Youtube comments of Steve Valley (@stevevalley7835).
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wrt the main armament, in my reading, it was head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss, previously known for being the father of the superimposed turrets on the Kearsarge and Virginia classes, that was advocating for the 14". As Drac said, Strauss maintained that engagements would always be at 12,000 yards or less. At that range, the 14" could penetrate well enough, and, being lighter, more could be carried. In a newspaper article speculating whether the Tennessees would have 16" rather than 14", there was some FUD injected into the debate, claiming the 16" had an alarmingly high wear rate, and claims that the British 15"/42 also had a very short service life, while the 14" had an excellent service life. Strauss held the line on the 14", until the summer of 1916. Jutland made it clear his 12,000 maximum engagement range was unrealistic, and, that summer, Daniels announced, with the agreement of the General Board, the next class, the Colorados, would be armed with 16" guns. In his annual report in the fall of 16, Daniels said this decision was made "over the objection of some officers". Strauss requested sea duty. There was no movement on his request for sea duty for a month or two. Late that year, in Congressional testimony, Strauss, again, rolled out his talking points for the 14", publicly pushing back on the decision made months before by Daniels and the General Board. President Wilson moved the next day to appoint then head of the Indian Head test range, Ralph Earle, as head of BuOrd, and Strauss was given command of the Nevada. The SecNav annual reports from 15-16 and newspapers of the same period made for some fascinating reading about this debate.
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As Drac noted, these were the first USN battleships mounting the new 12"/40, which was specifically designed to use smokeless powder. As mentioned in response to another question a week or so back, when the 12"/40, and the 8"/40, were designed, the designers did not fully understand the dynamics of smokeless powder. As a result, these guns had a tendency to blow off their muzzle and chase, due to higher than expected pressure in the tube. The Navy instituted a modification program that encompassed installing a heavy nickle steel liner inside, and hooping the barrel to the muzzle on the outside to reinforce the barrel. The Maines also used the Mk IV turret, which was the first balanced large turret used by the USN. The preceding Illinois class was the first the use the Mk IV, but pared it with the older 13"/35. As Drac said, by WWI all the Maine and Illinois class ships were relegated to the reserve squadron, spending the bulk of their time tied up in a navy yard with a skeleton crew. On March 6, 1915, Maine was being used as a receiving ship in the Brooklyn Navy Yard when a sea cock burst and the ship sank at the pier.
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I not only live in the US, but in metro Detroit, so goings on at the big three are local news.
The North American market is a global oddity, due to the popularity of cars so huge, and expensive, they are irrelevant in much of the rest of the world. GM and Ford have progressively withdrawn from most markets around the world. Both companies have withdrawn from India. GM withdrew from the EU, while Ford's market share in the EU has shrunk from 10-12% in the late 90s, to only 3.3% in 2024. Ford's EU share will take another hit this year, as it discontinues the Focus, which accounts for 20% of Ford Europe's volume. Over the last ten years GM's share in China has fallen from 15%, to 6.8%, and the company has written off much of it's Chinese operation. Ford's share in China is only about 1%. Ford withdrew from all of South America.
I foresee the future US market looking, not so much like the Russian market today, but the Soviet Union market of the 1960s: a handful of companies that have withdrawn from the rest of the world, hiding behind tariff walls, producing huge, expensive, but poor quality, ICE powered vehicles that are irrelevant in the rest of the world.
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Not long ago, I reread "Fifty Ships That Saved The World" about the destroyers for bases deal, and service of the ships in the RN.
HMS Ludlow, that Drac mentioned at the end of his piece, had an interesting incident at the start of it's RN service. Ludlow, the former USS Stockton, was one of the earlier Caldwell class ships, significantly shorter ranged than the later classes. She had made it to France in 1917, so she should have been able to make the trip again, if everything went smoothly.
Ludlow, in company with several other destroyers, was making her way to the UK, when radio traffic was picked up from Jervis Bay, which was engaging the Scheer, desperately asking for help. The USN had turned over the ships with full magazines and torpedo tubes. so the destroyers rang up flank speed and rushed to Jervis Bay's assistance.
They arrived at the scene too late to help. But that flank speed run had tossed Ludlow's fuel consumption calculations in the dustbin. According to the book, Ludlow's burners went out, from lack of fuel, just as she dropped anchor in Belfast.
Reports of Jervis Bay's action say that Scheer's reconnaissance plane had spotted the convoy, and reported it as completely unescorted. Can't help but wonder, if the destroyers, iirc, about six, had been steaming from Halifax with the convoy, would Scheer have attacked? If Scheer had attacked, what would the result have been, with six destroyers firing their large loads of torpedoes at Scheer?
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Argus was one of the carriers classified "experimental" by the Washington Treaty. That meant she could be replaced at the Admiralty's convenience, rather than waiting until she was 20 years old. I have read that the Admiralty had a plan to replace Argus, Hermes, and Eagle with new carriers in the early 30s, as they were all classified "experimental". Going by the standard displacements listed in Wiki, the carriers in service in the late 20s displaced a total of 118,830 tons, of the UK's 135,000 ton quota. Not enough displacement remained of the quota to build Ark Royal. Even though laid up, Argus was still classified as a carrier. She was taken in hand in 36 for conversion to a mother ship for target drones, which included removing her armament. As an unarmed non-combatant upon recommissioning in August 38, her tonnage became available for Ark Royal, which commissioned in December, 38. This was the same scheme the USN adopted for Langley, converting her to a seaplane tender, to free the tonnage for Wasp. Unfortunately, budget constraints in the 30s prevented the Admiralty completing their plan, replacing Hermes and Eagle with additional Ark Royal class carriers.
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We have the Greeks to thank for keeping a WWII vintage LST in commission until 1999. In 2000, it was purchased by a preservation group, which brought her back to the US. LST-325 is now based in Evansville, Indiana, still in her WWII configuration, still fully operable, and makes river cruises in the fall. I haven't been to 325, but I have toured LST-393 in Muskegon, MI. 393 was used to ship new cars across Lake Michigan for years, so, unlike 325, all of 393's original armament was removed long ago.
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As luck would have it, I recently read the Friedman book on aircraft carriers. In 1918, with zero experience with carriers, the pro-aviation faction of the USN had decided that it wanted carriers 825' long, displacing 24,000 tons with 140,000hp. By 1920, their ambition had grown to 35,000 tons, 180,000hp and they wanted six of them, now! Sounds like they were eying the Lexington class battlecruisers for conversion before they were even laid down. Not surprisingly, when the Washington treaty resulted in the cancellation of the battlecruisers, the pro-aviation faction was ready with a proposal to convert two of them to carriers, committing nearly half of the US' allowable carrier tonnage, while the USN still had little first hand experience in building and operating carriers. The Lexingtons were horribly inefficient carriers, which particularly mattered in the post Washington Treaty environment they were built in. Yorktown and Essex each have hangar decks 200' longer than Lexington, on lower displacement. It the 2 Lexington's had never been built, that would have freed up tonnage to follow Yorktown and Enterprise with 3 carriers of near Essex size, or 4 more Yorktowns, putting the USN in a much better position at the end of 41 with a net gain of 1 or 2 fleet carriers.
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wrt the Torpedo strike on Gneisenau, that operation is covered in detail in "Torpedo Bomber" by Ralph Barker. The book was also published in the UK as "Ship Busters". As Drac said, the raid was botched quite badly. iirc, from reading the book a few years ago, one other Beaufort did make it to the rendezvous point outside the harbor and was waiting for the other Beauforts to arrive. As that Beaufort orbited, the pilot saw Campbell arrive, and roar past, into the harbor, instead of forming up with the other Beaufort. Reading how that raid had been planned, the thought that occurred to me was that, had the bombers shown up as planned, all the AA gunners would have been awake and at their posts when the Beauforts tried to penetrate the harbor, and would probably have been shot out of the sky. As it worked out, Campbell took everyone by surprise and successfully reached the ship. The Germans recovered the plane and crew from the harbor. Apparently Campbell had been hit moments after dropping the torpedo, because the Germans reported a Canadian, I don't recall the man's name at the moment, was in the pilot's seat, when the plane was recovered.
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Fascinating discussion. Not long ago, I speculated on a triple main armament. Even found a speculative drawing of Bismark with a three-triple main armament. Like you, I wondered why they did not go triple, as, having built the Deutschlands and Scharnhorsts with triples, they should have been in their comfort zone with them. The only concern I had was that, with the horizontal sliding breech, the barbette would need to be larger, which might cause a problem for Anton, given the width of the hull at that point. However, with only three turrets, seems the superstructure could be moved aft, so Anton and Bruno would be where the hull is wider. I posted about this thought on a Navy group on Facebook. Knowing that you lurk that group from time to time, what did you think of that discussion?
As for the 105mm DP secondary, iirc, Jackie Fisher was an advocate of a greater number of 4", vs the 6" secondary the RN was going to in the run-up to WWI. The two classes Fisher had a direct hand in, Renown and Courageous, had the infamous triple 4", while QE and Revenge had 6". Can't help but wonder why the RN did not go with the QF 4", rather than the BL. With the QF's fixed rounds, both the bag man and rammer could be eliminated, reducing the crowding that plagued that triple mount.
wrt the triple screw design, I have read that the Germans found a triple screw layout made it easier to negotiate the turns in the Kiel Canal. Looking at how they have the rudders laid out: one either side of the center screw, I wonder if they were going for a thrust vectoring effect. I speculate the drill when transiting the canal was to make the trip on the center screw only. With only the center screw providing thrust, it would be running faster than if all three were turning, producing a stronger stream. With the twin rudders, whichever way the helm was turned, the broad side of one rudder or the other would be turned into that high speed stream from the center screw, vectoring the thrust.
Really enjoyed this post. Thanks!
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Thanks for your reply to my question about Courageous. I am satisfied that Furious was intended as a test bed for the 18". The design was in hand, could be built quickly, and, was large enough to carry the 18" guns. Since posting that question, I found a letter on The Dreadnought Project: Fisher to d'Eyncourt, saying words to the effect that the Baltic operation was "the story we will use to sell them to Cabinet", which makes it sound like the Baltic op was not what Fisher really had in mind, but only an excuse to build them. In that letter, Fisher also says having the draft be 22 1/2 feet or less was imperative. The draft was the only parameter laid out in that letter that Courageous missed, by a wide margin. Renown's draft was some 5 feet less than Revenge, but Courageous' draft was only some 14 inches less than Renown, so hardly seems worth the bother. I tried redesigning Courageous in SpringSharp to see if I could get to that 22 1/2 foot draft. Could not make the hull any flimsier, so replaced the two twin 15" with three twin 9.2" turrets borrowed from Lord Nelson pre-dreadnoughts, to reduce weight. Only reduced the draft to 24 1/2 feet. It could be a matter of Fisher seeing those unused 15" turrets and deciding he would see them used, for something, other than a monitor, and Courageous was what he came up with, to have the turrets put to use, much as the construction of Vanguard was due to the availability of those same four turrets.
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wrt the question about barrel life, Drac didn't touch on the issue of relining worn barrels, which was routinely done by WWI, if not sooner. There is a 1915 edition USN Midshipman's text book on Google books that describes the process. Initially, guns were built without liners, so the barrel had to be bored out to provide room for the liner. In the boring operation, we are talking about a feed rate for the boring head of about 6" per hour. On a USN 14"/45 from a Pennsylvania class BB, with a bore length of 630", that means that one operation takes 105 hours, or a bit under 4 and a half days, running continuously, and several cuts are made before reaching the finish dimension. The gun factories changed to building new guns with liners already in place. Then the process for refurbishing the gun was to put the gun in an oven heating the outside, to make it expand, while running cold water through the bore to cause the liner to shrink, to loosen it. Then a hydraulic press was used to push the worn liner out. Then a new liner was fitted the same way. Initially, liners were made with the same outside diameter their entire length, but it was found that sometimes they refused to come out, and had to be bored out. Then they hit on the idea of putting a slight taper on the liner, which eased removal.
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wrt the question about Mutsu, as Drac said, there was no way of knowing how useful Mutsu would be twenty years in the future. The original plan was for Japan to retain Settsu. Her sister, Kawachi, was sunk by a magazine explosion in 1918. With Mutsu, Japan was nearly 14,000 tons under her treaty quota. With Settsu instead, Japan would have been 26,000 tons under quota. Settsu would age out in 1931, but Japan would still only have 47,000 tons of headroom under their limit, not enough to build two treaty max ships. My favorite plan, as it makes the math the easiest, is to stick to the 5:5:3 ratio in "post Jutland" ships, and parity with the UK having one 42,000 ton ship, The IJN to have Nagato, Mutsu, and Tosa, while the US completes all four Colorados, plus one Lexington to act as consort to the carriers, and the UK builds four Nelsons to complement Hood. But the objective of the treaty was to stop spending money building ships. From what I have read, the Japanese had a lot of national pride tied up in Mutsu, and were determined at the conference that they were not going to give her up. What they ultimately did was probably the best possible outcome, with minimal waste for both Japan and the US, and minimal extra construction cost for the UK.
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re ships running out of fuel, one of the USN destroyers that was transferred to the RN in 40 came very close. The episode is recounted in "Fifty Ships That Saved The World". The ship was a Caldwell class, shorter ranged than the later Wickes class. There was concern about her short range, but, it was reasoned, she made it to France in 1918, so should be able to make it across the Atlantic again. Her group of six destroyers were en route from Halifax when they picked up radio traffic from Jervis Bay, which was engaging the Scheer. As the USN had handed over the ships with full magazines and torpedo tubes, the destroyers rang up flank and rushed to Jervis Bay's aid. They arrived too late, but the flank speed run had used up a lot of fuel. According to the book, the burners in the Caldwell class went out from lack of fuel, just as she dropped anchor in Belfast.
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wrt the question about Delaware's turret sighting hoods. Initially, the USN had the sighting hoods on the roof of the turret. When the USN adopted superfiring turrets, the sights were moved to a position low on the sides of the turrets, to move them away from the muzzle blast. The sight hoods are clearly visible on the pic Drac shows of the forward turrets at 21:13. They are exactly at the same level as the guns themselves, on the forward part of the turret. This change had a second benefit. The top mounted sights were connected to the guns via a complex linkage. No matter how precisely the components of the linkage were made, there was always a small amount of slop, which became more important as ranges increased. When the sights were moved to the sides of the turret, they were rigidly bracketed to the trunnions of the guns, so there was no lost motion between gun and sight.
re the engines in Delaware's sister, North Dakota. ND was originally build with Curtis turbines. Besides being very inefficient, the Curtis turbines broke down, often. There was considerable discussion, reported in the newspapers in 1917, about whether ND should be scrapped, or reengined. When the US entered the war, the decision was made that it would be faster to reengine ND, than to build a replacement, so new, geared, turbines, were installed. When ND was scrapped, the new turbines were removed, and installed in Nevada, when that ship was modernized.
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13:30 mark, SecNav Daniels did assent to the Tennessees having 14"
guns, but the driver in that decision was the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss. This was one of the more bizarre episodes at BuOrd. Strauss was of the opinion that engagements would always be at 12,000 yards or less, the 14" could penetrate at that range well enough, and, being lighter, more 14" could be mounted. There was public discussion whether the Tennessees would carry 14" or 16" in 1915, but disinformation about the 16" was being fed to the press. In one lengthy article about the Tennessees, there are a couple paragraphs about how the 16" was subject to extremely high barrel wear, and claims that the British 15" was also subject to very high wear, with a barrel life of less than 100 rounds. So, the Tennessees were ordered with 14". Jutland disproved Strauss' talking points in favor of the 14" and, in July of 1916, SecNav Daniels announced that the next class, what we know as the Colorados, would carry 16" guns. In his annual report for that year, Daniels says that the decision was made over the objections of some officers. Strauss offered his resignation and requested sea duty, effective upon appointment of a successor. A few weeks passed, and Strauss seems to have been dissatisfied with the pace of selection of his replacement. Strauss trotted out his talking points in favor of the 14" again, in a public Congressional hearing, months after the General Board and Daniels had decided on the 16". President Wilson nominated Ralph Earle, then commander of the Indian Head test range the next day. The Senate approved Earle that day, and Strauss was gone from BuOrd. The Tennessees appear to have the same diameter barbette as the Colorados, 31ft. The twin 16" turret is slightly lighter and the part of the turret that extends down into the barbette is about 6" smaller diameter, so it certainly appears feasible to have regunned the Tennessees while under construction. After commissioning, when the dispersion problem with the triple 14"/50 mounts was discovered, if it crossed the Navy's mind to regun with the 16", it was quickly dismissed, as the WNT prohibited increasing gun size, except for France and Italy.
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France had some appalling old tubs still in service in 1940. Pondering how the Brits came to be allowed to build two new, clean sheet designs, (Nelson and Rodney) by the treaty, when the treaty was supposed to be about stopping spending on capital ships, it occurs that the US was crying a river about having 3 treaty compliant ships at 75-80% complete (Washington, Colorado and West Virginia) and the enormous waste of scrapping them, to which the Brits might have replied "everything we have in process exceeds treaty limits, so if you want to complete the Colorados, we insist on being allowed to build new, treaty complaint, ships too, but we only want to build two, so you should only be allowed to complete two of your three." France had four Normandies in the water, in an advanced stage of construction. Seems France could have used the same forbearance offered to the US and UK and had two Normandies completed. But France reportedly took one look at the 28kt BBs Italy was working on, looked at what it would take to push the Normandies to an equal speed, found the cost exorbitant, and that was the end of it. It might be interesting to ponder, if two Normandies had been completed, as originally designed, replacing two of the Courbets, then rebuilt in the 30s to the degree the Andria Dorias were rebuilt.
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wrt to Dr D M Platt's question about replacing guns, expanding a bit on gun refurbishment, since he mentions whether a gun has a liner or not: To replace the liner the gun was placed in a pit, and the outside tube heated, while cool water was flushed through the bore to cool the liner, with the difference in thermal expansion between the cool liner and hot tube hopefully loosening the liner so it could be pressed out. Initially, the USN made liners with a uniform outside diameter, but then realized if the liner's outside diameter had a slight taper the chances of successfully pressing the liner out were improved. If the liner refused to be pressed out, then the procedure is the same as refurbishing a gun that was not originally made with a liner: the inside of the gun would need to be bored out to entirely remove the stuck liner, or to prepare a gun to have a liner fitted for the first time. Boring out a gun would take several weeks. I may have a more specific number in my notes somewhere, but I recall reading that the boring time was a matter of 3-4 days, for each cut. I just found a piece on youtube by Ryan, the curator of Battleship New Jersey, talking about 16" gun construction and maintenance. He says the refurbishment process, if all goes smoothly, took about 2 months.
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On the question of the KGVs being built as Lions, the treaty would not have allowed it, in the same time frame. The treaty required the parties to negotiate a displacement escalator, when it was determined that a non-signatory to the treaty was building a larger ship. The US and UK did not finish those negotiations until mid 1938. so, at the very least, KGV and PoW would have been laid down a year and a half later. Being laid down in the second half of 38, neither would have been in service when Bismark attempted it's breakout. I looked up where all the other RN capital ships were on the day of the battle in Denmark Strait. If the KGVs were not yet in service, the RN would probably have kept the Nelsons close to the UK. How would they be deployed to catch Bismark? How would Denmark Strait play out with both Nelsons, or Nelson plus Hood? If the Admiralty had decided to leverage existing material on hand, to speed construction, there were actually 8 twin 15" turrets in hand: the four from Courageous and Glorious, and the four that were on the Erebus and Roberts class monitors. Laying down only two Vanguards in late 38. rather than 5 KGVs would put less of a load on industrial capacity, so might result in a faster build. but I would not bet the farm on both being in commission by May 41. If they did make it into commission by late 41, then scratch one of only two modern battleships with Force Z. A Vanguard may not have had the same vulnerability that PoW had, but the Japanese would probably have kept beating on it until it sank.
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As Drac said, wrt the 14" armed Tennessees vs 16" armed Colorados, the question came down to USN expectations of engagement range. Head of BuOrd Strauss insisted that engagements would always be fought at 12,000 yards, or less. The 14" could penetrate well enough at that range, and, being smaller and lighter, more could be carried. Jutland drove the final nail in that theory. In the summer of 1916, the General Board, and SecNav Daniels, agreed 16" was the way to go, and overrode Strauss' recommendation. In his annual report that year, Daniels discussed the switch to 16", and said the change was made over the objections of "some officers". Strauss was very proud of the 14"/50, ordering it into production off the drawing board, with no testing. Can't help but wonder, if testing had been done, and the dispersion problems these guns experienced been discovered, would the 16" been selected for the Tennessees, by virtue of the fact the 16" can actually hit what it is aimed at?
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@robertf3479 yes, the volume of gas was a major issue. The Lexingtons could have easily been designed like the Kaga, with huge ducts along the sides of the hanger. The USN also looked at having the forward end of the hangers open for additional aircraft launching, as was done in the original layout of Kaga. Aviators were pressing for the Lexintons to have no obstructions at all on the flight deck, no island, no funnel. Ranger tried to address the gas issue by placing the boilers aft of the turbines so the gas could be vented near the aft end of the ship without long ducts. Given the minimal experience with carriers at the time, it is pure luck that they turned out as well as they did, rather than looking exactly like Kaga's original configuration. iirc, the original 1916 design for the Lexintons had 24 boilers, located on 2 decks, with 7 funnels.
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@genericpersonx333 a higher velocity shell, for a given range, will travel in a flatter trajectory, so it's chances of hitting are better because the distance between where the shell would hit the top of the hull and where the shell would hit at the waterline is longer because the shell drops less per unit distance. (there is a name for that zone, but it isn't coming to mind right now) If you want to go for a deck hit, then you want to fire at a lower velocity so you can fire at a higher trajectory. But, with a higher trajectory, the chances of a hit are lower because the shell sinks at a higher rate. The travel time to distance is listed in the gunnery tables. A USN 16'/45 firing with a reduced charge yielding a muzzle velocity of 2000fps at a target 23,500yards away: angle of departure from the gun 33 degrees, 20.4 minutes. Time of travel: 58.25 seconds. Angle of fall: 42 degrees 58 minutes. Firing the same gun with a full charge, yielding a muzzle velocity of 2600fps. at a target at the same range of 23,500 yards gives the following trajectory: angle of departure from the gun 15 degrees, 35.4 minutes. Time of travel 38.44 seconds. Angle of fall 22 degrees. 24 minutes. As you said, firing at a higher velocity makes it easier to hit the target, but, if the ship has heavy deck armor, and you hit on the deck, at 22 degrees, the shell may ricochet off. Drop a shell on the deck at 42 degrees and it punches through.
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Trivia bit that I didn't see anyone else mention. The troubles with the Mark 14 inspired a 1951 John Wayne movie "Operation Pacific". When Wayne's sub makes it back to Hawaii from patrol, some of the crewmen manage to be picked up by the SP. When Wayne goes to the brig to bail them out, the SP officer starts complaining about all the trouble he has with sub crewmen. He says "if it isn't Thunderfish (the fictional sub in the movie), it's the Tang, or the Wahoo, or the Silversides". So the Silversides got a mention in a Hollywood movie.
The sets in "Operation Pacific" look exactly like the inside of Silversides. I wonder if the studio bought a surplus Gato and cut it up to build the sets? Most sub movies show the periscope viewing station in the control room. "Operation Pacific" shows the scope station in the conning tower, as it is on Silversides. Can't help but wonder if all subs of that era had the scope station in the conning tower, and putting it in the control room is "artistic license" so the captain actor can interact with the control room crew actors?
The first time I visited Silversides, I didn't know there was a museum at the location. Didn't budget enough time to explore both in detail. So, on a later trip, when I visited the Milwaukee Clipper, I then drove around the bay to the Silversides, and gave the museum a more detailed exploration.
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The RN's situation, in the eastern Med in May 41, adds to an alt history scenario that I worked on a few years ago: after overrunning Greece and Crete, Axis forces land in Vichy controlled, Axis leaning, Syria, and drive to the oil fields in Iraq, which was then ruled by an Axis friendly dictator.
That scenario fell apart, when, by chance, I heard an audio recording of Hitler talking with a Finnish General. In that recording, made in 42, Hitler says that his meetings with the Soviets in late 40, during the preparations for the invasion of England, left him with the impressions the Soviets wanted a war with Germany, and were looking at overrunning Romania, threatening a major source of oil for Germany. Hence Hitler pivoted from trying to invade England, to invading the Soviet Union in June 41.
So much for my scenario of Axis occupation of Syria and Iraq, to get at Iraqi oil production.
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On the question of a world without Bofors: in the 1920s, John Browning designed a 37mm AA gun for the US Army. Due to lack of funding for the Army, the design sat on the shelf for several years, then was refined by Colt, and put into production in the late 30s. If USN BuOrd got over it's "not invented here" syndrome and adopted the Browning, instead of developing the 1.1", they would have gotten along quite well without the Bofors. The initial design of the 37mm, the M1, was fed with rigid clips from the left side, which would complicate multiple gun mounts. The M9 development switched to metallic link belt ammo, and was redesigned so both right and left feed versions could be built. I suspect that, fundamentally, any multiple mount designed for the Vickers could be adopted to the Browning, due to the similar ammo feed systems. The Browning had significantly more range than a Vickers, but a somewhat smaller shell. In US Army service, the Browning was replaced by the Bofors, starting in 43, as the Bofors offered advantages of longer range, larger shell, and somewhat more reliable operation.
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wrt the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the version I have read was that the alliance was intended to use Japan as a counterbalance to both the Germans and Russians in the Pacific. Germany purchased the Spanish colonies in the Pacific that the US had not rolled up in 98, including the Marianas, less Guam, the Carolines, and Palau, adding them to their existing colonies in the Marshalls, New Guinea, and other islands around the Bismark Sea, in 1899. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902. Japan rolled up the German colonies in WWI, and was given a mandate to hold the former German colonies north of the equator by the League of Nations. So Germany was no longer a threat to UK interests in the Pacific. The Soviets were still securing their position in Russia, so they were not much of a threat to the UK in the Pacific. I am thinking the Anglo-Japanese alliance had outlived it's usefulness to the UK. Additionally, having rolled up the German colonies, there were not many directions Japan could further expand it's empire, without bumping in to European interests. China was about the only independent nation in the area, and even there, the Japanese ran into European business interests. What was there in eastern Russia that would attract the Japanese? There is significant oil and coal production in eastern Russia now, but what was there in 1920, that would attract Japanese interest?
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The Italians being able to develop the Libyan oil fields in the 30s is a nightmare scenario. First, the Germans would have recognized that their war effort would be greatly aided by that oil, and Libya would have been far more stoutly defended, as João Rita posted. For openers, imagine an Italian fleet with unlimited fuel and aggressively lead, with cover from land based air. Early in the war, the RN was still trying to defend their interests in the far east, as well as patrolling the North Atlantic against German capital ships, so the odds against the Italians are not as overwhelming as they would appear on paper. The choke point between Sicily and Tunisia could have been one intensively defended point of obstructing Brit supplies to Egypt and squadrons of torpedo and dive bombers could have been based in Italian occupied Ethiopia to make supplying Egypt via the Red Sea equally problematic. I can see the Brits pushed/starved out of Egypt. A defensive line from Aqaba to Gaza looks appealing, but, with the Italian fleet dominating the eastern Med, that line could easily be outflanked. The Brits would probably have to pull back to a line from Basra to the Turkish border to defend the Iranian oil fields, where were being developed at that time. The Germans would probably move to preemptively occupy Algeria and Morocco to vigorously oppose any attempted landing, which would make the Libyan oil fields immune to air attack from the west. Axis occupation of all of North Africa would also make the Ploiesti oil fields out of range of air attack.
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wrt Brenden's question about armored cruisers, I was reading about British capital ships a couple weeks ago, and one piece talked about the armored cruiser/battlecruiser decision. An armored cruiser would cost a few hundred thousand Pounds less than a battlecruiser, but not enough less to enable more of the ships to be built for the same amount of money in the annual budget. The Admiralty was considering building another generation of armored cruisers, after building the Invincibles, as a budget cutting option, but then got wind of Von der Tann being built with battleship grade guns, so the Admiralty dropped the armored cruiser idea and proceeded with the Indefatigable class. Bottom line: 9.2" armored cruiser would cost almost as much as a battlecruiser, but could not stand up against a battlecruiser, nor could serve as an adjunct to the battleline. I was reading about the Courageouses in particular, and read that Fisher was specifying a maximum draft of 22.5 feet. The Courageouses failed that parameter spectacularly, drawing nearly as much as a Renown. I used SpringSharp to try to redesign Courageous to meet the 22.5 foot spec. By going to three twin 9.2" turrets taken from Lord Nelson class pre-dreadnoughts, to meet the cost and availability parameters of the Courageous, I could reduce the draft to 24.5 feet, which still missed Fisher's requirement.
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wrt the collapse of the naval treaties, Japan gave formal notice in 1934 that they would drop out of the treaty system at the expiration of First London, at the end of 36. Italy did not participate in the Second London treaty, due to the other parties being upset about Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. The Washington Treaty had licensed France to build up to 70,000 tons of battleships, beginning in 27 and 29, and that license was good until used, not subject to the continuation of the freeze on BB construction in the first London treaty. Dunkerque and Strasbourg used some 53,000 of the 70,000 ton allotment, so, when Richelieu was laid down in October of 35, it put France blatantly in violation of the treaty. Bottom line, by the time the Second London conference started, the US and UK were the only powers trying to comply with the treaty at all. The US insisted on the gun size escalator, to be triggered in April 37, if any party to the treaty system had not signed on to the Second London treaty. As Japan had given notice two years earlier that it would drop out of the treaty system, it was a virtual certainty that the escalator clause would be tripped. The tonnage escalator was nowhere near as clear. It would be tripped if it was determined that a power that was not a party to the treaty began construction of a ship that was not treaty compliant. When the clause was tripped, the powers participating in the treaty were to confer and agree on a new tonnage limit. Yamato was laid down in November 37. Intelligence reports regarding the amount of material being ordered for Yamato made it clear the ship would significantly exceed 35,000, so, at the start of 1938, the US and UK conferred on where to put the new tonnage limit. From my reading, the UK wanted a 43,000 ton limit, as that was the largest the RN facilities could support, while the US wanted 45,000. Negotiations continued for about six months before the US got the 45,000 ton limit it wanted for the Iowas. So, the short answer is the treaty system died a death of a thousand cuts, over a period of several years, starting in 1934.
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@AsbestosMuffins in a newspaper article on the decision to go to 16", the long running debate was recapped, with the note that the Navy had the same argument when it went from 12" to 14". Soon after the decision was made on the Colorados, there was discussion of changing the New Mexicos and Tennessees to 16". A Navy spokesman was quoted that the New Mexicos were too far along and such a change would have been prohibitively expensive. The barbettes on the Tennessees, from what I have found, were the same diameter as those on the Colorados, 32 feet. The twin 16" turret is slightly lighter than the triple 14", and the part of the 16" turret that extends down into the barbette is 6 inches smaller in diameter, so seems to me the 16" turret should fit a Tennessee fine. Neither California nor Tennessee had been laid down yet. I wonder how close they came to issuing a change order on the Tennessees to go to 16"? What probably made their decision was that the guns and turrets were on order and there would probably be cancellation charges if they made the change. Would they have made the same decision if they knew of the dispersion problems those tripe 14" mounts would suffer? Imagine the impact on the Washington Treaty. With 16" guns, the Tennessees would have been regarded as "post-Jutland", so, with them and Maryland, the US would have it's three "post" ships, and West Virginia and Colorado would be broken up. If the US completed West Virginia and Colorado, it would have five "post" ships, so the Japanese would demand to complete Tosa, to be it's third "post" ship, meeting the 5:5:3 ratio, while making a good argument they could built one ship over treaty limit, because of Hood. Then the UK would need to build four Nelsons for parity.
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Mercedes, BMW, and VW each have one assembly plant in the US. I have not looked at the content labels on a US built Merc or BMW, but would suspect that many of the internal components, engine, transmission, and such, are imported. In VW's case, the engines are imported from Mexico. Stellantis only imports a handful of Alfas, Masers, and Fiat 500es. Ford imports nothing from Europe.
Based on what happened when Trump was last in office, and imposed a protectionist tariff on Korean built laundry washers, US made cars will see their prices increased to match the tariff inflated prices of imports, so there will be no net loss of competitiveness for imports, unless Trump also imposes a limit on the number of cars imported, before the tariff is stepped up to a wholly impossible level. Trump's washing machine tariff had two steps: 20% and 50%. Once the 50% level was reached, Korean washers were no longer available.
The other variable is the incoming Trump administration is openly, proudly, anti-EV.. My theory is Musk has lost interest in Tesla, beyond using Tesla owners as beta testers for his AI systems.
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A year or two back, I was looking in to the design choices made on the KGVs, and found that armor production was one of the bottlenecks. Some of the armor was subcontracted to a Czech firm, to ease the bottleneck. I looked at the armor produced for the cancelled South Dakota class in the early 20s: 13.5" vs 14.7" for the KGVs, and both were flat sided designs, rather than inclined. The greatest difference was, after the KGV design was revised, it's belt extended one deck higher. Cranked up the alt history generator, to create someone in the Navy Department, in 1922, suggesting to SecNav Denby " The Washington treaty will allow us to build battleships again in ten years. Let's keep all that very expensive armor that has been made for the South Dakotas, so it can be used in the future". When the future arrives, the North Carolinas are designed with sloped armor, so the armor that had been stored for 15 years can't be used. So FDR sends a note to the British naval attache at the DC embassy, asking if the Admiralty might have use of a large quantity of battleship armor, suitable for flat sided installation. Unfortunately, such a thrifty minded person did not seem to be in the Navy Department in 22. The SecNav annual report a few years later reported that the last of the armor that had been made for the :South Dakotas had been sold as scrap.
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wrt the question about ships being repaired in a neutral US, there were two cases of German ships coming to the US for fuel and repairs in WWI, which both turned into a preview of the Graf Spee's situation. The commerce raider Prinz Eitel Friedrich steamed into Newport News Virginia on March 10, 1915 for fuel and repairs. It became quite an event as, in a hot second, there were British and French warships barely outside the US' 3 mile limit waiting for the Friedrich to attempt a breakout. US shore batteries were put on alert and a USN battleship patrolled to enforce US neutrality in case the Brits or French tried to attack the Friedrich in US waters. Ultimately, the Friedrich's captain opted for internment, rather than try to elude the British squadron. Then, on April 12th, the Kronprinz Wilhelm steamed into Newport News, also for fuel and repair, and the dance was repeated, until the Wilhelm's captain also chose internment. I would say the difference between the two incidents in Newport News, and the Graf Spee's, and British ships refitting in the US, is, in the case of the British ships, the Germans did not have the naval force to try and trap the ship as it left the US.
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The Colorado class has provided hours of entertainment speculating on alternate treatments of the class. Drac didn't really note it, but the Colorados were a 1916 design. Maryland was laid down only days after the US entered WWI, but the other three were delayed until after the war, being laid down in 1919-20. This delay had the result of three of the class still building at the time of the WNT. West Virginia and Colorado were completed, in exchange for the two Delawares being scrapped/demilitarized, while Washington was used for target practice. One alternate scenario: the USN takes the same path as the Admiralty in cancelling outright the Colorados, for the same reasons the Admiralty cancelled their 1914 BB program. The same decision would also result in Tennessee never being laid down, and possibly California, on which little progress had been made, being cut up on the slipway to clear it for higher priority ships. Where would that leave the USN in 1922? None of the Tennessees or Colorados ever completed, and all the postwar South Dakotas and Lexingtons exceed treaty limits. Another avenue of inquiry is how could the Washington have been saved? It appears that the money spent modernizing the Floridas in the 1920s, equaled or exceeded the money it would have cost to complete Washington. So the US completes Washington, and scraps the two Floridas. If the UK complains, give them a license to build a third Nelson, but, as the RN is still well over it's tonnage limit, building another Nelson would require two Iron Dukes be scrapped. Similarly, if the Japanese demanded to be allowed to build another Nagato, they would have to scrap a Fuso or Kongo to make the tonnage available, so, net, they would gain little for all the money spent.
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It has crossed my mind that the covid diagnosis is a cover story, while Biden goes home and reconsiders his candidacy. But then, I though he would use the interview a few weeks ago to announce his withdrawal.
The narrative about the attempt on Trump has shifted from "he's so brave!". "he's so strong!" to "Trump is chosen by God". I hear variations on that theme at the convention repeatedly "protected by God", "spared by God", "he is part of God's plan". Anyone of strong faith, who believes that everything is God's will, regardless whether an independent or Democrat, will have a hard time arguing against the God narrative about Trump.
The GOP is weaponizing Harris, saying words to the effect "Biden will never make it through another term. Do you want Harris for a President?". I expected a more blatant, racist, dog whistle, like "you don't want another of those people as President", but she is being used against Biden.
And the Democratic party is tearing itself apart.
The election was probably over last Saturday, the moment Trump got off the floor and pumped his fist, so the rest of it probably doesn't make any difference.
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On the question about having wing turrets, and Drac's note that Fisher liked the idea of more armament being able to fire forward: I have read that on the Dunkerque and Richelieu class ships, all the main guns were placed forward so they could all be used to fire at Italian ships as they ran away. Now, I have only read that in one place, have no idea if that was the author's attempt at humor, and freely acknowledge that some Italian forced acquitted themselves well. I will further note that ships with 3 main, centerline, turrets usually have 2 forward and 1 aft, except for the French Normanie class, that had one quad turret forward and two quads aft. Of course, the Normandies look to me like the designers were expecting a drydock 100' longer to be available for construction, and, when such a facility was not built, simply erased A turret and cut the bow off the thing.
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wrt the question of the Washington treaty being delayed for 3 years. That puts the start of the conference at November 24, during the US election. President Harding died in August, 23, so Coolidge is POTUS, running for a second term. From my reading, the US called the Washington conference because there was a sense that Congress would withdraw funding for the current construction program, regardless what other countries did, so Harding decided to try to get other countries to limit construction in sync with the US. In that light, Washington would have been completed, but all the Lexingtons and South Dakotas could very well have been cancelled and cut up on the slipway, regardless what anyone else did. In reality, Coolidge would probably have started the conference a month or two earlier, as a campaign ploy.
In Japan, the quake was in August, 1923. Amagi was laid down in December 20. Without the delays due to the treaty negotiations and conversion to a carrier, Amagi would have been in the water, and safe, when the quake hit. The second pair of Amagis were scheduled to be complete in December 24. There would have been an argument that the second pair of Amagis needed to be scrapped. Both Tosas would be complete. None of the Kiis or 13s would be complete. So, net, the IJN gains the two Tosas and first two Amagis. As the US would have unilaterally scrapped the Lexingtons in 22-23, there would have never been a clause allowing conversions that exceeded the treaty 27,000 carrier limit, so the second pair of Amagis, and the Kiis, are all broken up, rather than be converted.
