Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "Drachinifel"
channel.
-
2
-
2
-
@TheKingofbrooklin France did, strongly, blatantly, egregiously, violate the naval treaties. The WNT gave France good until used licenses to build 35,000 tons of battleship in 1927 and another 35,000 tons in 1929 for a total of 70,000 tons. The Dunkerques used up some 50,000 tons of that, leaving only about 20,000 tons left. France broke the treaty the day they laid down Richeleau, October 22, 1935. Then they broke it again when they laid down Jean Bart on December 12 of 1936. If there were any repercussions for violating the treaty, I have not heard of them.
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the undersized British BBs, iirc, during the 1930 London conference, the UK did make a proposal to reduce both the tonnage limit and gun size limit for BBs. I have read that the Dunkerques were built undersized, in part, due to British pressure to build smaller ships. Italy considered smaller designs in the late 20s, before deciding on a treaty-max design with Littorio. If the UK has won the day in 1930, and everyone was limited to smaller ships, 25,000t with 12" guns, would that not give the treaty parties incentive to heavily modernize their older 15"-16" armed ships, instead of building new, but weaker, ships?
2
-
@culex818 In the WNT,. the US was supposed to have equal tonnage to the RN. The limit settled on was 525,000 tons. Adding three Admirals, at 41,200T, as measured for the treaty, would require a corresponding amount of other ships be scrapped, or the treaty limit increased and US required to retain enough pre-dreadnoughts to have a corresponding amount. To offset the additional 123,600T of Admirals, the RN would need to dispose of Tiger, Thunderer, and the 3-KGVs. Historically, Thunderer and the KGVs were scrapped to make room for the two Nelsons, so, if the RN wanted the Nelsons too, then two or three of the Iron Dukes would head to the breakers as well. Historically, Tiger and the Iron Dukes were eliminated in the additional fleet drawdown required by the First London Treaty in 1930. If those ships had been scrapped in 22, then the 1930 drawdown would have eliminated the R-class BBs. So the RN in 1940 would have been the QEs, Admirals, Renowns, Nelsons and the new KGVs building, with, potentially a very large number of slightly used twin 15" turrets in inventory.
2
-
wrt the question about the Nelsons being armed with 15" guns, that would not have impacted the choice of 14" on the KGVs. I looked in to the question of the KGV armament decision, combining information in books by Garzke, Raven, and Friedman, as well as other sources. The Admiralty's own analysts, in the fall of 35, said that a 9-15" armament would give a better balanced ship than the 12-14" alternative that was contemplated. The analysts said the only reason 14" would be selected would be if required by treaty. Someone in the USN, in the fall of 35, said they would be open to a 14" standard, if Japan agreed. That gave the "influencer" in the Admiralty the excuse to promote 14". Of course, the entire notion of Japan agreeing to anything was a pipe dream. When Japan announced, in December of 34, they were dropping out of the treaty system, they said they were open to a new conference and a new treaty, only if Japan was given parity with the US and UK, (which was not going to happen). This was widely reported in the newspapers at that time. Orders for the KGV armament had to be entered by late 35, to meet the build schedule for ships laid down in 37, so the decision to go 14" was made in late 35, before the Second London conference started. Who was the "influencer" and why? The "who" appears to be First Sea Lord Chatfield. The "why" appears to be an embrace of the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory, a theory the USN had argued, and rejected, twenty years earlier.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the question about a lend lease Iowa, When I was reading "Fifty Ships That Saved The World" a while back, the thought crossed my mind, what if the US offered New York, Texas, and Arkansas, in addition to the destroyers? Those three battleships were operating together in the Atlantic in early 40. The book I read mentioned that one of the groups of destroyers was en route to the UK when they picked up radio traffic from Jervis Bay, when it was being attacked by Scheer. The destroyers, which the USN had handed over with full magazines and torpedo tubes, rushed to Jervis Bay's location, but arrived too late. What if the US had handed over those three obsolete battleships, and one had been traveling with Jervis Bay? Scheer's recon plane had reported the convoy was unescorted. If the plane had reported a battleship escorting the convoy, regardless how old, Scheer may not have attacked at all.
