beginning of September 1944. At that point, the Germans had only 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces in the western front, less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. When the British tanks drove into Amiens on the 31st August they discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West. A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that Germans facing his British 2nd Army were "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
Eisenhower had rejected Montgomery proposal at their meeting on the 23rd August that allied resources should be concentrated either in the North (Dempsey / Hodges, under Montgomery) or in the South (Hodges / Patton, under Bradley) so that the advance could continue into Germany. However, at the beginning of September, Eisenhower made the First Allied Airborne Army available for operations in the North. Before Eisenhower and Montgomery met on the 10th September at Brussels, Montgomery received an urgent request to undertake an operation that would hinder German V2 rocket attacks on London, which had begun on the 8th September. Market Garden could be undertaken without denuding other armies of resources, it could have taken the allies to the Ruhr and hindered V2 attacks on London. That is why it went ahead.
As weeping at the Oosterbeek Cemetery…each as they will. This is what General Urquhart stated:
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD
1958
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying:
The operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
We have no regrets.’
I hold the same view today, when the survivors are scattered all over the world, some of them still in the Army; when Arnhem is a busy and architecturally attractive post-war city with most of its scars healed. A new bridge spans the Neder Rhine. Sometimes a Dutchman finds a mortar splinter in his garden, and people on their Sunday walks come across spent British ammunition in the pine woods and the polder-land by the river.’
His words.
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William Swan
‘3. Due to the terrain, all heavy vehicles had to drive along a single road. This is against military doctrine and common sense. When a leading vehicle was destroyed, it blocked miles of vehicles behind it, so they could be attacked, in turn.
4. Much of the road was mined. The planners did not make nearly enough allowance for the many hours that would be wasted, while mines were cleared. The column was so painfully slow that the Germans could even mine the road ahead and lay ambushes, as it inched forward, (or didn’t).
5. Due to soggy, low-lying land, many stretches of the road through Eindhoven and Nijmegen to Arnhem were causeways. Vehicles silhouetted against the sky were picked off by concealed artillery, anti-tank guns, and panzerfaust teams. (By then, the Luftwaffe was a minor problem.)’ Your words.
But XXX Corps at Grave at 8.30 on the morning of the third day, with the entire day available to reach the troops at Arnhem Bridge. The points you mentioned had not stopped this. The problem was that the US 82nd Airborne Division had not taken Nijmegen City or Nijmegen Bridge.
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William Swan.
‘6. The Allied commanders had received false information that German troops along the road north would be second rate. They fought extremely well, and stubbornly. As TIK points out, during Operation Market Garden the German ability to form ad hoc military formations (the "Kampfgruppen") proved to be supremely effective - and not just at Arnhem!’ Your words.
‘8. Accurate Dutch information about German armoured units refitting near Arnhem should have been heeded, but was neglected because German intelligence was known to have captured and turned many British agents and members of the Dutch resistance. Allied intelligence was rotten. The quantity and quality of intelligence must weigh heavily when any operation is considered.’ Your words.
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
The aerial photography was far from clear – it can be seen on line.
Given all that, what were Eisenhower, Montgomery and Brereton supposed to do? Go or not go?
I could not say, could you?
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@etangdescygnes
William Swan
‘Yes. You are right. Dwight Eisenhower should have prioritised the Scheldt. The statement you quote is: "...Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches ...". It doesn't say Montgomery was "...ordered to...". There is a strong implication from this, and the admission of Sir Brian Horrocks, Commander of XXX Corps that he always regretted his decision not to press on from Antwerp to close off the Scheldt, that the British commanders could have persuaded Eisenhower to prioritise the Scheldt, if they had wished - but Montgomery didn't wish it, not right after Antwerp had been captured, and not later.’ Your words.
But by this time, Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and Land Forces Commander. Such a decision had to be his. In Normandy, during Montgomery’s tenure as Land Forces Commander, Montgomery had worked to a clear plan with the capture of the port of Cherbourg as the clear priority. Eisenhower had no such plan and the entire allied effort suffered.
‘Instead, Montgomery pushed his lethally flawed "Operation Market Garden" to redeem himself after his reputation had been seriously hurt among the American generals by his leaden feet at Caen, his appalling "Death Charge of the Armoured Divisions" during Operation Goodwood, and his slowness in closing the Falaise Gap, married to a desire to display the same kind of flare and dash as Patton, his most bitter critic.’ Your words.
Where is there reliable evidence that Montgomery wanted ‘to redeem himself after his reputation had been seriously hurt among the American generals by his leaden feet at Caen’? By evidence, I mean, his words, either spoken or written. Why would he? Montgomery had delivered victory in Normandy by D+78 ahead of the scheduled completion date of D+90, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and by giving the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad. Why would Montgomery have been worried about US commanders? Bradley and Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat between them. Bradley’s subordinate commander Hodges seems to have been largely anonymous. Bradley’s other subordinate commander, Patton had been passed over for Army Group command, possibly to his personal behaviour, and his Third Army was not even operational until 2nd August.
As for Caen, possession of that place had little effect on the outcome of Overlord. The Germans massed the vast bulk of their forces there, including 84% of their armour, just as Montgomery had intended. This led to the American breakout (Operation Cobra) facing next to no opposition, as evidenced by people who were there:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
Alanbrooke.
‘I feel I must write and congratulate you on what seems likely to be one of the most decisive battles in the world’s history.’
‘It has in every way justified your strategy and tactics, which I will remember you expounding long before we left England. How we were to bear the brunt of the battle for the first few weeks by constantly attacking the enemy, never giving him any rest , and never letting him have the chance of regaining the initiative. All this this to take the pressure off the Americans so that they might achieve what they did achieve and are achieving.’
Richard O’Connor.
As for the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Sir Brian Horrocks.
‘flare and dash’:
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
Notice that the sources I have quoted are people that were at the time, not historians writing about events that they had no personal knowledge of.
‘Obviously you can hold any opinion you wish, but it is my own belief that Market Garden was driven by Montgomery, for Montgomery, against all sound and wise military practices, and Eisenhower nodded because he had to hold the alliance together. Yes, Eisenhower had ultimate authority and must take the blame for saying "Yes", but Market Garden was rushed and fatally flawed. For the unnecessary deaths and maiming, I squarely blame Montgomery. You can blame whoever you wish!’
Your words.
Eisenhower and Montgomery stuck by their decision. Montgomery later stating: ‘As I was the Commander-in-Chief in that part of Europe, I must be responsible’. Unlike the US General Brereton, who was responsible MARKET, and over whom, Montgomery had no jurisdiction, and who, after the war, concocted a wartime diary in order to try to exonerate himself for things that went wrong.
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William Swan
‘9. As TIK points out, it was falsely believed that the ground south-west of the Rhine bridge at Arnhem was unsuitable for airborne landings, forcing the primary landings to occur 7 to 14 km (4.35 to 8.70 miles) away, (not “9 to 14 miles”). This was against military doctrine, and gave German officers time to organise the defence.’ Your words.
OK. But FAAA devised the air plan.
‘10. A German, Hans Koch, found the entire Allied plan for the operations at Arnhem in a pocket of an American officer’s uniform. He had died when his glider crashed. The American had carried the plans in violation of an explicit order not to do so. Koch made his discovery within 15 minutes after the first glider landed at midday on 17 September 1944, and rushed to Model’s headquarters. Model probably saw the plan within two hours of the first Allied landing.’ Your words.
Yes, as confirmed by the German General Karl Student:
"a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’ His words.
‘11. The British radios were virtually useless for communication between units on the ground, and for communicating with supporting aircraft. Yet good radios were essential for dispersed landings, and the British had planned to advance eastwards through Arnhem along three routes parallel to the river, simultaneously. Any chance of coordinated action that remained after the Germans had captured the plans, was torpedoed by the hopeless radios. Yet any senior officer who had bothered to make the relevant enquiries would have discovered how bad the radios were, long before the operation started! There should have been courts martial for such shoddy leadership!’ Your words.
But the problems were not confined to British radios. If people should have been court martialled, who should that have been?
‘12. The airborne troops lacked sufficient motorised transport and artillery. Even more bicycles would have helped.’ Your words.
Fifty-two 6-pounder and sixteen 17-pounder anti-tank guns. About 110 Jeeps. What should the totals have been?
‘13. The plan depended on airborne troops and supplies being delivered in successive waves during the first three days, due to a lack of aircraft. This made the operation vulnerable to bad weather, and that’s precisely what happened! Essential drops were delayed much too long.’ Your words.
But Market Garden was launched against a weather forecast of four clear days from the 17th September.
‘14. If Market Garden had succeeded, it might have led to a rapid advance to Berlin across the northern German plain. By failing, it extended the Allied flank 70 miles along the Rhine, forcing sectors to be thinly held by inexperienced troops, and stretching supply lines further. This situation created the opportunity for the Germans’ Ardennes Offensive, the “Battle of the Bulge” ’ Your words.
Are you attempting to pass judgement on the outcome of Market Garden with hindsight? Or are you trying to pass judgement on the decisions made by people at that time, based on their situation at that time? As far as the cause of “Battle of the Bulge” is concerned. That was surely down to Eisenhower’s Broad Front strategy, which stopped the allied advance, giving the Germans what they most needed, time and pace to rebuild existing forces and to create new forces – which were used in the Ardennes. Montgomery warned about a German counter attack, as did one of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton. Aachen, the Hurtgen Forest, Market Garden, Metz and so on all suffered from being under resourced due to the Broad Front strategy.
Alan Moorehead, who was with allied armies at that time noted:
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’
His words.
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@johnlucas8479
You omitted Aachen in your list of casualties and timescales
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign
P 224
‘The recent battering at Aachen had had occupied the first Army for a full month and cost 20,000 casualties and yet at no point had Hodges got more than twelve miles into Germany.’
As for German casualties, depending on where the figures came from, those fogures might need to be treated with caution…
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 489
‘German losses would be difficult to count with precision, not least because the Americans tended to inflate them. (Patton at times concocted figures from the whole cloth, or assumed that enemy casualties were tenfold the number of prisoners taken.) A U.S. Army estimate of 120,000 losses in the month following the launch of HERBSTNEBEL was surely too high, and Bradley’s claim of more than a quarter-million was preposterous. One post-war analysis put the figure at 82,000, another at 98,000. The official German history would cite 11,000 dead and 34,000 wounded, with an intermediate number captured, missing, sick, and injured.’
