Comments by "" (@neutronalchemist3241) on "Drachinifel"
channel.
-
26
-
25
-
19
-
19
-
16
-
11
-
10
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
@bkjeong4302 The source of the inconsistency of the shell as an explanation for the inexistent excessive dispersion is Iachino too.
On the dispersion of the 381/50 in battle at Gaudo (that's the example always taken of an excessive dispersion of those guns), we have both the direct testimony of the 1st Fire Director of the Vittorio Veneto, Capt. Luciano Sotgiu that, in his relation, in contrast with Adm. Iachino, did not see any out of the ordinary in his guns' salvos, and the pictures taken by the British of the salvos aimed at the HMS Gloucester that, knowing the dimension of the ship, and the range (from 23 to 26 km) clearly show a longitudinal dispersion of about 2% of the distance, that was pretty good considerig that the Vittorio Veneto was steaming at 28 knots.
The Vittorio Veneto did not hit anything at Gaudo because, firing from 23.000 to 26.000m on a pair of light cruisers entering and leaving the smokescreens, it could have hit them only for a lucky chance. It had been already amply demonstrated that, even at far closer distances and with much more rapidly firing guns, it was practically impossible to hit a ship that was only manuvering to not being hit, if not firing some thousands of shells.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
1. Doctrine. The Italians wanted a major engagement, so didn't want to divide their fleet in smaller sections to defend the Adriatic coastal cities, even more so because the Austrian actions didn't make substantial damages. The Austrians instead formed raid parties for rapid actions against them, that's why they were usually in numerical superiority in those early actions.
2. Amnesia of the author. Some situation not so favourable to the Austrians had been omitted. IE:
a) contemporary to the initial Austrian raid on the Adriatic coast of Maj. 24 1915, the Italian destroyer Zeffiro penetrated in "Porto Buso", destroyed the ships present, bombarded the installations and captured the Austrian garrison (11 dead, 48 captured). It probably made more damages alone than the entire Austrian expedition.
b) In the morning of Dec. 29 1915 the Austrian light cruiser Helgoland and four destroyers attempted to force the port of Durazzo. Welcomed by a new coastal battery they didn't know the existence of, attempting to manuver to avoid the fire, they ended on a minefield. The destroyer Lika, struk by two mines that caused the explosion of the magazines, sunk immediately with the loss of 71 men. The destroyer Triglav, struk by a mine and crippled, was abandoned by the crew and later sunk.
c) In 1916 The Regia Marina finally commissioned the kind of ship more fit to operate in the Croatian coast, the MAS. In june 1916 begun the operations of the MAS boats against the Austrian ports, with the sinking of several transport ships.
etc...
4
-
4
-
4
-
@aker1993 They were considered to be very effective. Despite not being a Nazi, or even a Fascist, Calosi was awarded the Order of the German Eagle, and the German GK3 pistol copied his own. After the Italian Armistice Calosi was hiding, to not be deported in Germany, and he was considered so important that the Allies devised the "Operation McGregor" (later recalled in the book and movie "cloack and Dagger") to exctract him form the German occupied part of Italy.
The operation was successful and Calosi, on his own request, was employed in the Newport torpedo Station, to develop a countermeasure to his own pistol. As recalled in Stanley P. Lowell book "Of Spies & Stratagems" Calosi gave spectacualr demonstrations, in live tests, of the effectiveness of his countermeasure in making the torpedoes explode off-target, but I don't know how much it had been employed by the US during the war since, a that point, we were pretty late in it.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@danielefabbro822 I already stated that the accuracy of the 381/50 was not worse than the main calibers of other powers, and that they barely hit anything (they did only in the second battle of the Sirte) because they had been used, or at extreme ranges, or on targets that were only manuvering to not be hit (in this case, it had been amply demonstrated that, even at far closer distances, and with much rapidly firing guns, you can hit something only spending thousands of shells).
But there is a reason why about 25.000m is the longest battleship hit ever recorded in action. Beyond that distance the salvo, not only the Italian, but of all the WWII battleship guns, were too disperse to have real chances.
Mind that, IE, in the battle of Denmark Strait, all the battleship hits happened between 18.500 and 15.000m distance.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@Kreatorisbackyt Not even close to be "the gun most unaccurate gun of WW2".
