Comments by "" (@neutronalchemist3241) on "The Great War"
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trauko1388
Actually is well reported in Ludendorff's diaries. "In Vittorio Veneto, Austria did not lose a battle, but lose the war and itself, dragging Germany in its fall. Without the destructive battle of Vittorio Veneto, we would have been able, in a military union with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to continue the desperate resistance through the whole winter, in order to obtain a less harsh peace, because the Allies were very fatigued."
And that was the general opinion of the western allies too. Still two weeks before Vittorio Veneto Foch took for granted that the war would have ended only in 1919. For the same reason, the Americans made only a very limited use of the BAR rifle in first line despite having many in the deposits. They seen that the fall offensive was losing momentum, and wanted to spare the best weapons for the operations of the following spring.
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Tychohuybers In Slovenia there are four linguistic groups, Croats, Hungarians, Italians and Slovenians, that were historically majoritarian in different regions of the actual Slovenia. A fifth, the Ladins, around year 1000 occupied all the Isonzo valley, but are now virtually extinct. During the second half of 19th century, The Austrian Empire, in response to the Italian Risorgimento, favoured the Slavic component in Croatia and Slovenia. Despite this, for example, in the 1900 census, in the city of Koper (then Capodistria) there were 7205 Italian residents, 391 Slovenians, 167 Croats and 67 Germans.
"we were there before" is only modern nationalistic bullshit.
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For the Italians, not really. When Italy entred in the war, in 1915, they initially purchased a batch of Adrian helmets from the French ("elmetto Adrian mod. 15"), but they were not satisfied with the strenght of the design, so, starting form the subsequent year, they started to manufacture an helmet ("elmetto Adrian mod. 16") that had the same overall shape, but was stamped in one piece of thicker steel sheet, with the crest welded on it and without insigna (that were simply painted with black paint). The French adopted a similar helmet in 1926. The weight of the M15 is from 670 to 750gr, that of the M16 is from 750 to 800gr.
It has to be noted that the crest on the Adrian helmet was not really aimed to deflect the shrapnels. You can see at 3:00 - 3:04 that it' has openings on the sides. It covered a small hole in the top, so that the hot air could escape, like in a chimney, but the rain couldn't enter.
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The reason of the Moschetto TS is that there are a series of jobs in the army (passing artillery shells, load and unload mules, ecc...) that are not compatible with a long rifle. If you give a long rifle to the men that had to do those activities, they'll put them somewere while they do their "main" job, with the result of not having the rifle at hand the moment it's really needed.
A Moschetto TS is small and light enought to be worn while doing other manual activities, and it had a bayonet, not cause those troops were really expected to use it for combat, but cause they needed it as a tool (can opener, wooden box opener, lever, ecc... the real main use of bayonets in both world war) even more than normal infantry.
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In the Trentino offensive THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY SURPRISE, if not in the scale of the operation. The Italian high command begun the preparations for the defence of the Trentino in the second week of March (suspension of the transfer from Trentino of the brigades "Ivrea" and "Sicilia", and sending in the brigade "Valtellina"). In the first week of April three new brigades were sent in the sector, then the 9th division was transferred at Bassano, the 10th at Schio, 10 alpine battallions and 6 mountain artillery batteries at Marostica. 6 batteries of 149mm guns, 6 of 105mm, 3 mechanized batteries of 102mm cannons and 3 batteries of heavy howitzers were put in reserve on the Tagliamento river. At the end of April the 44th division was transferred from the Albania to Desenzano, and further 7 divisions (27th division, X and XIV Corps) were put on reserve on the Tagliamento. In his visit in Trentino of late April, Cadorna was there to inspect the preparations for the incoming battle. The real difference between Cadorna and Brusati is that Brusati wanted to held all the ground his troops conquered in the first weeks of war. Cadorna, judging the Trentino sector not so important, only wanted to held the third line of defense.
So why the Austrians advanced so much?
Well, they did not actually. In many sectors the preparations had not been actuated very well, but, in an offensive like that, it was almost granted that the first line of defense would have been overrun. The artillery preparations almost always made them not defensible. Only the second, and more often the third line of defense could be held (the lost ground would have then be taken back with counterattacks). But in mountain warfare the placement of the lines was dictated by the ground. First and second line could be so close to not be really distinct, the third could be really far away.