2
-
2
-
My first concern would be the beam of a QE being broad enough to accommodate triple turrets. Wiki shows a QE having a beam of 90 feet. The 1916 design for the Lexingtons had a maximum beam of 91', but #1 and #4 turrets were twins, due to the taper of the bow and stern, and those were 14" guns. Nevada, with triple 14", had a beam of 95'. Hood, with twin 15" had a beam of 104', while the J3, with three triple 15" turrets, had a beam of 106'. The Littorios, with triple 15" had a beam of over 107'. Bismark, with a beam of 118', would probably have no problem taking three triple turrets.
To answer the question Drac responded to, I would say easily practical for Bismark to have three triples, and through a few more shells at both Hood and PoW. Hood, if starting from a clean sheet, could certainly have been fattened a bit, to accommodate triple 15". I am dubious about the QEs. I suspect they would need to be broadened significantly to take the larger turrets. That wrecks the length to beam ratio. To maintain speed, they would need to be lengthened proportionally to the broader beam. The Exchequer was already hyperventilating about the cost of the QEs. Escalate the cost even more, by building a longer and wider hull to accommodate triple turrets, and the Exchequer may go into full apoplectic fit and spike the entire program.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@stephenbond1990 The 1922 treaty specifies that, if a non-contracting power contracted with a contracting power to build a new ship, the new ship was subject to the treaty tonnage and armament limits. Contracting powers were not allowed to commandeer ships being built in their jurisdiction for any other power. Contracting powers were not allowed to gift or sell warships to other powers. So, nope, the Brits would not be able to build a G3 for Brazil, even if Brazil could pay for it and the US would not be able to build a South Dakota or Lexington for Argentina, because those ships exceed treaty limits. However, Washington was about 75% complete, and was within treaty limits. I don't know how selling it to Brazil would have worked out. It would meet condition 1: within treaty limits, but how would the decision fall wrt the prohibition on selling existing warships? Washington was incomplete, so not a functioning warship, but it's construction was not under foreign contract from the moment the keel was laid.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@IanLthestig As Walterbroadous said, torps of the time were not self-propelled, but riding on the end of a pole mounted on the bow of a sub, like the Hunley, or a steam powered launch. Another point is the confusion about terminology. When Admiral Farragut said "Damn the torpedoes" the torpedoes he was referring to are what are now called "mines". With the spar torpedo, the boat would ram the warhead against the side of the ship, and the tip of the warhead would embed in the wooden hull. The launch would then pull away to a safe distance and detonate the warhead by means of pulling a rope. As the spar torpedoes were usually delivered by surface vessels the defense system adopted was a boom made of logs, floating on the surface, so an attacking torpedo boat would be stopped before it was close enough for the spar to reach the hull. Eons ago, I read of a successful attack, in spite of the log boom, so I looked it up. An attack against the Confederate ironclad Albemarle was lead by Lt William Cushing on the night of October 28, 1864. The Albemarle was defended by a log boom, but the logs had been in the water a long time and were covered with moss and slime. The logs were slippery enough that Cushing's launch rode up and over them, and the attack was successful, with the warhead holing Albermarle at the waterline. The ironclad quickly sank. Cushing had detonated the warhead immediately on contact and the concussion threw him and all his crew in the water. Most of the crew were captured, but Cushing and one other crewman were able to evade capture and make their way back to Union lines. For this action, Cushing received the "Thanks of Congress". The Cushing family seems to have produced men with an exceptionally large pair. Cushing's brother, an army artillery officer, received the Medal of Honor posthumously for defending his position at the Battle of Gettysburg.
