Comments by "Sasha S" (@sashas3362) on "VICE News"
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@Euphoniumstar Section 230 does NOT cover non-neutrality. It doesn't say a platform/host can be biased. Although it does allow for censorship guided by good samaritan principles that is not the same as overtly allowing for censorship purely due to bias. Yes, the good samaritan censorship does allow for bias to also guide censorship decisions and one's beliefs can lead one to erroneously believe opposing viewpoints pose a threat to public safety. But if you asked the authors of s230 if the intent of the good samaritan censorship clause was to allow for biased censorship I'm sure they would deny it and insist it was only intended to protect people from genuine harm. Or do you believe there was some conspiracy between the authors and facebook, twitter, youtube, reddit, etc to censor certain groups when s230 was written? If you ask me the good samaritan clause was written without any bias intended in it's deployment because it allows for anybody with any beliefs to take advantage of it. In other words, it arms all sides with an excuse to censor. But only if they can make a convincing argument that their decision to censor was genuinely guided by good samaritan principles meaning to prevent harm and promote the general welfare of the community. You keep arguing that s230 allows for censorship but it only allows for censorship when there are good samaritan reasons for it. Aside from that I keep explaining to you that the telco laws forbid censorship for any reason except for good samaritan reasons such as in cases of illegal content or other content which is deemed harmful. Are you going to keep ignoring that point? If so I will have to ignore you because I don't have time to waste. Alas, there is one point which we haven't discussed and that is the fact that the terms of service for facebook, google, youtube, etc allow for them to ban or censor anyone who violates their terms. You agree to being censored and banned when you agree to those terms and/or use their service. So there can be no punishment for their censorship or banning unless it can be proven that it was either somehow in violation of their own terms or illegal. With Trump's EO 13925 it was declared that facebook and twitter were the new townsquare and that these platforms must be unbiased in their censorship and banning the same way police must be unbiased in deciding when to remove people for expressing themselves in the town square. Has EO 13925 been repealed or somehow neutered by the courts? If not then it is still in effect, isn't it? The telco laws which require neutrality in delivery of the data hosted by telcos certainly still requires neutrality (at least last time I checked).
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@Euphoniumstar Not to change the subject but have you heard about the "fediverse"? It's a new technology which links many or all of the social media platforms so you can post or share something on one and it will appear on all the others. What is trending on one can trend on the others. You can post on one of the censorship resistant alternatives like Minds and it will appear on facebook, twitter, youtube, etc. And you can see what facebook users are posting/sharing/liking/etc too even if you aren't using those platforms (if I understand correctly). Facebook, twitter, and the others in the "bad bunch" can still censor content but the fediverse puts an end to the need to actually use the bad bunch platforms or agree to their terms of service to remain connected to them. In other words you can leave facebook and twitter etc without actually leaving them. You can still participate with the rest of the world which remains on FB, twitter, YT, etc. It's awesome. Puts an end to the problem of feeling like you have to use the bad bunch if you want to remain connected with friends, family, and much of the rest of the world. Before the fediverse leaving the bad bunch would have meant everybody becoming disconnected from each other (unless everybody were to migrate to the same alternative). Not anymore. Now everybody can choose the platform of their choice without losing contact with the rest of the world. Thought you might find that interesting.
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@Euphoniumstar You see/hear justice clarence thomas' opinion on whether social media platforms and other online platforms are "common carriers" (or "public accomodations"), issued yesterday? Very revealing and may spell the end of censorship by big tech in online platforms open to the public. Here are some excerpts:
"If part of the problem is private, concentrated control over online content and platforms available to the public, then part of the solution may be found in doctrines that limit the right of a private company to exclude. Historically, at least two legal doctrines limited a company’s right to exclude.
"First, our legal system and its British predecessor have long subjected certain businesses, known as common carriers, to special regulations, including a general requirement to serve all comers. Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 Yale J. L. & Tech. 391, 398–403 (2020) (Candeub) see also Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, Pt. 1, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 514 (1911).
"Justifications for these regulations have varied. Some scholars have argued that common-carrier regulations are justified only when a carrier possesses substantial market power. Candeub 404. Others have said that no substantial market power is needed so long as the company holds itself out as open to the public. Ibid.; see also Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. & K. 61, 63, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (N. P. 1850) (“[A] person [who] holds himself out to carry goods for everyone as a business . . . is a common carrier”).
"And this Court long ago suggested that regulations like those placed on common carriers may be justified, even for industries not historically recognized as common carriers, when “a business, by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s] from private to be of public concern.” See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affirming state regulation of fire insurance rates). At that point, a company’s “property is but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has become of public interest.” Id., at 408.
"This latter definition of course is hardly helpful, for most things can be described as “of public interest.” But whatever may be said of other industries, there is clear historical precedent for regulating transportation and communications networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers. Candeub 398–405. Telegraphs, for example, because they “resemble[d] railroad companies and other common carriers,” were “bound to serve all customers alike, without discrimination.” Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).
"In exchange for regulating transportation and communication industries, governments—both State and Federal—have sometimes given common carriers special government favors. Candeub 402–407. For example, governments have tied restrictions on a carrier’s ability to reject clients to “immunity from certain types of suits”3 or to regulations that make it more difficult for other companies to compete with the carrier (such as franchise licenses). Ibid. By giving these companies special privileges, governments place them into a category distinct from other companies and closer to some functions, like the postal service, that the State has traditionally undertaken.
"Second, governments have limited a company’s right to exclude when that company is a public accommodation. This concept—related to common-carrier law—applies to companies that hold themselves out to the public but do not “carry” freight, passengers, or communications. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 41–43 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing places of public amusement). It also applies regardless of the company’s market power. See, e.g., 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. §2000a(a).
"...The similarities between some digital platforms and common carriers or places of public accommodation may give legislators strong arguments for similarly regulating digital platforms."
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I believe you will find the full opinion here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/040521zor_3204.pdf
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