Also "wear and tear" was not a problem. All the Italian naval guns, from 152mm on, were made for cold barrel swap (the rfling was changed without dismounting the gun from the cradle). So their barrel life was 1/2 of the others (due to the higher speed of the shell, not "poor linings"), but the time needed to change the barrel was 1/30.
It only needed a pair of days of work in port without any special facility to change the barrels of all the main guns of a ship while, for who didn't design his guns that way, it needed to remove the roof of the turret, remove the guns from the cradle, file the barrels in a gigantic lathe, put the guns in a specially built vertical furnace, insert the new internal barrel, etc...
2
-
2
-
@Kreatorisbackyt Facts are more important than anyone's opinions, or pretended reason why something should happen, if it didn't happen in reality.
In the battle of Denmark Strait, the supposedly super-accurate POW guns, scored a grand total of two hits in 21 salvos, fired from 20.000m to 12.900m range, on a battleship that was not manuvering to not be hit, that's pretty crappy (Hood didn't score a hit in 10 salvos from 24.300 to 14.000m range). And yes, it had problems with the output (all the KGV had, still in 1943). In the first 18 salvos it fired 55 shells out of 74 ordered. But it fired a significative number of shells anyway.
Bismarck against POW obtained 4 hits in 5 salvos from 14.000m to 15.000m range, out of about 36 shells fired, that's more or less what you should expect at that distance.
Italian 15 inch gun shown a1.7% range single turret spread in real actions fought in 1940 (and that's what the pictures taken during the clash at Gaudo shown), that any navy at the time would have considered average. We have pictures of larger (about 2.1% of the distance) single turret spread from the Gloucester and Liverpool at the Battle of Calabria.
Italian cruiser guns are the only ones that obtained +20 km hits in WWII, and several of them, not a single one like the British battleship guns, being them single cradle or not. BTW, to indipendently elevate the guns of a turret is a pretty useless feature.
2
-
2
-
The Russian report was pretty confused. According to it, the ship was attacked by the He 111 from the left side, while the torpedo hit it on the right side. The torpedo hit the ship at 01.26, and at the same time the Molotov shot down the aircraft, that crashed near the ship at 01.33, that's full seven minutes later.
At the same time, the Italian report is pretty clear, describing the attack of the MAS 569 from the right side of the cruiser, the torpedo hitting the ship at 01.30, and, after the MAS evaded, another explosion on the same spot at 01.34 (also seen by MAS 573), that the Italians concluded was the secondary explosion of the magazines, signaling the sinking of the ship (in reality it was the explosion of the He 111 shot down).
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
It's an often repeated mith. The Littorios almost always fired few shots at extreme ranges. Had they hit something, it would have been by far the longest range hit in history.
Only in two occasions they fired more shots.
At Gaudo the Vittorio Veneto was steaming at 28 knots and trying to hit, from 23 to 26 kms distance, two light cruisers that were entering and exiting smokescreens and only manuvering to not be hit. At that time it had been already amply demonstrated that it was practically impossible to hit a ship that was only manuvering to not be hit, even at far closer distances and with far more rapidly firing guns (see the battle of the Espero convoy) if not firing thousands of shells.
The second battle of the Sirte had been fought in a storm, and the Littorio had been the most accurate ship of both parties in that occasion.
The pictures taken by the Brits at Gaudo show, for Vittorio Veneto's salvo, a consistent single turret spread of 1.7% of the distance. Any navy of the time would have considered 2% acceptable to good in action.
US Navy obtained 1.1% single turret spread, but that was in tests, with the ship standing still and not steaming at 28 knots, after years of peacetime tuning, with delay coils already installed (Littorios had them installed in winter '42-'43) and with slower shells (for a simple geometrical reason, flatter trajectory shells, all things equal, will show wider horizontal spread. That has little IRL effect since ships are not just horizontal targets and the flatter trajectory reduces the vertical spread - that's why flatter trajectory is preferred in rifle shooting - and reduces the error in distance and bearing, by reducing the flight time). Richelieu shown a 2.1% single turret spread in tests (four guns in it's case) still in 1948, after delay coils had been installed, and that was considered acceptable.
2
-
@bluelemming5296 All is relative. According to Santarini, the OTO 351/50 of the Littorio were anyway more accurate than the 38 cm SK C/34 of the Bismarck at normal engagement distance (someone extended the study to the Sharnhorst, obtaining even worse results).