In the back of my mind is the thought the G3s and N3s were a bluff. When the US and UK were negotiating the tonnage escalator in 37, the UK was looking for a limit around 42,000, because that was what their facilities could handle. As the G3 and N3 exceed that displacement, I suspect they were not intended to actually be built.
Of course, a 1924 Washington conference could very well have failed, entirely. In February 1927, Coolidge called a conference in Geneva to limit total tonnage of smaller ships, as the original Washington treaty limited capital ships. The conference failed. I have read the British were making comments to the effect "the US is trying to buy parity on the cheap". The US would probably walk in to a 1924 Washington conference with the same idea: force other nations to draw their naval strength down to what the US had. The other nations would probably react the same way they did in 27, and, effectively, tell Coolidge to take a flying leap.
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wrt the KGVs being built with 15"/42s. During the design process, the Admiralty's own technical analysis branch determined that a 9-15" armament would give the best combination of firepower, protection, and speed. Someone, I think First Sea Lord Chatfield, clung to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory, and pressed for 14". Just as raising the height of the armor belt caused B turret to be reduced from 4-14" to 2, I would expect the same increase in armor to result in B turret being reduced from 3-15" to 2.
The switch from 16" to 14" in Second London appears to have been pressed for by the UK. Without someone in the Admiralty pushing for 14", the gun size limit would probably have been left at 16".
First London had extended the construction moratorium, so it would not have been possible to start the KGVs any earlier than they were historically. KGV and PoW were laid down on New Year Day in 37, the first day after the First London moratorium expired.
Guns were not the only bottleneck in the construction of the KGVs. British production capacity for armor had also atrophied since the end of WWI. I have read that some of the armor for the KGVs had to be contracted out to a Czech firm.
When most of the Iron Dukes, and Tiger, were scrapped in the early 30s, many of their 13.5" guns were retained. I have read that the KGV's 14" was designed to fit the same mount as the 13.5". In the back of my mind is the thought that, had there been a shortage of 14", the Admiralty had a contingency plan to mount 13.5" in their place on the KGVs.
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This was a fascinating time for carrier development. I have offered, from time to time, that the USN was nuts building the Lexingtons. The USN had so little experience with Langley, and a bit of advice from the Brits, that they really didn't know what they were doing. It's a miracle the Lexingtons came out as well as they did. On the other hand, without the Lexingtons, there would have been enough tonnage in the treaty quota to build three more Yorktowns, with enough left over to build Wasp as another full sized Yorktown, or enough tonnage to build three 27,000 ton proto-Essexes, while refusing to go along with the Brit's push to cut carrier tonnage to only 23,000.
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Better yet: doomed when the Lexingtons were converted, as they used so much of the US' tonnage quota that the Navy was forced into a lot of compromises. The USN had intended to use the rest of the tonnage to build 5 the size of the Ranger. Once they had Ranger built, they realized that wasn't a good idea, so built the 2 Yorktowns. Decent carriers, but that only left enough tonnage for another under sized, under powered, under protected ship. Yes, three torpedo hits would do a lot of damage, but Hornet took 3 aerial torpedo hits, 3 bomb hits, and 2 Kamikaze Vals, then a spread of US torpedoes, 400 5" gun hits, and 4 Long Lances from Japanese destroyers before sinking. Now there is a tough ship!
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wrt the ships Chile acquired after WWI, I hope they didn't pay too much for those destroyers. The first two of the class, which Chile received new, just before the war, lasted through WWII. The three that the RN had requisitioned, had apparently been run hard (HMS Broke had a couple particularly lurid engagements), as they went to the breakers in the early 30s. The subs Drac refers to are probably the six British H class boats built in the US by Fore River. Those subs were part of the order the Admiralty placed with Bethlehem Steel in 1914. With the US being neutral at the time, the Wilson administration impounded the subs. The Admiralty hit on the idea of signing over the subs to Chile as partial payment for Latorre and Cochrane, when those unfinished battleships were requisitioned. As Chile was not involved in the war, the Wilson administration approved of the sale. The sub's departure from the US, bound for Chile, was reported in US newspapers at the time.
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wrt retaining the Courageous class as "large light cruisers", given the WNT's classifications, anything over 10,000 tons or with guns larger than 8" is a "capital ship", the Courageouses would count as capital ships. That being said, the treaty says, wrt the tonnage quotas for each power: " The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement,..." it sounds like the tonnage limit only becomes a factor when a power starts replacing older ships. The original UK retention list totaled some 580,000 tons. When the two Nelsons were built, they replaced four older ships, and reduced total UK tonnage to 558,950 tons. Sounds to me that, in principle, the RN could have retained as many ships as it wanted to, but had to draw down the fleet to the 525,000 limit as those older ships were replaced. As for the Courageous' mission in WWII, I'm thinking convoy escort/raider hunter in the Atlantic or Indian Oceans. Before being attached to Force Z, Repulse was performing that mission in the Indian Ocean.
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wrt the question about 1939 AA upgrades, iirc, one of the issues with the Vickers Pom-Pom was that no-one in the US made cordite, and the Vickers did not work right with USN smokeless. My preferred alternate would be the Browning designed, Colt refined, 37mm, that the US Army used. Add the refinements that were added later in the war: ammo feed from either side, and ammo in metal link belts, rather than clips, and the 37mm could have been used in the same style of mounts as the Vickers. So the USN could have had a locally produced Pom-Pom, that had better range than the Vickers.
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wrt basing battleships in the Philippines, at one time, the Mississippi and Idaho, the two undersized ships that were sold to Greece, could have been based in the Philippines, as they were small enough to be accommodated in the Dewey drydock. That would also solve the problem of those two ships lacking the speed and range to steam with the Connecticuts, as they would be steaming by themselves.
Realistically, as Drac said, anything sent to the Philippines in 41, would be going to it's doom. The US could not forward deploy enough force to really be a deterrent. Drac reviewed USN pre-war battle plans some time ago. The plans seemingly imply that the Philippines would be written off if they were attacked. To get to the Philippines, from Hawaii, would have required steaming through thousands of miles of ocean, populated with islands the Japanese had held since 1918.
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@gregorywright4918 the USN had no choice with Wasp. They only had 15,000 tons available under the treaty, because Langley was the only one old enough to be classified as "experimental". All the treaty carriers were compromised. I have read comments that Ark Royal was lost due to inadequate compartmentalization, to save weight. The Yorktowns were compromised by not having staggered boiler and engine rooms. If Yorktown and Hornet had had staggered boiler and engine rooms, like the Essex did, they might have been able to limp away, rather than sitting, dead in the water, until the Japanese arrived to finish them off. Of course, that brings the alt history question, if Yorktown and Enterprise were built to the treaty limit at that time, 27,000, about the same as Essex, they could have had staggered boiler and engine rooms. Then we don't get Wasp, which made itself useful in the Atlantic, but was too vulnerable to survive in the Pacific. But, with a 27,000 ton design in hand, the USN may have laid down two carriers as soon as Congress authorized them in 38, so they would both be completed in 41, rather than Hornet being ready, but Essex delayed, due to the need to design from a clean sheet.
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After rolling around the news of Ford's investment in the EU in my mind, I came to the same conclusion: Ford it getting itself off the hook, so the EU operation can collapse. In addition to the sales drop in 2024, Ford will drop the Focus this year, which, iirc, accounts for 20% of Ford's EU sales, so that would drop Ford's market share under 3%. The two EVs Ford builds in Cologne are on a VW platform, so I would not be surprised if there are licensing fees paid to VW, adding to the car's cost.
While Ford attempts to sell cars in many countries, their production base is rapidly shrinking. They closed all of their plants in India, Brazil, and Australia. Germany is clearly up for the chop. Their Chinese operations are far weaker than GM's, and GM already wrote down their Chinese operations.
As Ford retreats to being a North American company only, and only selling the largest, most expensive, trucks and SUVs in that market. recall than 100 years ago, half of the cars in service in the world were Fords.
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@robertf3479 Langley also had folding funnels on the port side of the flight deck. Jupiter's boiler and engine rooms were located well aft, so the funnel location was an easy adaptation. Ranger replicated that funnel location, but had more funnels because of the greater boiler capacity. That approach was not an option on the Lexingtons because the boiler room location had already been set closer to midships, same as Kaga. The options with the more midships boiler room location were an island with a funnel, which the aviators opposed, or entirely flush decked, with the stack gas trunked aft. and directed away from the flight deck. Furious had the stack gas trunked aft and exiting from grills on the aft corners of the flight deck, which was a particularly bad location and the ducting inside the hanger turned the after part of the hanger into an oven from heat soak. Argus had a similar setup, but, less powerful engines, so less hot gas to vent. As I said, it was luck that the Lexingtons turned out as well as they did. With the US' lack of experience with carriers, they could easily have used the same solutions as Kaga. Unlike the Japanese, Italians and Brits, the USN, for whatever reason, did not do major reconstructions on it's older ships in the 30s, so, if the Lexingtons had been built like the Kaga, they would have entered WWII with the same configuration, while Kaga had been rebuilt with a small island, full length flight deck and a downward curving funnel midships in place of the long ducts.
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wrt the question about RN secondaries, seems the reversion to 4" on the Renowns and Courageouses was due to Jackie Fisher's involvement in the design of those classes, as he believed that a quick firing 4" was a better choice than a casemate mounted 6". As soon as Fisher was no longer involved in designs, the RN reverted to a heavier secondary on the Nelsons. I did a bit of comparison between the USN 5"/51 and the dual 4"/50 that was experimented with on a few USN destroyers. The guns had the same rate of fire, but the 4" was a twin. The 5" had slightly better armor penetration, but the DDs the secondaries were intended to fend off were not armored. They had virtually the same range. The single 5"/51 and twin 4"/50s, guns plus mount, weight virtually the same. Creating a hypothetical USN DP 4" mount, cutting the 4"/50 down to 45 caliber to reduce the moment of inertia, and mounting them on a copy of the RN DP mount used with the British 4"/45 Mk 16 in the mid 30s, would give a twin mount that weighed less than the combination of a 5"/51 and a 5"/25 that modernized USN standards were equipped with in the 1930s, while providing twice as many guns in each role, while leaving the 01 deck clear, for installation of additional light AA.
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Expanding on the question of treaty cruisers being a good idea, for anyone, the objective of the treaty was to limit costs. If some navies chose to build a large glass canon, vs a smaller, but better balanced, design, that was their own decision. The parties to the treaty had already seen the direction cruisers were taking. The USN built the Tennessee class, starting in 1903: 10" guns, 504 feet long, displacing about 14,500 tons. In 1906, the RN started on the Invincibles, 12" guns, 567', 17,250 tons, evolutionary growth from the Tennessees. By the time of the Washington conference, the benchmarks for a cruiser larger than a "scout" had evolved to Hood, Lexington, and Amagi, each at an eye-popping cost. If some of the Hawkins class had not been building at the time of the conference, the treaty could just as easily have limited cruisers to 6,000 ton, 6" gun "scouts" only. Actually, thinking on the topic, it might have been better for all concerned, if the two Hawkinses that were still fitting out were scrapped, and the limits set at scout cruiser size, so a Dido class, for instance, does not need to worry about being wildly outgunned by a Hipper or a Zara.
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@genericpersonx333 Strauss would have been right, ten years earlier. The turrets on the Tennessees were designed for 30 degrees of elevation, vs 15 for the New Mexicos. Strauss scoffed, said the ships would never need that much range, but it didn't cost anything to build the mounts for greater elevation, so he did not oppose the design. At Dogger Bank, January 1915, Lion commenced fire at 20,000. Jutland was merely confirmation that Strauss' thinking was outdated regarding engagement range. To penetrate battleship belt armor at longer range, you need a heavier shell that hits with more kinetic energy. The piece Drac did a while back about Admiralty engagement doctrine echoed this debate in the USN twenty years earlier. Admiralty doctrine was to close to 16,000 or less as rapidly as possible, at which range, the 14" on the KGVs could penetrate well enough, hence, it was called "decisive range".
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wrt the question about armament alternatives for the KGVs. I have read that the RN was fundamentally dissatisfied with the 16" used on the Nelsons due to their high barrel wear, and were looking for a lower velocity, more durable gun. Why in the world the RN did not buy US 16"/45s is beyond me, other than the possibility that they simply were not available yet, when the KGVs were fitting out. From time to time, someone floats the idea of stripping the 15"/42s off of the R-class and installing them on the faster KGV hull, in place of the 14" I found some estimates, at 1915 prices for RN 13.5" guns and twin turrets. Assuming those prices would be close to those for a 15", I adjusted for inflation to 1937 prices. Dismounting the guns from the Rs, and installing them in new build triple turrets for the 5 KGVs would only save about 1M pounds, far short of the amount needed to pay for an additional KGV, and the RN loses the use of the Rs. Using four of the original twin turrets would require a longer hull, pushing displacement over the treaty limit, as we see with Vanguard, so that is a non-starter. Using three of the original twin turrets would fit in the 35,000T KGV hull, but the ship, with only 6 heavy guns, would be outgunned by any other battleship it would likely run into, and the total savings for the five KGVs would be a bit over 3M Pounds, still less than half the cost of building an additional KGV, and they lose the use of the Rs. Other than buying the US 16"/45, what the RN did was the best option.
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@mattdill8090 that is a fun story. Nearly out of fuel and provisions, she steamed into Newport News, in April, 1915, as the US was, at that time, neutral. In a hot second, UK and French warships were steaming just outside US territorial waters, should the Wilhelm attempt a breakout. A battleship from the USN reserve squadron was dispatched, as soon as a full crew could be assembled by pulling men off other battleships of the reserve squadron, as a neutrality patrol, should anyone have ideas of steaming into Newport News to attack the Wilhelm. The US newspaper accounts of the incident make for fascinating reading.
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@Drachinifel one of the books I read, when I looked in to this issue, two years ago, said 12,500 tons of armor where ordered from Czechoslovakia. Where that specific armor went is probably immaterial. The point is how capacity limited British industry was. That same book says that British capacity to build mounts and fire control equipment was also limited, to the point where the armor was not necessarily the only impediment to completing the ships. I think other sources have said Anson and Howe were specifically delayed waiting on fire control systems.
From what I have read, the UK was the driver of the move to 14". The decision on gun size needed to be made by the end of 35, before the conference started, to meet completion targets. It was the US indicating that it would accept 14", if Japan agreed, that was the green light for the UK to commit to 14" for the KGVs. I don't know which book that information came from. It was not Friedman, or Raven. All I have is photographs of the pages, that I took when I had the book in hand.
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3:20:40 the question about a 14" armed Florida class. As Drac suggested, without the pushback that existed in the USN to the move from 12" to 14", which was repeated in the move from 14" to 16", resulting in moving to larger guns sooner, I can think of a significant impact. The Washington conference engaged in some political art in discriminating between pre-Jutland and post-Jutland ships. In their art, Hood was deemed "post-Jutland" even though it was designed before the battle, while Tennessee and California, laid down after Hood, were deemed pre-Jutland, while Maryland, which was laid down before Tennessee, was deemed post-Jutland. As the Colorados were largely a repeat of the Tennessees, with the exception of the 16" guns, if the Tennessees had been armed with 16" guns, which was openly discussed in 1915, defining the Tennessees as pre-Jutland would be even more problematic. If the Tennessees were armed with 16" guns, and therefore deemed "post-Jutland", then, for parity, the US would not have been allowed to complete Colorado and West Virginia. That would result in the US retaining the Delawares as "front line" battleships. In the fleet drawdown in First London, the Delawares would go, and one or both Floridas and both Wyomings would be retained as "front line" battleships.
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@scarecrow2097 newspaper reports of the time make for fascinating reading. The Naval appropriation bill the House passed had funding for more Connecticuts. Senator Hale demanded the Navy buy smaller ships, on the order of 12,000 tons, rather than more 16,000 ton Connecticuts, and he held up the appropriation bill until the appropriation for two Connecticuts was changed to the smaller Mississippis. The backstairs chatter the newspapers were reporting was that Hale, who represented Maine, was trying to get the contract for Bath Iron Works. At that time, Bath was building one of the 15,000 ton Virginias, having difficulty with a ship that size, and the Navy was very dissatisfied with Bath's progress. As it turned out, the Navy could not design a ship of less than 13,000 tons, which still exceeded what Bath could comfortably build. Newport News was low bid, for one Mississippi. The William Cramp yard bid a price that exceeded that of News for one ship, but bid a lower price for building both of the Mississippis. In the back of my mind, knowing the contracts for the Mississippis were entirely politically motivated, I will observe that the Cramp yard is in Philadelphia, One of the Senators from PA had a lot of juice, was the head of the state party machine, and also sat on the Naval Affairs Committee, so I would not reject the proposition that the Senator advised Cramp how to bid for the contracts. The ships were a failure for the USN because of their small size. They were a bit slower, and had significantly less range than the Connecticuts, so were mostly relegated to coastal patrol, separate from the rest of the fleet. And yet, being obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, and of little use to the USN, SecNav Daniels still exploited the Greeks to a horrendous degree. iirc, the newspapers were reporting the price Daniels extracted from Greece was about double what the ships were worth. From the Greek perspective, the Mississippis might have come in handy in 1912, but in 1914, if the Ottomans had received the two new Dreadnoughts building in the UK, the Mississippis would have been dead meat. One positive note, the Mississippis fit in the drydock in Piraeus. A Connecticut would have been too big.
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wrt the USN building 16" armed battleships, the "more smaller guns vs fewer bigger guns" argument raged for some time in the Navy Department. Head of BuOrd, Joseph Strauss was the main driver of the "more smaller guns" school. When Jutland demonstrated the need for being able to penetrate at greater range, Strauss was overruled by the SecNav and General Board. In his 1916 annual report, SecNav Daniels said the decision to go to 16" was made over the objections of some officers.
When the decision to go to 16" was made in the summer of 1916, there was speculation in the press about the New Mexicos and Tennessees being upgunned to 16" during construction. A Navy spokesman said that the cost to make the changes would be prohibitive. The article did not make clear if the Navy spokesman was talking specifically about the New Mexicos, which had been laid down the previous year, or the Tennessees, as well, which had not yet been laid down.
The 14"/50 was ordered into production, off the drawing board, with no test program. Having taken that shortcut, the first production 14"/50 was test fired at about the same time as the prototype 16". Strauss' 1915 report speaks glowingly, at length, of the virtues of the 14", and briefly mentions the 16". If the 14"/50 had been subjected to an in depth test program, the dispersion issue that dogged these guns may have been discovered before production started.
Given the timelines of events, I think the most probable situation would be the New Mexicos built with 14" and Tennessees built with 16". The two Tennessees, and three Colorados, would give the USN 5 16" armed "post-Jutland" ships.
At the same time, the Japanese could argue they were entitled to a 42,000 ton ship, because of Hood, and complete Tosa, as well as Nagato and Mutsu.
So, then the RN is allowed to build four new ships, so that, combined with Hood, the RN has parity with the USN at 5, and the IJN has 3.
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Returning to the question of the UK selling it's West Indies colonies to the US in exchange for the US canceling the UK's debt from WWI, which I brought up in the Q&A on the shore bombardment video of May 12th, I have done further reading on the WWI debt issue. The UK had made substantial loans to it's allies prior to US entry in April 1917. From that point on, the US bore the financial burden. As it worked out, the amount owed to the UK by the other allies was almost equal to the amount the UK owed to the US. On August 1, 1922, Arthur Balfour wrote a note to the French ambassador to the UK, words to the effect that the UK did not want to lean so heavily on France, and the other allies, for repayment of their debts. The UK would rather cancel all the debts owned to it, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was pressing the UK so hard for repayment, the UK needed the cash. The content of this note was publicly published by the UK government, which, to me, gives the note the color of an official offer by the UK government to cancel the war debts owned to it, if it is relieved of it's debt to the US. As noted in my May 12th question, extrapolating the price the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands to the total land mass of all the UK held islands, plus British Honduras, comes out to $4.15B, which equals the $4B of principle owed, plus a portion of accrued interest. What a different world it would have been, had the UK, effectively, paid it's debt to the US with dirt, rather than gold, and, in accordance with the Balfour note, then cancelled all debts owed to it, cutting the debt, and corresponding drag on the economies of the other allies, in half.
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@Thomas-gs4yq iirc, Iron Duke still has some of her 13.5" guns, but the armor had probably been removed for treaty compliance when she was downgraded to a training ship. The same was done with Wyoming. Secondly, I'm not sure the Duke was ever converted to oil fuel, so fueling her may have been an issue in some locations. You would think an additional old battleship would have been useful as long as there were German surface raiders around. I recently reread "Fifty Ships That Saved The World", about the destroyers for bases deal. There was no mention of Churchill asking for battleships, only destroyers. As it happened, a group of those old destroyers were making their way to England, when they picked up radio traffic from Jervis Bay, when she was in her battle with Scheer. The USN had handed over the destroyers with full magazines and torpedo tubes, so they rang up flank speed to rush to Jervis Bay's aide, but arrived too late.
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From my reading, it was the amount of material being ordered for Yamato that tipped off British and US intelligence that the Yamatos were going to exceed the 35,000 ton limit. Just how much the ships exceeded the limit was significantly underestimated by western intelligence, resulting in the Second London tonnage escalator being triggered, but the new limit being set at only 45,000 tons. If the IJN had gone with a more modest design, say 45,000 tons, western intelligence may not have twigged at all, and the treaty tonnage escalator not triggered until 1940, when the completed hulls were launched, too late to design the Iowas and Lions.
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Always enjoy your ship videos. How much did the Tennessees, and Colorados, benefit from analysis of Jutland? The oldest copy of Jane's at the local library is the 1958 edition, which lists the deck armor of both classes, presumably after their WWII updates, as 3 1/2" on the upper deck and 2 1/2" on the lower deck, with the more extensively reconstructed West Virginia having 9" of deck armor. Other than West Virginia, this amount of deck armor is far short of the later classes that were built in the 30s, and short of the British N3s, which were designed after the analysis of Jutland. It's interesting that, while the RN pressed on with construction of Hood, the other three ships of that class were suspended, and ultimately cancelled as it was reportedly deemed not feasible to update them. Yet the USN pressed on with laying the Maryland down a year after Jutland, and her three sisters, three years after Jutland, while the RN was going back to the drawing board. For that matter, the final design of the Lexingtons appears comparable to the Hood, but they were laid down after the RN knew it didn't want any more ships as thin skinned as the Hood. Seems that the USN would have been well advised to finish up the Tennessees as they were already building, but cancel the Colorados and Lexingtons before they were laid down, and go straight to the 1920 South Dakotas. What are your thoughts?
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@hughgordon6435 To a degree, ship types could be recognized by their rig. A two masted ship would be a brig or snow, so probably relatively small. A two masted ship with a gaff rigged mainmast was a brigantine, probably civilian. A three masted ship with gaff rigged mizzen, was a barque, with gaff rigged mizzen and main, a barquentine, most likely civilian. All masts gaff rigged, a schooner, most likely civilian. Three square rigged masts, with nothing for size comparison, could be a ship of the line, frigate, sloop of war/corvette, or a civilian ship.
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I chewed some of the alternatives in a comment a couple hours ago. The South American powers didn't have the money. The two surviving Invincibles were offered to Chile. Chile declined. Agincourt was offered to Brazil. Brazil declined. The only reasonably possible buyer would be the Dutch. They would want a ship that was "turn key", not something they would need to pour a lot of money into. They would want something oil fired, because that was the fuel they had in abundance, on Borneo. iirc, the RN did not put a Farthing into the Iron Dukes and Tiger in the 20s. They were never given torpedo bulges, never converted to oil fuel, no supplemental deck armor added. The USN however, did pour millions into modernizing Florida and Utah, only a few years before Florida was scrapped and Utah converted to a target ship. They received new oil-fired boilers (surplus from the North Dakota program), bulges and deck armor (also surplus from the ND program). But they still carried 12" guns and plodded along at 21kts. Would the Dutch want them, in the early 30s?
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Thinking on this a bit more, the Washington treaty allowed France to lay down a new, treaty compliant, BB in 27 and 29. With two of the Normandie class hulls at 65% complete, France could have pressed to have the 1927 and 1929 construction windows revised to allow for completion of existing, unfinished, hulls as an alternate to laying down new hulls. Then France could have closed up the hulls of Normandie and Flandre and laid them up for 5-7 years, while a new, longer, drydock is built. When construction resumes, as their original displacement was only 25,000T, there is plenty of room for doing the work considered in 1919 to make them 28kt ships, along with building a modern superstructure with modern secondary armament. Then scrapping two of the Courbets in 30-31 A Normandie built to late 20s standards, could easily defeat a Deutschland, so the Dunkerques would probably never have been built.
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For Ninja, the KGV 14" armament seems to follow the "more smaller guns means more hits" theory. I have been looking into that issue, as most of the justifications offered do not make any sense. The Admiralty produced a wide variety of designs for the KGVs with 14", 15", and 16" guns. In the fall of 35, the alternatives were analyzed by the Technical Division of Naval Staff. Their conclusion was that a 9-15" armament provided the best balance of hitting power, speed, and protection. The analysis said "The 14" gun ship should be ruled out, unless required by treaty." The Sea Lords agreed to go 15". Then, the US said it would be open to the upcoming Second London treaty imposing a 14" limit, contingent on Japan agreeing. A year earlier, December of 34, Japan had withdrawn from the treaty system. At that time, Japan said it's withdrawal was due to it's demand for parity with the US and UK. Japanese representatives said at the time, they were open to a new treaty, as long as the new treaty gave Japan parity. The US and UK were not going to give Japan parity, so I don't see how anyone could have taken the US offer of 14", contingent on Japan's agreement, seriously. The designs for KGVs with the different armament schemes show the 9-15" armament weighs less than the 12-14" under consideration. As the 15" armament has fewer guns, the lower parts count would indicate the 15" armament would cost less. Clearly, someone wanted the 14" armament badly enough to go against the Technical Division's analysis, against the issue of weight, and against the issue of cost. The only reason I can think of is adherence to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory.
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wrt the question about the Axis having adequate fuel supplies. The Vichy government was increasingly accommodating to the Axis. Luftwaffe aircraft were operating out of fields in Vichy held Syria. The Germans and Italians supported a coup in Iraq that put an Axis friendly regime in power. Oil was being produced at that time in Iraq. A 12" pipeline was operating, which ran between Kirkuk and Haifa. After the formation of Israel, part of that pipeline was repurposed for a new line to Baniyas, Syria. A rail line had been built by the Ottoman Empire from northern Iraq to the Med, but, after WWI, part of that rail line ventured into Turkey, which was neutral in WWII. In April 41, the Axis could have landed on friendly beaches in Syria, driven into friendly held oil fields in Iraq, and begun construction of rail and pipeline connections to bring the oil to friendly ports in the Med. The British invaded Iraq to reinstall a friendly regime in May 41, then invaded Vichy Syria in June 41, closing the window of opportunity the Axis had to secure a major oilfield. Can't help but wonder why Hitler decided invading Russia in June 41 was a better idea.
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American AA guns on Yamato. imho, would not have made a difference, due to the number of USN aircraft used in the attacks. The Japanese Type 89s on Yamato and Type 98s that were probably mounted on most of the escorts don't give up that much to the 5/38. The Type 96 topped the Oerlikon in both projectile weight and range, but had a much lower rate of fire. The only gap in the Japanese AA capability was a midsize autocannon. Building the Italian Model 1938 37mm under license, while not as good as the Bofors, would have filled that gap. But none of this would matter due to the weight of the USN attack. RAF Wing Commander Pat Gibbs DSO DFC & Bar worked out the principles of successful air attack against ships. during the war. The RAF didn't have dive bombers, so relied on torpedo bombers. Against a single ship, like Bismark, torpedo bombers did well enough. Against escorted ships, where the torpedo bombers had to fly over a destroyer screen, the aircraft were torn to shreds by AA fire. The tactics refined by Gibbs while commanding a Beaufort squadron on Malta were, first, use an overwhelming force to saturate the defenses, and second, bring along aircraft, in his case Beaufighters, to strafe the ships to suppress AA fire. Accounts of the attack on the Yamato show the pilots were following Gibbs' book.
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wrt the question about carrier conversions if the Washington treaty occurred a few years later. I agree with Drac that the Japanese would have been looking at converting the Kiis. wrt to the USN, SecNav Daniels had proposed another building program to follow the 1916 program that included the Lexigntons. But Daniels was gone with the change of administration in 1921. A four year delay in the treaty would put the conference during the Coolidge administration. Coolidge was even less interested in defense spending than Harding had been. As Drac said, given the attitude in the US during the time, I doubt the USN would have had a big capital ship program in the 20s. It was apparently the US that proposed the battlecruiser conversion clause of the treaty. Without battlecruisers under construction, the US would not have proposed the clause. If the UK has a G3 follow-on under construction, it might propose the conversion clause, but why would the US agree to it? I am not sure the conversion clause would have existed at all. Without the special clause, conversions would be limited by the treaty's general carrier specification of 27,000 tons. Or, the conference could fail entirely, as the 1927 (Coolidge administration) conference failed. There may not have been a successful naval conference until First London, in 1930, motivated by the depression.
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@solutionless123 the arms trade in general has always been a bit shady. Basil Zaharoff, an agent for Vickers, had a tendency to oversell their products. An incident relayed in "Reilly Ace Of Spies", pitted Riley, a British spy, against Zaharoff, for contracts for new ships for Russia. Riley maneuvered himself into position as the representative in Russia for Blohm und Voss. Reilly then advised British Intelligence, that, if B&V won the contract, he would forward full sets of drawings of the ships to the British government, giving the British government an incentive to hobble Zaharoff's efforts, cost Vickers a fortune in profits, cost thousands of British shipyard workers their jobs, to gain intelligence about German ship design. meanwhile, Reilly would pocket a massive sales commission from B&V. The US government made sizeable trade concessions to Argentina to aid US yards in winning the contracts for the Rivadavias, even though the Curtis turbines the ships were equipped with were considerably inferior to British Parsons turbines. The Admiralty bought some 14" guns that Bethlehem Steel had built for the Greek battleship that was building in Germany. The Brits discovered the gun design was defective, the guns tended to droop. I have not seen specific numbers, but I have read that the price Chile paid for Latorre and the destroyers was at a significant discount to their original contract price. Latorre was no longer a new ship, and was becoming obsolete by 1920. The destroyers were from an order for six Chile had placed before the war. Chile received two destroyers just before the war started, but the other four were requisitioned by the Admiralty. One of the four was sunk at Jutland. The other three were very active during the war, with HMS Broke being involved in two particularly lurid brawls. The two ships that Chile had received new from the builders in 1914 lasted until 1945, but the three that had been with the RN during the war went to the breakers in 1933. I wonder how serviceable those three had been for several years before they were scrapped, as Chile rang up Thornycroft in 1928 and ordered six more destroyers.
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If you look at the actual data, the per-capita murder rate in Chicago is well below that of several other cities. Two factors lead to the media hype and hysteria: Chicago has a large population, so there are more murders in total, and many members of the media have offices in Chicago, but not in the other, more violent, cities, so it is easier for them to cover violence in Chicago. So far, for 2023, Chicago ranks 10th in per capita murder rate, behind such garden sports as St Louis, Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, Cleveland, Kansas City, Memphis, and others. No, I am not a Chicago resident. I live in the burbs of Detroit.
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@kingswagii1607 the ships that were designed from the outset for TE drive had a layout intended to take advantage of the drivetrain. The boiler rooms were located along the sides of the hull, to act as a secondary torpedo defense system, with the turbine/generator sets inboard, along the centerline. There was only room at the inboard end of the prop shafts for the motors. To rebuild the ships to take 1930s vintage geared turbines would require a complete rearrangement of the boiler and engine rooms so that all four turbines could be installed in line with the prop shafts. Secondly, the WNT only allowed defensive improvements in ships: armor, torpedo protection and AA armament. Drac has mentioned that, if the QEs had been built with small tube boilers, they could have made 28kts. Several of the QEs were modernized in the late 30s, including new boilers, but still only made low 20s speeds, so I would assume that the Admiralty's interpretation of the treaty was it was illegal to significantly increase their speed. Italy was granted more leeway in improving their ships as they were so obsolete to begin with, and Japan dropped out of the treaty system, so was no longer constrained.
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Problem is, some adversaries have the bad form to not get within 16,000 yards. During 1914-1916, the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss, kept pushing 14" guns because they could penetrate any existing BB at 12,000 yards. But Dogger Bank was at about 20,000 and Jutland was at more than 15,000. In WWII, West Virginia opened up on Yamashiro at something over 22,000. What do you do when the opponent doesn't want to fight the fight the way that is optimal for you?
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@Alex-cw3rz from what I read, seems Yamashiro wasn't sunk by gunfire, but by the five or six torpedoes it caught. The point is, the upgraded 16"/45 could punch through any part of Yamashio at that range. For that matter, the upgraded 14"/50s on Tennessee and California could punch through at that range too. The battleships would probably have shot Yamashio to bits if the torpedoes had not killed her first. According to the tables on Navweaps, a Bismark class could punch through KGV's belt up to 24,000 yards, and could use it's speed advantage to control the range with KGV. This debate raged in the USN during WWI, with Strauss arguing that more 14" guns could be mounted than 16", and, as long as you bought his assertion that engagements would never occur beyond 12,000, the 14" provided more firepower. By the summer of 16, the General Board and SecNav had seen enough long range gunfights between the Brits and Germans to realize that Strauss' argument was not valid. I haven't had time to watch Drac's video yet, but I will be watching with interest to see if the Admiralty reenacted the argument that raged in the USN twenty years earlier.
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@whispofwords2590 I commented on the general carrier history post that the Lexingtons were horribly inefficient as carriers. The Navy compounded the mistake by building them after the tonnage limits of the Washington Treaty were known. The Yorktowns had hanger decks 200' longer than the Lexingtons, on a third less displacement. The two Lexingtons could have been replaced by two Yorktowns, with enough tonnage left over to build another Yorktown, and still have enough tonnage available to build the Wasp as another 20,000 ton carrier. Additionally, the Navy was in a dilemma designing the Yorktowns because every ton added for capability or surviveability took a ton away from the Wasp, edging the Wasp closer to uselessness. Without the Lexingtons hogging tonnage quota, the Navy would have been able to design in more capability and surviveability into Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp and, ultimately, Hornet, because Hornet was built to the best available design, even though the Navy knew of the compromises made in the Yorktown design.
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@michaelsnyder3871 intelligence operations always involve a degree of guesswork. Remember the conversation between Charlton Heston and Hal Holbrook, as Rochefort, in "Midway"? Heston asked how much of the IJN correspondence they could actually read. Holbrook said words to the effect "we don't really read them. we see a hint here, a glimmer there". Heston says "you're guessing!" That is about it, educated guessing. The Admiralty designed the Admiral class battlecruisers, based on their best guesses about the Mackensens. The Alaska class cruisers were designed based on best guesses about an IJN class of heavy cruisers. The 1938 conference between the US and UK regarding where to set the new displacement limit, was based on their best guess about the size of the Yamato, and their own facilities. Reportedly, the UK wanted a limit of 42,000 due to limits of facilities around the empire (which really makes you wonder if the G3 and N3 were intended to be built, or a bluff, only bargaining chips to be traded away for concessions by other parties to the treaty), while the US wanted 45,000, because that was what was needed to achieve their goals for speed, protection, and firepower. The only thing the US and UK could be reasonably sure of was that Yamato was going to be considerably over 35,000, which triggered the escalator clause. The estimates of how much over 35,000 could have been colored by the parties own agendas. I have read that the assessment was Yamato would be 45,000, which was what the US wanted. I wonder if British Intelligence was saying 42,000, because that was what the Admiralty wanted? The actual data in hand was imprecise. As we saw with Bismark and Littorio, you could be significantly over the treaty limit, without the UK and US catching on. That is why I suggest that, had Yamato not been so far over the limit, but closer to Bismark and Littorio, the US and UK might have not had the confidence to call the IJN on it, and increase the displacement limit.
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wrt the New Yorks using VTE power, the Wiki entry gives a somewhat different answer to that question. The Floridas and Wyomings used Parsons turbines, from the UK. When the New Yorks were ordered, there was apparently pressure to "buy American", but the US turbine manufacturers could not meet the Navy's performance specifications, so the Navy reverted to VTE. Of the next class, Oklahoma still had VTE power, while Nevada used Curtis turbines, then the Pennsylvanias were a head to head comparison of Curtis and Parsons turbines. It is entirely possible that Parsons understood something about turbine efficiency that Curtis did not. There had been earlier head to head comparisons, where the USN would build one BB with VTE power, and it's sister with Curtis turbines and the Curtis powered ships were horribly inefficient. The range and coal capacity for the two classes is incomplete in the 1919 edition of Jane's and somewhat divergent in the Wiki entries, but there is some indication that the Parsons turbines were quite competitive with VTE. The 1919 edition of Jane's also reports an inability/unwillingness of US turbine manufacturers to meet USN specifications motivating the reversion to VTE.
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@t.r.a.e.3218 That bracing, iirc "diagonal riser", was a discovery during Constitution's last restoration. Large frigates had an issue with "hogging", where the bow and stern sag, due to the weight of the ship and guns, where the hull forward and aft is too narrow to provide enough buoyancy to support the load. The diagonal braces direct the loads from the gun deck toward the keel amidships, where there is enough buoyancy to support the load. Apparently, those braces were removed somewhere during the ship's life. The restoration crew was reviewing the small amount of documentation that has survived from the ship's construction and saw mention of "diagonal risers" in the documents. The British had captured USS President, a sister of Constitution, and, per usual Admiralty procedure, made up a set of drawings for her. Those drawings still exist in the Admiralty archives, so the Constitution restoration crew was able to review the drawings, which showed those diagonal braces. Seeing them on the drawings it became obvious how critical they were for the ship's structural integrity, so they were recreated and installed during the restoration.
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With regard to Dunkerque and Strasbourg, I was reading Garzke's "Allied Battleships" recently. Garzke claims Strasbourg, with it's increased armor, was in fact a response to Littorio. The first two Littorios were apparently ordered June 10, of 34. The Italian government was openly talking about building 35,000 ton treatymax ships, which was widely reported in the press. Strasbourg was ordered July 16th, with increased armor, as a reply, according to Garzke. At the start of the 1930s, France had the 70,000 tons of capital ship tonnage as offered by the Washington Treaty, plus an additional 23,500, due to the France finding a rock in Quiberon Bay and sinking, in 1922. Given the replacement tonnage available due to the loss of France, Richelieu, combined with the two Dunkerques, did not violate the fleet tonnage limits of the treaty. France publicly renounced the fleet tonnage limits of the treaty and proceeded with Jean Bart, which did put France over the fleet tonnage limit. It occurs that, if France had decided an uparmored Dunkerque was not an adequate reply to Littorio, and gone directly to the Richelieu and Jean Bart, they would have been very close to being within the treaty displacement limit, and, without Strasbourg occupying a drydock in Saint Nazaire and consuming production resources, Jean Bart could have been laid down at the same time as Richelieu, and both would have been complete by the fall of France. Your thoughts?
