Comments by "Hyok Kim" (@hyokkim7726) on "Military History not Visualized"
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@jimmers123 Yes, data wise without context. However, in Savo, U.S. had not been properly briefed about the IJN task force approaching, and the command had been disorganized, caught napping.
In Tassofaringa, U.S. had been waiting for an ambush, with radars working this time, it was the Japanese who had been surprised in an ambush, yet, they rose to the occasion and prevailed. None other than U.S. naval operations chief was impressed that this was the finest example of the IJN leadership in the war.
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@manilajohn0182 ‘’ Their losses at Savo Island were far greater however, and although they didn't know the Japanese were inbound, they were careless.’’
The reason why I think Tasso was worse than Savo is that at Tasso, there was no Allied Command with confusion regarding the chain of command. Also, like you had said, the decision makers at the top were not available when they were sorely needed. Also, an important field intel recon info regarding the IJN task force was not handed down to them. Also, the radar didn’t detect the IJN task force due to their very clever hugging the complex coast line, even though if some Seabees had been placed there as coast watchers, they could have detected the IJN task force.
At Tasso, there was no Allied Command with the confusion of chain of command, not only they had had an advance intel, but also this time the radar worked, and detected them. Plus USN actually had a very good plan, if orthodox, and conventional. U.S.N also had learned the lesson at Savo byt then.
Given the advantages USN had at Tasso relative to Savo, this should have been a cakewalk. I understand the reason for the defeat at Savo, Tasso is just beguiling.
Of course, U.S.N. had made very elementary, but very critical tactical mistakes at night fighting. But this should have been foreseen, especially after Savo.
‘’ Hyok Kim Well, I agree with you in part. Tassafaronga should not have happened. On the other hand, Savo Island was inexcusable. Eight months after Pearl Harbor, the Americans (and Australians) were caught asleep at the switch- but now in wartime.’’
Ok, so I get your reasoning. So you must think MacArthur was the worst U.S. general, no/
‘’Furthermore, the cost in both men and ships was far more severe. Tassafaronga was just another naval defeat; had it not been for Mikawa's (understandable) caution however, Savo Island could have resulted in a disastrous early end to the United States' first counteroffensive.’’
You surely don’t think it would have changed the strategic outcome, do you/
It wouldn’t have mattered if it had put an end to the U.S. counter offensive then. It would have merely delayed the inevitable by at most a year.
Btw. If MacArthur had not screwed up at Clark, he would not have departed Philliphines, and instead of Midway, the decisive battle would have been fought at Philiphine far sooner, , that means no Savo, or Tasso, that much quicker route to the victory.
In fact, even if IJN had won Midway, in fact, even if IJN/IJA had conquered Hawaii, and raided San Diego, the canal, it would not have changed the strategic outcome. U.S.N. would have poured through both South America, and the Indian ocean, and IJN/IJA would have faced two front war, against U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. It would have delayed the inevitable, by at most 2 to 3 years.
Japan was doomed when she decided to attack the West, instead of the Soviet Union.
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@manilajohn0182 ‘’ Good post. If I understand it correctly, 'the' critical mistake at Tassafaronga was made by Rear Admiral Wright, who delayed issuing the order to open fire for something on the order of 4-5 minutes, which resulted in a poor torpedo attack angle on the Japanese.’’
To my understanding, I don’t consider it as a mistake. People tend to judge it based on Monday Morning Quarterbacking, based on the information not available at the time the decision was made. Wright could have easily wanted to make sure they didn’t fire too prematurely.
Here’s one example of too premature firing sealing the fate of a battle.
Qing Manchu Cavarly vs Joseon Korean line of Musketeers - YouTube
This really had happened during Qing invasion of Joeseon.
The mistake was too much redundant targeting of a single target without knowing the true strength and the disposition of the enemy in real time. Too much fire was concentrated on the lead destroyer. That had left the rest of IJN squadron an opportunity into counterattacking the U.S.N. cruisers unscathed.
Another reason for additional casualties, 2 extra USN cruisers were the suboptimal formation during the IJN counter attack. 1 USN cruiser veered toward the IJN destroyers while passing the already hit and burning cruisers, making it into a brightly illuminated target, and the other didn’t try to increase the speed or maneuver to avoid the incoming torpedoes, again making an easy target. 2 extra cruisers hit as a result. This could have been easily avoided with pre battle drill/plan, no brainer for night fighting.