The tactic to stop a large scale attack was to fix the wings of the attacking army, so progressively narrowing the line of advance, and putting he advancing formations progressively at risk to be hit at the flanks, and that was done. The Austrians overrun the Italian third line at Asiago, but they did it only there. At that point, the Trentino offensive was over, and the Austrians rethreated almost to the starting line to avoid to be counterattacked while being so exposed.
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***** Really not. Probably you don't understand English very well. There were no US troops in Italy at all at the time of the Battle of the Solstice, and only one regiment operated in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, they fought gallantly and conquered one machineguns' nest, but it was really a marginal action in a battle where millions of men were involved. Moreover, you have to consider that, for every allied soldier in Italy there was more than an Italian soldier on the Western Front helping French and British. A total of 100.000 Italian soldiers, an entire corp (the 2nd), operated on the western front. They. for example, fought the second battle of the Marne, stopped the German Attempt to encircle Reims, and took part in the general offensive that repeled the Germans east of the Meuse in october 1918.
All in all, your point of view seems very peculiar. You seem to take pride in the fact that many Slavics fought for the Empire, then in the fact that, in the end, they decided to betray the Emperor and deserted.
In the same time, you seem to mock who fought the Empire for the entire lenght of the war, winning it in the end, like they fought the Empire for the previous 100 years, winning their nation on the battlefield.
One might think that the Slavics that were under the Empire have to be at least a bit grateful to the Italians, for having kicked their asses so hard to convince them to stop being Franz Josephs' bitches, flee form the battelfield, and leave the same Italians to give them a nation. Instead what one has to read? Whining and more whining.
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***** Thanks, but what you are saying is, not surprisingly, inaccurate for an ignorant.
With the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and the Serbia Campaign already ended in november '15, The Empire had no more multiple fronts, All of it's strenght was focused on the Italian Front, and was even helped by German troops there. On the contrary, Italy was fighting on the Italian and on the Western fronts. Despite those facts, Italy had been, in all evidence, able to win over the Empire, infact it won, and the Empire surrendered.
"Simple operation against a weeker enemy" are, obviously, your opinions. Given how much you know of the war you are talking of, you can imagine how much credible they sound.
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***** In the English Wikipedia (and every English source for that matter) is listed as "Battle of Caporetto", whine to them if you want.
Secondly, the country existed when the war started. It had been the war that made it disappear, so the answer is "Yes".
The war of Rome Vs Carthage, for example, had been higly successful for the Romans, that clearly won it, since Carthage ceased to exist.
And, as alredy said, it seems that the populations that obtained a country thanks to the fact that the Italians won the war for them, should be at least a bit grateful to them.
Unless they preferred to be under the Empire, obviously, that's legit.
But, in that case, they have been even more defeated.
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***** The Empire was still expanding in 1908 when annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. You can tell to yourself that it was dead in a date of your personal preference, but that's only your personal preference. There is nothing to back it, and, in this case it's to be explained why the Slavics soldiers were still eager to obey to their German officers so many years after the supposed "death" of the Empire.
You are trying to communicate in English, and, in every English source, the battle is called "Battle of Caporetto", regardless to what's the current name of the place, like there is a "Battle of Zama" regardless the fact that there is no more a place called "Zama" there. Live with it. And, oh, according to the then Austrians masters of the Slovenians, the place was known as "Karfreit".
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When Italy entred in the war, in 1915, they initially purchased a batch of Adrian helmets from the French ("elmetto Adrian mod. 15"), but they were not satisfied with the strenght of the design, so, starting form the subsequent year, they started to manufacture an helmet ("elmetto Adrian mod. 16") that had the same overall shape, but was stamped in one piece of thicker steel sheet, with the crest welded on it and without insigna (that were simply painted with black paint). The French adopted a similar helmet in 1926.
It has to be noted that the crest on the Adrian helmet was not really aimed to deflect the shrapnels. You can see at 3:00 - 3:04 that it' has openings on the sides. It covered a small hole in the top, so that the hot air could escape, like in a chimney, but the rain couldn't enter.