Where does all this start and finish?..
D-Day - 10,000 casualties in less than 24 hours, maximum allied advance, five miles, approx.
Casualties set against time, distances, outcome?
Market Garden stretched the already overstretched German forces another 50 miles, freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on Britain and left the allies well placed to advance to the Rhine in the months that followed. William Swan sat in the Oosterbeek Commonwealth cemetery and wept. Perhaps William Swan could pass on what happened when he visited cemeteries in Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, or what he might think and when he visits those places.
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@johnlucas8479
William Swan stated this:
‘So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden, and needlessly, too. It was among the worst military operations ever, ranking right alongside Montgomery’s “Operation Goodwood” at Caen, Winston Churchill’s hare-brained and lethal interventions at Calais and in the early Norwegian Campaign, and Gen. Mark Clark and Major Gen. John P. Lucas’s colossal stuff-up at Anzio.’
So, he was the one that began making comparisons...
I merely compared the casualties at Market Garden with the casualties incurred it the same theatre of war, in some other operations, during Eisenhower's tenure as allied land forces commander. The actions noted by William Swan would seem to have been a more disparate collection than the the ones I noted.
Where do other factors come in, in the tear jerking stuff?..
This?:
'So many young people were maimed and died during Operation Market Garden'?
At Arnhem, a very high percentage of casualties were those persons that were taken prisoner, rather than maimed and killed. How does that ratio compare the rest of Market Garden, and other operations?
And, or this?:
'and needlessly, too'?
Does this come down to whether commanders were right to launch an operation, knowing what they knew at that time? Who can say?..
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@finallyfriday.
Part Two.
You stated that Montgomery was not a fighter...
After being sidelined due his outspoken criticism of the campaign in France, Montgomery was was apppointed to command British forces in Torch, but was immediately re-assigned to command Eighth Army on the death of General Gott. In the desert he told his troops:
'The defence of Egypt lies here at Alamein and on the Ruweisat Ridge. What is the use of digging trenches in the Delta? It is quite useless; if we lose this position we lose Egypt; all the fighting troops now in the Delta must come here at once, and will. Here we will stand and fight; there will be no further withdrawal. I have ordered that all plans and instructions dealing with further withdrawal are to be burnt, and at once. We will stand and fight here.
If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.'
His words.
And this, in his first major command. Notice his use of we and us instead of you.
Unlike US comanders, who always grabbed themselves the biggest mansion, castle, or chateaux they could find, Montgomery, as an army commander, and as an army group commander lived and worked oit of three caravans. Last time time I looked they could still be seen at the Imperial War Museum in London. You should go there one day, you might learn something.
There was no hanging about at SHAEF for Montgomery. If peoople wanted to see him, they had to go a lot closer to front line.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fwqAQ1-ixE&t=121s&ab_channel=mrgreen1066
0.09 seconds onwards.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTUC79o4Kmc&lc=UgyzeTPA0DgNrj1Ya5R4AaABAg.9JpkSvfkI669KEqyZMJfoa&feature=em-comments
1,hr, 4 minutes, 31 seconds onwards.
When Montgomery went to see Hodges at his headquarters in the US bulge crisis, Hodges offered Montgomery a sit dowd meal. Montgomery, said no words to the effect, I've got a flask of sandwiches and coffee, I'll eat those and we can then get down to work.
The Germans surrendered to Montgomery it was in a tent on Lüneburg Heath. That is were the Army was.
...it ain't like they told you in the Hollywood films.
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@charleszhaowang
Good for Monty! I might have exaggerated when I talked about his retirement. But here are few facts:
‘- Reaching the Seine earlier than the schedule, the real cause for that is Operation Cobra - the
Normandy breakout, led by Bradley, Patton, US 3rd Army, and Falaise encirclement, where the incompletion of the encirclement was also attributed to Monty’s fault.’
No. Drawing almost all of the German armour (84%) onto the British Second Army front, allowing the US First Army to capture Cherbourg to help to ensure that the allies won the battle of the build-up, and then to break out towards central France. Operation Cobra took place 25–31 July 1944. US Third Army, led by Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton joined the battle on 2nd August, 1944.
Bradley was responsible for any failure to complete the ‘Falaise encirclement’, as he later acknowledged:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
And also, another participant:
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Sir Brian Horrocks’ Corps Commander. Page 53.
‘- Michael Wittmann, SS Panzer Ace, single handedly halted the advance of an entire British armed division during the Falaise encirclement.’
No. The action took a week after D-Day (13th June). Wittmann was killed on the 8th August.
‘- The Scheldt, after Operation Market Garden, the Scheldt actually became secondary objectives, compared to the Allied’s advance toward Germany.’
No. Due to Eisenhower’s mistaken policy for the all of the allies to advance at the same time, the Scheldt became the allies first objective after Market Garden, until the Scheldt was cleared.
‘- Northern part of the Bulge, yes, good for Monty, and British was lucky, did not bear the brunt of the German offense. But remember this, when Monty demanded for more control of the campaign, Bradley threatened to resign, and Eisenhower threatened to talk to Churchill.’
But Montgomery commanded two US Armies in the Bulge, so how was Montgomery lucky?
As far as control of the land campaign was concerned, Montgomery wanted a single, competent commander, preferably himself, but, failing that, he would accept Bradley as land forces commander, providing a decision to appoint a single commander was made.
‘- Saved Denmark from Russian occupation, actually this is a big point, imagine if that happened, the outcome of WW II would be very different, and Hitler and the Allied would probably reach Moscow for the second time.’
To imagine that, would be to imagine the greatest criminal in history, Hitler, getting way with his crimes.
‘With huge hindsight, regardless the internal squabbling within Allied themselves, the biggest mistake of WW II is actually the failure to contain Communism. The entire Cold War history of the past 60 years or so has proven this point. Unfortunately that is just the way it is.’
If so, then the key actions that allowed that to happen were American: failure to support actions to block the Russians in the Balkans, Eisenhower’s broad front policy that stopped the allied advance in the West, Roosevelt trying to do a deal with Stalin behind Churchill’s back, Eisenhower stopping the allied forces from advancing towards Berlin.
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@bigpants6121
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
P66-67
'Criticism is usually directed at Browning for ignoring Brian Urquhart's warnings. Yet Browning was faced with an appalling dilemma. He had not received all the intelligence available and he was far from uncaring about the fate of his men; he had threatened to resign over the ill-preparedness of one of the earlier proposed operations. But was a British general to jeopardize this great airborne operation, perhaps the last opportunity of the war, a mainly American operation, for fear of what might happen to British troops? Perhaps Brian Urquhart was wrong. Perhaps the
German armour, if present, would not react quickly and the bridge at Arnhem could be held until XXX Corps arrived. Morale among the airborne units would certainly suffer if 'Market' was cancelled. Browning decided that it was too late, that the risks must be taken and that the operation must proceed.
Browning's written orders to 1st Airborne, dated 13 September and signed by himself, had contained this paragraph: 'ENEMY INFORMATION The latest Intelligence will be sent to you up to the time of take-off ' But the latest reports were not passed on. General Urquhart may have been told by Browning; his memoirs do not mention this. What is certain is that no official warning of the latest German tank strength reached units, and neither Brereton nor Browning made any attempt to amend the plan to lessen the danger from the Panzers. John Frost says that his battalion would have still been quite happy to carry on with the operation, but could have benefited from a warning by taking more anti-tank weapons and ammunition and possibly leaving such heavy items as mortars behind.'
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@jwrosenbury
‘Which part?
All of it.
The destruction of enemy forces is what Montgomery sought. When he met Eisenhower on the 23rd August 1944, Montgomery stated that allies were not strong enough to advance on a broad front, and that in order to keep after the Germans, a decision should be made to concentrate the available resources on one part of the front. 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group were each getting 7,000 tons of supplies per day and this allowed for 20 divisions to continue the advance with the remaining forces put on a defensive footing. Montgomery advocated that British 2nd Army and US 1st Army should advance together towards the Ruhr, in order to most effectively stifle German war production, with Canadian 1st Army, and US Third Army put on a defensive stance. Failing that, Eisenhower should go with the US 1st Army, and the US 3rd Army, with British 2nd Army and the Canadian1st Army put on a defensive stance. Montgomery offered to abide by either decision, provided that such a decision was made.
The available allied intelligence seems to have favoured Montgomery’s point of view:
SHAEF intelligence report: 26.08.44:
" Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
Eisenhower chose neither of the options presented by Montgomery.
Political considerations seem to have come from Eisenhower, rather than Britain:
In answer to Montgomery's proposal to halt the 1st Canadian Army and the US 3rd Amy
Eisenhower stated:
"The American public would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
‘Or the part where British intelligence ignored warnings of German armor for political reasons? Oh, it couldn't be that part. I left that out since it was a minor supporting detail.’ Your words.
The intelligence regarding German armour was inconclusive:
A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that the Germans facing his British 2nd Army were: "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 of 13.09.44stated that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
The aerial photo reconnaissance showed little in the way of armoured vehicles – those photos can be seen on line.
Anything purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was routinely ignored due to the German ‘Englandspiel’ penetration of the Underground, and Market Garden was no different to any other matter at that time in this regard.
‘Even the best generals aren't perfect, and Monty wasn't the best general. He was only mid-grade.’ Your words.
You base this opinion on what evidence?..
‘Admittedly he was the best the British had, but that's damning with faint praise. Slim was maybe better, but Burma was a totally different operation requiring different skills. He rated great as generals go.’ Your words.
The best that Britain had?.. Who are they being compared to?..
Opinion: German generals usually seem to have performed well. But were seldom more successful than the anyone else when the odds were not in their favour. A good many of them seem to have been involved in war crimes, and, in some cases they were rather to close to German crimes against humanity.
Opinion: Russian commanders were faced with the unhappy problem of fighting on their own territory and, perhaps, partly due to political pressure, were profligate with Russian lives
By the time that the US Amy finally saw action against the German Army, the Germans were irretrievably committed to a two front war and were short of manpower and weapons, particularly up-to-date weapons.
Facts: Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower had never seen a day of personal combat, Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943.
Alanbrooke, Alexander, Auchinleck, Gort, Maitland, Montgomery, Slim and Wavell had all seen action in the First World War, and all been involved in under-resourced campaigns when the German Army were at the height of its power.