So why the Bismarck hit the Hood and the Prince of Wales?
Because it fired, from 18.500m to 15.000m distance on targets that were not trying to evade.
The same moment the POW steered to break the contact, the Bismarck ceased to hit anything, even if the target was at less than 16.000m distance, and quit firing at only 18.500m distance.
In the same engagement, the Hood did not hit anything at all, even firing several salvo at less than 20.000m distance and, according to the same Santarini, the POW shown a marginally better gunnery than the Bismarck, but not enough to change the outcome of the clash.
Mind that, having the fastest muzzle velocity than any WWII battleship gun, all things equal, the 381/50 should have a larger horizontal dispersion for purely geometrical reasons (firing two shots with a given error in vertical angle difference, the fastest shell with the flatter trajectory will fly more between the two horizontal drop points), but that has little practical effect, since ships are not only horizontal targets (the same Santarini, IE, calculated that the Hood was a vertical target three times larger than an horizontal one) and the same flatter trajectory of the fastest shell reduces the vertical dispersion (other than the error in bearing, by reducing the flight time).
2
-
2
-
2
-
@bluelemming5296 I stated there was nothing wrong with the ammo quality. Santarini agree with that.
I stated it had always been fired at extreme ranges and/or on smaller ships that were manuvering to not be hit (in that case, it had been amply demonstrated that it needed thousands of shells to hit something). And infact Santarini found WWII battleship guns that had worse dispersion, without anyone complaining about that, and that had been quite effective, because they had been used on shorter ranges and on ships that were not evading.
Those guns had been used against ships that, according to Santarini, had among the better dispersion patterns of all WWII powers, and that had been throughly beaten. Mind that, the Brits, in the Battle of Denmark strait, opened fire at 24.500m, but them too didn't hit anything as long as the range had been over 20.000m (and the Hood didn't hit anything at all).
So, it doesn't seem that the 381/50 dispersion pattern could cause any real problem in actual engagement conditions.
A thing is a statistical analysis, another thing is complaining. It's like complaining of the 3MOA average accuracy of the M4 carbine, when there are 1-1.5 MOA DMR rifles. Firing on human-sized targets at actual fighting range, it doesn't make any real difference.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@geordiedog1749 I'm sorry that this is proving so problematic for you, emotionally. Your "moral supremacy" kicked in long ago. It kicked in already when you decided to start talking about "moral supremacy" instead of facts and telling people they were "cherry picking" when they talked about episodes YOU specifically mentioned without any selection. Not having even noticed that simple fact demonstrates YOU were enough emotionally involved to ignore facts, or in bad faith. Choose one.
I suggest you to learn to differentiate facts from narrative (especially dubious moral narrative that, in your view, should change facts) and quit trying to adapt the first ones to the second.
Then you found a history book that tells at Sirte 1 the Brits DIDN'T flee the battle. DIDN'T end up on an Italian freshly laid minefield they didn't suspect the existence of, (but maybe they CHOSE to end on it). DIDN'T lose two ships and 830 seamen and DIDN'T have to retire the rest of the Malta Strike Force, In exchange for the the Regia Marina not having a single casualty?
You found an history book that tells at Sirte 2 the Brits DIDN'T have several ships badly damaged (The Kingston and Havock had been effectively lost) in exchange for no damages for the Italians. DIDN'T leave the merchants on their own. Then DIDN'T have the convoy almost entirely destroyed? I'm curious to know who wrote them.
What you consider "decent" is an opinion of you (and, if you consider decent the narrative above...). Vincent O'Hara is surely an historian and just told Pedestal had been a defeat. James Sadkovich is surely an historian and called it a disaster. Jack P. Greene is surely an historian and called it an Axis victory.
If Pedestal had been a "strategic success" for the Brits, then how PQ 17 hadn't? More ships get through, and PQ 18 followed at only 2 months distance. The strategic outcome of PQ17 had been than most of the shipment dind't arrive where it was expected to,. The strategic outcome of Pedestal had been that most of the shipment didn't arrive where it was expected to and several warships had been sunk or badly damaged as well. Involving "strategic victory" is like saying "but in the end the Allies won the war".
Maybe people want to discuss stuff without seeing it polluted by laughable moral considerations used to change obvious facts.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@michaelsommers2356 After I provided the source, you stated: "That does not show that the Italians stopped using Enigma."