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@someuser7501 I envisioned a GM, several years ago, where the only Americans employed by the company were the honchos at the HQ in Detroit. All vehicles would be entirely designed and built in China.
Of course, now we have a government that is eager to erect tariff barriers. So, now, the plan would be to offshore all the engineering, because foreign engineers are cheaper than Americans, transmit the design information to the US over the same fibre that brings us all those telemarketing calls, to duck tariffs on physical goods, then build here.
Thing is, with the US going all in on ICE, the skill set to design ICE powertrains, and the huge vehicles that the industry wants to sell in the US, will atrophy in places like China and India. The engineering will probably become a primary application of AI, or become entirely static, like US automotive engineering was from the 50s, into the 70s, before safety and emissions regs forced changes.
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@pedenharley6266 In the late 30s, several old C Class (older than Delhi) cruisers were tagged to be converted into AA cruisers, with, first, single, then twin 4"/45s. That work seems to have been suspended when the war started. Navweaps says that, no matter how many 4"/45s were built, the Admiralty never had enough of them. The USN's supply of 5" guns was probably as tight. I have read about how the USN ramped up production of 4 and 5 inch guns during WWI, farming production out to a large number of companies, but never had enough to arm all the convoy ships, and escorts. I would expect the situation to have been the same in WWII.
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The WNT has provided hours of covid isolation entertainment. The Steve plan of tweaks: first, set the battleship maximums at what was already in commission. Setting gun size at 16" forced the Japanese to lie as the Nagatos had 16.1", so I would set the maximum at 16.1". Hood was far above the 35,000 ton limit, so I would set the individual ship tonnage where Hood was, according to treaty measure, 41,200. Because I hate waste, I would allow ships already in the water to be completed, provided that a corresponding tonnage of existing ships were eliminated. The cutoff date for what is "in the water" would be the same as the cutoff date for "experimental" aircraft carriers, November 12, 1921. This was done with Colorado and West Virginia, in exchange for the two Delawares. I would extend it to allow completion of Washington, at the cost of the two Floridas. I would give the UK the stink eye for crying about not having any 16" gun ships as the RN had a large number of ships with 15" guns while the bulk of the USN and IJN were armed with 14". The Japanese would feel pretty ill-used as Tosa and Kaga missed the "in the water" date by one month and by five days, respectively, so I might offer them the choice of scrapping the Tosas, or completing them, and scrapping three of the Kongos instead.
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I see Ranger as the true heir to Langley, with the same sort of aft boiler room and swiveling funnel arrangement. To my thinking, the Lexingtons should never have been built, with carrier development proceeding directly from Langley to Ranger. Yes, I hear the cries. The Lexingtons are big, and they look nice, but they were horribly wasteful of displacement for the air group they carried. Reading newspaper reports of the time, the cost overruns on the Lexingtons were horrendous, with the ships ending up costing twice as much as originally claimed. The Lexingtons also had an excruciatingly long build time, evidence the USN didn't know what it was doing, and was changing the design frequently as experience was gained with Langley. And, without the Lexingtons, the USN would have had displacement available to build three Yorkowns, with enough left over to build Wasp as another full size Yorktown.
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@janwitts2688 iirc, the US paid Spain some $20M to give up it's claims on the Philippines and Guam. The balance of the Marianas and Carolines were also Spanish colonies, but, with the crown jewel, the Philippines, gone, Spain had little interest in the rest of it's Pacific holdings, so sold the island groups to Germany the next year, for some $4M. Japan, being allied with the UK, overran the German held islands in 1914, and continued to occupy the former German colonies north of the equator, after the war, under a League of Nations mandate. As for the US forcing the citizens of the Philippines to submit by force of arms, that was what imperial powers did at the time. Kipling wrote "White Man's Burden" around the turn of the century to try and make a moral case for imperial conquests.
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Speaking of the WWI battlecruiser situation, some accounts I have read say that, in spite of the press of other priorities, construction of Hood proceeded as Hood, combined with the two Renowns then building, would make up the battlecruiser losses from Jutland. What if Fisher's salesman skills were just a bit better and the contracts for Agincourt and Resistance were also converted to Renown class battlecruisers? With four Renowns building, would Hood have been proceeded with, or any of the Admirals laid down at all? Then, in the late 1930s, with the KGVs and fast carriers under development, the other three Renowns receive rebuilds comparable to Renown's, because they can keep up with the new ships, while QE, Warspite and Valiant remain in their 1930 form, similar to Malaya and Barham. Would anything really change in WWII?
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@Blandge I can see a US pre-war heavy cruiser being mistaken for a "California type" BB, because of the USN's affection for "clipper" bows. I don't know about the most egregious case. How many times did the Japanese claim to have sunk Enterprise? The second Lexington, CV-16, was claimed sunk by the Japanese so many times it became nicknamed "the blue ghost", blue for the camo paint color it was painted, and ghost because if was claimed sunk so many times. When I was on the Lex, some 50 years ago, I noticed a blue ghost mascot painted on the ship's C-1. The Wiki article says sinkings were claimed following actions on Dec 4, 43, March 8, 44, June 11,44, November 5,44
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@collinwood6573 considering how elderly the TBD was by 42, it was OK. It was considerably slower than the other USN aircraft, when loaded. That low cruising speed, I put down to the drag from the unorthodox way the TBD carried it's torpedo: hanging down at an angle, rather than cinched up tight under the fuselage. The reason the TBD was slaughtered at Midway was the attack was fatally botched. At Coral Sea, the TBDs, SBDs and F4Fs, made coordinated attacks. At Coral Sea, a few SBDs and F4Fs were lost to the Japanese CAP, but not a single TBD was lost to Japanese action. The only difference between Coral Sea and Midway was the SBDs and F4Fs all went in the wrong directions, leaving the TBDs exposed.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 not quite up to the Bofors standard, but John Browning designed a 37mm AA gun for the US army. Originally clip fed, from the left side, it was modified to take chain link belts, and feed from either the right or the left. I proposed, on another page, that, given a proper water cooling system, the Browning gun could have been used in a quad mount very much like that used on the PomPom, instead of the USN trying to get he 1.1" working. Of the two, the Browning 37, and the Bofors, the Bofors is the better gun. I have my notes somewhere, but, iirc, it comes down to the Bofors having a slightly larger shell, and a higher ceiling. The US Army used the Browning gun well into 42, gradually replacing it as Bofors became available.
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wrt the alt history of no allied intervention in Greece, the Axis was working on getting access to the oil fields of Iraq and Iran. The Vichy government was increasingly accommodating to the Axis, allowing Luftwaffe units to operate in airfields in Syria. Italy and Germany had backed a coup in Iraq, April 1, 41, which removed the pro-British regime and installed a pro-Axis regime. The Iranian regime was also regarded as Axis friendly. Without Allied intervention, Greece may have been defeated sooner, enabling an amphibious operation from Greece to Syria. British troops invaded Iraq May 2, 41, closing the door on the possibility of unopposed Axis access to Iraqi oil, before the Germans could secure Greece and Crete.
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wrt to the question of Revenge being a downgrade from the QE, and other cases of following ships being less capable, another glaring example are the USN Mississippi class BB-23 and 24. The Mississippis were of smaller displacement than the preceding Connecticut class, and so short on speed and coal capacity that they were incapable of keeping up with the rest of the battle line. The Mississippis were the product of Senator Hale, the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, who refused to pass the Navy appropriation legislation the House had passed to the Senate floor until his two small battleships were funded. Press criticism of the Mississippis at the time was blistering and there were charges that Hale was insisting on the small ships for personal reasons. Hale retired from the Senate in 1911, making the ships expendable. The Greeks showed up, with checkbook in hand, in 1914, desperate for battleships to counter those the Ottomans had building in the UK. Even then, the US held Greece up for some $12M+, what the US had paid for the the undersized, and by 1914 obsolete, ships, when new.
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wrt the question on relining guns, I happened to read a US Naval Academy gunnery textbook from 1915 last week that describes the process in detail. At the turn of the century, a lot of guns were initially built without liners, and had to be bored out to make room for the liner when the gun was refurbished. The feed rate for the boring operation was about 6"/hour, so boring a 12-14" gun would take 4-5 days, running continuously, per pass, and it would take several passes to bore the gun sufficiently to allow insertion of a liner. Initially, the liners were of uniform diameter, which simplified the boring operation. The liners were inserted and removed by placing the gun in an oven and heating it, to cause the metal of the gun to expand, so the unheated liner could be inserted. Removing an existing liner amounted to heating the outside of the gun, while running cold water through the bore to keep the liner cool so it would not expand with the heated gun. Then pressing out the old liner with a press. Sometimes, the uniform diameter liners did not want to come out, and had to be bored out, consuming a great deal of time and expense. So the shift was made to boring the gun and turning the OD of the liner with a slight taper, so they would separate more readily.
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wrt the question on the F2A, as Drac said, the first problem was weight. The early models were quite agile. "Pappy" Boyington praised it's handling. But the Navy wanted armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, more guns, more ammo, and weight grew. Besides a disastrous impact on performance, the increased weight lead to more landing gear failures. In Aussie hands, the planes were put on a diet: all the armor, except that directly behind the pilot, was removed. The wing 50 cal machine guns were replaced with .303s. Besides the reduced weight of the .303 guns and their ammo, putting the weight reduction out on the wins would also reduce rotational inertia, which improves roll rate. The life raft and Brewster provided radio, which did not work worth a hoot, were also removed. As modified, the Aussie Buffs apparently pretty much held their own against the early Japanese army fighters. Another problem was the engines installed on the Aussie and far east RAF Buffs. There was apparently a shortage of Wright Cyclones, so the planes built for export were fitted with worn out airline castoffs (the DC-2 used the Cyclone) that had been 'refurbished" by Wright. Whether due to the engines being refurbs, or the fundamental design of the engine, I don't know, but the Buffs in far east service also tended to overheat and blow out their oil. Given that the Cyclone was also used in the SBD and B-17, I would lean toward laying the engine's ill temper in the export Buffs on their state of wear, in spite of being "refurbished". Best moves to improve the Buff, besides the weight reduction program the Aussies gave them, would be actual, new, Cyclones, or Pratt Twin Wasps, like the earlier, Grumman-built, F4Fs had. Or, take the entire program away from Brewster and give it to someone who knew how to run an aircraft factory, and had capacity available.
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Drac, I started looking in to the Courageous class "large light cruisers" some days ago. There are two narratives about them that I see repeated over and over: 1: they were built with shallow draft to operate in the Baltic. and, 2: they were converted to carriers because of the Washington treaty. I can't find any support for either of those narratives that makes any sense. As you point out in your piece on the Courageouses, the Germans could send any capital ships into the Baltic that they wanted via the Kiel Canal. If the Courageouses were the only big gun ships the RN could get into the Baltic, they would be dead meat when the entirety of the High Seas Fleet came over the horizon. If the RN could get other capital ships into the Baltic, there is no reason to build the Courageouses. The WNT appears to not regard the Courageouses as "capital ships". The Courageouses do not appear on the capital ship disposal list, nor the capital ship retention list, nor is there any verbiage that I can find in the treaty compelling their conversion. Why were the Courageouses built? One person on another forum has offered a scenario that makes sense: the Courageouses were built as cruiser killers that were small and cheap enough, in relative terms, to build in large quantity. That scenario has the virtue of making sense. The Courageouses cost a third less than the Renowns, and used fewer of the limited inventory of twin 15" turrets per ship, allowing more of them to be built. Have you ever heard of this alternative to the generally accepted scenarios?
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@jetdriver by "fully modernized" members of the Big 5, I presume you are referring to California and West Virginia. Those ships had been sunk, and were going to be in the yard a long time anyway. As long as a lot of reconstruction was being done anyway, may as well build them to 1942 standard. Colorado received next to nothing in reconstruction, just added AAA. Once the war was on, as long as ships were not severely damaged, I can understand the Brits not wanting to take a ship offline for a year or two for major work. As for wearing out the QEs and Rs, the ships were over 20 years old and obsolete. With Italy out of the war in 43, the German capital ships mostly sunk, and the KGVs in commission, the old tubs were not worth more than what could be described as palliative care as they all had a date with the breakers on V-E day.
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wrt the question about models vs drawings, in some applications, the model was built first, because of the difficulty of rendering 3-dimentional objects on 2-dimension drawings. When I worked in fluid handling in the 70s, it was routine to build a model of a refinery or chemical plant first, to work out all the pipe routing, then make up drawings from the model. It was routine to build full scale mockups of new aircraft for the same reason, to work out all the hydraulic and electrical conduits and possible interference with bulkheads. The Boeing 777 was the first aircraft to be designed entirely in computer, in the early 90s, because, 3D computer modeling had finally advanced enough.
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USN procurement choices in 1936. That is a "target rich environment", especially BuOrd. It wasn't just the ineffective Mk 14 detonators. The air launched Mk 13 torp suffered multiple failure modes including the motor not starting, sinking, running too deep and running erratically. In a live fire exercise in the summer of 41, of 10 Mk 13s fired, only 1 ran hot, straight and normal. Once BuOrd was convinced the failures were not all pilot error and went to work, the faults were corrected and the Mk 13 was an excellent weapon, by late 44. Then there was the 1.1" AA gun. Looked good on paper, liquid cooling and an automatic ammo feed system so it could fire continuously, with a larger shell and greater range than the 25mm AA guns then available. But the 1.1" had multiple jam modes, plus the human factors issue of not having adequate room for the loaders to do their job. The Navy produced a color newsreel film about Midway that has several short looks at a couple 1.1s, firing. In the first 3 looks, the 1.1" in the foreground is blasting away with all 4 guns and looking very formidable. In the 4th glimpse, only the gun on the right end is firing, the other three are all stopped. The 1.1's faults were never corrected. If BuOrd was not going to conduct adequate development programs and deliver reliable weapons, they should have overcome their "not invented here" bias and bought weapons from other services. so we would have gone into the war with Brit Mk VIIIs in subs, Brit Mk XIIs in aircraft, and Bofors AA guns.
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@sharlin648 in short, yes, the Pom-Pom was hindered by a low muzzle velocity, which limited range. Keep in mind how old the Pom-Pom design was by WWII. The early, smaller bore version, dated from the Boer War. I have heard wartime Pom-Pom gunners say their objective was not so much to shoot down enemy aircraft, as it was to provide deterrence: throw so much flack in the aircraft's path that the pilot decides to go look for an easier target. The Pom-Pom had something of a renaissance when the RN returned to the Pacific late in the war. While the Pom-Pom lacked the range to effectively engage attacking aircraft before they dropped their payload, in the case of a kamikaze, where the aircraft does it's damage at zero range, the range limitation of the gun was not a factor. When a kamikaze closed to effective range, a Pom-Pom could shoot it to bits much more effectively than an Oerlikon.
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wrt the question about the 14" guns on the KGVs, British cordite seems to be considerably less dense than USN smokeless powder. While the weight of the charge in the British guns is less, the chamber size of the British guns is significantly larger. This is also true of the 16"/45 used on the Nelsons vs the 16"/45 used on the US Colorado class. The muzzle velocity of the British guns is a bit lower, but a lower muzzle velocity results in a higher trajectory and steeper angle of fall, which is better able to penetrate deck armor.
The debate about whether to stay with 16", or having more guns by downscaling to 14", was a long standing debate. The USN had had exactly the same debate 20 years earlier. The head of BuOrd insisted that engagements would always be fought at 12,000 yards or less, a 14" could penetrate well enough, and, being smaller, more 14" could be carried. The USN General Board looked at the engagement ranges at Jutland, overruled the head of BuOrd, and made long range gunnery the priority. As Drac said, the choice for the KGVs was dependent on the same condition that the head of BuOrd had specified in 1915: engaging at short range.
I have another theory about the move to 14" guns. UK industry's capacity to make large guns had atrophied since WWI. The guns for the KGVs had to be ordered by late 35, before the change to 14" was specified by the Second London Treaty, to meet the construction schedule for the ships. I have read that the new 14" was designed to fit in the same cradle as the earlier 13.5"/45. When Tiger and most of the Iron Dukes were scrapped in the early 30s, the Admiralty retained many of the 13.5" guns. Navweaps says 54 of those guns were in inventory in 1939. It may be possible that the Admiralty designed the KGV gun mounts for backward compatibility. If there was a development or production problem with the new 14"/45, I think it is possible the Admiralty was looking at completing some or all of the KGVs with the 13.5" as a stopgap.
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@ernestcline2868 the first thoughts that come to mind: cruisers and battleships could take the extra top weight of cat, hangar, and aircraft better than a destroyer, and fleet auxiliaries could not keep up with the battlefleet, often plodding along at a maximum of 15kts. I suppose they could try the treaty work around the Japanese tried, by building aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons, to carry a dozen, or fewer scouts. But it was probably cheaper to mount the cats on the battleships and cruisers, than build new, dedicated, ships. Full on aircraft carriers were limited by the treaty in number, and expensive.
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On that 1936 question, I'll give the USN General Board and C&R a thumping too. 36 is too early to prevent resources being wasted on the Alaska class cruisers, but it's just about right to have the Tennessee and Colorado class BBs updated into something useful in a mid 30s threat environment. As Drach's boiler video went into, boilers were much more capable in the mid 30s, than 20 years earlier, when the Tennessees and Colorados were designed. Use the space freed up by eliminating the motor-generator sets to install larger turbines to use the greater boiler output and they could produce a decent turn of speed. Being short and fat, they will not be efficient at speed, but then the length/width ratio was actually slightly higher than the also short and fat 27kt South Dakotas. Then a new superstructure and AA suite like West Virginia had after it's rebuild. If the budget was not available for the work, then i would lay up the Wyomings, New Yorks, Nevadas and Pennsylvanias to reduce running costs to make the funds available to C&R for the rebuilds. Just because the treaties allowed those old hulks to be run, doesn't mean they need to be run at the expense of improving newer, more capable, ships.
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wrt the question about the RN pushing for the reduction to 14" guns in Second London. Nothing prevented the Brits using 14" guns in the earlier treaties, if they wanted to do that to provide, what in their assessment, was a better balanced ship. The French had built the Dunkerques well below treaty maximums in both guns and displacement. Seems it's more a matter of the RN trying to use the treaty to force everyone else to build what the RN wants, rather than everyone else working their own design within the original parameters. This was done again wrt carriers. Seems the Brits did a survey of their repair facilities around the empire and found that some facilities could only handle a carrier of 23,000 tons, not the 27,000 tons the earlier treaties had allowed. So, Ark Royal was built to 22,000 and the Illustrious class built to 23,000. And, Second London cut the carrier tonnage limit to what the Brits wanted to build, not what any other party was capable of building. The "escalator clause" of Second London only covered the gun size increase from 14" to 16". It did not include the displacement increase. The displacement increase was negotiated between the US and UK in early 38, and, again, the Brits tried to limit the increase to the 41-42,000 ton range, the largest British facilities could handle. The US held out for 45,000, which they finally got in mid 38, enabling the Iowas. Without so much time wasted due to British obstruction wrt the tonnage increase, the US could have skipped the slow, cramped, South Dakotas and gone straight to the Iowas that they really wanted.
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Enjoyed your comments on the Lexingtons. One observation I would make wrt armor, they had armor roughly equal, or better, than anything that could catch them. Their armor is roughly equal to the Kongos, 7" inclined at 11.5 degrees according to Friedman, a bit inferior to Amagi's, but Lexington's guns could punch through Amagi's armor as readily as a Kongo's. Lexington's armor is probably adequate against any 8" cruiser. Reducing armament is one thing I would not do, as the Amagis were designed with 10-410mm guns, so cutting the Lexingtons from 8 to 6 would put them at a further disadvantage, in a battle where the first one who scores a solid hit will probably be the winner due to the vulnerability of both ships. I think the final iteration of the Lexingtons was pretty decent, considering the mission as a scout. Only change I would want to make is get rid of the casemate mounted 6", in favor of the twin turrets used on the Omahas,.
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@BrigadierBill iirc, Germany was trying to get on the Naval Treaty system, as it would supersede the limits of the Versailles treaty. The allies were trying to find some way to prevent the construction of the Deutschlands, which complied with the letter of the Versailles treaty. A switch to the Naval Treaty system would manifest itself one of two ways: the Deutschlands would be classified as cruisers, with gun size limited to 8", which would make them slow, underarmed, heavy cruisers, or the ships would be made larger/more expensive, mounting guns up to 16". So, presume the allies allowed Germany to join the treaty system early enough to forestall construction of the Deutschlands, what happens, is the question? I would expect that Germany would go straight to the Scharnhorsts. Without already having the 11" gun in hand, because the Deutschlands were not built, Germany would probably go straight to 15", buying the technology, if not the guns themselves, from Italy, if need be, to advance the construction schedule. The knock-on effects would be interesting too. If Germany was allowed to build 35,000 ton battleships, pleas to France to build the Dunkerques below treaty limits would probably fall on deaf ears. Without Strasbourg clogging up the St Nazaire drydock. Jean Bart could have been laid down at the same time as Richelieu, so they both would have been commissioned just as France fell, and escaped to French West Africa. As Dunkereque and Strasboug would not exist, the Mers el Kabir attack would probably not have happened as all that would have been there would be two hopelessly obsolete battleships and a handful of DD.
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Very interesting interview. Thanks for offering it. A couple observations: no-one is ever fully prepared for war. I have yet to hear a General or Admiral not say "if we had had another year (or two), to prepare, we would have been in a better position". As a wise man once said "no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy". wrt the USN figuring out that a thrust across the Pacific to defend the Philippines or Guam would run a gauntlet of Japanese held islands: the Marianas and Carolines had been Spanish colonies prior to 1899. With the US having paid Spain to give up it's claims to the Philippines and Guam for payment of some $12M, Spain sold the Marianas and Carolines to Germany for about $4M. Japan, as an ally of the UK, rolled up these German colonies in WWI, and continued to hold them under a League of Nations mandate. The US could have avoided that situation by buying all the Spanish colonies in 1899, rather than cherry picking the two properties they did, thus preventing any potential enemy sitting astride the supply lines to the Philippines. wrt the US having bases in the Caribbean: I did some back of the envelope calculations of the value of all the UK held islands, plus British Honduras, by extrapolating what the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917. As it turned out, the total value of the West Indies colonies was just about equal to the debt the UK owed the US after WWI. At the same time, Arthur Balfour wrote a note to the French ambassador to the UK saying that, if it was up to the UK, it would forgive France's debt to the UK, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was demanding repayment in full, with interest, in cash, the UK needed the cash from France. If the UK had signed over the colonies to the US, it would wash out the UK's debt to the US. Then the UK could follow through on Balfour's proposal and cancel all the debts owed it by it's allies, because, again, allied debts to the UK were almost exactly what the UK owed the US, so, again, the debts wash out. Then the Caribbean becomes essentially a US lake. This colony for debt swap was widely discussed in the press at the time, but Lloyd-George and President Harding both said "no". On the USN's severe shortage of scouts: this became glaringly evident in a pair of exercises in early 1916, when the weather was less than ideal. The DDs that were supposed to do the scouting were forced back to port, while the BBs plowed ahead, with no idea what lay over the horizon. It did not go well for the "attacking" force. Shortly after the US entered WWI, capital ship construction was given much lower priority, so that resources could be focused on addressing the US' deficiency in scouting and ASW forces. Three of the Colorado class, which had not been laid down, were postponed until after the war, and work on Maryland, Tennessee and California was slowed to a crawl. Maryland and Tennessee were laid down in April and May, respectively, of 1917, days or weeks after the US' declaration of war, escaping the postponement that delayed the other three Coloradoes. Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare Feb 1, announcing it's intention to sink without warning neutral flagged ships, including those from the US, in the designated war zone, reneging on a promise made in 1915. As if that was not enough of a defacto declaration of war on the US, the Zimmerman telegram was a further provocation. Bottom line, unlike 1941, the US' declaration of war in April was not a response to a surprise, but a culmination of a long series of provocations that afforded the US plenty of time for planning prior to making the declaration. I can't help but wonder if there was discussion in the Wilson administration and the Navy Department to take a page from the Admiralty's book of 1914 and cancel the Tennessees and Coloradoes outright, for the same reasons, before Tennessee and Maryland were laid down, and scrapping California on the slipway (a photo from March of 17 shows all that had been assembled of California was the keel and bottom of the hull), so that three more slipways, steel and manpower would be available to address the USN's critical shortage of smaller ships.
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wrt the Lexington's protection. As Drac said, USN Scouting Group doctrine was 35kts. The 1919 Lexington design was better protected than the earlier designs. From what I have read, the need for better protection was acknowledged, but the reduction to 34kts to gain the protection was only grudgingly accepted. The ship could easily have been better protected, but TPTB were not willing to accept a further reduction in speed.
The alt history possibilities post-Treaty are interesting. Reportedly, the UK was willing to accept a single ship maximum of some 42,000 tons, because of Hood. If the other powers had dug in their heels and demanded that each was entitled to build a 42,000 ton ship, because of Hood, what would the US have done? If they completed one South Dakota, it would have been a red-headed stepchild as no other US battleship could keep up with it. With two Lexingtons being converted to carriers, a new mission for the battlecruiser emerges, as consort for the carriers. Seems most likely that, if the US had been allowed one 42,000 ton ship, it would have been a Lexington, not a South Dakota.
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@JohnSmith-of2gu There were horizontal, reciprocating, steam engines in paddle wheel driven ships. On a mid 19th century stern wheeler, typically two cylinders, each driving a connecting rod attached to the corresponding end of the paddle shaft. The side paddle steamer Sudan, built in 1921, is still carrying passengers on the Nile. I saw some film of the engine running some years ago. It is a triple expansion, and it looked like it was installed horizontally with the paddle shaft being, effectively, an extension of the crankshaft. As you said, getting the power turned ninety degrees to drive a screw would involve some very large gearing. Of course, if there was a compelling need for a horizontal TE and the ship was wide, you could do a horizontal opposed engine. Then the engine could be mounted longitudinally with the crankshaft on the ship's centerline.
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I laffed, a couple years ago, when the VAG CFO was talking about how they will take the VW brand "upmarket". That seems to be the ambition at a lot of companies: push prices and profit margins higher and higher. Wags have said "VW has always thought it was more high end than it really is". There are a couple UK based T-Roc reviews on youtube, where the reviewer comments on the cheap, hard, plastic, interior, but notes that, in spite of the cheap materials, VW wants over 30,000 Pounds for the things.
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@Ranari's Brawling Channel oh, goody! Another alternate history question. OK, so the US goes to the Washington treaty committee and snivels that the Japanese have 4 battle cruisers and the Brits have 4 battle cruisers, but the US doesn't have any. After much discussion, the committee settles on breaking out BCs as a separate class of capital ships, with a quota of, say 120,000 tons total, with that tonnage deducted from the allotment for BBs. Lets further say that the same mechanism used for carriers is used for BCs, so that 2 currently under construction that exceed the 35,000 ton limit can be completed. That gets the US two Lexingtons built as BCs, and two built as carriers. So, what would the USN do with them prior to the war? Occurs to me that with crazy fast CVs and BCs, the USN could develop tactics for a fast raiding force: planes find and assess the target, maybe soften it up, then the BCs finish them off. They could influence USN tactics to favor speed to the point where the North Carolinas and South Dakotas aren't built, unless they are lightened and lengthened enough to top 30kts. How would the Lexingtons be updated? I have seen models built by people speculating on that question, and they came out looking very much like Iowas. How would that work out? USN architects look at the speed and armor requirements, and the 35,000 ton limit, in the mid 30s and declare it "impossible", so nothing is laid down, while they wait. Japan gave notice they would no longer abide by the naval treaties on Dec 19, 1934, so the USN architects pull out a clean sheet and start working on a design assuming the collapse of the treaties. With the conclusion of negotiations with the Brits on June 30 of 38, setting the displacement limit at 45,000 tons, which is what the US wanted, contracts for the Iowas are issued on July 1, 38, one year sooner than historical. Iowa and New Jersey laid down Nov 1, 38, because North Carolina and South Dakota are not clogging up the ways. Both launch in June 40 and commission in April/May 41. Two more Iowas are laid down in 39 and commission in 42, because the South Dakotas aren't clogging up the ways at Newport News and Fore River. Then the last pair of Iowas is laid down in Brooklyn and Philly the day after Iowa and New Jersey launch, commissioning in 43. The question then is are the Montanas laid down, or is all the capital ship material used for the Essex swarm?
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@liladoodle the UK was trying to sell surplus ships. The two surviving Invincibles were offered to Chile, in place of trying to reconvert Eagle back into a battleship. Agincourt was offered to Brazil. The timeline would be very tight. Agincourt was placed in reserve, while the government was trying to sell her, in March of 19. Jupiter's conversion to a carrier was authorized July 11, 19. Of course, all it would take is someone with enough influence to say "what use is a carrier that is too slow to keep up with the battle fleet?" There was a consensus, post WWI, that 12" guns were obsolete. It would be a stretch, but someone could argue that Wyoming could be converted to a carrier, the Wyomings being the largest of the 12" armed battleships, and redundant when the 1916 building program was completed.
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@Dave_Sisson The US taking over all the West Indies colonies would require some artful spin. The US had prohibition at the time, and a significant industry in the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, was rum production. Puerto Rico had been defined as part of the US, and Puerto Rican citizens as citizens of the US by the Jones Act, so Puerto Rico had prohibition, but the US apparently did not impose prohibition in the Philippines. The Caribbean was pretty much an American lake anyway. The US invaded Haiti in 1915, and invaded the Dominican Republic and Mexico in 1916. Cuba? The US invaded a second time in 1906. The US intervened in Central America so many times that British Honduras would have been an exceptionally handy base. Besides, from my readings, by 1920, British Honduras had more trade with the US than with the UK. The West Indies were not particularly of strategic value to the UK, as most of the UK's colonies are around the Indian Ocean, but the West Indies are on the US' doorstep, and control access to the Panama Canal. I added a postscrip to my question in the post last month: there was a lot of chatter in US newspapers at the time about what a great deal it would be for the US to swap the IOUs the UK had written for the islands, but Lloyd George said no, Harding said no and the Prince of Wales said no. I wish I could jump in the WABAC machine and ask why they were against it. It's not like the UK never gave up a territorial claim before. There was a lot of trading real estate back and forth when the border between the US and Canada was set at the 49th parallel. The US had been buying land from other powers since 1803. I don't understand what the problem was. I would jump at the chance to pay a debt with dirt, instead of gold.
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@austin0351 I have wondered the same thing. The New Mexicos were upgraded, new engines and superstructures, in 31, but nothing was done with the Tennessees and Colorados. The Italian ships were much more extensively updated than the New Mexicos. Reportedly only about 40% of the original Italian ships remained after the rebuilds. iirc, a clause of the treaties was that the offensive capability of ships could not be increased, only defensive, like torpedo protection and AA armament. Maybe the US did a more literal reading of the treaty, while the Italians were more liberal in their interpretation. Maybe lengthening the US ships, the way the Italian ships were lengthened, would have put them over the 35,000 ton treaty limit, as the US ships started out roughly 10,000 larger than the Italians. Bottom line is probably the US ships could have received new superstructures and modern AA armament, ending up looking like West Virginia in 44, but they would still be 21 knot ships, because the treaty limit would have prevented the lengthening, until the treaty system collapsed, and, by then, the US was building entirely new BBs.
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@NaomiClareNL as an exercise, I considered the impact of the French claiming the three Mackensen class hulls that were in the water as war reparations, towing them home and completing them, with the guns built for the Normandies, rather than trying to lengthen and upengine the Normandies to be competitive with where the Caracciolo class had raised the bar. The end result was Mackensens completed along those lines would be, by 1930 standards, undergunned, with an obsolete armor layout and inadequate torpedo protection. Additionally, if France had completed the Mackensens, they would have lost the two battleship construction licenses granted by the Washington treaty that they used for the two Dunkerque class ships. I wouldn't give the time of day for the incomplete Bayerns as they were 21kt ships, that had diesels for cruising engines, when big diesels were not yet quite ready from prime time. If it was the Dutch doing all that acquiring, the Netherlands were neutral in WWI, so would have had to pay for the incomplete ships, where France could get them for free, then the Dutch would be paying to complete them and paying the running costs for the next 20 years. I suspect the Dutch would not be considering the 1047s, because the Mackensens would have burned up all their money.
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@bkjeong4302 the thought crossed my mind that, had the Navy gone with the North Carolina option of 725' with a 13.5" belt, 9-14" guns and a 30kt capability, at the 35,000 ton limit, would they have been deemed fast enough and well protected enough, to render the Iowas redundant and thus never built. The story goes Admiral Reeves rejected the 30kt concept as too slow to work with 33kt carriers, so they went with the 28kt version, presumably in the expectation that the BBs would operate separately from carriers, so they went for bigger guns instead. Of course, the irony of Reeves' assessment is that the 28kt BBs did operate with carriers, so the 30kt option he rejected would have been fine, and the extra 10,000 tons, months wasted arguing with the Brits to get the 45,000 ton limit, the ludicrous amount of power and cost, to get 3 kts, was all unnecessary, and the Iowa concept would have been tossed in the dustbin with the Lions. A decision that a 30kt battleship was good enough might have prevented the Alaska class cruisers seeing the light of day as well.
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Timing is everything department. In the armor piece a few days ago, I proposed an alt history where the US retains the belt armor made for the South Dakotas, then sells it to the UK for the KGVs, when the North Carolinas are designed with sloped belts. One objection was that the US armor would be inferior to the armor that the KGVs were designed with. The solution to that problem would be to replace the US armor with new, British armor, when it became available. Today, Drac addresses that question: the feasibility of replacing an armor belt. Photos of KGV and Prince of Wales launching shows their external belts were not installed when the ships were launched, answering the question whether the armor was structural or not.
Would the South Dakota armor fit KGV? In December 1918. Repulse went into refit, which included removing her 6" belt, and replacing it with the 9" belt armor that had been made for Almirante Cochrane, which was now surplus. The only detail I am hazy on it how the armor was made to fit the different hull? There must have been means of using shims, or reshaping the more ductile back side of the armor, to fit.
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@greenbean7853 convince the USN to stay with 14" at which point in time? There was a titanic debate, 14" vs 16", in 1916. Adm Strauss, head of BuOrd at the time, favored the 14", as more could be carried, and more guns equals more hits. The same thinking dominated at the Admiralty in the mid 30s, driving the reversion to 14" in the KGVs, before Second London mandated that change for everyone.
The case for 14" always hung on the range that engagements were likely to be fought at. Adm Strauss insisted that engagements would never be fought at more than 12,000 yards. In the late 30s, Admiralty fighting instructions said to close, as rapidly as possible, to 16,000 yards, or less, before fully engaging. At those ranges, a 14" could penetrate well enough.
What convinced the US SecNav and the General Board to override Adm Strauss' recommendation was Jutland, as ships successfully engaged at greater ranges, where a 14" might not penetrate, but a 16" would. The SecNav and General Board decided to go with 16" for the Colorado class in the summer of 1916, after analyzing Jutland. In his annual report that year, SecNav Daniels said the decision was made "over the objections of some officers". Strauss requested to be relieved at BuOrd and given sea duty.
So, for the USN to stay with 14" would require every attempt to engage at greater ranges to fail miserably, which would validate Strauss' position, and the late 30s Admiralty fighting instructions.
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Several of the standards were reboilered with boilers left over from the cancelled South Dakota program, so would have been state of the art circa 1919. I know that the New Mexicos were reengined with new geared turbines in the early 30s. New Mexico herself had been built with turbo-electric drive, but the hull arrangement had not been specifically designed for TE drive, so it was possible to retrofit geared turbines. North Dakota had been built with Curtis turbines, which were a failure, so she received new geared turbines in 1917, When North Dakota was scrapped, those newer turbines were reinstalled in another battleship. wrt gun elevation changes, the WNT prohibits altering the "general type" of existing mounts. When the USN wanted to increase elevation, there were, lets say vigorous discussions between the US and UK whether that violated the treaty clause prohibiting altering the "general type" of mount.
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KGV turret faces are an interesting topic in themselves. Since the turn of the century, a sloping turret face had been the thing, to better deflect an incoming shell upward. The KGV turret face is near vertical. According to some of my reading, the thinking was that a shell coming in on a high ballistic trajectory would hit a sloping face near square, increasing it's chance of penetration. So the KGV turret face was designed vertical, so the high angle shell would strike a glancing blow, decreasing the probability of penetration. But, to get the vertical face, while keeping the trunnions where they needed to be for turret balance, required the front of the turret to be very short. The quad turret front on the KGVs is so short it doesn't cover the top of the barbette, so the turret has an armored skirt in front of the turret face, to cover the barbette. So, instead of an inbound shell penetrating a sloping turret face, on the KGV, the high shell hits the vertical face and is deflected downward. iirc, angle of incidence equals angle of deflection, so the shell would probably hit the deck, not that skirt that covers the barbette. To hit the skirt, the shell, or bomb, would need to fall vertically. But Admiralty fighting instructions said to close to 12-16,000 yards, where trajectories are flatter. At 16,000 yards, the angle of fall of a shell from Bismark is only 10.4 degrees, nearly square to the KGVs vertical turret face. So, seems they built a turret optimized for 20,000+ yards on a ship that was supposed to engage at 16,000 or less.
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@gregorywright4918 I agree that Repulse got the nod because it could keep up with PoW. Sending two QEs, not PoW or Repulse, solves the speed differential issue. Some accounts say that it was considered to add Hermes to the force as Hermes was in South Africa at the same time that PoW rounded the cape, so she could have joined the force, but Hermes could not keep up. Hermes could keep up with QEs though. The issue hangs on Churchill's insistence, apparently over pushback from the Admiralty, that a new battleship be sent. The RN didn't seem to be put off by the QE's speed, or lack thereof, as they had all of them in the Med, facing off against the 27kt Italian rebuilds and the 30kt Littorios. Some material I have seen says that, once in Singapore and looking over the situation, Phillips requested the Rs be sent to Singapore. But, by the time Resolution and Ramillies had made it to Ceylon, it was March, Force z had been sunk and Singapore had fallen to the Japanese.
