Comments by "Black_Triton" (@black_triton9264) on "War Archive" channel.

  1. Firstly, i appreciate the amount of work that went into this presentation 👏 However, your conclusion evades the fact that the Russians defeated the Ukrainian assault. None of the operational or strategic goals were achieved by UA with losses in men and equipment that cannot be replaced. The comparison of the Kharkov offensive and summer counter-offensive is like comparing apples to oranges. Completely different set of circumstances. By the sounds of your narrative, this is something that the UA command also failed to recognize. Another failure is for NATO "advisors" not to have understood RU defensive doctrine. Despite public articles showing the heavy defensive works being prepared for months. How on earth could the massive minefields have been missed. Senior UA commanders would have learned defensive doctrine during their time in the Soviet forces. But forgot or ignored it all. UA underestimated their enemy and overestimated their own capability. A fatal mistake.
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  2. @Adonnus100  firstly, you have probably not noticed that the nature of high intensity warfare has changed. The biggest advantage that UA has is US/NATO aerospace ISR. Secondly, you seem to be fixated on ground taken/held just like UA. While their adversary's strategy is on attrition of the enemy. The results of the summer offensive bear this out. The UA feeding troops into cauldrons is helpful, too.
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  3. @nilloc93  if you were one of the authors of the video, thanks for taking the time to reply. The whole thing (the offensive) was under-resourced. But I suppose political pressure "to show a return on our investment" doomed . No wonder Zaluzhnyy distanced himself from this and, in the aftermath, said "no nato army would have attempted what we did but we had a gun to our heads". Nato should have put the brakes on this. As their credibility was on the line once the blame storming began. You'll recall the defensive statements the US made like we told them not to this or that. You, me, the media were all correct about the under-resoursing of combat support. Especially in the engineering eqpt dept, IMHO. Yes, they knew minefields were there. The major journalism outlets told us all about them. Yet there were much, much more which UA commanders found to be of unbelievable density. This is where I why I made the comment of being unprepared for Russian defence. The opsec was criminal. Months in advance saying what they were going to do: thru the front line, to Tokmak, to Sea of Azov. The UA even made video trailers for the big show! On the other hand, we are always left speculating about what the Russians are going to do until we see it unfolding. Often missing out on identifying the shaping phase of their ops. It seems that the only strength (hope) the UA counted on was their superior moral shocking the low moral, drunken, incompetent, under armed and supplied orc army which would flee before the onslaught. Complete fantasy. Comparing US and Iraq... please. It was like beating up an unconscious drunk. Unfortunately, that became the validation for US doctrine to then be similarly applied to peer/near peer scenarios.
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  4. @buckplug2423  UA got HARMs well before the summer offensive. Retrofitted on MiG29. Other areas where RU has advantages: EW, counter-drone, long range missiles and drones, reconnaissance-fire complex, artillery, logistic chain, Ka52, #s of tanks, IFVs, trucks and aircraft of every type, FABs, and for the first time starting early 2023 a numerical superiority in manpower. And RU's latest advantage is that Syrsky is commander of UA...
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  5. This is the first of your videos I saw. An impressive amount of work. Great visuals. 👍
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  6. @TheWarArchive  "Oryx" 😆. That site is severely compromised. Might as well source your "info" from the Ukrainian govt and NAFO. Glory to the Ghost of Kiev! 💪
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