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+franzlimit Not by chance, the Irredentists' motto was: "Trento e Trieste", not "Trento, Bolzano e Trieste".
"So why did Italy want this land?", cause, as the war itself amply shown, to fight wars going uphill is double the effort, and the South Tyrol happens to be between the Italian speaking regions and the watershed (natural border).
"and why was it granted by the allies?" Cause, if the South Tyroleans were Austrians, they were on the losing side, and so they have no much a say in the matter. Same thing for the Italian speaking Istrians at the end of WWII (and we can say the South Tyroleans had been a little more fortunate than them).
"This province had nearly no Italians in it (before Musolini started to change this)". Yeah, but it had nearly no Italians in it cause the Austrians changed it, with a policy of forced germanization between 1861 and 1914, so to reitalianize it a bit was seen as simply fair. None is innocent.
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Italians also had gas masks first than Caporetto. The gas attacks were normal on the Italian front. The infantry masks weren't effective vs the phosgene, and the use of that gas (for the first time on the Italian Front) by the Germans had a part in the breaktrough, but it wasn't only the phosgene. The gas was useful only to pass the first line of defense. But on the Italian front, at that time, too many soldiers were simply stuck on the first line, while the second and third lines of defense were less effective (a weakness already seen during the 1916 Austrian offensive on the Asiago Plateau). And the units were too dependent from the central command, for orders, as personal initiative was discouraged.
Diaz's staff adressed all those problems. and finally gave up with the entire trench warfare, adopting instead tactics of mobile defense, with indipendent small units allowed to move and call for the support of the artillery. Practically an anticipation of IIWW.
As for the tactic used by the Austrians on the Battle of the Solstice, mind that it came after months of failed attempts to repeat Caporetto's success on Mt. Grappa. They needed to try something different.
As for the location of the attack. The problem of an attack trough the mountains was still the same correctly outlined by Falkenhayn in 1916. On a map it seemed easy, but was only an illusion. On the ground it was a logistic nightmare. Once reached the Po valley, the attackers would have faced an army able to move for internal lines, with excellent roads and railways. The Attackers instead would still have to be supplied through alpine trails. In practice, the attackers would have reached the plains only to have their backs to the wall.
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The reasons why Falkenhayn advised against the Trentino offensive were pretty simple. In his own words, anyone that had seen a map of Italy's northern border would have been tempted by such a move. But it was only an illusion. To reach the plain was not impossible, but, even after having done that, the army would have still to be supplied through those same mountain trails that made the preparation of the attack so difficult. The defenders otherwise, would have been supplied through the roads and railwais of the Po valley. In the end, the attackers would have reached the plain only to find themself with their backs to the wall.
As for Cadorna, I'm starting to wonder why this channel, when there is to say something about him, decides to leve all pretenses of historical accuracy in order to make him look as a bigger idiot than his counterparts on the western front?
In the Trentino offensive THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY SURPRISE, if not in the scale of the operation. The Italian high command begun the preparations for the defence of the Trentino in the second week of March (suspension of the transfer from Trentino of the brigades "Ivrea" and "Sicilia", and sending in the brigade "Valtellina"), In the first week of April three new brigades were sent in the sector, then the 9th division was transferred at Bassano, the 10th at Schio, 10 alpine battallions and 6 mountain artillery batteries at Marostica. 6 batteries of 149mm guns, 6 of 105mm, 3 mechanized batteries of 102mm cannons and 3 batteries of heavy howitzers were put in reserve on the Tagliamento river. At the end of April the 44th division was transferred from the Albania to Desenzano, and further 7 divisions (27th division, X and XIV Corps) were put on reserve on the Tagliamento. In his visit in Trentino of late April, CADORNA WAS THERE TO INSPECT THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE. The real difference between Cadorna and Brusati is that Brusati wanted to held all the ground his troops conquered in the first weeks of war. Cadorna, judging the Trentino sector not so important, only wanted to held the third line of defense.
So why the Austrians advanced so much?