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@alexmoskowitz811 the USN did have a naming convention, initially. Carriers were named after previous ships, or battles, a convention carried over from the Lexington class battlecruisers. When I was on the Lexington, CVT-16, there was a mural on one of the bulkheads in the hangar, of all the preceding USN ships named Lexington. If I recall correctly, there were five preceding ships. That started to fall apart with the FDR, then Forrestal. Now, they all seem to be named after people, same as DDs.
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wrt the question about Hood. The USN had very detailed information. An Admiralty engineer named Goodall had been seconded to USN Bureau of Construction and Repair. where he both provided information on Hood, and advised on the redesign of the Lexingtons. The US SecNav and members of the General Board had gone on a European junket in the spring of 1919, which included a stop to look over Hood. As soon as they came back from the trip, they redesigned the Lexingtons based on their examination of Hood. Yes, everything the Americans were shown on Hood, and everything Goodall said could have been disinformation, but the information appears to be fairly accurate. Goodall's input on the Lexingtons included decent armor, which the USN declined in favor of more speed. I have read that, during the treaty negotiations, the British were open to an individual ship displacement limit of some 43,000 tons, the same as Hood. I give the Brits points for intellectual honesty on that point. The US declined, and insisted on the 35,000 ton limit.
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wrt rangfinding, as Drac said, estimating range tended to be the more difficult problem. That lead to advocacy of higher velocity guns, as their flatter trajectory increased danger space at the target. But, when the fighting instructions say to head directly toward the enemy to bring range down to 12-16,000 yards, that offers the enemy a danger space, ie allowance for range finding error, the full length of the ship, 600-800 feet, to shoot at, if they fire in a high ballistic trajectory, rather than fire in a flat trajectory. Drac noted in his piece on one of the USN battleships he visited, the USN provided reduced charges for it's guns, so they had the option of firing in a high trajectory to better penetrate a deck, turning decades of gunnery theory on it's head.
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@kemarisite wrt to the 1.1" jamming issue: there is a color film about Midway that was produced by the Navy. In that film are 2, maybe 3, good shots of a pair of 1.1s firing. In the first shot or two, the guns look very formidable. In the last shot, on the mount in the foreground, only the right side gun is firing. As you said, the loading machine was designed so that the guns could be reloaded while firing, so 3 out 4 guns on that mount have stoppages for something other than a reload. So, in maybe 5 seconds total, of those two mounts, a total of 8 guns, firing, the camera caught 3 stoppages. The early 1.1 mounts were made by Ford Electric. While faster than the 96 mount, they were also unreliable. Later 1.1 mounts made by GE were reliable, and retained for use with Bofors guns when the 1.1s were discarded. It's a hard choice between the two, because of the 1.1's unreliability. A couple drydocks back, someone asked Drac what he would do if he was in charge of USN procurement in 1935. I added to his response that, as BuOrd had already been working on the 1.1 for a few years, and it still wasn't satisfactory, and the 40mm Bofors was in production in 35, I would be sending a cablegram to Sweden, inviting Bofors to send a demonstration team over, pronto, followed by production orders for mass numbers of Bofors to be installed on everything from DEs on up. iirc, The Navy finally did have a shootoff, between the 1.1, Bofors, the 37mm the Army was using and the Vickers, which the Bofors won, but valuable time had been lost.
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@gregorywright4918 Besides Friedman, and other books on the subject, I have found newspapers of the time make for fascinating reading, and the papers will report all the debates in Congress. The Library Of Congress has a keyword searchable database for papers of that era. The annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy, which include the annual reports of the individual bureaus, are another great resource. I have even found the full text of some naval appropriation bills on line. Did you know that the appropriation bill that funded Langley, appropriated more money for zeppelins than for the carrier? I posted a question about the Langley vs zep funding for Drac in Guide 264, so maybe we will hear his views on that topic. While the Navy was considering another collier conversion before the treaty, I'm pretty sure they would have changed their mind after the treaty. The treaty decreed any carrier in service or building, which included Langley, as "experimental", and not subject to the 20 year replacement cycle of the treaty. Converting a second collier after the treaty would doom the navy to having a ship with zero combat value occupying part of their displacement allocation for the entire interwar period.
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wrt the question about the WNT not having the clause preventing sale of ships. iirc, navies of the dominions were regarded as part of the British Navy. I am sure a Philippine navy would be regarded as part of the USN. There could be some potential customers in South America. Chile did buy back Latorre. The UK did offer the two surviving Invincibles to Chile, at 200,000 Pounds each, plus some 600,000 Pounds each for renovation, but Chile declined. Argentina and Brazil did not have the money for more battleships. Greece had the incomplete Salamis sitting in the Vulcan yard in Germany, but did not want it. Litigation over the fate of Salamis ran through most of the 1920s. The Dutch abandoned their pre-WWI battleship plans. Italy, France, and Russia abandoned battleships that had been under construction before the war, so they are unlikely to be interested in buying more. The only other power of any size that comes to mind is China, but it's navy at the time appears to have been a shambles. So, I don't think there would be a market for old, war-worn, ships with no torpedo protection, no deck protection, and coal fired.
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The question of why only two Nelsons vs three Colorados and two Nagaots was discussed at length in another forum recently. No really satisfying answer had been determined. The WNT divided ships into "pre-Jutland" and "post-Jutland" groups. Hood was placed in the "post-Jutland" group, in spite of being a pre-Jutland design, with a few modifications. But the US Tennessee and California, both laid down after Hood, were deemed pre-Jutland, but the Colorados, essentially repeats of the Tennessees. except for the upgrade to 16" guns, were deemed post-Jutland. One of the participants in that other forum is a professional historian, who has the minutes of meetings held at Secretary Hughes' home, between some of the delegates. Materials from that era quote British officials as saying outright that Hood was not really post-Jutland. Hughes talks about "efficiency" in the meeting minutes, without really describing what he means by that term. There apparently was very little discussion of technical issues. Running the math, the throw weight of the 12-14" battery on a Tennessee is almost identical to that of the 8-16" battery of a Colorado. The 16" guns have more penetration at range, but the larger number of 14" guns give a greater probability of a hit. This was the subject of a titanic argument in the Navy Department in 1915-16. My seat of the pants suspicion is that Hood was officially deemed post-Jutland as a piece of diplomatic art, because the UK needed three "post-Jutland" ships, because of the Nagatos, but did not want to pay for a third Nelson.
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wrt the carrier only USN in the 30s, the first problem is that Wasp consumed the last of the US' treaty allotment for carriers. Once the treaty system collapsed, Congress authorized two new carriers in 38. Of those two, one was built to the existing Yorktown design, which was, by then somewhat outdated, while the second carrier, Essex, was delayed while the new design was drawn up. The North Carolinas could be laid down when they were, because of the expiration of the treaty battleship construction moratorium at the end of 36. There was no treaty mechanism that would allow more carriers to be laid down at that time. So, even if the US had not been laying down BBs in the late 30s, they would not have started the war with more carriers, due to the Navy's preference in 38 to wait for a new, more capable, design, rather than building obsolescent Yorktowns to infinity. The Navy ordered 11 Essexes in 1940, one year after Hornet was ordered, but the war was upon them before they were completed.
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@SPR-Ninja the promoters of 14" always base their position on the ships being able to close to a range where the 14" can penetrate. During 1915-16, Admiral Strauss at BuOrd kept insisting that engagements would always be fought at 12,000 yards, or less. SecNav Daniels and the General Board overruled Strauss in the summer of 16, after Jutland proved it was practicable to engage at longer range. Admiralty fighting instructions that the KGVs were designed for also dictated engagements be fought at relatively short range, less than 16,000.
An Admiralty analysis of a KGV with 14" guns and a hypothetical 15" KGV showed the 15" gunned ship would have a penetration range advantage on the order of 1,000 yards.
There was another factor one book brought up about those Admiralty fighting instructions: the instructions were, in part, based on the assumption that the remote gun directors would be knocked out, so the ship would need to be close enough for the guns to hit anything under local control. Apparently, Bismark's remote directors were knocked out. Scaling off of the map of the engagement I find on-line, KGV and Rodney appear to have been following the fighting instructions and been within 16,000 yards, but Bismark couldn't hit anything with turrets under local control, so the premise of the fighting instructions, that you could hit anything under local control at that range appears to be wrong.
But the "why 14"?" question, and why change the treaty limit, as nothing prevented the KGVs being built below treaty limits, are still there. Raven says the UK pushed the treaty change to prevent the US and Japan building 16" ships, but, by going to 14", the UK handed the French, Italians, and Germans, gunnery superiority with their 15" ships, so that makes no sense.
The only thing that makes sense is someone clinging to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory and everything else is excuses, intended to obfuscate embrace of a theory that had been discredited twenty years earlier.
Bottom line, I figure the KGVs did OK. Three of them squared off against other capital ships, and survived. (there are some claims that Lindemann wanted to finish off the PoW, but was overruled by Lutjens) The only one to be defeated, was defeated by aircraft.
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@jarmokankaanpaa6528 I agree with everything you say, in general. There are circumstances where a deck hit might be easier or preferable. In the case of Hood, iirc, Hood was heading, more or less, toward Bismark, so the target presented by the hull would appear smaller, a shell would hit at an angle, limiting it's penetration, and there was no way to mitigate the angle of impact. But the deck target area offered would be the same as if Hood was on a parallel course. The armor penetration table for Bismark's guns doesn't go below 20 degrees, because a hit at that angle would ricochet off, but there is a way to mitigate that angle of impact issue on a deck hit: use a reduced charge. My theory is that Bismark's gunners knew their business, only loaded the main charge in the guns, fired at a higher angle, going for a deck hit, and the eyewitness testimony by Captain Leach of a deck hit is correct. Unfortunately, the extracts from USN gunnery tables that I have access to are partial, so I can't find the exact angle of fall at the range, approx 19,000 yards, where Hood was hit, and the characteristics of Bismark's guns would be different. As close as i can come is a USN 14" at 14,500 yards: angle of fall at full charge 12 degrees, 5 minutes. For a reduced charge: 20 degrees 53 minutes, which is getting to the angle where a shell could punch through Hood's deck armor. The actual shot being at a longer range, the angle of fall on Hood would be greater. On the side hit issue, the term I could not recall last night was "danger space". For that same USN 14" the danger space with a full charge and a 20' high target was 31 yards. From the drawings and pix, Hood appears to have had between 25 and 30 feet of freeboard midships, so the side hit danger space would be correspondingly larger. Hood's beam was 104ft, or a bit over 34 yards. Given the angle Hood was at, the effective range difference between the near side and far side of the deck would be quite a bit larger than 34 yards. Captain Leach testified that Bismark was firing half salvos, and two hit short and one long, or one short, two long, he didn't recall which, and he had an "impression" the fourth shell landed near the mast.
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@baileyd5210 It seems the Axis had eyes on Iraqi oil. Vichy was allowing the Luftwaffe to operate from airfields in Syria. The Germans and Italians supported a coup in Iraq that put an Axis friendly strongman in charge. Iraq, at that time, was producing 3.438MT/year. Not a huge gusher, but it would be helpful, and there was an existing pipeline from the Iraqi oil fields to the Med. The pipe forked in western Iraq, with one branch going into British held Palestine, and the other fork going into French held Syria. The Ottoman built rail line from near the Iraqi oil fields to the Med would probably have been problematic, as it wandered across the Turkish border in a couple places, which might cause the Turks to object to the Axis shipping oil by rail. With the fall of Greece, and abandonment of the invasion of the UK, Germany had the resources to invade Syria and Iraq, but, as you said, invaded Russia instead.
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@jsl985 from my reading, the USN wanted the same rate of fire per mount, as the single .50 cal machine guns they were replacing. NavWeaps gives a rate of fire for the .50 machine gun of 450-600rpm. The 1.1 cycle rate was 150rpm. with a practical rof of 100rpm, so a quad 1.1 mount throws 400-600rpm. same as a single M2. Their insistence, in the early 30s when the 1.1 was being developed, on rof, was probably based on the guns being aimed by the Mk 1 eyeball, so the more rounds the better, in the hope that a few would hit. The 1.1" shell weighed .416kg, vs 48.5grams for the M2, so the rounds that did hit would do a lot more damage. For comparison the 25mm Bofors of the mid 30s threw a .25kg shell, the Japanese 25mm fired a .26kg shell. On paper, the 1.1" looks good, heavier shell, higher altitude capability. If only BuOrd had done the work to make it reliable.
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wrt completing Francesco Caracciolo, I did some back of the envelop calculations several months ago. Italy was building a lot of destroyers in the 20s. If Italy had canceled a number of those destroyers, that would have freed up enough funding to complete Caracciolo. Another problem was the armament. The guns were built by three different contractors, to three different designs. The guns were supposed to have the same ballistics, but I would want all the guns on the ship to match. By 1918, Terni had only built 3, and two had been installed in a shore battery near Venice, leaving 1 additional Terni. Two Pozzuolies had been installed at Brindisi, an additional pair of Pozzuolies installed on a monitor that had sunk, and two more Pozzuolies were installed on improvised monitors, leaving six. Of the nine Ansaldo built guns, seven were handed over to the army, which converted four of them to railroad guns. An additional pair of Ansaldoes were installed on a monitor. Three of the Ansaldoes turned over to the army appear to have never been used. So there were not eight guns of any single manufacturer that were unused, for installation on Caracciolo. In addition, the installations at Venice and Brindisi look like battleship turrets, so they may have been taken from the battleship program as well. Beyond the lack of guns, the Caracciolo design has been criticized as not having enough torpedo protection, nor enough deck armor, by post-WWI standards.
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wrt Daniel's question about steel shortages, I think he might mean the steel shortage immediately after the war. Part of the problem was the steelmaking facilities had been run very hard through the war and many facilities were simply worn out. Another part of the problem was, during the war, the industry had been optimized for producing the sort of steel needed for war production, rather than peacetime consumer goods. One example: Kaiser tried to get into the automobile business after the war. Kaiser owned several steel mills, but they were set up to produce steel plate, for ships, not the coils of thin, rolled, steel, needed for car production. The Kaiser auto plant had to buy steel coils on the spot market, at exorbitant prices, and air freight them to the plant.
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@themanformerlyknownascomme777 , there is something about that switch to 14" that doesn't seem right to me. Reportedly, the US opposed it, demanded the escalator clause, which would certainly be tripped, as Japan had given notice two years earlier they were dropping out of the treaty system. There was no mystery about the North Carolinas, as they were undoubtedly designed for 16", and the chatter about 14" was nothing but a Kabuki dance. I have set my project for the winter as sifting all the information I can get my hands on about Second London and the KGVs to figure out what the real reason for the 14" is. It can't be for cost, as the 9-15" armament weighed less than 12-14" originally planned for the KGVs, implying less material, and the lower number of guns reduces piece count. With less material and a lower piece count, I can't see how the 9-15", could have cost more. It seems that the "more smaller guns" school of thought had been discredited by 1920. The decision that 16" was superior had been made in the USN in 1916, and the RN was on the same track, escalating to 15", 16" with the Nelsons, and 18" with the N3s.
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wrt saving Hornet. The only thing that could have been done to Hornet after the battle, would be if they had some large collision mats premade to lash over the holes in the engine room. That might control the flooding, but I wouldn't want to be in the engine room, if they try to make any speed, with nothing but the collision mat between me and the ocean From my reading of the Friedman carrier book, the Yorktowns had a fatal flaw in the design, all the boilers were grouped together, and all the turbines were grouped together. They could take a real beating, anywhere but in the boiler and engine rooms. Hornet was hit in the engine room, twice, leaving her dead in the water and unable to exit the area. The design flaw was corrected in the Essex, where boiler rooms and engine rooms were staggered, so a hit in one engine room would not leave the ship dead in the water. I don't know why such an obvious vulnerability was designed in to the Yorktowns, unless it was the same reason an entire list of vulnerabilities were designed into Wasp: to save weight. Prior to the second London treaty, the tonnage limit on carriers was 27,000. The Yorktowns only displaced 20,000. The tonnage that had been "saved" to build Wasp could have been divided between Yorktown and Enterprise to make them both 27,000 ton carriers as robust as the Essex. Hornet was built after the second London treaty collapsed, so could be built to the same 27,000 ton design.
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Italian battleships, fascinating topic. The Washington treaty allocated the same tonnage to Italy and France, but the list of ships retained, while having both over their 175kt quota, allowed nearly 40kt more to France. Both retention lists included several pre-dreadnoughts. Hypothetically, lets assume the RM decided to help fund construction of Caracciolo and Colombo, as the two on which significant progress had been made, by an aggressive scrappage program of everything older than the Cavours and abandonment of the attempted salvage of da Vinci, immediately after the war. Neither ship would have been completed at the time of the treaty, however, only having 4 BBs in commission, Italy would cry a river that it was vastly short of it's allowed tonnage, and, as the new BBs were under the 35kt treaty limit, work would be allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, the drawings for the class would be retained, and updated periodically. in anticipation of the new construction as allowed under the treaty, with Colonna being laid down in 27 and Morosini laid down in 29, with the Cavours and Andrea Dorias scrapped, rather than rebuilt, with the funds thus made available used to update the Caracciolos and Colonnas to the latest late 30s standard and expedite construction of the Littorios. Very potent force of fast, modern, ships, only needing fuel and leadership to create havoc for the RN in the Med.
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Regarding the South American battleship race, having reviewed your previous videos, a question comes to mind. Both HMS Canada and Erin were derived from existing RN battleship classes, but Agincourt was not. Agincourt's design, with the two widely spaced funnels, with two center-line turrets between, is unique among British ships. What Agincourt looks like, more than anything else, is Rivadavia. If someone had approached Fore River for a second generation Rivadavia, it would have looked like Agincourt, with the two midships turrets pulled in to the center-line. Is that what happened? Did Brazil go to Armstrong and say "we want a ship like Rivadavia, but with one more turret, to one-up Argentina"?
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I think you are referring to "angle of fall". It varies depending on both velocity and range. for example a USN 16"/45 Mk 1,. fired with a full charge and a muzzle velocity of 2600fps will show an angle of fall at 10,000 yards of 5 degrees, 55 minutes, while the same shell at 20,000 yards will fall at 17 degrees, 4 minutes. At 25,000 yards, firing that 16"/45 with a full charge will produce an angle of fall of 24 degrees, 54 minutes, but firing the same gun with a reduced charge and muzzle velocity of 2000fps will produce an angle of fall 48 degrees, 35 minutes.
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@thehandoftheking3314 As I understand, you are asking about a WWI scenario similar to the WWII scenario of recycling the turrets from the WWI Courageous class battlecruisers on HMS Vanguard as a time and cost saving expedient. These are some of the issues to run into recycling guns and turrets from the 1890s on new-build ships circa 1914: First, the turrets are 20 years old. Turrets from the 1890s vintage Majestic class battleships were installed on monitors during WWI to provide fire support. First issue was the turrets needed to be modified to allow much higher elevation, so they could fire to a greater range. The second issue, discovered after the monitors were in use, was the systems in the turrets, like the hydraulics, were old and brittle and frequently broke down. Another issue was that the older guns, being designed for short range, were only 25-35 caliber, so inaccurate at longer range. Another problem was some pre-1900 guns were designed for black or brown powder and performance was sub-optimal with smokeless or Cordite. The USN had a particularly bad run in the early 1900s as their designers did not understand the dynamics of smokeless and the 8"/40s and 12"/40s that were, supposedly, designed for smokeless blew their muzzles off with disturbing regularity, requiring an extensive rebuild and reinforcement program be implemented. Then there was the safety issue. Early turrets were designed with single stage hoists operating in the open. There was a disastrous incident on USS Georgia in, iirc, 1904 where an ember in the gun from a previous shot (they didn't have air purge systems in the guns then either) touched off the first bags rammed for the next shot. The flames shooting out of the breech ignited the other bags sitting on the hoist, Burning chunks of propellant fell down the open hoist and ignited more bags in the handling room at the bottom of the hoist, next to the magazine. Probably the only reason Georgia didn't go up like a Roman candle was USN smokeless is a bit less volatile than Cordite. Some 35 men died. They retrofitted trunks and shutters around those open hoists, but later turrets, with two stage hoists, are much safer. Then there is the simple issue of size. Early pre-dreadnought guns were typically 12". By WWI, 14-15 inch guns were the thing.
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wrt to the question about DD guns with fixed or semi-fixed ammo at 56:37, eons ago, I saw a training film on the 5"/38, with it's semi-fixed ammo, in the all singing, all dancing, enclosed turret with integral ammo hoist. iirc, there were two men: one drops the propellant in the loading tray, the other drops the shell in the loading tray, then the rammer pushes both in together. The film explained the choice of semi-fixed ammo: crew fatigue. By breaking the load into two pieces, they kept the weight of each piece down, so the loaders could keep loading longer without becoming exhausted. 5"/38 shells weigh about 55lbs and the propellant about 30lbs. I pity the guys that had to load a 5"/25, because it's fixed rounds weighed 80lbs.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 if the US fleet was in harbor, they would still be sunk in shallow water, and salvageable, while the land based US air would sink the IJN force in deep water. My nightmare scenario, for the US, is Japan doesn't go anywhere near Hawaii, but invades the Philippines, maybe even giving the US forces there safe passage if they go away. If a lot of Americans were killed in the invasion, and public pressure forced FDR to launch a reinforcement mission. any force dispatched to the Philippines would run a gauntlet of Japanese held islands and subs, and suffer significant attrition before they reached the islands. If the US public feels the Philippines are sufficiently remote, and US casualties in the invasion are minimal, there may not be any pressure on FDR to engage in a war. Then, Japan is free to take anything it wants.
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re Greek capital ship purchase after WWI, the first two alternatives that come to mind would be HMS Erin or HMS Agincourt. Both were new ships in 1914, and both were placed in reserve in 1919-20, so were surplus to the Admiralty's needs. Seems either would be an insult to the Turks. Another alternative would be Courageous and Glorious. They offered more speed than Yavuz, a state of the art powerplant with geared turbines and oil fired, small tube boilers, and their relatively shallow draft could be an advantage in the Aegean. Additionally, I don't see them listed in either of the capital ship lists in the WNT, implying that the WNT respected the RN's designation of the ships as cruisers, meaning the UK would not be prohibited from selling them after the treaty was signed. But then probably Greece's most generous benefactor would have been Basil Zaharoff. Zaharoff saw conflict of interest as a feature, not a bug. He was an agent for Vickers, and Vickers had built Erin. Having Greece buy Erin, bundled with a fat overhaul and modernization contract with Vickers, would probably sound like a good idea.
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The Caribbean could have been a virtual US lake, from 1922. Arthur Balfour sent a letter to the French ambassador to the UK in 1922, which was openly published by the UK government, saying that, if it was up to the UK, they would cancel the debts owed it by the allies, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was demanding debt repayment in cash, the UK had no choice but to demand repayment from it's allies, in cash. As an exercise, some time ago, I looked in to the market value of all the British colonies in the Caribbean circa 1920. Using the price per square mile that the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917, I found the value of all the British held islands, plus British Honduras, almost exactly equaled the entire UK war debt to the US, specifically equal to all the loan principle and about half of accrued interest. Coincidentally, the war debts owed by the other allies to the UK almost exactly equaled the UK's debt to the US. Hypothetically, if the UK had bartered it's West Indies colonies to the US, which would make the Caribbean approaches to the canal a virtual US lake, the UK could then cancel the debts owned it by all the other allies as it would be a wash with the cancellation of UK debts to the US. What a different world the interwar years would have been if all that debt had vanished. There was a lot of chatter about a US/UK land for debt swap in US newspapers at the time, but President Harding said no, Lloyd George said no, so that was the end of it.
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@Cbabilon675 As we know, the Japanese had a relationship with Vickers, covering everything from battleships, to building the 2 pounder pompom under license. The Japanese also had a relationship with Hotchkiss. Besides the Type 96 AA gun, the Japanese Type 92 and Type 3 heavy machine guns were based on the Hotchkiss Mle 1914, changing out the original 8mm Lebel cartridge for the 6.5 Arisaka in the Type 3, and 7.7mm in the Type 92. As these guns were licensed from Hotchkiss, getting them into production was no doubt much easier than trying to reverse engineer captured Bofors. The Russians bought some examples of the 25mm Bofors, which preceded the 40mm version, in 1935. They reverse engineered it, increasing the bore to 37mm, test firing the prototype in late 1938. If the Japanese took as long to reverse engineer Bofors captured in late 41, it would have been late 44/early 45 before they could get it into production. I would venture that, if Vickers had produced a modern AA gun, to replace the pompom, in the mid 30s, the Japanese would have licensed that, rather than the Hotchkiss.
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@rickyc8958 The RM's issue seemed to be more a matter of fuel and leadership. Some things I have read about the Caracciolo class are not very complimentary, like that the torpedo protection was inadequate. That being said, after all the money spent updating the Cavours and Dorias in the 30s, they were well short of state of the art too. At lease the Caraccoilos started out with better speed capability. It's doubtful that the Caracciolos could have been completed before the Washington Treaty went into effect. The Caracciolo was built up enough to launch, to clear the ways, in the spring of 20. If Italy had had the money, which it didn't, that one could probably have been completed by the end of 21. Ansaldo had Columbo about 5% done, overall. The Orlando and Odero yards had made even less progress on their ships. If Italy had the money, which it didn't, it could have argued at the Washington conference that, as the US and UK were both allowed to complete two ships after the treaty went into effect, Italy should receive the same courtesy, but if they did that, then Italy would not have had the 1927 and 1929 BB construction windows, which they used to build the first two Littorios. Given a choice between two updated Caracciolos and two Littorios, I would go with the Littorios every time. The other issue with completing the Caracciolos is most of the 24 guns that had been made for them had been diverted to other uses. 7 of the Ansaldo built guns had been transferred to the army, which mounted 4 of them on railroad carriages that were on the firing line for almost 2 years. The other two Ansaldos were mounted on a monitor of particularly eccentric design, and spent a few months on the firing line. Two of the Terni built guns were installed as shore batteries near Venice, which left one Terni as a spare. Four of the Pozzuoli built guns were used as shore batteries at Brindisi. Two Pozzuolis were installed on an improvised monitor that foundered in a storm. Two more Pozzuolis were installed on improvised monitors that survived the war. So, of the 24 guns built for the Caracciolos, there were only 3 Ansaldos, 1 Terni and 4 Pozzuolis that were in new condition and could be made available. This is where it gets complicated. The guns were supposed to all have the same ballistic performance, but they were different designs. The Pozzuolis were designed by Armstrong, the Ternis by Vickers and the Ansaldos were a monobloc design by Schneider. By 1919, I don't think this mess could have been cleaned up at anything resembling reasonable cost to get even two Caracciolos built, and if they did, they would have lost authority to build two Littorios a dozen years later. And that is probably far more than you anticipated learning about the Caracciolos.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 ever read "The Enemy Below"? I did, about fifty years ago. The book was written by Denys Rayner, who spent the war variously commanding a Corvette or a Destroyer, hunting subs, so I suspect some of the details in the book may be accurate. I remember one passage in the book where the CO is frustrated because his Destroyer is so long it can't stay with the U-Boat in a turn. The CO recalls that his old Corvette was so short it could easily stay with a U-Boat in a turn, but the Corvette was so slow, the U-Boat could surface, and run away from the Corvette on it's diesels. With nothing other than that tidbit, and taking U-505's length of 251feet and surfaced speed of 18.2kts, I eliminate the Flower and Castle class Corvettes because they can barely crack 16kts. I eliminate full sized DDs, as too long, Mahan 341' and Fletcher 376', for instance. Best combination of small size and high speed, at least in USN inventory, would probably be a Buckley class DE: 306', 24kts.
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@tjokflots before GPS, they used celestial navigation: to find latitude, use a sextant to measure the angle of elevation above the horizon of Polaris, if in the northern hemisphere, or the Southern Cross, if in the southern hemisphere. Finding longitude was a much tougher nut to crack, which brings up your other question, the revolutionary invention. To find longitude, use the sextant to find noon where you are, then compare local noon to GMT shown on a chronometer (hyper accurate clock) which shows how many hours, and degrees of planet rotation, you are away from GMT. The chronometer was the revolutionary invention. The first practical chronometer was invented by John Harrison, in England, around 1761, after several years of working the problem and several previous failed attempts.
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@jlvfr two German commerce raiders, armed former ocean liners, Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Kronprinz Wilhelm steamed into Newport News, Virginia for fuel and repairs in 1915, when the US was neutral. The first to arrive, the Friedrich, received a lot of play in the newspapers of the time. British and French warships arrived just outside the US' three mile limit in short order, should the Friedrich attempt a breakout. The USN maintained a reserve fleet of old pre-dreadnoughts with skeleton crews, so men were transferred from other reserve ships to bring the complement of one at the Philadelphia Navy Yard up to full strength, and it steamed down to Newport News for neutrality enforcement, should the British and French think about steaming into Newport News to attack the Friedrich. The Captains of both ships decided to accept internment in the US. When the US entered the war, both ships were seized and used as troop transports for the duration. After the war, they were sold into commercial service.
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@richardcutts196 my favorite scenario for the three Mackensens that were in the water was for France to claim them as war reparations and tow them to Brest for completion. The incomplete Normandies that France had in the water had been obsoleted by the war, but many of the guns intended for the Normandies has been completed, and the Normandie guns were just a hair smaller than what Mackensen was designed for 13.4" vs 13.8" and 5.5" vs 5.9". Of course, the WNT would interfere with that plan, so then two are completed as fast BBs, instead of France receiving the licenses to build two new ships, which became the Dunkerques, and the third is converted to a carrier, instead of Béarn. But France was broke. The US was pressing for repayment of war debts, in cash, and the UK was pressing France for repayment of war debts, in cash, so the UK could use the cash to pay it's debts to the US, and France had a huge reconstruction job ahead of it as it had "hosted" the front line for the entire war.
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@bkjeong4302 Yes. Devastators did fine prior to Midway. At Coral Sea, the strikes were properly coordinated, with dive bombers and fighters attacking at the same time as the Devastators. From everything I read, at Coral Sea, losses were taken by the dive bombers and fighters, that came in at the altitude where the CAP was, but the Devastators attacked without loss. There were 6 Avengers at Midway. Only 1 returned from their attack on the fleet. The Brits had the same issues: catastrophic losses of Beauforts and Swordfish when attacking ships with a DD screen. During Operation Cerberus, the first Brit force to intercept the Germans was 6 Swordfish. The Swordfish had a squadron of Spits as escort. The Swordfish could outmaneuver the Fw190s that intercepted them, but, while all six made it over the DD screen to line up to attack the battleships, only two survived to make it back out past the DD screen. Those two survivors were flaming wrecks who ditched a couple minutes after clearing the DD screen, with the surviving crewmen picked up by Brit MTBs. Pat Gibbs commanded a Beaufort squadron on Malta and demonstrated that the way to attack ships was first: in overwhelming numbers to saturate the enemy defenses, and, second, bring along aircraft to strafe the escorting ships to suppress AA fire.
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Something I have been playing with over the last few days: the fleet tonnage quotas of the WNT seems to have ended with Second London, as the RN laid down four new treaty max carriers in 1937, which would put the RN far over their quota, if it was still in force. If the US had delayed ordering Wasp until after the Second London conference, and the end of the fleet quotas, the ship could have been redesigned as a 23,000 ton treatymax ship. With that new 23,000 ton design in hand, when Congress authorized two more carriers in 38, that new design would have been used for Hornet, rather than the obsolescent Yorktown design. That matters because, after the Yorktowns, the USN went to staggered boiler and engine rooms, for better survivability. What doomed Hornet was total loss of power. If Hornet had been built to a design with staggered boiler and engine rooms, she may have still had partial power for damage control and propulsion.
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wrt to the question about a fleet of Vanguards. in the Q&A section on Queen Mary post a few days ago, my reply to a question of what if the RN had completed all four Admirals followed the repercussions on the fleet due to treaty tonnage limits, resulting in the R-class ships going to the breakers for the fleet draw down called for by the First London Treaty in the early 30s. That opens up the possibility of the Admiralty having a very large number of dual 15" turrets on hand when the battleship construction moratorium ended at the end of 36. Using four turrets per ship, as Vanguard, requires a long hull, which would exceed the treaty 35,000 ton limit. The thought crosses my mind that, a KGV using 3 twin 15" turrets, instead of the 14" layout historically received, would result in lower displacement due to the smaller turrets and, because fewer guns, less ammunition carried, which might result in more speed. Additionally, the cost savings of using existing guns and turrets may make it possible to build more than the five KGV class ships that were built. But, would the RN really be comfortable building a battleship that would assuredly be outgunned by any other individual battleship, because such a KGV would only have 6 guns vs potential adversaries having 8 or 9. Or, would they take a compromise route and remount the used 15" guns in new triple turrets?
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@dougjb7848 the Admiralty did not have sufficient quantity of 16" guns of any sort laying in a warehouse. I am proposing the 13.5" as a stopgap, if there was a design or production problem that prevented new 14" being built to equip all the KGVs in a timely manner. For that matter, there appears to have been close to 200 15"/42s built. With the Revenges, QEs, Renowns and Hood, that totals 100 afloat at any given time. With, say, 16 or 24 held in inventory for rapid replacements for serving ships, there would be plenty more available to equip the KGVs, at 8 or 9 guns per ship, if a new 15" suffered design or production delays. The bias at the Admiralty at that time was for more, smaller, guns, hence the shift to 14", of which they also had roughly comparable replacements in inventory.
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@Enterprise One if you want to see a good sub movie, check out "The Enemy Below". The film is loosely based on the novel of the same name, written by Denys Rayner, who spent WWII commanding Corvettes and Destroyers, hunting subs. Cracking good story, so good, that the plot was stolen, virtually point by point, for an episode of the original "Star Trek". The movie also features a real, Buckley class DE, a specialized sub killing machine. If you want to view more from the German/sub side, watch "Das Boot", but the critics were more enthusiastic about that one than I.
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@admiralrover74 in general, that would be the case. I looked up the specific information for the 14"/45 and 15"/42, and it almost looks like the 14" was designed to replicate the performance of the 15", in a smaller, lighter package, rather than exploiting twenty years of advances in technology to produce a higher performance gun. The tables on Navweaps for these guns are expressed in degrees of elevation required to reach a specific range. For the 14": 13.75 degrees reaches 20,000yds, 19.25 degrees reaches 25,000. For the 15": 13.8 degrees reaches 20,000, 19.2 reaches 25,000. For the 14" striking velocity at 20/25K are 1563fps/1459. For the 15" @ 20/25k: 1556fps/1461. Angle of fall 14" @20/25K: 18.2/26.4. For the 15" @ 20/25K: 18.3/26.3. Armor penetration: 14" @ 20/25K: 11.2"/9.5" 15" @ 20/25K: 11.7/10.2". What was a 14" capable of in 1935? The USN rebuilt it's 14"/50s in the mid 30s and significantly improved their performance over their 1915 configuration. Performance of the rebuilt Mk 11 guns: range: 12 degrees yields 20,000yds and 17.6 gives 26,000 (not a typo, the tables do not give an elevation for 25K for an AP shell) Impact velocity (muzzle velocity was 2700) @ 20K/25K: 1588/1455. Penetration @20/25K: 13.75/11.27". Angle of fall at 20/25K: 16.33/24.8. According to the footnotes of the tables, the penetration data for both US and UK guns were calculated using a USN formula, so they should be comparable to each-other. Bottom line, for the typical BB armor belt of 13-14", the US 14" can penetrate at longer range than either British gun, and it's flatter trajectory will produce a wider danger space, improving the odds of a hit. The cost of the higher performance for the US gun is higher barrel wear due to the higher muzzle velocity, barrel life being on the order of 200 rounds, vs 340 for the 14"/45.
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@Rdeboer that question came up in a FB group, specifically, why did Warspite retain most of her 6" secondaries in her rebuild, as the twin 4"/45s that were installed were capable of performing as dual purpose guns. Removing all the 6" and replacing them with twin 4"/45s would triple her heavy AA armament, potentially resulting in the ship taking less damage from aircraft. A question along the same lines came up, if Bismark had gone all in on the 105mm gun, instead of dividing deck space between the 105s and 150s, that would greatly have improved the probability of splashing a particular Swordfish. Seems that the roadblock to going all in on 4"-5" DP secondaries was a consensus that heavier secondary guns were needed for dealing with attacking destroyers. The one dissenter to that consensus appears to be Jackie Fisher. Jackie held that a quick firing 4" was perfectly fine for dealing with light surface targets. The two classes Jackie had a hand in designing during WWI, the Renowns and Courageouses, had low angle 4" secondaries, while the QEs, Revenges and Nelsons all had 6". To directly answer your question, yes, the adoption of DP guns greatly increased AA firepower. Had more navies abandoned the concept of dedicated, heavy, low angle, secondary armament, more deck space would have been available for armament that could perform in the AA role, as well as anti-surface.
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@vixtontitano2394 I started looking through newspapers from late 1915 when the bids for BB 43 and 44 were opened. The two low bids, under $7M were from the New York and Philadelphia Navy yards, while Mare Island bid $7.4M. Neither Philadelphia or Mare Island were presently equipped to build battleships. Mare's bid included the money for needed improvements, Philadelphia's did not. Ballpark estimates for improvements in Philadelphia ran from $200,000 to $400,000, which, on top of the construction bid of $6.774M was still less than Mare Island's. SecNav Daniels asked Congress for $175,000 to extend the slipway and dredge the channel in Philadelphia to allow battleships to be built, on December 6. Then Daniels met with President Wilson. Suddenly, the estimate for improvements in Philadelphia jumped to $1M on December 10th, which made Mare Island cheaper. At that time, BB44. the one to be built in Mare Island was unnamed. Then Assistant Secretary of the Interior Jones was given the credit for changing the name of the ship building in New York from California to New Mexico in early 16, freeing the name California for BB44. Thanks for asking that question. Newspaper reports of this sequence of events made for fascinating reading.
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@vodeankandosii3982 First order of business would seem to be to build a larger drydock at Cockatoo Island. According to my 1928 USN port guide, the larger of the two docks at Cockatoo was 630' over the blocks and 84' wide. There was a privately owned dock in Woolwich that was 850' over the blocks, but only 83' wide. Renown, for instance, would not fit in either, due to it's 90' beam. The Admiralty built a large enough dock to handle anything existing or planned in Singapore, in the late 30s, which was lost to Allied use when the war was barely started. The Cook dock in Sydney harbor, large enough to handle anything, did not open until 1945. The Aussies started looking at large drydock options in 1938, just as the King George dock in Singapore was opening. The planning and construction for the King George dock had started in 1928. 20/20 hindsight says the Admiralty and the RAN should have cooperated to share the costs of building a large dock at Sydney, instead of Singapore, but didn't work out that way.
