Youtube comments of Gort (@gort8203).
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The funniest thing about the TSR-2 myth is that the majority of internet fanboys who think the wing loading of the F-104 somehow made it too dangerous to fly and unsuitable for the low-level strike role also think the TSR2 that was much heavier with equivalent wing loading was the perfect design for the job.
What follows is an edit added in response to a comment below from @sergarlantyrell7847.
I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as (supposedly) “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but also a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the same pitch-up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone also seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and the plane had a stick pusher to keep the pilot from going there.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German service was due to training and operational issues. They would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So, I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just saying it's ironic how many think the F-104G should have been cancelled for that reason. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. It was obsolete on its first flight.
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@roo72 It's documented in many places. I didn't just learn this yesterday, so if you expect me to cite from memory where you can find it, I don't have the time to read through my library for you. I'm just here to point out the mistake so people can do their own reading if they are interested in the facts. The important distinction here is the B-29 and B-36 were responses to two separate and distinct USAAC requests for bombers of different capability, and this video confuses those two. You could start with the Wikipedia pages for the B-36 and B-29. Note that the specification to which the B-29 was developed was issue earlier and called for range exceeding that of the B-17, but was not sufficient to bomb Germany form the western side of the Atlantic. These program concepts had different names but I can't remember them exactly.
B-29. Before World War II, the United States Army Air Corps concluded that the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, which would be the Americans' primary strategic bomber during the war, would be inadequate for the Pacific Theater, which required a bomber that could carry a larger payload more than 3,000 miles.[7]
In December 1939 [note, before the Blitz and concern that Britain might concede defeat], the Air Corps issued a formal specification for a so-called "superbomber" that could deliver 20,000 lb (9,100 kg) of bombs to a target 2,667 mi away, and at a speed of 400 mph.
The genesis of the B-36 can be traced to early 1941, prior to the entry of the United States into World War II. At the time, the threat existed that Britain might fall to the German "Blitz", making a strategic bombing effort by the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) against Germany impossible with the aircraft of the time. The USAAC therefore sought a bomber of truly intercontinental range,
The USAAC sent out the initial request on 11 April 1941, asking for a 450 mph top speed, a 275 mph cruising speed, a service ceiling of 45,000 ft—beyond the range of ground-based anti-aircraft fire—and a maximum range of 12,000 miles at 25,000 ft. These requirements proved too demanding for any short-term design, far exceeding the technology of the day, so on 19 August 1941, they were reduced to a maximum range of 10,000 mi, an effective combat radius of 4,000 mi with a 10,000 lb bombload, a cruising speed between 240 and 300 mph, and a service ceiling of 40,000 ft—above the maximum effective altitude of Nazi Germany's anti-aircraft guns, save for the rarely-deployed 12.8 cm FlaK 40 heavy flak cannon
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@heyfitzpablum You don't listen. Where did I say the A-10 and the SU-25 have identical roles? I said the SU-25 is more suitable for a greater variety of missions than the A-10, such as interdiction or armed recce, as well as close air support. I asked if you have reason to believe the SU-25 has insufficient loiter capability the job, or that it lacks the radios necessary for the job, and the crickets I hear in response tell me you have no reason. You just regurgitate the A-10 talking points because you want to claim the A-10 is better.
I'm not saying the A-10 isn't better for the very narrow mission of strafing undefended tanks with a 30mm gun, but that mission has proved be a pipe dream anyway. The A-10 hardly has a monopoly on CAS, and the Su-25 was indeed specifically meant for that role as well, and is actual a more broadly relevant aircraft. The reason is that the A-10 was born of politics. The authoritarian USSR government did not force the SU-25 design to placate the interservice rivalry that distorted the acquisition process in the U.S.
BTW fixed wing and helicopters have different roles and tactics. In Iraq the Army relearned that lesson when they tried to employ the Apache like fixed wing aircraft. USAF gave the A-10 the 30mm gun in order to take the anti-tank role from the prototype Cheyenne helicopter/fixed wing hybrid because that aircraft was designed to be employed on the battlefield like a fixed wing aircraft.
BTW, I don't put much weight on the loitering story. In fact, I repeated it to an A-10 pilot once and he told me it was BS. If you look at the history of CAS, rapid response to a call for support has actually been just as if not more important than loiter, and the A-10 is a slug when it comes to getting there quickly when troops need immediate support.
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That does not solve the problem, which you are ignoring, because the aircraft would be no more survivable if flown by the Army. The Army is not stupid. It is not the Army that cares about the A-10, it is politicians.
“The only thing I care about is the effect on the target, I don’t give a rat’s ass what platform brings it in,” Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “I could care less if it’s a B-52, if it’s a B-1 bomber, if it’s an F-16, an F-15, an A-10. I don’t care if the thing was delivered by carrier pigeon. I want the enemy taken care of.”
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@FastJetPerformance The closed pattern is a tight circuit. It is simply an overhead pattern entered directly from takeoff. There is nothing tighter. I was speaking of the techniques you used to fly the overhead pattern, not its dimensions.
Flight manual airspeed is 300 KIAS on initial rather than 350. That was a legal limitation below 10,000 ft in the U.S. in most places.
At 300 knots you did not pull power to idle at the break. The drag from pulling 3-4 G would slow the airplane below gear extension speed by the time you rolled out downwind. You might reduce power a bit if floating the break because you needed a wider pattern for an overshooting wind in the final turn or doing a no-flap pattern, but you would leave power up when pulling a tight break.
The flight manual shows lowering the gear once rolled out on downwind, not in the break. You did not want the gear in motion with more than 45 degrees of bank or more than 1.5 G because it could overstress the landing gear trunnions.
While AOA/G could be played in the final turn to rollout on final, pilots planned to fly the green donut or they were considered wide (AKA weak), and pilots were expected to fly the green donut on final, not showing a white chevron until near the runway. That was considered less than book performance and would be graded as such. Low power settings on short final could lead to an insidious sink rate that was the cause of more than one go around, undershoot, or crash. Flying even an on-speed final turn would made you fast if you suddenly rolled wings level on final, so you wanted to plan deceleration to avoid need for a large power reduction there.
If not using the drag chute it was common to aerobrake after touchdown to save brake heat and protect the tires, as there was no anti-skid. For a touch-and-go you just lower the nose from the landing attitude to the takeoff attitude without touching the nosewheel on the runway.
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@robertmaybeth3434 It was obviously suitable, or Germany and Canada would not have bought it specifically to fulfill their NATO obligations to perform that role. You can't see this because you do not understand the role or the history of combat aircraft in general. Here are some facts that may help you understand more:
Number of engines is irrelevant. All the aircraft that performed that role in that theater prior to the F-104, such as the F-84, were also single-engine. The F-104 was an improvement due to is speed, which improved its ability to reach its assigned targets, and do so more quickly.
All these single engine fighter-bombers had relatively short legs. It was not a long-range strategic bombing mission. The mission was to deliver a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy airfield, troop concentration, or supply dump. Strike fighters carried external fuel to extend their range, but even so in many cases it was expected to be a one-way mission. Pilots with insufficient fuel to return to a friendly base expected to bail out over a designated safe area for evasion and maybe have a chance to survive the war. People who did not serve during the cold war may not understand such plans, or the commitment it takes to perform them.
The weapon loadout was a single tactical nuclear bomb, so how much payload do you need. The F-104 could carry four external fuel tanks in addition to the weapon, so it had sufficient range to reach its assigned targets.
Hope that helps you understand the realities.
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The failure of the F-111B has become a mythical narrative on the internet. The reality is that the Navy changed its mind about the roles its next fighter needed to perform. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but if you repeat a narrative for decades it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. I was never meant to be a dogfighter.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter. But if the Navy had expected the F-111 to be a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objection of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its needs as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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These terms really mean nothing and are used interchangeably by so many people. The real problem emerges when attaching strict meaning to the letters "F" or "P" when part of an aircraft designation. Both letters have been used by the US to designate fighters, which started out being called scouts in the first world war. But they are fungible today. The F-105, F-111, and F-117 were really tactical bombers, and were labelled with an "F" mostly for political reasons rather than to describe the primary function of the aircraft.
Another issue is that while the Navy had separate communities of fighter and attack pilots, USAF tactical air forces called all their pilots fighter pilots even if they flew an attack type aircraft, because being a fighter pilot was more a state of mind than an air to air mission, and pilots could transition between both types of aircraft.
There has never been a letter to designate "interceptors" because all fighters can perform the interception role. There were a few dedicated all-weather bomber interceptors, but they all had the F-designation. For example, the F-89, 92, 102, and 106 were all designed to intercept and destroy incoming bombers, and had unique equipment not then used for air superiority fighter. That dedicated bomber interceptor era is pretty much over now.
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@michaelfrench3396 You remain wrong about everything.
The F-105 was the fastest thing going at low level. ALL airplanes are slower while carrying a heavy external load. The A-6 would not have been faster carrying that load. I don’t know that any of these aircraft were cleared for release of an external bombload at supersonic speed. Who said they would be at top speed when releasing their bombs? You are making up counters to irrelevant points not even made.
By the way, heavily laden is a relative term. Yes, bombs are heavy. If you think any jet carrying a normal bomb load is ‘heavily laden’, then they are all always heavily laden all the time, and there is no way to send a non-heavily laden jet against a target. You are soaking your comments in pejorative language that means nothing in realty.
Any jet attacking a SAM site was going to do it at low altitude. Of course there is more AAA there. What plane do you think should have been used to attack SAMs from higher altitude (which was of course within the heart of the SAM engagement envelope). The F-105 was designed for striking ground targets. The air force did not have a better plane for the job or they would have been using it. We could discuss the tactics employed, which varied during the war, but that is beyond the scope of your comments and your knowledge.
Weasels flew in pairs. Of course, in the battle area. Not to make them harder to hit, but because they were a limited resource, and you don’t put them all in the same area. Because they had to maneuver a lot to do their job, and a two-ship flight is a maneuverable formation.
“I'm saying that the military leadership knew that it was a bad idea to throw a Large group of heavily laden aircraft at a Sam site”
No, they didn’t know that, and it’s an inaccurate description of what they did. Again, your pejorative language means nothing. It was a strike package. You have no idea of how a strike package works. It is not “throwing damn near a hundred slow moving heavily. Laden bombers at a anti-aircraft missile site”. A strike package is a coordinated group of aircraft, and they all don’t swarm over a single point in the sky at the same time. You need to learn a lot more before you start criticizing the actions of people with more training, experience, and responsibly in this area than you will ever know.
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Unremembered by whom?
The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but repeat a narrative for decades and it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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No mention of why the Navy wanted to explore fighters with liquid cooled engines. Perhaps for the same reason the European powers used liquid cooled engines in their carrier aircraft? Liquid cooled engines in general can produce more power per unit of displacement, per unit of frontal area, and sometimes even per unit of weight. Basically, superior cooling allowed use of higher manifold pressure. The liquid cooled engines were also generally more fuel efficient, allowing an airplane to carry less fuel or fly longer on an equivalent amount of fuel.
The countries using the liquid cooled engine were not deterred by the supposed drawbacks commonly attributed to them, so how serious could they be? For example, do radials really require so much less maintenance that the difference is significant enough to outweigh the superior performance of liquid cooled engines? Eliminating the need to maintain a cooling system (and the stores to service it) is a benefit, but then you have more spark plugs to check and change, more valves to adjust, maybe more bolts and connections to check for security considering all the separate cylinders and the wider temperature cycle of the air cooled engine. I would like to hear from a maintainer of these WWII engines on this subject.