Well, they did not actually. In many sectors the preparations had not been actuated very well, but, in an offensive like that, it was almost granted that the first line of defense would have been overrun. The artillery preparations almost always made them not defensible. Only the second, and more often the third line of defense could be held (the lost ground would have then be taken back with counterattacks). But in mountain warfare the placement of the lines was dictated by the ground. First and second line could be so close to not be really distinct, the third could be really far away. The tactic to stop a large scale attack was to fix the wings of the attacking army, so progressively narrowing the line of advance, and putting he advancing formations progressively at risk to be hit at the flanks, and that was done. The Austrians overrun the Italian third line at Asiago, but they did it only there. At that point, the Trentino offensive was over, and the Austrians rethreated almost to the starting line to avoid to be counterattacked while being so exposed.
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For the first part, Yes. From the beginning of the war, until the Austro-German offensive of nov. 1917 he was in the small village of Martignacco, near Udine, at less than 20km from the front, and he often visited the first line. He was in fact closer to the front not only of any other Chief of State, but of many generals. IE Svetozar Boroević, that, among the many nicknames earned during the war ("the lion fo the Isonzo, ecc...), had also that of "the absent general", since he spent the war at Postojna, 30 km from the front.
For the second part, despite the attempts of depicting him as a particular kind of idiot (even plainly lying, IE talkig of the Battle of Asiago as a "surprise attack" when there had not been any surprise, and the Italians begun to prepare the defence since mid March. In his visit of the sector at the end of April, Cadorna was not there for a pleasure trip, he was inspecting the preparations for the incoming battle) Cadorna was not really any worse than his counterparts on the western front. Someone exonerated Haig after the Somme? After Passchendaele? After Cambrai? At the end of the war he was deemed as a great general. Criticisms begun only in the late '20s, and he still has defenders.
Cadorna was stubborn, and not particularly brilliant, but battles, on the Italian front, tended to be breif and furious affairs. He was partly justified thinking "if next time I manage to deploy more men and more guns, I'll break through". On the western front, were battles were less intense, but lasted for months, a general could not really think that, on a certain day, he was using more men and guns than the day before, or the day after. And still they sent wave after wave of soldiers to die for a daily gain of few yards of land. Every week of the battle of the Somme, or of Verdoun, count as an Isonzo battle.
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In the Trentino offensive THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY SURPRISE, if not in the scale of the operation.
The Italian high command begun the preparations for the defence of the Trentino in the second week of March (suspension of the transfer from Trentino of the brigades "Ivrea" and "Sicilia", and sending in the brigade "Valtellina").
In the first week of April three new brigades were sent in the sector, then the 9th division was transferred at Bassano, the 10th at Schio, 10 alpine battallions and 6 mountain artillery batteries at Marostica. 6 batteries of 149mm guns, 6 of 105mm, 3 mechanized batteries of 102mm cannons and 3 batteries of heavy howitzers were put in reserve on the Tagliamento river. At the end of April the 44th division was transferred from the Albania to Desenzano, and further 7 divisions (27th division, X and XIV Corps) were put on reserve on the Tagliamento. In his visit in Trentino of late April, CADORNA WAS THERE TO INSPECT THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE.
The real difference between Cadorna and Brusati is that Brusati wanted to held all the ground his troops conquered in the first weeks of war. Cadorna, judging the Trentino sector not so important, only wanted to held the third line of defense.
So why the Austrians advanced so much?
Well, they did not actually.
In many sectors the preparations had not been actuated very well, but, in an offensive like that, it was almost granted that the first line of defense would have been overrun. The artillery preparations almost always made them not defensible. Only the second, and more often the third line of defense could be held (the lost ground would have then be taken back with counterattacks). But in mountain warfare the placement of the lines was dictated by the ground. First and second line could be so close to not be really distinct, the third could be really far away. The tactic to stop a large scale attack was to fix the wings of the attacking army, so progressively narrowing the line of advance, and putting he advancing formations progressively at risk to be hit at the flanks, and that was done. The Austrians overrun the Italian third line at Asiago, but they did it only there. At that point, the Trentino offensive was over, and the Austrians rethreated almost to the starting line to avoid to be counterattacked while being so exposed.
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Sorry, but it's MrOpellulo comment, like any generalization, to be ignorant and misleading.