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@321gman3 first question: Yes, the USN had follow-on designs in progress. Chief designer Admiral Taylor was not happy with the SoDak design, feeling the metacentric height was inadequate, for one thing. Taylor drew up a design he liked much better, which was also a bit bigger, and a bit faster, but also more expensive. SecNav Daniels rejected it on cost, for the SoDaks. However, Daniels was proposing another large building program, which may well have used Taylor's bigger, faster, design.
Second question: I would not say the Nevadas were particular damage sponges. Okie probably only stayed upright long enough to take 9 torpedoes, because they all hit in close succession. Nevada took a lot less damage at Pearl, but, after grounding, slowly settled as the ship progressively flooded. iirc, Drac talked about how Nevada had progressively lost the ability to maintain watertight integrity over the interwar years. When Nevada was being used for target practice, I would expect all the WT doors to be closed. Were the ventilation ducts also sealed off, making the ship tighter than it could have been with a crew on board?
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On the Kimmel December 6th scenario, I think Graham Baxter is pretty close: schedule an all forces air raid drill for Dec 7th, at say, 7:00am. Sunrise that morning was at 6.26am, so everyone has plenty of daylight to work in. One thing I would like to try is have the destroyers in Pearl circle Ford Island laying smoke. If the entire harbor basin is full of smoke, the Japanese can't hit what they can't see. Then, with every Army fighter in the air, I, as Kimmel, would be in the fully manned communications center when the phone call from the radar station at Opana Point came in shortly after 7:02. I would say something along the lines of "I have an idea, lets vector about 50 fighters to the target the radar has identified to practice an intercept." Then, when the Japanese react to their formation being buzzed by 50 P-40s, it's game on.
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@kemarisite I second everything Frank says. The Vickers, especially in the octuple mounts, can throw an absolutely lurid amount of steel, but not very far, nor for very long, while a Bofors can really reach out and touch someone, and bang away all day. The Vickers did have something of a return to usefulness in 45, when the Brits started running into Kamikazes, as their throw weight dwarfed an entire phalanx of Oerlikons and they could shoot an inbound plane to bits. The Italians used Vickers guns on several of their warships during the 20s and 30s, the guns being license built by Terni. The RM changed out a lot of the Vickers in the late 30s in favor of the Breda 37mm, for the same reasons that the Brits and US went to the Bofors: the Breda had three times the effective range, and magazines could be stacked in the loading machine to maintain a high rate of fire, without the reload stoppages of a Vickers.
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@cycloneranger7927 that question was being asked when 16" guns were selected for the Colorados in 1916. iirc, the official answer from the USN was that the New Mexicos would not have been cost efficient to try to convert during construction. Tennessee and California were not laid down until after the decision on the Colorados had been made, in the summer of 16. From what I can find, the barbettes of the Tennessee's are the same diameter as those on the Colorados: 32 feet. The part of the twin 16" turret that extends down into the barbette on the Colorados is actually about 6" smaller in diameter than the triple 14". I'm going by memory here, but sticks in my mind that the turrets for the Tennessees had not been built yet, when the decision was made to go to 16" for the Colorados, they were still in design. So, yes, by everything I see, it would have been feasible to build Tennessee and California with 16" guns. Now, we get to the complications. BuOrd had ordered 14"/50 guns for the New Mexicos, Tennessees, and the battlecruisers, in one lot. The Navy had those 14" guns coming out it's ears. Shifting the Tennessees to 16", with so much money already sunk into building the 14"/50s would have had Congress in an uproar about the waste. Then we get to the Washington Naval Treaty. In a feat of diplomatic art, Hood was deemed "post-Jutland" even though it was designed before the battle. Tennessee and California, both laid down after Hood, and with a more advanced armor and torpedo protection system, were deemed "pre-Jutland", while the Colorados, a near-repeat of the Tennessees, but with 16" guns, were deemed "post-Jutland". I lay the difference between the "pre" and "post" ships to the Tennessees having 14" guns. If the Tennessees were built with 16", it would have been nearly impossible to insist they were "pre" ships. With Tennessee and California 16" armed and deemed "post-Jutland", the US would not have been allowed to complete Colorado or West Virginia. After the treaty went into effect, upgunning the ships was prohibited. As for getting more speed out of the standards, you are dealing with multiple problems with the turbo-electric ships, because, even having more steam, you would need to install uprated turbines, uprated generators, and uprated final drive motors. The interior arrangement of the ships was specialized for TE drive, making it impossible to shift to modern geared turbines, for anything resembling a reasonable cost. And the ships were still short and fat. Lengthening them to improve speed would add even more cost, and, as they were already over 30,000 tons, there may not have been enough room left before hitting the 35,000 ton treaty limit, to lengthen them enough to significantly improve speed. The Italian Andrea Doria class gained about 4,000 tons in their rebuild, but they started far below the 35,000 ton limit.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 the Kiis were never laid down. The treaty only allowed for conversion of existing ships that exceeded treaty limits. The other two Amagis, Atago and Takao, were broken up in April, 1924. The earthquake that wrecked Amagi was in September, 23, so, theoretically, Atago or Takao could have been completed as a carrier, as they were still in existence when Amagi was wrecked. Kaga's construction, being much farther along, probably cost a lot less to covert than completing Atago or Takao.
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Ranger had been built several years earlier, so the USN would have had her, regardless what happened years later. On the question of Wasp, if she had been delayed, then, yes, she could have been redesigned as a 23,000 ton "improved Yorktown", with the deck edge elevator. Then, when Congress authorized money for two new carriers, instead of building Hornet to the then somewhat obsolete Yorktown design, and Essex held up waiting for a new design, Hornet and Essex could both be built to the new "improved Yorktown" design the navy already had in hand , and both would be in commission on December 7th.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 I read, somewhere along the line, that, after the loss of the Lex at Coral Sea, the USN learned to inert the fuel delivery system, On warning of an attack, the gas mains to the flight deck were drained, and the mains and pump rooms were filled with CO2, Wasp was lost because she had no warning of the sub's attack, and was running air ops, so the gas mains were full of gas. As for filling the storage tanks with inert gas, I don't know if that was/is done on carriers. Sticks in my mind that a certain concentration of O2 in the fuel tank would be needed for combustion. A tank with nothing but fuel vapor in the top of the tank might not burn. Aircraft, and cars, have been running around for well over a century, without elaborate inert gas systems for the tanks, without exploding in a fireball, unless the tank is ruptured.
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wrt the question about alt history, I enjoy speculating about the repercussions of a pivot in a decision, but do not go in for magical thinking. I have never seen, nor have any interest, in seeing "The Final Countdown", as a for instance. The fun ones are where one person changes his mind: Admiral Strauss at BuOrd accepts the 16"/45, instead of pushing the 14"/50, so Tennessee and California are built with the 16", making them "post-Jutland" in the treaty, so Colorado and West Virginia are never completed. Or, when Congress is demanding, in June 1918, that the navy make a start on all the ships authorized in the 1916 Act, SecNav Daniels talks common sense to Congress, that the South Dakotas have rendered the Colorados obsolete, so cancel West Virginia, Colorado, and Washington, before they are laid down, and proceed with the South Dakotas, then the treaty intervenes to prevent the South Dakotas being completed. How does the non-existence of Colorado and West Virginia vibrate through the next 25 years?
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@tommeakin1732 that thought crossed my mind. Use a development of the 12"/50 on the Wyomings on the Lexingtons to save weight and size, vs the 16", making the Lexingtons essentially a 1920 version of the Alaskas. Thinking about it, a 12"/50 could punch through the armor of anything that could catch up to a Lexington, and having a sub-battleship size gun would discourage the temptation to put battlecruisers in the battleline against full-on battleships. But the Wyomings were years away from scrapping. What was available in abundance immediately after WWI was the 12'/45, but then you start running into problems penetrating battlecruiser armor. Navweaps gives a penetration for the 12"/50 at 12,000 yards of as much as 12.3" and 10" at 20,000 yards, enough to punch through an Amagi's belt at those ranges. But the 12"/45 could only penetrate 10.8" at 12,000 yards, so punching through Amagi's belt at longer range than that becomes problematic.
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In the battles of Elli and Lemnos, Averof did most of the work, inflicting gun damage on several Ottoman ships, but sinking nothing. The newly purchased Aetos class destroyers had 21" torpedo tubes, unique in the Greek fleet, and the Greeks had not bought any torpedoes for them. However, Greece had the eight Thyella and Niki class destroyers, each of which mounted a pair of torpedo tubes. Newspaper reports at the time say the older Greek destroyers, the ones that should have had torpedoes, stayed at Lemnos, rather than come out with the rest of the fleet and participate in the battle. Why didn't the Nikis and Thyellas come out with the rest of the fleet and torpedo the ex-German pre-dreadnoughts when they were exposed, and sink them, so they would not need to be dealt with again? And thanks for addressing my question about battleship construction sequence.
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A Bismark vs Hood question came up on another forum a few days ago. The theory was offered that Bismark penetrated Hood's deck by using a reduced charge, to lower muzzle velocity, enabling firing at a higher angle. Extracts from a 1935 USN gunnery table, were offered as evidence this was an established practice: for a USN 14" full charge, 2600fps MV, at 14,500 yards, angle of fall is 12 degrees, for reduced charge, 2000fps, angle of fall is 20 degrees. For a USN 16", full charge, at 23,500 yards, angle of fall is 22 degrees, reduced charge, 42 degrees. One pushback offered to this theory was that there was no record of Bismark doing this, but the records would be in the ship, at the bottom of the ocean, and no-one would have though it worth mentioning in the after action debrief of the surviving crew, because it was SOP. Additional challenge to the theory was that Bismark's guns used brass cased charges that could not be adjusted. But only the main charge was brass cased, the fore charge was in a bag, so the charge could be adjusted. What say you? Is it plausible that, knowing they were shooting at an old ship with inadequate protection against plunging fire, Bismark's gunners simply turned to the reduced charge page of their gunnery table, fired at high angle, and the eye-witness accounts, and narrative of the last 80 years, that it was a deck hit that penetrated to the magazine, are correct?
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@WaverleyWanderer your question sounds close to what I proposed in the ship profile post Q&A a couple days ago: what if the WNT gave the RN two licenses for future BB construction in 1927 and 29, like France and Italy received, instead of being allowed to build the Nelsons immediately. As Todd said, the bar on BB speed had been raised significantly by 1930. In planning the KGV,s seems the Admiralty did not even seriously consider 16" guns when First London permitted them. I ran some quick estimates and the three triple 15" armament proposed for the KGVs would have weighed 850 tons more than the 14" armament the ships ultimately received. I would suspect that, with 1930 powerplants, it could be impossible to build a heavily armored. 28 kt, ship with the weight of 9-16" guns. I'm sure there was a reason the Admiralty wanted 14" guns on the KGVs, and negotiated the gun size reduction in Second London. The Admiralty didn't revisit 16" guns until the collapse of the treaty system allowed them to increase displacement to over 40,000. Considering the alternative, I suspect that, with the two licenses in hand, the RN would not have responded to the Deutschlands, as they apparently didn't even consider the Deutschlands enough of a threat to spend the money to modernize both Renowns at that time. Most likely, and best outcome, for the RN, would be to see the first two Littorios laid down in 34, and use the licenses to advance the timeline for the KGV class, laying down KGV and Prince of Wales in 36, with Duke of York and Anson laid down on January 1 of 37. That would have the RN, at the time of Bismark's breakout, with four KGVs in commission, instead of two KGVs and two old, slow, Nelsons.
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wrt von Spee's options, a route around Africa would afford the opportunity to pick up Königsberg in Tanganyika en route. Most of Africa being colonies of various European powers means that most of the places they could put in for coal would either be hostile, or neutral, but full of allied spies that would report their arrival. Scharnhorst had a range of 4800nm and Königsberg's range was 5750nm. As soon as the war started, British and French troops invaded Kamerun, taking Douala on September 27, 1914. South African forces landed at Lüderitz in Southwest Africa in the fall of 14 and Swakopmund on Feb 11, 1915. Dar Es Salaam to Swakopmund is 3385nm, so von Spee could make it, if he started early, and if plenty of coal was available. Spain was neutral, and the distance from Swakopmund to Dakhla in the Spanish Sahara is 4249nm. From Dakhla to Wilhelmshaven is 2552nm, if going by the channel. So the trip would be feasible, provided von Spee started early enough to reach Swakopmund before the South Africans occupied the town, and if there was plenty of coal available.
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@baronungernthebloody553 easy part first, Kaga also had flying off decks for both upper and lower hangars as originally built. If WWI had not happened, the UK would not have had a huge debt to US money interests. If WWI had not happened, the US would not have started the 1916 building program. The US Congress, in the 1920s, was not interested in funding a large navy. The thinking is, had the US not proposed the treaty to halt construction, Congress would have stopped funding for the 1916 program and the Lexingtons and South Dakotas would have been broken up on the slipway anyway. Without WWI, I do not see the US military ever being built up beyond that needed for random "big stick" waving exercises in Latin America, so taking on a British Empire not weakened by WWI would be suicidal. No matter how much US money interests may cry about British obstacles to their trade ambitions, I do not see Americans being willing to pay the tax to enable a large military.
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@baronungernthebloody553 there was no "American military giant" until WWII. TR postured with the "Great White Fleet", but most of those ships were obsolete when they made the trip around the world. The US could handle Spain in 98, but declined an opportunity when it only took the Philippines and Guam, instead of all of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific. I wonder if the US could have engaged in WWI prior to April 1917, as it had been involved in "big stick" waving exercises in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in 16. When the US did engage in WWI, it was with French artillery and French and British aircraft. By some accounts, the Navy Bill of 1916 was in response to British interference in US trade. By some accounts, the RN was seizing neutral US ships carrying goods to neutral European countries, on the possibility of the goods being transshipped to Germany,, then selling the cargoes, and sometimes the ships, and the crown pocketing the proceeds. The 1916 bill was intended to build a fleet capable of standing up to the RN. Interest in building a fleet "second to none" came to a screeching halt when the Harding administration took office in 1921. Secretary Hughes' initial treaty proposal was an immediate stop to all capital ship building, because the US didn't want to spend another dime and wanted a way out from under the contracts with the shipyards. The treaty was supposed to give the USN parity with the RN, but reality is far from it. Look at the retention lists. The treaty gave the RN more tonnage, more ships and more firepower than the USN. The original Hughes proposal had the US retaining six battleships with 12" guns, while West Virginia, Colorado and Washington, all in an advanced state of construction, would be scrapped. Even the oldest ships retained by the RN in Hughes' proposal had 13.5" guns with substantially more throw weight, and they were newer than the 12" gun USN ships. The RN was also given licenses to build the Nelsons. The Colorados and Nagatos were 1916 designs. The Nelsons were a six year newer design that could fully exploit wartime experience. The US was clearly negotiating from a weak position, and everyone knew it, but the objective was to stop US spending on ships. Frankly, I'm amazed the USN got the money for the carrier conversions. When Calvin Coolidge was POTUS in the mid 20s, seeing a request by the Army for money for aircraft, asked "why can't they buy one aeroplane, and take turns flying it?"
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wrt the question about substitutes in the absence of the 20mm and 40mm guns, in my reading about the navy's AA gun competition, while the Vickers performed fairly well, apparently it did not function well using USN smokeless powder, and no-one in the US made cordite. Given that issue, I'm thinking they would have gone with the 37mm. The 37 apparently had a tendency to jam, but a proper cooling jacket may have solved that. The army version had a water chest, and, the crew was supposed to stop firing every 60 or 90 rounds, and flush water through the gun to cool it. The manual for the gun says if it jams, it's because it's too hot. The 37 was developed into a model that could be fed from either right or left, with simple modification, and switched from rigid clips, to metal belt ammo. The 37 has a significantly higher ceiling than the Vickers, though not quite as high as the Bofors. Given that the gun and ammo were already in production in the US, I would think logistics would have won the day and the 37mm would have been adapted. The 20mm Hispano never seemed to work right for the US, which is why US fighters tended to have .50 cal machine guns instead. Here's an odd thought. The aircraft version of the 37mm was light enough to use on a free mount, as was done on PT boats. A while back I looked at the numbers, and, iirc, the aircraft 37mm had range performance competitive with the 20mm. While it's rate of fire was slower, the weight of the shells was greater, so each would do much more damage to the target. If I was running BuOrd, I could see the M1 in twin and quad mounts replacing the Bofors, and the M4 replacing the Oerlikon.
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@johnshepherd8687 as luck would have it, somehow, a side by side cross section drawing of QE and Hood found it's way into my files. I don't know how accurate it is. From the bottom up, QE's side armor was 13", a 6" strake. and a second 6" strake, ending at the main deck. Hood had a 12" strake, 7" strake, and a 5" strake, all angled. QE had a 1" main deck, 2" one deck below, then 1" two decks farther down. Hood had 2" on the main deck, 0.75 to 1" one deck below, 2" one deck farther down outboard, with a 1" vertical bulkhead, then 1.5" deck inboard. So, yes, assuming the drawing is accurate, and allowing for the greater effectiveness of sloped armor, Hood was pretty close to being as well protected as a QE.
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@stephenknowles1420 Yes, the classifications can get confused at the extremes. I have always heard the Alaskas referred to as cruisers. When the Dunkerque's were designed, the UK had been pressing for lowered tonnage and gun size limits in the treaty system, and was reportedly pleased that the French designed well below the treaty limits. Of course, then Italy laid down the Littorios, a treaty-max (plus some) design, and France realized it had made a mistake. When Alaska was designed, there were no limits, as the treaty system had collapsed, and no-one was building a capital ship with main guns smaller than 14". So at the time of her design, Alaska was too undersized, under armed, and under protected, to be any sort of capital ship.
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@bkjeong4302 in defense of the Iowas, when they came into service, there were still several IJN BBs running around, and the Iowas could have earned their keep, if they had been in the right place at the right time. In one of my alternate histories. the tonnage increase to 45,000 tons would be written into the Second London treaty, like so many articles erroneously say, instead of being negotiated between the UK and US in 38. Then the USN would skip the slow tubs of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes, build 6 Iowas, which would start commissioning in 41, when they would have had plenty to shoot at.
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@bkjeong4302 Given the multiple battles in the Solomons, the Iowas would have looked useful when they were building in 42, but not so useful, in addition to the NCs and SDs, to carry on with Illinois and Kentucky, which were suspended in later 42. wrt Samar, there is a narrative that Halsey was supposed to leave the BBs behind when he started his run to the decoy group, but brought them along to realize his fever dream of having the BBs finish off what the air group had not already sunk. The decoy group only had two big gun ships. Halsey could have brought the two Iowas along, as they had the virtue of being able to keep up with the carriers, to do the mopping up, while leaving the four 28kt tubs behind so they wouldn't slow him up. That leaves Taffy 3 in the warm company, of Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Washington, when Kurita's posse comes over the horizon. That would have been interesting: Yamato, the biggest dude on the block, Nagato being pretty decent, and Kongo and Haruna with glass jaws, squaring off against 4 USN ships with state of the art fire control, while the Taffy 3 air group throws everything but the kitchen sink at them. I bet Halsey would have been pissed he missed it.
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@timengineman2nd714 the full text of the treaties is on line. I read the replacement sequence off of the WNT. The treaty required the older ships to be decommissioned when the new ships entered service, three years after they were laid down, so, technically, as the drawdowns from First London only gave the USN 68kt of headroom, theoretically, Arkansas would need to be decommissioned when Washington commissioned in May of 41, but, by then, events had made the treaties irrelevant. As an exercise, I considered what if the USN had taken a page from the Admiralty's book in April 1917, and cancelled outright BBs that had been ordered, but not laid down, as the Admiralty cancelled three Rs and a QE. That would mean Tennessee and all the Colorados would never be built. To fill the USN's 525,000t quota, the USN would have needed to retain not only the South Carolinas, but also three of the pre-dreadnought Connecticut class. Being saddled with such hopelessly obsolete ships, the USN would probably be granted licenses for future construction, as France and Italy were, but would Coolidge have spent the money?
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@pyronuke4768 I found an interesting clause in Second London: minimum values for a "capital ship": 17,000 tons and 10" guns. Anything smaller than than runs into the maximums for a cruiser: 10,000 tons and 8" guns. Second London does not explicitly limit the number of ships of a type, but the limit, is implicit, as the only mention of an exception to replacing ships when they age out, by the rules of the treaty, is when a ship is lost or destroyed by accident. Germany's Panzerschiff were exempt, because Germany was not a party to the naval treaty system when they were built. The Panzerschiff complied with the limits imposed by the Versailles treaty. Another factor is how much the county's industrial base for building warships had deteriorated between the wars. To complete the KGVs, between 40 and 42, they had to order the 14" guns in December 35. Some of the armor for the KGVs had to be contracted out to a company in Czechoslovakia. A couple weeks ago, I fired up SpringSharp to see what I could come up with, if the Admiralty had kept the armor and 13.5" armament when the Iron Dukes were scrapped, and needed something quick and cheap. I used the length and beam of Renown, deepened the draft 3 feet to improve beam strength of the hull, installed a KGV power plant, as it was already designed and in production, 5" deck armor, assuming it was bought out, maybe US STS, with 4 Iron Duke main turrets and the Iron Duke belt armor. The Iron Duke belt was skimpy, a narrow 12" band at the waterline, with 8" above. Outside of the skimpy belt, it worked out really well. SpringSharp gave a top speed of 29kts, stable gun platform, good sea boat, roomy and comfortable for the crew. The displacement came out over your 25,000. It was somewhere in the low 30s, within treaty limits. With your 25,000 limit, you will probably come up with something like Dunkerque. Roughly the same armor, armament, and speed, as my "HMS Expendable", but Dunkerque had the compromised armament layout, and everything was custom made and, thus, optimal, but expensive. Mine has a more flexible 2 twin turrets at each end, and is quick and cheap to build due to extensive use of existing material.
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@pyronuke4768 I understand what you are going for. We have to be mindful of the existing constraints. If you wait until the haggis hits the fan, to render the treaty irrelevant, you end up with something like the Alaskas, ordered in 40, but, by the time they are in commission, almost all of the IJN cruisers they were intended to kill had already been sunk. We need something that can commission in 40-41, which means it must be started during Second London. The RN was in a good position to build a lot of capital ships, except it didn't have the industrial capacity anymore. Second London said capital ships age out at 26 years. That means the RN can commission one ship in 40, two in 41, and 8 in 42. The UK only had the capacity to build the 5 KGVs new, from the keel up, not the 11 ships they could have commissioned. In the USN, Arkansas aged out in 38, the New Yorks in 40, and the Nevadas in 42, a total of 5, but, over that period, the US built 2 North Carolinas and 4 South Dakotas, so, looking at the situation from 1937, they had no more "replaceable" ships. The Italians, if they were abiding by Second London, could have called Roma and Impero replacements for two Cavours, leaving the two Dorias eligible to be replaced in 42. If you want to be Japanese, Russian or Dutch, you can do anything you want. The material you can buy from other countries would probably be limited by national security concerns of the selling countries. You are unlikely to be able to buy the latest and greatest guns and high pressure power plants from anyone you wish. Example, Vanguard was laid down 2 years after the South Dakotas, but Vanguard's plant ran at 350psi, rather than the 600psi of the South Dakota plant. There is also a logistics problem Different country's guns use different propellant. When the Admiralty bought some US made 14" in 1914, they had to buy US smokeless powder for them through the war. They tried RN cordite, but saw a significant loss of muzzle velocity and range. If you want to be the USN, you need to wait until Congress decided to ignore the treaty limits in mid 38. Then grab as much off the shelf hardware as possible, to speed construction, so they are in commission in 41. The USN had an abundance of new 14"/50s on the shelf. Maybe combine some of them with a 120,000hp Hornet powerplant. I have great fun with alt history scenarios, but, I dig into the details to see what was realistically possible.
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@snakeplissken2018 that thought crossed my mind too. The Yamatos, Nagato, and the Kongos were together with the Fusos at Brunei. They all set sail on October 22. It would have been easy to switch assignments so that BB Division 1, the Yamatos and Nagato, went through Surigao, while the Fusos and Kongos form the center force. Only thing that comes to mind that would cause an objection to that alignment would be the speed difference between the Fusos and Kongos. Of the US battleships at Surigao, only two, West Virginia and Maryland, had 16" guns. I would put the Yamatos at the head of the column to break trail, presuming they can take the most damage, while they deal with the US line. That would leave Nagato, no pushover itself, relatively undamaged, to get at the beachhead. Of course, it would have also helped if Shima's force of cruisers and destroyers had coordinated better, so they could deal with the US DDs and PTs before they got a crack at the Japanese battleships.
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I have seen UK market road tests of the T-Roc, that make the same point: it is very expensive, for what it is.
Here in the US, Stellantis and Ford are working the same business plan: increase price, while reducing quality. Globally, VW's warranty claims expense is only exceeded by Ford's. In the US last year, the average transaction price, across the industry, was about $48,000. Stellantis' ATP was over $53,000, and the company bragged it was the highest ATP in the US. And Stellantis takes that much money off of people without a "luxury" brand like Cadillac or Lexus. They just price Jeeps like they were Range Rovers.
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@Pavlos_Charalambous iirc, the British naval advisors to Greece were recommending they buy more torpedo boats and destroyers, instead of sinking so much money into one or two big ships, but seems the politicians had other ideas. I read about how, when ordering Salamis, the Greek PM authorized a ship with three turrets that, iirc, could fit in the drydock. As soon as the PM was out of the country for a few days, a handful of movers and shakers in Parliament sent Vulcan a change order for the larger, more expensive, more heavily armed version that was actually built. When the PM arrived back in Greece and saw what they did, he tried to reverse the change order but Vulcan refused to allow the reversal. Vulcan really tended to play hardball with Greece. In 1912, Greece needed new destroyers desperately. They bought two V-class ships that Vulcan had built for the German navy, but, to compensate Vulcan for having to schedule two more Vs for the German navy, Vulcan required Greece to buy more torpedo boats. That is something I noticed about the battles of Elli and Lemnos: the Greek torpedo boats were a non-factor. I gather the Aetos class had empty tubes. The Niki and Thyella class ships must have had torpedoes on board. But the only Greek torpedo attacks I see mentioned are a couple raids in harbor, sinking an Ottoman ironclad that had been pretty much reduced to a hulk, and a gunboat, and the torpedo boats used on those occasions seem to be the oldest ones in Greek inventory.
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@davidlow8104 Drac has commented in the past that the IJN's building program was unsustainable due to the projected budget consuming so much of government revenue, so the IJN program would collapse of it's own weight. The US was demanding repayment, in full, of it's ally's war debt. When the depression hit, France immediately defaulted. The UK and Italy made partial payments as best they could, until Congress passed legislation that defined partial payment as a default, punishable by the same sanctions. With nothing to lose, the UK and Italy stopped making payments entirely. From that, I take that the five powers that were parties to the treaty were all under significant financial stress in 1930. Converting an existing battlecruiser to a carrier is very expensive. Converting Courageous to a carrier cost some 2M GBP, about the same as the cost to originally build her as a "large light cruiser". Building Ark Royal, from the keel up, cost 3M GBP, for a more capable ship with a larger air group. Converting an old battlecruiser to a carrier would have the same capacity restrictions as the Courageouses and Lexingtons, as well as the cost of an entire new powerplant: replacing direct drive turbines with geared turbines, replacing coal fired boilers with oil fired, converting coal bunkers to oil tanks, adding torpedo protection. The four G3s would barely be enough to replace the coal fired battlecruisers that survived the war, so I would expect the Renowns and Hood to be retained as they were. Likewise, the four N3s would barely replace the 12" armed dreadnoughts, let alone the 13.5" armed Orions, KGVs, and Iron Dukes The fleet size drawdown motivated by the state of the economy and the hypothetical 1930 treaty would probably see the last of the coal fired ships scrapped, rather than see any of them converted to carriers.
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Washington Treaty era alt history. Right in Steve's wheelhouse. Historical basis: The 1916 Navy Bill had a cost limit on the first four BBs, which we know as the Colorados. There was no cost limit on the following six BBs, which we know as the South Dakotas. USN priorities changed when the US entered the war, and capital ships were put on the back burner. In June 1918, Congress included an amendment in the annual Navy Bill, requiring the Navy Department to make a start on the ships authorized in 16, but not yet started. That would be the three remaining Colorados, Lexingtons and South Dakotas. SecNav Daniels proceeded per plan.
The Steve alt: Daniels says the 42,000 ton design, which Congress had approved, made the Colorados obsolete, so building the remaining three would be a waste. He proposes completing Maryland with 14"/50s, as BuOrd head Strauss had ordered them in quantity far in excess of need. Skip the 16"/45, and go straight to the 16"/50, laying down the South Dakotas as soon as practicable. There is a South Dakota class drawing dated 5-3-18, planned to be laid down in 1919. That drawing shows the ships with a displacement of 42,500 tons. 400 tons of that being reserve boiler feed water, and 1600 was fuel, which were omitted from treaty displacement calculations. Historically, the UK was willing to accept an individual ship displacement of 42,000 tons, due to Hood, so the South Daktoas, per the 1918 drawing, are golden. The final construction drawings for the South Dakotas are dated April 25, 1919, approved by Franklin Roosevelt, as "acting" SecNav. So we are looking at them being laid down in late 1919, at the earliest. There is no way they would be complete before the treaty, just as the three later Colorados were not complete, historically.
Japan demands to be allowed to complete Tosa, because of Hood, giving Japan three "post-Jutland" ships with 16" guns, one being of 40,000-ish tons. Given the 5:5:3 ratio, that would mean the US could complete 5 of the South Dakotas, but Japan objects to the US having that many ships of that size, and the US doesn't want to spend that much money. The compromise reached is the US completes two South Dakotas, and is allowed to up-gun Maryland, Tennessee, and California to the 16"/45, if it wants to, giving the US 5 "post-Jutland", 16" armed, ships. The UK is then allowed to build one ship of up to 42,000 tons, and 3 32-35,000-ish ton "post-Jutland", 16" armed, ships.
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@dimhal7840 You can get a feel for the effectiveness of axis AA by reading Ralph Barker's "Ship-Busters", published in the US as a Ballantine paperback "Torpedo Bomber". The book primarily covers RAF Beaufort ops, with an occasional mention of Swordfish. Losses to axis ship-borne AA were horrific. When the Scharnhorsts made their run up the channel, the first formation to attack them were a half dozen Swordfish. The stringbags were wiped out by German AA fire, with only 5 crewmen surviving and picked up by British MTBs. Beauforts suffered heavy losses in both the Med and North Sea, until they hit on the idea of bringing along some Beaufighters to strafe the ships to suppress AA fire while the torpedo planes made their attack. The man that really developed Beaufort tactics was Pat Gibbs (later Wing Commander, DSO, DFC and bar) who developed the tactics while commanding a squadron on Malta. He ended up launching mass attacks of Beauforts with torpedoes, strafing Beaufighters and Blenheims dropping bombs, all at the same time, to overwhelm the Italian convoy escorts.
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@bkjeong4302 I can certainly see a scenario where they build four Kiis, rather than any Tosas or Amagis. Yes, if the Tosas had not been laid down, that would leave the slipways at Kawasaki and Mitsubishi available for Atago and Takao at the same time as Amagi and Akagi were laid down, so there would be better alternatives to Kaga, when Amagi was wrecked. But would the IJN do that, with a doctrine that called for both battlecruisers and battleships? The last iteration of the Lexingtons was spawned after SecNav Daniels and his entourage inspected Hood on a junket to Europe in early 1919. If the Japanese had made a similar inspection of Hood, they may have made the leap in doctrine to the fast battleship in 1919, cancelled the Tosas and Amagis, and gone straight to the Kiis, I have noticed, everything I see indicates the Kiis were little more than up-armored Amagis, so the doctrinal leap to the fast battleship may have been made over a very short time span.
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@MrTScolaro yes, that was the case, and the rebuilt 16"/45 could do some damage. They could punch through Yamashiro's 12" belt at that range. I finished watching that video yesterday, and found a discrepancy. The slide in the video shows the 14" penetrating 17" of armor at 16,000 yards, which is what Wiki says. Navweaps quotes two different sources saying that gun could only penetrate 13", which would mean that the 14"/45 was barely adequate at the Admiralty doctrine dictated 16,000 yards, and not up to the job of landing a kill shot beyond that. The penetration of the US North Carolina 16"/45 is understated in the slide, according to Navweaps too. The number cited, iirc 16.7" is close to the 16"/45 mounted on the Colorados. Per Navweaps, the Mk 6 guns the North Carolinas carried could penetrate over 20" at 15,000. I have asked around for another source for penetration data on the 14"/45 and come up empty, so far. The only other reasonably modern 14" at that time to compare were the US rebuilt 14"/50s, which has a muzzle velocity 200fps higher than the 14"/45 and could only penetrate, 16.76" at 15,000. How the British gun, with a lower muzzle velocity, penetrate more, at longer range? I would love to see a credible source.
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wrt future proofing BBs. The Brits leveraged the Washington treaty to future proof their fleet. Of the ships retained by the RN, all except Tiger mounted 15" guns. The USN Tennessee, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Nevada and New York classes only had 14" and the Wyomings and Floridas only mounted 12". And, because of the replacement schedule in the treaty, it would be 1941 before the US could replace the last of it's 14" gunned ships. Additionally, the Brits wangled a fleet far above it's quota, while the USN was nearly dead on. The quota was 525,000 tons each for the RN and USN. With the Nelsons, the RN ended up with 558,950 tons, while the USN only had 525,850. If the USN had completed Washington, instead of using it for target practice, the USN would have had 558.450 tons, the parity with the RN the USN was supposed to have, but no, couldn't do that. Wow did the US get rogered. Supposed to have parity with the RN, but, in reality, USN tonnage down a complete BB compared to the RN and locked into smaller guns for 20 years. The Japanese were pretty ill used too. Their quota was 315,000 tons, but their retention list totaled only 301,320. To maintain the 5:5:3 ratio to the RN, the IJN should have been allowed an additional 20,370 tons. for a total of 335,370, not enough for Tosa, which exceeded the 35,000/ship tonnage limit, but enough for another Nagato. Future proofing via lawyers.
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@redrust3 the original Lexingtons had the same number of boilers as Hood, 24, but the design also had turbo-electric drive, which requires a lot more space than Hood's geared turbines, and the original Lexington design was about 13 feet narrower than Hood, because USN scouting group doctrine dictated 35kts, rather than the 32kts of Hood. All added up to an excruciatingly cramped hull, which, combined with the TE drive, necessitated an extremely unorthodox boiler arrangement, which played havoc with the boiler uptake arrangement. It's something, how Vickers could come up with a functional design for Kongo, the Brits could design Hood, and with those ships showing the way, the USN created that mess.
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As others have noted, the Cordite propellant the Vickers used was susceptible to degradation from heat. I have also read that, in the engagement where the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk, the Vickers were constantly jamming, put down to deterioration of the ammunition due to the heat and humidity. With that vulnerability, the Vickers would not have been a good choice in the Solomons campaign. Then there is the short range issue, which the Brits tried to address with a "high velocity" version of the gun, but the HV version still wasn't all that high velocity. The Vickers did seem to have something of a renaissance late in the war, where range was not such an issue when shooting at kamikazes and they threw enough steel to knock down a plane in a hurry, something the Oerlikon was deficient at. One other thing was reload time. The Vickers had huge magazines, which, when they ran dry, required a crane to replace, while you could simply keep stuffing more clips into the Bofors loader.
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@skywise001 Some material says that the UK was willing to accept a single ship displacement limit of 42,000, rather than 35,000, in the Washington treaty. I am pretty confident that Japan would opt to complete one of the Tosas. The US could have completed one of the Lexingtons, or a South Dakota. A South Dakota would be something of a stepchild, unable to use her higher speed, because the other battleships in the fleet could not keep up. A Lexington could steam with the two carrier conversions as part of the Scouting Group, so, my hunch is, a Lexington would be completed. France and Italy would probably not build anything.
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Thank you for your reply. It appears that I can request my local library to transfer in a 1919 edition of Jane's, so I can look into this further. A 1920 or 21 edition would be preferable, but none are available in my area. I don't think Congress would have objected to going straight from the Tennessees to the SoDaks. Congress approved the SoDaks as designed, and the Colorados were not that much of an advance over the Tennessees. The Colorados had the advantage of being within the 35KT limit of the 1922 treaty, so the US was able to swap the Delawares for Colorado and West Virginia, as the Brits swapped 4 older BBs the treaty allowed them to keep for the clean sheet design Nelsons. Yes, the SoDaks exceeded the treaty limit by some 7-8KT. As carriers, the Lexingtons exceeded the treaty limit of 27KT, but the US got a clause added to the treaty allowing 2 conversions at 30KT, and apparently they were allowed another 3KT for their torpedo protection. How could the SoDak's displacement be reduced? The first thing that comes to mind would be deleting the #1 and #4 16" turrets with their associated barbettes, magazines, and extensions of the armor belt, then shortening the barbettes of #2 and #3 turrets to lower them to deck height. Somewhere between the flexibility in displacement cap, the allowance for torpedo protection and putting the SoDaks on a displacement reduction program, two SoDaks probably could have been completed, maybe three. If the entire Colorado class had been cancelled, the USN would be some 90KT short of the RN's battleship tonnage. Add the 40KT of the two Delawares to the existing 90KT deficit and there would be tonnage available for three SoDaks. Have you done a piece on the SoDaks? I haven't seen one.
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wrt the two questions about the Courageouses, my first thought is that the cruiser fleet tonnage limits of First London would make it imperative the Courageouses be scrapped as soon as possible, as each Courageous scrapped would make tonnage available to build three new cruisers. On the other hand, by the time of First London, the Deutschland was building, and the Admiralty might think the Courageouses were the perfect thing to kill Deutschlands.
As for a no Courageouses at all scenario, Jackie had tried to have a third Renown class, probably as Resistance, built, but his request was refused. The turrets were in hand, from the cancelled R-class ships. They probably would have ended up on monitors, or used on Hood, instead of the Mk II turrets being built from scratch. Regarding the impact on naval aviation, the Washington treaty does allow conversion of two ships that would otherwise be scrapped to be converted. The Wiki article on the G3s says there is no photographic evidence any of them were actually laid down. The G3s were so huge that they could probably not be cut down enough to get under the 33,000 limit anyway. The Lions were scheduled to be scrapped for treaty compliance. They are significantly shorter, and a bit beamier, than the Courageouses. Fit a modern, oil fired, plant, and their speed might be improved significantly. But the cost would probably be so great that the Admiralty would probably be better off building a clean sheet design. Without the Corageouses, something like Ark Royal would probably have been built in the late 20s.