Perhaps the Navy preference for radials is due as much to the usual factor that drives the Navy – tradition -- as it is to these perceived advantages of the radial. Between the wars, radials were pretty much king in the U.S., and inline engines more favored in Europe. It was natural for many U.S. fighters to have radial engines, even the land-based Army fighters. It was only after the excellent Allison V-1710 arrived that the P-40 was developed out of the radial engine P-36, and outperformed it. (Note, as aircraft speeds increased the advantage of lower frontal area was magnified.) In the run up to WWII the U.S maintained an edge in radial development and Europe had an edge in inline development, so perhaps the superior potential of the liquid cooled engine was not really perceived by many in the U.S. Perhaps the Navy just stuck with what they knew rather try to put that engine developed for the Army into one of their fighters. Food for thought?
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"The AVRO Lancaster could actually carry More Weight"
That must be the new math I've heard about.
The B-29 empty weighed 74,500 and had a normal max takeoff weight of 133,500, So it could lift 59,000 lbs. Combat overload was an additional 1500 lbs.
The Lancaster empty weighed 36,900 and had a max takeoff weight of 68,000, so it could lift 31,100 lbs.
If these numbers are even close to accurate the Lancaster could not carry more weight.
Reliability of the well developed RR Merlin was obviously ahead of the sill developing R-3350, but that engine made the outstanding performance of the B-29 possible. It couldn't have performed on the more reliable Merlin.
More agile? Says who?
I don't know why you think the B-29 couldn't have done the famous dam-buster raid that did not actually change the course of the war, but if the Lancaster hadn't been there I'd suspect the B-24 could have also handled it.
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@williamzk9083 For one thing, people don't always use consistent terminology, and for another the piece you read was generalizing about an overall concept, not describing a specific aircraft. The FU-4 has balance tabs, not spring tabs, unless the Navy didn't know what it was talking about in the pilot manual.
Spring tabs are a type of servo tab, but you can actually have a servo tab without springs, which means the pilot can only move the tab and not the whole control surface. The term spring tab covers a couple of different types of linkage design. The tab type that is not confusing is the plain balance tab, which is what this airplane has. The pilot does not directly move the tab as he does with a control tab. The pilot moves the control surface directly, and the balance linkage moves the tab opposite the direction of the surface to reduce the force needed to move it against the airflow. There is no spring to ensure the tab moves only when control forces are high, or they would call it a spring tab.
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@MrArgus11111 Surprising, but then again this is YouTube, where anybody can post a video about anything no matter how little they really know about the subject. Boyd did a couple of good things such as sparking a mathematical analysis of energy maneuverability. Good pilots tacitly understood EM, but getting into an objective format that helped inform the development of the next generation of fighter planes. But he was an extremist rather than a genius, and luckily senior USAF leadership that had actual experience commanding combat operations did not fall for the extreme concept of the simple dogfighter.
Boyd was wrong about what was needed to dominate in actual air combat, as opposed to friendly dogfights over the local air patch, and he and his acolytes were wrong about the need for modernization in general. What was really bizarre was that while they were trying to hobble the USAF with a fleet of simple dogfighters, the Soviets we working as hard as they could to modernize their own weapons systems. The Gulf War proved Boyd and the ‘reformers’ wrong, but they still had the nerve to insisting this war proved them right! There was no way to retreat from the position they had zealously established for themselves, so they tried to twist reality into their own story.
To me the OODA loop is just common sense painted up to look like incisive insight. I’ve seen this sort of thing from consultants of all types, particularly in aviation safety. They make a bunch of graphics and charts to explain things you already know with bigger words, and then charge you $400K for it.
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The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but if you repeat a narrative for decades it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements later changed.
When the TFX program began the USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. To achieve this twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. It was not intended to be a dogfighter.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that the USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and the USN wanted side-by-side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy and made two different configurations, but MacNamara’s DOD wanted more commonality and thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly to be a dogfighter. If the Navy had wanted a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objections of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its requirements for its next fighter as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and they realized that the missileer was too limited a role. The also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the overweight airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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@dickmelsonlupot7697 You must be really stupid to start an argument by calling me stupid. Wow, that really put me in my place. You and all the fanboys who go around stupidly saying "bbrrt" to each other after learning about air warfare from video games think you are the experts. Right . . .
The A-10A was cheap to maintain. The A-10C is not your father's Oldsmobile and has almost as many systems as an F-16. I doubt it is actually all that much cheaper to maintain, and given that it can't perform half the roles of an F-16, it provides less bang for the buck.
You call me stupid, but your automotive analogy is really stupid. The purpose of CAS is to deliver ordnance on targets in close proximity to friendly forces. Precision guided munitions have become the weapons of choice, and they are now delivered by almost any fighter or bomber in the inventory. It's now 2020, not 1951, 1967, or even 1991; it's 2020. You think we should keep doing CAS the way we did it in 1951.
The only ordnance an A-10 can deliver that an F-16 can't is a 30mm anti tank round. These days strafing with the gun is restricted to dire circumstances, even in relatively permissive environments. It will not be a viable tactic in a battle near the combined arms formations of a major world power. The F-111 killed at least as many tanks as the A-10 in the Persian Gulf war, and technology has improved in the last 30 years. The future of interdicting armor is not strafing with a gun, it is guided anti-armor munitions delivered by multi-role aircraft.
Loitering low and slow is something you do in low intensity war against goat herders who do not have modern anti aircraft defenses. It will get you killed in a war against a major power. But if you can loiter high, nothing does it better than a B-1 or B-52, which can carry enough ordnance to keep goat herders at bay all day long.
As far back as Vietnam, USAF began withdrawing the A-1 Skyraider from CAS in high threat areas because it became increasingly vulnerable as anti aircraft defenses moved south. The Air Force replaced O-2 and OV-10 FAC aircraft with two seat F-100 and F-4 fast movers over the higher threat areas. USAF even bit the bullet and rushed out to buy a version of the Navy A-7 because it needed faster less vulnerable aircraft for interdiction and CAS.
By the 1980s USAF already realized the A-10 was not going to be survivable if the Soviets came across the Fulda Gap and north German plain. I knew a few A-10 pilots who trained and exercised to deter that war. They did not plan to loiter over the battlefield. They approached known targets behind masking by terrain, and when they unmasked to attack they had the throttles to the stops wishing the airplane could go faster. They did not expect to survive if war broke out. Yet you want the air force to keep flying this airplane against even more lethal air defenses of the 21st century. You must think keeping the "bbrrt" sound is worth pilots dying over.
Funny, nobody demands that the Navy or Marines use a low, slow, and vulnerable airplane, even though all they've done since Vietnam is deliver CAS with fast moving jets. Why not? Politics. People like you who think you are smarter than USAF are the problem. You are ignorant and you call me stupid. You are living in the past Bubba.
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I can't fault Dark Skies for repeating the worn-out narrative that multirole aircraft are usually failures, but it's essentially a myth, as history is replete with examples of airplanes that excelled at diverse roles. The fact that the F-4 Phantom performed well for both the USAF and USN must have informed the McNamara decision to pursue a common follow-on aircraft for both services. The Panavia Tornado would later successfully cover the same diverse mission set at which the F-111 had been aimed.
The fundamental reason the Navy pulled out of the TFX program was because the needs of the service changed. The TFX was meant to produce an airframe that could function as both a strike aircraft and a fleet defense fighter. It was to replace the cancelled Douglas F6D Missileer fleet defense fighter project for the Navy. The Missileer was cancelled basically because it was subsonic to allow for long loiter (CAP), and the Navy changed its mind and decided the fleet defense role would require an aircraft with high supersonic dash as well as long loiter. A large swing-wing aircraft could provide range, loiter, and high dash speed, so it was logical for DOD to think a single airframe could serve both services.
Remember that this was the age of thinking that future air combat would be with missiles rather than guns. What happened was that the Vietnam War came along, and combat experience convinced the Navy that it needed a different airplane than what it had asked for -- it needed the new aircraft to be capable of air superiority missions as well. This change in design role could not be met with the by then F-111 design.
USAF always wanted the TFX as a bomber rather than a fighter, and it was needed as soon as possible to replace the F-105, so they continued with the program after the Navy pulled out. It’s ironic that USAF was by then stuck with the side-by-side seating required by USN over USAF objections, as that configuration is one of the things that made the F-111 structure heavier than it could have been otherwise. One of the first things Grumman told USN when they were given the task of designing the F-14 to the revised specification was that the side-by-side seating had to go, and the Navy had learned a lesson and relented. Grumman stood on the shoulders of the work done by General Dynamics and corrected that and other structural inefficiencies of the F-111 design, resulting in the spectacular F-14 that could perform both fleet defense and air superiority roles quite well. And it later went on to become a capable strike aircraft as well.
It was not the folly of McNamara that failed the TFX program, as was air combat requirements that were changing as rapidly as airplanes could be designed to meet them. Based on emerging combat experience USN wisely decided that even a supersonic Missileer was not the best use of hanger deck space. The F-111 was successful at deep interdiction and strike for USAF, which never saw it as a fighter. Since it is always easier to bomb with a fighter than to fight with a bomber, all you have to do is look at both past and present tactical aircraft to debunk the myth that multi-role or multi-service aircraft never work. But few today have the combination of range and penetrating ability the F-111 brought to the game in its day.
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@pogo1140
CAS is not being moved to F-16 squadrons, it has always been there. What do you think that have been doing in the sandbox all these years. The F-15E, B-1, and B-52 also do CAS, with more survivability and/or accuracy than the A-10 can over a hostile battlefield. The F-35 is not needed for that role, although it can do CAS when it isn't needed to penetrate contested airspace.
Unless my reading is very of of date, Helicopters and drones do not replace fixed wing CAS, which the Army is still very much interested in, just as they are still interested in artillery and armored vehicles. Helicopters are not analogous to indirect fire support, they are analogous to direct fire from highly mobile fire support vehicles, and their doctrine and tactics reflect the differences.
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@grizwoldphantasia5005
So I’m the ignorant one for quoting the generals in charge of the actual policy, while you are the genius for ignoring them and making up you own facts. [insert sardonic laughter]
Fact: most of what USAF does is ground support, be it close or distant. USAF was the only US service to develop and procure a dedicated close air support airplane. USMC also does air to ground support, and in fact that is the very reason Marine Air even exists. They have been doing CAS with A-4s, F-4s, and then F-18s, and you say they are renowned for it. So ask yourself, if they are so renowned for CAS why have they never asked for the A-10? They could even have had a navalized version, so that is no excuse. No, I don’t want an answer because I know you will just make up some more BS, but try to think it out in your own mind and you might learn something.
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@carlpolen7437 You are trying to mildly disagree with a proven fact. The only weapon the A-10 can employ that other tactical aircraft cannot is the 30mm gun. Forget all the stuff that can go under the wings, because every other jet can also employ those weapons. The difference is that those other aircraft can also do other missions the A-10 cannot perform, such OCA.DCA,CAP, AI, SEAD, and more. Nobody is going to be making gun runs at tanks on a modern battlefield. Modern ground attack is about guided weapons employed from safer distances. It is not worth keeping the A-10 for one unique weapon of limited utility. This is why USAF wants to send them to the boneyard and switch the O&M funds that support them to more versatile and efficient aircraft that are sorely needed.