2
-
2
-
@bkjeong4302 That question has crossed my mind too. Most navies had been settled in at 12", for a while. European next evolution seemed to always be a hair under 14". The Brits went to 13.5", French 13.4", German 13.8". Then those three, plus Italy, which got big gun technology from Vickers and Armstrong, went to 15". Japan, in spite of it's close ties to the RN, went to 14", then 16", following the US pattern. The first cause that comes to mind is the various gun development programs are following the evolution of forging equipment, Europe went to 15" during WWI because that was the largest/longest tube the Brits and Germans could forge? But the Japanese bought forging equipment from the US, and US forging technology was at a slightly different pace than in Europe? I really don't know. Don't even have any sort of evidence based suspicion.
2
-
2
-
I just addressed that scenario in a separate post. The IJN did not have enough headroom under it's treaty tonnage limit to build another Nagato, without scrapping a Fuso or Kongo to make the tonnage available. The net gain in ship firepower, for all the money spent building a third Nagato, would be poor value for money. as the throw weight of a Fuso's 12-14" guns is very close to that of a Nagato's 8-16" guns. The RN was well over it's tonnage limit, so, to build a third Nelson, they would need to scrap two Iron Dukes. As the Dukes went to the breakers in the early 30s, that would be a net gain for the RN by 1940. Similarly, the US was just about dead on it's treaty limit, so completing Washington would require scrapping the two Floridas, but the two Floridas were scrapped/demilitarized in the early 30s, so that is also a net gain for the US by 1941. One big difference, the third Nelson and Nagato would need to be built from the keel up, at considerable additional expense. I tried to find what the USN spent modernizing the Floridas (conversion to oil, with new boilers, added deck armor and torpedo bulges) vs what it would have cost to complete Washington. Turns out it would have been about a wash: Washington could have been completed for the money spent on the Floridas only a few years before they were disposed of.
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the Lexington battle cruiser refit question. I have seen pix of a scratchbuilt Lexington model modernized to WWII standards. It looked very much like an Iowa. What would have happened in the real world, if they had been built as battle cruisers? If they had been built as planned, that implies the Washington Treaty didn't happen, which means the SoDaks would have been built as well, so no surplus material ordered for the SoDaks would be available to reinforce the Lexington's armor. Would the Lexingtons ever have been significantly updated at any point through 1945? I would say probably not. They would not have been updated any more than any other class of USN capital ships in the 30s. If they were based at Pearl, due to their ability to keep up with the carriers, they would have been out with the carriers and not damaged in the attack. Without being sunk or heavily damaged at Pearl, they would have had the minimal updating that other capital ships that missed Pearl received: added triple A, updated fire control and radar, like Colorado. Their best chance of surviving the war would have been as triple A platforms protecting the carriers. as the Japanese pilots would be concentrating on the carriers. If they got involved in any of the surface engagements around the Solomons or Philippines , they would have been shot full of holes.
2
-
@QuizmasterLaw Several older ships seem to have been pretty decrepit. Most of the surviving Revenges and Malaya were put in reserve by the end of 43. I read somewhere, regarding the Madagascar operation, the original intention had been to use Malaya, but she was so decrepit they used Ramillies instead. Rodney was intended to be used for fire support in Normandy, but, first, went into drydock, because the hull was leaking so badly. Royal Sovereign went to the Philadelphia Navy Yard for refit in early 43, but the navy yard couldn't do anything with the hoists, because they were worn out. After repairing what it they could, the ship was returned to the UK, and they passed her off to the Russians. Drac has commented on the poor condition of Nevada at Pearl Harbor. At the time the Washington Treaty was signed, battleships were expected to have a 20 year life. First London decreed they would have a 26 year life. By the time WWII got rolling, these ships were closing in on 30 years, well past their projected life spans.
