Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "Drachinifel"
channel.
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@vodeankandosii3982 First order of business would seem to be to build a larger drydock at Cockatoo Island. According to my 1928 USN port guide, the larger of the two docks at Cockatoo was 630' over the blocks and 84' wide. There was a privately owned dock in Woolwich that was 850' over the blocks, but only 83' wide. Renown, for instance, would not fit in either, due to it's 90' beam. The Admiralty built a large enough dock to handle anything existing or planned in Singapore, in the late 30s, which was lost to Allied use when the war was barely started. The Cook dock in Sydney harbor, large enough to handle anything, did not open until 1945. The Aussies started looking at large drydock options in 1938, just as the King George dock in Singapore was opening. The planning and construction for the King George dock had started in 1928. 20/20 hindsight says the Admiralty and the RAN should have cooperated to share the costs of building a large dock at Sydney, instead of Singapore, but didn't work out that way.
2
-
@321gman3 first question: Yes, the USN had follow-on designs in progress. Chief designer Admiral Taylor was not happy with the SoDak design, feeling the metacentric height was inadequate, for one thing. Taylor drew up a design he liked much better, which was also a bit bigger, and a bit faster, but also more expensive. SecNav Daniels rejected it on cost, for the SoDaks. However, Daniels was proposing another large building program, which may well have used Taylor's bigger, faster, design.
Second question: I would not say the Nevadas were particular damage sponges. Okie probably only stayed upright long enough to take 9 torpedoes, because they all hit in close succession. Nevada took a lot less damage at Pearl, but, after grounding, slowly settled as the ship progressively flooded. iirc, Drac talked about how Nevada had progressively lost the ability to maintain watertight integrity over the interwar years. When Nevada was being used for target practice, I would expect all the WT doors to be closed. Were the ventilation ducts also sealed off, making the ship tighter than it could have been with a crew on board?
2
-
2
-
On the Kimmel December 6th scenario, I think Graham Baxter is pretty close: schedule an all forces air raid drill for Dec 7th, at say, 7:00am. Sunrise that morning was at 6.26am, so everyone has plenty of daylight to work in. One thing I would like to try is have the destroyers in Pearl circle Ford Island laying smoke. If the entire harbor basin is full of smoke, the Japanese can't hit what they can't see. Then, with every Army fighter in the air, I, as Kimmel, would be in the fully manned communications center when the phone call from the radar station at Opana Point came in shortly after 7:02. I would say something along the lines of "I have an idea, lets vector about 50 fighters to the target the radar has identified to practice an intercept." Then, when the Japanese react to their formation being buzzed by 50 P-40s, it's game on.
2
-
2
-
@kemarisite I second everything Frank says. The Vickers, especially in the octuple mounts, can throw an absolutely lurid amount of steel, but not very far, nor for very long, while a Bofors can really reach out and touch someone, and bang away all day. The Vickers did have something of a return to usefulness in 45, when the Brits started running into Kamikazes, as their throw weight dwarfed an entire phalanx of Oerlikons and they could shoot an inbound plane to bits. The Italians used Vickers guns on several of their warships during the 20s and 30s, the guns being license built by Terni. The RM changed out a lot of the Vickers in the late 30s in favor of the Breda 37mm, for the same reasons that the Brits and US went to the Bofors: the Breda had three times the effective range, and magazines could be stacked in the loading machine to maintain a high rate of fire, without the reload stoppages of a Vickers.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@cycloneranger7927 that question was being asked when 16" guns were selected for the Colorados in 1916. iirc, the official answer from the USN was that the New Mexicos would not have been cost efficient to try to convert during construction. Tennessee and California were not laid down until after the decision on the Colorados had been made, in the summer of 16. From what I can find, the barbettes of the Tennessee's are the same diameter as those on the Colorados: 32 feet. The part of the twin 16" turret that extends down into the barbette on the Colorados is actually about 6" smaller in diameter than the triple 14". I'm going by memory here, but sticks in my mind that the turrets for the Tennessees had not been built yet, when the decision was made to go to 16" for the Colorados, they were still in design. So, yes, by everything I see, it would have been feasible to build Tennessee and California with 16" guns. Now, we get to the complications. BuOrd had ordered 14"/50 guns for the New Mexicos, Tennessees, and the battlecruisers, in one lot. The Navy had those 14" guns coming out it's ears. Shifting the Tennessees to 16", with so much money already sunk into building the 14"/50s would have had Congress in an uproar about the waste. Then we get to the Washington Naval Treaty. In a feat of diplomatic art, Hood was deemed "post-Jutland" even though it was designed before the battle. Tennessee and California, both laid down after Hood, and with a more advanced armor and torpedo protection system, were deemed "pre-Jutland", while the Colorados, a near-repeat of the Tennessees, but with 16" guns, were deemed "post-Jutland". I lay the difference between the "pre" and "post" ships to the Tennessees having 14" guns. If the Tennessees were built with 16", it would have been nearly impossible to insist they were "pre" ships. With Tennessee and California 16" armed and