Comments by "Gort" (@gort8203) on "Ed Nash's Military Matters" channel.

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  29. The failure of the F-111B has become a mythical narrative on the internet. The reality is that the Navy changed its mind about the roles its next fighter needed to perform. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but if you repeat a narrative for decades it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs. The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. I was never meant to be a dogfighter. The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter. But if the Navy had expected the F-111 to be a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objection of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter. The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its needs as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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  55. No mention of why the Navy wanted to explore fighters with liquid cooled engines. Perhaps for the same reason the European powers used liquid cooled engines in their carrier aircraft? Liquid cooled engines in general can produce more power per unit of displacement, per unit of frontal area, and sometimes even per unit of weight. Basically, superior cooling allowed use of higher manifold pressure. The liquid cooled engines were also generally more fuel efficient, allowing an airplane to carry less fuel or fly longer on an equivalent amount of fuel. The countries using the liquid cooled engine were not deterred by the supposed drawbacks commonly attributed to them, so how serious could they be? For example, do radials really require so much less maintenance that the difference is significant enough to outweigh the superior performance of liquid cooled engines? Eliminating the need to maintain a cooling system (and the stores to service it) is a benefit, but then you have more spark plugs to check and change, more valves to adjust, maybe more bolts and connections to check for security considering all the separate cylinders and the wider temperature cycle of the air cooled engine. I would like to hear from a maintainer of these WWII engines on this subject. Perhaps the Navy preference for radials is due as much to the usual factor that drives the Navy – tradition -- as it is to these perceived advantages of the radial. Between the wars, radials were pretty much king in the U.S., and inline engines more favored in Europe. It was natural for many U.S. fighters to have radial engines, even the land-based Army fighters. It was only after the excellent Allison V-1710 arrived that the P-40 was developed out of the radial engine P-36, and outperformed it. (Note, as aircraft speeds increased the advantage of lower frontal area was magnified.) In the run up to WWII the U.S maintained an edge in radial development and Europe had an edge in inline development, so perhaps the superior potential of the liquid cooled engine was not really perceived by many in the U.S. Perhaps the Navy just stuck with what they knew rather try to put that engine developed for the Army into one of their fighters. Food for thought?
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  112. People need to use a little perspective when they pass judgement on the procurement decisions of the cold war era. One common narrative is that the reason USAF had to use “hand me down” A-1s in Vietnam is because it was too focused on fast jets and ‘looked down’ on the CAS role. Yet the same critics don’t fault the U.S. Navy and Marines for divesting themselves of these A-1s as fast as they could replace them with fast jets. Why were USAF and Navy BOTH focused on fast jets? Because the Eisenhower administration decided that trying to compete with the size of the Soviet conventional military forces was an unaffordable burden on the U.S. economy. Therefore the U.S. focused spending on strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems in order to achieve deterrence. The goal was to deter a major ground war with the Soviets rather than fight one, and if it became necessary to actually fight one it would be fought with nuclear weapons, where the U.S. had superiority. Smaller conventional U.S. ground forces would remain for projection of presence and as a trip wire against the Soviets, but nobody in the U.S. was equipping to fight a protracted ground war. Equipping to fight brushfire conflicts in third world countries was also not a priority, and it was necessary leave such contingencies to the collateral capabilities of the main forces in the event such a conflict occurred. The need to conduct conventional ‘limited warfare’ operations in Vietnam was an unwelcome event in the context of this plan. USAF entered that conflict with a force designed to deter nuclear war, but rapidly adapted to the need for fixed wing CAS. USAF was way ahead of the Navy and Marines in its use of slow prop aircraft for CAS, who made no attempt to resurrect slow prop airplanes dedicated to CAS. Yet USAF receives all the criticism despite a demonstrated willingness to adapt. While the U.S. was busy in Vietnam the calculus of deterrence began to change, and nuclear weapons were no longer considered sufficiently reliable in deterring a conventional ground war. The Army developed the M-1 tank and TOW missile. Defending against both the Soviets and the U.S. Army caused USAF to acquire the A-10, which could be argued (on another day) was actually a mistaken procurement inspired by the last war rather than the next war. To this day USAF is the only U.S. service to ever procure a dedicated low and slow CAS jet aircraft. The very purpose of Marine air is to support the Marine on the ground, yet the Marines have been conducting CAS with supersonic jets since the 1960s, and have never asked for an equivalent to the A-10. They spend their limited finding on swept wing aircraft, including the inefficient S/VTOL variety. The force of fast jets that many today see as a dumb mistake was driven by the reality of the real possibility of nuclear war, and the need to avoid it.