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Jordan's "Warships After Washington" says that the UK was supportive of a 43,000 ton limit for individual battleships, while the US wanted the 35,000 ton individual ship limit. (chapter 5, page 74) What if they compromised, that everyone was entitled to one 43,000 ton ship, because the RN had Hood, with the rest of their battleship force limited to 35,000 tons? The Japanese could have demanded the right to complete one of the Tosas as their 43,000 ton ship. That would give the IJN 3-16" armed ships. To maintain the 5:3 ratio, the US would need to complete the forth Colorado, Washington, and one 43,000 ton ship. Which 43,000 ton ship would they choose, a South Dakota, or a Lexington, and why?
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@nathand.9969 If we assume the "reasons" are because the British have pursued the other Admiral class battlecruisers, as suggested in a question in part 2 of today's drydock, then converts two to carriers, leaving them with two 40,000 ton + ships, that creates the justification for the US to complete two Lexingtons as battlecruisers, for parity. I would expect them to be paired with the carriers, through the interwar years, by virtue of the fact they can keep up with the carriers, and that deployment would be consistent with the "scouting group" thinking in the USN. On December 7th, if the battlecruisers are not in refit, they would be at sea with the carriers. As the carriers were in heavy use in 42-43, I would expect the battlecruisers to be equally as busy, with modernization being along the lines of improved AA armament, radar, and fire control, rather than an extensive rebuild, like West Virginia, California, and Tennessee received.
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wrt the Ise conversions, I am a bit puzzled too. Apparently Hyūga was nominated for conversion because both of her aft turrets were already damaged, limiting her effectiveness as a battleship anyway. My first impulse would be to remove the superfiring midships turrets, one from Hyūga, and one from Ise, due to their more limited field of fire, to replace the two damaged turrets, then use the freed up midships deck space for more AA. That doesn't help their lack of carriers though. Apparently the conversion work started in early 43. By that time, the Kongos had demonstrated that they did not have the survivability for a surface engagement. My plan would be to pull turrets from the surviving Kongos to replace the damaged ones on Hyūga, if feasible, and convert the Kongos to full length deck carriers, because they could keep up with the other carriers, which the Ises could not.
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@TeaDrinkingOspin Wiki says the Lex earned 11 Battle Stars and a Presidential Unit Citation. I never read the Wiki entry on her before. Wiki notes that, when she was torpedoed off Kwajalein, most of the casualties were in the Chief's mess. My rack was right next to the Chief's mess. It wasn't even a compartment, more a wide spot in the passageway that we shared with a foam proportioner and racks full of the foam chemical. I figured we had to be just about over the screws. The ride was smooth and quiet in that space, until they gave the throttle the last notch, then things would start to shake. As a training carrier, the Lex would steam back and forth across the Gulf. The Lex ran at full speed most of the time as it was running air ops continuously. Once you get a ship that size up to full speed, you don't want to slow down for anything, so, when they ran out of water, either approaching the oil rigs off Louisiana, or Florida, they would execute a 180 degree turn at full speed. I swear they had it in for me, saying "ah, Steve is sitting down to chow, time to turn the ship around". All too often, I would be just getting into my meal when the 1MC would bark "heel to port". I would have to grab my tray and glass and hang on as the ship heeled over in the turn.
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There was discussion, in the press, of upgunning the Tennessees to 16" in the later part of 1916, after the decision was made to go with the 16" on the Colorados. The newspapers quoted a Navy official as saying upgunning the New Mexicos would be prohibitively expensive, but, iirc, he did not directly answer the question wrt the Tennessees. The barbette diameter figures I have at had do not give the diameter for the turrets on the New Mexicos, however, the drawings on NavWeaps show the turret pan diameter being exactly the same as the Tennessees at 28' 11.5". According to the Wiki entry, 119 14"/50s were built, almost two complete sets of guns for every ship that used that model. I have read that the guns for the battlecruisers were ordered at the same time as the guns for the Tennessees. Even though California and Tennessee had not been laid down yet, I would expect contracts for that large number of 14" guns had been let, and, if the Navy did make the gun size change on the Tennessees, there would be substantial order cancellation charges that would need to be paid. The "more smaller guns equals more hits" argument that you mention was loudly and publicly exercised in the Navy at the time. While SecNav Daniels and the General Board eventually decided on 16", their determination that was the correct decision was probably not firm enough to pay the cancellation charges for the 14" guns that were already in production.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 wrt your fist question, providing a hangar for the floatplane. You can get a good idea what it would look like, by looking at a Fletcher that had the FRAM modernization, which had a hangar for the DASH ASW helo, as well as the flight deck. The hanger for an OS2U would be a lot longer than the DASH hangar as the plane is over 33 feet long, vs a length of 13 feet for the DASH helo.. In addition to losing the second torpedo mount, and #3 5" mount, she would also lose the #4 5" mount. That may still leave the cat overhanging the #5 5" mount. Someone with drafting skills may care to do a layout of a FRAM Fletcher, with a hanger twenty feet longer, to see where the cat ends up, and whether it interferes with #5 5"'s arc of fire.
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Expanding on the issue of the British blockade of Germany in WWI, at least in terms of raw materials for war production, tended to be a bit porous. During 1915-16, there was a lot of friction between the US and UK, over neutral US flag ships, bound for neutral European ports, being seized by the UK, the cargoes declared contraband, and sold, with the proceeds paid to the crown. The US was protesting the seizures vigorously, until the US Secretary of State met with his UK counterpart. The UK representative, the name is in my notes somewhere, brought hard data showing a sharp uptick in imports of strategic materials by the neutral European powers, and asked words to the effect "if Denmark (for instance) is not reshipping this material to Germany, why have their imports of nickel quadrupled since the war started?" Of course, once the US entered the war, that closed off a major source of material that could be reshipped to Germany.
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@myparceltape1169 that is understandable. Double handling goods, unloading in Danish ports, then reshipping to Germany, raises costs and delays receipt at the final destination. An uptick in traffic in neutral ports, caused by goods destined for Germany could exceed port capacity, and cause more delays. We in the US spent several months recently listening to the media natter daily about port backups on the west coast causing shortage of goods across the US. And, of course, Germany would prioritize things like minerals and chemicals needed for the war effort, so things like grain wait again. During WWII, my mother worked in the offices of a machine shop. One frustrated customer called one day, said words to the effect "I entered my order months ago, I haven't even received a date when it will start production. It has a Double A-1 priority. What does it take to get something out of your shop?". Mom said, with a straight face "Triple A priority". That is a wartime footing. Orders in that shop with less than Triple A never went anywhere, until they were upgraded to Triple A, or the war ended.
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@NoNameAtAll2 The Italians starting going to the destroyer swarm model in the 20s. Overall, Italy lost about 9 DDs in WWI, but received 10 ex-Austrian and German DDs as war reparations. They also built 35 more during the war. From the end of the war to 1925, Italy scrapped or sold 17 old DDs. So Italy had a net gain of 19 vs prior to 1915, so no shortage of DDs at all. While the RM was pleading poverty, cancelling the Caracciolo class BBs, scrapping all their pre-dreadnoughts and abandoning the salvage of da Vinci, leaving them with only 5 BBs, they were constantly building more DDs. Their DD building program laid down 3 in 1919, 4 in 20, 5 in 21, 2 in 22, 3 in 23, 4 in 24 and 8 in 25. 26 was the only year of that decade when the RM did not lay down more DDs, all the while pleading poverty, economic recession, and social unrest. They didn't lay down a new cruiser until 25, and they didn't use their 1927 and 1929 battleship construction windows offered by the Washington treaty until they laid down the first two Littorios in 34. The light Italian units appear to have been plenty busy during the war, as most of them were sunk, while the BBs mostly sat in harbor.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 pushing muzzle velocity higher has it's costs, primarily bore wear. Design faces more issues as velocity is increased too. I have read that the RN tried 50 caliber guns, and they always proved unsatisfactory, though my readings did not say exactly why. The Germans seemed to have more success with 50 caliber guns, but post-war analysis showed the German guns to be made of considerably higher quality (and higher cost) steel, than British guns. The USN 14"/50 suffered very high dispersion when first introduced delivering 12 gun patterns at longer ranges of 1,200 to 3,200 yards. It was not until after 20 years of tweaking the guns, that the pattern size was reduced to 700 yards. At Surigao Strait, Tennessee and California reported patterns of 300-400 yards, at 20,000 yards. Additionally, the longer the barrel, the more it will tend to droop. The Navy Indian Head proving grounds were far too small to fire a 14"/50 with a full charge, so, even if the gun had been subjected to a test program prior to being put into production, the dispersion problem might not have been revealed. Dahlgren was big enough to allow full charge test firings, but it did not open until late 1918, long after the 14"/50s had been built, then superseded by the 16/45.
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Were small German marine turbines of this era particularly fragile or maintenance intensive? The Ottoman Empire had some Schichau built torpedo boats, and the two that survived WWI were immediately scrapped, while French built boats, with VTE power, that were slightly older, served into the early 1930s. Greece bought two turbine powered V90 class torpedo boats in 1912 which were also scrapped immediately after the war, though I have been informed that the French assigned crews that tended to neglect and loot those ships. The Vulcan built boats Greece ordered immediately after the V90s, were VTE powered, and served into 1941, in spite of also being in the care of the French for part of WWI. The Greek cruiser Elli, with Parsons turbines, also survived French possession and served until being sunk by an Italian sub in 1940. It seems that only the torpedo boats with Schichau or AEG-Vulcan turbines had the lifespan of a mayfly.
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@TheOhgodineedaname You didn't say when that manual was written, but I'm expecting it was talking about cordite or US smokeless powder. Black powder burns fast, so peak pressure is in the chamber, and pressure falls as the shell moves down the tube. Smokeless powder burns slower, so it is still burning, and adding pressure, as the shell moves down the tube. When the USN switched to smokeless at the turn of the century, the gun designers did not understand this. The result was chamber pressure within expected limits, but the muzzle and chase blowing off the gun because the pressure down the tube was far higher than it would have been with black powder. If the shell is only a quarter to halfway down the tube, and is not instantly dislodged by the charge, then you have the combustion gasses compressed in a quarter to half of the tube, instead of distributed through the full length of the tube.
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@chrissouthgate4554 yes, I have read that 100-110lb limit for one man to handle. Reality seems to have been, yes, a man could lift a shell that size, once, maybe twice, but fatigue will become an issue very quickly. The British 4.5 had fixed ammo, with the complete round weighing 87lbs, and they had crew fatigue issues. Enter the 5.25": semi-fixed ammo, but the shell alone weighed 80lbs, so they did not improve the human factors. The USN 5/38 had semi-fixed ammo, and the shell only weighed 55lbs.
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@bkjeong4302 I am not sure the USN would necessarily be much smaller if the US did not hold the Philippines. The lever for the 1916 building program was that the US was whining about the British blockade of trading partners in Europe.
Or, consider the flipside: the US buys all of the Spanish Pacific possessions, rather than just the two real pearls. The US did pay Spain to drop it's claims to the Philippines, $20M. Germany paid 17M Marks for the balance of the Spanish colonies. What was the Mark/USD exchange rate in 1899? If the US held all of the Marianas, and Carolines, and Palau, Japan could not have occupied those territories in 1914, and the League of Nations would not have given Japan a mandate to rule those islands after the war. That might turn Japanese attention even more toward a land campaign in China and eastern Russia, rather than across oceans. Would the IJN have had such aggressive expansion plans, post WWI, if they did not have an island empire to patrol?
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@genericpersonx333 apparently, the KGV turrets were designed and built by Vickers. But you would think there would be some interface between Vickers, RN Ordinance, and the higher ups in the Admiralty that coordinate the work of the various departments. I have staked out the KGV armament as an area of study over the winter. Coming up with some interesting tidbits. In 35, a large series of different concepts were designed, with armament of 16", 15" and 14" and speeds of 30kts, 27kts, and 23kts. An armament of 9-15" was determined to provide the best balance of speed, protection, and firepower. The admiralty's own analysis said the 14" should be forgotten about, unless it is required by a treaty. Shazam. A year later, the UK has written a clause into the treaty to mandate 14".
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@toddwebb7521 it's a tough call. The Dunkerque's high velocity guns had more range and, probably, penetration than the old 13.4, and the Dunkerques had a more modern armor and torpedo protection scheme, so, in some ways, they were better protected. If the MN had the Mackensens, the Washtington treaty probably would not have given them the two construction licenses they used to build the Dunkerques, so, when they laid down Richelieu in late 35, they would have been in violation of the treaty anyway. The idea of getting ships already half built, for free, and being able to use guns already in inventory on them, is appealing from a cost savings standpoint. But, a dozen years later, they would be sort of obsolete compared to the Dunkerques.
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@ZweiZwolf The US fuel consumption reg used to be based on a sales weighted average of all models built, which forced manufacturers to produce smaller, more economical, more affordable, vehicles, in addition to the larger models. The fuel consumption reg was 'reformed" around 2006. The new system assignes a "target" consumption number based on the vehicle's footprint: the product of the wheelbase and track. I read the reg when it was published. The reg plainly stated that the equation used to calculate the fuel consumption target was skewed to provide targets for large vehicles that were easier to attain, while the targets for smaller vehicles were made harder to attain, and the formula favored trucks over cars. This "reform" removed the need for manufacturers to make smaller cars at all, so the move to gigantism was expedited. Automakers make a larger profit margin on more expensive cars, so price soared, as well as size, in pursuit of higher profits from shrinking volume. Did you hear the howler from Ford CEO Farley recently? He declared Ford will be "the Porsche of off-road". What is Porsche know for? High prices, and exceptionally fat gross margins. Thing is, unlike Porsche, Ford is not a cult. People will not pay Porsche prices for the shoddy stuff Ford turns out.
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@adamalton2436 I am not sure what sort of powder Maine was equipped with that night, whether black powder, brown powder, or early USN nitrocellulose. iirc, USN nitrocellulose does not contain any nitroglycerine, as cordite does. USN nitrocellulose seems to be pretty patient, compared to cordite. In the early 1900s, before the USN used any safety features, there were a couple lurid turret fires, one involving the entire interior of the barbette, with 20-30 men killed, but the magazines did not blow up.
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@sparviero142 adding to Frank's comments, from the specs on navweaps, the German gun had a longer range and higher ceiling than the Breda, but the Breda's rate of fire was 4 times that of the German gun. The Breda came out in 1932, but, apparently, the early models did not have a full recoil mechanism, so the mounts had to be very heavy and strong, limiting the gun's use to capital ships, and they vibrated like crazy. The model 1939 single mount had an equilibrator, so the entire gun could recoil, smoothing operation. The gun was reportedly accurate and popular with it's crews. Why the heck the other axis powers didn't standardize on the Breda beats me.
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@TheKingofbrooklin France did, strongly, blatantly, egregiously, violate the naval treaties. The WNT gave France good until used licenses to build 35,000 tons of battleship in 1927 and another 35,000 tons in 1929 for a total of 70,000 tons. The Dunkerques used up some 50,000 tons of that, leaving only about 20,000 tons left. France broke the treaty the day they laid down Richeleau, October 22, 1935. Then they broke it again when they laid down Jean Bart on December 12 of 1936. If there were any repercussions for violating the treaty, I have not heard of them.
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wrt the undersized British BBs, iirc, during the 1930 London conference, the UK did make a proposal to reduce both the tonnage limit and gun size limit for BBs. I have read that the Dunkerques were built undersized, in part, due to British pressure to build smaller ships. Italy considered smaller designs in the late 20s, before deciding on a treaty-max design with Littorio. If the UK has won the day in 1930, and everyone was limited to smaller ships, 25,000t with 12" guns, would that not give the treaty parties incentive to heavily modernize their older 15"-16" armed ships, instead of building new, but weaker, ships?
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@culex818 In the WNT,. the US was supposed to have equal tonnage to the RN. The limit settled on was 525,000 tons. Adding three Admirals, at 41,200T, as measured for the treaty, would require a corresponding amount of other ships be scrapped, or the treaty limit increased and US required to retain enough pre-dreadnoughts to have a corresponding amount. To offset the additional 123,600T of Admirals, the RN would need to dispose of Tiger, Thunderer, and the 3-KGVs. Historically, Thunderer and the KGVs were scrapped to make room for the two Nelsons, so, if the RN wanted the Nelsons too, then two or three of the Iron Dukes would head to the breakers as well. Historically, Tiger and the Iron Dukes were eliminated in the additional fleet drawdown required by the First London Treaty in 1930. If those ships had been scrapped in 22, then the 1930 drawdown would have eliminated the R-class BBs. So the RN in 1940 would have been the QEs, Admirals, Renowns, Nelsons and the new KGVs building, with, potentially a very large number of slightly used twin 15" turrets in inventory.
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wrt the question about the Nelsons being armed with 15" guns, that would not have impacted the choice of 14" on the KGVs. I looked in to the question of the KGV armament decision, combining information in books by Garzke, Raven, and Friedman, as well as other sources. The Admiralty's own analysts, in the fall of 35, said that a 9-15" armament would give a better balanced ship than the 12-14" alternative that was contemplated. The analysts said the only reason 14" would be selected would be if required by treaty. Someone in the USN, in the fall of 35, said they would be open to a 14" standard, if Japan agreed. That gave the "influencer" in the Admiralty the excuse to promote 14". Of course, the entire notion of Japan agreeing to anything was a pipe dream. When Japan announced, in December of 34, they were dropping out of the treaty system, they said they were open to a new conference and a new treaty, only if Japan was given parity with the US and UK, (which was not going to happen). This was widely reported in the newspapers at that time. Orders for the KGV armament had to be entered by late 35, to meet the build schedule for ships laid down in 37, so the decision to go 14" was made in late 35, before the Second London conference started. Who was the "influencer" and why? The "who" appears to be First Sea Lord Chatfield. The "why" appears to be an embrace of the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory, a theory the USN had argued, and rejected, twenty years earlier.
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wrt the question about a lend lease Iowa, When I was reading "Fifty Ships That Saved The World" a while back, the thought crossed my mind, what if the US offered New York, Texas, and Arkansas, in addition to the destroyers? Those three battleships were operating together in the Atlantic in early 40. The book I read mentioned that one of the groups of destroyers was en route to the UK when they picked up radio traffic from Jervis Bay, when it was being attacked by Scheer. The destroyers, which the USN had handed over with full magazines and torpedo tubes, rushed to Jervis Bay's location, but arrived too late. What if the US had handed over those three obsolete battleships, and one had been traveling with Jervis Bay? Scheer's recon plane had reported the convoy was unescorted. If the plane had reported a battleship escorting the convoy, regardless how old, Scheer may not have attacked at all.
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My first concern would be the beam of a QE being broad enough to accommodate triple turrets. Wiki shows a QE having a beam of 90 feet. The 1916 design for the Lexingtons had a maximum beam of 91', but #1 and #4 turrets were twins, due to the taper of the bow and stern, and those were 14" guns. Nevada, with triple 14", had a beam of 95'. Hood, with twin 15" had a beam of 104', while the J3, with three triple 15" turrets, had a beam of 106'. The Littorios, with triple 15" had a beam of over 107'. Bismark, with a beam of 118', would probably have no problem taking three triple turrets.
To answer the question Drac responded to, I would say easily practical for Bismark to have three triples, and through a few more shells at both Hood and PoW. Hood, if starting from a clean sheet, could certainly have been fattened a bit, to accommodate triple 15". I am dubious about the QEs. I suspect they would need to be broadened significantly to take the larger turrets. That wrecks the length to beam ratio. To maintain speed, they would need to be lengthened proportionally to the broader beam. The Exchequer was already hyperventilating about the cost of the QEs. Escalate the cost even more, by building a longer and wider hull to accommodate triple turrets, and the Exchequer may go into full apoplectic fit and spike the entire program.
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@stephenbond1990 The 1922 treaty specifies that, if a non-contracting power contracted with a contracting power to build a new ship, the new ship was subject to the treaty tonnage and armament limits. Contracting powers were not allowed to commandeer ships being built in their jurisdiction for any other power. Contracting powers were not allowed to gift or sell warships to other powers. So, nope, the Brits would not be able to build a G3 for Brazil, even if Brazil could pay for it and the US would not be able to build a South Dakota or Lexington for Argentina, because those ships exceed treaty limits. However, Washington was about 75% complete, and was within treaty limits. I don't know how selling it to Brazil would have worked out. It would meet condition 1: within treaty limits, but how would the decision fall wrt the prohibition on selling existing warships? Washington was incomplete, so not a functioning warship, but it's construction was not under foreign contract from the moment the keel was laid.
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@IanLthestig As Walterbroadous said, torps of the time were not self-propelled, but riding on the end of a pole mounted on the bow of a sub, like the Hunley, or a steam powered launch. Another point is the confusion about terminology. When Admiral Farragut said "Damn the torpedoes" the torpedoes he was referring to are what are now called "mines". With the spar torpedo, the boat would ram the warhead against the side of the ship, and the tip of the warhead would embed in the wooden hull. The launch would then pull away to a safe distance and detonate the warhead by means of pulling a rope. As the spar torpedoes were usually delivered by surface vessels the defense system adopted was a boom made of logs, floating on the surface, so an attacking torpedo boat would be stopped before it was close enough for the spar to reach the hull. Eons ago, I read of a successful attack, in spite of the log boom, so I looked it up. An attack against the Confederate ironclad Albemarle was lead by Lt William Cushing on the night of October 28, 1864. The Albemarle was defended by a log boom, but the logs had been in the water a long time and were covered with moss and slime. The logs were slippery enough that Cushing's launch rode up and over them, and the attack was successful, with the warhead holing Albermarle at the waterline. The ironclad quickly sank. Cushing had detonated the warhead immediately on contact and the concussion threw him and all his crew in the water. Most of the crew were captured, but Cushing and one other crewman were able to evade capture and make their way back to Union lines. For this action, Cushing received the "Thanks of Congress". The Cushing family seems to have produced men with an exceptionally large pair. Cushing's brother, an army artillery officer, received the Medal of Honor posthumously for defending his position at the Battle of Gettysburg.
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@bkjeong4302 That question has crossed my mind too. Most navies had been settled in at 12", for a while. European next evolution seemed to always be a hair under 14". The Brits went to 13.5", French 13.4", German 13.8". Then those three, plus Italy, which got big gun technology from Vickers and Armstrong, went to 15". Japan, in spite of it's close ties to the RN, went to 14", then 16", following the US pattern. The first cause that comes to mind is the various gun development programs are following the evolution of forging equipment, Europe went to 15" during WWI because that was the largest/longest tube the Brits and Germans could forge? But the Japanese bought forging equipment from the US, and US forging technology was at a slightly different pace than in Europe? I really don't know. Don't even have any sort of evidence based suspicion.
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I just addressed that scenario in a separate post. The IJN did not have enough headroom under it's treaty tonnage limit to build another Nagato, without scrapping a Fuso or Kongo to make the tonnage available. The net gain in ship firepower, for all the money spent building a third Nagato, would be poor value for money. as the throw weight of a Fuso's 12-14" guns is very close to that of a Nagato's 8-16" guns. The RN was well over it's tonnage limit, so, to build a third Nelson, they would need to scrap two Iron Dukes. As the Dukes went to the breakers in the early 30s, that would be a net gain for the RN by 1940. Similarly, the US was just about dead on it's treaty limit, so completing Washington would require scrapping the two Floridas, but the two Floridas were scrapped/demilitarized in the early 30s, so that is also a net gain for the US by 1941. One big difference, the third Nelson and Nagato would need to be built from the keel up, at considerable additional expense. I tried to find what the USN spent modernizing the Floridas (conversion to oil, with new boilers, added deck armor and torpedo bulges) vs what it would have cost to complete Washington. Turns out it would have been about a wash: Washington could have been completed for the money spent on the Floridas only a few years before they were disposed of.
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wrt the Lexington battle cruiser refit question. I have seen pix of a scratchbuilt Lexington model modernized to WWII standards. It looked very much like an Iowa. What would have happened in the real world, if they had been built as battle cruisers? If they had been built as planned, that implies the Washington Treaty didn't happen, which means the SoDaks would have been built as well, so no surplus material ordered for the SoDaks would be available to reinforce the Lexington's armor. Would the Lexingtons ever have been significantly updated at any point through 1945? I would say probably not. They would not have been updated any more than any other class of USN capital ships in the 30s. If they were based at Pearl, due to their ability to keep up with the carriers, they would have been out with the carriers and not damaged in the attack. Without being sunk or heavily damaged at Pearl, they would have had the minimal updating that other capital ships that missed Pearl received: added triple A, updated fire control and radar, like Colorado. Their best chance of surviving the war would have been as triple A platforms protecting the carriers. as the Japanese pilots would be concentrating on the carriers. If they got involved in any of the surface engagements around the Solomons or Philippines , they would have been shot full of holes.
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@QuizmasterLaw Several older ships seem to have been pretty decrepit. Most of the surviving Revenges and Malaya were put in reserve by the end of 43. I read somewhere, regarding the Madagascar operation, the original intention had been to use Malaya, but she was so decrepit they used Ramillies instead. Rodney was intended to be used for fire support in Normandy, but, first, went into drydock, because the hull was leaking so badly. Royal Sovereign went to the Philadelphia Navy Yard for refit in early 43, but the navy yard couldn't do anything with the hoists, because they were worn out. After repairing what it they could, the ship was returned to the UK, and they passed her off to the Russians. Drac has commented on the poor condition of Nevada at Pearl Harbor. At the time the Washington Treaty was signed, battleships were expected to have a 20 year life. First London decreed they would have a 26 year life. By the time WWII got rolling, these ships were closing in on 30 years, well past their projected life spans.
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The Washington Naval Treaty granted the RN construction licenses for two battleships, which could be used immediately, which produced the Nelsons. If those two licenses had been granted for execution in 1927 and 1929, as the licenses granted to France and Italy were, how would that impact Admiralty decision making when the Deutschlands were built? Would the Admiralty follow the lead of the French and build two light battlecruisers, possibly using the 15"/42 turrets in inventory as a cost saving measure? Or, would the Admiralty decide Hood and the Renowns were sufficient to deal with the Deutschlands, and, when the first two Littorios were laid down in 1934, use the licenses to advance the timeline of the construction of the KGV class, laying down KGV and Prince of Wales in 36, with Duke of York and Anson laid down January 1 of 37 and Howe laid down in May of 37?
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@Philistine47 from my study on the subject, Ranger's lack of size was directly due to the Lexington's excess of size. The two Lexingtons used half of the US' tonnage allotment. Friedman on carriers talks about the debates in the Navy about how many carriers they wanted, and how to divide up the remaining tonnage. They soon decided Ranger was too small, so the Yorktowns were made larger, but not too large, so that enough tonnage allotment was left to build a minimally effective carrier, which became Wasp. Yes, the Yorktowns were vulnerable. They did not have staggered boiler and engine rooms. Considering how Yorktown and Hornet were both lost: dead in the water, but not on fire, can't help but wonder, if they had been built with staggered boiler and engine rooms, like an Essex, would they have survived?
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@christopherrowe7460 the USN did have a lot of input from the RN in carrier design. Stanley Goodall was seconded by the Admiralty to the USN during the war and was a major conduit of information between the USN Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Admiralty's chief constructor Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt. Goodall provided in depth information about Hood to the USN. Friedman's book on carriers goes on to describe the continuing exchange of information between the USN and RN in the 20s, The RN went to larger carriers during the war. As soon as the war ended, enthusiasm for carriers waned significantly and Eagle and Hermes were both long builds.
Seems the IJN took the rational approach to carriers. Hosho was laid down in 1920, when Akagi and Kaga were both intended as big gun capital ships. It would be interesting to see where IJN carrier design would have gone without the intervention of the treaty, and that special clause the US wanted, allowing the conversion of outsized battlecruisers.
Yes, the USN was designing 35-39,000 ton carriers before the treaty. You know how we Americans roll, always want to have a bigger one. But reality, and a tight fisted Congress, resulted in Langley. I have read that, until the intervention of the treaty and availability of the battlecuriser hulls, the Navy was planning on converting a second collier. As for the dimensions of US carriers, beam is dictated by the Panama Canal. The need for speed, the more wind over the deck, the safer air ops are, as well as USN "scouting group" doctrine, dictates the length to beam ratio of a cruiser/battlecruiser. If I was in charge in the 20s, Langley would have been followed in 3-5 years, by Ranger. Even looking at Ranger, I can see the lineage going to Langley, not the Lexingtons. Ranger has the same far aft positioned boilers, with swiveling, deck edge funnels, as Langley. Ranger, as originally planned, was flush decked, same as Langley. The USN did not return to the Lexington's layout with midships boilers and an island, until Yorktown.
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@stanleyrogouski I looked up the AA armament SD had when completed in March of 42: (8) .50 machine guns, (28) 1.1" (I take that as 7 quad mounts), and (16) Oerlikons, along with (16) 5"/38s. That was a substantial increase from what had been originally planned. Prince of Wales had (16) QF 5.25" in twin turrets, (32) 2 pounder pompoms (which I take to be (4) octuple mounts), and (80) UP projectors. The SD's 1.1 mounts can engage more targets at the same time, but PoW's pompoms will do more damage to anything they get zeroed in on. Without the golden BB torpedo hit that killed power to many of the mounts on PoW, there isn't much to choose between the two, and SD had it's own wonky electrical system issues. Repluse had not been modernized like Renown, and was somewhat deficient in AA, by 1941 standards: (8) 4" and (2) octuple pompoms. For the heck of it, I proposed sending the newly rebuilt QE and Valiant as Force Z, with their places in Alexandria being taken by Malaya and Revenge, and Malaya's place in Force H taken by Prince of Wales. Rebuilt QE and Valiant: 20 4.5" in twin turrets, 4 octuple pompoms, and 4 quad .50 machine guns. I could make a case that QE and Valiant, together, could put up more AA than PoW and Repulse, combined, and the QEs might even have an edge on a pair of SDs. Even more interesting: there was a suggestion that Hermes join Force Z, but she was rejected as too slow to keep up with PoW and Repulse. Hermes could keep up with QEs just fine, but I doubt it would occur to anyone in Singapore to make up tail hooks for some of the Buffalos the RAF and RAAF were flying so that Hermes could have some proper fighters to provide a CAP.
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wrt the question about all the Rs being built as Renown class battlecruisers, consider the alternative: in addition to Renown and Repulse, the other two cancelled ships; the R class Resistance and QE class Agincourt are also reordered as Renowns making use of the 15" guns and Mk 1 turrets that were in process for the cancelled ships. It is written that the Admiralty proceeded with construction of Hood as it, in conjunction with the two Renowns, were seen as replacements for the three battlecruisers lost at Jutland. If the Admiralty had four Renowns building at the time of Jutland, would the Admiralty see any need to build Hood? Would any of the Admirals been laid down at all, considering the wartime press of other priorities, and the number of Renowns building? Impact on the WNT? The 525,000 ton limit, as I read the treaty, was only a factor when building replacements for ships currently in commission. The original retention list for the RN, with Tiger, the three surviving KGVs and Thunderer was some 580,000 tons. When the Nelsons were built, the drawdown toward the limit started, with four dreadnoughts scrapped and the RN's tonnage reduced to just under 559,000T. Without Hood, but with two additional Renowns, the RN's treaty retention list would have probably looked very much the same, with the possible elimination of Thunderer.
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Almirante Latorre and the USN, revisited. Two concerns I had; ammo and spares supplies for a British built ship in USN service. If the Elswick and USN 14" guns had precisely the same bore, it may have been possible to use USN shells. The Elswick chamber is significantly larger than the chamber in the USN gun, so plenty of room to load a charge of USN smokeless to provide equivalent performance to cordite. That leaves the problem of the USN trying to source replacement parts for all the UK built systems in the ship. Hence, Plan Steve: The UK buys Almirante Latorre into service (again), or, if lacking cash, the US buys her and lend-leases her to the U.K. There is a significant probability that the shells and charges from the 14" mounted on the KGVs would work in the Elswick guns, and spares would, from RN perspective, be locally sourced. With an additional obsolete BB available for convoy duty, the Latorre (HMS Canada, again?) could relieve one of the New Yorks, so the New York could be redeployed to the US west coast, without creating the logistics problems deploying a foreign built ship would.
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@usssouthdakota5541 Renown was with Ark Royal, in Force H. Repulse was with KGV in the channel south of Iceland. The way I see it is Tovey know how vulnerable Hood was, and Repulse was even more vulnerable, so the two forces were formed of one strong ship (KGV or PoW) and one weak ship (Hood or Repulse). PoW, still working up, was the weaker of the two KGVs, so was paired with the stronger of the two obsolete battlecruisers, Hood. To directly answer your question, if Repulse had been placed with PoW, there would have been no doubt which was the weaker ship, so I would have expected PoW to lead the attack. PoW would probably have lasted longer than Hood, but surviving the engagement is another question. iirc, Bismark initially concentrated on Hood, allowing PoW to close to "decisive" range undamaged. With PoW leading, it would have been taking fire longer and would have been more damaged by the time it entered "decisive" range of under 16,000 yards.
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@Davidsladky135 as Joe said, carriers started out being named after previous ships, just as the Brits keep recycling names. When I was on the Lex, 50 years ago, there was a painting on a bulkhead in the hangar of all the previous Lexingtons. iirc, there were 4 or 5 preceding ships of that name. There was a long string of Enterprises before CV-6. It was as much chance as anything else that most of the early carriers were named after battles as previous USN ships had been named to commemorate the same battles. Of the six Lexington class battlecruisers, the two that were completed were named after preceding ships that had been named after battles, three were named after ships of the original 6 frigates and one, Ranger, named after a ship commanded by John Paul Jones during the revolution. There were six USS Hornets, dating back to the revolution, before CV-8 and there were eight USS Wasps, dating back to the revolution, prior to CV-7.
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The GOP has no alternative to MAGA. The traditional "supply side" argument, that everyone else needs to make do with less, so more money can be given to the rich, is a non-starter. The GOP Presidential candidate has only won the popular vote once, in the last 35 years. MAGA is the only alternative: policies to enrich the rich, at everyone else's expense, camouflaged with racism and homophobia.
Trump said he would not run in 28, if he lost in 24. If he wins in 24, and can still draw a breath in 28, he will run, regardless what the Constitution says.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 the same thought crossed my mind. Italy, in particular, was stuck with some impossible ships, the four Elena class pre-dreadnoughts and the salvaged hulk of the da Vinci, classified as front line battleships, to fill up Italy's quota. Three Orions or KGVs would replace the tonnage of those five worst ships, or Erin, by itself, would make a good replacement for da Vinci. Sold to Italy for their scrap price, as that was their fate without a sale, which Italy could cover by selling the Elenas and da Vinci for scrap. But would Italy want the running cost? And, would the transfer of dreadnoughts that were only a decade old cause Italy to loose the licenses it was given to start building replacement ships in the late 20s, licenses which were used to build the first two Littorios? Without those licenses, the Littorios could not have been laid down until 1937, meaning they would not have completed until 41. With the Littorios not laid down until 37, the French would not have laid down Richelieu and Jean Bart until 38, so they would have been too far from completion when France fell to escape to North Africa. With battleships only ten years old, would Italy have been given the latitude for improving existing ships that allowed the rebuilds of the Cavours and Dorias?
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@brendonbewersdorf986 the pre-dreadnoughts, and the RN 12" gunned ships were being sold for scrap before the treaty, so, if the UK had wanted to sell them to other users, they could have. The UK proposed selling the two surviving Invincibles to Chile, replacing the battleship that was halfway converted to HMS Eagle. That deal fell through, so the battlecruisers were stricken in March of 1920 and sold for scrap. HMS Canada, which had been purchased from Chile, was sold back to Chile with the deal closing in April of 20. The UK tried to sell the Gin Palace to Brazil, but Brazil declined. Greece already had the two former US pre-dreadnoughts. Greece's new-build ship, the Salamis, was tied up in litigation with the Vulcan yard in Germany for several years, with Greece trying to cancel it, and Vulcan wanting to be paid.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 I find the most satisfying alt history scenarios are the ones where I try to poke holes in the scenario to see if it holds up. I ran a scenario a while back where the US bought one or both of the surviving Invincibles to get their large, fast, hulls to convert to more satisfying carriers than Langley. I required the conversion to be cheap, because that was how Congress rolled. Had in mind to use the powerplants from a handful of Clemsons that had been cancelled before being laid down in February of 1919, hence the plants would be surplus and available cheap. Worked out that the cancelled Clemsons were to be built by Newport News. News sourced turbines from Westinghouse and boilers from Babcock and Wilcox. Unfortunately, New York Shipbuilding sourced turbines and boilers from the same vendors, and laid down ten more Clemsons, after the ones from News were cancelled. So the powerplant vendors most likely trimmed the back end of their production schedule, components they had not started building yet, so no cheap surplus plants for the carrier conversions. Based on the re-enginging of North Dakota in 1917, new turbines, at market price, for an Invincible would cost $1.2M, plus 8 boilers, plus converting coal bunkers to oil tanks. I'm thinking close to $2M just to replace the worn out coal fired plant, before conversion to a carrier can even start. The budget for Langley was $500,000, so the Invincible idea is a no-go.
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I posted a comment related to this earlier, which the net seems to have eaten. There was a debate in the USN on this very topic during WWI. The head of BuOrd from 1913-16, Admiral Strauss, seemed dead set against the 16"/45. Strauss seems to have been of the opinion that optical gun direction systems would never be improved, and battleships would never engage at more than 12,000 yards. In his view, the greater range and long range penetration ability of the 16"/45 was unneeded, while the 14"/50 penetrated well enough at less than 12,000 yards, and, being lighter, more could be mounted on a ship. The 14"/50 could not penetrate battleship belt thickness armor at more than 12,000. In the 1915 BuOrd annual report, Strauss sneers at the mounts in the Tennessees being designed for 30 degrees of elevation, vs the 15 degrees of the New Mexicoes, because, in his view, that much elevation will never be needed. Even more disturbing, was the disinformation about the 16" being fed to American newspapers at that time. One story that appeared in several papers in early 1915, a couple months after the Battle of Dogger Bank, which proved that capital ships could engage at much greater distance than 12,000 yards, said that the 16" suffered very high erosion, the British 15"/42 only had a life of 100 rounds, and the 14"/50 was more durable. Barrel life data on Navweaps shows exactly the opposite: the early 15" and 16" both more durable than the 14". In an article published in early 1916, Strauss is directly quoted as saying the 14" is the equal of the 15"/42, and, again, rattles on about how USN guns can penetrate "heavy armor" at 12,000 yards. A few months later, the Battle of Jutland, again, demonstrated that battles can be carried out at far grater ranges than the 12,000 that Strauss kept rattling on about. Strauss had his way with the New Mexicoes and Tennessees, but, the need to reach and penetrate at ranges of 15,000-20,000 yards, having been demonstrated twice, SecNav Daniels announced the Coloradoes would be armed with 16" guns. In the 1916 SecNav annual report, Daniels says the move to 16" is being made over the objection of some Naval officers. Also in late 16, Strauss was transferred out of BuOrd and given sea duty.