‘’MacArthur was not the worst U.S. general in WW2 (Fredendall)- MacArthur was merely one of the worst. By far his greatest error was his persuading the War Department that if he was massively reinforced with aircraft and material, he could take men from a land with no organized military tradition, and turn them into a force capable of repelling the Japanese- in under a year.’’
‘’ On the other hand, Savo Island was inexcusable. Eight months after Pearl Harbor, the Americans (and Australians) were caught asleep at the switch- but now in wartime.’’
You said Savo was inexcusable due to it happening 8 months after Pearl Harbor, and the Allied command getting caught asleep, in war time.
MacArthur not only got caught asleep, 9 hours after Pearl Harbor, but even put a ‘Do Not Disturb’ sign on the door knob.
‘’.. , he could take men from a land with no organized military tradition, and turn them into a force capable of repelling the Japanese- in under a year.’’
Had the Founding Fathers had organized military traditions by the standard of the time when they faced against the Red Coats/
What about the Afghans against the Red Coats/
‘’The actual reason (imho) was that he didn't want to see himself placed in command of a force predestined to defeat- so he used his personal status to radically alter U.S. grand strategy in the Pacific theater for the worse, and at the expense of other areas- including Hawaii.’’
MacArthur departed Philiphines on 03/12/1942, the battle of Midway was on early June 1942, less than 3 months. Had MacArthur not got caught napping with ‘Do Not Disturb’ on the door knob, 9 hours after Pearl Harbor, he would not have had the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground, that meant U.S. would have had enough air assets to either repel the Japanese invasion force, or damage them enough to slow them down considerably, both during the landing, and after the landing, that would have meant U.S.N. could have sent reinforcement soon enough to counter attack the Japanese, using Philiphines as a gigantic Midway. This would have meant IJN could not have bypassed Philiphine to Guadal. The decisive battle would have been fought beyond the Dutch Indies, meaning no oil to IJN, and the Flying Tigers from China could have joined the fray as well.
‘’No, I don't believe that a theoretical destruction of U.S. transports at Savo would have changed either the outcome of the war.’’
‘’…. had it not been for Mikawa's (understandable) caution however, Savo Island could have resulted in a disastrous early end to the United States' first counteroffensive.’’
Ok, so nothing disastrous there strategically at Savo.
‘’The war still would have ended in late 1945 because of the American possession of the Atomic Bomb.’’
It wasn’t the bomb that made Japan surrender, despite the popular misconception. It was the Soviets invading Manchuria, and the poor performance of the Kwantung Army.
‘’It may however, have resulted in the abandonment of "Watchtower" (with another "Watchtower" being carried out some months later).’’
There would have been no ‘Watchtower’, had U..S succeeded in keeping Philippine, and U.S. would have, had MacArthur not got caught napping, 9 hours after Pearl.
‘’Logistical considerations alone precluded the Japanese from ever taking the Hawaiian Islands.’’
Why couldn’t IJA have landed troops in Hawaii/
Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor – UH Press
‘’Raids on the U.S. west coast are fantasy because of the same reason.’’
With Hawaii, as the new base of operation, why couldn’t IJN raid San Diego/
Btw. Bombing a battleship from air was considered fantasy as well, by no less than U.S.N. just a few decades before Pearl Harbor.
Billy Mitchell - Wikipedia
‘’That the Imperial Army was bogged down in both China and Manchukuo,….’’
Easy, IJA could have withdrawn a few divisions from China, and Manchuria with no strain.
‘’… and that the Imperial Navy was already beginning to experience a shortage of pilots and aircrew by May of 1942 were just additional nails in the coffin on that matter.’’
With the conquest of Hawaii, IJN/IJA could have simply starved out the Allied in the South Pacific. That would have left enough IJN assets to raid San Diego, and the canal.
Still, even with that accomplished, U.S. still would have won the war, eventually, only additional 2 or 3 years.
