Comments by "Gort" (@gort8203) on "Ed Nash's Military Matters"
channel.
-
132
-
77
-
47
-
46
-
30
-
14
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
12
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
8
-
7
-
6
-
6
-
That does not solve the problem, which you are ignoring, because the aircraft would be no more survivable if flown by the Army. The Army is not stupid. It is not the Army that cares about the A-10, it is politicians.
“The only thing I care about is the effect on the target, I don’t give a rat’s ass what platform brings it in,” Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “I could care less if it’s a B-52, if it’s a B-1 bomber, if it’s an F-16, an F-15, an A-10. I don’t care if the thing was delivered by carrier pigeon. I want the enemy taken care of.”
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
The failure of the F-111B has become a mythical narrative on the internet. The reality is that the Navy changed its mind about the roles its next fighter needed to perform. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but if you repeat a narrative for decades it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. I was never meant to be a dogfighter.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter. But if the Navy had expected the F-111 to be a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objection of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its needs as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
These terms really mean nothing and are used interchangeably by so many people. The real problem emerges when attaching strict meaning to the letters "F" or "P" when part of an aircraft designation. Both letters have been used by the US to designate fighters, which started out being called scouts in the first world war. But they are fungible today. The F-105, F-111, and F-117 were really tactical bombers, and were labelled with an "F" mostly for political reasons rather than to describe the primary function of the aircraft.
Another issue is that while the Navy had separate communities of fighter and attack pilots, USAF tactical air forces called all their pilots fighter pilots even if they flew an attack type aircraft, because being a fighter pilot was more a state of mind than an air to air mission, and pilots could transition between both types of aircraft.
There has never been a letter to designate "interceptors" because all fighters can perform the interception role. There were a few dedicated all-weather bomber interceptors, but they all had the F-designation. For example, the F-89, 92, 102, and 106 were all designed to intercept and destroy incoming bombers, and had unique equipment not then used for air superiority fighter. That dedicated bomber interceptor era is pretty much over now.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
No mention of why the Navy wanted to explore fighters with liquid cooled engines. Perhaps for the same reason the European powers used liquid cooled engines in their carrier aircraft? Liquid cooled engines in general can produce more power per unit of displacement, per unit of frontal area, and sometimes even per unit of weight. Basically, superior cooling allowed use of higher manifold pressure. The liquid cooled engines were also generally more fuel efficient, allowing an airplane to carry less fuel or fly longer on an equivalent amount of fuel.
The countries using the liquid cooled engine were not deterred by the supposed drawbacks commonly attributed to them, so how serious could they be? For example, do radials really require so much less maintenance that the difference is significant enough to outweigh the superior performance of liquid cooled engines? Eliminating the need to maintain a cooling system (and the stores to service it) is a benefit, but then you have more spark plugs to check and change, more valves to adjust, maybe more bolts and connections to check for security considering all the separate cylinders and the wider temperature cycle of the air cooled engine. I would like to hear from a maintainer of these WWII engines on this subject.
Perhaps the Navy preference for radials is due as much to the usual factor that drives the Navy – tradition -- as it is to these perceived advantages of the radial. Between the wars, radials were pretty much king in the U.S., and inline engines more favored in Europe. It was natural for many U.S. fighters to have radial engines, even the land-based Army fighters. It was only after the excellent Allison V-1710 arrived that the P-40 was developed out of the radial engine P-36, and outperformed it. (Note, as aircraft speeds increased the advantage of lower frontal area was magnified.) In the run up to WWII the U.S maintained an edge in radial development and Europe had an edge in inline development, so perhaps the superior potential of the liquid cooled engine was not really perceived by many in the U.S. Perhaps the Navy just stuck with what they knew rather try to put that engine developed for the Army into one of their fighters. Food for thought?
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@grizwoldphantasia5005
So I’m the ignorant one for quoting the generals in charge of the actual policy, while you are the genius for ignoring them and making up you own facts. [insert sardonic laughter]
Fact: most of what USAF does is ground support, be it close or distant. USAF was the only US service to develop and procure a dedicated close air support airplane. USMC also does air to ground support, and in fact that is the very reason Marine Air even exists. They have been doing CAS with A-4s, F-4s, and then F-18s, and you say they are renowned for it. So ask yourself, if they are so renowned for CAS why have they never asked for the A-10? They could even have had a navalized version, so that is no excuse. No, I don’t want an answer because I know you will just make up some more BS, but try to think it out in your own mind and you might learn something.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
People need to use a little perspective when they pass judgement on the procurement decisions of the cold war era. One common narrative is that the reason USAF had to use “hand me down” A-1s in Vietnam is because it was too focused on fast jets and ‘looked down’ on the CAS role. Yet the same critics don’t fault the U.S. Navy and Marines for divesting themselves of these A-1s as fast as they could replace them with fast jets.
Why were USAF and Navy BOTH focused on fast jets? Because the Eisenhower administration decided that trying to compete with the size of the Soviet conventional military forces was an unaffordable burden on the U.S. economy. Therefore the U.S. focused spending on strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems in order to achieve deterrence. The goal was to deter a major ground war with the Soviets rather than fight one, and if it became necessary to actually fight one it would be fought with nuclear weapons, where the U.S. had superiority. Smaller conventional U.S. ground forces would remain for projection of presence and as a trip wire against the Soviets, but nobody in the U.S. was equipping to fight a protracted ground war. Equipping to fight brushfire conflicts in third world countries was also not a priority, and it was necessary leave such contingencies to the collateral capabilities of the main forces in the event such a conflict occurred.
