Comments by "Stephen Jenkins" (@stephenjenkins7971) on "" video.
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@akouafray8616 Well, for one thing, China didn't have "outdated tools", they had relatively modern weaponry both made in China and provided by the USSR. The CCP even had the MiG-15's which were more advanced than the US' WW2-era planes. The US only just made the F-86 Sabre to counteract the MiG's by December of 1950, and even then didn't arrive in greater number until mid-1951. China effectively had ownership of the skies within that half-a-year time period. Does that sound like a technologically inferior country beating back a technologically superior one?
The US literally shed its MIC overnight once WW2 ended, and was in the midst of throwing away their Sherman tanks until the Korean War broke out; US leadership had to scramble to re-take much WW2 equipment and weaponry. If anything, to an extent, the CCP was far more prepared for the war than the US itself was since it didn't de-militarize prior to the conflict.
The US had no belief that it would lose in Korea because it had no idea that China would enter the war. Literally, General MacArthur dismissed the concept because nobody thought China would fight a war that literally had nothing to do with them. So idk where you get the idea that the US sent less troops out of fear of losing them, especially when the US held the line against millions of CCP/NK forces.
China CLAIMS it sent a volunteer army, but in reality that's just the name. It's pretty much taken for granted that the army sent was part drafted/part professional force; though most likely drafted. The CCP called it the "volunteer" army because it looks good, just like the UN called the army sent to Korea a "police" force.
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@akouafray8616 Yeah, after doing a little research, it seems that many people in the "Volunteer" army themselves didn't even want to return to China once POW exchanges were discussed, as seen by this bit here:
"During the Panmunjom Truce negotiations, the chief stumbling block to the arrangement of a final armistice during the winter of 1951–1952 revolved around the exchange of prisoners. At first glance, there appeared to be nothing to argue about, since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, by which both sides had pledged to abide, called for the immediate and complete exchange of all prisoners upon the conclusion of hostilities. This seemingly straightforward principle, however, disturbed many Americans. To begin with, UN prisoner-of-war camps held over 40,000 South Koreans, many of whom had been impressed into Communist service and who had no desire to be sent north upon the conclusion of the war. Moreover, a considerable number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners had also expressed a desire not to return to their homelands. This was particularly true of the Chinese POWs, some of whom were anti-Communists whom the Communists had forcibly inducted during the Chinese Civil War into the PLA unit that was later transferred into Korea."
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