Comments by "LRRPFco52" (@LRRPFco52) on "CBC News" channel.

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  27. Dogfighting has already ended in the 4th Generation. Nobody in the current fighter communities is thinking they will merge with other fighters into visual range, cross each other’s 3-9 lines, and start gaming for rear quadrant missile or guns shots on an opponent. They still train for it in BFM, but since everyone has helmet-cued HOBS missiles with pretty substantial range and No-Escape Zone (NEZ) parameters from frontal or high-aspect approaches, every one keeps away from those bubbles. With modern sensors, PID can be achieved right before entering visual range, so face-shots with HOBS missiles are the norm for the pilots that are dumb enough or amateurs at evading threat WEZ profiles in the older jets. In 5th Gen fighters, the SA is so ominous, that they are already watching everything you do from hundreds of km away, scanning what weapons you have with multi-spectral fused sensors even in passive modes, sharing that data with each other, faster than it took me to type this sentence. They manage the space with vastly-superior knowledge about where threats are and what they are capable of, then employ weapons against them in ways that are almost impossible to deal with. Even if a 4.5 Gen +++ fighter is able to evade incoming weapons with its countermeasures somehow, its next course of action is to attempt to leave wherever it though the weapons were coming from, which could mean flying into even more unfair NEZ profiles. These are the rules of the new road, and why China and Russia are doing everything in their power to try to develop and produce similar systems.
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  28. The YF-23 had too many design risks, many of which needed to be corrected for the proposed F-23A to work. Each actuator in the wings for control surfaces was 4 smaller hydraulic actuators so that the wings could remain super-thin for supercrusie performance. There was a complex dual-reservoir hydraulic actuator system for each of the tailplane stabilators. It never demonstrated weapons bay storage or separation because there wasn’t a functional design to deal with the narrow fuselage and the required weapons count for AAMs. At least 2 of the wind screens cracked during supersonic tests, so that needed to be re-designed. The intakes did not manage the boundary layer air well enough to allow it to go past Mach 1.81, so the F-23A was going to need totally new intakes and flight testing on the basic airframe and propulsion combination. For these reasons, the USAF saw a lot of risk in costs with the F-23A proposal, and awarded the ATF contract to the F-22A proposal by Lockheed/Boeing/General Dynamics. The YF-22 had none of those problems. It had simpler actuators, PAV1 YF-22 flew faster than any of the other 3 ATF PAVs and was the only one to exceed Mach 2. It demonstrated weapons release from both weapons bays, with the AIM-9 and AIM-120. None of the bowless canopies cracked at even higher speeds that the YF-23, and its intakes perfectly separated boundary later air while also not providing any Line-of-Sight RF wave propagation like the YF-23 did, which is the first signature a LO airframe needs to eliminate, let alone a VLO/Stealth design. The YF-23 looked and flew superbly because it was an aerodynamic masterpiece, but had a lot of internet problems with the design that needed major attention and billions more in RDT&E. That’s why it was not selected.
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