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@nickdanger3802
‘Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success"’
Bernhard, the SS man, and Nazi Party member, got shown the door by both the British and US in the Netherlands. He was given refuge in Britain after the Netherlands folded in four days in 1940. Only his royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
‘Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen’
If the Russians were sharing doubts about any one person, much more likely those doubts were about Eisenhower, as the Americans made sure that the know nothing bald bloke’s ceremonial role as supreme commander was trumpeted around the world. Perhaps the Russians were showing solidarity with the British. The two countries that had done most to bring about the defeat of Nazi Germany. If, however, there is an implied criticism of Britain, then the Russians can fcuk off. Britain (including Montgomery) were fighting the Germans while the Russians were in an alliance with Nazi Germany. Whatever, Norman Gelb made a berk of himself on this point.
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Gel Syk
Montgomery [Bernard] scared...
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON
1986
P259 - 260
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained. Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently. Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-
fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized.'
P.S. Big Woody also goes by the name of Para Dave on YouTube comments.
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@onylra6265
Not really...
My questions to you were:
One: How do you know what was in Montgomery's mind regarding Market Garden?
in reply to your claim that: 'It was the brainfart of Monty, in service of his bruised ego'
All you have done is to show that Montgomery was prepared to state that he had made a mistake in thinking that the Canadian 1st Army could clear the Scheldt Estuary on its own.
How does that relate to your claim of him having a bruised ego?
"I have not been afflicted with any feeling of disappointment over this"
Where is this on record that Churchill stated this?...
'and backed to the hilt by arch-bungler Churchill.' Your words.'
I asked you, where is there any evidence that Churchill had any direct involvement in Market Garden? Montgomery proposed Maket Garden on the 10th September, 1944,. At that time, Churchill was attending the OCTAGON conference in Canada.
Why was Montgomery's promotion to Field Marshall 'spiteful'? That promotion was in line with the same promotions of Alenbrooke, Alexander, and Maitland -Wison at that time. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradley, they all had personal combat experience, followed by command at various levels, up to senior command. In Montgomery's case, he had been awarded the DSO in the First World war, he had perfomed with distinction, under trying circumstances in Frace in 1940, when in command of a single division. As a single army commander, he had won in North Africa and Sicily. As an Army Group commander, he had won in Normandy. By contrast, Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience (he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943), he had never commanded a division in the field, and had not directly commanded an army in a campaign. If a comparison were to be made between the merits of Eisenhower being made a Five Star General and Montgomery being a Field Marshall, based on their respective military achievments, as far as I can see it was a case of Eisenhower being over promoted.
As for the 'arch-bungler Churchill', he led Britain for 62 of its 72 war. At the end, Britain, British Commonwealth and Empire territories were free of Axis control, at a cost of less than 700,000 war dead.
Of the other major war leaders, Hitler, ended the war dead, with Germany in pieces and occupied and millions of Germans dead. Mussolini was was out of power and dead. Tojo ended the war dead and with Japan in pieces and occupied. Stalin occupied Eastern Europe, but at a cost of 27 million Russian dead. The other war leaders from around the world do not really compare. Roosevelt, for example, was in charge of a country that was thousands of miles from its nearest enemy, was untouched by war, and was not in conflict with Germany when it was at the height of its power. I would take Churchill over this motley collection of individuals.
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@onylra6265
Rick Atkinson's Guns at Last Light p224-5, offers no evidence to support his claim that Churchill promoted Montgomery to the rank of Field Marshall "as a solace". Churchill's six volume history of the war makes no mention of the promotion, nor does Montgomery in his memoirs, or in his 1947 work Normandy to Baltic'. Chester Wilmot does not mention it in 'The Struggle for Europe'. Anyone can guess what the motivation was for the comments that Atkinson noted by Ramsay and Bradley's subordinate, Patton.
Perhaps Ramsay was put out at not being promoted to Admiral of the Fleet. Who can
say? Based on current evidence I could not say...and neither can anyone else.
As Bradley's subordinate, Patton. Iin a note to his wife, he wrote: 'I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say?' No word about the desirability of the war ending as soon as possible, only his personal situation. Perhaps he also saw Montgomery's promotion as a possible impediment to his quest for personal glory. Who can say?..
As for Antony Beevor, I have not read the work you noted. Why would I have? I do not look for history books in the book carousel stands at airport departure lounges. If it is like his others efforts, it will bring nothing new to the subject. Why would it?..All the key people were dead before he started work, all the key evidence has long since been found. Unless key evidence in the VD figures for troops in newly liberated Luxembourg or some such stuff. Still, as if he needs to worry about what I state. He knows how to pander to his chauvinistic American readership and the lucrative US lecture circuit. I hope he get to read this, but I could not be that lucky.
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@Calh92
Montgomery being arrested in some rubbish that was in a 'book', if such a term could be used, by some oppo called Bill O'Reilly and is supposed to have happened when Montgomery visited who has declined my request for him to supply a shred of evidence to support his lunatic story.
Unfortunately for O'Reilly, and Big WoodyMontgomery's activities in his visit to the First Army HQ are well known.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 448
‘At 12.52 p.m., a SCHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshall Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Twelfth Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army.
P449
‘Having been alerted to the impending command change at 2:30 Wednesday morning, he dispatched a major to Chaudfontaine for a “bedside conference” with Hodges who was roused from his sleep to learn that four British divisions were moving towards the Meuse to secure he riverbanks and bridges. Roadblocks also had been built on the Brussels highway with vehicles and carts.
‘The field marshal himself arrived at Chaudfontaine at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday in a green Rolls-Royce flying a Union Jack and five-star pennant from the front fenders, accompanied by outrider jeeps with red-capped MPS. As usual he was dressed without orthodoxy in fur-lined boots, baggy corduroy trousers and as many as eight pullovers. “Unwrapping the bearskin in which he was enveloped,” Iris Carpenter reported, “he picked up his box of Sandwiches, his thermos jug of tea and his situation map chalked over with his grease pencil, and marched inside.’
‘Politely declining Hodges’s offer of lunch—“Oh, no, I’ve got my own” — he propped his map on a chair and said calmly “ Now let’s review this situation…The first thing we must do is to tidy up the battlefield.”’
‘Three hours later they had both a plan and an understanding. Hodges and his staff appeared tired and dispirited, British officers later reported, but determined to hold fast.’
This from one of Big Woody ffavoured sources.
Hails of derisive laughter.
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@Calh92
That press conference...
This from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 636– 637
‘In a press conference given on 7 January, Montgomery described how Eisenhower had placed him in command of the whole northern front. He emphasized that the repulse of the German onslaught had been an Anglo-American effort, but somewhat unfortunately went on to describe the battle as ‘most interesting. I think, possibly, one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.’
Montgomery expressed his admiration for the fighting qualities of the American soldier and how grieved he was to see uncomplimentary articles about Eisenhower in the British Press. However, the subsequent handling of Montgomery’s statements by the British newspapers and by the B.B.C. caused a crisis. The Prime Minister telephoned several times to Eisenhower, who said that Bradley was most upset. He proposed to award the Bronze Star to Bradley with a citation drawing attention to his fighting qualities, and to the work of the American armies bearing the brunt of the German offensive. At a meeting on 9 January, the Supreme Commander remarked that censorship was a two-edged weapon. Anything withheld by the censors immediately acquired news value, and the Press, by inuendo or other means, invariably circumvented it. It seemed to him that he reaction of the American Press to the statements in the British newspapers would be to exaggerate the United States point of view. There would be no end to the statements which the Press of the two countries would make in reply to each other. He also remarked: ‘For two and a half years I have been trying to get the Press to talk of “Allied” operations, but look what has happened.’
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.
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@nickdanger3802
Further to the question from Para Dave:
Chester Wilmot.
Second World War: Greece, Syria, North Africa, including reporting from Tobruk during the siege, Crusader. The Far East, the, Kokoda Track campaign. Europe: D-Day (He landed with 6th Airborne), and through to VE-Day.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2jDCwF5j8E&ab_channel=VariousArtists-Topic
He regularly broadcast throughout the campaign, becoming a well known voice to BBC listeners in Britain, and around the world.
As interviews by Chester Wilmot - its all very sparse...as he admits in 'The Strugle for Europe':
['German] Generals Halder, Blumentritt, Westphal and Bayerlein.'
'So far as Allied operations are concerned I have relied very largely on
documentary material which has not yet been published and on my own interrogations of the principal commanders and staff officers concerned. During the campaign from Normandy to the Baltic I was in the fortunate position, as a
correspondent for the B.B.C., of being an eye-witness of many of the major
operations, particularly on the British and Canadian fronts, and I kept a detailed day to day record, much of which could not be published at the time. After the war, in the winter of '45-'46, through the help of General Eisenhower and Field-
Marshal Montgomery, I was able to travel freely throughout the American and
British Zones-of Occupation in Germany, examining the records and interviewing the officers of formations and units in their respective commands. The material gathered then was subsequently supplemented by the examination of official records and reports made available to me by the War Cabinet Historian's office
in London, and the historical sections of the British Admiralty and Air Ministry,
the Canadian Army and the U.S. Army and Navy. For this assistance I must record my great indebtedness to the following officers and officials: Brigadier H. B, Latham, Col. A. E. Warhurst, Lt.-Col. Graham Jackson and Mr. Brian Melland of the War Cabinet Historian's Office; Rear-Admiral R. M. Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander D. W. Waters, and Mr. G. H. Hurford at the Admiralty; Mr. J. C. Nerney, Squadron-Leader L. A. Jackets, Squadron-Leader J. C. R.
Davies and Mr. C. L.James of the Air Ministry; Col. C. P. Stacey, the Chief
Canadian War Historian and Lieut.-General G. G. Simonds, now Chief of the Canadian Army General Staff; General J. Lawton Collins, now Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and Rear-Admiral J. B. Heffernan, USN, Director of Naval History and Records.'
