Comments by "Maria" (@maria8809ttt) on "What could the Bank of England do to support the UK economy?" video.

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  8. Senior mainstream economist now admits central banks are not as independent as many believe. ,'In the 1990s, the central bank independence notion manifest in the adoption of inflation targeting as the primary policy target. ' Citizens were thus confronted with the prospect that a major arm of macroeconomic policy – interest rate adjustments – which may impact on their material well-being was being divorced from the process of political accountability' There are several reasons – political and operational – why the notion of central bank independence is a fiction. First, in almost every nation it is the elected politicians who appoint the management boards of central banks including the governors. That makes the flavour of the monetary policy boards reflective of the politics of the day. Second, in many jurisdictions, the Finance or Treasury ministers can overturn a monetary policy decision should they wish. There are various means through which this power can work. Third, and most importantly, on a practical or operational level, the central bank and the treasury functions must be closely coordinated daily to ensure that the policy targets of each are capable of being met. Fiscal policy interventions impact on the reserve balances in the cash system. Central banks manage the corridor or spread within which the short-term interest rates can fluctuate with liquidity variability. Liquidity management must therefore be performed in close liaison with the treasury department, so that the central bank can understand what fiscal injections/withdrawals are coming up on any given day and the implications for the banking reserve system. Fourth, we have countless historical examples where central bank officials have imposed their views and influence on the fiscal process.' The rest of this indepth blog can be viewed on line: William Mitchell Morden Monetary Theory. Macroeconomic research teaching and advocacy. Titled: Senior mainstream economist now admits central banks are not as independent as many believe.
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  18. The BIS understand that: 1. “Central banks are public institutions with policy mandates; they typically transfer their excess profits to the fiscal authority” – so, ultimately they are part of government and inherit the currency-issuing status. The Economic and Monetary Union is a little different because none of the Member State governments are sovereign in the euro. Only the ECB has the currency-issuing capacity and France, for example, cannot order it to use that capacity. For nations such as Australia, etc, the central banks are creatures of the state. 2. For central banks “the usual concept of solvency does not apply” – they are not commercial entities that are accountable to their shareholders. 3. For whatever reason, many central banks had arrangements with treasury or finance departments in government to indemnify them against losses. What does that mean? Simply that the government will always ‘cover’ the losses in an accounting sense – numbers flowing from the left pocket of government to the right pocket. 4. Other central banks did not follow that path and “note that they are irrelevant from the perspective of the overall public sector balance sheet”. That is, explicitly recognise that the central banks are part of government despite all the claims about ‘independence’. The BIS write in this regard that: 'As central banks generally remit some or all of their profits to the fiscal authority, they are part of the “consolidated” public sector finance picture … Recent losses for a number of central banks have led to smaller transfers to the fiscal authority or none at all, in some cases probably for years to come.' Right to Left pocket or vice versa '.… central banks do not seek profits, cannot be insolvent in the conventional sense as they can, in principle, issue more currency to meet domestic currency obligations, and face no regulatory capital minima precisely because of their unique purpose.' In other words, a currency-issuing government, unlike a non-government corporation, can never run out of money. There are no financial constraints. The BIS, however, sneak this fiction into the story: ' … central banks are protected from court-ordered bankruptcy and are backed (indirectly) by taxpayers.' The taxpayers are not part of this story. Taxes reduce non-government spending capacity (among other functions – like stopping people smoking). They do not fund anything or back anything. Principally, from the macroeconomic perspective, taxes serve to create the real resource space that the government can spend into without causing demand-pull inflation. The central banks are backed by government because they are part of government – that is the reality. “These provisions allow central banks to successfully operate without capital and withstand extended periods of losses and negative equity.” The BIS provide several examples from history. But, then things fall apart The BIS then start qualifying their conclusions: There can be, however, exceptional situations where misperceptions and political economy dynamics can interact with losses to compromise the central bank’s standing. If there is macroeconomic mismanagement and the state lacks credibility, losses may erode the central bank’s standing, which may jeopardise its independence and could even lead to the currency’s collapse. No examples are given. Why? Because this is hot air. Yes, politicians might beat up the story to bring harm to other politicians. Financial markets might talk big about abandoning the currency but if the central bank holds its position then as Japan shows, the ‘market players’ lose. The Roubini-types have been forecasting hell for Japan and claim that the Bank of Japan will back down soon and accede to the market demands for interest rate rises and the abandonment of yield curve control. The full blog to this can be found on line: William Mitchell Modern Monetary Theory Macroeconomic research, teaching and advocacy. Titled in the drop down menu: Central banks accounting losses are rising but are of no importance to anything important. Economic text books need updating.
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