Comments by "" (@neutronalchemist3241) on "Mentour Now!" channel.

  1. The MCAS had never been necessary. It was only needed for the 373 MAX to handle like the older series at high angles of attack, and avoid simulator time to train pilots to the new handling charateristics. Already the fact that now it can be activated only once for flight practically makes it a relic, to not admit it was uselss from the start.
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  2. The difference is that Boeing's backlog on the 737 is identical to what they had in 2018. The backlog of Airbus on the A-220 / A320, that was already longer, grew of further 1300 aircrafts.
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  3. The MCAS, even in the first version, could operate only once, after the flaps had been retracted, and was resetted only by the pilots actuating the manual electric trim, otherwise even the first version would have worked only once per flight. Now it doesn't reset any more, so it can work only once per flight. The MCAS never solved any problem. It was only needed for the 373 MAX to handle like the older series at high angles of attack, and avoid simulator time to train pilots to the new handling charateristics. Already the fact that now it can be activated only once for flight practically makes it a relic, to not admit it was uselss from the start. 737 pilots can cut off all the electricity to the elevator. The switches are on the centrer of the console. They don't do that because this switches off both the MCAS and the manual electric trim command, and to trim the aircraft by using the residual manual wheel is an hassle (you need 15 complete turns of the wheel to trim the elevator 1°).
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  4. It requires to reengineer the wings structure to widen the hinge points of the landing gears. To change the position of the engine nachelles is easier, since they are external.
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  5. A new Boeing aircraft wouldn't have put Airbus on the ropes. They would always have had the advantage of the A220 pilots being able to seamlessly transition to the "NEO" version, while the Boeing aircraft would have needed a complete training. As for the ropes. In 2018 Boeing had a backlog of 4,763 aircrafts of the 737 MAX,and Airbus one of 6,536 for the A220/A330 NEO. Today boeing has a backlog of 4,770 aircrafts for the 737 MAX, and Airbus one of 7,832 for the A220/A320 NEO. Had Boeing introduced a new model, MAYBE they would have had a slightly longer backlog, and Airbus a slightly shorter one. But Airbus would have had plenty of time to design a new model anyway.
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  6. It requires to reengineer the wings structure to widen the hinge points of the landing gears. To change the position of the engine nachelles is easier, since they are external.
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  7. It requires to reengineer the wings structure to widen the hinge points of the landing gears. To change the position of the engine nachelles is easier, since they are external.
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  8. It requires to reengineer the wings structure to widen the hinge points of the landing gears. To change the position of the engine nachelles is easier, since they are external.
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  9. The system operates if you are flying manually. The pilots could cut all the electricity to the stabilizer and trim it manually with the trim wheel to counter the MCAS-induced trim, however it requires 15 complete turns of the wheel to trim the stabilizer of only 1°. 38 complete turns to reset the stabilizer from a single MCAS impulse, and the trim wheel, in a nose-down situation, can become very stiff, and even jam completely, due to aerodynamic forces.
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  10. There were two sensors. There are always been. But the MCAS was linked to only one. Because it costs less. More. On all the previous 737 there was a specific alarm if the readings of the two sensors differed. On the 737 MAX to have the readings of the AOA sensors on display for the pilots was a paid optional, and also the alarm was linked to that optional. Most companies (included the two of the crashes) decided to not acquire that optional (because the pilots almost never need an AOA display). But the pilots didn't know that the alarm, that had always been available, had been removed. They believed the differential AOA sensors alarm was still there.
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  11. Problem is that it had been tested by pilots that knew it existed. If you knew what it was and what it did, it was extremely easy to override. But if you didn't even knew it existed, you had no way to know what was going wrong.
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