'I am under a great obligation
to those who have helped me and particularly to: Air Chief Marshall Lord
Dowding; Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder; General W. Bedell Smith,
Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, General Sir Frederick Morgan, Major- General K. W. D. Strong and Brigadier E. J. Foord (all of SHAEF) ; Major- General Sir Francis de Guingand, Major-General Sir Miles Graham, Brigadier R. F. K. Belchem, Brigadier E. T. Williams, and the late Col. J. O. Ewart (of 21st Army Group) ; Air Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, who was Chief of Staff to the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Admiral Sir George Creasy, who was Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay;
General Sir Miles Dempsey and Col. L. M. Murphy (of Second British Army);
the late Lieut.-General George S. Patton, Lieut.-General W. H. Simpson, Major- General Clift Andrus, Major-General H. W. Blakeley, Major-General James M. Gavin, Major-General C. H. Gerhardt, Major-General R. W. Grow, Brigadier- General E. L. Sibert, and Col. B. A. Dickson (of the U.S. Army); General Sir Evelyn Barker, Lieut.-General G. C. Bucknall, General Sir John Crocker, Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, General Sir Richard O'Connor (all of whom commanded corps in Second Army) ; Major-General C. M. Barber, Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, Lieut.-General Sir Richard Gale, Major- General Sir Percy Hobart, Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, Major-General D. C. Spry, General Sir Ivor Thomas (all of whom commanded divisions in Second Army) ; Major-General G. W. Lathbury, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, Brigadier K. G. Blackader, Brigadier B. A. Coad, Brigadier J. W. Hackett, Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey, Brigadier S. J. L. Hill, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde,
Col. A. Jolly, Lt.-Col. R. M. P. Garver, Major A. D. Parsons, and Dr. J. M. Stagg.'
The rest of time he just sat on his hands.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part One:
‘Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."’ Para Dave.
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’. Notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
'Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
‘The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’ Para Dave.
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the
Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
'From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem' Para Dave.
So how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part Two:
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’ Para Dave.
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ Para Dave.
Why go to Max Hastings, when you can get it straight from de Guingand:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
'How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ' Para Dave.
The old div, Max Hastings, the Golf club bar bore, reported on the from the Falklands war, and then appointed himself an expert all things Second World War. He should have checked first.
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
'How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies'
Para Dave.
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact Montgomery until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part Three:
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’ How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy. 'Para Dave.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’ Para Dave.
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When
he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once,
“This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
Who else was there? Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers, forget it. Patton?.. It was of little consequence to the British, but he seems to have been unable to stop himself from assaulting US soldiers, and Sicilian civilians. Beyond that, it seems to have been Montgomery or Alexander.
‘Fancy some more?’ Para Dave.
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when he (or she) pulls the trigger.
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How did the whole plan collapse? The allies advanced 50 miles, stretching the German resources still further, hindered German attempts to launch V Weapons at Belgium and Britain and freed a fifth of the population of the Netherlands.
The allied operations that began that autumn, none of which were any more successful than Market
Garden, cost the allies 20,000 casualties at Aachen, 45,000 casualties at Metz and 55,000 casualties at the Hurtgen Forest. Market Garden cost the allies 15,000 casualties.
Further, the intelligence was seen by all allied leaders and included inconclusive aerial photography and Ultra decrypts and reports from the Netherlands, which were being routinely ignored since before Market Garden, due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the the Dutch Underground.
It ain't like they tell it in Hollywood.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Brereton said no to airborne operations on Walcheren at at that time, clearly his authority over FAAA operations was absolute, unless, of course, Eisenhower, who by that time was allied land forces commander, as well as supreme commander.
Examples of Brereton having the final say:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@Kangaxxter
‘In North Africa, Monty inherited an army on third base and he pretended he hit a triple. His singular victory North Africa were direct results of the US landings and pulling Axis attention to the other side of Africa.’ Your words.
Total Rubbish.
The army that Montgomery inherited was, by the accounts of people there, fragmented, and demoralized, after defeats at Gazala and Tobruk. Auchinleck’s victory at the First Battle of Alamein was perceived as a stop-gap measure. The Second Battle of Alamein was timed to occur before the Torch landing in order to persuade the Vichy French forces not to oppose the Torch landings, which were made up of British and US forces. There is no evidence of Axis forces being drawn from the Alamein front to oppose the Torch landings.
‘Montgomery was a propaganda general for a propaganda military. He was someone that British media could idolize, not because he'd done anything great but because they needed to idolize someone to squash the "America saves the day" narrative that was gaining traction.’ Your words.
Total Rubbish.
British people were not looking to idolize anyone from the ruling, or governing classes, or the upper echelons of the armed forces. The whole thrust of British propaganda and media output was to emphasize the common effort, particularly the efforts of ‘ordinary’ men and women, and to the future.
Montgomery gained attention because he won battles, as did anyone else who was successful against the enemy. Your claim that ‘the "America saves the day" narrative that was gaining traction’ is absurd. Britons were sure of their own survival by their own means by the middle of the war, with the story the Battle of Britain and other events already subject official history documents. If any foreign power was subject of appreciation, it was Russia, and the Red Army. As evidenced by the ‘Second Front Now’ movement, the presentation of the Stalingrad Sword to Stalin by Churchill at the Tehran Conference, and so on. My own father was called to briefing in Aldershot military town on day after Germany invaded Russia in which the officer of the day stated ‘Germany has invaded Russia, so we can’t lose now.
‘The only thing that stopped the American Army from advancing to the Rhine in Aug 44 was the preparation for Monty's insane boondoggle: OP Market Garden. If Monty had really wanted to win the War by Christmas, he should've just let Patton do his job. I mean, he knew that his plan would fail, which is why he tried as hard as possible to not be the CO of Market Garden once Churchill told Roosevelt to tell Eisenhower to listen to Montgomery’ Your words.
Total Rubbish.
MARKET GARDEN was not designed to win the War by Christmas. It was a limited undertaking, and its aim was to reach the Ijsselmeer and give the allies bridgehead over the Rhine. The reason that Eisenhower gave it the go-ahead was it could be mainly mounted from existing 21st Army Group resources and the First Allied Airborne Army. Montgomery had previously proposed a concentration of forces for a single thrust into Northern Germany, to be led by Montgomery. Montgomery also offered to subordinate 21st Army Group to Bradley for an allied thrust in the South, provided a decision was made to concentrate the available resources in one place. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt. Churchill had nothing to do with MARKET GARDEN, before, and during that operation, he travelling to, attending, and travelling home from the OCTAGON conference in Quebec.
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@stephenmahood8724
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P56
'For this Montgomery deserves more credit than some revisionist historians seem willing to give, particularly in view of the failure of the Desert Air Force to impede Rommel's retreat along a single coastal road. The RAF squadron leaders had not trained their pilots in modern strafing techniques, had used the wrong sort of bombs, had failed to use up-to-date methods of ground-to-air control; and were wary of flak. General Kirkman later recalled:
At that stage [the break-out after Alamein] the Air really failed. The Air claimed they could destroy a retreating army. Well they didn't—I mean, I motored along these roads afterwards, there wasn't a mass of German burned-out vehicles. The fact is, our bombing was a bit inaccurate in those days, and a retreating army isn't quite as vulnerable as the Air likes to think. . . .
Not until 'Maori' or 'Mary' Coningham left and was succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst did RAF techniques improve'
EL ALAMEIN
MICHAEL CARVER
LONDON. B.T. BATSFORD 1962
P174
'The previous evening Montgomery had given his orders for the final break-out which he saw was imminent. In 30th Corps the Australians were to clear up the area of `the pocket' east of Sidi Abd el Rahman. Freyberg, reinforced by Roddick, was to break out as soon as possible and make for Sidi Ibeid, ten miles southwest of Russell's objective, prepared to move immediately onwards to block Rommel's retreat at Fuka, 45 miles to the north-west. Wimberley was to be prepared to relieve him at Sidi Ibeid. Lumsden's main task was to operate north-wards and clear up the coastal sector. Briggs was to pivot on Tel el Aqqaqir and aim at occupying the area three miles S.S.E. of Ghazal station, while Harding, passing round his southern flank, was directed to Ghazal station itself, where he was to cut the coast road. The R.A.F. were to concentrate all their efforts on the road immediately west of the front during the night and westwards from Daba during the day.'
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'Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.'
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers personal combat experience, zero. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers in planning military campaigns, sod all. Brereton experience of airborne operations, zero. So much for them, and their nancy boy US CV's.
Browning fought, and commanded in two world wars, Urquart had been in action prior MARKET GARDEN. His performance at ARNHEM was commented on by Brigadier Hackett: 'I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.' His words. Lathbury had peformed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as well taking part in HUSKY.
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Nick Danger
'Airborne combat experience: Browning none, failed jump training twice. Urquhart none, failed jump training due to air sickness. Lathbury one op, Sicily.'
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers personal combat experience, zero. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers in planning military campaigns, sod all. Brereton experience of airborne operations, zero. So much for them, and their nancy boy US CV's.
Browning fought, and commanded in two world wars, Urquart had been in action prior MARKET GARDEN. His performance at ARNHEM was commented on by Brigadier Hackett: 'I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.' His words. Lathbury had peformed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, as well taking part in HUSKY.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
'There you go - that's how important LZs are,Geronimo a former US Para tried telling these slappies.If 1st Para were properly supplied they wouldn't have taken Arnhem but they could have fought off the encirclement and performed a tactical retreat with a lot less losses. But that's Monty again a no show during the largest air drop up until that point of the war - any other Army he's either removed or shot'
How stupid can any one person [Para Dave] get. Brigadier Hicks ccreated the horseshoe shaped perimeter to try ensure 1st airborne were not entirely surrounded. Several major things combined to hinder his plans, including the Nijmegen Bridge nor being in US hands when XXX Corps arrived on the scene during the morning of the third day, and the Germans finding a copy of the MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier at the start of the operation.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart.
Was does an idiot like Para Dave expect?.. That Montgomery be in the lead XXX Corps tank? Nobody asked that that Brdley be i the lead US tank into Arnhem.
Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
That is what you call 'no show'.
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@nickdanger3802
'Why would a US soldier have the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" since the only people who would need or have access to the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" would be Browning and his useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
The Germans would not need the "entire MARKET GARDEN plan" to know where the British were or that they would be resupplied by air drop, would they?'
Oh well, its your funeral...
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@nickdanger3802
Yea... far more important than getting the entire MARKET GARDEN plan as soon as the operation started.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
Cheer up... I might get bored with doing this. You can but hope.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
Part one (of two).
0/10 for effort. 0/10 for knowledge of the subject.
