Comments by "Hyok Kim" (@hyokkim7726) on "Why was the US Navy mauled at Savo Island?" video.
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@jimmers123 Yes, data wise without context. However, in Savo, U.S. had not been properly briefed about the IJN task force approaching, and the command had been disorganized, caught napping.
In Tassofaringa, U.S. had been waiting for an ambush, with radars working this time, it was the Japanese who had been surprised in an ambush, yet, they rose to the occasion and prevailed. None other than U.S. naval operations chief was impressed that this was the finest example of the IJN leadership in the war.
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@manilajohn0182 ‘’ Their losses at Savo Island were far greater however, and although they didn't know the Japanese were inbound, they were careless.’’
The reason why I think Tasso was worse than Savo is that at Tasso, there was no Allied Command with confusion regarding the chain of command. Also, like you had said, the decision makers at the top were not available when they were sorely needed. Also, an important field intel recon info regarding the IJN task force was not handed down to them. Also, the radar didn’t detect the IJN task force due to their very clever hugging the complex coast line, even though if some Seabees had been placed there as coast watchers, they could have detected the IJN task force.
At Tasso, there was no Allied Command with the confusion of chain of command, not only they had had an advance intel, but also this time the radar worked, and detected them. Plus USN actually had a very good plan, if orthodox, and conventional. U.S.N also had learned the lesson at Savo byt then.
Given the advantages USN had at Tasso relative to Savo, this should have been a cakewalk. I understand the reason for the defeat at Savo, Tasso is just beguiling.
Of course, U.S.N. had made very elementary, but very critical tactical mistakes at night fighting. But this should have been foreseen, especially after Savo.
‘’ Hyok Kim Well, I agree with you in part. Tassafaronga should not have happened. On the other hand, Savo Island was inexcusable. Eight months after Pearl Harbor, the Americans (and Australians) were caught asleep at the switch- but now in wartime.’’
Ok, so I get your reasoning. So you must think MacArthur was the worst U.S. general, no/
‘’Furthermore, the cost in both men and ships was far more severe. Tassafaronga was just another naval defeat; had it not been for Mikawa's (understandable) caution however, Savo Island could have resulted in a disastrous early end to the United States' first counteroffensive.’’
You surely don’t think it would have changed the strategic outcome, do you/
It wouldn’t have mattered if it had put an end to the U.S. counter offensive then. It would have merely delayed the inevitable by at most a year.
Btw. If MacArthur had not screwed up at Clark, he would not have departed Philliphines, and instead of Midway, the decisive battle would have been fought at Philiphine far sooner, , that means no Savo, or Tasso, that much quicker route to the victory.
In fact, even if IJN had won Midway, in fact, even if IJN/IJA had conquered Hawaii, and raided San Diego, the canal, it would not have changed the strategic outcome. U.S.N. would have poured through both South America, and the Indian ocean, and IJN/IJA would have faced two front war, against U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. It would have delayed the inevitable, by at most 2 to 3 years.
Japan was doomed when she decided to attack the West, instead of the Soviet Union.
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@manilajohn0182 ‘’ Good post. If I understand it correctly, 'the' critical mistake at Tassafaronga was made by Rear Admiral Wright, who delayed issuing the order to open fire for something on the order of 4-5 minutes, which resulted in a poor torpedo attack angle on the Japanese.’’
To my understanding, I don’t consider it as a mistake. People tend to judge it based on Monday Morning Quarterbacking, based on the information not available at the time the decision was made. Wright could have easily wanted to make sure they didn’t fire too prematurely.
Here’s one example of too premature firing sealing the fate of a battle.
Qing Manchu Cavarly vs Joseon Korean line of Musketeers - YouTube
This really had happened during Qing invasion of Joeseon.
The mistake was too much redundant targeting of a single target without knowing the true strength and the disposition of the enemy in real time. Too much fire was concentrated on the lead destroyer. That had left the rest of IJN squadron an opportunity into counterattacking the U.S.N. cruisers unscathed.