In the Italian army, like in any of WWI there were stubborn idiots that knew nothing of the modern warfare, and there were intelligent and prepared generals (Etna, Capello, Reghini, the firsts that comes in mind). Cadorna was stubborn, and not particularly brilliant, but it was not really worse than his western counterparts. Yes, he fought 11 battles using the same tactic, and still expecting it could work. But battles on the Italian front tended to be brief and furious affairs. He was at least partly justified thinking "if next time I manage to assemble more men and guns, I can break through". He never gave up to the mindset of the war of attrition.
On the western front, were battles were less intense, but lasted for months, there was not even that justification. At the Somme, or Verdun, a commander couldn't reasonably think that he was using that day more men and guns he had used the day before, or he would have used the day after. And still they sent, day after day, thousands of men to die for a daily gain of a yard of land. Every week of those battles counts as an Isonzo battle. And still on 31 jul. 1917, they begun the Battle of Passchendaele with exactly the same mindset of 1915.
As for the "barbaric conditions", contemporary observers often noticed that trenches and soldiers on the Italian front tended to be cleaner than on the western front (and that high officers tended to spent more time in first line with their soldiers than their westen counterpart).
As for the discipline, summary executions were much more usual among the French. In 1934 an investigation of the newspaper "Le Crapulliot" found that between 1914 e il 1918, 1.637 french soldiers had been executed, (compared to only 675 official death sentences). The Italians had 770 death sentences, and about 50 summary executions after Caporetto.
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As the clip says, the Arditi were supposed to take a trench and hold it until they were relieved by regular troops. They were effective in this. They could, take a trench much more easily than a "human wave" assault, but that tactic could bring only to very limited territorial gains.
In 1917 (not first) the Germans developed the right tactic for the Stormtrooper to work more effectively "do not stop. Do not worry about the pockets of resistance that you leave behind. Keep going forward. Aim for the backlines, communication and supply lines".
In 1918, the Arditi used the same tactic against the Austrians.
It has to be noted, however, that the same Germans and Austrians tried to use the same tactic after nov. 1917, in the subsequent attempts to break through the Piave line, and failed, as the Italians at that point had learned to have much deeper defensive lines and less dependent to central command. So that, in June 1918, in the last attempt to broke the Italian defense (Battle of the Solstice) the Austrians had practically gave up to use that again, and resorted backto the massive attack.
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As the clip says, the Arditi were supposed to take a trench and hold it until they were relieved by regular troops. They were effective in this. They could, take a trench much more easily than a "human wave" assault, but that tactic could bring only to very limited territorial gains.
In 1917 (not first) the Germans developed the right tactic for the Stormtrooper to work more effectively "do not stop. Do not worry about the pockets of resistance that you leave behind. Keep going forward. Aim for the backlines, communication and supply lines".
In 1918, the Arditi used the same tactic against the Austrians.
It has to be noted, however, that the same Germans and Austrians tried to use the same tactic after nov. 1917, in the subsequent attempts to break through the Piave line, and failed, as the Italians at that point had learned to have much deeper defensive lines and less dependent to central command. So that, in June 1918, in the last attempt to broke the Italian defense (Battle of the Solstice) the Austrians had practically gave up to use that again, and resorted back to the massive frontal attack.
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As the clip says, the Arditi were supposed to take a trench and hold it until they were relieved by regular troops. They were effective in this. They could, take a trench much more easily than a "human wave" assault, but that tactic could bring only to very limited territorial gains.
In 1917 (not first) the Germans developed the right tactic for the Stormtrooper to work more effectively "do not stop. Do not worry about the pockets of resistance that you leave behind. Keep going forward. Aim for the backlines, communication and supply lines".
In 1918, the Arditi used the same tactic against the Austrians.
It has to be noted, however, that the same Germans and Austrians tried to use the same tactic after nov. 1917, in the subsequent attempts to break through the Piave line, and failed, as the Italians at that point had learned to have much deeper defensive lines and less dependent to central command. So that, in June 1918, in the last attempt to broke the Italian defense (Battle of the Solstice) the Austrians had practically gave up to use that again, and resorted back to the massive frontal attack.
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