‘This just keeps getting earier and easier. BTW how is it Monty got driven into the ENGLISH channel,and never got Dunkirked after the GIs arrived? Read Monty's confession’
Yea right ho…
Like Montgomery, a single division commander in 1940 was responsible for the outcome of the allied strategy in 1940. The ‘GIs arrived’… with an advance guard to Northern Ireland in the middle of 1942. With the outcome of the war already settled, in the skies over Britain in 1941, and in front of Moscow in 1941. Still, there was plenty of time for the big victory parades that the Americans love so much.
‘Monty's misadventures - where was he when this debacle started coming apart everywhere almost immediately? Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses at the Belgian border until the Troop support and supply flights went over at 2:30 in the Afternoon?Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why didn't Monty or the Others think to put the bridging equipment up front?17 bridges over 12-13 canals might have come in handy ON TIME don't you think? All 4 Senior British officers and not one thought of this glaring over site - that explains why the RN & RAF was much better led than anything Monty came up with. Try reading what the top officers in the Alliance had to say’
Oh dear…To whom it may concern…
MARKET GARDEN was timed against the start of MARKET. All enquiries on that one to be sent to the heirs of the US General Lewis Brereton. The Son Bridge was 20 miles from the GARDEN start line was blown up by the Germans within a short time of the US airborne forces landings at ONE end of that bridge. XXX Corps got a Baily Bridge to Son and installed it – all in 12 hours. Seems like a marvellous effort. It is widely known that XXX Corps had copious amounts of bridging equipment as far forward as any reasonable assumption about likely needs could be made. ‘glaring over site’ US 82nd turning up at Nijmegen without assault boats might be seen as a glaring oversight. Who can say?..
‘Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." ’
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’ -notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. All this after five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ’
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
‘From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
‘Now how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?’
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
‘Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ ’
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand was Montgomery’s Chief of Staff. Max Hastings, is that bloke with the Hank Harvin glasses that they call the ‘golf club members bar bore’, who thinks he knows more about the history of warfare than the rest of the world put together.
‘How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ’
Max Hastings should have checked first:
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
Part two (of two).
0/10 for effort. 0/10 for knowledge of the subject
‘How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies’
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’. How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak’
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion. This is what Churchill stated in a note to Roosevelt:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 15 Dec 43
9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
Not a word about Montgomery’s military accomplishments’. Why do people not check first?..
‘Fancy some more little villa?’
ROTFL. Coming from Para Dave, this is like being taunted by a dead sheep.
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@gandalfgreyhame3425
'1. Caen. Monty had to cook up an excuse that his plan "was only to tie down the main body of German Army so the US Army could succeed with its Operation Cobra" - this was a complete lie, because Monty's well documented plans for his doomed attack on Caen had as its objective the taking of Caen, not to sacrifice his men and tanks in a stupid long distance death charge across 1000 yards of open terrain into withering fire from well positioned German cooks and 2nd rate troops armed with tanks and 88mm anti-tank guns. Had you read that book I cited above about the Normandy Campaign, you would know that.' Your words.
Read this:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
and this:
'The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.'
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
THE AMERICAN LIFE MAGAZINE 1951.
'2. Falaise Gap (which should have been the Falaise Pocket except Monty failed to close HIS end of the pincers movement in time and thus allowed +30,000 of those German cooks and 2nd rate troops to escape).' Your words.
Read this:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377
And this:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
'3. Market Garden. Monty's worst and most criminally negligent plan.' Your words.
How so?
'4. The Battle of the Bulge (which Patton was cutting off in a pincers move on his end, but again, Monty failed to close off his end in time to trap the German troops to convert the Bulge into a Pocket).' Your words.
Read this:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
And this:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
'5. Getting beat across the Rhine by Patton's 3rd Army. This was not a planned attack by the 3rd Army - Patton's troops saw that the Remagen bridge had not been successfully blown up and made the daring decision to cross the bridge - Monty's troops would have NEVER TAKEN SUCH A DECISION ON THEIR OWN.' Your words.
Err... it was Hodges' US 1st Army that captured the Remagen bridge, not Patton's US 3rd Army.
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@gandalfgreyhame3425
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING 1994
P68
'All of the air side of 'Market' was planned in England, and 2nd TAF was only invited at the last minute to send an officer to England to provide liaison. He was unfortunately delayed by bad flying weather and arrived after the final planning conference, too late for serious co-ordination to be arranged. But two American radio teams had been provided for the necessary communications; the teams contained four jeeps, two radio sets, two officers with airborne combat training, eight signalmen and two British drivers. They were scheduled to be carried on the second lift from Manston in four American Waco gliders piloted by British glider pilots.'
That puts ground - air liaison firmly in the hands of FAAA, commanded by US General Lewis Brereton, and not with 2st Army Group, commanded by Montgomery.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
'the Americans insisted that 2nd T.A.F. should not operate during airborne missions, lest there should be a clash between American and British fighters.'
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@paulmazan4909
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
1954.
Chapter IX The Martyrdom of Warsaw
P 123
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 25 Aug 44’
‘As Stalin’s reply evades the definite questions asked and adds nothing to our knowledge, I propose a reply on the following lines:
[Begins.] “We earnestly desire to send U.S. aircraft from England.
….
‘President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 26Aug 44’
‘I do not consider it would prove advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join in with you in the proposed message to Stalin.’
As best as I can see, to fly the Polish airborne brigade into Poland would have entailed several hundred aircraft, most of them American, between eight and nine hundred miles, a big chunk of it over German controlled territory. Unarmed aircraft, each with a crew of four, that would have had to rely on using Russian airfields to get the aircraft home, via another eight or nine hundred mile flight partly across German controlled territory. What about a fighter escot of Mosquitos and Mustangs? How was that to be managed?..
Three million Poles, six million Poles dead, its still down to the Germans, they chose to do the killing.
'Roosevelt and Churchill were not going to go to war with Russia over Eastern Europe but that is not to say they had no means of challenging Stalin. Both were pouring war supplies into Russia and had that as a bargaining chip they never used. Conveniently ignoring, despite the promises of the Atlantic Charter, the fact that Russia was allied with Germany and invaded and took one third of Poland in 1939, switched sides and would do so again as soon as the war ended.' Your words.
Get real. The whole of allied Lend-Lease to Russia amounted to less than 5% of their needs. By August 1944, nothing was going to stop Stalin from doing what he wanted to in Eastern Europe. The idea that Britain and the USA were in any sort of position to threaten Russia in regard to Poland is absurd.
As for events in 1939, you now state that 'The agreement was to open an offensive to draw German troops to the west and releave pressure on the Poles.'
But it was all over in Poland in 36 days, 34 if you take it from when Britain and France declared war on Russia. The French call up was behind schedule, the BEF was 10% of allied forces. What could Britain and France realistically have done?
As for Arnhem, the figures speak for themselves:
1st Airborne:
Dead; 1,174 (13.1%). POW; 5,903 (65.8%). Evacuated; 1,892 (21.1%). Total; 8,969.
Glider pilots:
Dead; 219 (17.3%). POW; 532 (42.5%). Evacuated; 532 (42.5%). Total;1,262.
Polish brigade:
Dead; 92 (5.4%). POW; 111 (6.6%). Evacuated; 1,486 (88.0%). Total; 1,6.89.
So there you have it:
21.1% First Airborne evacuated, 42.5% Glider Pilots evacuated, 88% of Polish brigade evacuated.
And you really think that the Poles were left to it?..
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TIK You have neglected to take note that by the 10th September, Montgomery had receved an urgent question from London, enquiring as to what could be done about the launching of V2 rockets at London from the the West of the Netherlands, the first lauchings having taken place on the 8th September.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
It was all but impossible to intercept V2 rockets once they were airborne, and there were no fixed launching sites that could be destroyed. Market Garden offered the chance to stem the flow of rockets into the Western part of the Netherlands. British troops in the Netherlands (my own father among them), could see V wepons being launched, and quite understandably, they wanted something done about this matter. This should be taken into account when assessing the purpose of MARKET GARDEN, and why Arnhem was included in the plan for that operation.
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Bullet-Tooth Tony
'the pratt said he'd go to Berlin' Big Woody (aka Para Dave).
Assuming Para Dave means that he is claiming that Montgomery intended to go to Berkin..
Let us examine the available evidence in regard to this matter
(Evidence meaning testimony of people who were actually there, and contemporary douments. As opposed to some oppo spouting off many decades after the event)...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
.MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that
‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN:
‘21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’
Thanks go to the American John Lucas for drawing attention to this item in the 21st Army Group Report.
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seth1422
‘Monty missed several opportunities to isolate enemy forces over his career, including a really tantalizing one immediately after seizing Antwerp.’
What missed opportunities? Not Antwerp, the advance had been too swift and the required forces were not in place.
‘Admiral Ramsey never stopped being furious with him over the Scheldt. Dempsey didn't trust his judgement. Harris couldn't forgive him for his dissembling over Goodwood. Churchill was uneasy with him and thought he was a "cad". And even Alanbrooke, his most important defender, constantly lived in fear of what he would screw up next.’
Where is the evidence that backs up these claims.
‘Films are a terrible source for history.’
But millions upon millions of Americans see them as accurate history and those opinions filter down to things like YouTube. That is why the likes of myself, John Cornell, John Burns and others on here to deal with these idiotic comments.
U571 is one the most blatant examples of American arrogance and chauvinism. There are plenty of others (top of my head): Pearl Harbour, Patton, A Bridge Too Far, Nuremberg, Mussolini: The Untold Story, Anne Frank: The Whole Story and so on and so on). Even the so called masterpiece Saving Private Ryan is the usual American stuff with a 20 minute horror scene bolted onto the front. Even with that the film makers still find time to fit in a dig at the British and at Montgomery.
I understand that even the Canadians are targeted – in a film called Argo?
‘We are knew that already, and are trying to have an adult conversation. The VT (Variable Timing) Fuse is a neat story, and knocking down the V-1s its finest chapter. I recommend you check it out.’
You mean check it out again. I started on Britain’s war story, including Britain’s many inventions like the VT in about 1969. How about you?
‘Churchill respected Monty as a general and the effect on the men Monty had when he took over in '42 was obvious. Churchill did not get on with him personally’
How do you know they did not get on personally? As far as their work was concerned, I picked out one extract from Churchill’s history of the war – there more – across the six volumes.
‘Ever hear the story of Monty's wager with "Beatle" Smith for a B-17?’ Read, dismissed it. Smith should not have made the wager if he was not prepared for the consequences. Hopefully it taught him a lesson.