Your statement makes no sense. Of what "that" are you talking about? Do you know the source? Evidently not. So how can you talk about what it shows or not?
The Italian Navy didn't use Enigma at all. It adopted the C38m since 1940. In three years of war, before the armistice, only few hundreds of C38m messages had been decrypted by Ultra, most of them after several days and of no military value. IE the one relating to the loss, in December 1941, of a bag of shirts destined for the Governor of the Aegean, Admiral Campioni, message regularly noted by the British after a week of cryptoological efforts.
Better results the Brits had with the C35, used by the Regia Aeronautica, but with no practical value, since: "The time span between the interception of C35/38 traffic in the Middle East and his Typex encryption averaged 36 hours. They were followed by '50 hours on average' for radio transmission from Middle East to the United Kingdom, with the addition of other 4 hours between the receiving station and the Admiralty and further 4 hours from the latter to the decyphers".
At that point, the value of every message of the Aeronautica had long expired.
For the really important messages, the Italian Navy used manual cyphers, There were 14 kinds of them. Ultra managed to decypher some of the messages encrypted with the minor ones, but never broke the two really important ones during the war (SM16 and SM19) and completely gave up in 1942.
2
-
2
-
2
-
CipiRipi00 We'll never know if the Bismarck hit the Hood EVEN ONE SINGLE TIME.
It was well known that the initial salvoes of the British ships were often off by kilometers.
In the clash with the POW, opposed to a BB that had HUGE teething problems, that reduced it to a single working gun, the Bismarck received worse damages that it inflicted.
None ever said that the POW had good groups. BB cannons had to be TESTED, for LONG to obtain good grups, and the POW was completely new.
The best groups are NOT the tighter ones but the ones that give the best probabilities to hit the target AT LEAST with a shell for every salvo at the optimal fighting range. IE Analyzing the results of the battle of Leyte Gulf, the US Navy concluded the Japanese had not understood how dispersion worked. Their salvoes were so tight that the inevitable error in estimating bearing and distance of the target made so that they were all misses.
Fact is that the Italian BBs NEVER had an enemy BB at less than 25 km, so any comparison with the battle of the Denmark Strait, fought from 20km to 15km, is completely useless.
In the battle of Gaudo, that's the one cited to "prove" the scarce accuracy of the 381/50, the Vittorio Veneto, steaming 28knots, fired on a couple of light cruisers, that were laying smoke screens and steering to not be hit, not at 15.000m, but from 23.000m to 26.000m. At that distance the Bismarck didn't even TRY to fire at a much bigger target that was not steering. It had been already amply demonstrated that, even at much shorter distances, and with much more rapidly firing guns, it was practically impossible to hit a target that was only manuvering to not been hit, if not firing thousands of shells (see the battle of the Espero convoy).
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
It's an often repeated mith. The Littorios almost always fired few shots at extreme ranges. Had they hit something, it would have been by far the longest range hit in history.
Only in two occasions they fired more shots.
At Gaudo the Vittorio Veneto was steaming at 28 knots and trying to hit, from 23 to 26 kms distance, two light cruisers that were entering and exiting smokescreens and only manuvering to not be hit. At that time it had been already amply demonstrated that it was practically impossible to hit a ship that was only manuvering to not be hit, even at far closer distances and with far more rapidly firing guns (see, IE, the battle of the Espero convoy) if not firing thousands of shells.
The second battle of the Sirte had been fought in a storm, and the Littorio had been the most accurate ship of both parties in that occasion.
The pictures taken by the Brits at Gaudo show, for Vittorio Veneto's salvo, a consistent single turret spread of 1.7% of the distance. Any navy of the time would have considered 2% acceptable to good in action.
US Navy obtained 1.1% single turret spread, but that was in tests, with the ship standing still and not steaming at 28 knots, after years of peacetime tuning, with delay coils already installed (Littorios had them installed in winter '42-'43) and with slower shells (for a simple geometrical reason, flatter trajectory shells, all things equal, will show wider horizontal spread. That has little IRL effect since ships are not just horizontal targets and the flatter trajectory reduces the vertical spread - that's why flatter trajectory is preferred in rifle shooting - and reduces the error in distance and bearing, by reducing the flight time). Richelieu shown a 2.1% single turret spread in tests (four guns in it's case) still in 1948, after delay coils had been installed, and that was considered acceptable.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bluelemming5296 We know that the Brits didn't hit anything past 20.000m. We don't know why. We can hypothesize. But has a KGV class battleship ever hit something at over 20.000m distance in action, to make a comparison? Even in Bismarck's last battle, on an enemy that was practically adrift, the Brits opened fire only at 20.000m and, for when they hit something, they were so close that they were using their secondaries as well.
