Comments by "Nattygsbord" (@nattygsbord) on "The Confrontation between Keitel and Hitler during the Planning of Operation Barbarossa" video.

  1. Operation Barbarossa could not have been more luckier than it already was. Germany won on the lottery wheel, and yet do "internet experts" complain and think it was highly likely and even probable that this war could have started in a better way. I see that as extremely unlikely. It was just random chance that the Luftwaffe managed to destroy most of the Russian airforce in the first two days of the war, and all what remained of it within two weeks. If destroying the largest airforce in the world while it war standing on the ground lined up, wasn't extreme luck then I don't know what more people expect? Winning the lottery 10 times in a row? Destroying the Russian airforce the first days of the war saved Germany from disaster, as the German artillery was hopelessly undersized compared to other great powers. But with total air superiority could Stuka bombers replace the role of the artillery to soften up enemy resistence and wreck havoc on Russian infrastructure and lines of communication so the Russians could not coordinate effiecent counter-attacks to stop the German advance into Russia. The Russian army had also been taken completly by surpise. Units had not yet been mobilized when the war began and half of all tanks were unusable due to lack of maintance. Stalin had also forbidden his troops to fire back at the Germans the first few days of the war so the confusion at the frontline was total, as no one knew what to do, and the higher ups offered no leadership at all. And Stalins idiotic "not a step back" policy only made things worse. And all those things contributed to giving Germany some big wins in the beginning of the war. I don't think Germany could realisticly have been more lucky at the start of this war. Sure might Germany perhaps have two months extra to move into the Russian interior. But that would have not compensated for the lack of total air superiority. The mud season in april could have given Russia time to mobilize its troops, and move them to the front and given defenders more time to dig in. While the German armor spearheads would have their speed severly reduced. And the German advance towards Moscow in 1941 was pretty much obvious that it would fail by mid october, as most tanks that the Germans had started the war with had either been destroyed in battle or rendered unusable due to wear and tear by all long distances of travel on the Russian steppe, and all dust that the Russian summer threw into the sand filters. The infantry units had also taken much losses. And the German logistics systems could not keep up, if the Germans would push beyond Smolensk and towards Moscow. Germany simply was exhausted and needed to build wider railroad tracks and hoping for taking Moscow the next summer instead of pushing forward. It turned out that the German logistical system worked very poorly as the distance to Berlin grew. The amount of railway cars that could reach the German troops were limited. And it became clear that the troops could not get everything they wanted. They needed fuel, ammo, food, spareparts and winter uniforms. The German Generals believed that the troops needed more ammunition so they could make the last push and take Moscow and end the war. But their priorities were wrong. The lack of winter uniforms would soon kill thousands of German troops and injure even more. And many German units had already taken heavy losses even before the winter began. Some of Germanys best troops had already been lost and could never be replaced - such as the disproportionally high losses among NCOs and dead soldiers in Gross Deutschland regiment and Totenkopf Division. And then came the winter. And then came the final Russian counter-attack. The attack on Moscow was doomed to fail even before it had started. In hindsight would Germany probably been better off if they had made a strategic time out by October. And given troops a rest. Trenches would be dug out. The frontline would be straighten up and good positions for the next summer offensive would be taken. Bunkers and new railway tracks and railroad stations would be built. By doing this would Germany not only have been better prepared to face Stalins counter-offensive with bunkers, mines and trenches. But it would also have shorter supply lines that would have made it easier for the Germans to fight and harder for the Russians as their supply lines would be more stretched out. The catastrophic retreat in the winter in 1941 that led to gigantic losses of abandoned equipment such as heavy artillery and transport planes would thereby been avoided. And troops lost to freezing and fighting outside Moscow would also never have happened. Which would have left Germany much better prepared for the offensive in 1942.