"perhaps the 'low and slow' missions the A10s were designed for were never as feasible as they seemed. "
That is another inconvenient truth most A-10 lovers refuse to accept. Many think the A-10 was conceived as a tank killer, but it really started as a replacement for the A-1 Skyraider. In other words, it was conceived to fight the last war, not the next one. The anti-tank gun was added to the design in order to sell the A-10 to Congress as a less expensive alternative to the very expensive Cheyenne helicopter, so as to keep the CAS mission and funding in the USAF. In reality the A-10 was expected to suffer a sacrificial loss rate in blunting any WARSAW Pact invasion of Western Europe, and the pilots did not expect to survive long. GBAD systems have improved significantly since the 1970s, but we still have this airplane that is obsolete for anything other than low intensity warfare.
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@robert-trading-as-Bob69 Perhaps you share some misconceptions with the creator of this video. Perhaps I can help with how you see things.
“The airflow over the wing creates lift, which would be difficult with the wing at an angle as per the taildragger scenario envisioned by the video.”
The angle of the wing doesn’t make it difficult to create lift, the angle is necessary to create sufficient lift for takeoff. The point is that angle is best controlled with the elevator, and you don’t get a benefit from sitting at that angle prior to nearing takeoff speed (unless on a rough field, see below).
“It would take longer to achieve translational lift.”
Translational lift is a helicopter thing, not an airplane thing. The wing provides lift as soon as it has airflow moving past it. It just needs to reach a certain airspeed before it has enough lift to break ground. Keeping the wing at a high angle of attack for the entire acceleration run incurs drag that slows the acceleration. Not a problem in a powerful prop fighter like an F8F, but a definite issue for an early jet with poor takeoff acceleration due to low installed thrust. You must have heard of the civilian-owned F-86 that failed to takeoff and crashed into an ice cream stand because the pilot rotated to takeoff attitude too soon.
“I do seem to recall crop duster taildraggers having VTOL capabilities.”
You must mean STOL capabilities, and of course they do. So does the OV-10 nose dragger. STOL is a function of slow speed lift, and does not require a tail wheel. Tail wheel aircraft are often considered better at coping with rough field surfaces, but for a smooth hard surface the landing gear has no real benefit, and a nose gear usually allows for harder braking after landing. The subject of this video was not designed to be rough field STOL jet.
Tailwheel aircraft benefit from lighter weight, and less drag if the landing gear does not retract. It is arguably better for soft rough lumpy surfaces. Other than that they are no benefits and multiple drawbacks to tailwheel landing gear.
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@johncunningham4820 Predictable response. I easily disproved your absurd statement that the Lancaster carried more weight, so now you want to argue that part of the weight carried was fuel. You obviously don’t even understand that every long-range aircraft trades off between fuel and payload for any mission. The amount of fuel carried depends on the distance at which you need to deliver the payload. Shorter distance, more payload, longer distance less payload. Why? because the total weight than can be lifted is the given, and that is what YOU chose to compare. But your statement was incontrovertibly false, and your new desire to compare bomb capacity is also a loser. According to Wikipedia, the Lancaster had a maximum normal bomb load of 14,000 lb. (6,400 kg) of bombs. The B-29 could carry 20,000 lb. (9,100 kg) maximum over short distances and could even be modified to carry two 22,000 lb. (10,000 kg) Grand Slam bombs externally. The B-29 was simply a far more capable aircraft than the Lancaster.
The video was about the B-29, and your desire to try to cut it down was not well served by changing the subject to the Avro Lancaster. So now you want to change the subject to the Dh Mosquito, which is completely irrelevant to the B-29. Why? It seems you are just a chauvinist with an axe to grind. But again you are wrong, because the Mosquito, wonderful airplane that it was, at 4000 lb. of bombs did not have a higher payload capacity then the B-17, which could carry 8,000 lbs. internally or 17,600 lbs. total. The B-17 could go 20000miles with 6000 lbs. of bombs, something the Mosquito could never match. Your ignorant claim does a disservice to a great aircraft by comparing it to a long-range heavy bomber it could not hope to match in terms of range and bombload.
I don’t even want to get into it, but your claim that the B-29 was far more “cumbersome” than the Lancaster just because of an extra 20 feet on each wingtip is also ludicrous. I doubt you have ever flown large aircraft, or you would know that while 20 extra feet of wing can be a serious factor during taxi in close quarters, it is barely noticeable in flight.
Your desire to denigrate the B-29 and pump up the Lancaster is silly. Both airplanes were bombers. One was more advanced and could lift more and carry it farther than the other. Those are the facts, and you should learn to live with them.
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People need to use a little perspective when they pass judgement on the procurement decisions of the cold war era. One common narrative is that the reason USAF had to use “hand me down” A-1s in Vietnam is because it was too focused on fast jets and ‘looked down’ on the CAS role. Yet the same critics don’t fault the U.S. Navy and Marines for divesting themselves of these A-1s as fast as they could replace them with fast jets.
Why were USAF and Navy BOTH focused on fast jets? Because the Eisenhower administration decided that trying to compete with the size of the Soviet conventional military forces was an unaffordable burden on the U.S. economy. Therefore the U.S. focused spending on strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems in order to achieve deterrence. The goal was to deter a major ground war with the Soviets rather than fight one, and if it became necessary to actually fight one it would be fought with nuclear weapons, where the U.S. had superiority. Smaller conventional U.S. ground forces would remain for projection of presence and as a trip wire against the Soviets, but nobody in the U.S. was equipping to fight a protracted ground war. Equipping to fight brushfire conflicts in third world countries was also not a priority, and it was necessary leave such contingencies to the collateral capabilities of the main forces in the event such a conflict occurred.
The need to conduct conventional ‘limited warfare’ operations in Vietnam was an unwelcome event in the context of this plan. USAF entered that conflict with a force designed to deter nuclear war, but rapidly adapted to the need for fixed wing CAS. USAF was way ahead of the Navy and Marines in its use of slow prop aircraft for CAS, who made no attempt to resurrect slow prop airplanes dedicated to CAS. Yet USAF receives all the criticism despite a demonstrated willingness to adapt.
While the U.S. was busy in Vietnam the calculus of deterrence began to change, and nuclear weapons were no longer considered sufficiently reliable in deterring a conventional ground war. The Army developed the M-1 tank and TOW missile. Defending against both the Soviets and the U.S. Army caused USAF to acquire the A-10, which could be argued (on another day) was actually a mistaken procurement inspired by the last war rather than the next war. To this day USAF is the only U.S. service to ever procure a dedicated low and slow CAS jet aircraft. The very purpose of Marine air is to support the Marine on the ground, yet the Marines have been conducting CAS with supersonic jets since the 1960s, and have never asked for an equivalent to the A-10. They spend their limited finding on swept wing aircraft, including the inefficient S/VTOL variety.
The force of fast jets that many today see as a dumb mistake was driven by the reality of the real possibility of nuclear war, and the need to avoid it.
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The needs of USAF and USN were not incompatible in this case. The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. Both USAF and USN were asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and Macnamara logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with minor variations could do both jobs.
The reason one airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superior fighter. It was not originally intended to be what became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer with the addition of supersonic dash capability. The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too heavy for a fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam. They realized that they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper to recognize that the needs of USN had evolved, and this was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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@VAMobMember No, it absolutely does not, dude. Quicker response just means the airplane reacts more quickly to a stick input and pitches more rapidly to the AOA limit. It does not increase the amount of lift the airplane generates at that limit. These are two separate things.
Back when it was in service the USAF jet that had the highest G onset rate was the T-37 trainer, which had a high incidence of G-induced loss of consciousness. Very rapid response to stick input and very rapid buildup of G, even though it was a very stable aircraft. Even statically stable fighters are very responsive to the controls. Making the controls twitchier does not really make the airplane turn better. Getting to the G limit a fraction of a section sooner only improves the turn for a fraction of second, but twitchy controls make it hard to hold the airplane right on the AOA or G limit throughout the turn. Holding the airplane at the limit for 10s of seconds is much more productive than reaching that limit a 10th of a second sooner. With twitchy controls a human pilot has trouble holding the wing precisely at the AOA or G desired, but FBW controls can do it for him.
Again, the real purpose of relaxed static stability is to allow the tailplane to add to the total G produced by the aircraft rather than subtract from it. If the wing is producing 30,000 lb. of lift, but the tail has to produce 2,000 lbs. of negative lift to hold the nose up at the desired AOA, the airplane is only producing a total of 28,000 lbs. of lift. If you move the CG aft of the center of pressure and the tail produces 2,000 lbs. of positive lift while holding the desired AOA, the airplane is producing total of 32,000 pounds of lift. Guess which one turns tighter.
This is of benefit even if you are not producing lift at the limit. Say you only need 20,000 lbs. of lift for the turn you want to sustain. If the wing has to produce less of that total lift it can operate at a reduced angle of attack, reducing drag and making the G more sustainable.
I won't bother to explain the reduction in trim drag when the airplane geos supersonic, which is another important benefit of relaxed static stability.
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@wartornforester1868 Again a very long run-on comment, which is hard to break down and follow, but I will address a couple of you points because you presented your views with civility and I appreciate that very much in this venue.
You said: "My problem is that it [the A-10] did have success and should not be disgarded and ignored completely." Actually I don't see that it has had all that much success, if we define success as employing unique capabilities to do things other systems could not do to change the course of battle. When you built a single purpose airplane, it has to do that single thing better than any other airplane you have available. If you remove flying low and slow over the enemy to shoot a 30mm gun from your list of essential missions, it is clear that the A-10 is no longer essential. All other ordnance can be delivered by other aircraft, usually more safely without overflying the enemy. Low and slow is old fashioned CAS, and anybody who follows this stuff should be aware that aircraft employing those high risk tactics will not survive long in the face of serious anti aircraft defenses. The bottom line is that we do not keep airplanes for what they have done for us in the past, we keep them for what they can do in the future. USAF needs desperately needs to modernize.
One should not generally think of helicopters like fixed wing close air support. The US Army doesn't. Close air support is basically a form of off board inorganic indirect fire. Unless doctrine has changed recently, helicopters are considered high speed organic maneuver elements that quickly bring direct fires to where they are needed on the battlefield. U.S. forces have become dependent on close air support because they have been travelling light, both to get downrange quickly and to not have to drag artillery all over the theater while responding to insurgent militias. In a war against a major power artillery would have to return as the largest component of indirect fires used against front line enemy formations. Aircraft will be busy carrying out air superiority and interdiction missions to protect friendly maneuver formations from air attack and follow-on forces.
Obviously my opinions are my own, but I share many of the views held by senior commanders and other experts that are available in open source documents. I am former military, but more relevant is that I have followed this stuff for a long time. I don't believe in playing a credentials game on this incognito forum, and people here should look at the facts presented rather than try to rely on ad-hominem support for their positions. I'm getting a kick out of all the people telling me I have to watch Greg's video on the bomber mafia's "deceit and treachery"; it must be true because he made a video expressing that position. Greg's channel is my favorite on YouTube, but that doesn't make me a blind follower. Too many YouTube viewers seem to be uncritical followers of anything they see that strikes their fancy, which is really scary.
Again, I appreciate your civil comments, to which I have no problem responding.
