Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "Shore Bombardment in WW2 - We're in the re-landscaping business now!" video.
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@gregorywright4918 I am more familiar with US history. You may be right. The UK did return Java to the Netherlands and some possessions to France after Napoleon's defeat. I do not see mention of any possessions sold for cash or barter in the late 19th or early 20th century. I don't know enough about British politics to know why, other than maybe pride. I can think of several reasons why President Harding would not be interested. Congress passed a law requiring all debtors to repay their war debts, in full, in cash, on time, with interest. Some of the large debtors, including the UK, opened their negotiations with the assertion that all the US' loans should be entirely forgiven. as the US' contribution to the war effort. One reason I can think of that Harding would not be interested is that the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, were famous for rum production, and prohibition was the law of the land in the US. The US apparently did not impose prohibition in the Philippines, but prohibition was the law in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Due to proximity to the US, prohibition would probably have been imposed on all the West Indies colonies, putting a lot of people out of work and stirring resentment of the US. Another reason that comes to mind is that US immigration policy in the 20s was very restrictive and blatantly racist. Some of the newspaper articles from the early 20s that I read noted that the British tended to treat citizens of color better than the US treated it's black citizens. Most of the British West Indies islands have populations that are 80-90% of African decent. I can see Harding and his cabinet, given their biases, taking one look at large numbers of blacks, out of work because rum production is shut down, coming to the US looking for work, vs a nice, big, pile of cash, and grabbing the cash, in spite of the payment schedule negotiated with the UK being 62 years.
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Drac, you have mentioned the friction between the US and UK in the 1920s. One contributor was the UK's war debt. Apparently the UK wanted to pay by exporting manufactured goods to the US, but the US had protectionist trade politics, did not want British goods, but cash instead Did anyone explore the UK transferring real estate to the US instead? At that time, the British Empire was centered around the Indian Ocean. The West Indies were not strategic to the UK, but they were strategic to the US, abutting the US coast, and controlling access to the Panama Canal. The UK West Indies holdings: all the islands, plus British Honduras, but not British Guyana, total some 22193.5 square miles. Extrapolating the price the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917, gives a value for the UK holdings of about $4.150B. UK debt to the US after WWI, by what I have seen, was some $4.277B. Seems that, rather than arguing about a discount to face value, and a 60 year payment schedule. the UK could sign over the West Indies colonies, the US extinguish the debt, and we are square. addition: Drac, never mind. I found lots of discussion of this very suggestion in newspapers of 1920-1923. Seems many were in favor of such a trade, except Lloyd George and President Harding.
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@williamgoin139 that is why, if I was running the Washington Conference in 1922, I would have introduced throw weight into the capital ship specifications, setting the main battery at 8-16", or 9-15", or 12-14" per ship, so each nation could choose whether they wanted to fire fewer, larger shells, or more smaller shells, but they would all be sending the same weight of fire downrange, roughly 17,000lbs, give or take about 1,000. As 12" shells were so much smaller, roughly 870 pounds, vs 1400 for a 14", I would define 12" as obsolete, as ships with such small guns were so far off the throw weight target range. 12" armed ships would not be subject to the treaty replacement schedule and could be replaced at any time at their nation's convenience, if I ran things.
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