deemed "post-Jutland", the US would not have been allowed to complete Colorado or West Virginia. After the treaty went into effect, upgunning the ships was prohibited. As for getting more speed out of the standards, you are dealing with multiple problems with the turbo-electric ships, because, even having more steam, you would need to install uprated turbines, uprated generators, and uprated final drive motors. The interior arrangement of the ships was specialized for TE drive, making it impossible to shift to modern geared turbines, for anything resembling a reasonable cost. And the ships were still short and fat. Lengthening them to improve speed would add even more cost, and, as they were already over 30,000 tons, there may not have been enough room left before hitting the 35,000 ton treaty limit, to lengthen them enough to significantly improve speed. The Italian Andrea Doria class gained about 4,000 tons in their rebuild, but they started far below the 35,000 ton limit.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@brendonbewersdorf986 the Kiis were never laid down. The treaty only allowed for conversion of existing ships that exceeded treaty limits. The other two Amagis, Atago and Takao, were broken up in April, 1924. The earthquake that wrecked Amagi was in September, 23, so, theoretically, Atago or Takao could have been completed as a carrier, as they were still in existence when Amagi was wrecked. Kaga's construction, being much farther along, probably cost a lot less to covert than completing Atago or Takao.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Ranger had been built several years earlier, so the USN would have had her, regardless what happened years later. On the question of Wasp, if she had been delayed, then, yes, she could have been redesigned as a 23,000 ton "improved Yorktown", with the deck edge elevator. Then, when Congress authorized money for two new carriers, instead of building Hornet to the then somewhat obsolete Yorktown design, and Essex held up waiting for a new design, Hornet and Essex could both be built to the new "improved Yorktown" design the navy already had in hand , and both would be in commission on December 7th.
2
-
2
-
@vikkimcdonough6153 I read, somewhere along the line, that, after the loss of the Lex at Coral Sea, the USN learned to inert the fuel delivery system, On warning of an attack, the gas mains to the flight deck were drained, and the mains and pump rooms were filled with CO2, Wasp was lost because she had no warning of the sub's attack, and was running air ops, so the gas mains were full of gas. As for filling the storage tanks with inert gas, I don't know if that was/is done on carriers. Sticks in my mind that a certain concentration of O2 in the fuel tank would be needed for combustion. A tank with nothing but fuel vapor in the top of the tank might not burn. Aircraft, and cars, have been running around for well over a century, without elaborate inert gas systems for the tanks, without exploding in a fireball, unless the tank is ruptured.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the question about alt history, I enjoy speculating about the repercussions of a pivot in a decision, but do not go in for magical thinking. I have never seen, nor have any interest, in seeing "The Final Countdown", as a for instance. The fun ones are where one person changes his mind: Admiral Strauss at BuOrd accepts the 16"/45, instead of pushing the 14"/50, so Tennessee and California are built with the 16", making them "post-Jutland" in the treaty, so Colorado and West Virginia are never completed. Or, when Congress is demanding, in June 1918, that the navy make a start on all the ships authorized in the 1916 Act, SecNav Daniels talks common sense to Congress, that the South Dakotas have rendered the Colorados obsolete, so cancel West Virginia, Colorado, and Washington, before they are laid down, and proceed with the South Dakotas, then the treaty intervenes to prevent the South Dakotas being completed. How does the non-existence of Colorado and West Virginia vibrate through the next 25 years?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@tommeakin1732 that thought crossed my mind. Use a development of the 12"/50 on the Wyomings on the Lexingtons to save weight and size, vs the 16", making the Lexingtons essentially a 1920 version of the Alaskas. Thinking about it, a 12"/50 could punch through the armor of anything that could catch up to a Lexington, and having a sub-battleship size gun would discourage the temptation to put battlecruisers in the battleline against full-on battleships. But the Wyomings were years away from scrapping. What was available in abundance immediately after WWI was the 12'/45, but then you start running into problems penetrating battlecruiser armor. Navweaps gives a penetration for the 12"/50 at 12,000 yards of as much as 12.3" and 10" at 20,000 yards, enough to punch through an Amagi's belt at those ranges. But the 12"/45 could only penetrate 10.8" at 12,000 yards, so punching through Amagi's belt at longer range than that becomes problematic.
2
-
In the battles of Elli and Lemnos, Averof did most of the work, inflicting gun damage on several Ottoman ships, but sinking nothing. The newly purchased Aetos class destroyers had 21" torpedo tubes, unique in the Greek fleet, and the Greeks had not bought any torpedoes for them. However, Greece had the eight Thyella and Niki class destroyers, each of which mounted a pair of torpedo tubes. Newspaper reports at the time say the older Greek destroyers, the ones that should have had torpedoes, stayed at Lemnos, rather than come out with the rest of the fleet and participate in the battle. Why didn't the Nikis and Thyellas come out with the rest of the fleet and torpedo the ex-German pre-dreadnoughts when they were exposed, and sink them, so they would not need to be dealt with again? And thanks for addressing my question about battleship construction sequence.