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@Jason-fm4my
I'm getting tired of being called an idiot by ignorant fanboys, and your comments seemed like more of same. Perhaps I gave them short attention due to their arriving along with Lupot's and starting with “lol”. I’ll probably be sorry, but if you want me to address them:
“lol, the Russians and most other countries use the su-25(still in production) that fulfills the same role. The Chinese use the Q-5 and are building the L-15B for this.”
--The SU-25 is another fairly unique airplane, but even it not equivalent to an A-10. It outperforms the A-10 in speed and climb and is closer to the A-7 in performance. Any dedicated attack plane USAF buys to replace the A-10 is more likely to perform more like something between an SU-25 and an A-7 than the A-10.
--The Q-5 is not even close to an A-10, it’s as supersonic capable strike fighter. If you think this airplane can do CAS, an F-16 certainly can. You don’t seem to realize that this airplane makes my argument instead of yours.
--The L-15B is an advanced trainer that can perform ground attack, much like the KAI T-50 and maybe the coming T-7A Red hawk. None of those airplanes resemble an A-10, they more closely resemble a light fighter like an F-16. They hardly make the case that the unique A-10 is needed for the same role.
“Only the embarrassingly weak NATO airforces don't have dedicated CAS anymore. I don't know if you are using Germany who can barely scrape 6 working planes together as your example of military brilliance.”
--This impertinent and antagonistic comment was one reason I did not respond. Badmouthing NATO and Germany doesn’t convince me of anything. It implies I made some vague comment on “military brilliance” which I did not. It also implies that all non-NATO countries in the world have dedicated CAS aircraft like the A-10, which is not true. Many countries around the world do have light close air support aircraft, but they cannot be compared to the A-10. They also have fast jet strike or multirole fighters that cannot be compared to the A-10. What IS interesting is that those countries believe their various aircraft are adequate to perform CAS, and they don’t have an A-10 equivalent.
“Even the U.S. Airforce is wishy washy on keeping or replacing the A-10 with the Super Tacano.”
--USAF tried multiple times to retire the A-10 and apply the funding to more modern aircraft; they have hardly been “wishy washy” about that desire. The Tucano type light attack aircraft concept began as study for a light attack aircraft for our allies battling insurgent forces, not for an aircraft that would be used by USAF in a major conflict against a near peer world power. A less capable aircraft than the A-10 would be even less useful in a major conflict. The USAF does not need a dedicated COIN aircraft for use against insurgent goat herders, but the Afghani air force could use one.
“None of the other commenters here have brought up any examples or sources detailing significant combat loses that might precipitate dropping the dedicated CAS role altogether as you are suggesting.”
--The A-10 has never fought a major war, so its combat loss rate is irrelevant. This is where you guys completely miss the point. The A-10 has been fighting goat herders, so of course it hasn’t suffered losses. Almost any airplane can do that, hence the idea of using a cheaper plan like a Tucano. But we already have F-16s and others that can also do it, so we don’t need an A-10 or a Tucano to fight the goat herders unless we plan to continue doing it for a very long time. The U.S. is trying to get out of that war, so now is not the time to invest in staying there.
“Even the US Airforce is only basing this decision on cost.”
--“Even” USAF? Listen carefully now: The whole point of the argument is about cost, as force composition is always about cost. The fanboys either think cost is irrelevant, or they don’t know how to really measure it. USAF knows how to measure cost, because they actually fight with airplanes, but all the armchair keyboard warriors think they understand costs better than USAF. It’s amazingly ludicrous.
--If it cost the same or less to keep all the A-10s AND still buy the multi-role fighters USAF really needs, they would be happy to hang on to the A-10 in case it can be used in a low threat environment somewhere. The problem is that USAF can’t afford that, so keeping it cuts into readiness for a real war. Where is the Navy and Marine version of the A-10? They can’t afford it either--but they have a better lobby and are not forced to have it.
“That's why we would be the only country to try and drop dedicated CAS while actively successfully using it. If we completely dropped dedicated CAS NATO, South Korea, and Japan would likely have to develop their own to replace our lost capability.”
--Stop comparing CAS against desert goat herders with CAS in a major conflict, where the A-10 would not be a success.
--But if those countries thought they needed dedicated CAS aircraft, they could spend their hard earned cash on them. If you pay attention you can see that are voting with their wallets and buying multi-role aircraft, not A-10 equivalents.
--Fighters have always performed CAS, and modern multi-role aircraft can perform CAS even better, as well as other mission that must be successful prosecuted before CAS can become viable. The P-47 video is what started all these comments, but ignorant fanboys raving about the P-47 as the grandfather of the A-10 don’t realize it was actually more akin to an F-100 or an F-16.
“While I support the U.S. Airforce, they aren't infallible and civilians are entitled to criticize how their tax dollars are spent even if they turn out to be wrong.”
--Most civilians don’t seem to understand the fundamental arithmetic of preparedness. USAF is trying to field the most combat power it can for the money, because it is preparing to fight a war with a major power, not goat herders in the desert. You all think you know more about CAS than USAF does, but you don’t.
(Note: I mean no disrespect toward the majority of the goat herders of the world. It is just a convenient shorthand for the insurgent militias that lack sophisticated anti-aircraft defense systems.)
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I agree that the F-104 was an alternative to the G91, not just potentially but in actuality. It was a much more capable aircraft than the G91, which was just another subsonic jet like the F-84F that Germany was already flying. As you point out the F-104 airframe was inherently suitable to low-level high-speed flight, and the G had the necessary systems for the nuclear strike role. Only 770 G91s were ever built as opposed to 2600 F-104s, so it is clear which aircraft provided better operational capability for NATO.
It was not TAC doctrine to intercept soviet bombers, it was ADC doctrine. They adopted the F-104 as an interim interceptor when the F-106 was suffering development delays. The F-104 didn’t have radar missiles or the SAGE system so it was not a capable all-weather interceptor, so they gave them back to TAC when they got the F-106.
In Vietnam the F-104C performed escort, CAP, and CAS with a good deal of success, except it never got to actually engage a MiG there because it was not challenged by them. The G91would not have been able to perform the counter air missions.
I think the G91 was a niche aircraft that was a waste of space for most countries, as the number produced seems to bear out.
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@rogerwilco99 Yes, like the 101 it suffered from "pitch-up" at high AOA, but I'm not sure what you mean by "stability issues", but I'm not aware of any unique instability in the F-104. If you have any specific info in that regard please share. As far as I have read it shared many flight characteristics with other jets with low aspect ratio highly loaded wings and a high polar moment of inertia, but instability was not the cause of that overused moniker. It had a high approach speed and you had to give the airplane your full attention during most phases of flight, but when properly handled it was not really more dangerous than other fighters of its day. The USAF quickly moved on from the 104 because it was a sports car that achieved its high kinematic performance by carrying very little in the way of fuel, weapons, and sensors, and USAF wanted more of those in a fighter. The Luftwaffe had a higher accident rate than the USAF primary because they had skipped an entire generation of slower jets and went straight into the double-sonic F-104. They were flying it in the usually cloudy central European weather, and flying it at high speed at low level, which was a very unforgiving operational environment. Here is one good summary: https://theaviationgeekclub.com/heres-luftwaffe-dubbed-iconic-f-104-starfighter-widow-maker/
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Turn performance in WWII is often overrated and misunderstood. At low speed an airplane with more wing or lift coefficient will usual turn tighter because it can produce more G at that speed than an airplane with less wing or lift coefficient. But at high speed turn rate and radius is limited by the amount of G the airplane or pilot can sustain, because at that speed even a small wing can produce enough lift to reach that limit. Load factor limits for these airplanes are hard to come by, so when comparing them that figure is often replaced by an assumption of what the average pilot could sustain. The lower that assumed G limit is, the slower the speed at which the 'less lift' airplane can match the turn of the 'more lift' airplane.
The German pilots interviewed did not seem concerned that the Spitfire could turn more tightly than the 109. They knew what they were doing. Air combat in WWII was not fought like WWI. Tight turning was considered more of a defensive than an offensive maneuver. Speed of climb and dive were the performance attributes that dominated in combat, where the goal was to attack the enemy from a position of advantage rather than to face off into a fair duel against an equal and aware fighter. If a 109 could not down a Spitfire in a brief turn before bleeding airspeed he would be ill-advised to get anchored in a slow speed dogfight where his odds of victory were much diminished.
Give a smart WWII pilot a choice between a quicker turning fighter that underperforms the opposition and a slower turning fighter that outperforms the opposition and he will usually choose the later because is increases his chances of both victory and survival.
*[Addendum for clarity] *
My point here is not to enter an argument particular to the Spitfire and BF109, but to point out in principle why a slow speed turning advantage was not the most important attribute in WWII combat. But if like Closterman you think the 109 could turn better than the Spitfire at slower speeds, then just swap the assumed attributes of the two aircraft for the purpose of this discussion, or imagine two theoretical aircraft.
The Spitfire had significantly more wing area and lower wing loading than the 109, so with other things equal it should turn better when slower. But all things are not necessarily equal, so it is possible that the 109 could have had better slow speed lift through a combination of factors such as an airfoil with a greater coefficient of lift, less washout, etc. The use of the automatic leading-edge slots could have reduced the need for washout and allowed the outer portion of the wing to produce more lift than if it had more washout.
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@airplanes42 To begin with, Arnold’s 1939 memo should be read carefully. It does not prohibit development of drop tanks for fighters, it states that no USAAC funding will be expended on such development. Aircraft manufacturers were free to privately fund drop tanks, but the Army didn’t have the money for that. At the time external fuel tanks was seen as overload fuel for ferry flights rather than combat missions. Use of long-range fighters to escort deep bombing raids was not part of official doctrine. Yet while there were long range tanks for the P-38, Alexander Kartveli fought against fitting drop tanks to the P-47 for a long time because he believed that would spoil its clean aerodynamics and pervert its intended role.
Here is something I posted elsewhere on drop tanks on the 1930s:
While aircraft speed and altitude had increased since the great war the purpose of fighters was still to control the skies over friendly territory and the battlefield, not to penetrate deep into the enemy heartland. A new community within the U.S Army was trying to develop daylight precision bombing for the latter purpose, but fighters were not a part of that thinking.
Fighters of the 1930s could barely keep up with bombers, and it was not thought that they would have the range necessary to accompany heavy bombers on raids deep into enemy territory. Even if they could, the fighter generals would not allow their own meagre assets to be used for that purpose. Long range bomber and short range tactical aviation advocates competed with each other for primacy in doctrine as well as funding. The tactical advocates had the upper hand because they were aligned with the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and armor generals, while the new-thinking strategic bombing advocates were seen as the fringe. So bomber doctrine and design assumed bombers would have to defend themselves. Saying the bomber will always get through didn’t mean there would not be losses, it simply meant that the target would always be hit.
With fighter performance being limited by weight and size, the fighter community did not want the performance of fighters diluted by making them heaver so they could fly further. U.S. fighters already tended to be heavier than their European counterparts simply because of the greater distances they had to fly within the United States. Rather than making fighters even larger, auxiliary fuel tanks were considered to extend range for ferry flights, but not for combat flights. In fact, during this period there was a school of thought that auxiliary fuel should be carried internally rather than externally, because the drag of an external fuel tank used up a good portion of the extra fuel carried. So, some fighters were given additional space for internal fuel that was used only for ferry flights. This was called overload fuel, because when so loaded the aircraft exceeded its design gross weight, making it unsuitable for combat but okay for non-maneuvering ferry flights.