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@satern7473 I looked in to that a bit recently. The ships the Netherlands was looking in to at the start of WWI would have been meat on the table in 41. I'm not sure how realistic the 1047s were. They seem to be a very ambitious, and expensive, design. If they had built anything heavier than De Ruyter, I'm thinking maybe a variation on a Deutschland. Maybe with a steam plant, rather than diesel, as their fuel source was close at hand, so the ships would not need extreme range, and steam may provide more speed. During the invasion of the DEI, all four Kongos were in theater, escorting the carriers. If the Dutch had one or two Deutschalnds deployed, the Kongos would simply be brought forward to deal with them, if they had survived the air strikes.
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wrt the 12" gun proposal at First London, I would say this was aimed directly at Italy, and, secondarily, at France. While First London overrode the replacement schedule in the WNT, and extended the battleship construction holiday through 1936, Italy and France each had two good until used licenses to build battleships that took effect in 1927 and 1929. At that point in time, the largest guns the RM had in service were 12", and the largest France had were 13.4". Even with the 12" proposal failing, I have read that the UK brought a great deal of pressure to bear on France to build the Dunkerques well below the treaty limits. This is clearly intended as a means to keep the Nelsons, QEs and Rs relevant, by leveraging the treaty to, as Drac correctly says, force Italy and France to build hilariously undersized and underarmed battleships. Meanwhile, the Versailles Treaty kept Germany down to the Deutschlands, with their 11" guns.
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@Thecrownswill by 1940, the Dauntless was pretty much obsolete. It stayed in front line service so long because Curtis had so much development trouble with the Helldiver. Little reason for the UK to bother setting up an entire supply chain to produce an obsolete plane. The UK never bought the Helldiver at all, judging it unacceptable for any use, due to it's vile handling characteristics. The UK did buy a few Brewster Buccaneers, naming them Bermuda in RN service. The RN only used the Bermudas for training, judging them unacceptable for combat. Then there is the overhead clearance issue in the hangars of RN carriers. The Corsair's wing tips had to be clipped 6" to fit in some RN carriers with it's wings folded. The Dauntless' wings were longer, though a different in where the hinge was could make a difference in folded height. I looked, but could not readily find, a dimension for height for either plane with it's wings folded. The one USN bomber/torpedo plane the RN did buy in quantity was the Grumman Avenger, which, like all Grumman aircraft, folded it's wings parallel to the fuselage, so it did not suffer overhead clearance issues.
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@rambling_reiver the need for speed has several factors: safer take off and landing due to more wind over the deck. Ability to take off with more gas and payload, due to more wind over the deck. The Brits took over some Vought Vindicators that the French had ordered, but wanted to use them on HMS Archer, a converted freighter, but, due to Archer's low speed, 16kts, the Vindicators could not lift a useful payload, so Archer got Swordfish instead. The third factor in favor of high speed for a carrier was that, for air ops, the carrier needs to head into the wind to maximize wind over the deck. Wind direction usually varies from fleet direction, so, with the extra speed, a carrier can chase the wind to launch a strike, then use it's high speed to catch up with the rest of the fleet.
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@bkjeong4302 yes, that was the plan, by the late 30s, rendering the Lexington's 8" battery useless, but then Glorious was sunk, then Gambier Bay was sunk. When the Lexingtons were built, nothing larger than a cruiser could keep up with them, outside of the few remaining Brit battlecruisers, so 8" guns would be adequate to defend against any likely surface opponent. If Glorious had 8" guns, and was attacked by Prinz Eugen, it could have held it's own. If Glorious had been attacked by Lutzow, it could have run away. Just bad luck it ran into ships it couldn't outrun, or outgun with an 8" armament, if it had had that armament.
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@TwinHuginHelmet I would think the IJN would go with Tosa or Kaga, as their construction was more advanced than the Amagis, having gotten to the point of launching. For the USN, none of the 40,000 ton ships was all that great. The South Dakotas were too slow and the Lexingtons were vulnerable. The USN was in a spot. It laid down so many ships in 1919-20 because Congress had passed a Naval appropriation bill on July 1, 1918, which compelled the Navy to begin construction of all the ships that were authorized in the 1916 act, but not yet begun, to be begun by July 1 of 1919. That was some 48 ships, including three Colorados, all the South Dakotas, all the Lexingtons and all the Omahas. Were I in SecNav Daniels' shoes, I would have tried to reason with Congress that the Colorados were a waste of money, because the South Dakotas, in breaking with the "standard battleship" template, made the Colorados obsolete. Failing that, I would step into Secretary Hughes' shoes at the Washington conference. Understanding that Congress in 1922 will not fund much of anything, I would look at the US being the only one of the big three navies stuck with ships mounting 12" guns, and demand licenses for future construction the same way France and Italy had licenses due to their obsolete, 12" gunned ships.
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@gregorywright4918 I am more familiar with US history. You may be right. The UK did return Java to the Netherlands and some possessions to France after Napoleon's defeat. I do not see mention of any possessions sold for cash or barter in the late 19th or early 20th century. I don't know enough about British politics to know why, other than maybe pride. I can think of several reasons why President Harding would not be interested. Congress passed a law requiring all debtors to repay their war debts, in full, in cash, on time, with interest. Some of the large debtors, including the UK, opened their negotiations with the assertion that all the US' loans should be entirely forgiven. as the US' contribution to the war effort. One reason I can think of that Harding would not be interested is that the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, were famous for rum production, and prohibition was the law of the land in the US. The US apparently did not impose prohibition in the Philippines, but prohibition was the law in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Due to proximity to the US, prohibition would probably have been imposed on all the West Indies colonies, putting a lot of people out of work and stirring resentment of the US. Another reason that comes to mind is that US immigration policy in the 20s was very restrictive and blatantly racist. Some of the newspaper articles from the early 20s that I read noted that the British tended to treat citizens of color better than the US treated it's black citizens. Most of the British West Indies islands have populations that are 80-90% of African decent. I can see Harding and his cabinet, given their biases, taking one look at large numbers of blacks, out of work because rum production is shut down, coming to the US looking for work, vs a nice, big, pile of cash, and grabbing the cash, in spite of the payment schedule negotiated with the UK being 62 years.
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@emperordave3006 the USN had a 14"/50 in 1915. In 1916, the USN looked at what had been happening in Europe, and switched to the 16"/45. I don't understand the physics, but, apparently, a lighter shell looses momentum faster compared to a heavier shell. I have access to partial copies of USN gunnery range tables from the mid 1930s. I looked up both a 14" and 16". both fired with an initial muzzle velocity of 2600fps. By the time the shells reach 14,500 yards, the 16" shell is traveling 200fps faster than the 14". So, it comes down to a 16" holding momentum longer, and hitting at longer ranges with higher velocity. Looking at the late 1930s rebuilt USN 14" and 16", the 14"/50, with a muzzle velocity of 2900fps could penetrate 13.75" at 20,000 yards, but the 16"/45, with a muzzle velocity of 2520fps could penetrate 16.24" at 20,000.
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@tripducey3076 The treaties after WWI, rather than WWII? the appeal of the treaty was that no-one really wanted to get into another naval building race, partly due to their debt overhang from WWI. Nothing really happened if someone broke or left the treaty system. Japan gave notice in 1934 that it would leave the treaty system when First London, which Japan signed, expired at the end of 36. France broke First London when it laid down Richelieu and Jean Bart. but signed Second London anyway. Italy did not sign Second London, because of the criticism of it's invasion of Ethiopia. The only consequence in any of the treaties for anyone dropping out was tripping the gun size escalator clause in Second London, that stipulated that, if any power that had signed the previous treaties did not sign Second London, maximum gun size would go back to 16" from the 14" that Second London stipulated. As Japan had given notice two years earlier it would not sign, it was a certainty the clause would be triggered. The tonnage escalator was much more vague. It stipulated that if any power not in the treaty system built a ship that exceeded treaty limits, the parties to the treaty would negotiate an appropriate increase in treaty limits. As soon as the US and UK discovered how much material was being ordered for Yamato, making it clear it would exceed treaty limits, they started negotiating the tonnage limit increase.
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wrt the question about Naval espionage, you might like to read "Reilly, Ace Of Spies" by Robin Bruce Lockhart. There was a TV series, based on the book, produced in the early 1980s, which makes for interesting viewing. A couple of Reilly's operations: he was sent to infiltrate the B&V yard to obtain the drawings for a new model gun. He got himself hired in at the yard as a fireman, and persuaded the head of the yard fire department to gather keys for every building and office in the yard, in one place, which was accessible by the firemen. Reilly then pilfered the keys to the drafting office, and made off with the drawings. After losing most of their fleet to the Japanese, the Russians put out an RFP for a new fleet. Reilly got himself appointed the agent for B&V in Russia. Basil Zaharoff, as usual, represented Vickers. Reilly told his superiors in British intelligence, if B&V won the contract, he would forward copies of the B&V drawings to the British. The British then had an incentive to hobble Zaharoff's efforts on behalf of Vickers to obtain the intelligence. Of course, if B&V won the contract, Reilly would pocket a very large sales commission. This was not the first time the British questioned whose side Reilly was really on.
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@jonathanj8303 the Rivadavias were turbine powered dreadnoughts mounting 12-12" guns, and, apparently, the latest in US fire control technology. The US was as much concerned about any buyer flipping them for a quick profit to a major, potentially hostile, power, like Germany, as they were the Greeks having them. The Mississippis were 6 years old at the time of sale, VTE powered, with only 4-12" guns, and bog slow at 17kts. The Mississippis were pretty much a pork barrel creation, too slow and short ranged to steam with the fleet, so pretty much useless to the USN. There were some pretty blunt articles in the press about how Senator Hale had forced inferior ships on the Navy.
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@chrissouthgate4554 I don't view Ranger as a cheaper option. It was the USN's first purpose built carrier. Ranger was larger than either Hōshō or Hermes. Especially with the treaty limiting displacement, it would be foolish to waste a lot of displacement, as well as money, on concepts that may not prove out in use. Think, for instance, about the triple flying off decks that Akagi and Kaga were originally built with, and what it cost to rebuild them with single, full length, decks. Imagine if the Brits had actually built a carrier with islands on both sides of the flight deck, and what it would cost to fix that mistake. The USN was remarkably lucky the Lexingtons came out as well as they did, because the USN didn't know diddly about carriers at the time. I envision the Lexingtons accumulated a pile of change orders the size of a house as experience was gained with Langley. The cost overruns on a Lexington, alone, would have paid for Ranger.
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So Mahan advocated for bases and protection of the supply lines to those bases. Yet, just as Mahan was doing all this scribbling, the US took the Philippines and Guam, both having very nice harbors, from Spain, but the US did not take the rest of the Marianas and Carolines from Spain at the same time, leaving the door open for a hostile power to take those islands and stand astride the supply lines to Guam and the Philippines. First Germany, a nation later hostile to the US, bought those islands from Spain. Then the Japanese, later very very hostile to the US, took those islands from Germany. Then the US garrison in the Philippines was cut off and starved, because the US couldn't run the gauntlet of enemy bases to relieve the Philippines, just as Mahan warned could happen. How could the US miss something so obvious?
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Book recommendations are always welcome. What I have found is, often, reading on a topic produces more questions, because there often seem to be things left out. One fact does not knit tightly with the next fact in the narrative. How could the Washington treaty regard Hood as "post Jutland", but Tennessee and California are "pre-Jutland"? The narrative about the KGVs having 14" guns made no sense. I went through books by Garzke, Raven, and Friedman, before I was satisfied that the decision to go to 14" was driven by First Sea Lord Chatfield, and his embrace of the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory, and I many have only picked up on that as the pivot because I have studied the row in the USN over going from 14" to 16" in 1916. Has anyone written an in-depth analysis of the story of the Greek battleship Salamis? I thumbed through Friedman on WWI naval weapons, and found that the German 30.5cm/50 mount would have fit almost perfectly, being designed for a barbette less than 1.5" smaller in diameter than what Salamis was built for. Why didn't the Germans do that? I will be chasing these questions for years.
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@PelhamExpress The Second London treaty specified a reduction in gun size to 14", effectively outlawing the 15"/42 for new construction, though the treaty did have an escalator clause permitting a return to 16" by, iirc, April 37, if any party to the previous treaties refused to sign the new one. Japan had given notice in 34 that it was dropping out of the treaty system, but the RN didn't want to wait until the April drop dead date, laying down the KGV and PoW on New Year Day of 37, the first day after the moratorium on BB construction ended. What puzzles me about the Lions, is why the Admiralty insisted on trying to reinvent the 16" gun. The UK and US were allies. The US had developed 16"/45 and 16"/50 guns in the late 30s. Seems the obvious thing to do would be for the Admiralty to send a purchase order to the USN for the required number of guns, and move on to the next issue.
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wrt reforming the USN in the 1910s. Building the standards with an eye to reengining them in the 30s for more speed would be futile, because the USN didn't update the Tennessees or Colorados during that period, when the update of the New Mexicos in 31 showed the way. A more plausible choice would be to forego the turbo-electric drive in the first place and use the space freed up by elimination of the motors and generators for larger turbines and boilers. Also, forget triple expansion engines and go straight to turbines, even if that means buying them from Parsons. Another thing would be to forget the casement mounted secondary armament. Put all the secondary armament on deck, so they can be easily replaced with modern AA during WWII. With a large increase in the budget prior to WWI, at least some of the Battle Cruisers would have been laid down, in their original 1916 design. If the USN were lucky, the hulls would have been launched in 17 to clear the building ways and further work delayed until after the war. Then, instead of converting a collier that would have had resale value, convert the incomplete BC hulls to carriers. With construction under way, in 21, they would have been exempt from the treaty as "experimental", so could be replaced whenever the USN saw fit.
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Yes, BK and Gues, they were intended as cruiser killers, just like the WWI Brit battle cruisers. They are bigger and more expensive than a CA, but, at some point, they are probably going to find themselves in a situation where they are up against real battleships, running is not an option, and they are going to get pounded, just like a CA, in spite of their extra cost to build and run. Scharnhorst did OK, until it ran into the Duke of York. Imagine what would have happened to the Lexingtons if they had been built as Battle Cruisers, and got stuck into the Solomons campaign.
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All the foreign automakers are losing big gobs of market share in China. Jeep has already withdrawn. Ford is looking at China more as an export hub, rather than competing in the domestic Chinese market.
VAG started losing focus in the 90s. Ferdinand Piech went into "empire building" mode, adding armloads of halo products, Bugatti, Bentley, Ducati, and Lamborghini to the product portfolio. Marchionne said that Bugatti was the biggest waste of capital he had ever seen. He also added Skoda and Seat, offering the same products, in the same markets, as the VW brand, while adding extra overhead.
I had hopes that the diesel scandal would force VAG to clean up it's product portfolio. The head of the union made the same observation. Why is VAG wasting so much money on redundant and vanity products? But no, VAG kept all the nonsense, and kept bleeding.
So now, VAG declares a "crisis", and dumps on the staff in the plants. Right out of the McKinsey playbook. Not a word about VAG going all in on gimmicks, that don't work every well, while the basic reliability of their cars goes in the tank.
And I say all this as a VW owner, a now 10 year old VW, from a time when VW executed much better on reliability and useability.
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wrt the Mers-el-Kebir full battle scenario: the Bretagnes were only armed with 13.4" guns. As well as being even slower than an R class, they would be hard pressed to penetrate to the vitals of a QE or R class, while the British 15/42s would have no problem cutting through their 10" belts. Given the RN's numerical superiority in light units, plus it's heavier guns, plus speed advantage, it sounds like a slaughter if the entire French squadron stood out to engage. Were I the French commander, out of respect for French human life, I think I would have the Bretanges stay in port and provide covering fire, while the Dunkerques and DDs run at high speed. Leaving Valiant and Resolution in their wake would even the odds, if the RN wanted to make a running fight of it, while the crews of the Bretagnes could swim to shore.
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@gregorywright4918 the lack of bases and drydocks was the vulnerability of the "thruster" plan exposed in 34. There was no way to repair damage suffered steaming past the mandates to reinforce the Philippines, and the force would need to steam past the mandates again to get to the facilities at Pearl. The King George dock in Singapore was not completed until the late 30s, and it was captured by the Japanese. Neither of the docks at Cockatoo Island could accommodate the largest battleships and carriers. It wasn't until the Cook dock was completed in 45 that Sydney could repair anything afloat. The buildup of the Philippine military should have started as soon as the islands became a commonwealth, with it's own civilian government, in 35. The Philippine military was woefully under-equipped. Apparently, they had M1917 Enfields. We made over 2M of those rifles, so there had to be large numbers of them available in US inventory. The army was extremely short of artillery. The US had provided a few WWI 75mm guns, but hundreds more of those guns were in inventory. The Philippine air force had 48 P-35s. The Air Corps was replacing 36s with 40s and B--18s with 17s and 25s, so 36s and 18s could have been provided. The Air Corps decided it didn't like dive bombers, so the A-17s were retired in 38, when only a couple years old. The A-17s could have been provided. The other shortfall was training. Instead of keeping the Philippine Scouts concentrated in US Army units, the Scouts could have been reformed into training cadres and used to train the Philippine troops. If bringing the Philippine forces up to scratch had begun in earnest as soon as the "thruster" plan was found to not be viable, then the only US personnel left in the islands would have been at Subic, a number small enough to be evacuated with the USN surface elements. At the end of the day, if relief didn't come in six months, Filipino soldiers could ditch their uniforms, blend in to the civilian population, and wage a guerilla war for years. Blending in to the civilian population was not an option for an American, so those men were doomed.
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@igooooorrrrr the Wiki entry for Dreadnought says she cost 1,785,683 GB Pounds to build. That converts to about 8,598,849 US Dollars. When Dreadnought was sold for scrap in 1921, US newspapers reported the selling price as $176,000, so scrap price was about 2% of the build price. These days, it seems the USN nearly has to pay to get breakers to take old ships off it's hands. The USN sold Kitty Hawk to the breakers for 1 cent, vs a build cost of $264M in 1961, which equates to $2.5B now.
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@michaelmacleod7051 yes, the WNT specifically prohibited sale of condemned ships. If the UK had sold Erin to Chile, in place of Almirante Cochrane, which was in mid-morph to HMS Eagle, that would have happened in April 1920, coincident with the sale of HMS Canada to Chile, and prior to the treaty. It crossed my mind that Italy's battleship force after the treaty, which included four pre-dreadnoughts and the salvaged hulk of Da Vinci, listed as front line battleships, was insulting enough to justify Erin or one of the condemned Orions or KGVs to be offered at scrap price, to replace Da Vinci, but that didn't happen.
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A two part question about the two surviving Littorio class battleships: first part: the Wiki entry notes both had been significantly damaged prior to the Italian surrender. Was that damage repaired at any point? Second part: we have all heard about how President Roosevelt promised Stalin a significant part of the Italian fleet, and the Soviets were a bit put out when they were handed worn out US and UK castoffs instead. After the surrender, the Littorios sat at Malta, then at Alexandria, then in the Great Bitter Lake, until after the end of the war, then they were handed to the US and UK, then scrapped. What was the problem with handing those two battleships to the Soviets in 44? It is only two ships, arguably obsolete by 1944. If there was concern about post-war hostilities with the Soviets, US and UK naval air and sub forces were so large that, if the Soviets went off the reservation with the battleships, the ship's life expectancy would be measured in days. I don't see the point in reneging on FDR's promise.
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@observationsfromthebunker9639 This is from the record of the US Senate, 1930: "Of the enormous total of $118,000,000, we have already spent or have been obligated to spend about $38,000,000, leaving $80,000,000 still to be appropriated if we are to modernize our battleship fleet, and then we do not obtain parity with Great Britain. According to the testimony, a new battleship would cost approximately $39,000,000. Hence we could match the Rodney and Nelson and make up our existing deficiency in battleship strength, which can not be done by modernization, by building two ships like the Rodney and Nelson with the money which it is proposed to spend for modernization." There you have it. Modernizing old BBs does not make them the equal of new-build. As we know, the Tennessees and Colorados never saw a rebuild, so were even farther off the pace compared to the Nagatos and modernized Kongos and Ises. Sure, a Tennessee or Colorado can hurt you, so you are better off sinking it into the mud of Pearl, but they are less of a threat than a KGV or North Carolina, because they are so obsolete. Of course, if I was in command in Japan, I would never have attacked Pearl in the first place. I would have taken the Philippines, preferably by infiltrating the Philippine government that was established in 1935, and rolled the dice that the US population would not support a war over the Philippines.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 The first thought that comes to my mind, would a Japanese designed ship have enough interior room for tall Germans? I'm barely 6', and there were places in the Lex where I did not have a huge surplus of headroom below the ducts, pipes, and conduits, hanging from the overhead. Are Japanese ships designed for smaller people? Second issue is the timeline. Even if Germany and Japan signed their treaty earlier than September 40, the Graf was laid down in December 36, while Zuikaku was laid down in May of 38. Would the Germans break up the Graf on the slipway, and start over? We would need to push the timeline for the alliance back to 34, when Japan gave notice it was dropping out of the treaty system, a year after the Nazis came to power, and are preparing a naval building program, and coincident with the rebuilds of Akagi and Kaga, so that IJN officials could provide advice to the Nazis, before the Graf was laid down. But, even in that fortuitous set of circumstances, Nazi leadership would be the same, so I suspect that even a Graf of sound design would end up exactly the same as the historical one.
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I don't think you can go by the number of guns being built, because it is routine to produce many more guns than needed to populate the turrets when the ship is built, so that replacement guns are readily available when the original guns need to be relined or are damaged in some manner. Total number of 15" guns mounted in ships: (40) in QEs, (40) in Rs, (12) in Renowns, (8) in Courageouses, (8) in Hood, (8) in monitors, for a total of 116. According to Wiki, 186 were built. Whether Agincourt was intended as a QE, or a proto-Hood, it probably would have used (4) turrets, implying that, from the cancelled Rs plus Agincourt, there should have been (16) Mk I turrets in inventory, but I can only account for (14): (6) on the Renowns, (4) on the Courageouses, (2) on Erebus class monitors and the final (2) landing on the Roberts class monitors in 1940. But that is inconclusive too, because there could have been more turrets in process that were never completed when the four battleships were canceled in 1914.
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Thanks for your thoughts on the twin DP 4". On a Facebook group, recently, I proposed doing a mass "austere" update on all of the QEs and Rs, replacing all the casemate 6", with twin 4"., rather than spending so many resources on the more expensive rebuilds if QE, and Valiant, leaving the other ships unable to mount a credible AA defense. I credit their lack of AA as the primary reason Repulse, and, later, all of the Revenges, were banished to the Indian Ocean.
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@WALTERBROADDUS yes, I would expect a significant working up time. Before Richelieu joined the RN force in the Indian Ocean, she worked with the Home Fleet for five months after her refit in the US. My favorite scenario is where Richelieu and Jean Bart make for the UK, rather than North Africa when France falls. And both Dunkerques just happen to be in the Atlantic and make for the UK as well. Over the following months, the French ships are reequipped with UK AA armament and exercise with the Home Fleet. When Bismark tries to break out, the three French ships make for the Denmark Strait, because they are faster, while KGV and PoW make for the closer Faroe Islands channel. The obsolete battlecruisers serve as a backup in case Bismark breaks through the first line. Of course, for the French ships to serve willingly with the RN in 41 would require Reynaud to skip across the channel, set up a government in exile, and denounce collaborators like Petain and Darlan.
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@gildor8866 14" production was certainly on stride. By June of 16, the guns for Idaho had been delivered, the guns for New Mexico and Mississippi were being proof fired, and the turret mounts were being assembled at the Naval Gun Factory. By June of 17, all the 14" for Tennessee and California were expected to be completed by October. However, by June 1917, the turrets for the Tennessees were still in design. Then priorities changed and resources were funneled into freighters and DDs. As for the ships, there was not a lot of daylight between the two classes. Maryland was laid down a month before Tennessee, so, at the time Maryland was laid down, they must have anticipated having the 16" guns ready in time.
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@RedXlV If it's any consolation, the 1919 edition of Jane's calls them "Maryland" class, and the preceding class the "California" class. If you look at what those two yards were building before the Colorados, New York Shipbuilding laid down Idaho on Jan 20, 1915, while Newport News laid down Mississippi on April 5, 1915, so New York Shipbuilding should have launched Idaho first, so the slipway would have been clear for Colorado before Newport News launched Mississippi on Jan 25, 1917. If New York shipbuilding had taken the same amount of time on Idaho as Newport News took on Mississippi, Idaho would have launched in October of 16, so, given the same lag Newport News had between the two ships, Colorado would have been laid down, in January 1917, 3 months ahead of Maryland, and all would be right with the world. The Navy probably did not allow for New York Shipbuilding taking so long on Idaho when the hull numbers for Maryland and Colorado were set.
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@kemarisite I suspect what made the semi-fixed ammo for the 5"/38 workable was the power rammer. iirc, shell and charge are dumped in the loading tray and rammed together., vs loading shell and charge separately on the 5"/51. That is what gave the 5"/38 the rate of fire equal to a gun with fixed ammo. I did an exercise where the USN used the twin 4"/50 mount that was installed on a few DDs experimentally, in place of each 5"/51 on a BB. The results were interesting. Then I did an exercise where the 4" is cut down to 45 caliber, converted to a sliding breech, and installed on the twin, dual-purpose, British Mi XIX mount they used with their 4", in place of the 5"/51-5"/25 combination USN BBs had in the 30s. Even more fascinating results. I have read that Jackie Fisher was an advocate of more smaller, rapid fire, guns, for a secondary, rather than the 6" casemate mounts then common on RN capital ships. The ships Jackie had a personal hand in, the Renowns and Courageouses, both had 4" secondaries. My hypothetical USN 4" exercises indicate Jackie might have had a point.
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@WALTERBROADDUS when I visited the LST museum ship in Muskegon, MI a few years ago, I had them start up the old Army training film on how the ship operates. As you said, first, schedule the landing on a rising tide. So. between the landing craft being lighter, after discharging it's cargo, plus the rising tide, they can back off. The LST was much more elaborate. They had ballast tanks that would be pumped out before hitting the beach, then refilled to plant the ship firmly on the beach for unloading. They also kept the engines going forward, to keep the ship forced onto the beach. After unloading, they pumped out the ballast tanks, started reeling in the kedging anchor they dropped on the way in, reversed the engines, and, with the rising tide, pulled themselves off the beach.
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@M.M.83-U The Normandies, Caracciolos and Mackensens all had obsolete armor and TDS systems by 1919 standards. I have seen drawings of a Caracciolo that show the last modification, in 1919, with 110mm of armor added to the weather deck. Those same drawings show most of the boilers arranged in compartments along the sides of the hull, separated by an additional bulkhead from the centerline compartments that contained another half dozen boilers and the turbines for the inboard shafts, so the side boiler rooms act like a TDS. I have seen a photo of Caracciolo dated December 1915 that shows the weather deck being installed. The interesting thing about the photo is most of the decking is not yet in place and I can see that there are no compartment bulkheads below the weather deck and I can see the turtleback armor deck. I interpret that photo as showing a temporary deck being put on to protect the hull from the weather in preparation for work on the ship being suspended. Seems that, with the turtleback being exposed like that, the reasonable thing would have been to add more armor to the turtleback, before completing the first deck and the permanent weather deck. Alltogether, considering the way the boiler rooms were arranged to mimic a TDS, the opportunity to reenforce the turtleback offered by where construction was when suspended in early 16, speed, and the 15" guns, I would much rather go into WWII in Caracciolo than a Normandie or Mackensen.
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wrt the 1.1"/Bofors 40mm/Vickers pompom question. iirc, one major issue with the Vickers was that it did not work right using USN propellant, and no-one in the US made cordite. Another gun tested in the USN shootoff that the Bofors won, was a 37mm gun the US Army was using. The 37mm had a significant range advantage over the Vickers, though range and shell size were slightly less than the Bofors offered. In the absence of the Bofors, I would expect the 37mm to receive the mods it historically did later: metallic link belt feed, in place of clips, and feed from either right or left. With belt feed from either right or left, I envision a quad mount quite like the quad Vickers mount, with the same rate of fire as the Vickers, but significantly longer range.
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During VAG's last crisis, over diesel emissions, the company whined about the cost, and threatened factory headcount reductions. The head of the union, made a very good point: why not VAG get rid of redundant divisions and vanity projects instead? Skoda and SEAT compete in the same segment as VW, so they are paying for three sets of administrative overhead, when there could be only one. Then there is the money they pour into vanity projects like Bugatti and Lamborghini. Sergio Marchionne publicly said Bugatti is the biggest waste of capital he had ever seen. Did VAG clean house? Nope.
VAG has followed the same playbook at Stellantis, and Ford, with the same result. They all cut quality, and raised price, to fatten up their operating margins. VW's global warranty claims expense is now only exceeded by Ford's. They could charge premium prices, after the plague, by working the "shortage" narrative. But now, they have 100 days supply, or more, of cars sitting in storage lots, so the "shortage" narrative no longer works and customers are rejecting the high prices.
So what is VAG's response? Same thing that their first choice was in their last crisis: take money away from the employees.
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@stormy0307 I agree a mongrel fleet is not ideal from a supply standpoint, but if you order a Yarrow widget, you should receive a Yarrow widget, not an Ansaldo widget. The fact that the RM used several German and Austrian ships for a number of years, rather than scrapping them outright, as the UK, US, and France did, with their war reparations ships, tells me the supply problems paled at the prospect of a free ship. In the case of battleships, the RM would not have wanted UK castoffs anyway, due to the running costs. While the RM was happy to run Austrian and German cruisers and destroyers, they sent the Tegetthoff to the breakers as soon as they received her. I did some back-of-the-envelope figuring a while back. The RM had a significant destroyer building program in the 20s. I figured that, if they had foregone about half of those destroyers, they would have had enough money to complete Caracciolo, but the RM's priorities said destroyers, not battleships.
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wrt the question about USN alternatives to the Oerlikon and Bofors guns: the US Army had two 37mm guns, the lightweight, low velocity, M4, which was used in aircraft, such as the P-39 that Drac mentions, and the high velocity M1, which was used as a ground based AA gun. Comparing the M1 to the Bofors, the Bofors fired a heavier shell with greater range and ceiling, which would make the Bofors the winner in a head to head competition. The Bofors clips being gravity fed also simplified loading as the clips needed to be pushed into the M1 by the man loading the gun so that the feed pawls would grab it. The M1 also had an awkward cooling system, using a water chest. M1 firing had to be stopped every 60 rounds while water was flushed through the gun to cool it. The M1 was later developed into the M9, where the rigid clips were replaced by a disintegrating metal link belt, like the Vickers used, and redesigned for both left and right side feed versions. If the Bofors had not existed, the M9 would probably have been developed sooner, a more effective cooling system developed, and the gun could probably be adopted to any style mount that was developed for the Vickers, as they were both side fed, metal link belt, guns.
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@Zonkotron I think the velocity vs size debate was cited wrt the guns on the Nelsons. The formula E=M(Vsquared) argues that a higher velocity shell will deliver more energy. A Nelson gun fired at about 150fps higher muzzle velocity than a 15"/42. Penetration at 20,000 yards was 12.2" for a 16" vs 11.7" for a 15". Barrel life for the 16" was 200-250 rounds, vs 335 for the 15", so not a lot of penetration gained for the 30% reduction in barrel life, considering the 16" shell was also slightly heavier. The difference was even more stark between the USN 14/50 and 16"/45, The 14" Mk 4 (New Mexico and Tennessee class) fired a 1400lb shell at 2800fps and could penetrate 6.7" at 20,000 yards, with a barrel life of 250 rounds. The 16"/45 Mk 1 on the Colorado class fired a 2110lb shell at 2600fps, and could penetrate 11.5" @ 20,000 yards, with a barrel life of 350 rounds. It is hard to imagine, now, how a debate between the 14" and 16" could rage in the USN at the time, but it did.
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This question received several likes, but no answer, when posted a while back, so, with a shipbuilding video, lets try it again: At what point were a battleship's turbines and boilers typically installed? "The Battleship Builders" says the powerplant was installed during fitting out, so that the hull would be lighter at launching. But, the Wiki entry on the North Carolina class shows boilers being installed in NC, on 16 January of 39, while the ship was launched in June of 40. I have seen an aerial photo of Washington being launched, which shows midships decked over, implying the powerplant has already been installed. Which was the usual sequence of powerplant installation on a BB, before or after launch? Thanks!
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The naval treaties have been brought up in comments a couple times recently, and that got the wheels turning wrt the Deutschlands. Some articles mention that, as the allies were trying to figure out a way to prevent their construction, Germany offered to break up Deutschland on the ways, if the allies agreed to replace the naval limitations of the Versailles treaty with the existing naval treaties between the five powers, with a capital ship quota of 125,000 tons, vs 175,000 for France and Italy. Ultimately, France opposed the proposal and it was dropped. What if Germany had come under the 5 power treaties? The Deutschlands would immediately be outlawed as cruisers as their 11" guns exceeded the treaty limit. However, Germany then could go directly to the Scharnhorsts, which were comfortably under the naval treaty's 35,000 ton limit for battleships. Drach's video on Scharnhorst says that Germany had lost the ability to build really large guns, so, instead of the desired 15". the Scharns received the 11" developed for the Deutschlands. But if the Deutschlands are not built, then that 11" gun is not developed either. By the time the Deutschland would have been laid down, the treaty change agreed, Deutschland broken up on the ways, and the Scharnhorsts designed, Hitler was in power. By 34, Hitler could ring up his buddy in Rome and say "hey Benny, could Ansaldo run off some extras of the 15"/50 it's making for your Littorios? I have an idea." So, which would work out better for the allies? With the treaty switch, the Deutschlands, which churned up their share of mischief early in the war don't exist, but the Scharnhorsts are more potent.
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@jetdriver Yes, you are correct wrt Tennessee and Maryland. All of the big 5 were promptly laid up at the end of the war, along with the North Carolinas and South Dakotas, where they languished for a dozen years before going to the breakers. All the QEs, Rs and Nelsons went straight to the breakers in the late 40s. I think the US hanging on to the big 5 was the aberration, not the Brits sending 30 year old ships straight to the breakers. Besides the 4 surviving KGVs, the Brits also had Vanguard. Reading about the construction of the Lions and Vanguard, I get the impression that the UK was having chronic shortages of workers and material during the war, far worse than the US ever had as work on the ships started, and stopped, several times. A severe shortage of workers and material in the UK could also contribute to skimping on refits for old ships that weren't long for the world anyway, while the US was relatively flush with resources, so could do work the Brits couldn't manage.
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@coltaxe100 There would actually be two different "if you coulds', one with the naval treaties and one without. Without treaties and an unlimited checkbook, the sky is the limit, especially if you include contracting with yards in Canada and the US. With the treaties, then you get out the calculator and a copy of Jane's to see what decisions to make differently. wrt Carriers, the Washington treaty specified that all carriers in service or building at the time of the treaty were deemed "experimental" and not subject to the 20 year replacement schedule, so they could be replaced at any time. Argus, Eagle and Hermes all fit that criteria. Eagle was not efficient as a carrier, but had a bit of size and a bit of speed, not fast, but fast enough to cruise with QEs, so it might be worthwhile to retain. Argus had no speed, and Hermes had no size. so remission both as seaplane tenders to free up the tonnage to build a second Ark Royal. Depending on the assessment of the situation, Renown and Repulse had size and speed, and could have been converted to carriers, after the treaty collapsed, faster than new carriers could have been built from the keel up. As for BBs, instead of building the Nelsons, the RN could have taken deferred construction windows, like France and Italy did, so they could have built two, modern, fast, BBs in the early 30s, rather than the eccentric and slow Nelsons. Outside of that, the RN really couldn't do anything more within the framework of the treaties. The 1930 London treaty extended the BB building moratorium through 1936. KGV and Prince of Wales were laid down New Year's day of 1937. The other three KGVs had all been laid down by July of 37. Really, when it comes to BBs, the Brits did about as well as they could, within the limits of the treaty, without having 20/20 foresight.
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@greg_mca the first thing is carrier aircraft tend to be built stronger to withstand the rigors of carrier ops. The first day out when I was on the Lexington, I was taking a shortcut through the hanger when, with no warning, I heard *WHAM*. I was wondering what part of that old ship had broken, when a guy walking with me said "plane landed". I also, by luck, got a photo of an A7, that had just trapped. The deceleration was so strong the pilot can be seen in the photo thrown several inches away from his seatback, in spite of the harness he was wearing. I used to know at what deceleration rate a person's eyeballs will pop out of their sockets. Obviously, the deceleration on a carrier landing is safely below that limit, but not hugely below it. Consequently, a land based plane, like a Hurricane or Spitfire, will usually require structural strengthening, in addition to the expected arresting hook and life raft. The strengthening will usually degrade performance due to the extra weight. The aircraft will be changed to suit the ships, not the other way around. The Brits were hurting for single seat fighters in 40. They bought the Grumman F4F, know in British service as the Martlet. The Martlet I, like all early Wildcats, did not have folding wings, so the Brits tended to leave them ashore. The Martlet II introduced Grumman's folding wing feature to the Royal Navy, so more of the planes could be accommodated on board. When Drac does his video on the Graf Zepplin, he may get into how the 109s and Stukas were modified for carrier service. If you get a chance, see "Ships With Wings", a British 1941 production. It gives some good looks at Swordfish and Skuas coming up the elevator with their wings folded. A lot of that footage was shot on the Ark Royal, less than a year before it was sunk.
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wrt making Wasp more survivable. I don't think trying to use the same torpedo and AA protection tonnage allowance as the Lexingtons would be viable, because, iirc, the tonnage added for those systems was counted in the displacement of the ship, and that additional tonnage was not available when Wasp was built.
The best thing that could have been done with Wasp was to route all the gasoline mains outside of the hull. A lesson learned from the loss of Lexington was, when an inbound attack is detected, drain the gas mains and fill the mains and pump rooms with CO2. When Yorktown and Hornet were lost, they did not burn. That was not possible with Wasp, as she was actively operating aircraft at the time, and hit without enough warning. A running modification that was being made on carriers, as they came in for refit, was to reroute the gas mains outside the hull. Wasp was in Norfolk for some work at the beginning of June, before deploying to the Pacific. The material I have access to this morning does not say if the gas main modification was done on Wasp. Late war photos of Enterprise show what I believe to be that external gas main, running horizontally down the starboard side, just below the hangar. There are a couple photos of Wasp, taken in Norfolk. in June 42, that do not show a similar pipe system.