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  2.  @robertleache3450  Moscow 1942 would then only be battle against well prepared enemy that had dug in and prepared at least 3 lines of trenches, and 80% of the red army would be concentrated there. And hard street fighting would not be a good way of using German superiority in manouver and firepower - but instead it would only benefit the Soviets who held the superior numbers, and street fighting also benefit the defenders more than the attackers. And if the battle in Ukraine today learns us anything it is that the defenders holds and advantage and that you need a 5 to 1 advantage in numbers for a succesful attack on a city. All those things does not play into favor for the German army. Ukraine on the other hand will offer Germany lots of flat ground. Today is only 15% of the country covered in forests so there will not be many places with good defensive positions to hide, and the place is good for manouver warfare where the German panzers can drive deep into enemy lands and encircle enormous Russian troop concentrations and cut them off from their supplies so they have to give up and surrender. This move to take southern Russia instead of Moscow came as an surprise to Stalin, and the Russians were caught completly unprepared - so the element of surprise would also be in German hands. The weather in southern Russia is also better for the Luftwaffe. While the swamps and thick forests around Leningrad are unsuitable for tanks - as the baptism of fire for the Tiger I tank showed. World war 2 was more than anything else an industrial war. So taking Southern Russia therefore made more sense than any other objective in this war. Neither Moscow or Leningrad had any oil, food, or manganese. Their terrain was not as open for offensive warfare as the huge open plains in the south. This push intot he south could be enough to turn the tables and end the war in Germany's favor. Russia would probably be terrified and try to counter attack to take this area back as soon as possible as even a temporary loss of it would be catastrophic for the Russian war effort. However if Germany would be able to punch back those counter attacks, then the future would look bright for nazi Germany. From Stalingrad could now German bombers reach deep into Russias big industrial centres in the Ural mountains and hammer them. Leningrad would be continue to be cut off from the outside world and lay under siege. And Russia which had suffered heavy losses in 1942 and 1941 would have to spread out its decimated forces over a long frontline - and thus making the Russian defensive line very thin, weak and fragile for any new German offensive punches into its territory.
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  3.  @westnblu  By October 1941 did the German High Command conclude that they had neutralized so many Soviet troops that it would be equal to 150 Divisions. This is an impressive number. When Germany planned Operation Barbarossa they did expect opposition from 150 Divisions, and after they wiped out say 100 of them then victory would be theirs they thought. But they were of course wrong. Even if this operation was succesful, and the German army had managed to destroy even more divisions than expected and at a faster rate than planned, did Operation Barbarossa end as a failure. And the reason was simple - by the same october had Russia built another 150 new Divisions to throw against the Germans and denying them a rest. So thing were a bit worrying for the Germans at that time. I guess that most German Generals still thought they could win. The Russian army was crappy and would likely suffer the same fate as in World War 1, and there was not much of a two front war going on and USA remained neutral. But the hurry to take Moscow seems like a dumb decision. Not only does the weather make it unsuitable. So does also the German tank losses and the logistical strain. Many (even perhaps most Generals) argued for a push directly towards Moscow. And Hitler correctly rejected this foolish idea, and he did choose to encircle the pocket at Kyiv and destroy the half a million strong massive troop concentration there. Had Hitler listened to his Generals idiotic advice to take Moscow directly could this large force in Kyiv have outflanked the Germans from the south, and a Russian pincer could have cut off the entire supply line for army group centre as it pushed towards Moscow, and without supplies would that large fighting force be in big problems and suffer catastrophic losses, or even getting encircled and wiped out completly. So the Germans destroyed the Kyiv pocket. And now should they have realized that they did not have the time to take Moscow in this year (1941). They did not have the time or the manpower or tanks to do so. And even if they took Moscow it would likely not have ended the war (it did not work for Napoleon in 1812). It would just have been a bloody meatgrinder like Stalingrad. And once the city was taken would the Germans be to weak to defend it against a Russian counter attack. Or the end result could perhaps be even worse, and end up with a German army encircled inside Moscow which would be wiped out the same way