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I think the panzers should have been designed in modular, scalable fashion from the get go, than ad hoc fashion as it happened later. Interleaved track version should have been built during peace time for the coming war, for well trained panzer crews, but once war phase happened, the interleaved track should have been abandoned for non-interleaved version, and wider track adopted as well. In fact, the Germans should have concentrated on TDs with open turrets, 88s, with thinner armors, to be attached to panzers units, and TDs with open case mate, 88Ls to be attached to panzer grenadiers, but using the same suspension, engines, to take maximum advantage of economy of scale rather than panthers and tigers, more Panzer III or IVs and far more TDs, and squad portable assault mortars, but no Panthers, no Tigers, no sturmtigers. With III or IVs leading the way, to be backed up by TDs with open turrets, and further behind TDs with open case mates, and even further behind assault mortars.
This would have maximized both movement and fire power, but also economy of scale, reliability, durability, lower/easier maintenance. IIIs and IVs providing direct fire power against infantry, light fortifications, and enemy artillery, TDs with open turrets providing fire power against enemy tanks, TDs with open case mates, providing even further reserve fire power against enemy tanks, and assault mortars providing flexible fire power against both enemy infantry supporting the enemy tanks, and against the dense concentration enemy tanks themselves, at a relatively safe distance.
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0219 Great point, one of the biggest flaws in the Japanese grand strategy, but it wasn’t the only one, but there were bigger flaws, that is, regarding the differences regarding China for differing Japanese factions.
However, how would have conquering China have solved the Japanese oil, rubber problem/
Hadn’t Japan had already enough iron ores and coal in Manchuria and Korea/
0252 On Marco Polo, there is more than meets the eyes. Not just ‘two’ sides, but there were 2 more, one CCP, and the Soviets. CCP instigated Marco Polo on the instruction from the Soviets.
Mao The Unknown Story does a marvelous job on this, and many others. It really opened my eyes, and my disdain for Oxies and Cambies deepend.
Yes, KMT and many in IJA wanted to limit the fighting, but some ‘tactical’ crowd in IJA and CCP, and their moles within KMT, plus the Soviet, the puppet master of CCP back then wanted the fighting to spread.
0500 Thanks for the info on the lack of shipping. I wasn’t aware of that info contributing to the resource problem for Japan.
0600 Outstanding points, the root cause. Sadly, this point has been long ignored by U.S. Military. Some/many in U.S. military, and their civilian allies want less civilian oversight, using Vietnam as the ‘proof’.
0750 Excellent point, basically IJN was engaging in ‘Keeping up with Joneses’ mentality, rather than objective assessment of Optimal Japanese Interest. IJN was for IJN’s optimal interest, not Japan. Actually, despite stereotype, IJA was more attuned to optimal Japanese interest, as a group other than some of the ‘tactical crowd’ stationed at China, and Toshei faction as a group.
Also, the civilians did make a grand strategic mistake in the Siberian intervention. They should have supported IJA fully, and annexed the Soviet Far East, and form a buffer state in the region, no brainer, the Soviet was the true existential threat to Japan. This ended up hurting their credibility later on in the 30s.
0820 Great points overall, but some of these were justified. Good risk/reward.
1038 I think you’re relying on sources engaging in hyperliteralism. Yes, many with IJN did say it, but did they really believe it or were they engaging in PR façade based on groupthink as pointed out by USN in later analysis/
People say things in public to present false façade for PR purpose while hiding their real agenda.
IJN decided that the optimal policy for IJN to claim the national resources was to go to war, primarily using its own assets to justify its existence, but they could not say that, could they/
War brings out opportunities for younger, lower level officers to show their mettle/usefulness, and the opportunity to rise, absent in peace. They have a tendency to rationalize the decision to go to war, but while hiding behind the façade of flag waving/patriotism/existential threat.
U.S. is no different in that regard. I’ve seen and heard the same sentiment before.
1140 Another excellent point, but the civilians had lost credibility by abandoning the Siberian expedition too prematurely, especially when it was really going well, and for the ‘wrong’ reasons, such as too much sensitivity to the foreign, hypocritical, pseudo democratic ideals.
1314 All great points, but let me add another one. ‘’When going gets tough, the tough get going.’’ You had already said about why Austrians went for Waldheim, the same for the Japanese, and the same for U.S.
1340 I disagree on this one. I think you’re being hyper literal and confusing the excuse/façade/rationalization people use with the real underlying reasons.
Japan had another alternative for self-sufficiency. The Soviet Union. By destroying the Soviet Union, she would have solved resource problems, and eliminate the only existential threat in one go, with no need for a powerful blue water navy, no need to go to offensive war against U.S., China, and the rest of the Euro Colonials, plus a powerful ally, Germany, with enough space for a buffer state or two between.