2
-
2
-
The Washington Naval Treaty granted the RN construction licenses for two battleships, which could be used immediately, which produced the Nelsons. If those two licenses had been granted for execution in 1927 and 1929, as the licenses granted to France and Italy were, how would that impact Admiralty decision making when the Deutschlands were built? Would the Admiralty follow the lead of the French and build two light battlecruisers, possibly using the 15"/42 turrets in inventory as a cost saving measure? Or, would the Admiralty decide Hood and the Renowns were sufficient to deal with the Deutschlands, and, when the first two Littorios were laid down in 1934, use the licenses to advance the timeline of the construction of the KGV class, laying down KGV and Prince of Wales in 36, with Duke of York and Anson laid down January 1 of 37 and Howe laid down in May of 37?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Philistine47 from my study on the subject, Ranger's lack of size was directly due to the Lexington's excess of size. The two Lexingtons used half of the US' tonnage allotment. Friedman on carriers talks about the debates in the Navy about how many carriers they wanted, and how to divide up the remaining tonnage. They soon decided Ranger was too small, so the Yorktowns were made larger, but not too large, so that enough tonnage allotment was left to build a minimally effective carrier, which became Wasp. Yes, the Yorktowns were vulnerable. They did not have staggered boiler and engine rooms. Considering how Yorktown and Hornet were both lost: dead in the water, but not on fire, can't help but wonder, if they had been built with staggered boiler and engine rooms, like an Essex, would they have survived?
2
-
@christopherrowe7460 the USN did have a lot of input from the RN in carrier design. Stanley Goodall was seconded by the Admiralty to the USN during the war and was a major conduit of information between the USN Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Admiralty's chief constructor Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt. Goodall provided in depth information about Hood to the USN. Friedman's book on carriers goes on to describe the continuing exchange of information between the USN and RN in the 20s, The RN went to larger carriers during the war. As soon as the war ended, enthusiasm for carriers waned significantly and Eagle and Hermes were both long builds.
Seems the IJN took the rational approach to carriers. Hosho was laid down in 1920, when Akagi and Kaga were both intended as big gun capital ships. It would be interesting to see where IJN carrier design would have gone without the intervention of the treaty, and that special clause the US wanted, allowing the conversion of outsized battlecruisers.
Yes, the USN was designing 35-39,000 ton carriers before the treaty. You know how we Americans roll, always want to have a bigger one. But reality, and a tight fisted Congress, resulted in Langley. I have read that, until the intervention of the treaty and availability of the battlecuriser hulls, the Navy was planning on converting a second collier. As for the dimensions of US carriers, beam is dictated by the Panama Canal. The need for speed, the more wind over the deck, the safer air ops are, as well as USN "scouting group" doctrine, dictates the length to beam ratio of a cruiser/battlecruiser. If I was in charge in the 20s, Langley would have been followed in 3-5 years, by Ranger. Even looking at Ranger, I can see the lineage going to Langley, not the Lexingtons. Ranger has the same far aft positioned boilers, with swiveling, deck edge funnels, as Langley. Ranger, as originally planned, was flush decked, same as Langley. The USN did not return to the Lexington's layout with midships boilers and an island, until Yorktown.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@stanleyrogouski I looked up the AA armament SD had when completed in March of 42: (8) .50 machine guns, (28) 1.1" (I take that as 7 quad mounts), and (16) Oerlikons, along with (16) 5"/38s. That was a substantial increase from what had been originally planned. Prince of Wales had (16) QF 5.25" in twin turrets, (32) 2 pounder pompoms (which I take to be (4) octuple mounts), and (80) UP projectors. The SD's 1.1 mounts can engage more targets at the same time, but PoW's pompoms will do more damage to anything they get zeroed in on. Without the golden BB torpedo hit that killed power to many of the mounts on PoW, there isn't much to choose between the two, and SD had it's own wonky electrical system issues. Repluse had not been modernized like Renown, and was somewhat deficient in AA, by 1941 standards: (8) 4" and (2) octuple pompoms. For the heck of it, I proposed sending the newly rebuilt QE and Valiant as Force Z, with their places in Alexandria being taken by Malaya and Revenge, and Malaya's place in Force H taken by Prince of Wales. Rebuilt QE and Valiant: 20 4.5" in twin turrets, 4 octuple pompoms, and 4 quad .50 machine guns. I could make a case that QE and Valiant, together, could put up more AA than PoW and Repulse, combined, and the QEs might even have an edge on a pair of SDs. Even more interesting: there was a suggestion that Hermes join Force Z, but she was rejected as too slow to keep up with PoW and Repulse. Hermes could keep up with QEs just fine, but I doubt it would occur to anyone in Singapore to make up tail hooks for some of the Buffalos the RAF and RAAF were flying so that Hermes could have some proper fighters to provide a CAP.
