Comments by "" (@neutronalchemist3241) on "Plainly Difficult"
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Moreover, according to Dyatlov, the RBMK reactros were already working, unknowingly for their operators, in conditions that the same RBMK Chief Designer, N A Dollezha, considered incontrollable. Infact, with 2% enrichment of the fuel, special absorbers should have been inserted into the channels to contrast positive void coefficient at low power levels. In reality the commercial RBMK worked with 2% fuel enrichment, no special absorbers, and none of the operators even knew that those absorbers should have been present.
It's typically Soviet. The chief designer states that, if made in a certain way, the reactor is safe and can rise power from any energy level.
The designers of the plant remove safety measures (maybe simply implying that low enrichment fuel would not have been used), but mantain the statement that the reactor is safe and can rise power from any energy level.
The operators only know that the reactor is safe and can rise power from any energy level.
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@petemaly8950 The radiused corners were evidently not radiused enough, since both the real-scale tests performed at Farnborough and the analysis of the wrecks shown the points of failures being exactly the corners of the passengers' windows and the automatic-direction-finding window, so they didn't "knew" shit. What they thought they knew was wrong.
It's fairly simple.
Lots of people out there doesn't know what they are talking about. It happens to someone into here as well.
When the Comet first flew, there already were airliners with oval shaped windows. It's not like the designers chosen that shape due to aesthetic considerations. So the designers didn't use "all the current, up to date knowledge for the design". Not even close. Fairly straightforward really
In real life the Comet G-ALYP was lost due to a fracture starting from the corner of the automatic-direction-finding window. Not enough of the wreckage of the G-ALYY was recovered to establish the cause, of the failure, and the wreckage of the G-ALYV was not investigated enough, even if eyewitness testimony already pointed to a structural failure. In the first test on the G-ALYU the fracture started from the forward escape hatch window, that's identical in shape and structure to the passenger windows. In the second test, the fracture started from the corner of the passenger window N.7. The section of the fuselage with the crack starting from the passenger window is currently on display in the RAF museum at Cosford. So you are wrong again, sorry.
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@petemaly8950 That's your fixation, not mine.
"There's a reason ships' portholes are not square, and it's exactly the same reason. The designers should have taken the hint."
And they should.
There is a reason other airliners had oval shaped windows, and it's exactly the same reason. The designers should have taken the hint.
And they should.
There is a reason production parts should be tested instead of parts that simply have the same shape. The designers should have know it.
And they should.
The designers chose the risk. And the airplanes crashed.
Stating that "what failed first was in fact irrelevant" is pretty ridiculous. Your 4 year old granddaughter would surely explain it to you.
If you don't like forward escape hatch window, that's identical in shape and structure to the passenger windows, the passenger window still failed in 50% of the tests performed, confirming you are wrong again. Your 4 year old granddaughter would surely explain it to you.
Provided her existence.
Because, having seen your mental ability, at this point, I wouldn't bet on you really knowing the age of your granddaughter, or her existence IRL.
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@petemaly8950 Wrong again.
Simple stuff, for anyone but you.
You can't "prove" what's false.
"as far as they were concerned" count for any testing ever mande on anything that proved to be defective introduced on the market "as far as they were concerned it was safe". But it wasn't. Very very basic stuff, not at all difficult, for anyone but you.
Any of your family's pet and various insect around the house could lecture you on the matter at this point.
And you keep on lying.
I already told you that you don't know enough of two RL incidents out of three to know what failed, AND THE PASSENGER WINDOW FAILED IN ONE POST-INCIDENT STRESS TEST OUT OF TWO PERFORMED (the other time it had been the forward escape hatch window, that's identical in shape and structure to the passenger windows). SO 50% OF THE TIMES. Fact is that the redesigned Comet had the oval shaped windows. Like other airliners already had before the Comet's first flight.
The section of the fuselage with the crack starting from the corner of the PASSENGER WINDOW is currently on display in the RAF museum at Cosford. With a big arrow pointing to the corner of the PASSENGER WINDOW N.7 that says "ORIGIN OF THE FAILURE".
The window of the front escape hatches, that failed in the the first post-incident stress test had the same shape, structure and dimension than the passenger window. the rear one was bigger.
To say that "failure start points are irrelevant" is ridiculous. The failure start points are what made the aircrafts crash, as it would be simple & very easily understood by anyone with a functioning brain.
To say that "De Havilland proved through extensive testing that the aircraft design was good" is hilarious, since the design was faulty and caused the crashes, and you can't "prove" what's false. Something even teh fleas on your'daughter's dog would surely be able to lecture you about at this point. Not only, but the "extensive testing" had been made on the wrong pieces.
Yeah "There's been lots of serious failures that would have been prevented with more testing". So? Had anyone said that the case of the Comet was unique? Keep in mind however (yeah... like you could..) that you talked about tests. I talked about taking a hint.
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The long time spent between the early studies and the realization of the dam played a big part in the disaster.
In the '30s none in the world took in serious consideration the geological charateristics of the basin in building a dam. What counted were the geological charateristics of the bedrock where the dam had to be linked, and those were perfect (infact, the dam itself withstood the impossible, contrary, IE, to the Malpasset Dam, in France, that collapsed in 1959 due to the faulty charateristics of the bedrock). The construction of the dam was approved in 1943 so, when the construction of the dam really begun, in the '50s, the studies on the basin were lacking, and were still lacking when the further rising had been approved.
Serious studies had been done in the '60s, but at that point too much money had been already spent and, of the various studies available, the SADE obviously chose to believe to the ones that described the possible landslide to be only superficial.
Curiously, of all the geologists consulted by the SADE in the '60s, the one that made the almost perfect prediction of the charateristics of the landslide was the son of the chief designer of the dam.
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