This was done in order to justify/rationalize the existence of a powerful blue water navy, for IJN’s benefit, of course. It wasn’t just between IJA and IJN, but also within IJA, the Toshei faction, and Kodosha faction. Toshei allied with IJN in order to retain the control of IJA from Kodosha, kinda similar to what USN did with USMC against U.S. Army, and to a lesser extent USAF.
1507 Sorry on this one, your source is dead wrong. Hakagure was written by a clerk with no battle experience, not even the second, third hand knowledge of war, engaging in false nostalgia. The real samurais during Sengaku era were extremely calculating to a fault, One famous samurai had changed his masters 7 times. Why I disdain Oxies and Cambies, The full blown sophistries. Of course, both IJA and IJN were extremely calculating, irrational maybe, but calculating nevertherless. Kinda similar to some Americans engaging in false nostalgia regarding the Wild, Old West, and the cowboys.
I’d say Karl May had done better job than Kakagure.
Hagakure - Wikipedia
Karl May - Wikipedia
Akechi Mitsuhide - Wikipedia
As for IJA’s tendency for escalation, in U.S. they call it doubling down. U.S. Military is no better, but only kept under control because of the civilian oversight, sans that, U.S. Military would be no better than IJA.
Why Macarthur got sacked, and rightly so.
Douglas MacArthur - Wikipedia
1600 You’re relying on the source engaging in hyperliteralism, resulting in false conclusion. Nagano was trying to rationalize the existence of the powerful, blue water navy, hiding behind the façade of national survival.
1818 Another reason why I disdain Oxie and Cambie. Those are merely excuses/rationalization/façade, not the real reasons. Tojo didn’t want to lose the control of IJA to Kodosha. That was the real reason. Like I has said before, parochial, not national.
1849 So Tojo WAS calculating. Doesn’t’ this contradict what you had said earlier/
2020 Another Cambie. Even if Japan had won the victory against U.S. China, and the Euro Colonials, she still would have to contend with the Soviets, who WAS the real existential threat. Your Cambie source is implying the Japan had not noticed it. Really/
2040 Sugiyama was engaging in PR, not objective analysis. How could he have not failed to notice the looming Soviet threat/
2130 The Tsushima analogy does not apply. Japan had the logistical advantage over the Baltic fleet, a long way from home, the crew tired. IJN at home base with no logistical difficulties, plus the tacit support of the ‘West’ against Russia. And they knew exactly where the Baltic fleet had to pass through, nice bottleneck for ambush from home team.
2146 I disagree. That was the rationale ‘the tactical crowd’ and Toshei faction sold to retain the control of IJA from Kodosha, with the intrigue of CCP and the Soviets on their behalf.
It’s a little more complicated than the conclusion of the video. While I do strongly agree that the lack of the civilian oversight was the main root cause. There were more.
The lack of oversight still had existed during the Siberian expedition. So how do you explain IJA giving up on expedition due to the civilian oppositioin/
It was due to the civilians losing the credibility in front of the public when IJA was actually right in grand strategy. That loss of credibility emboldened the military stronger than it should have, and weakened the civilian authority weaker than it should have.
Japan was not a dictatorship, or even an oligarchy, despite the popular stereotypes. Japan was a combination of military anarchy, plutocratic oligarchy, and limited pseudo democracy.
The military did not have the blanket power. As had been noted, they were not a unifying block, but a loose alliance of differing factions, fighting for public approval, and trying to justify each branch’s existence.
That Japan had to go to war to accomplish the economic autarky is not in dispute, but the reason why Japan went to war against U.S. has little to do with it. She chose to go to war against U.S. for parochial interest of IJN, and Toshei faction in the IJA.
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@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized 0400 Ichigo was a plus, a force multiplier in CCP’s victory in the civil war, but it was not the reason for their victory. It made their victory faster, but was not the reason. PLA had already engaged in moving in to the area vacated by KMT, and it was tolerated by IJA with the tacit understanding that CCP would not engage in sabotaging IJA against KMT. Local field PLA commanders not only did not object to this, but whole heartedly supported it against the wishes of CCP as a group. About the only CCP leader who whole heartedly supported this strategy was Mao, and the reason for him gaining the control of PLA.