as the 6th Army at Stalingrad. I am surprised that German Generals even proposed such an idiotic move as to trying to take Moscow. But I guess they overestimated themselves and looked down on their racially inferior foe and confirmed their contempt for the Russians by their poor military performance. And to some degree was their view valid. Many times in that war did German regiments manage to beat off Russian divisions, and German divisions could beat back entire Russian army corps. However, the good self-confidence turned over into arrogance and over confidence. Many Generals did probably also subscribe to the idea of one great big battle that would decisivly determine the outcome of a war. Like the battle of Königgrätz ended the war between Prussia and Austria. So maybe they then saw the battle of Moscow as the final great battle to win. A battle which would finally destroy the Red army and force Russia to surrender to all of Germany's peace terms. Once again do I think this idea is silly most wars are not determined by one great battle alone. And something that would be obvious by 1941 is that the Soviets had already suffered so many catastrophic defeats, that one could say that they had already fought large decisive battles, but they have all failed to end the war. Not even the biggest defeat in military history - the surrender of 600.000 Russians at Kyiv did end the war. So it would probably clear to everyone with a braincell that killing off the red army was not going to happen. So Hitlers decision to focus on stealing food, oil and industrial capacity by stealing southern Russia in 1942 made much more sense. There might be other reasons than stupid Generals that decided an attack towards Moscow. It has been said that Hitler wanted to give the Japanese the impression that the war with Russia was soon over and that a final push toward Moscow was on its way. The idea was to not discourage Japan from declaring war on USA and pull Japans big navy into the war against USA and sign an alliance. Hitlers talk about just kicking in the door and the building would fall apart... did not happen however.
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  4.  @westnblu  Not really. The Afrika Korps had 3 Divisions. That is rougly 45.000 men. During Operation Barbarossa did the Germans have 2000 men dead per day. So that is only enough to replace 23 days of fighting. That is just a drop in the ocean for all manpower the Germans needed. So in the larger scheme of things did North African front not matter to this war. And in in 1941-42 was also the Africa Korps mostly using weapons like Panzer II which was considered outgunned and obsolete compared to the Russian tanks. In the long run did things however become problematic for the Germans. As they were forced to fight a 5 front war - in Russia, in France, in the south (Italy/North Africa), in the Atlantic ocean with uboats and battleships, and the air war over Germany and France. And Germanys lack of oil and late transition over to a war economy made it even harder to meet all wartime needs. So that is the problem they had with the western allies. The problem in the east was rather that they had been unprepared for a long war. The Luftwaffe did run out of bombs during operation Barbarossa. The pilots got exhausted by flying dive bombing missions multiple times per day for a hundred days. And the Germans lost more troops in the battle for Moscow than they did invading all countries in western Europe. And when Stalins winter offensive came they had to retreat and leave heavy equipment behind - so the Germans lost thousands of tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and transport planes. And the result became that the German army had to start the war of 1942 with a much weaker army than that of 1941. Germany was no longer strong enough to attack Russia in the North, middle and the south at the same time. So now it had to choose where to attack. And they went for Caucausus. But Germany did not really have enough troops for even that as they would have needed an extra army corps if they wanted to take both Stalingrad and Maikop at the same time. Personally I see this as bad planning for Hitler and his Generals. They could have mobilized more troops in late 1941 so they could have gotten more troops to play with on the eastern front by the late summer of 1942. Another alternative could have been to have moved some of the 20 divisions located in France in 1942. Hitler was paranoid about operation Torch and did think the Americans would invade France as soon as he started a war with them. But personally do I think that Germany could have sent atleast half of those troops to Russia. Had just a half-dozen or so of their better units located in France in 1942 been deployed in the east, then the disaster at Stalingrad would never have happened. By 1942 was time crucial for Germany. It could nto win a long war against USA, UK and USSR. By taking Ukraine/Caucausus/Stalingrad would they be able to take the industry, agriculture and oil from the Russians. Perhaps they could not exploit those resources that effectivly yet. But on the other hand would the loss of those areas be a disaster for the Russian war economy