The power exerted by the so-called bomber mafia is vastly overrated. Hap Arnold’s 1939 memo was written in this environment and is completely irrelevant to later wartime policy. By the beginning of 1942 it was nothing but a historical archive of a superseded policy, and Armold directed the air staff to get drop tanks on fighters as soon as possible.
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@humungus4206 I’m probably not going to convince you of anything, but others read these comments so I will say the following about your claims.
A comment from a tour guide is anecdotal, not conclusive, and even if true does not support the claim that Germany got “2nd rate engines”. All things in this world are not equal. This is why we set standards in the first place, and some items and humans exceed them while others barley meet them. But if they do meet the standard their performance is acceptable for its task and purpose. At some point you have probably been to doctor or been flown by an airline pilot who was last in his class and barely passed his exams. All engines on a single airplane don’t even perform exactly the same, which is why over time they are checked and adjusted to ensure they perform to the minimum standard. Germany did not have a unique burden with its J-79 engines, beyond perhaps having to rapidly learn how to operate and maintain them.
Ordnance loadouts are developed through a testing process. If the German air force put untested loads on aircraft for routine peacetime operations it would be irresponsible. So much so that I again doubt this single anecdotal and probably hearsay source for the claim. In any case it does not in any way impeach the suitably of the airplane for its intended purposes, and the blame is entirely on the operator rather than the machine.
Lastly: “Germany tried to make it a 3 (roles) 1 fighter for air superiority, interception and bombing at the same time which led to it being mediocre in all but good at none.”
This is the tired old uniformed narrative about the F-104, one you don't need a tour guide to hear. First of all, Germany did not try to make it all those things, it had already been modified for and used in all those roles by the US Air Force. Almost all fighters end up dropping bombs even though they were originally designed for air to air. Germany bought a later model F-104 that was fitted with improvements for the low-level strike role. It was acquired to fulfill its NATO commitment for that role.
If not being the absolute best choice for any role makes the airplane “mediocre”, then remember that by that standard most of the airplanes that fought and won WWII were also mediocre. Everything cannot be the best. Even if it is the best when introduced, a better thing will be along shortly. Germany was offered a better strike jet in the F-105, but decided it was too expensive. Given that Germany did not need a long range jet that could deliver more than a single nuclear weapon the 104 was a sensible choice based on the economics of meeting the requirements rather than exceeding them. They needed money for many other things such as tanks as well.
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@burnttoast111
You are so confused that you are projecting your own confusion on to me. I'm not even going to try to respond point by point to each of your misconceptions. Let’s try to keep it simple and break through the extraneous clutter. . .
You at least understand the difference between where the nose is pointed and the direction of travel (AKA flight path). Well, a 90 degree pure vertical dive is a FLIGHT PATH, not a nose angle. If the wing is producing an aerodynamic force perpendicular to the flight path (AKA lift), the flight path cannot remain unaccelerated and will alter in the direction the force is applied. If you cannot accept the fact that you cannot maintain a pure vertical flight path unless the wing stops producing lift I need speak no further, because you do not understand fundamental concepts of flight. Read no further.
Only if you can accept that zero lift from the wing is what allows a constant pure vertical flight path (AKA velocity vector), does how an airplane achieves zero lift become a point of interest.
In a pure vertical 90 degree dive, an airplane with a symmetrical wing at zero angle of incidence will have its nose aligned with the flight path. This is because a symmetrical airfoil produces zero lift at zero angle of attack. Again, if you do not accept that simple premise, read no further.
But because a cambered airfoil produces some lift even at zero AOA, to produce zero lift you have to hold the airfoil at a negative angle of attack. An installed positive angle of incidence will only increase the negative pitch angle the nose will have to assume relative to the wind.
Here’s an example that may help illustrate. To fly inverted in airplane with a symmetrical airfoil and zero angle of incidence, you can simply roll the airplane inverted and push to nose above the horizon the same number of degrees that it was during upright flight; so it’s a snap to stabilize in inverted level flight. In an airplane with a cambered airfoil and a positive angle of incidence it is not so intuitive. Because the cambered wing doesn’t work as well inverted, and is mounted at the wrong angle to the fuselage, you will have to push the nose much higher than it was for upright flight in order to produce sufficient lift to fly level. It feels even more unusual and takes longer to get oriented and settle on the pitch attitude needed to stabilize in level flight.
Since you went right into condescension mode I have to tell you that you are indeed talking out of your butt, and you should question whether you can take in new information and begin to unpuzzle your mind. You are more proof that one doesn’t need to understand how airplanes work to get a pilot license any more than one need understand how an automobile works to get a driver’s license. Non-pilots out there should take heed and be careful who they climb into an airplane with.
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@grizwoldphantasia5005
I have responded to your dumb comments, you just refuse to accept the facts.
You: “The Air Force hates the ground support role; they want to be fighter jocks at 30,000 feet, or transcontinental bomber jocks, or even transport jocks who can build up a resume for the airlines. The Air Force hates spending money on a plane they hate.”
This is ignorant BS. USAF has done more CAS than all the other services combined, and by a wide margin. That because it is the air force, stupid. USAF is the only U.S. service to have ever procured a dedicated CAS aircraft. Show me the USMC version of the A-10. You can’t.
You: “You still haven't rebutted my claim that the Air Force wanted to control all air assets when split from the Army in 1947/48 BTW”
Of course the air force wanted control of all fixed wing aircraft. They are the air force, stupid. I guess the army shouldn't have all the tanks or the navy have all the submarines either.
Let the U.S. Army decide if the A-10 is useful? Giving the A-10 to the Army is a dumb idea because it will still be obsolete. Besides, the Army position on the A-10 is already clear, but you refuse to accept it because I came from the Army chief of staff. Apparently, you’d rather hear official Army policy from some private in the motor pool [Insert sardonic laughter].
“The only thing I care about is the effect on the target, I don’t give a rat’s ass what platform brings it in,” Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley https://www.csis.org/events/priorities-our-nations-army-general-mark-milley in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “I could care less if it’s a B-52, if it’s a B-1 bomber, if it’s an F-16, an F-15, an A-10. I don’t care if the thing was delivered by carrier pigeon. I want the enemy taken care of.”
The usefulness of the A-10 is known. Low and slow over a modern battlefield is not useful. No other air force is building an A-10 equivalent, and the closest thing to it, the SU-25 has suffered over Ukraine. You don't listen to U.S. Army generals, so you probably don't listen to the Ukrainian minister of defense who, has said he doesn't want the A-10.
“We have been requesting combat aircraft from our partners for a long time now,” Yuriy Sak, adviser to Ukraine’s minister of defense, told Air Force Magazine by phone from Kyiv on July 21. “We need Western-standard fighter jets. We need Western-standard combat aircraft. … To target Russian positions in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine needs “fast and versatile” combat aircraft such as the F-16—not slow-moving ground defense platforms such as the retiring fleet of U.S. A-10s, a proposition Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall entertained in comments”
You have been spewing BS that has no basis in reality, and I’m done responding to it. I’ve done all I can here to help other readers see your BS for what it is.
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@Idahoguy10157 You also don't see the Navy or Marines buying the A-10, even though Marine Air exists to support Marines on the ground. The Navy got rid of all its A-1 Skyraiders during the Vietnam war while the Air Force was operating them, and the Navy and Marines have delivered CAS with fast jets ever since. Why didn't they also get a low and slow A-10? Because they know better and have a better lobby.
Edit:
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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let's try this
You also don't see the Navy or Marines buying the A-10, even though Marine Air exists to support Marines on the ground. The Navy got rid of all its A-1 Skyraiders during the Vietnam war while the Air Force was operating them, and the Navy and Marines have delivered CAS with fast jets ever since. Why didn't they also get a low and slow A-10? Because they know better and have a better lobby.
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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@magoid Subsonic fighters had problems at high speeds, but supersonic fighters generally have few vices at high speed and have to be handled carefully at low speeds. The very reason USAF bought the T-38 for advanced pilot training was to prepare students to handle high performance aircraft like the century series fighters then in service. Each student got many hours practicing stalls, controllability demos, and patterns and landings, but only a single sortie that broke Mach 1, and that just to demonstrate that it was basically a non-event.
I agree that the 104 gets too bad a rap with regard to maneuverability. As you say, it could not generate much G at low speed, but if the pilot kept his speed up it had good sustained maneuverability, and use of takeoff flaps in a pinch to get a gunshot meant it was not completely helpless against most contemporaries when flown properly. It was designed for speed at the expense of wing, so anyone who compares it against modern fighters designed for turning at the expense of speed doesn't understand the history of fighters.
Anyway, if Chis meant controllability or stability when he said maneuverability I wish he would correct his terminology. If he’s trying to debunk the common narrative that this jet could not turn at all I agree with him, but saying that maneuverability and turning are not the same thing is inaccurate.
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@johnathanh2660 I don't substantively disagree with anything you said, but I think the point is whether the battlefield will ever be cleansed enough to allow low and slow CAS. That is not the percentage bet, considering that we didn't really even get there in the Gulf War.
Even if that might occur at some point, why wait for it when you can prosecute the same targets from safer altitudes much earlier in the conflict. Why have A-10s sitting around waiting for a permissive environment that may not emerge until the conflict is decided. Better to have aircraft that can fly vital missions on day one, and swing to CAS later when they are no longer required for counter air, SEAD, or deep strike and interdiction missions.
The zero-sum game is not about taking out tanks, it is about taking about tanks, it is about being able to do everything that needs to be done. There are plenty of systems available to take out tanks, and Ukraine have been doing it without the GAU-8.
Casual observers have become conditioned over the last 20+ years to think CAS is the main function of airpower. They forget that the biggest killer on a conventional battlefield is artillery. We didn't bring our heavy artillery to the special ops counter insurgency war in Afghanistan, and we didn't have to do any counter air, or deep area interdiction, so fire support looks like the sole job of tactical aircraft. This will not be the case in a major conflict against a peer power.
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@startrekmike
In my last response to I said show me where I said that “the A-10 can't deliver weapons while outside the AA/MANPAD threat area?" Your response to me is to talk about using the SU-25 as a “metric”. So, before you distract us off the first topic, do you now realize I did not say that, and do you now realize what I actually said? Do you?
Now as to the SU-25, I said it has enough in common to illustrate how vulnerable low flying slow movers are to modern GBAD. You want to twist that into some sort of quasi-academic analysis about global “effectiveness” that obscures the simple point I intended to make. Let me try to restate it for you so you can’t help but understand it.
The engagement envelope of low altitude IR SAMs and AAA varies with the speed of the target. The A-10 is slower than the SU-25. This means the A-10 can be engaged by such systems at a greater distance or with greater probability of hit.
Ukraine is in the middle of a fight for its life. Yet in response to U.S. Air Force discussions on how to provide Ukraine with A-10s, Ukraine said the slower aircraft won’t fill the mission set urgently needed. To target Russian positions in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine needs “fast and versatile” combat aircraft such as the F-16—not slow-moving ground defense platforms such as the retiring fleet of U.S. A-10s
To use the gun, the A-10 must get well within the range of AAA and IR SAMs such as the SA-9 Gaskin, not to mention MANPADS. This is why strafing or other low and slow delivery methods are not viable against an army defended by modern GBAD. This is why USAF plans to provide CAS with guided munitions from a safer altitude. The only time fighters are allowed to strafe is as a last resort when troops in contact are in imminent danger and it is a reasonable risk to take given the local GBAD environment.
