Comments by "Hyok Kim" (@hyokkim7726) on "Why did Japan attack the United States" video.

0219 Great point, one of the biggest flaws in the Japanese grand strategy, but it wasn’t the only one, but there were bigger flaws, that is, regarding the differences regarding China for differing Japanese factions. However, how would have conquering China have solved the Japanese oil, rubber problem/ Hadn’t Japan had already enough iron ores and coal in Manchuria and Korea/ 0252 On Marco Polo, there is more than meets the eyes. Not just ‘two’ sides, but there were 2 more, one CCP, and the Soviets. CCP instigated Marco Polo on the instruction from the Soviets. Mao The Unknown Story does a marvelous job on this, and many others. It really opened my eyes, and my disdain for Oxies and Cambies deepend. Yes, KMT and many in IJA wanted to limit the fighting, but some ‘tactical’ crowd in IJA and CCP, and their moles within KMT, plus the Soviet, the puppet master of CCP back then wanted the fighting to spread. 0500 Thanks for the info on the lack of shipping. I wasn’t aware of that info contributing to the resource problem for Japan. 0600 Outstanding points, the root cause. Sadly, this point has been long ignored by U.S. Military. Some/many in U.S. military, and their civilian allies want less civilian oversight, using Vietnam as the ‘proof’. 0750 Excellent point, basically IJN was engaging in ‘Keeping up with Joneses’ mentality, rather than objective assessment of Optimal Japanese Interest. IJN was for IJN’s optimal interest, not Japan. Actually, despite stereotype, IJA was more attuned to optimal Japanese interest, as a group other than some of the ‘tactical crowd’ stationed at China, and Toshei faction as a group. Also, the civilians did make a grand strategic mistake in the Siberian intervention. They should have supported IJA fully, and annexed the Soviet Far East, and form a buffer state in the region, no brainer, the Soviet was the true existential threat to Japan. This ended up hurting their credibility later on in the 30s. 0820 Great points overall, but some of these were justified. Good risk/reward. 1038 I think you’re relying on sources engaging in hyperliteralism. Yes, many with IJN did say it, but did they really believe it or were they engaging in PR façade based on groupthink as pointed out by USN in later analysis/ People say things in public to present false façade for PR purpose while hiding their real agenda. IJN decided that the optimal policy for IJN to claim the national resources was to go to war, primarily using its own assets to justify its existence, but they could not say that, could they/ War brings out opportunities for younger, lower level officers to show their mettle/usefulness, and the opportunity to rise, absent in peace. They have a tendency to rationalize the decision to go to war, but while hiding behind the façade of flag waving/patriotism/existential threat. U.S. is no different in that regard. I’ve seen and heard the same sentiment before. 1140 Another excellent point, but the civilians had lost credibility by abandoning the Siberian expedition too prematurely, especially when it was really going well, and for the ‘wrong’ reasons, such as too much sensitivity to the foreign, hypocritical, pseudo democratic ideals. 1314 All great points, but let me add another one. ‘’When going gets tough, the tough get going.’’ You had already said about why Austrians went for Waldheim, the same for the Japanese, and the same for U.S. 1340 I disagree on this one. I think you’re being hyper literal and confusing the excuse/façade/rationalization people use with the real underlying reasons. Japan had another alternative for self-sufficiency. The Soviet Union. By destroying the Soviet Union, she would have solved resource problems, and eliminate the only existential threat in one go, with no need for a powerful blue water navy, no need to go to offensive war against U.S., China, and the rest of the Euro Colonials, plus a powerful ally, Germany, with enough space for a buffer state or two between. This was done in order to justify/rationalize the existence of a powerful blue water navy, for IJN’s benefit, of course. It wasn’t just between IJA and IJN, but also within IJA, the Toshei faction, and Kodosha faction. Toshei allied with IJN in order to retain the control of IJA from Kodosha, kinda similar to what USN did with USMC against U.S. Army, and to a lesser extent USAF. 1507 Sorry on this one, your source is dead wrong. Hakagure was written by a clerk with no battle experience, not even the second, third hand knowledge of war, engaging in false nostalgia. The real samurais during Sengaku era were extremely calculating to a fault, One famous samurai had changed his masters 7 times. Why I disdain Oxies and Cambies, The full blown sophistries. Of course, both IJA and IJN were extremely calculating, irrational maybe, but calculating nevertherless. Kinda similar to some Americans engaging in false nostalgia regarding the Wild, Old West, and the cowboys. I’d say Karl May had done better job than Kakagure. Hagakure - Wikipedia Karl May - Wikipedia Akechi Mitsuhide - Wikipedia As for IJA’s tendency for escalation, in U.S. they call it doubling down. U.S. Military is no better, but only kept under control because of the civilian oversight, sans that, U.S. Military would be no better than IJA. Why Macarthur got sacked, and rightly so. Douglas MacArthur - Wikipedia 1600 You’re relying on the source engaging in hyperliteralism, resulting in false conclusion. Nagano was trying to rationalize the existence of the powerful, blue water navy, hiding behind the façade of national survival. 