Surely, in the Denmark strait, the positioning of the sights on the Prinz Eugen was no better than on the British battleships, but it scored hits farther than them anyway.
It's not a mystery at all. And its pretty amusing to reason like the Brits were standing, waiting for the Italians to come close. The Brits never served a battleship to a Littorio at short distance. When the guns of the Littorio had been fired at extreme ranges it's because the enemies, that were light cruisers and destroyers, fled. The only time they (again, light cruisers and destroyers) engaged a Littorio at short range had been in the second battle of the Sirte, under a storm.
For when the Littorios had been fully operative, Brits and Italians knew the shortcomings of battleships, and tended to use them under their own air cover. That means that the possible areas of contact were really limited.
The only REAL possibility to have a clash between a modern British battleship squad (Nelson, Rodney and Prince of Wales) and the two Littorios had been during Operation Halberd, but there the Italian command miscalculated the route of the Britsh formation, and so the Italian squad failed to make contact (But Nelson was hit by an aerial torpedo anyway, and the Royal Navvy didn't risk a battleship so close to the Italian bases for more than a year after).
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@geordiedog1749 After Pedestal Malta was resupplied by submarines. A new convoy didn't show up until November. Italian convoy losses had always been due much more to submarines than to Malta based aircrafts.
That of the "moral supremacy" is in general a mith, when applied to defeats it's a pathetic excuse.
Sirte 1 and 2 had been losses for the RN, and to talk about a pretended "moral supremacy" that should change the outcome is laughable. Sirte 1 is the Brits having the moral supremacy to flee the battle. Then having the moral supremacy to end up on an Italian freshly laid minefield they didn't suspect the existence of ("choosing", LOL!). Then having the moral supremacy to lose two ships and 830 seamen that surely had been happy to drawn showing their moral supremacy (but maybe they chose to), and having to retire the rest of the Malta Strike Force (but with the moral supremacy). In exchange for the the Regia Marina not having the moral supremacy and not having a single casualty. Trying to use "moral supremacy" to argue this had not been a defeat proves to not be able to handle basic facts, and infering "it would have had to anyway" is sour grapes. Sorry, IRL the Regia Marina didn't sail expecting to lose, they won easily without receiving a single casualty, the RN lost badly. Those are the facts.
Sirte 2 is the Brits having the moral supremacy to have several ships badly damaged (The Kingston and Havock had ben effectively lost) in exchange for no damages for the Italians. Then having the moral supremacy to leave the merchants on their own. Then having the moral supremacy to have the convoy almost entirely destroyed. Sorry, IRL the Regia Marina didn't sail expecting to lose, they won easily, the RN lost badly. Those are the facts. Convoy PQ 17 is recalled as "PQ 17 disaster". 1/3 of the convoy passed through and the escort ships suffered no losses. If PQ 17 had been a disaster, Sirte 2 had been a tragedy.
What you like or not is inconsequential. Randomly using the expression "cherry picking" doesn't make you any favour. YOU talked first about "first and second Sitre (sic)" so if someone was cherry picking it was YOU. It happens that "first and second Sitre" had been clear Italian victories. So did Pedestal. What had ben said about Convoy PQ 17 is valid for Pedestal too. If PQ 17 had been a disaster, Pedestal had been a tragedy.
There is, and there will always be, people that prefer to not see plain facts, shut eyes and ears and repeat propaganda (like that of the "moral supremacy") until they believe it. They came to believe that losing two ships, 860 men, and having to leave an important base, in exchange for no losses for the enemy, is a victory due to something they call "moral supremacy" they pretend to have existed. They can't admit a defeat, for how much evident it is, because it doesn't fit their narrative of "bossed from start to finish" and, since the narrative is more important than facts, what doesn't fit into the narrative can't exist. Since they believe in things like "bossed from start to finish" they pretend to know what the people "expected" too. They don't know, obviously, but it fits into the narrative of the perpetual victory, and narrative is more important than facts.