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  118. The needs of USAF and USN were not incompatible in this case. The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. Both USAF and USN were asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and Macnamara logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with minor variations could do both jobs. The reason one airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superior fighter. It was not originally intended to be what became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer with the addition of supersonic dash capability. The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too heavy for a fighter. The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam. They realized that they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper to recognize that the needs of USN had evolved, and this was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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  128. "The piranha could be smaller but retain comparable combat capability to existing aircraft". Not the first to try the impossible. If you measure combat capability by a single attribute such as speed or maneuverability it's possible to build a stripped down sports car of an aircraft, but it will not be a very useful fighter in large scale real world operations. One early jet-age lightweight fighter was the F-104. Kelly Johnson wanted to buck the trend to every heavier fighters and go Mach 2 with the smallest and simplest fighter possible. As a result it had tremendous performance and was awesome to fly. But even though it got stretched after the porotype flew it was never capable enough for U.S. Air Force needs. It was successful in the export market for the same reason light fighters usually are, which is that cost outweighs capability. In other words it is more important to show the world you have a somewhat capable high performance combat aircraft than to have a more capable one that you can’t afford. The successful F-16 and F-18 both grew out of a lightweight fighter prototypes, but the operative word is grew. They ended up being enlarged to make space for the fuel and systems needed for useful combat operations. The fact that these relatively small aircraft became so useful was made possible by continued miniaturization of the electronics needed to support operations other than visual combat. Size is relative, and miniaturization has made aircraft of this size the new standard for short range fighters.
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  160.  @grizwoldphantasia5005  I have responded to your dumb comments, you just refuse to accept the facts. You: “The Air Force hates the ground support role; they want to be fighter jocks at 30,000 feet, or transcontinental bomber jocks, or even transport jocks who can build up a resume for the airlines. The Air Force hates spending money on a plane they hate.” This is ignorant BS. USAF has done more CAS than all the other services combined, and by a wide margin. That because it is the air force, stupid. USAF is the only U.S. service to have ever procured a dedicated CAS aircraft. Show me the USMC version of the A-10. You can’t. You: “You still haven't rebutted my claim that the Air Force wanted to control all air assets when split from the Army in 1947/48 BTW” Of course the air force wanted control of all fixed wing aircraft. They are the air force, stupid. I guess the army shouldn't have all the tanks or the navy have all the submarines either. Let the U.S. Army decide if the A-10 is useful? Giving the A-10 to the Army is a dumb idea because it will still be obsolete. Besides, the Army position on the A-10 is already clear, but you refuse to accept it because I came from the Army chief of staff. Apparently, you’d rather hear official Army policy from some private in the motor pool [Insert sardonic laughter]. “The only thing I care about is the effect on the target, I don’t give a rat’s ass what platform brings it in,” Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley https://www.csis.org/events/priorities-our-nations-army-general-mark-milley in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “I could care less if it’s a B-52, if it’s a B-1 bomber, if it’s an F-16, an F-15, an A-10. I don’t care if the thing was delivered by carrier pigeon. I want the enemy taken care of.” The usefulness of the A-10 is known. Low and slow over a modern battlefield is not useful. No other air force is building an A-10 equivalent, and the closest thing to it, the SU-25 has suffered over Ukraine. You don't listen to U.S. Army generals, so you probably don't listen to the Ukrainian minister of defense who, has said he doesn't want the A-10. “We have been requesting combat aircraft from our partners for a long time now,” Yuriy Sak, adviser to Ukraine’s minister of defense, told Air Force Magazine by phone from Kyiv on July 21. “We need Western-standard fighter jets. We need Western-standard combat aircraft. … To target Russian positions in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine needs “fast and versatile” combat aircraft such as the F-16—not slow-moving ground defense platforms such as the retiring fleet of U.S. A-10s, a proposition Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall entertained in comments” You have been spewing BS that has no basis in reality, and I’m done responding to it. I’ve done all I can here to help other readers see your BS for what it is.
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  228. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but repeat a narrative for decades and it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs. The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter. The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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