1818 Another reason why I disdain Oxie and Cambie. Those are merely excuses/rationalization/façade, not the real reasons. Tojo didn’t want to lose the control of IJA to Kodosha. That was the real reason. Like I has said before, parochial, not national. 1849 So Tojo WAS calculating. Doesn’t’ this contradict what you had said earlier/ 2020 Another Cambie. Even if Japan had won the victory against U.S. China, and the Euro Colonials, she still would have to contend with the Soviets, who WAS the real existential threat. Your Cambie source is implying the Japan had not noticed it. Really/ 2040 Sugiyama was engaging in PR, not objective analysis. How could he have not failed to notice the looming Soviet threat/ 2130 The Tsushima analogy does not apply. Japan had the logistical advantage over the Baltic fleet, a long way from home, the crew tired. IJN at home base with no logistical difficulties, plus the tacit support of the ‘West’ against Russia. And they knew exactly where the Baltic fleet had to pass through, nice bottleneck for ambush from home team. 2146 I disagree. That was the rationale ‘the tactical crowd’ and Toshei faction sold to retain the control of IJA from Kodosha, with the intrigue of CCP and the Soviets on their behalf. It’s a little more complicated than the conclusion of the video. While I do strongly agree that the lack of the civilian oversight was the main root cause. There were more. The lack of oversight still had existed during the Siberian expedition. So how do you explain IJA giving up on expedition due to the civilian oppositioin/ It was due to the civilians losing the credibility in front of the public when IJA was actually right in grand strategy. That loss of credibility emboldened the military stronger than it should have, and weakened the civilian authority weaker than it should have. Japan was not a dictatorship, or even an oligarchy, despite the popular stereotypes. Japan was a combination of military anarchy, plutocratic oligarchy, and limited pseudo democracy. The military did not have the blanket power. As had been noted, they were not a unifying block, but a loose alliance of differing factions, fighting for public approval, and trying to justify each branch’s existence. That Japan had to go to war to accomplish the economic autarky is not in dispute, but the reason why Japan went to war against U.S. has little to do with it. She chose to go to war against U.S. for parochial interest of IJN, and Toshei faction in the IJA.
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‘’’ They simply believed that Germany would prove to be completely victorious over the Soviet Union - something both they and virtually everyone else had been given ample evidence to so believe prior to the Dec. 1941 Soviet counter-offensives.’’ If Japan had believed that Germany would prove to be completely victorious over the Soviet Union, then how do you explain Japan letting the U.S. ship supplies to the Soviet Union through the area Japan had controlled/ Pacific Route - Wikipedia ‘’ Simply standing aside and waiting for the "inevitable" German victory in 1942 carried risks of its own for Japan- the peace proposals to Britain in July 1940 had specifically avoided any transfer of British Empire territory and Hitler had made no effort to strip a conquered France of any colonies. If Japan was going to take advantage of this once in a lifetime opportunity for self-sufficiency it must move now.’’ Japan could have seized the colonies after the German victory. Do you really think Hitler would have risked going to war against Japan on behalf of defeated Britain and France/ Why would/should he/
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@timonsolus Japan simply could have seized the Soviet Far East.
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@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized ‘’ Although the IJN and IJA usually had different views.’’ They had different false rationale on behalf of their narrow perceived optimal interest, IJN especially. Even within IJA, as you already know, Toshei and Kodosh factions. Kodosha was more ideologically pure. Toshei more opportunistic, and ‘calculating’. Btw. IJN had been trained on British model, IJA, Prussian. So much for British strategic wisdom.
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