Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "The Drydock - Episode 101" video.

  1. wrt the question about Marine detachments on USN ships, the Marines were long gone when I was on the Lex, but I did notice one head that was tagged for Marines, so there was some separation of facilities. With the Marines gone from the ship, "G-Division" had custody of all the small arms, as well as the line throwing guns.
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  2. wrt the question about guns being the longest lead item for a BB, what was the lead time for a gun around WWI? I started looking into the history of the Italian Caracciolo class BBs a while back. The Caracciolo was launched in May of 20, and Ansaldo had built up about 12% of the hull of Columbo, but, if Italy had wanted to continue with their construction, they would not have had guns for them as most of the guns that had been ordered for them had been redirected during WWI as shore batteries, mounted on railroad carriages or mounted on monitors.
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  3.  @calvingreene90  expanding on Frank's reply. over last winter, I read about RAF Beaufort torpedo bomber operations. The low and slow approach required for launching a torp left the plane very vulnerable to AA fire from the escorts, which the Beaufort had to overfly to get at the intended target, resulting in a lot of Beauforts being shot to bits. The Brits hit on the idea of bringing along some Beaufighters to suppress the AA fire by strafing the escorts, to improve the probabilities of the Beauforts surviving. By 44, aerial torpedoes were becoming obsolete as they were very expensive and had a low probability of a hit. The preferred weapon was becoming rockets, which were both cheaper and more accurate.
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  4.  @calvingreene90  taking out escorts is easier said than done as they are usually a smaller target, can move at a higher speed and are more maneuverable. I think I grasp what you are saying: suppress the triple A by sinking the ships at the edge of the formation, and work your way in to the main target. Thing is, a sub lining up a shot has lots of time: multiple periscope sightings and a TDC to perform the calculations. A pilot of a TBD doesn't have any of that, and he has the pressure of dozens of people trying to kill him as he lines up the shot. A TBD driver has to estimate distance to target, target speed, and amount to lead the target, all calculated in his head. One of the theories of why all the torpedo planes missed Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the Channel dash is that the pilots were used to shooting at freighters steaming at 10-12 kts. The battleships were steaming at 30, and the pilots simply didn't lead them enough when dropping the torp. Error in the amount to lead the target can be reduced by dropping closer, but there is an inner limit to the drop zone as the torp needs time to come back up to running depth after the deep plunge it takes from being dropped, and then the warhead has to arm itself. Meanwhile, the target can see the TBD coming long before it drops, and start taking evasive action. At Coral Sea, TBDs dropped close to 20 torps at Shōkaku without result. Yes the early Mk 13 was a sorry excuse for a torp, but zero for twenty? That is how hard it is to hit a ship at high speed with a torp, even a big ship.
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  5.  @RedXlV  My take on the Nelsons is the US was sniveling about having 3 Colorados, which were under the treaty 35kt limit, so close to completion being scrapped, so was allowed to complete 2 Colorados, in exchange for scrapping the two Delawares that the treaty would have allowed the US to keep. The UK didn't have any treaty compliant ships under construction, so was compensated by being allowed to build the Nelsons, in exchange for scrapping 4 ships the treaty allowed them to keep. The compensation for France and Italy, for the US and UK being allowed to complete two new ships were their own new construction windows in 1927 and 1929, which the other signatories were not given. The US and UK construction windows did not open until 1931. The first London treaty extended the battleship holiday to 1936, but the construction windows given to France and Italy starting in 27 and 29 were good until used, so, the Dunkerques and first two Littorios could be laid down in the early 30s, using those 27 and 29 construction windows, while everyone else was still shut down. If France had completed two of the Normandies and Italy completed two of the Caracciolos, using the same forbearance that the US and UK used, then they would have lost the 27 and 29 construction windows and not been able to build the Dunkerques and Littorios.
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  6.  @RedXlV  the objective of the treaty was to reduce spending, so, if the RN had three treaty busting battle cruisers, their scrapping list for other ships would have been even longer than it already was, to keep total tonnage under the limit. If BCs were to be regarded as a separate class from BBs, and the RN had the three treaty busters, plus Renown, Repulse and Tiger. then the US would demand it be allowed to complete an equivalent tonnage of Lexingtons and Japan would want to complete enough of the Amagis to have a proportional tonnage. when combined with the Kongos. All this BC building sort of defeats the intention of the treaty to reduce spending. On the other hand, if the US was content to scrap Colorado and West Virginia, or use them for target practice, like Washington was, the Nelsons would not have happened, and France and Italy would not have had the 27 and 29 construction windows, so the Dunkerqes and Littorios are not built in the early 30s. That leaves Italy entering the war with only the four rebuilt Cavours and Dorias as they could not have started work on the Littorios until Italy withdrew from the treaty system in 36, leaving Littorio and Veneto with a completion date in 41 or 42, if ever. The Richelieus would be laid down as a response to the Bismarks, in 37, later than historically,, unless the drydocks were occupied by the Dunkerques being laid down to respond to the Scharnhorsts. The French would be just nicely started on the Dunkerques, see the Bismarks laid down, realize how inadequate the Dunkerques are, and start over. This all ends up with the Richelieus being incomplete hulls destroyed by allied bombing or broken up for scrap by the Germans.
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  7.  @olivergoodridgeify  I have read a bit about them. According to what I have read, they proceeded with Hood, as a replacement for the BCs lost at Jutland. They started reworking the design for the other Admirals, based on their analysis of Jutland, until they reached the point where the other Admirals were effectively, a different class than Hood, and such a patchwork of adaptations that they decided to chuck the mess and start over with a clean sheet. The irony is the 1919 design for the Lexington class BCs, the design that was laid down, is said to be heavily influenced by Hood, even though, by the time the Lexingtons were green lighted, the Brits had said they didn't want any more ships like the Hood.
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