It's their choice, but they can't pretend to spread it without anyone recalling what the facts are.
Facts are stubborn things.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Drachinifel One should say that 3 light cruisers,
and 10 destroyers should be able to deal with 1 light cruiser and 5 destroyers, but at Kolombangara id didn't go exactly that way. Battles with far more favorable odds than being in two and having to deal with six had been botched. At Cape Spada the odds were favourble to the Brits due to sheer numbers.
The Giovanni dalla Bande Nere dealed quite well anyway. In a 6 vs. 1 battle it received two hits, with limited damages, in exchange of one, until the Brits decided to quit. Yeah, the Colleoni had been immobilised by a single hit, but it had been the presence of the destroyers that made the difference, since three of them could deal with the immobilised ship, while the others kept the single Italian cruisers at bay.
Mind too that five years separated the Colleoni (laid down 1928) by the Sidney (laid down 1933). The contemporary Condottieri class cruisers were the Duca D'Aosta, or even the Duca Degli Abruzzi, that were very well protected.
1
-
@Drachinifel Actually the Italian ships were chasing the destroyers Sydney and Havock and turned when they saw Sidney AND OTHER THREE DESTROYERS. At that point the odds were clearly in favour of the British. To describe the battle as "two cruisers that run for their lives as soon as they sighted another cruiser", not mentioning the presence of OTHER FIVE BRITISH SHIPS, is or ill-informed, or dishonest. Choose one.
As said, it had been the presence of the destroyers that made the difference in the outcome of the battle, since three of them could deal with the immobilised ship (that was finished with three torpedoes), while the other ships could keep the single Italian cruisers at bay.
After the sinking of the Colleoni the battle went on 6 vs. 1 for another hour, until the Sidney decided to quit. At that point the Brits had scored two hits on the Bande Nere vs. one of the Italian unit on the Sidney, all of them with light damages. The Bande Nere speed was reduced to 28 knots, due to a boiler overheating, for half an hour, so it seems odd that the Brits had not been able to close distance having at least a 4 knots advantage.
1
-
@Drachinifel Sorry, they were chasing the second destroyers flotilla of Nicholson, (destroyers Hasty, Hero, Hyperion, Ilex), and turned when they saw Sydney and Havock.
You are talking of false narrative? Three destroyers sunk the immobilised ship, while a cruiser and other two destroyers (so mantaining a numerical superiority) could deal with the other cruiser. It had been the presence of the destroyers that made the difference in the outcome of the battle. To describe the battle as "two cruisers that run for their lives as soon as they sighted another cruiser", not mentioning the presence of OTHER FIVE BRITISH SHIPS, is or ill-informed, or dishonest. Choose one.
Have you read my first message, where I wrote "After the battle became a 6 vs.1 It had been the Sidney that in the end made smoke and broke the contact, BECAUSE IT WAS RUNNING OUT OF AMMUNITIONS."?
In a 1 vs. 6 battle it was not really surprising that he didn't decide to quit because he was scared. BUT you wrote "the Italian ships survival was largely on account of them running away fast enough to keep the range open to a degree that scoring hits was quite hard." Since the Italian ship was limited to 28 knots for half an hour, while the Brits could steam at least at 32 knots, it doesn't seem the case.
So you didn't mention them because you didn't like their class?
Pretended battles don't count, sorry.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
How someone can look at those pictures and state they show a 1.5km dispersion is beyond me. It's like hearing someone stating they depicts a renaissance painting of the ascension of Christ and the others commenting "Yeah, yeah. Look a the colours. The brush strokes...".
Knowing the lenght of the HMAS Perth, the first picture shows a single turret spread of 410m and the second one of 413m (a little more do to the parallax). That means 1.7% of the distance. Any navy of the time would have considered 2% acceptable to good in action.
US Navy obtained 1.1% single turret spread, but that was in tests, with the ship standing still and not steaming at 28 knots, after years of peacetime tuning, with delay coils already installed (Littorios had them installed in winter '42-'43) and with slower shells (for a simple geometrical reason, flatter trajectory shells, all things equal, will show wider horizontal spread. That has little IRL effect since ships are not just horizontal targets and the flatter trajectory reduces the vertical spread - that's why flatter trajectory is preferred in rifle shooting - and the error in distance and bearing, by reducing the flight time). Richelieu shown a 2.1% single turret spread in tests (four guns in it's case) still in 1948, after delay coils had been installed, and that was considered acceptable.