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the question about all the Rs being built as Renown class battlecruisers, consider the alternative: in addition to Renown and Repulse, the other two cancelled ships; the R class Resistance and QE class Agincourt are also reordered as Renowns making use of the 15" guns and Mk 1 turrets that were in process for the cancelled ships. It is written that the Admiralty proceeded with construction of Hood as it, in conjunction with the two Renowns, were seen as replacements for the three battlecruisers lost at Jutland. If the Admiralty had four Renowns building at the time of Jutland, would the Admiralty see any need to build Hood? Would any of the Admirals been laid down at all, considering the wartime press of other priorities, and the number of Renowns building? Impact on the WNT? The 525,000 ton limit, as I read the treaty, was only a factor when building replacements for ships currently in commission. The original retention list for the RN, with Tiger, the three surviving KGVs and Thunderer was some 580,000 tons. When the Nelsons were built, the drawdown toward the limit started, with four dreadnoughts scrapped and the RN's tonnage reduced to just under 559,000T. Without Hood, but with two additional Renowns, the RN's treaty retention list would have probably looked very much the same, with the possible elimination of Thunderer.
2
-
Almirante Latorre and the USN, revisited. Two concerns I had; ammo and spares supplies for a British built ship in USN service. If the Elswick and USN 14" guns had precisely the same bore, it may have been possible to use USN shells. The Elswick chamber is significantly larger than the chamber in the USN gun, so plenty of room to load a charge of USN smokeless to provide equivalent performance to cordite. That leaves the problem of the USN trying to source replacement parts for all the UK built systems in the ship. Hence, Plan Steve: The UK buys Almirante Latorre into service (again), or, if lacking cash, the US buys her and lend-leases her to the U.K. There is a significant probability that the shells and charges from the 14" mounted on the KGVs would work in the Elswick guns, and spares would, from RN perspective, be locally sourced. With an additional obsolete BB available for convoy duty, the Latorre (HMS Canada, again?) could relieve one of the New Yorks, so the New York could be redeployed to the US west coast, without creating the logistics problems deploying a foreign built ship would.
2
-
@usssouthdakota5541 Renown was with Ark Royal, in Force H. Repulse was with KGV in the channel south of Iceland. The way I see it is Tovey know how vulnerable Hood was, and Repulse was even more vulnerable, so the two forces were formed of one strong ship (KGV or PoW) and one weak ship (Hood or Repulse). PoW, still working up, was the weaker of the two KGVs, so was paired with the stronger of the two obsolete battlecruisers, Hood. To directly answer your question, if Repulse had been placed with PoW, there would have been no doubt which was the weaker ship, so I would have expected PoW to lead the attack. PoW would probably have lasted longer than Hood, but surviving the engagement is another question. iirc, Bismark initially concentrated on Hood, allowing PoW to close to "decisive" range undamaged. With PoW leading, it would have been taking fire longer and would have been more damaged by the time it entered "decisive" range of under 16,000 yards.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Davidsladky135 as Joe said, carriers started out being named after previous ships, just as the Brits keep recycling names. When I was on the Lex, 50 years ago, there was a painting on a bulkhead in the hangar of all the previous Lexingtons. iirc, there were 4 or 5 preceding ships of that name. There was a long string of Enterprises before CV-6. It was as much chance as anything else that most of the early carriers were named after battles as previous USN ships had been named to commemorate the same battles. Of the six Lexington class battlecruisers, the two that were completed were named after preceding ships that had been named after battles, three were named after ships of the original 6 frigates and one, Ranger, named after a ship commanded by John Paul Jones during the revolution. There were six USS Hornets, dating back to the revolution, before CV-8 and there were eight USS Wasps, dating back to the revolution, prior to CV-7.
2
-
2