As for Market Garden. This reason, that reason. Who cares, it has all been done to death. There was a need to show Gavin’s failings but that has now been done. All Beevor has done is to cause the paper industry to fell more trees – for no good reason. TIK has taken him apart on here.
‘That is why none of the major historians do so.’ Surely you are not putting Beevor in the category of ‘major historian’, Are you?
The idea that Market Garden proved the case for a broad front strategy is nonsense. A narrow front strategy in 1944 would have entailed any army group size thrust. Twenty First Army Group with US Ninth Army backed up by airborne forces as required. All with absolute priority on resources. With Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Hodges and Patton being halted if necessary to keep advance going. Such a thrust would have been able to make full use of allied air power and logistic back up. A thrust that would have got to the Ruhr and then Berlin. A thrust that should have been decided on in August as the enormity of Montgomery’s victory in France became apparent.
Market Garden involved light airborne forces and one conventional army corps with a brief period priority in supplies. Even then The Germans only managed to defeat one airborne division. The broad road front strategy was fine provided all the allies wanted the war to go on into the middle of 1945 and carry a counter attack with 100,000 casualties – which is what happened.
‘most the infantry and virtually all of the armor engaged in the battle did not start in the operational area. Virtually all of it came in by "blitz" rail transport from elsewhere. That's why tanks (in contrast to SP guns) were not seen in Arnhem until D+3.’
As correctly noted by John Cornell.
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@michaelkenny8540
Artillery?..
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXIX. THE AUTUMN STALEMATE
P634
casualties." The German outpost line was lightly held and was quickly overrun at many points on the first day, but after that it became a matter of assaulting each strong-point in turn with little support from armour, because the drenched fields soon became quagmires, and with inadequate support from artillery because of the ammunition shortage. What might have been achieved with the aid of heavier and more concentrated artillery fire was apparent from the experience of the two divisions, one British and one American, which assaulted the intact defences of the Siegfried Line at Geilenkirchen, where Bradley's front joined Montgomery's. This attack gained rapid success, for American fire-power was reinforced by British guns which, as the Ninth Army's historian says, " had ample ammunition to permit artillery support on a far more lavish scale than American supply permitted."
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P126
‘In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it.'
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@richardbono5540
Really...
All I can find is a diary entry from Eisenhower's naval aide Butcher. Tedder was supposedly the ring leader of a plot to get rid of Montgomery. Something he later denied:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push’
I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
This from the diary of Alanbrooke, CIGS:
July 27th.
‘Then Dinner with the P.M., Ike and Bedell Smith’
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
Hardly the words of a Chief of Imperial General Staff that wanted to sack Montgomery...
As for Churchill, I am very familiar with his six volume history of the Second World War. There is no mention of a desire, or plan to sack Montgomery in that work.
Atkinson and Beevor were not even born when the war ended, and therefore could not have been there, unlike the people I have quoted. So what do Atkinson and Beevor offer in regard to 'everyone from Churchill to the Imperial General Staff wanted to sack him in Normandy'?
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@FilipCordas
First of Hitler got elected by promising German people jobs and prosperity. He did not get anywhere by just banging on about the Treaty of Versailles, the jews, and all the rest of his claptrap, as German election results showed.
The Polish crimes against Germany were so great, the Nazis had to dress dead concentration camp inmates in German military uniforms and leave them at a radio station so as to give Germany a flimsy pretext for starting the war.
No sane person would rate any other date than that in September 1939, when Germany caused a war that involved Germany, Poland, France, Britain and Russia as he start of the war.
The idea that the USA kept Britain afloat in the war is absurd. In 1940 Britain had the world’s largest Navy, the world’s largest merchant fleet, the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, Europe’s largest auto industry, Europe’s largest aircraft industry, the world’s most advanced air defence system, and it was reading the German armed forces coded messages. Germany had zero chance of defeating Britain. And what was the USA doing at this time?..
‘He wanted to force Britain into peace by bombing campaigns.’ Your words.
His peace on his terms, after he had invaded Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, France, and so on. If Hitler had wanted peace, all he had to do was to stick the agreement he made in 1938.
‘Also he didn't attack Russia he attacked the USSR and was hoping that all the internal conflicts would create an internal war within the USSR just like in WW1’ Your words. Only in Hitler’s overheated imagination could there be a vision of the Russian people overthrowing the communist government with the Germans on Russian soil.
But surely there must more relevant platforms than YouTube comments for up and coming Neo-Nazi like you to spout their nonsense.
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@nickdanger3802
Montgomery was a single division division commander in France in 1940. He perfomed with distiction in trying circumstances to bring his division home almost intact when so ordered to do so. Further, his nightime march to covered the allied left flank, after the Belgians had suuredered to the Germans, having given Britain and France one hour's notice of that surrender.
The idea that Montgomery took the credit for, or was given the credit for the Dunkirk evacuation is absurd.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 81
‘All three were commanded by fine soldiers, and one-the 3rd-by a trainer of genius. Major General Bernard Montgomery was then a man of fifty-two, with only a year’s experience as a divisional commander. But Brooke’s diary that winter contains many references to the progress of the defensive works made by his division and its impressive training Exercises. ‘It was a matter’ he wrote, ‘of the greatest interest watching Monty improving every day as he began to find his feet as
a Divisional Commander….These Exercises, all of them admirably run …were an eye opener to me as to his ability as a trainer. Their value was more than proved when we finally carried out our advance, as his 3rd Division worked like clockwork.’
P 107
‘Monty with his quick brain for appreciating military situations was well aware of the very critical situation that he was in, and the very dangers and difficulties and difficulties that faced us acted as a stimulus on him; they thrilled him and put the sharpest edges on his military ability.’
P 138
I proceeded to Bondues to see Monty at the 3rd Division H.Q., as I wanted to find out how he was getting on with the preparations for the very difficult move that lay ahead of him. He had to evacuate his present position and lead his division under cover of darkness across the Lys just east of Armentières, past Ploegsteert Wood and up by second-class roads northward within 4,000 yards of the fluctuating front of the 5th Division, to the north of Ypres, where he was to prolong our eastern defensive flank north of the 50th Division. It was a task that might well have shaken the stoutest of hearts, but for Monty it might just have been a glorious picnic. He told me exactly how he was going to do it, and was as usual exuberant in confidence. There is no doubt that one of Monty’s strong points is his boundless confidence in himself. He was priceless on this occasion, and I thanked Heaven to have a commander of his calibre to undertake this hazardous march.’
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Jerry 2234
At that time all information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground was routinely disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that respect.
The Ultra information, as in most other cases, as far from complete:
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.
The aerial photographs can be seen on-line, they gave a far from complete picture of German forces in the region.
The same information as seen by Eisenhower and Brereton, Commander, First Allied Airborne Army, over whom, Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
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@daleburrell6273
The average American documentary about the Berlin Air Lift goes something like this:
AMERICA,SUPPLIES,MARSHALL,AMERICATHIS,C47,CANDY,AMERICATHAT,GODDAM,
TEMPELHOF,AMERICATHIS,AMERICATHAT,C54,CHEERINGBERLINERS,TRUMAN,
MONTGOMERYCLIFT,AMERICATHIS,CANDY,HOLLYWOOD,AMERICATHAT,GODDAM,AMERICADIDITALL,STRATOFREIGHTER,STARSANDSTRIPES,CANDY.
Oh, and some others helped as well.
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@desmondmiller3198
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Notice that this Patton, seems to have have no regard for the progress of the allies, his thoughts seem to be about his chances of personal advancement.
Of Montgomery on Patton, all I could find this:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
Monty had, however, continued to show concern about Bradley's front the more so because, in contrast to General Bradley's confidence, Monty did not think highly of either Hodges or Simpson, the First and Ninth US Army Commanders. If only Bradley would transfer Patton to the Ardennes or preferably to Ninth US Army's sector, then Monty was sure all would be well—T.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES'
Hardly like Montgomery seeing Patton as a rival, was it?
But of course, you have other evidence?..
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@raynehell1217
Get lost. The BBC was castigated for its stance during the Falklands war for being anti- government, for being for being anti- government in the 1991 and 2003 wars in the Middle East. It even got on the wrong side of the Royal Family as the Queen's Christmas broadcast was taken away from it. So much for the BBC being a state broadcaster.
In Britain, the Daily Mail, Nadine Dorres, the rag bag of deluded Brexiteers, all hate the BBC. Abroad, its Putin's government, Rupert Murdoch, Trump supporters, NRA supporters, and so on hating the BBC. Are you in there somewhere?..
From Anne Frank to Mikhail Gorbachev, and so on and so on...they have all trusted the BBC. And with good reason.
Or perhaps you are one of those holocaust denial nutters who think that Anne Frank diary is a forgery?..
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@johnlucas8479
Err…I make it three questions.
'1) how do you define success'
For me it probably depends on the circumstances pertaining to each undertaking.
Examples:
Dunkirk.
After the French collapse, and the Belgian collapse, Britain managed to extricate the BEF from an almost impossible situation. A success that would have massive consequences in the years ahead.
The Battle of Britain.
A huge British victory in the most important battle of war – anywhere. Victory that condemned Hitler to waging a two-front war and thus securing his ultimate defeat.
The Balkans.
British forces ejected from Greece and Crete but, albeit unintended, the campaign caused a fatal five week delay to Operation Barbarossa.
The Battle of the Atlantic.
Mostly fought by the Royal Navy which dealt with the German surface fleet and two-thirds of its submarine ensuring that 90% of shipping bound for Britain arrived unmolested.
The North African Campaign.
Prevented a German – Japanese link up and German access to imports from outside of mainland Europe. Ultimately ensured oil supplies from the Middle East and freed up one million tons of merchant shipping.
Ultra.
The Poles first broke into Enigma, the French provided intelligence to the Poles that saved them three years of work. Britain took on this work and created a comprehensive code breaking organisation that coped with up-grades to Enigma, broke into the infinitely harder German Geheim Schreiber (Secret Writer), as well as Italian and Japanese naval codes.
2) what do you mean on their own’
Who can say? Every British or US undertaking in Europe had some involvement from other parties.
For the USA, that meant the use of Great Britain as a base for joint operations in Europe. The Royal Air Force providing more than 50% of the air forces, the Royal Navy provided 79% of the warships and 67% of the landing shipping.