Another reason for additional casualties, 2 extra USN cruisers were the suboptimal formation during the IJN counter attack. 1 USN cruiser veered toward the IJN destroyers while passing the already hit and burning cruisers, making it into a brightly illuminated target, and the other didn’t try to increase the speed or maneuver to avoid the incoming torpedoes, again making an easy target. 2 extra cruisers hit as a result. This could have been easily avoided with pre battle drill/plan, no brainer for night fighting.
‘’MacArthur was not the worst U.S. general in WW2 (Fredendall)- MacArthur was merely one of the worst. By far his greatest error was his persuading the War Department that if he was massively reinforced with aircraft and material, he could take men from a land with no organized military tradition, and turn them into a force capable of repelling the Japanese- in under a year.’’
‘’ On the other hand, Savo Island was inexcusable. Eight months after Pearl Harbor, the Americans (and Australians) were caught asleep at the switch- but now in wartime.’’
You said Savo was inexcusable due to it happening 8 months after Pearl Harbor, and the Allied command getting caught asleep, in war time.
MacArthur not only got caught asleep, 9 hours after Pearl Harbor, but even put a ‘Do Not Disturb’ sign on the door knob.
‘’.. , he could take men from a land with no organized military tradition, and turn them into a force capable of repelling the Japanese- in under a year.’’
Had the Founding Fathers had organized military traditions by the standard of the time when they faced against the Red Coats/
What about the Afghans against the Red Coats/
‘’The actual reason (imho) was that he didn't want to see himself placed in command of a force predestined to defeat- so he used his personal status to radically alter U.S. grand strategy in the Pacific theater for the worse, and at the expense of other areas- including Hawaii.’’
MacArthur departed Philiphines on 03/12/1942, the battle of Midway was on early June 1942, less than 3 months. Had MacArthur not got caught napping with ‘Do Not Disturb’ on the door knob, 9 hours after Pearl Harbor, he would not have had the Far East Air Force destroyed on the ground, that meant U.S. would have had enough air assets to either repel the Japanese invasion force, or damage them enough to slow them down considerably, both during the landing, and after the landing, that would have meant U.S.N. could have sent reinforcement soon enough to counter attack the Japanese, using Philiphines as a gigantic Midway. This would have meant IJN could not have bypassed Philiphine to Guadal. The decisive battle would have been fought beyond the Dutch Indies, meaning no oil to IJN, and the Flying Tigers from China could have joined the fray as well.
‘’No, I don't believe that a theoretical destruction of U.S. transports at Savo would have changed either the outcome of the war.’’
‘’…. had it not been for Mikawa's (understandable) caution however, Savo Island could have resulted in a disastrous early end to the United States' first counteroffensive.’’
Ok, so nothing disastrous there strategically at Savo.
‘’The war still would have ended in late 1945 because of the American possession of the Atomic Bomb.’’
It wasn’t the bomb that made Japan surrender, despite the popular misconception. It was the Soviets invading Manchuria, and the poor performance of the Kwantung Army.
‘’It may however, have resulted in the abandonment of "Watchtower" (with another "Watchtower" being carried out some months later).’’
There would have been no ‘Watchtower’, had U..S succeeded in keeping Philippine, and U.S. would have, had MacArthur not got caught napping, 9 hours after Pearl.
‘’Logistical considerations alone precluded the Japanese from ever taking the Hawaiian Islands.’’
Why couldn’t IJA have landed troops in Hawaii/
Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor – UH Press
‘’Raids on the U.S. west coast are fantasy because of the same reason.’’
With Hawaii, as the new base of operation, why couldn’t IJN raid San Diego/
Btw. Bombing a battleship from air was considered fantasy as well, by no less than U.S.N. just a few decades before Pearl Harbor.
Billy Mitchell - Wikipedia
‘’That the Imperial Army was bogged down in both China and Manchukuo,….’’
Easy, IJA could have withdrawn a few divisions from China, and Manchuria with no strain.
‘’… and that the Imperial Navy was already beginning to experience a shortage of pilots and aircrew by May of 1942 were just additional nails in the coffin on that matter.’’
With the conquest of Hawaii, IJN/IJA could have simply starved out the Allied in the South Pacific. That would have left enough IJN assets to raid San Diego, and the canal.
Still, even with that accomplished, U.S. still would have won the war, eventually, only additional 2 or 3 years.
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