even in the short run. Their economy had already been shaky with all resource bottle necks and moving all industries by rail from the west to ural. So far had it been able to keep its head above water thanks to huge pre-war stockpiles of strategic resources. But by late 1942 were those stored stockpiles beginning to running out. And if Russia could not take the pressure off by winning at Stalingrad and liberating Ukraine and Caucausus - then their economy would be strangled to death. And the lend lease shipments before mid 1943 was relativly tiny and would not save Russia from disaster. Without oil would the Russian military be severly handicapped as their planes, tanks and trucks could nto move. It would be hard to replace all industry lost, like their tank factory at Stalingrad. And losing the breadbasket of Russia: Ukraine - would have meant a disasterous decline in food supplies. In World war did the lack of food from Ukrainian farmers mean that Russias big cities such as Moscow and Leningrad would be starving. The price of bread would rise astronomically and lead to massive inflation. No one could afford to eat anymore and you would get food riots and revolution and people would lose motivation to fight and wanna end the war. And the war industry would now face problems like in World war 1. It now have to raise wages to be able to attract workers. And this all this would be tied to the inflation problems. And now when you produce too little food, is it really wise to try to get farmers to move to the cities to work in factories to produce ammunition for the red army? And Russia is a poor country so you cannot do like USA. USA could increase food production without more workers by using more tractors and more fertilizer. But Russia could not afford that. And America could replace industrial workers with machines, fordism and convayor belts. But Russia could not afford to do the same as they were a poor country that could not buy expensive machines. So the American workers were more effiecent thanks to all tools and machines and 1 American worker could therefore produce as much stuff as perhaps 4 Russian workers could do combined. This did allow USA to save manpower and send more men to the frontline in green uniforms. But Russia could not afford to do that. They needed a larger workforce at home. They needed a higher proportion of their population to work as farmers - or otherwise would all the soldiers and industrial workers starve to death. So had Germany managed to hold Southern Russia would the result have been disasterous. Russia would end up with too little food, too little industrial production and too few soldiers to continue fighting the war effectivly. The country would likely have fallen apart like it did in 1917. If Hitler was not a fool he could then make peace and grab all of Ukraine, Caucausus, Belarus, and the Baltics for himself. Pressing forwards onto the Urals was not necessary. And it could wait atleast until the western allies had been defeated.
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  5.  @neboyshanicolich761  Taking Moscow was completly unrealistic as I said earlier.
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  6.  @westnblu  Guderian and others wanted an attack on Moscow. I think that is insane an unrealistic. The Germans were too exhausted and was outflanked from a huge Russian troop concentration in Kyiv. And even if they took the City they would not be able to hold it. And in 1942 things were just as hopeless. 80% of the red army stood outside Moscow and had dig in and was waiting for a German attack. Would it then make sense to attack to trying to attack such a strong well defended city? No. This attack would be doomed to fail. Attacking the south made more sense. And just as Hitler was lucky in 1941 and managed to destroy the Russian airforce in just 2 weeks were Hitler now extremely lucky again. Stalins winter offensive had started exremely well for the Russians. But Stalin became too over-ambitious and ordered his troops forward even more despite they risked running low on supplies and would lose coordianation and units would be unable to support each other. So the Germans could easily encircle and destroy this huge Russian wave coming towards them. And suddenly had the offensive changed from a triumph into a disaster for the Russians. In Southern Russia did the Russians try to make a pincher movement around Kharkov in 1942. But instead of encircle the Germans, did the Russians themselves get their huge forces encircled and destroyed, in one of the greatest military disasters of the red army of that year. After that big victory was there no troops standing between Stalingrad and army group south to defend Southern Russia. So the campaign in the south started extemely lucky for the Germans. But because of some bad strategical decisions later on would 1942 end in a disaster at Stalingrad. And with that did Germany lose the war. After Kharkov 1942 was the axis at their peak. And after that would the Axis quickly crumble. Soon came the defeats at Midway, and then El Alamein, Stalingrad, Guadacanal, the battle of the Atlantic and the loss of North Africa. And after that was the Axis doomed to lose the war.