I didn’t say the gun was the A-10’s primary weapon, I said it is the only weapon unique to the A-10. The guided air to ground munitions that can be delivered by the A-10 are also delivered by every other tactical aircraft, as well as the B-1 and B-52. All your chatter about loiter and big wings is beside the point. If you want persistent CAS with a deep magazine over the battlefield, try a B-1 or B-52. (If you need rapid response from a distance, don’t call an A-10.) The B-1 will be retired, but the B-52 is getting a targeting pod just like all the fighters carry.
If the A-10 is not urgently need in Ukraine, it will not be needed by USAF either. As I said elsewhere, funding is a zero-sum game. Every O&M dollar spent on the A-10 is a dollar that cannot be spent on other aircraft that actually are urgently needed because they bring much more to the fight. The A-10 can do CAS. These other aircraft can also do OCA, DCA, AI/BAI, SEAD, deep strike, etc. USAF is not modernizing to fight tribal insurgents, it is modernizing to deter or fight China, Russia, or their proxies. USAF wants to retire the A-10 because keeping it degrades readiness. I will repeat; keeping it degrades readiness. If you want to argue against that, pick up the phone and call the Department of the Air Force, and let us know how far you get.
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But that's an apples to oranges comparison. The 747 will never carry two tanks, or four Greyhound buses, or ready to fly CH-47 helicopters. The two aircraft don't compare in terms of capabilities such as roll-on roll-of large vehicles, or the ability to air drop them.
The C-5 is less efficient because it has to carry around all the built-in equipment that gives it such capabilities and more. Cargo ramps at both ends, built in winches, kneeling landing gear, two auxiliary power units, hundreds of pounds of tie down chains, 6 hydraulic systems, etc. It is not an efficient airplane, it is a capable airplane that can move outsize cargo no other US aircraft can move, and move it directly to the war zone if needed. For example, a Boeing 747 will never take a load of 160th SOAR helicopters to where they are needed.
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@williamzk9083 I can't be sure if there is an overall point to your last comment or if you are just sharing random facts. I don’t want to get into the weeds on the difference between spiring tabs and servo tabs, so I will repeat my original statement: the F4U-4 had balance tabs, not spring or servo tabs. That is the clear distinction of the tab types. To address a couple of your recent statements:
“A Balance Tab would have reduced aileron force but not by very much compared to a geared servo spring tab.”
You say that like it’s a bad thing. The intent is to reduce the force required to move the surface so that it is more easily manageable but still provides natural feel. I recall reading that an early version of some new airplane such as the Typhoon or Tempest was fitted with spring tabs, but the test pilots thought they were too sensitive and would lead to overcontrolling and structural damage, so they were removed. A balance tab can be easily tuned to provide the level of force reduction desired without oversensitivity because the pilots is till connected to the whole control surface.
A servo or control tab is used when forces are very high due to the size of control surfaces and high speed. The KC-135 had servo tabs as its primary control mechanism, and when at speed the pilot never felt the force required to move the control surface itself, only the force required to move the servo tab. Only when the tab hit its mechanical stop would the pilot start to move the actual control surface. The stop allowed for full control deflection at low or zero airspeed. No springs are mentioned. Perhaps it had springs bur the manual did not think the pilots needed to know. (The rudder was also flown by a servo tab but also had a hydraulic boost because greater deflection than the tab could provide was needed at low speed with an engine out.)
“Used on DC-4, B-29 and all passenger jets till fly by wire as backup for hydraulics.” Don’t overgeneralize, as this varies. Some airliners with irreversible powered flight controls have a manual reversion feature, some do not. The B-737 can manually move the ailerons and elevator without hydraulic pressure, but with much heavier control forces because it does not have servo tabs. The 757 has no manual reversion, and I suspect more modern and larger aircraft also do not. These airplanes have redundant hydraulic power and control systems that still provide ample control after loss of one or more systems. Fully powered controls have been around for a long time before FBW, which does not replace hydraulic power, it just replaces some of the pilot skill needed to properly manipulate the controls.
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@anydaynow01 I agree with some of your comments, but not: "The whole A-10 gets shot down argument is a moot point since you don't send in ground forces (including their loitering air support) until you have attained air superiority (air force's job)!".
A primary argument of many A-10 fanboys is that it is a 'flying tank' that can take punishment like no other plane, allowing it to operate low and slow despite anti-aircraft defenses. Early dominance may allow CAP to protect CAS sorties from fighter intervention, but the large numbers of mobile AAA guns and SAMs that travel with mechanized forces will remain a constant threat. It would be a different than war the A-10 has been fighting.
There's a reason Chuck Horner initially didn't plan to use the A-10 in the Gulf War. Medium altitude was the battle plan for the Gulf War, and deployment of aircraft that could execute the new battle plan was the priority. They had scary figures on the expected A-10 loss rate against Warsaw Pact forces. Due to popular demand, and the fact that that we increased the size of the expeditionary force, the A-10 was ultimately deployed, but I think it spent more hours Scud hunting and vehicle plinking from medium altitude than it did hitting enemy forces in close proximity to friendly troops (AKA CAS). Those were useful tasks, but other aircraft could have performed them as well if they had not been needed more badly for other missions the A-10 could not do.
Even after most of the Iraqi air force and radar SAMs were destroyed, USAF aircraft were still kept above the threat envelope of AAA and small SAM systems. The A-10 doesn't have real advantages over multi-role aircraft in dropping ordnance from these higher altitudes. It not that it's bad at it, it's just not appreciably better than aircraft that can also perform other missions the A-10 cannot. When you can only have a limited number of airplanes, you cannot afford planes that specialize in a single role that can also be performed by your other more versatile airplanes. USAF could afford that back when it was very large, when there was extra funding to be awarded by procuring a dedicated CAS airplane. That extra funding is long gone. The USAF is now smaller than it has ever been, and it cannot afford to retain luxuries like the A-10 that now serve to reduce the overall combat power of the force.
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@kenneth9874 "without American high octane fuel and other technology the merlin would have remained a mediocre under performing loser"
That is not a fact, it is your opinion, and it is ignorant. Technology crossed the Atlantic in both directions, both with regard to engines and fuel. And while Packard did indeed make useful improvements to the Merlin, it was never “a loser”. That’s just a dumb inflammatory statement. Your black and white judgments on everything shuts out true understanding.
You seem to have a lot of misconceptions floating around in your head. For example, you think the absence of turbosuperchargers on the Model 332 Lightnings the British ordered was due to some sort of nefarious political or legal issue, or perhaps the U.S. didn’t want to share the “secrets” of the turbos. The reality is that the British Purchasing Commission intentionally ordered them that way. But why?
The Brits had large qualities of P-40s on order, and they wanted the engines in the 332 to be same, meaning all rotate to the right and not have a turbosupercharger attached. They did not want the logistic complication of a second type of engine. They were also aware that the shortage of turbos was restricting production of U.S. aircraft, and they desperately wanted these aircraft as soon as possible.
Furthermore, they did not plan to employ these airplanes in high altitude escort or interception. They were expected to be employed along with the P-40s on order, which were also not high-altitude fighters. This order was placed during the ‘phony war’ prior to the Battle of Britain, when air combat so far had been conducted at low and medium altitude.
They had no operational experience with turbos and didn’t want exposure to complications that might interfere with operational readiness.
If you don’t believe these facts don’t try to argue with me, just go to Page 45 of Warren Bodie’s book on the P-38 and argue with him. I let you pull me off topic just to demonstrate that your crude opinions have no foundation. With that I am done reasoning with you. Have a nice day and goodbye.
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@termitreter6545 It's not an assumption of what you think, its a rhetorical device to equate your comment with another to show how weak yours is. I'm sure you've experienced this before. And speaking of assumptions, or premises, I don’t think you understand the concepts behind these aircraft, and your point is just wrong.
"Interceptor bombers" were not really a thing, but fast bombers and strike fighter-bombers were, and they never fell out of favor until they were replaced by stealth platforms. In this context the GR91 was not at all fast and not of the same concept. It was an inexpensive slow ground attack jet for CAS and battlefield interdiction, not meant for nuclear strikes of well-defended critical targets. NATO got the F-104 and other fast aircraft for that role. The F-111 and Tornado are not successors of the GR-91, they are successors of the F-105 and F-104G.
When the G91 was first proposed NATO already had subsonic jets that outperformed it, but they were a decade older and not "standardized", which was the rationale for the G91. The G91 didn’t do anything other jets already in service could not do better. You can even see the G91 as mostly a ploy to give NATO countries an alternative to US built aircraft so they could support the European industry. Problem was the G91 was not really very capable or versatile, and could only be a direct replacement for obsolete aircraft like the F-86 that were becoming limited to low-performance roles. Hence the low production numbers of the G91. At least three times as many F-104s were produced even though it was designed before the G91.
Equating the F-35 with the G91 is ludicrous and is likely to trigger F-35 haters who think it is too expensive and unsuitable for the CAS role. But what is silly about the comparison is that actual strike aircraft like the F-111 and Tornado (which the G91 was not) were designed to penetrate on the deck at high speed to avoid radar detection and enemy defenses. The whole point of stealth aircraft like the F-35 is to not have to hug the deck to survive.
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DePuy didn't redesign the US Army to refight Vietnam, he was faced with designing a post-Vietnam army to deter and if necessary fight major conventional wars. That is why the the army was so successful on the battlefield in the Gulf War of 1991, which was a conventional rather than a proxy guerilla war.
I do not think DePuy shares responsibility for the mess of Iraq. He did not set geopolitical grand strategy, and shouldn't be blamed for the mistakes that ruined Iraq both pre and post 2003. The US military is controlled (often against its own judgement) by civilian authority. The civilians that planned that war had a superb military designed to destroy the enemy, not a military designed to build a nation out of the rubble of that destruction. The national command authority had no plan for the aftermath of "mission complete" because they didn't think past removal of Saddam -- apparently they thought that simple first step was all that was necessary for a regime change.
But it was a delusion to think a democratic state would spontaneously form in the rubble of the former regime. When General Franks asked for more forces for the invasion, SecDef Rumsfeld told him he always wanted more, but that the NCA wanted the army to go in light with minimal footprint on this one. He essentially gave Franks Dark Helmet's line from Spaceballs: "Prepare, prepare, you're always preparing; just do it!" Rumsfeld wanted to go in light, relying on airpower instead of artillery and other hard to transport heavy equipment, because they saw no need to stick around to clean up the mess. Franks may not have seen the need to do much beyond simply winning the ground war, but that goal was not really his fault, and certainly not DePuy's fault.
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@RCAvhstape The F-111 was never intended to be "an actual fighter plane". It was intended to be a bomber and a fleet defense aircraft.
The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but if you repeat a narrative for decades it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements later changed.
When the TFX program began the USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. To achieve this twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. It was not intended to be a dogfighter.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that the USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and the USN wanted side-by-side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy and made two different configurations, but MacNamara’s DOD wanted more commonality and thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly to be a dogfighter. If the Navy had wanted a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objections of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its requirements for its next fighter as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and they realized that the missileer was too limited a role. The also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the overweight airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but repeat a narrative for decades and it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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@IgnoredAdviceProductions
“Now I know what the reasoning for side by side seating is, but considering no fighter has ever had that seating arrangement, it's a pretty flimsy excuse.”