Three) ‘Do the following examples meet your criteria of success:’
I would answer as follows:
1) 101st Div defence of Bastogne:
It was one division in action for one week. Not nice if you were, but there but bigger events were playing out in other places at the same time.
2) Capture of Cherbourg:
The capture of Cherbourg was behind schedule, was heavily influenced by the massing of German forces in front of the British Second Army further to the East. The assault involved 30 Commando and troops from the division my father was serving in at that time.
3) Capture of Bridge at Remagen by 9th US Arm Div:
Who can say? According to Eisenhower it was piece of good fortune.
4) The encirclement of the German 15th Army in Ruhr Valley of 1st, 3rd and 9th US Armies:
It involved US 1st, 9th and 15th Armies. Also support from 21st Army Group. It was less than a month from VE Day, it was bordering on a mopping-up operation.
Britain was in the war from its first day to the last. Britain fought in every theatre of war, fought Germany on its own for a year. Relative to its circumstances it out-produced every other major belligerent in the war. Nobody, but nobody, tells Britain about who did what in the war. Certainly not the USA, which was 3,000 mils from any hint of danger to its homeland, was only in the second half of the war in Europe and had the benefit of several years of being able to observe the war and to prepare for conflict.
Harsh but fair.
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@nickdanger3802
Ah yes, day one...
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands.'
Ouch!
It was all going to be so easy for you, John Lucas, Big Woody/Para Dave, westpoint snell and the others, when you breezed onto YouTube comments a few years ago. Everything that went wrong was going to be the fault of the British.
What happened?.. Your Hollywood/Stephen Ambrose/ Bill O'Reilly, etc., and their chauvinistic claptrap came up against real history, and lost.
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John Cornell
Its a Monday, so to cheer ourselves up...
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON
1977
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Ouch!
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Thought for the day...
As we all know, the US Army was nowhere near the German Army until 1943. By which time, as we all know, the Germans were irretrievably committed in Russia, and were short of fuel, manpower and so on.
But what of their big ticket items such as tanks? The Marks III and IV were pre-war technology. The production of new generation of German tanks, (Tiger I and II), Pather, Jagdtiger and Jagdpather amounted to just 8,400.
On their own , Britain produced 10,676 new generation: Churchills, Cromwells and Comets.
And Aeroplanes? At the end of the war, the Luftwaffe was still using 1939 technology in big numbers: Bf-109, Bf-110, Do 217, He 111 and so on. The Me 262 production amounted to just 1,430.
8,400 new generation tanks, 1,430 jet fighters to be spread across three fronts.
Americans should shut up. Their forces never had to face the Germans when they were at their peak between 1939 and mid 1942.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Not really...
If it is a question of bragging, then the facts are very simple. Britain is the size of the US State of Oregon, with a population the same as the US states of California and Texas. Britain had to import 40% of its needs. Britain was bombed, blockaded, and its major European enemy in control of the European coast from the North Cape to the Bay of Biscay, and at one point it was 21 miles away from mainland Britain. Relative to its circumstances, Britain out-produced every other major combatant.
US Lend-Lease supplies amounted 11% of Britain’s needs across the war years. Nobody, but nobody tells Britain about production during the war.
Britain fought from the first day of the war to the last day of the war, the only major belligerent nation to do. Britain was the only major belligerent nation to go to war on behalf of another country (Poland). All of the others, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the USA either attacked other countries or were attacked by other countries. Britain was the only country to fight Nazi Germany on its own - while Russia was allied to Germany, the USA was neutral, Britain nearest ally, Canada (then population 11 million) was 2,500 miles away.
The chiefs staff told the government at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 that Britain could be ready for a major war before 1941. A year later, in the face of Nazi aggression, Britain found itself at war. France collapsed in a matter of weeks, Italy declared war cutting Britain from the Mediterranean shipping routes. 18 months later, Japan declared war on Britain. Britain had to build a mechanized army with conscripted soldiers almost from scratch. Thank god (the world should be also thankful) that Britain had the foresight to prioritize the Navy and the air force in the build up to the war.
Come the hostilities, Britain (and Russia) faced Germany when it was at the height of its powers in terms of manpower, resources and technology.
Germany was never again as powerful in relation to its enemies as it was in 1940 and 1941. Britain won the Battle of Britain, the most important battle of war - which condemned Germany to a two front war. The air force then took the fight to Germany on its own until 1943, and on its own again in the winter of 1944/45. Britain's effort in Greece helped to delay the German attack by five fatal weeks. In Greece, as in Norway and at Dunkirk, British sea power was able to retrieve allied forces in the face of defeat. The Royal Navy defeated the German surface fleet, the Italian surface fleet, and put the French fleet beyond as was by a distance, the major factor in winning the battle of the Atlantic - almost 70% of U-boat sinkings were due to the Royal Navy. The navy was even able to venture into the Pacific towards the end of the war.
Clear headed British thinking led to the Germany first decision and the Mediterranean strategy, which denied Germany access to resources outside of Europe, freed up one million tons of merchant shipping with the conquest of Sicily. The strategy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans, an advantage that the USA began to undo in the Summer 1944.
Britain led the world in RDF, ASDIC and other technologies, code breaking and espionage.
Russia suffered much more in human and material terms than Britain but only ever fought on land, and on one front. They come second after Britain. But overall, if push comes to shove, as regards to who did what during the war, we rule.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Not really...
If Battle of Britain had been lost, particularly in the high summer, anything could have happened. German aircraft ranging unopposed across Southern England could easily have led to a change of government and or a capitulation or negotiated peace. The German attempt to mount an invasion was never a bluff until the autumn. German preparation were far too extensive, right down to sorting the waterproofing of tanks, which they mastered in a matter of weeks, and the issuing of guide books to the troops. The Germans may have been reluctant to go ahead and some were pessimistic about its outcome, but they were quite prepared to go ahead. Victory in the air made Britain's survival a certainty. Victory led to the Germans having to leave one million troops and a third of its air force in the west. An expensive submarine building programme, an air defence system, Germany being cut off supplies outside of mainland Europe and a fatal five week delay to Barbarossa. Von Runstedt was asked by Russian interogators after the war, what the point when Germany lost the war (They were expecting his reply to be Moscow or Stalingrad etc). His answer: The Battle of Britain. With Britain out of war, Germany gets its free hand in the east, no Battle of the Atlantic, no second front.
The war started on 1st September 1939. No responsible person could think otherwise. America only went to war because Japan (With violence), Germany and Italy declared war on the USA. Germany attacked other countries, Italy attacked other countries, Russia was attacked.
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@BobSmith-dk8nw
Just so as you know...
A cretin, from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, who used the name Big Woody (and other names) on YouTube spent about two years on You Tube calling Montgomery a coward, XXX Corps cowards, Lord Carrington a coward, disparaging cancer sufferers and so on and so on. He (or She) was everywhere on YouTube items about Montgomery, Market Garden etc., quoting hack US historians who were nowhere the events they were passing judgement on. He disappeared last summer, after me, and others outed him, but has now started using my name, John Cornell's name, John Burns's name, and possibly others too. He is on this thread using my name.
Don't go down the same route...
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@beardedchimp
De Valera signed the the German Embassy book of condolences for Hitler's death, on the 2nd May, 1945. During the war, his government refused the allies use of ports on the West Coast of Ireland, while his countrymen consumed imports that British, Canadian, and US sailors had brought across the oceans of the world to the British Isles.
De Valera had made common cause with the Germans (and Austrians) in the 1916 Easter rising. After the last war, Eire was the only team that would play Germany at football, hence the German away kit being green for decades. Two Second World War pariah states recognizing each other.
I have read and heard Churchill's brilliant put down of De Valera in 1945, and De Valera's weak at attempt at answering him back.
Even now you see and hear Irish political commentators and politicians, like Fintan O'Toole, and the Sinn Fein / IRA head head girl, McDonald giving it the big one about all that is wrong with Britain, while their country was bailed out by Britain in the economic crash of the 2010s, x number of Irish t people seek a life in mainland Britain, and the republic relies on the RAF for its air defence. People were killed and maimed in mainland Britain by people claimed to be acting in the name of Irish unity, or some such claptrap excuse. Compare the British reaction to those murders with is happening in Gaza, and the Lebanon...
We get all this glib talk of accommodation and acceptance, and cultural identity for loyalists in the deadful event that Northern Ireland is forced into another country, but the Irish president, the poison leprechaun, Higgins did not even have the grace to attend a church service that marked 100 years of Northern Ireland.
Harsh but fair.
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@beardedchimp
A version I saw, had De Valera actually travelling to the German Ambassador's county residence at Dún Laoghaire (Proper name: Kingstown) to pass on his condolences, spoken, written, or whatever. And the following day, the German Ambassador received a message condolences from the President of the Southern Irish state.
De Valera's diary for that period would make fascinating reading:..
'28 January 1945: The Red Army claim to have overrun a German holiday camp called Auschwitz, where they claim to have wharehouses full of clothes, and seven tons of female human hair. This is clearly a example of Russian propaganda lies.'
'12 April 1945: The US Army claims to have overrun a German holiday camp called Buchenwald, when the lying Americans claim to have found, amongst other things, former stable buildings for 80 horses horses being used to house 1,200 people, with five persons to a bunk. An obvious lie, the SS being such a noble organization, would never have done such a thing.'
'16 April 1945: The British Army claims to have overrun a German holiday camp camp called Belsen, where the lying British claim to have found 13,000 unburied bodies. The photographs they produced of piles of bodies are obvious fakes.'
'1 May 1944: Yesterday, one of the greatest leaders that ever lived, and my political soulmate, Adolf Hitler, died, whilst fighting the Bolshevik hordes in Berlin'
2 May 1945: Daytime, travelled to the German Ambassador's country home at Dún Laoghaire to offer my heartfelt condolences for the death of the Führer. Words cannot express my sorrow at his passing. Evening, raining, stayed in to contemplate how much more I could done to help the noble Axis cause. I rejoice that I have denied Britain and the USA the use of the former treaty ports, and I celebrate the allied loss of life that stemmed from that decision.'
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@jacquiewalton9744
A lack of a book of condolences was no problem for DeValera. He drove to country home of the German ambassador to Ireland at Dún Laoghaire (Proper name: Kngstown), to offer condolences on the death of Hitler.
Perhaps he actually said this:
"On behalf of the Government, of Dáil Éireann, and of the people of Ireland, I wish to express our deep sorrow at the death of the Führer Hitler and our very great sympathy with his family and with the German people in the calamity which has befallen them. Germany has lost a great man and a noble leader."