The need to conduct conventional ‘limited warfare’ operations in Vietnam was an unwelcome event in the context of this plan. USAF entered that conflict with a force designed to deter nuclear war, but rapidly adapted to the need for fixed wing CAS. USAF was way ahead of the Navy and Marines in its use of slow prop aircraft for CAS, who made no attempt to resurrect slow prop airplanes dedicated to CAS. Yet USAF receives all the criticism despite a demonstrated willingness to adapt.
While the U.S. was busy in Vietnam the calculus of deterrence began to change, and nuclear weapons were no longer considered sufficiently reliable in deterring a conventional ground war. The Army developed the M-1 tank and TOW missile. Defending against both the Soviets and the U.S. Army caused USAF to acquire the A-10, which could be argued (on another day) was actually a mistaken procurement inspired by the last war rather than the next war. To this day USAF is the only U.S. service to ever procure a dedicated low and slow CAS jet aircraft. The very purpose of Marine air is to support the Marine on the ground, yet the Marines have been conducting CAS with supersonic jets since the 1960s, and have never asked for an equivalent to the A-10. They spend their limited finding on swept wing aircraft, including the inefficient S/VTOL variety.
The force of fast jets that many today see as a dumb mistake was driven by the reality of the real possibility of nuclear war, and the need to avoid it.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The needs of USAF and USN were not incompatible in this case. The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. Both USAF and USN were asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and Macnamara logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with minor variations could do both jobs.
The reason one airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superior fighter. It was not originally intended to be what became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer with the addition of supersonic dash capability. The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too heavy for a fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam. They realized that they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper to recognize that the needs of USN had evolved, and this was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@grizwoldphantasia5005
I have responded to your dumb comments, you just refuse to accept the facts.
You: “The Air Force hates the ground support role; they want to be fighter jocks at 30,000 feet, or transcontinental bomber jocks, or even transport jocks who can build up a resume for the airlines. The Air Force hates spending money on a plane they hate.”
This is ignorant BS. USAF has done more CAS than all the other services combined, and by a wide margin. That because it is the air force, stupid. USAF is the only U.S. service to have ever procured a dedicated CAS aircraft. Show me the USMC version of the A-10. You can’t.
You: “You still haven't rebutted my claim that the Air Force wanted to control all air assets when split from the Army in 1947/48 BTW”
Of course the air force wanted control of all fixed wing aircraft. They are the air force, stupid. I guess the army shouldn't have all the tanks or the navy have all the submarines either.
Let the U.S. Army decide if the A-10 is useful? Giving the A-10 to the Army is a dumb idea because it will still be obsolete. Besides, the Army position on the A-10 is already clear, but you refuse to accept it because I came from the Army chief of staff. Apparently, you’d rather hear official Army policy from some private in the motor pool [Insert sardonic laughter].
“The only thing I care about is the effect on the target, I don’t give a rat’s ass what platform brings it in,” Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley https://www.csis.org/events/priorities-our-nations-army-general-mark-milley in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “I could care less if it’s a B-52, if it’s a B-1 bomber, if it’s an F-16, an F-15, an A-10. I don’t care if the thing was delivered by carrier pigeon. I want the enemy taken care of.”
The usefulness of the A-10 is known. Low and slow over a modern battlefield is not useful. No other air force is building an A-10 equivalent, and the closest thing to it, the SU-25 has suffered over Ukraine. You don't listen to U.S. Army generals, so you probably don't listen to the Ukrainian minister of defense who, has said he doesn't want the A-10.
“We have been requesting combat aircraft from our partners for a long time now,” Yuriy Sak, adviser to Ukraine’s minister of defense, told Air Force Magazine by phone from Kyiv on July 21. “We need Western-standard fighter jets. We need Western-standard combat aircraft. … To target Russian positions in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine needs “fast and versatile” combat aircraft such as the F-16—not slow-moving ground defense platforms such as the retiring fleet of U.S. A-10s, a proposition Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall entertained in comments”
You have been spewing BS that has no basis in reality, and I’m done responding to it. I’ve done all I can here to help other readers see your BS for what it is.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but repeat a narrative for decades and it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Well actually that is not a point of order, it is an opinion. One I suspect you got from Greg’s P-39 video. I am a Patreon supporter of Greg, but I do not buy that opinion, which is based on a magazine article written by a Bell executive. I think the writer was trying to present the aircraft as relevant even though it had failed to meet its original design intent, while burnishing the reputation of Bell as an innovator.
However, the nose is not really more streamlined in terms of the ideal shape in subsonic flow. The airplane was clean in its use of buried heat exchangers, but even so the overall drag was found to be high in reality, which disproves the supposed benefit of the pointy nose.
The specification called for a 37mm gun (to kill bombers) which would have been very difficult to install alongside an engine, a problem solved by the then unconventional aft mounted engine. Considering the extra weight of the drive shaft along with the dubious aerodynamic advantages, the 37mm gun remains the most reasonable primary purpose behind the configuration of this aircraft, one that a single magazine article cannot disprove.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1