Of course real fighters don't have side-by-side seating, that was my point. But you are missing the important point that the F-111B was not a fighter; it was a fleet defense radar interceptor which was a follow-on to the cancelled Douglas F6D Missileer. That airplane also had side-by-side seating for the pilot and RIO. It was cancelled because it was too slow, after it had been decided that the role would require a higher performance jet. I would not have chosen side-by-side seating, but for this narrow role it is not completely illogical.
“I blame McNamara for the vark mess because there WAS a design that both the Air Force and Navy were happy with, the Boeing model 818. The source selection board approved it 6, Six with a capital S, times and he overrode them every time, fired everyone, and decided to just go with the General Dynamics/Grumman design instead because "he said so," completely ignoring the experts telling him over and over, "no, this is going to be a complete disaster, stop it" all because he wanted to chase his stupid "commonality."
I already said I essentially agree with this, so you are repeating yourself. You can hate McNamara all you want for various reasons, but I’m limiting my discussion to the technical merits of the TFX program. I say the essential objective of commonality was valid, but he pushed it to a disruptive extreme. He had to assert his authority and make his mark. The program could have succeeded if he'd listened better, but he believed he was always the smartest person in the room.
In this particular case, the idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea. History is full of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not aerodynamically or structurally incompatible. The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because the original USN specification was for a heavy fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. It was not intended to be a dogfighter.
Both services were asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash for penetration or intercept. To achieve this a large airplane with twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for. Given rising budget pressures and development costs, DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single airframe with some variations could do both these jobs. Ultimately, the Navy changed the job requirements for F-111B after it had been designed, which is why it was canceled.
Don’t get us started dissecting the F-35 or we will really be off in the weeds.
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@theharper1 How is it you can’t understand that the 12,000 lb. figure is spurious and a meaningless comparison? You have no comprehension of what these numbers actually mean. You are comparing a number for a maximum bomb load over a shorter range to that of a typical bomb load at a much longer range.
The B-29's 12,000 lbs. was quoted for a mission radius of radius 1600 miles. That is more than the radius of a mission from Tinian to Tokyo. I’ve read elsewhere that the average bomb load for a B-29 was 16,000 lbs., which is more than the weight quoted for that 1600-mile radius, so that already beats your 14,000-pound figure. The B-29 could carry up to 20,000 lbs. on a short-range mission, well beyond the 14,000 maximum of the Lancaster. How many pounds could a Lancaster deliver over a 1600-mile radius? Answer: none, because it couldn’t even do that radius, which is more than twice the radius from London to Berlin.
You don’t seem to understand that bomb load varies with the amount of fuel that must be carried to get to the target and back. An airplane can only lift so much. The B-29 was a larger and more powerful aircraft that could lift far more than the Lancaster, and over an equal mission radius it could deliver more weight of bombs. It could deliver the Lancaster’s maximum14,000 pounds of bombs to a much more distant target than the Lancaster could even reach. There is no comparison in the capability of these two aircraft.
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It didn't morph into a strike aircraft, that's what it was always intended to be.
The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements changed. The lessons of the TFX program are commonly misinterpreted, but repeat a narrative for decades and it becomes "truth". The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions.
Initially the TFX program was reasonable because USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. Twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and USN want side by side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy, but MacNamara’s DOD thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly for a dogfighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its specifications for the TFX as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and realized they also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the heavy airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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@Arnechk I'm sorry, but that is too overgeneralized or simplistic. The F4U was indeed a great design, but it was not flawless and did not outclass all of what you are calling "airforce designs". Claiming the F4U was a more advanced class than designs like the P-47 or a P-51 doesn't make sense given the advanced features and performance of those designs.
You probably don't find reasoning as to why the inverted gull wing was not used by other designs simply because the fanbase media idolizes the plane and doesn’t bother to consider whether it really improved overall performance as much as we like to assume. That fact that it was not used elsewhere sort of speaks for itself, and we can assume it did not solve problems for later designers the way Vought believed it did for them.
Then again, Vought has a history of unique design features that are not adopted for other aircraft of the same type. The wings of the F4U and F-8 Crusader were iconic because they were unique, but both are often misrepresented in casual commentary. It is said that the wing of the F4U allowed a bigger prop, when actually the prop had to be that size and had to clear the deck, and the wing allowed the landing gear to be shorter than it would have been otherwise.
t is usually said that the tilting wing of F-8 allowed more lift from a higher angle of attack, but the angle of attack was set by the lift characteristics of the wing. Tilting the wing up simply allowed a shallower fuselage angle at that wing angle of attack, providing better pilot visibility and allowing shorter landing gear to provide the required deck clearance. But the titling wing feature was not even adopted for Vought’s own A-7 Corsair II derivative, so we can assume by then it had been decided the small difference the title made in other areas was not worth its weight and complexity. I really appreciate Vought’s willingness to break with the pack and try different design compromises, but we have to admit those unique features did not change the way things were done in future aircraft.
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The A-10 was proposed to Ukraine by the US and they said they do not want it; they want fast jets that are useful. A-10s doing low and slow CAS would just get their pilots shot down.
Ukraine Says It Needs ‘Fast and Versatile’ Aircraft, Not the A-10
July 22, 2022 | By Abraham Mahshie
Air space over Ukraine has been contested for more than five months, replete with advanced Russian fighter jets and near-universal Russian surface-to-air missile coverage that make penetration by aging Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29s and Su-25s both risky and dangerous.
For the duration of that time, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has asked the United States and international partners for Western combat jets and the training to fly them. U.S. officials have weighed in, but they may not be suggesting the right aircraft, a Ukrainian defense official told Air Force Magazine.
“We have been requesting combat aircraft from our partners for a long time now,” Yuriy Sak, adviser to Ukraine’s minister of defense, told Air Force Magazine by phone from Kyiv on July 21. “We need Western-standard fighter jets. We need Western-standard combat aircraft.”
Reznikov again discussed Ukraine’s battlefield needs at a July 20 virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group led by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III.
Following the meeting, U.S. Air Force leaders indicated that conversations had begun on how to provide Ukraine with Western aircraft, such as older A-10s, but Ukraine says the slower aircraft won’t fill the mission set urgently needed.
To target Russian positions in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine needs “fast and versatile” combat aircraft such as the F-16—not slow-moving ground defense platforms such as the retiring fleet of U.S. A-10s, a proposition Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall entertained in comments July 20.
U.S. defense leaders such as Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley have repeatedly recommended to President Joe Biden weaponry for Ukraine that meets evolving battlefield needs.
A-10s do not meet that bar, the defense adviser said.
“The answer to this question depends on the understanding of the needs of the Ukrainian Air Force in the current situation,” he said.
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@1chish I didn't say the RAF did nothing; I said the RAF would have never bombed German into submission alone.
The RAF definitely won the BOB, but it prevented the invasion or submission of England more than it destroyed the Luftwaffe. I would never try to minimize that critical strategic victory won by Fighter Command, which changed the course of the war, and we all know tremendous honor is due. However, the fact that the Luftwaffe threw in the towel when it realized it was overreaching did not leave it destroyed, and it was able to support the invasion of the USSR in short order.
Eastern front operations bled the Luftwaffe, but it would not have ultimately been destroyed if not for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and the most productive element of that offensive in destroying the Luftwaffe was daylight bombing by the USAAF. It brought them up to be shot down, which ironically was the same strategy that failed the Luftwaffe in the BOB.
The fact the Britain resisted alone while waiting for the U.S. to enter the war is a testament to the leadership of Winston Churchill and the resilience of the British people, but that doesn't give Brits the right to whine about the fact that a nation a continent away was in no hurry to join in cleaning up another European mess, or in defending a British Empire from which the U.S had once fought to extricate itself.
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@sergarlantyrell7847 I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but it also had a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it for the 104 instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the very same pitch up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and if a pilot was dumb enough to go there the plane had a stick pusher to keep him out of it.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German hands was due to training and operational issues. The Germans would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just surprised that everyone thinks the F-104G should have been cancelled. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. Obsolete on its first flight.
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@sergarlantyrell7847 I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as (supposedly) “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but also a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the same pitch-up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone also seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and the plane had a stick pusher to keep the pilot from going there.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German service was due to training and operational issues. They would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So, I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just saying it's ironic how many think the F-104G should have been cancelled for that reason. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. It was obsolete on its first flight.
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@sergarlantyrell7847
I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as (supposedly) “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but also a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the same pitch-up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone also seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and the plane had a stick pusher to keep the pilot from going there.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German service was due to training and operational issues. They would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So, I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just saying it's ironic how many think the F-104G should have been cancelled for that reason. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. It was obsolete on its first flight.
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@sergarlantyrell7847
I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as (supposedly) “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but also a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the same pitch-up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone also seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and the plane had a stick pusher to keep the pilot from going there.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German service was due to training and operational issues. They would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So, I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just saying it's ironic how many think the F-104G should have been cancelled for that reason. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. It was obsolete on its first flight.
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YouTube won't let me reply to @sergarlantyrell7847 again. I have tried four times. So, let's see if I can sneak it in as a reply to myself, but it is really a response to @sergarlantyrell7847.
@sergarlantyrell7847. I’m suggesting the TSR 2 would have been just as (supposedly) “tricky” to fly, if not more so. It not only had high wing loading (which in itself is not everything), but also a highly swept delta wing, which places the airplane deep into the backside of the power curve during approach and landing. I’m not the one who thinks this is “a problem” ; It’s a feature of the airplane configuration that the pilots of jets like the F-106 also coped with, even though it made them less forgiving than the F-104 on approach. I get a kick out of people who think the takeoff and landing speeds of the first Mach 2 fighter were too extreme, but they have no idea of the landing speeds of contemporaries such as the F-101 and F-106, or the Concorde airliner for that matter.
The wing of the F-104 was not problematic. It was a straight wing, and they had well-known characteristics. Lockheed chose it instead of a delta because of its superior lift properties at subsonic speed, while still providing low drag at Mach 2 due to its span and thickness. The pitch-up characteristic was not due to the wing, but to the tail, and it was not unique to the F-104. The F-101 had the same pitch-up characteristic even though it had a completely different wing planform. (Heck, everyone also seems to think the F-100 “Sabre Dance” was a pitch-up due swept wings stalling from the tip first.) The pitch-up occurred well outside the useful flight envelope of the F-104, and the plane had a stick pusher to keep the pilot from going there.
The F-104 did not have particularly dangerous flight characteristics in comparison to its contemporaries. It was obviously a poor glider, and its early accident rate was due to engine problems. Its accident rate in German service was due to training and operational issues. They would have crashed just as many F-105s if they had bought that airplane instead.
So, I’m not suggesting the TSR-2 should have been canceled due to its flight characteristics, I’m just saying it's ironic how many think the F-104G should have been cancelled for that reason. The TSR2 was properly cancelled because it was too expensive and behind its contemporaries in development. It was obsolete on its first flight.
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@humungus4206 I’m probably not going to convince you of anything, but others read these comments so I will say the following about your claims.
A comment from a tour guide is anecdotal, not conclusive, and even if true does not support the claim that Germany got “2nd rate engines”. All things in this world are not equal. This is why we set standards in the first place, and some items and humans exceed them while others barley meet them. But if they do meet the standard their performance is acceptable for its task and purpose. At some point you have probably been to doctor or been flown by an airline pilot who was last in his class and barley passed his exams. All engines on a single airplane don’t even perform exactly the same, which is why over time they are checked and adjusted to ensure they perform to the minimum standard. Germany did not have a unique burden with its J-79 engines, beyond perhaps having to rapidly learn how to operate and maintain them.