Perhaps he added this:
"The people of Ireland [Paddyland] have, in the last few months, seen some of the Führer's many great achievements at Auschwitz, Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, and many other such places."
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@andy313131313136
D-Day and Normandy
Montgomery led the allied ground campaign in Normandy, completing the campaign ahead of the scheduled completion date (D+90) and with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
ACCORDING TO THE US GENERAL EISENHOWER:
‘The Battle of the Beachead was a period of incessant and heavy fighting and one which, except for the capture of Cherbourg, showed few geographical gains. Yet it was during this period that the stage was set for the later, spectacular liberation of France and Belgium. The struggle in the beachhead was responsible for many developments, both material and doctrinal, that stood us in good stead throughout the remainder of the war.’
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’
Regarding Caen, it was one of a number of objectives which had wish to have by dates set against them, which Montgomery noted in his briefing to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London before the invasion.
An eye witness to that briefing noted:
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND.
Caen was a nice to have objective, but its capture or not capture changed little, the Germans still massed the great bulk of their forces in Normandy there. Cherbourg was the more important objective and this was captured 10 days later than expected.
Overall, Montgomery’s plan for Normandy was very simple, to draw the great bulk of German forces onto the British front in order to allow the US forces to break out against far weaker opposition.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
Falaise Gap
Bradley failed to close to Falsie Gap. It was he who stopped Patton:
These are Bradley's own words:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND:
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS:
Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Notice that all of the people I have quoted were actual participants in the events they were describing.
If you want to read about those times, start with the people who were actually there.
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@karldavidson9767
'wow that is both interesting and 540 degrees opposite of everything that I have ever read about Monty. Are you sure that’s how it happened?'
Sure?.. Who can say? Not me.
North Africa…
Montgomery Rommel at Alam el Halfa with four divisions against Rommel's six divisions. Its all on record.
Montgomery then reorganized and reinvigorated Eighth Army to deliver a victory that ended the war in North Africa.
This, from people who were there:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery."
____________________________________________________________________________
Normandy…
Montgomery planned for the campaign in Normandy to reach the Seine by D+90 with SHAEF predicting allied casualties between 250,000 and 270,000. The dates in between were a wish list, with the capture of Caen being on that list, as was Cherbourg, which was much more important to the allies than Caen.
Montgomery laid out his plans to allied leaders at St Paul’s School, West London, on the 15th May, 1944. 21 days before the intended date for D-Day, 5th June.
This from Alanbrook’s diary, which give some context:
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P189-190
" May 15th. Went straight from home to St. Paul's School to attend Eisenhower's final run-over plans for cross-Channel operations. The King, P.M., Smuts and all Chiefs of Staff were present. The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a co-ordinator, a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all qualities of a commander in one man? May be I am getting too hard to please, but I doubt it."
Monty made excellent speech. Bertie Ramsay in-different and overwhelmed by all his own difficulties. Spaatz2 read every word. Bert Harris told us how well he might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the two other Services. Leigh-Mallory gave very clear description. Sholto Douglas seemed disappointed at the smallness of his task, and so was I. Then Humfrey Gale and Graham on Administration, followed by Grasset on Civil Controls of France. A useful run-through. The King made a few well-chosen remarks. After lunch he presented the C.B. to Bradley and two other decorations." " Back to War Office and finished up with Monty dining quietly with me. He was in very good form and bearing his responsibilities well."
This from an eye witness to the St Paul’s School meeting:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen’
This from a post-war historians who were NOT at the St Paul’s School meeting, but one assumes have sifted through the available evidence:
MAX HASTINGS
OVERLORD
D-DAY AND THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY
MACMILLAN PUBLISHING 1984
‘At St Paul’s School on 15 May, Montgomery presented the OVERLORD plan for the last time before the senior officers of the Allied armies, crowded on wooden benches behind the single row of chairs at the front for the King, Churchill, Smuts and Brooke.’
‘Montgomery’s presentation on 15 May, like his earlier briefing on 7 April, was acknowledged even by his critics as a brilliant performance: a display of grip, confidence, absolute mastery of the plan.’
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P 588
As in April, Monty ran through the tasks of the four armies, as well as those of the commandos and airborne troops. Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D + 90', outlining again the manner in which the British and Canadians would 'contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead' while the American forces, 'once through the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula, and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British Second Army.
____________________________________________________________________________
Market Garden:
Montgomery had no final say on the MARKET plan:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@Paravleugel
' I am truly sorry for you that you did not understand the irony in 'For Montgomery to beat Rommel he had to be a genius'. Montgomery won, as I mentioned before, because of the help he got from Bletchley Park.
Until the decryption of Enigma the Allied Forces were chased by Rommel through the whole of North Africa. And nobody was able to stop him (except for his supplyline).
Caen was easy according to Montgomery, matter of days, but as you stated it took more than 11 weeks. Imho he stays hugely overrated and a maverick.'
But it is as easy to say that Rommel only had success as long as he was receiving intelligence reports from the US Embassy until that source dried up in the middle of 1942. The reality of war in North Africa was that both sides advanced over enormous distances until, either their supplies ran out, or external factors brought an advance to halt, as with British in 1941. Rommel was stopped by Auchinleck at Alamein and by Montgomery at Alam-el-Halfa.
Montgomery never stated that Caen would be easy, nor did he make any commitments as to when Caen would be captured. The reality was that only major German counter-attack on D-Day took place in front of Caen (as witnessed by my own father), as the German 21st Panzer Division reached the coast between SWORD and JUNO beaches. Thereafter, the Germans ranged almost their entire armoured forces in Normandy on the Caen front, with 6.5 of their 8 Panzer Divisions placed there, including all of their Panzer Vl Tiger tanks.
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'18,000 French died so us Brits could escape'
And also, over 100,000 Frenchmen escaped, with British help.
'GB who lost in Norway France and Crete and Greece and everywhere else until we worked out how to fight Germany'
But throughout that period, Britain was still catching up with German war preparations, and the Axis had the benefit that any agressor has, in choosing were the battles will take place.
In each of the places you have noted, British sea power lessened the effect of those German victories. And in the case of Norway, the German navy suffered such severe losses that it could offer no help in any German attempt to invade Britain.
'same with Russia Germany wiped the floor with them in 1941'
But the German achieved what? There was no outright victory, and they were left with a 2,000 mile front, 1,000 miles from their homeland, having sustained a million casualties in six months.
'France made the mistake of being totally defensive I mean if they had attacked Germany during the invasion of Poland they could of beat them before things got out of hand'
But the Polish campaign was over in five weeks. What was to be done in five weeks, with the French mobilization taking longer than expected.
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@BunyipToldMe
'So, almost half a million English troops'
Err...
No it was 390,000 British troops.
The Dutch supplied 240,000 troops, the Belgians, 600,000 troops, the French supplied 2.1million troops to the allied cause.
The Germans had 3.35 million troops.
'Why didn't they fight instead of running away or surrendering?'
Err...
The Germans attacked on the 10th May 1940.
In the early morning of the 15th, the French Premier Raynaud, telephoned Churchill to tell that the Germans had broken through French lines and the war was lost.
Churchill flew to Paris on the 16th. During his meeting with French leaders at the Quai d’Orsay he could see French officials burning French government papers in the garden.
The Netherlands capitulated on 17th May.
German forces reached the coast on the 24th May, leaving two French armies, 250,000 British troops and the Belgian army isolated from the rest of the allied armies.
Belgium capitulated on the 28th May, having given France and Britain one hour notice of that surrender.
On the same day, the Germans captured Calais, leaving Dunkirk as the only port in Northern France in allied hands.
The Dunkirk evacuation finished on the 4th June, with 220,000 British troops, and 110,000 French troops evacuated to Britain.
On 10 June, the French government declared Paris an open city. On the same day, Italy declared war on France.
On 13 June, At a meeting a meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council at Tours, Britain offered the French a Franco-British Political Union. The offer was rejected.
On 14 June, Paris fell.
On 16th June, Petain replaced Reynaud as the French Premier having already begun secret negotiations with the Germans for an armistice, whilst still urging Britain to send more forces to France.
On 17th June, Petain sought agreement from Britain to seek a separate armistice with Germany. Britain agreed to that request, with two conditions: that the French fleet be put beyond the reach of the Germans, and that Germans pilots in French custody be transferred to British custody.
General de Gaulle, who no longer in the French government, arrived in London on 17th June and in a BBC broadcast on the 18the June, called on French people to resist German occupation.
On the 22nd June, the French concluded an armistice with Germany, with neither of the British conditions for an agreement to an armistice having been fulfilled.
The last British in France departed on 25th June.
And your service in which major war gives you the right to accuse troops of running away?..
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@nickdanger3802
Total rubbish.
Read and learn:
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P393
Montgomery's memorandum to O'Connor of the 15th July 1944 stated:
‘On July 15th, when he saw the Second Army Instruction, Montgomery gave O'Connor a personal memorandum which made his intention clear beyond dispute. This note began:
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and * write it down 1 to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle. To gain a good bridgehead over the Orne
through Caen and thus to improve our positions on the eastern flank. Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Effect of this operation on the Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas. A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank. But the eastern flank is a bastion on which
the whole future of the campaign in North-West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it were to become unstable, the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.’
P404
‘Accordingly, on the eve of Cobra, the German armour in Normandy
was deployed as follows:
On the Second Army front: Seven Panzer Divisions (of which five and
a half were east of the Orne) and four heavy tank battalions.
On the First Army front: Two Panzer Divisions, one Panzer Grenadier Division, 1 and no battalions of heavy tanks.’
Chester Willmot landed in France on D-Day and reported from the front through to VE Day.
He personally interviewed key people in the events of that time.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON. 1947
P 406
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
The battle of Normandy, with Montgomery as allied land forces commander, ended ahead of the scheduled completion date (D+90) with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
Read what the people who were actually there have to say about these events.
All these people like Beevor, Hastings, the turd Ambrose, none of them were there. All they do is dig out the odd new statistic, re-print previously published quotes and pronounce judgement on events decades after they happened. All with aim of making a few bob.
As far as I am concerned, they can all fuck off.
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@Plomien-wq5ke
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
These reports were ciculated to Eisenhower, Montgomery, Brereton, Dempsey, and Browning.
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