1
-
1
-
We'll never know what really happened to the Hood, but vs. the Prince of Wales, that had serious teething problems that silenced all of his guns bar one, the Bismarck received worse damages that it inflicted.
"still floating" is not that a great result. The very low metacentric height made the Bismarck almost impossible to capsize (in return it made it a poor shooting platform, due to the very short roll time), but the ship was sinking anyway, only slower. The Dorsetshire's torpedo actually hit the superstructure (near to the catapult), because the ship's superstructure was already underwater. Much shells hit it, but the battle had been already over in quite a few minutes. "Most of the British shells struck the forward superstructure of Bismarck with the hits late in the action simply rearranging the debris created by earlier shell hits."
The ship's four turrets scheme was quite outdated. For a ship that big it lacked system's redundance and the lack of pumps and valves between the fuel tanks was a major flaw (a single hit on a tank, and the ship was condemned to leak fuel until drydocked), her two rudders were placed so close that it was near to impossible a hit damaging the first wouldn't damage the second too. It shared a design flaw with all the Germans' major ships of her generation, that made her stern section too fragile. The AA fire proved to be ineffective. The very high pressure engines gave her long endurance, but proved to be problematic on any German ship that lived enough.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ReichLife Then is 34 for the Regia Marina in March '43. Since the war declaration obviously. If we count from the first real engagement, then there were 7 months difference between the Battle of the River Plate and the Battle of Calabria, so it would be January 1943 for the italians.
So, at 34, for both, or 31 for both, months of war, the italians were still regularly delivering shipment to N. Africa, while the Germans were seldomly moving ships from port to port, far from the operations, while the Luftwaffe attacked a convoy.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ReichLife 1) Only problem is you purposedly keeping on trying to derange the argument, because you know you have nothing to say on the real one. An engagement is not badmouthing the Brits, that's what you consider "conducting offensive operations". Nor the respective navies had suffered any real attrition before the first engagement. I have to corect myself however, for the Regia Marina the first real engagement had not been the Battle of Calabria, but the Battle of the Espero Convoy, two weeks before. I'll still consider 7 months difference though.
2) keep trying to ignore you believed you could correct others without even checking and then had been able to talk about others "jumping to conclusions like kangooru, without second thought whether they are right or wrong". That, other than being quite funny, perfectly showcases your entire argument and your blatant inability to comprehend simple concepts.
It's cute you think you are able to "ridicule" something.
Italian shipments were going to, and through, heavily contested areas, not seldomly strolling from port to port like the Germans in Norway. Notice (like you being able to. LOL!) that I din't talk about shipments to Aegean, that obviously were less contested.
Your childish inabily to comprehend simple concepts is still cute. Go on.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
It's an often repeated mith. The Littorios almost always fired few shots at extreme ranges. Had they hit something, it would have been by far the longest range hit in history.
Only in two occasions they fired more shots.
At Gaudo the Vittorio Veneto was steaming at 28 knots and trying to hit, from 23 to 26 kms distance, two light cruisers that were entering and exiting smokescreens and only manuvering to not be hit. At that time it had been already amply demonstrated that it was practically impossible to hit a ship that was only manuvering to not be hit, even at far closer distances and with far more rapidly firing guns (see the battle of the Espero convoy) if not firing thousands of shells.
The second battle of the Sirte had been fought in a storm, and the Littorio had been the most accurate ship of both parties in that occasion.
The pictures taken by the Brits at Gaudo show, for Vittorio Veneto's salvo, a consistent single turret spread of 1.7% of the distance. Any navy of the time would have considered 2% acceptable to good in action.
US Navy obtained 1.1% single turret spread, but that was in tests, with the ship standing still and not steaming at 28 knots, after years of peacetime tuning, with delay coils already installed (Littorios had them installed in winter '42-'43) and with slower shells (for a simple geometrical reason, flatter trajectory shells, all things equal, will show wider horizontal spread. That has little IRL effect since ships are not just horizontal targets and the flatter trajectory reduces the vertical spread - that's why flatter trajectory is preferred in rifle shooting - and reduces the error in distance and bearing, by reducing the flight time). Richelieu shown a 2.1% single turret spread in tests (four guns in it's case) still in 1948, after delay coils had been installed, and that was considered acceptable.
1