Ordnance loadouts are developed through a testing process. If the German air force put untested loads on aircraft for routine peacetime operations it would be irresponsible. So much so that I again doubt this single anecdotal and probably hearsay source for the claim. In any case it does not in any way impeach the suitably of the airplane for its intended purposes, and the blame is entirely on the operator rather than the machine.
Lastly: “Germany tried to make it a 3 (roles) 1 fighter for air superiority, interception and bombing at the same time which led to it being mediocre in all but good at none.”
This is the tired old uniformed narrative about the F-104, one you don't need a tour guide to hear. First of all, Germany did not try to make it all those things, it had already been modified for and used in all those roles by the US Air Force. Almost all fighters end up dropping bombs even though they were originally designed for air to air. Germany bought a later F-104 that was fitted with improvements for the low-level strike role. It was acquired to fulfill a NATO commitment.
If not being the absolute best choice for any role makes the airplane “mediocre”, then remember that by that standard most of the airplanes that fought and won WWII were also mediocre. Everything cannot be the best. Even if it is the best when introduced, a better thing will be along shortly. Germany was offered a better strike jet in the F-105, but decided it was too expensive. Given that Germany did not need a long range jet that could deliver more than a single nuclear weapon it was a sensible choice based on the economics of meeting the requirements rather than exceeding them. They needed money for many other things such as tanks as well.
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@humungus4206 I’m probably not going to convince you of anything, but others read these comments so I will say the following about your claims.
A comment from a tour guide is anecdotal, not conclusive, and even if true does not support the claim that Germany got “2nd rate engines”. All things in this world are not equal. This is why we set standards in the first place, and some items and humans exceed them while others barley meet them. But if they do meet the standard their performance is acceptable for its task and purpose. At some point you have probably been to doctor or been flown by an airline pilot who was last in his class and barley passed his exams. All engines on a single airplane don’t even perform exactly the same, which is why over time they are checked and adjusted to ensure they perform to the minimum standard. Germany did not have a unique burden with its J-79 engines, beyond perhaps having to rapidly learn how to operate and maintain them.
Ordnance loadouts are developed through a testing process. If the German air force put untested loads on aircraft for routine peacetime operations it would be irresponsible. So much so that I again doubt this single anecdotal and probably hearsay source for the claim. In any case it does not in any way impeach the suitably of the airplane for its intended purposes, and the blame is entirely on the operator rather than the machine.
Lastly: “Germany tried to make it a 3 (roles) 1 fighter for air superiority, interception and bombing at the same time which led to it being mediocre in all but good at none.”
This is the tired old uniformed narrative about the F-104, one you don't need a tour guide to hear. First of all, Germany did not try to make it all those things, it had already been modified for and used in all those roles by the US Air Force. Almost all fighters end up dropping bombs even though they were originally designed for air to air. Germany bought a later F-104 that was fitted with improvements for the low-level strike role. It was acquired to fulfill a NATO commitment.
If not being the absolute best choice for any role makes the airplane “mediocre”, then remember that by that standard most of the airplanes that fought and won WWII were also mediocre. Everything cannot be the best. Even if it is the best when introduced, a better thing will be along shortly. Germany was offered a better strike jet in the F-105, but decided it was too expensive. Given that Germany did not need a long range jet that could deliver more than a single nuclear weapon it was a sensible choice based on the economics of meeting the requirements rather than exceeding them. They needed money for many other things such as tanks as well.
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@Idahoguy10157
There is no logic in your comment.
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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@Idahoguy10157 Your comment contains no logic.
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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@Idahoguy10157 Your comment contains no logic.
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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@Idahoguy10157
“The A-10 was not designed to operate off of a ship”. The A-10 could have easily been modified to operate off a ship, or had such features included at its inception, had the Navy had the slightest interest in this supposedly premier CAS platform. They were not interested in spending a dime on it, for good reason. If the F-35 can exist in three versions, the A-10 could far more easily have existed in two versions. The fact that the F-35 is operated by all three services works against your point, not for it.
“In Naval Aviation there was the A-4 and the A-7 and the AV8 Harrier”. These are all fast jets, not low and slow jets like the A-10. USAF was operating the A-7 when it was forced to develop the A-10 because the A-7 was supposedly not good enough, and the A-10 eventually replaced the A-7. If one accepts the story that the A-10 was needed for CAS, then the Navy and Marines were demonstrably not interested in providing CAS, while USAF was. Given that CAS is the core role of Marine Air, they obviously thought the fast movers were fine.
You might also consider that countries around the world lined up to buy the F-15, USAFs most expensive, sophisticated, and tightly controlled fighter, while nobody was asking for the relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated, and loosely controlled A-10. No other country built the equivalent of the A-10, not even Russia, which built many aircraft that were outwardly close copies of U.S. aircraft. The Russians came closest with the SU-25, but that airplane is actually closer to the A-7 than the A-10, and as such more versatile.
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@scootergeorge7089 You didn't learn much from the video, did you?
The idea that one basic airframe could fulfill two different roles was not a dumb idea at all. History is full of examples of aircraft that were versatile enough to fly for different services and even perform different missions. The original requirements presented by the Navy and USAF were not incompatible, but the requirements later changed.
When the TFX program began the USAF and USN were both asking for a large aircraft that could lift a heavy load of fuel and weapons, with long range or long loiter, plus high-speed dash or intercept. To achieve this, twin engines and an innovative variable geometry wing were called for, and DOD logically assessed that it would be wasteful to develop two very expensive advanced airframes when a single one with some variations could do both jobs.
The reason one basic airframe could do both jobs was because original USN specification was for a fleet defense fighter, not an air superiority fighter. It was not originally intended to be what later became the F-14, but to perform the role meant for the Douglas F6D Missileer, with the addition of supersonic dash capability. It was not intended to be a dogfighter.
The biggest difference between the airframe requirements of the two services was that the USAF wanted a tandem cockpit and the USN wanted side-by-side seating. Boeing tried to make both services happy and made two different configurations, but MacNamara’s DOD wanted more commonality and thought USAF could suck it up and have the crew sit side by side. This is ironic considering that when the Navy cancelled its version USAF was stuck with the cockpit it didn’t want, which also ironically contributed to the airplane being too ungainly to be a dogfighter. If the Navy had wanted a dogfighter it would not have insisted on the side-by-side cockpit over the objections of the Air Force. The F-111 cockpit was suitable for a radar interceptor, but not for an air superiority fighter.
The original idea wasn’t dumb -- what happened was that needs changed. USN revised its requirements for its next fighter as result of combat experience in Vietnam, and they realized that the missileer was too limited a role. The also needed an air superiority fighter to replace the F-8 and F-4, but couldn’t afford that in addition to a dedicated fleet defense aircraft. Thus, the TFX would now have to be able to dogfight as well as be a missile interceptor. The F-111B could have worked as a missileer, but it was too fat and underpowered to compete as an air superiority fighter. It was proper of the Navy to recognize that its needs had evolved. This was perhaps the beginning of the Navy realizing that budgets and hangar decks did not have room for so many specialized aircraft. USAF desperately needed the F-111 to replace the F-105, so they sucked it up and accepted the overweight airframe caused by the loveseat cockpit they never wanted.
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@davidpeters6536 Yes, they are all great looking planes, but the T-38 is not an F-5B, or any other suffix, any more than a KC-135 is a B-707 even though both were developed from the Boeing 367-80.
The T-38 and the F-5 were both developed from the N=156 lightweight fighter concept based on the J-85 engine. The USAF actually needed a new trainer rather than a lightweight fighter, so the T-38 went into service first with USAF. The F-5 came along later when the Kennedy administration ordered it developed as an inexpensive export fighter for U.S. allies.
There are a number of differences between the two aircraft. The F-5A/B added leading edge slats and extensions for more lift, beefier wheels and landing gear to carry more weight, and a list of items such as auxiliary engine air intakes, a drag chute, combat avionics, guns, and weapons pylons. The extra lift from the wing must have been nice, but the weight of all these additions did reduce performance compared to the T-38. The uprated engines that came with the later F-5E/F brought a welcome increase in performance.
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Well actually that is not a point of order, it is an opinion. One I suspect you got from Greg’s P-39 video. I am a Patreon supporter of Greg, but I do not buy that opinion, which is based on a magazine article written by a Bell executive. I think the writer was trying to present the aircraft as relevant even though it had failed to meet its original design intent, while burnishing the reputation of Bell as an innovator.
However, the nose is not really more streamlined in terms of the ideal shape in subsonic flow. The airplane was clean in its use of buried heat exchangers, but even so the overall drag was found to be high in reality, which disproves the supposed benefit of the pointy nose.
The specification called for a 37mm gun (to kill bombers) which would have been very difficult to install alongside an engine, a problem solved by the then unconventional aft mounted engine. Considering the extra weight of the drive shaft along with the dubious aerodynamic advantages, the 37mm gun remains the most reasonable primary purpose behind the configuration of this aircraft, one that a single magazine article cannot disprove.
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@WilhelmKarsten It seems you have to spread your misinformation everywhere.
The proof is not self-evident, and it isn't even proof. You want to call the widely accepted purpose of the minor wing sweep a myth, but your proof is nothing but your own assumption of what you think the facts must be in order to comport with your desired narrative.
Much slower airplanes have wing sweep that equals or exceeds that of the Me262. A sweep angle of 18.5 degrees (same as the DC-3) will only marginally reduce critical Mach number. A greater angle is need for meaningful improvement. What you call a myth actually makes more sense than your assumption that this minor sweep angle was chosen to reduce critical Mach number. If you have a primary source document that proves your assertion then show it to us, because your assumptions are not credible.
The Me262 was in no way fly-by-wire, either analog or digital. "Fly-by-wire (FBW) is a system that replaces the conventional manual flight controls of an aircraft with an electronic interface. The movements of flight controls are converted to electronic signals transmitted by wires, and flight control computers determine how to move the actuators at each control surface to provide the ordered response." The ME-262 did not do that in any way, shape, or form, and had conventional elevators for pitch control. A great many airplanes adjust the angle of the stabilizer with electric or hydraulic motors for the purpose of trim, but that is absolutely not "fly-by-wire". If you don't understand how trim functions, I will be happy to explain it to you.
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@solomonarbc I know what a turbine is, as they did back in the 1930s when this plane was designed, and they used various terms such as exhaust driven supercharger, turbine driven supercharger, or turbo-supercharger for short. That's because the important constant is what it does--how it is driven is a variable. Exhaust driven superchargers have since become so common that pronouncing all those dreary syllables is too much trouble for those raised with a short attention span, so a shorter term came into vogue. The fact that the newer term now dominates doesn't make the other terms inaccurate.
But instead of accepting that and learning something, you want to enforce use of the first term you ever heard, because that makes it the only term in your mind. You're the kind of person who thinks someone employing the original and correct pronunciation of the word "forte" is ignorant, because you have only heard the incorrect pronunciation so often used by the actually ignorant. Mispronunciation eventually became so widespread that it overpowered the correct pronunciation, and became officially acceptable in the media. So I now have to mispronounce the word incorrectly if I don't want others to think I'm the ignorant one. You seem to favor such changes that accommodate ignorance rather than inspire education and understanding. You could open your mind to a little bit of learning, but you prefer to stick with what you already know, and even enforce it on others. You would have made a great instructor at a Khmer Rouge reeducation camp.
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