Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  5. For Ninja, the KGV 14" armament seems to follow the "more smaller guns means more hits" theory. I have been looking into that issue, as most of the justifications offered do not make any sense. The Admiralty produced a wide variety of designs for the KGVs with 14", 15", and 16" guns. In the fall of 35, the alternatives were analyzed by the Technical Division of Naval Staff. Their conclusion was that a 9-15" armament provided the best balance of hitting power, speed, and protection. The analysis said "The 14" gun ship should be ruled out, unless required by treaty." The Sea Lords agreed to go 15". Then, the US said it would be open to the upcoming Second London treaty imposing a 14" limit, contingent on Japan agreeing. A year earlier, December of 34, Japan had withdrawn from the treaty system. At that time, Japan said it's withdrawal was due to it's demand for parity with the US and UK. Japanese representatives said at the time, they were open to a new treaty, as long as the new treaty gave Japan parity. The US and UK were not going to give Japan parity, so I don't see how anyone could have taken the US offer of 14", contingent on Japan's agreement, seriously. The designs for KGVs with the different armament schemes show the 9-15" armament weighs less than the 12-14" under consideration. As the 15" armament has fewer guns, the lower parts count would indicate the 15" armament would cost less. Clearly, someone wanted the 14" armament badly enough to go against the Technical Division's analysis, against the issue of weight, and against the issue of cost. The only reason I can think of is adherence to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory.
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  15.  @solutionless123  the arms trade in general has always been a bit shady. Basil Zaharoff, an agent for Vickers, had a tendency to oversell their products. An incident relayed in "Reilly Ace Of Spies", pitted Riley, a British spy, against Zaharoff, for contracts for new ships for Russia. Riley maneuvered himself into position as the representative in Russia for Blohm und Voss. Reilly then advised British Intelligence, that, if B&V won the contract, he would forward full sets of drawings of the ships to the British government, giving the British government an incentive to hobble Zaharoff's efforts, cost Vickers a fortune in profits, cost thousands of British shipyard workers their jobs, to gain intelligence about German ship design. meanwhile, Reilly would pocket a massive sales commission from B&V. The US government made sizeable trade concessions to Argentina to aid US yards in winning the contracts for the Rivadavias, even though the Curtis turbines the ships were equipped with were considerably inferior to British Parsons turbines. The Admiralty bought some 14" guns that Bethlehem Steel had built for the Greek battleship that was building in Germany. The Brits discovered the gun design was defective, the guns tended to droop. I have not seen specific numbers, but I have read that the price Chile paid for Latorre and the destroyers was at a significant discount to their original contract price. Latorre was no longer a new ship, and was becoming obsolete by 1920. The destroyers were from an order for six Chile had placed before the war. Chile received two destroyers just before the war started, but the other four were requisitioned by the Admiralty. One of the four was sunk at Jutland. The other three were very active during the war, with HMS Broke being involved in two particularly lurid brawls. The two ships that Chile had received new from the builders in 1914 lasted until 1945, but the three that had been with the RN during the war went to the breakers in 1933. I wonder how serviceable those three had been for several years before they were scrapped, as Chile rang up Thornycroft in 1928 and ordered six more destroyers.
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  33.  @michaelsnyder3871  intelligence operations always involve a degree of guesswork. Remember the conversation between Charlton Heston and Hal Holbrook, as Rochefort, in "Midway"? Heston asked how much of the IJN correspondence they could actually read. Holbrook said words to the effect "we don't really read them. we see a hint here, a glimmer there". Heston says "you're guessing!" That is about it, educated guessing. The Admiralty designed the Admiral class battlecruisers, based on their best guesses about the Mackensens. The Alaska class cruisers were designed based on best guesses about an IJN class of heavy cruisers. The 1938 conference between the US and UK regarding where to set the new displacement limit, was based on their best guess about the size of the Yamato, and their own facilities. Reportedly, the UK wanted a limit of 42,000 due to limits of facilities around the empire (which really makes you wonder if the G3 and N3 were intended to be built, or a bluff, only bargaining chips to be traded away for concessions by other parties to the treaty), while the US wanted 45,000, because that was what was needed to achieve their goals for speed, protection, and firepower. The only thing the US and UK could be reasonably sure of was that Yamato was going to be considerably over 35,000, which triggered the escalator clause. The estimates of how much over 35,000 could have been colored by the parties own agendas. I have read that the assessment was Yamato would be 45,000, which was what the US wanted. I wonder if British Intelligence was saying 42,000, because that was what the Admiralty wanted? The actual data in hand was imprecise. As we saw with Bismark and Littorio, you could be significantly over the treaty limit, without the UK and US catching on. That is why I suggest that, had Yamato not been so far over the limit, but closer to Bismark and Littorio, the US and UK might have not had the confidence to call the IJN on it, and increase the displacement limit.
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