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  7.  @robertleache3450  Army group north was the most succesful army group during Barbarossa. In Just two months it had achieved all its objectives. It moved so fast that the road to Leningrad laid open and could have been taken without a fight. But the Germans made a halt, and the oppurtunity slipped away. Instead was a siege started, and not much interesting things happened in the north for the next 2 years. The rapid success of the army group also meant that Hitler could steal some of its divisions and use them to take Kyiv, Moscow and then Stalingrad. Personally I think that the push towards Moscow in 1941 was just a waste of resources. And the battle of Rzhev was also just another unnecessary meatgrinder which could have been avoided. Losing thousands of men for defending a railroad crossing doesn't make sense. Especially not when that piece of railroad only got importance if you wanna launch an attack on Moscow. And I don't wanna attack Moscow. Not in 1941, 1942 or not any other year either. It is Ukraine, Caucausus and Stalingrad that I want to secure more than anything else, If I had been a nazi General. Russia could not fight without the resources from those areas, and Germany with its small resources needs those areas too. Ukraine, the breadbasket of Russia could help Germany with its food shortage problem. Aluminium and rare earth metals from Ukraine have big importance for making aircrafts and for making strong steel - which is needed for tank production. Coal and oil is in short supply in Germany and every little bit helps. And here you also got timber and lots of industrial capacity. You will also be able to cut off the southern lend lease route. And destroying all bases for the Russian black sea navy so it cannot threaten Germanys chrome imports from Turkey. For the Russians will the situation become dire without South Russia. As they now lose their main source for food and oil.
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  8. I would destroy the Russian military in Poland or western Ukraine where I might have a logistical superiority . And after wipeing it out I would move in on broad front into Russia like Germany did in World war 1 when it won the war there. I would also invest resources in roads and railroads. Balts and Ukrainians should not have been mistreated. The Russian military have larger numbers, but Germany can still win if it manages to encircle Russian troops and cut off their logistical supplies and thereby strangle one Russian army to death after another. German superiority in tactics and mobile warfare and its equipment with superior firepower could balance out Soviets superior numbers. And with defeat after defeat would morale in Russian society fall apart. And the economy would fall apart as well with higher inflation and food shortages. People might rise up like it did in 1917 and kick out their ruling regime and install a new one that would accept any peace terms no matter how horrible. When the Swedes invaded Russia in 1707-1709 it probable came close to destroying Russia in that regard. The Russian army had suffered one humiliating defeat after another: Narva, Rauge, Saladen, Jakobstadt, Gemäuerthof, Grodno, Fraustadt, Holowczyn, Malatitze, Rajovka, Veprik etc. So the morale of the Russian army was pretty low in 1709. So had the Russian army been defeated at the battle of Poltava in 1709 it could just have been another of those indecisive victories that Sweden won where Russia lost enormous amounts of men. But a defeat on that scale could also have been the last straw that did break the camels back. The Russian Tsar was unpopular. 9 years of war had led to higher taxes, church bells had been molten down to become iron cannons, manpower losses had been high. People were tired of the war and war exhaustion were high. And Tsar Peter was unpopular among the nobility before the war for his attempts to westernize the country and when he introduced the beard tax. Another crushing military defeat could have made the country rise up in revolution like it did in 1917. Many nobles could see their chance of grabbing power, and a Russian civil war could have been started. And another victory for the Swedes, could have encouraged more of Russias enemies to join the war against Russia. First of all would the Ukrainians who already were pro-Swedish join the Swedes to gain independence from Russia. And Poland which was a Swedish puppet state could see a chance to retake provinces that Russia had stolen from them back in the 1600s. The Ottoman empire had 20 years earlier been at war with Russia and would also be interested in retaking land and destroying one of its most dangerous arch-enemies. And Persia would also be interested in destroying its arch enemy Russia. Sweden did not play its diplomatic cards that well until very late in this war. So here it missed a great oppurtunity, which could have made the odds more even and forced Russia to accepting peace.
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