Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  21. The naval treaties have been brought up in comments a couple times recently, and that got the wheels turning wrt the Deutschlands. Some articles mention that, as the allies were trying to figure out a way to prevent their construction, Germany offered to break up Deutschland on the ways, if the allies agreed to replace the naval limitations of the Versailles treaty with the existing naval treaties between the five powers, with a capital ship quota of 125,000 tons, vs 175,000 for France and Italy. Ultimately, France opposed the proposal and it was dropped. What if Germany had come under the 5 power treaties? The Deutschlands would immediately be outlawed as cruisers as their 11" guns exceeded the treaty limit. However, Germany then could go directly to the Scharnhorsts, which were comfortably under the naval treaty's 35,000 ton limit for battleships. Drach's video on Scharnhorst says that Germany had lost the ability to build really large guns, so, instead of the desired 15". the Scharns received the 11" developed for the Deutschlands. But if the Deutschlands are not built, then that 11" gun is not developed either. By the time the Deutschland would have been laid down, the treaty change agreed, Deutschland broken up on the ways, and the Scharnhorsts designed, Hitler was in power. By 34, Hitler could ring up his buddy in Rome and say "hey Benny, could Ansaldo run off some extras of the 15"/50 it's making for your Littorios? I have an idea." So, which would work out better for the allies? With the treaty switch, the Deutschlands, which churned up their share of mischief early in the war don't exist, but the Scharnhorsts are more potent.
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  24.  @coltaxe100  There would actually be two different "if you coulds', one with the naval treaties and one without. Without treaties and an unlimited checkbook, the sky is the limit, especially if you include contracting with yards in Canada and the US. With the treaties, then you get out the calculator and a copy of Jane's to see what decisions to make differently. wrt Carriers, the Washington treaty specified that all carriers in service or building at the time of the treaty were deemed "experimental" and not subject to the 20 year replacement schedule, so they could be replaced at any time. Argus, Eagle and Hermes all fit that criteria. Eagle was not efficient as a carrier, but had a bit of size and a bit of speed, not fast, but fast enough to cruise with QEs, so it might be worthwhile to retain. Argus had no speed, and Hermes had no size. so remission both as seaplane tenders to free up the tonnage to build a second Ark Royal. Depending on the assessment of the situation, Renown and Repulse had size and speed, and could have been converted to carriers, after the treaty collapsed, faster than new carriers could have been built from the keel up. As for BBs, instead of building the Nelsons, the RN could have taken deferred construction windows, like France and Italy did, so they could have built two, modern, fast, BBs in the early 30s, rather than the eccentric and slow Nelsons. Outside of that, the RN really couldn't do anything more within the framework of the treaties. The 1930 London treaty extended the BB building moratorium through 1936. KGV and Prince of Wales were laid down New Year's day of 1937. The other three KGVs had all been laid down by July of 37. Really, when it comes to BBs, the Brits did about as well as they could, within the limits of the treaty, without having 20/20 foresight.
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  25.  @greg_mca  the first thing is carrier aircraft tend to be built stronger to withstand the rigors of carrier ops. The first day out when I was on the Lexington, I was taking a shortcut through the hanger when, with no warning, I heard *WHAM*. I was wondering what part of that old ship had broken, when a guy walking with me said "plane landed". I also, by luck, got a photo of an A7, that had just trapped. The deceleration was so strong the pilot can be seen in the photo thrown several inches away from his seatback, in spite of the harness he was wearing. I used to know at what deceleration rate a person's eyeballs will pop out of their sockets. Obviously, the deceleration on a carrier landing is safely below that limit, but not hugely below it. Consequently, a land based plane, like a Hurricane or Spitfire, will usually require structural strengthening, in addition to the expected arresting hook and life raft. The strengthening will usually degrade performance due to the extra weight. The aircraft will be changed to suit the ships, not the other way around. The Brits were hurting for single seat fighters in 40. They bought the Grumman F4F, know in British service as the Martlet. The Martlet I, like all early Wildcats, did not have folding wings, so the Brits tended to leave them ashore. The Martlet II introduced Grumman's folding wing feature to the Royal Navy, so more of the planes could be accommodated on board. When Drac does his video on the Graf Zepplin, he may get into how the 109s and Stukas were modified for carrier service. If you get a chance, see "Ships With Wings", a British 1941 production. It gives some good looks at Swordfish and Skuas coming up the elevator with their wings folded. A lot of that footage was shot on the Ark Royal, less than a year before it was sunk.
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  40. wrt the question about reusing existing guns to expedite battleship construction, the first option that crosses my mind is to have the Admiralty retain all of the 13.5" Mk V heavy shell guns when their original ships were scrapped. By my figuring, that would be 80 guns, plus whatever spares were in inventory to support the ships originally built with them. Using the 13.5s would also comply with the reduction in gun size to 14" in Second London. Alternately, the USN apparently had ordered 14"/50s for the battlecruisers at the same time as the guns were ordered for the Tennessee class BBs, then the battlecruisers moved on to the 16"/50, leaving the USN with a large, surplus inventory of new 14" guns. Reportedly 119 14"/50s were built, to support only 5 BBs that used them. Even allowing for 24 spares, 2 complete sets of replacements, to support the USN BBs, USN need would be 84 guns, leaving 35 available for potential sale to the UK, enough for 2 KGVs, plus a full set of spares. The problem with using the US guns would be powder, as they would need to be fed USN smokeless, rather than cordite, for optimal performance. During WWI, the RN used US built 14"/45s on one class of monitors. They experimented with cordite in them and, reportedly, suffered a significant loss of range. The problem with any existing 13.5" or 14" gun would be turrets, which are also time consuming to build. Salvaged 13.5" would have twin turrets. USN 14" would require new turrets to be built. Twin turrets are not weight or space efficient, which becomes an issue when complying with the treaty displacement limits, and the displacement limit was not increased until mid 1938. The gun size escalator triggered in April 1937. The return to 16" guns a year before the displacement limit increase makes me want to cast a lustful eye on the triple 16" turrets on the Nelsons, moving them to more capable hulls.
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  43.  @johnfisher9692  I understand where you are coming from, but the hazard is in sacrificing good enough for better, to the point that nothing ever gets built. At some point, a design needs to be frozen, so it can be built, while the designers keep working to improve on that design for the next generation. The other hazard is, of course, that a design element could be entirely wrongheaded, and the subsequent design heading even farther off in the wrong direction, before the flaw in the logic is discovered. An example of the first case is the first generation carriers. Eagle and Hermes were six year builds. The Lexingtons were seven year builds, and C&R was complaining, in it's annual reports, about how disappointed they were in the slow progress. Akagi and Kaga were also slow builds. In the case of the Lexingtons, I am thinking the delays, and the huge cost overruns, were the result of a massive number of change orders as new ideas were birthed, or experience was gained with Langley. In comparison, Ranger was built in only 3 years, with only a $2M, about 10%, cost overrun. Ranger had one major change order while construction was underway: the addition of an island, which probably accounts for a good share of that $2M overrun. I have no doubt that the original $23M conversion cost for the Lexingtons was intended to be accurate. The estimate given in 1922 for a clean sheet dedicated carrier was $27M. Extrapolating Ranger's cost to 20,000 tons gives a cost of $28M. Lexington's cost ballooning from $23M to $40M was probably unforeseen and the result of starting the ships when the USN was still too far down the learning curve. A few days ago, I asked my local public library to transfer in a copy of Friedman on carriers to see if he can provide conformation of my suspicions that the Lexington's cost overrun, was due to change orders.
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