2
-
2
-
A Bismark vs Hood question came up on another forum a few days ago. The theory was offered that Bismark penetrated Hood's deck by using a reduced charge, to lower muzzle velocity, enabling firing at a higher angle. Extracts from a 1935 USN gunnery table, were offered as evidence this was an established practice: for a USN 14" full charge, 2600fps MV, at 14,500 yards, angle of fall is 12 degrees, for reduced charge, 2000fps, angle of fall is 20 degrees. For a USN 16", full charge, at 23,500 yards, angle of fall is 22 degrees, reduced charge, 42 degrees. One pushback offered to this theory was that there was no record of Bismark doing this, but the records would be in the ship, at the bottom of the ocean, and no-one would have though it worth mentioning in the after action debrief of the surviving crew, because it was SOP. Additional challenge to the theory was that Bismark's guns used brass cased charges that could not be adjusted. But only the main charge was brass cased, the fore charge was in a bag, so the charge could be adjusted. What say you? Is it plausible that, knowing they were shooting at an old ship with inadequate protection against plunging fire, Bismark's gunners simply turned to the reduced charge page of their gunnery table, fired at high angle, and the eye-witness accounts, and narrative of the last 80 years, that it was a deck hit that penetrated to the magazine, are correct?
2
-
@WaverleyWanderer your question sounds close to what I proposed in the ship profile post Q&A a couple days ago: what if the WNT gave the RN two licenses for future BB construction in 1927 and 29, like France and Italy received, instead of being allowed to build the Nelsons immediately. As Todd said, the bar on BB speed had been raised significantly by 1930. In planning the KGV,s seems the Admiralty did not even seriously consider 16" guns when First London permitted them. I ran some quick estimates and the three triple 15" armament proposed for the KGVs would have weighed 850 tons more than the 14" armament the ships ultimately received. I would suspect that, with 1930 powerplants, it could be impossible to build a heavily armored. 28 kt, ship with the weight of 9-16" guns. I'm sure there was a reason the Admiralty wanted 14" guns on the KGVs, and negotiated the gun size reduction in Second London. The Admiralty didn't revisit 16" guns until the collapse of the treaty system allowed them to increase displacement to over 40,000. Considering the alternative, I suspect that, with the two licenses in hand, the RN would not have responded to the Deutschlands, as they apparently didn't even consider the Deutschlands enough of a threat to spend the money to modernize both Renowns at that time. Most likely, and best outcome, for the RN, would be to see the first two Littorios laid down in 34, and use the licenses to advance the timeline for the KGV class, laying down KGV and Prince of Wales in 36, with Duke of York and Anson laid down on January 1 of 37. That would have the RN, at the time of Bismark's breakout, with four KGVs in commission, instead of two KGVs and two old, slow, Nelsons.
2
-
wrt von Spee's options, a route around Africa would afford the opportunity to pick up Königsberg in Tanganyika en route. Most of Africa being colonies of various European powers means that most of the places they could put in for coal would either be hostile, or neutral, but full of allied spies that would report their arrival. Scharnhorst had a range of 4800nm and Königsberg's range was 5750nm. As soon as the war started, British and French troops invaded Kamerun, taking Douala on September 27, 1914. South African forces landed at Lüderitz in Southwest Africa in the fall of 14 and Swakopmund on Feb 11, 1915. Dar Es Salaam to Swakopmund is 3385nm, so von Spee could make it, if he started early, and if plenty of coal was available. Spain was neutral, and the distance from Swakopmund to Dakhla in the Spanish Sahara is 4249nm. From Dakhla to Wilhelmshaven is 2552nm, if going by the channel. So the trip would be feasible, provided von Spee started early enough to reach Swakopmund before the South Africans occupied the town, and if there was plenty of coal available.
2
-
@baronungernthebloody553 easy part first, Kaga also had flying off decks for both upper and lower hangars as originally built. If WWI had not happened, the UK would not have had a huge debt to US money interests. If WWI had not happened, the US would not have started the 1916 building program. The US Congress, in the 1920s, was not interested in funding a large navy. The thinking is, had the US not proposed the treaty to halt construction, Congress would have stopped funding for the 1916 program and the Lexingtons and South Dakotas would have been broken up on the slipway anyway. Without WWI, I do not see the US military ever being built up beyond that needed for random "big stick" waving exercises in Latin America, so taking on a British Empire not weakened by WWI would be suicidal. No matter how much US money interests may cry about British obstacles to their trade ambitions, I do not see Americans being willing to pay the tax to enable a large military.