The reason for the victory of CCP was in Manchurian campaign. Manchuria was the most industrialized part of China thanks to the Japanese occupation, industrial policy and the abundant coal, iron ore deposits there.
Plus the extensive railroad network and the armored train system built by the Japanese were a plus as well as Manchuria was the most ideal horse breeding ground in China, other than inner Mongolia, but inner Mongolia had neither major road or railway network to bring those horses into the heartland of China proper.
During the civil war, the best strategic mobility was provided by the railroad, and mobile firepower, the armored trains. The best tactical mobility, the horses. China had very poor road system, trucks were pretty much worthless when it came to strategic mobility, tanks few, and very poor infrastructures, air force, pretty much non-existent.
Another reason was IJA POWs, and IJA weapons, released by the Soviets to PLA in Manchuria, who provided both trained men power, and the training in light infantry tactics, even provided air cover for PLA in Manchuria against KMT, and it was for this reason, PLA ended up winning in Manchuria.
Initially, neither PLA nor KMT had home ground advantage in Manchuria, PLA were poorly armed, and trained, whereas KMT had been battle hardened against IJA and trained, equipped by U.S., and defeated PLA in no time. But then came several months of misguided truce brokered by U.S. Army and PLA used this to get IJA weapons, and to be trained by IJA POWs released by the Soviets for this very purpose.
IJA was big on light infantry doctrine, whereas U.S. Army was big on combined arms, but neither PLA nor KMT had the capacity to use combined arms, only light infantry. So PLA ended up gaining the advantage, and defeated KMT in Manchuria.
Once PLA gained the control of Manchuria, she could use the extensive railroad and armored trains to defend Manchuria easily from KMT. PLA would have had far superior strategic mobility, and mobile firepower against KMT’s attempt to take it back. Since Manchuria had abundant coal, iron ore, and horses, and the trained railroad personnel from IJA, PLA now could move into the heartland of China proper with impunity and attack cities when and where, and how PLA chose against KMT.
You can read all about if from ‘Mao, the Unknown Story’.
Btw. U.S. military advisers advised KMT against moving into Manchuria per Brig. Gen. USMC Ph.D. Oxford, Samuel B. Griffith. This was nothing more than self serving BS to avoid their responsibility in the victory of PLA. KMT could not afford to lose Manchuria for the reasons I had stated. It was the US. Military’s brokered truce that had given the opportunity for PLA’s victory against KMT in Manchuria.
Overall, I am not impressed with these prestige publications.
0632 Precisely. The Soviet was the real, existential threat to Japan, and that’s why Kodosha had advocated attacking the Soviet Union.
Even if Japan somehow managed to win a victory against the West, she would still have had the Soviets, and this time with no West to come to the aid of Japan, whereas if the Soviets had attacked Japan, and she started losing, then almost certainly the West would have come to the aid of Japan for their own sake. Another word, the West was a competitor, and potential ally, certainly not her enemy by choice. The Soviet was.
1235 Exactly, The railroad = Strategic Mobility, Mobile Fire Power = Armored Trains, extension/repair of railroad = iron ore, fuel = coal, Tactical Mobility = horses, coal, armored trains, iron ore, horses = Manchuria
1540 Opportunity for black market profit for corrupt IJA officers for selling the army rations, forcing the rank and file to loot and rob
2035 Exactly. I agree with Justin on this one. But so claimed Samuel B. Griffith. Another reason to be suspicious of official archives from non free government. And to be suspicious of people hiding behind prestige publications, and credentials.
2629 Let me qualify on this one, a bit. CCP controlled Manchuria, railroad network from there into China proper, coal mines with no bottlenecks, iron ore no bottlenecks, trained infrastructure people, armored trains, horses, IJA weapon deposits, IJA training for PLA troops. If one controlled Manchuria, with no hinderance, it was just a matter of time.
Mao was not a communist. He was a narcissist, hedonist, anarchist, an opportunist, and he knew it. He pretty much admitted it in private.
2800 On translation problem, solved. ‘Mao The Unknown Story’ had done the work. He even interviewed the surviving witnesses for the first hand account, not just relying on archives. British Journalism at their finest, but neither Cambie nor Oxie.
Btw. My criticism was on the publisher, not necessarily the author’s educational background.
3000 Again, Justin got it right. I blame Marshall mission for KMT defeat in the civil war more than anything else. ‘Mao The Unknown Story’ makes this absolutely clear.
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