2
-
2
-
@baronungernthebloody553 there was no "American military giant" until WWII. TR postured with the "Great White Fleet", but most of those ships were obsolete when they made the trip around the world. The US could handle Spain in 98, but declined an opportunity when it only took the Philippines and Guam, instead of all of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific. I wonder if the US could have engaged in WWI prior to April 1917, as it had been involved in "big stick" waving exercises in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in 16. When the US did engage in WWI, it was with French artillery and French and British aircraft. By some accounts, the Navy Bill of 1916 was in response to British interference in US trade. By some accounts, the RN was seizing neutral US ships carrying goods to neutral European countries, on the possibility of the goods being transshipped to Germany,, then selling the cargoes, and sometimes the ships, and the crown pocketing the proceeds. The 1916 bill was intended to build a fleet capable of standing up to the RN. Interest in building a fleet "second to none" came to a screeching halt when the Harding administration took office in 1921. Secretary Hughes' initial treaty proposal was an immediate stop to all capital ship building, because the US didn't want to spend another dime and wanted a way out from under the contracts with the shipyards. The treaty was supposed to give the USN parity with the RN, but reality is far from it. Look at the retention lists. The treaty gave the RN more tonnage, more ships and more firepower than the USN. The original Hughes proposal had the US retaining six battleships with 12" guns, while West Virginia, Colorado and Washington, all in an advanced state of construction, would be scrapped. Even the oldest ships retained by the RN in Hughes' proposal had 13.5" guns with substantially more throw weight, and they were newer than the 12" gun USN ships. The RN was also given licenses to build the Nelsons. The Colorados and Nagatos were 1916 designs. The Nelsons were a six year newer design that could fully exploit wartime experience. The US was clearly negotiating from a weak position, and everyone knew it, but the objective was to stop US spending on ships. Frankly, I'm amazed the USN got the money for the carrier conversions. When Calvin Coolidge was POTUS in the mid 20s, seeing a request by the Army for money for aircraft, asked "why can't they buy one aeroplane, and take turns flying it?"
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
wrt the question about substitutes in the absence of the 20mm and 40mm guns, in my reading about the navy's AA gun competition, while the Vickers performed fairly well, apparently it did not function well using USN smokeless powder, and no-one in the US made cordite. Given that issue, I'm thinking they would have gone with the 37mm. The 37 apparently had a tendency to jam, but a proper cooling jacket may have solved that. The army version had a water chest, and, the crew was supposed to stop firing every 60 or 90 rounds, and flush water through the gun to cool it. The manual for the gun says if it jams, it's because it's too hot. The 37 was developed into a model that could be fed from either right or left, with simple modification, and switched from rigid clips, to metal belt ammo. The 37 has a significantly higher ceiling than the Vickers, though not quite as high as the Bofors. Given that the gun and ammo were already in production in the US, I would think logistics would have won the day and the 37mm would have been adapted. The 20mm Hispano never seemed to work right for the US, which is why US fighters tended to have .50 cal machine guns instead. Here's an odd thought. The aircraft version of the 37mm was light enough to use on a free mount, as was done on PT boats. A while back I looked at the numbers, and, iirc, the aircraft 37mm had range performance competitive with the 20mm. While it's rate of fire was slower, the weight of the shells was greater, so each would do much more damage to the target. If I was running BuOrd, I could see the M1 in twin and quad mounts replacing the Bofors, and the M4 replacing the Oerlikon.
2
-
@johnshepherd8687 as luck would have it, somehow, a side by side cross section drawing of QE and Hood found it's way into my files. I don't know how accurate it is. From the bottom up, QE's side armor was 13", a 6" strake. and a second 6" strake, ending at the main deck. Hood had a 12" strake, 7" strake, and a 5" strake, all angled. QE had a 1" main deck, 2" one deck below, then 1" two decks farther down. Hood had 2" on the main deck, 0.75 to 1" one deck below, 2" one deck farther down outboard, with a 1" vertical bulkhead, then 1.5" deck inboard. So, yes, assuming the drawing is accurate, and allowing for the greater effectiveness of sloped armor, Hood was pretty close to being as well protected as a QE.
2
-
2
-
@stephenknowles1420 Yes, the classifications can get confused at the extremes. I have always heard the Alaskas referred to as cruisers. When the Dunkerque's were designed, the UK had been pressing for lowered tonnage and gun size limits in the treaty system, and was reportedly pleased that the French designed well below the treaty limits. Of course, then Italy laid down the Littorios, a treaty-max (plus some) design, and France realized it had made a mistake. When Alaska was designed, there were no limits, as the treaty system had collapsed, and no-one was building a capital ship with main guns smaller than 14". So at the time of her design, Alaska was too undersized, under armed, and under protected, to be any sort of capital ship.
2