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@angelomaset1441 my first guess would be the KM would look a lot like the Italian RM, except with smaller quotas under the naval treaties: a couple of WWI BBs, probably the two Bayerns that were completed, cruisers, DDs, probably no Deutschland class, as the 11" guns exceeded the treaty limits for cruisers, but with the Scharnhorsts built a few years sooner, but with 15" guns developed from the Krupp 38 cm SK L/45 used on the Bayerns. The 11" would not have been available, as the Deutschlands not being built means the 11" is never developed. Then you get into speculation: would the Germans have radically updated the Bayerns the way the Italians updated their old BBs, or just press ahead with the Bismarks as soon as the naval treaties collapsed.
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@bkjeong4302 I remember my grandfather talking about how the Japanese used a little latch, rather than the large, and heavy, mechanisms the USN used. I'm thinking weight was the factor, with the IJN choosing to maintain aircraft performance, at the expense of not carrying quite as many aircraft.
wrt, the folding wings on dive bombers, the multi-G stress was a consideration. That being said, while the SBD did not have folding wings, the SB2U and SB2C did have folding wings. I found a pic on-line of three SB2Us in the hangar of Bearn, with their wings folded. The Skua and navalized Stuka also had folding wings.
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How about this one: instead of trying to do a piecemeal update on Tiger, which, iirc, had never been converted to oil fuel, nor had torpedo bulges installed, so add that to the work order. let's take a Sawzall to the Revenges, about midships, and add an 80 foot, or so, plug in the hull to house more propulsion machinery, and improve the length to beam ratio. An 80 foot plug amidships would give almost exactly the same length to beam ratio of the Lion class battlecruisers, that could make 27.5kts. without the modern propulsion machinery the Revenges would be retrofitted with.
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First point: I expect that Trump is itching to push racist buttons. Whether Harris is at the top of the ticket, or still VP, in line if Biden dies or is disabled in office, Trump is going to float the dog whistle "you want another of those people as President?"
Options: Gavin Newsom? His ex-wife is snuggling with one of Trump's spawn. She will say the most horrible, personal, things about Newsom. Won't matter if any of it is true, or not. Newsom would have no way of pushing back.
Few other Dems have had national exposure. Jamie Raskin? Cancer survivor. What are the chances of a relapse? Adam Schiff? Maybe. Got plenty of exposure in the two impeachments.
Who has instant, national, name recognition? Who has a lot of influence in the party?
Get ready for "everybody sucks 2.0" as Hillary walks in to, in her mind, "save the world".
The hardest voting decision I ever had to make, was in 2016. Which corrupt, megalomaniac to vote for?
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@brendonbewersdorf986 as they say, everything is relative. HMS Rawalpindi and HMS Jervis Bay could manage about 15kts and carried seven or eight 6" guns. A Connecticut class pre-dreadnough could touch 18kts, and carried 4-12" and 8-8" in twin turrets, as well as some casemate mounted 7" that might be useable in a flat calm. I would not bet a lot on the Connecticut against both Scharnhorsts. Connecticut's 12"/45s, even with unmodified mounts that are restricted to 15 degrees, can reach out 20,000 yards. Her 8" mounts could elevate to 20 degrees, good for 22,000 yards. At ranges greater than that, Scheer could not penetrate Connecticut's 11" main belt, but at any range they can reach, Connecticut's 12" and 8" can punch through Scheer's 3.1" belt. Against the Scheer, with the Connecticut positioned so the Scheer would have to go through it to get at the convoy, I rather like Connecticut's chances, if given modern fire control.
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@arivael the Courageouses were called "large light cruisers". I would run with that, use them as light cruisers, that happen to have very large guns. A triple 8" turret weights less than half what the twin 15" turret's weight, but I don't know if a quad would fit on the existing barbette. Would the greater rate of fire, vs throwing smaller shells, be worth the effort? Thinking of them as cruisers, I don't see a need for significant additional armor, as they are about as well protected as treaty era cruisers. Replace the six triple 4" mounts with six, or more, twin DP 5.25" and some medium AA, and they would not seem absurd to me.
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wrt the question about reusing existing guns to expedite battleship construction, the first option that crosses my mind is to have the Admiralty retain all of the 13.5" Mk V heavy shell guns when their original ships were scrapped. By my figuring, that would be 80 guns, plus whatever spares were in inventory to support the ships originally built with them. Using the 13.5s would also comply with the reduction in gun size to 14" in Second London. Alternately, the USN apparently had ordered 14"/50s for the battlecruisers at the same time as the guns were ordered for the Tennessee class BBs, then the battlecruisers moved on to the 16"/50, leaving the USN with a large, surplus inventory of new 14" guns. Reportedly 119 14"/50s were built, to support only 5 BBs that used them. Even allowing for 24 spares, 2 complete sets of replacements, to support the USN BBs, USN need would be 84 guns, leaving 35 available for potential sale to the UK, enough for 2 KGVs, plus a full set of spares. The problem with using the US guns would be powder, as they would need to be fed USN smokeless, rather than cordite, for optimal performance. During WWI, the RN used US built 14"/45s on one class of monitors. They experimented with cordite in them and, reportedly, suffered a significant loss of range. The problem with any existing 13.5" or 14" gun would be turrets, which are also time consuming to build. Salvaged 13.5" would have twin turrets. USN 14" would require new turrets to be built. Twin turrets are not weight or space efficient, which becomes an issue when complying with the treaty displacement limits, and the displacement limit was not increased until mid 1938. The gun size escalator triggered in April 1937. The return to 16" guns a year before the displacement limit increase makes me want to cast a lustful eye on the triple 16" turrets on the Nelsons, moving them to more capable hulls.
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@RedXlV Yes, I was thinking of using the twin 13.5" on something along the lines of a Scharnhorst. Of course, any scenario using 13.5" would depend on the Admiralty retaining the gun and turret sets and armor when the Iron Dukes were scrapped in the early 30s. I read somewhere they did retain some of the guns, but I don't know about the rest.
Once the gun size escalator triggered in April 37, the Admiralty could do something with the 8 twin 15" turrets that were in inventory: the 4 from Courageous and Glorious, the two on the Erebus class monitors, the one on Marshal Soult and one new one in warehouse. Again, prior to the displacement escalator triggering in June 38, they would be looking at a Scharnhorst. After June 38, they could build two Vanguards. As Drac noted, armor would be an issue, as they were already making the armor for the five KGVs, unless it was feasible to strip the armor off the Revenges.
That brings us back to the Nelsons: triple gun and turret sets, and armor. wrt the 2,375lb shell, my concern would be overpressuring the tube by going to such a heavy shell, but if the 2.250 had proved out, use that. Using the Nelson turrets would enable building something along the lines of a North Carolina, and, as the turrets had been debugged, they might not have the issues that were experienced with the KGV quad turrets early on. But, stripping two serviceable battleships, even if to build two much more capable ones, on the eve of war, would be controversial.
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@johnfisher9692 I understand where you are coming from, but the hazard is in sacrificing good enough for better, to the point that nothing ever gets built. At some point, a design needs to be frozen, so it can be built, while the designers keep working to improve on that design for the next generation. The other hazard is, of course, that a design element could be entirely wrongheaded, and the subsequent design heading even farther off in the wrong direction, before the flaw in the logic is discovered. An example of the first case is the first generation carriers. Eagle and Hermes were six year builds. The Lexingtons were seven year builds, and C&R was complaining, in it's annual reports, about how disappointed they were in the slow progress. Akagi and Kaga were also slow builds. In the case of the Lexingtons, I am thinking the delays, and the huge cost overruns, were the result of a massive number of change orders as new ideas were birthed, or experience was gained with Langley. In comparison, Ranger was built in only 3 years, with only a $2M, about 10%, cost overrun. Ranger had one major change order while construction was underway: the addition of an island, which probably accounts for a good share of that $2M overrun. I have no doubt that the original $23M conversion cost for the Lexingtons was intended to be accurate. The estimate given in 1922 for a clean sheet dedicated carrier was $27M. Extrapolating Ranger's cost to 20,000 tons gives a cost of $28M. Lexington's cost ballooning from $23M to $40M was probably unforeseen and the result of starting the ships when the USN was still too far down the learning curve. A few days ago, I asked my local public library to transfer in a copy of Friedman on carriers to see if he can provide conformation of my suspicions that the Lexington's cost overrun, was due to change orders.
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@brianwillson3565 Yes, several USN and IJN carriers had enough overhead clearance to store spare aircraft suspended from the overhead. The number of spares that could be carried that way varied between the different classes of carriers. At some point, I saw a listing for carriers that broke out the number of spares, vs number that were ready for service, but, right now, I don't recall where. Some British carriers had very low overhead clearance. F4U Corsairs had to have some 6" clipped from their wingtips so they would fit in some British carrier hangars with their wings folded, because, as with most USN aircraft, except Grumman's, the Corsair's wings folded upward. All RN aircraft wings folded back, parallel to the fuselage, so they could fit in the hangars with low clearance.
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@Lubyak it may be a matter of how much a gun does or doesn't irritate it's crews. The US 1.1 jammed, a lot, in several different ways. There is color combat footage of Midway, shot by the USN, that has several short looks at a couple 1.1" mounts on one of the ships. In the first couple looks, the mount in the foreground is banging away just fine and looking very potent. In the third glimpse, only the right end gun is firing. As the loading machine of the 1.1" held two clips and switched between clips automatically when one clip was empty, the three guns that are stopped are probably not stopped for a reload, but because the things jammed, again. That is probably a total, of all the glimpses, of 10 seconds of looking at that mount, and the camera caught 3 of 4 guns jammed. Any machine will engender a degree of loyalty, if it simply works as intended. Doesn't matter if the 96 has to stop to reload every few seconds. Doesn't matter if the 96 throws a light shell. Doesn't matter if the 96 has a short range. Doesn't matter if the 96 vibrates. If the thing shoots when you pull the trigger, it will be appreciated.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 the Browning designed M1 was tested by the Navy, in the late 30s, but was bested by the Bofors, which participated in the same trials. In a world without Bofors, or if the Nazis had paid heavily to obtain an exclusive license from Bofors, then I can certainly see the M1 performing fairly well in it's place. But, seeing how the big dogs at BuOrd behaved in the late 30s, seems like the M1 may have been rejected because "not invented here". In one flight of fancy, I conceived of belt fed M1s in a quad mount patterned after that used with the Vickers Pompom, and single, flex mounted M4s, with a quick change magazine, used in place of the Oerlikon.
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@joelmontgomery4837 Of the three battlecruisers, Renown was the only one with a modern AA suite. Probably would have ended up the way Z historically did. As an exercise, I put together some timelines and found an alternate Force Z that would have been more capable against aircraft, and salve Somerville's bruised pride. Due to the shortage of battleships, Somerville was stuck with Malaya as his flagship, which he didn't like. So, instead of continuing around Africa, on it's way to the far east, PoW pulls in to Gibraltar to be Somerville's flagship. Historically, shortly after that time Force H and the force from Alexandria were both engaged in diversionary actions to distract from a British land offensive in Africa. Use those diversionary actions to cover the transfer of Malaya to Alexandria. At the same time, Revenge delivered a convoy to Aden, so then have Revenge steam up the canal to Alexandria. With Malaya and Revenge in place, QE and Valiant, both with modern AA, become Force Z and make for Singapore. Hermes finishes it's refit at Simonstown and makes for Singapore. A workshop in Singapore fabricates arresting hooks that are fitted to some of the RAF Buffalos based there. When QE, Valiant and Hermes meet up in Singapore, all but one or two of Hermes' Swordfishes are put ashore and as many Buffalos as possible put on board to provide a CAP. Some sources say there was consideration of Hermes joining PoW in South Africa, but not pursued as Hermes could not keep up with PoW, but the dozen or so Stringbags she normally carried would not have been useful as the battle occurred.
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@gregorywright4918 the RAF in Malaya had Buff B-339Es, with several items of UK equipment and a different Mod Cyclone engine, from the 339 C and D the Dutch flew. The question of structural strength is one I don't have an answer to. Depends on how Brewster designed them: with additional parts, beside the hook, that were deleted from the 339 variants, or making the existing structural parts stronger. If Brewster had two sets of structural parts, it's a sure bet the factory would have mixed them up and some USN pilots would see their tails break off on an arrested landing. I would expect the planes to be structurally identical, except for the hook not being bolted in, because that would be simplest for Brewster. Of course, the easy thing would have been to send a wire to Brewster at that time to confirm, but getting anything out of Brewster, parts or information, in a timely manner was difficult. Even if the RAF did get an answer, if it came from Brewster's export agents, a pair of brothers by the name of Miranda. I wouldn't trust it. Before being hired by Brewster, the Mirandas had done time in Federal prison for violating a US arms embargo. After the USN took over the Brewster factory in PA, the government sued the Mirandas and Brewster principle Jimmy Work for $3.2M for fraud. I wonder if the Aussies knew up front that the shiny new Buffs they bought were going to have engines that had been discarded by US airlines and "refrubished" by Wright, instead of new engines?
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@grantlee5737 three differences between the Deering and Constitution, that I see. The Deering is a schooner, vs square rigged, was built in 1919, rather than more than a century earlier, and does not have guns or boarding parties to man. Being a schooner, sails are raised and lowered by pulling on halyards, rather than climbing out on a yardarm. Being built in 1919. most of the pulling on the halyards was probably done by an engine driven winch. rather than purely manpower. According to Wiki, the crew of the Deering was 11, as you said. Compare to Preussen, also five masted, but square rigged, built in 1902, which had a crew of 45. Cutty Sark, roughly the same size as Deering, but a three masted, square rigged clipper, built in 1870, had a crew of 28-35. Wiki says that HMS Bounty, when she set sail for Tahiti in 1787, had a crew of 44, including the captain, plus two civilian gardeners. Crew on non-military square rigged ships appears to have been fairly stable over the centuries. The major labor saving came in the switch to schooner rig, and the availability of an engine driven winch to do the halyard pulling.
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@AddumEnied the carrier conversions were quite inefficient at carrying aircraft. I suspect that the US, and Japan, both shot themselves in the foot by doing the conversions, rather than building carriers from the keel up, which could be optimized for carrying aircraft.
There is an alt history, however, where, at the Washington conference, Japan demands to be allowed to build a 42,000 ton capital ship, because of Hood. So, to make tonnage available to complete Tosa, Kongo is converted to a carrier.
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@jacqueshejeije7499 no specific name, or number, for that alt history scenario. I generate alt histories as a hobby during the winter. The Washington treaty intervention provides a wide range of possible scenarios. That scenario of Tosa being built, is based on a factual position by the UK negotiators that they were willing to accept an individual ship displacement limit of 42,000 tons, because of Hood. The US pressed for a 35,000 ton limit, because it didn't want to spend the money to build anything bigger. The treaty allowed Japan to have 315,000 tons of capital ships, but the retention list in the treaty shows Japan having only 301,320 tons. Not enough room for Tosa, without reclassifying Kongo, to free up her 27,500, giving Japan 41,180 tons, just enough to allow for Tosa to be completed.
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@beedrillbot121 I haven't give an alternate WWI as much thought as you. Given that Germany already held most of the Marianas, I would say it's guaranteed that von Spee would head his squadron to Guam and knock it off, which would give von Spee a home port Germany could call it's own.
There is a possibility that, with Germany declaring war on the US and intervening in Mexico, the other European powers say "oh, that was random", sit back for a while and see what develops.
If Huerta told the Mexican population that, while the US started the war, Mexico (with Germany's help) is going to retake all the territory the US stole from it and restore the Mexican borders of 1824. would the rebels put their revolution on hold, and line up behind Huerta for the greater good of Mexico?
Hispanics constituted a large part of the population of the SW US, but the Angeloes often treated them as badly as African-Americans. Would the Hispanics be loyal to the US, or form a fifth column to aid the Mexicans?
Germany would be in it for oil concessions. The UK would be looking at it's primary economic rival, Germany, and it's up and coming economic rival, the US, bleeding each-other. The UK may choose to sit back and watch, while selling war material to both at a tidy profit.
Would the US put up a fight, or sue for peace? The German army had 4.5M men, the US Army had 200,000, so a small portion of the German army could overrun the US Army. Most of the US population and industry wee outside of the disputed area, but most of the oil was in the disputed area. The reason the US was so hopped up about Tampico was that it was the site of the first Mexican oil boom, and US oil companies wanted that oil.
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@TheJuggtron I read a book about the Washington conference last winter, but I was more focused on the US and UK activities. iirc, the Australian member had some input into the decision making, but I don't recall what that was specifically. A bit of background: Australia became independent of the UK in 1901. New Zealand declined to join the Australian federation, so became a dominion of the UK in 1907: self-rule for internal affairs, but foreign affairs directed by the UK. While Australia formed the RAN, a division of the RN was assigned to defend New Zealand, largely funded by Wellington and increasingly manned by Kiwis. There was no formal New Zealand navy until 1941. Australia's GDP, hence it's ability to fund a navy, was about 5% of that of the UK. New Zealand's GDP was about 20% of Australia's. Australia had funded and operated a battlecruiser. New Zealand funded the construction of a battlecruiser, then gifted it to the RN. By the time of the WNT, both of those battlecruisers were nearly ten years old, with an entire war's worth of hard running. I don't think either country would want a badly worn, obsolete, coal-fired, battlecusier. How about the UK expressing it's gratitude for the gift of HMS New Zealand and the contributions during the war of HMAS Australia, by gifting Courageous and Glorious to the two countries? Nearly new, oil fired, state of the art weaponry. If Australia did take on both Courageouses, they probably never would have bought the two County class cruisers. If the Kiwis had a Courageous, they probably could not afford any other cruisers of any description. Of course, the other fly is the Courageouses were too big for the Sutherland drydock at Cockatoo Island, the dock being 210 meters long and the ships 240 meters. The RN would have to gift the Aussies a floating drydock too.
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@colinhunt4057 I agree that Sea Lion was probably postponed, iirc it was not officially canceled, due to the lateness of the season, rather than entirely due to the resilience of the RAF, as some narratives claim. And, as you said, the river barges that had been commandeered for the sea lift needed to be released to resume their commercial hauling. At the moment, I am reading a speculative alt history of Sea Lion, that draws a lot from German preparations and planning for the invasion. I think it was serious, as England was very much back on it's heels, due to the loss of equipment in France. iirc, Ian on Forgotten Weapons, noted some 90% of army inventory of Bren guns had been lost in France, along with vast numbers of tanks, artillery, and anti-tank guns. Have you seen the sort of things being issued to the Home Guard? Some folks were handed a length of pipe, with a WWI bayonet welded on the end.
What changed my thinking about the motives for invading the Soviet Union was my chance hearing of that recording of Hitler from 42. According to Hitler's statements in that recording, the negotiations in late 40 were an attempt to pull the Soviets into the Axis. Hitler was proposing the Soviets would be allocated Iran and India. Apparently, the Soviets also wanted the Balkans. The way to get to the Balkans from the Soviet Union, was through Romania, which threatened German oil supply. Hitler said that, by the time Molotov headed back to Moscow in November 40, he was sure the Soviets wanted a war, so he acted proactively and attacked first. Of course, that left no resources for invading the UK.
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@spookyshadowhawk6776 iirc, the Vickers in the Boer War was a 1 pounder, single barrel, 37mm, that could be mounted on a carriage similar to that used for a Gatling, or post mounted on a vehicle or ship's deck . That begat a 1 1/2 pound/37mm, which was used as a light AA gun by the RN in WWI, which begat the 2 pound/40mm. The early 2 pounders, Mk I, Mk II, were single mounts and apparently suffered reliability issues. The later Mk VIII, used in multiple mounts, was more reliable.
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@StE-m8w On the other hand, from my readings, the Type 96 was reasonably reliable. The USN 1.1" did not have to stop firing to reload, and vibrated less, but jammed frequently. In the color USN film about Midway, there is a view of a pair of 1.1" mounts shown several times. In the first couple shots, all four guns of the mount in the foreground are firing, but in the last shot, only the far right side gun is firing. Additionally, with the largest Type 96 mount being a triple, the loaders had room to work, while, in the quad 1.1" mount, the loaders were absurdly crowded.
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@jrturner7707 The deletion of casemates seems to have been uneven. The early British battlecruisers had deck mounted 4", the middle group: the Lions, Queen Mary, Tiger, had casemates, but the last group: Renowns, Courageouses, Hood, had deck mounts. British dreadnoughts clung to casemates through the Revenge class, then the Nelsons went to deck mounts. The USN persisted with casemates through the Lexingtons and South Dakotas. The IJN clung to casemates through the Tosa, Kii, "Number 13" and Amagi designs.
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What indeed was his plan with Renown and Courageous? Think I would suggest that he was trying to get back to his original concept. As the battlecruisers had grown, their speed had not increased appreciably. So, with the last two generations, he makes another leap in speed, at the expense of protection and number of guns. I have read a claim that Renown was intended for the Baltic project. I have read the generally accepted narrative that Courageous was intended for the Baltic project. In reality, Renown was some five feet shallower draft than the immediately preceding battlecruisers, but Courageous' draft was only 14" less than Renown's. Hardly seems worth the bother for another 14". A letter from Fisher to d'Eyncourt was calling for a draft of no more than 22 1/2 feet, for Courageous, saying that that draft was "vital for Baltic work", but also saying that he and d'Eyncourt need to "make a good story for the Cabinet", and "It's on the Baltic necessity that we will carry these ships through in the Cabinet." Courageous missed that mark by over three feet. Courageous meets all of his design parameters, except draft. If draft was the key consideration, for the Baltic op, and the ship missed that parameter by over 3 feet, why was Courageous built? I'm thinking Courageous was built only because they would not let him build a third Renown. The Baltic op story was used to con the Cabinet, and was never his actual intention.
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@marktuffield6519 Thanks for the tip. I reviewed that video. As noted previously, my reading on the X-Lighters is completely at odds with what the speaker states. They were not laying around in British ports, waiting for the Baltic op, as the speaker claims. The speaker also does not disclose that Courageous, as built, missed that draft parameter by several feet, and was barely an improvement over Renown. He glosses over just how Fisher proposed to provoke the Germans into invading Denmark. And, if Germany did invade Denmark, would that allow enough time for the Danish/Swedish/British alliance the speaker claims? In 1940, it took Germany all of 6 hours to crush all resistance in Denmark. If the British tried to land on those two Danish islands that sit astride the straits, they would probably find them already occupied by the Germans. Looking at a map of that area, I see plenty of bays that the Germans could anchor old pre-dreadnoughts in, to create instant shore batteries. And that map that Fisher supposedly drew? Drawn in 1917, two years later. Was he trying to give the Baltic op the color of a serious plan, after the fact? Would not be the first time someone tried to rewrite history for personal benefit. All in all, I have trouble taking that speaker seriously. Here is something for your aviation enthusiast side. I presume you are aware of the Battle of the Coral Sea. I also presume you know of the Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bomber, and how they were slaughtered at Midway. You may know that Lexington was sunk at Coral Sea, and the wreck found in 2018. You may also be aware that a cluster of aircraft were found on the ocean bottom that had slid off the Lexington's deck as she sank. An expedition is scheduled to set sail in May, to attempt to recover some of those aircraft. At 11,000 feet, this is the deepest salvage ever attempted. Their targets are an F4F Wildcat that was flown by both Jimmy Thach and Butch O'Hare, and as many as all seven TBDs that are laying there. At present, there are no TBDs above water, anywhere in the world. Due to the cold, dark, oxygen starved, water, the planes are in good condition.
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@montecorbit8280 I'm pretty sure you are right. US flag ocean liners during that period, being US sovereign territory, had no liquor on board, so passengers had to face the entire trip stone, cold, sober. Passengers on a Cunard liner could start getting juiced up the moment the ship was outside of US territorial waters, so the liquor was certainly on board, while the ship was in a US port. That brings up an interesting question: while a British ship could have liquor on board while in a US port, could they serve, or was the rum ration stopped while in US territory? I read of one incident, before prohibition became US law. There was some sort of diplomatic function going on, on board a ship, tied up at a USN base. SecNav Daniels was an ardent temperance campaigner. When a couple wagons full of liquor for the function showed up at the gates of the navy base, they were denied entry. I somehow suspect the diplomatic function did not go well, without "lubrication".
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wrt the Tegetthoff, as Drac said, it appears to have been mostly a matter of cost, for what were not particularly good battleships. After the war, many Austrian destroyers and torpedo boats were allocated to Italy, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. Many of these ships served their new owners well into the 1930s. Italy did not have a huge inventory of destroyers, like the US did after the war, and embarked on a significant destroyer building program through the 20s. Italy was also putting down a rebellion in Libya. Even if Italy had done some horse trading with France to get both Tegetthoffs, potentially to use one as spares for the other, battleships were not a priority for Italy at the time, iirc, I did read somewhere along the line that the Italians did strip the heavy guns off of Tegetthoff for use as shore batteries.
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@lloydknighten5071 to expand on Walter's reply, sighting was done at the turret. In the pic of Barham undergoing refit that Drac used, you can see the three sighting periscopes on the top of A turret: one between the guns for the man traversing the turret and one on each side for the men operating the elevation of the corresponding gun. At the turn of the century, there were armored hoods in those locations, where the gunners stood, sighting through small telescopes. The telescopes were connected to the guns by a complex linkage so they would elevate in unison. Slop could never be entirely eliminated from the linkage connecting the gun to the scope, so, with the South Carolina class, the USN changed to a new model turret that had the scope rigidly bracketed to, and concentric, with the gun trunnion, so there was no slop. This resulted in the scopes being mounted low on the side of the turret, instead of the top, which also had the advantage, as the South Carolinas were the first USN battleships with superfiring turrets, that the sights were out of direct muzzle blast of the superfiring guns. While the RN persisted with the turret top mounted sights when they shifted to superfiring turrets, I have read that the gunners were directed to not fire the superfiring guns within 20 degrees either way of dead ahead, to prevent the sighs in the lower turret suffering from the muzzle blast.
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So, you are assuming a scenario at the Washington conference where the USN starts sniveling "the Brits have 4 battle cruisers, the Japanese have 4 battle cruisers, but we don't have any, that's unfair!", resulting in the USN swapping both Floridas, both Wyomings, both New Yorks and Oklahoma to clear the tonnage to build 4 Lexingtons, with the last two hulls converted to carriers. The potential for new tactics being developed around a very fast task force combining aircraft and big guns is intriguing. However, as the USN did not modernize it's capital ships during the 30s, the BCs would have gone into WWII, with, probably 8-5/25s replacing the original 3" AA guns, plus a couple of 1.1" Hardly adequate by WWII standards. Additional AA guns would be added from time to time, but the chances of them ever seeing the all singing, all dancing dual 5/38s would be pretty slim as installing them would require so much time in the yard. The best thing about the BCs might be, had they been based at Pearl, they probably would have been out with the carriers on Dec 7th.
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@coyotehater If I were Tojo, I would refrain from irritating the Brits and Americans, when I would receive their full attention in return. Attacking the French or Dutch colonies would probably bring the Brits in too. Japan had invaded China in 37, so that operation could keep them entertained. by itself. That being said, if I were Tojo, I would start a covert propaganda campaign in the US to turn US opinion against hanging on to the Philippines, combined with some astroturf demonstrations in the Philippines to make hanging on to the islands more expensive for the US. When the Germans finally get it in gear, I would not attack Pearl, as that would make Americans really mad. Now that the propaganda campaign has had time to work to loosen the US' grip on the Philippines, I would push harder for US withdrawal from the islands. If the US still doesn't leave, then offer an ultimatum to either withdraw or be removed forcibly. If the US pulls out, fine. If the US sends the Pacific Fleet plodding over to defend the islands, that's good too, because that presents the opportunity to decisively defeat the US Fleet in deep water and far from their repair facilities.
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@lonjohnson5161 Drac could fill a day in Muskegon, MI. While there are several Gato class subs around, the one in Muskegon, USS Silversides, is pretty well known, including being mentioned, along with Tang and Wahoo, in the movie "Operation Pacific". There are also a WWII vintage LST, and a Great Lakes excursion steamer in the same port. I think there is also a Gato class boat in Wisconsin. The air and space museum in Kalamazoo, Michigan has a restoration shop that does a lot of work for the Navy, restoring aircraft salvaged out of Lake Michigan. They are presently working on their third SBD. An expedition is scheduled to set sail in May to attempt salvage of the planes that fell off the Lex's deck when she sank at Coral Sea. If the salvage is successful, the Kalamazoo museum is in line to get a couple of the TBDs to restore.
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As I commented on the Wasp post, the Lexingtons were horribly inefficient carriers, with hangers 200 feet shorter than a Yorktown's on more than 50% greater tonnage than a Yorktown, an issue compounded by the Washington Treaty's tonnage limits. The Friedman book indicates that the pro-air faction in the Navy appears to have had their eyes on the battle cruisers for conversion to carriers before the BCs were even laid down. By 1920, the pro-air faction had decided that a carrier "must" be 35,000 tons, with 180,000hp, a recipe that the Lexingtons fit perfectly. I would not be surprised if the "cost savings" numbers were manipulated to justify giving the pro-air faction what it wanted. Interestingly, once the pro-air faction had been placated by the Lexingtons, Navy thinking turned 180 degrees, with the concern that having a few large carriers would result in the sinking of only one ship severely crippling carrier strength, so then the decision was made to use the remaining carrier tonnage on 5 ships the size of the Ranger. Of course, the push for the Lexingtons could have been partly motivated by the ridiculous inadequacy of the Langley, a topic to be taken up when the video on that ship is presented.
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perk an alt history situation with all four Admiral class being continued. If two Admirals were completed as carriers, they, plus Argus, Hermes, Eagle, and Furious, would fill the RN's carrier tonnage quota under the treaty. That would mean Courageous and Glorious could not be converted, unless, Argus, Eagle and Hermes were all scrapped/reclassified, which would have been allowed under the WNT. If those three ships are eliminated to permit conversion of Courageous and Glorious, there would be no tonnage available for Ark Royal. If only one Admiral was converted to a carrier, that would leave enough tonnage for Courageous and Glorious, provided Argus was scrapped/reclassified. Then Eagle and Hermes could be scrapped/reclassified to clear tonnage for Ark Royal. The one Admiral conversion also has the virtue of making the math simple: the RN has three Admirals as "post-Jutland", the US has the three Colorados and Japan has the two Nagatos. On the other hand, there would be a tendency to convert two, because the US and Japan were converting two. The RN could forgo converting the Courageouses, which leaves them available to chase German raiders in 1940. I rather like the prospect of Courageous squaring off against Sheer, rather than Jervis Bay.
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wrt changes in Second London, from my reading, Second London seemed to be more about the UK trying to push everyone else down to the sort of ships the UK wanted. I have read that Ark Royal was built the way she was, under the Washington limit of 27,000 tons, to maximize the number of drydocks around the empire that could accommodate her, so the treaty tried to push everyone else's carriers down to the same size. The UK had to build smaller cruisers to obtain the number of cruisers needed in the tonnage allowance available. The treaty tried to force everyone else's light cruisers down to the same size. Nothing in the earlier treaties said the UK could not build battleships with 15" or 14" guns. The French, and Italians, were perfectly happy to build 15" guns, when the treaty allowed 16". But someone in the Admiralty was pressing for 14". The decision to go 14" on the KGVs had been made before the Second London conference started. So, again, Second London was used to try to force everyone else down to the gun size the UK wanted to use. Same mindset came up when the US and UK were negotiating the displacement escalator in early 38. The UK was pushing for a 42,000 limit, as that was the maximum their facilities around the empire could accommodate. The US wanted 45,000, so the Iowas could be the ships they wanted. As we see with Lion, nothing prevented the UK building what suited it's needs, even if it was under the official limit. The consistent mindset in the UK, was to use the treaty to try to prevent anyone building anything more powerful than what the UK wanted to build. I could point out that Lord Chatfield was First Sea Lord from January 33 through September 38, so he was in a position to influence the design of the KGVs, Second London, and the negotiations for the battleship tonnage escalator.
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@RedXlV somewhere, recently, I floated my WNT idea of using throw weight as the standard to equalize BB power, rather than displacement. An objection came up of that exact nature: the IJN simply decks over one barbette, to keep the ship in the 8-16" gun limit, and, when the balloon goes up, the fifth turret and guns magically appear from a warehouse and are installed. I conceded that is a possibility, but, at least, it's harder to do than simply lie about the displacement. If you would like to do the math, Navweaps has the weights for the guns, turrets, shells, powder charges and number of rounds carried per gun, so see if it all adds up to the 5,000+ tons you would need to carve off a Tosa to get under the displacement limit.
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@joshthomas-moore2656 my two cents worth: BCs cost as much to build as a BB. BCs cost as much to run as a BB. Due to their armament, they will, sooner or later, be stuck into a battle against BBs, where their glass jaw will become evident. iirc, one of the Kongos was sunk by cruisers in the Solomons. To my eye, BCs are poor value for money. BCs are at a disadvantage against BBs, yet they can be taken out by a group of 3-4 cruisers. One of my nightmare scenarios is the IJN realizing the Kongos aren't up to the job around 1938, and converting them all to carriers, so they will not be stuck into a surface engagement, which would give the IJN a massive superiority in air group strength early in the war.
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@themanformerlyknownascomme777 by it's designation, F-111, the plane was intended as a fighter. During it's development in the early 60s, dogfighting was considered passe. The idea was to stand off and shoot the other guy down with a missile. iirc, the Hughes Phoenix system the F-111 was designed for could guide six missiles to separate targets, simultaneously. Turned out the 111 was too big and heavy for carrier ops, so Grumman designed the 14, to use the same Phoenix system. As for a replacement for the 111, we now have the "Strike Eagle" version of the 15, and people have been strapping bombs on the 16 for decades as well. The USAF also had the F-117. which, in spite of it's "F" designation, I never heard of being used as an air superiority fighter, only as a bomber.
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@geofftimm2291 The justification for the regression to 14" was the "more guns equals more hits" narrative. As originally intended, a 12 gun KGV would send 50% more rounds down range, than a QE, or a Bismark. Given the RN fighting instructions that required the ships to close to 16,000 yards or less, rather than standing off at greater range, the 14" could penetrate well enough and the greater number of shells would, all other things being equal, result in more hits and faster degradation of the enemy ship. The problem was, the KGV had to be well enough protected to survive until it closed to 16,000, which resulted in the increase in armor, which required the reduction from 12 to 10 guns, which partially defeated the rational behind regressing to 14" in the first place.
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@Thirdbase9 Drac, and others. have, from time to time, mentioned the RN's use of "supercharges", which were larger than standard charges to increase the range of large guns. USN gunnery tables from the 1930s provide trajectory tables for both "full charge" and "reduced charge" shots. I have been offering that Bismark penetrated Hood's deck, as Captain Leach said he saw, by use of a reduced charge, to provide a lower muzzle velocity, resulting in a steeper angle of fall, but I have received withering pushback, insisting that reduced charge was never, ever, used in combat....but the data was readily available, Bismark's gunners would have known what angle of fall was needed for a penetrating deck hit, reduced charge made that angle possible at that range, and no-one else has offered a scenario that fits with the eye-witness accounts.
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wrt the Courbet class, there was a significant body of opinion at that time that battles would always be fought at short range. The head of USN BuOrd at that time, Admiral Strauss insisted that battles would never be fought at more than 12,000 yards. At 12,000 yards, the 14"/50 could penetrate well enough, and, being lighter, more 14"/50s could be mounted vs 16". When the Tennessees were designed to allow their 14" guns to elevate to 30 degrees, vs the 15 degrees of the New Mexicos, Strauss scoffed, saying the ships would never need that amount of range. The armor of the Courbets, or lack thereof, is another matter.
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wrt salvage of Oklahoma. Yes, she did obstruct traffic to a degree where the wreck was. But, rather than tying up a drydock for a few months, and using new material, to patch her up, why not tow the refloated wreck into East Loch, out of the traffic flow, let her settle, build a cofferdam around her, and break her up there? What I would have wanted to do would be to tow the refloated wreck out to sea, and scuttle her, with the service for burial at sea, for the men inside, as was done with Maine after she was raised from Havana harbor. My only concern with that plan was what if one of the temporary patched failed, and she sank in the channel, blocking the entrance to the harbor?
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@gregorywright4918 yes, I am assuming a twin 4" mount, which the USN experimented with on a couple Clemsons. Looking at the photos of the mounts in use, the issue is clear. There was not enough deck room on the foc'se of a Clemson for the crew required to operate a twin mount. (all data taken from Navweaps) weight of a 5"/51 with single mount: 15.36-17.26mt. Weight of a twin 4"/50, guns and mount, 12.33mt. Rate of fire is the same, 8-9rpm, but adoption of a sliding breech, combined with the 4" fixed ammo could double that. Weight of the 5" common shell: 50lbs, vs 33 for the 4". Charge in common shell 5": 1.73lbs, 4": 1.39lbs. Range to penetrate 2" of armor 5": 8000yds, 4": 6300yds. So the twin 4" mount can fire more steel, with more charge than a single 5". Go to a sliding breech, and the twin 4" can fire a lot more steel and a lot more charge. Yes, the 5"/51 can penetrate more armor, but the DDs and torpedo boats that would usually be attacking are not armored. It would take a light cruiser to stand up to the 4". Yes, the 5"/51 has more range, 18,800yds @ 25 degrees, than the 4": 15,000yds @ 19.9 degrees, but torpedo boat armament was aimed by the Mk 1 eyeball, and, particularly hull mounted casements offered such a poor view of potential targets that maximum range is probably academic. I took my investigation one step farther: cutting the 4"/50 down to 45 calibers, and mounting them in a copy of the British Mk XIX mount. The result was lighter than the combination of a single 5"/51 and a single 5"/25, while being able to throw more steel than either of the 5" guns, and freeing the upper deck for more light AA armament. Yes, I am assuming the 1.1" for light AA, as that is what they had.
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My thoughts? Farley is an idiot. I will explain. In spite of Trump openly campaigning on putting tariffs on Canadian and Mexican cars, Farley is crying that he wants steep tariffs on Toyotas and Hyundais, not Fords, regardless of where they are built. As you said, the models Ford builds in Mexico are the Bronco Sport, Maverick, and Mach-E. Farley said, publicly, a couple years ago, he wants to get out of the two row SUV market, where the Bronco Sport and US built Escape are, because, he complains, there is too much competition in that segment, so he can't charge as high a price, with as fat a profit margin, as he wants. So, cutting Bronco Sport and Maverick production off from the US, would give Ford an excuse to shift prospects into the larger Bronco, or Ranger pickup, which are more expensive. Farley committed some $5.6B for "Blue Oval City", a greenfield battery and assembly plant to build electric F-150s. Why F-150s? That is Ford's most profitable product. A few days ago, he claimed to have just discovered that F-150s have poor aerodynamics, and people with F-150s carry heavy loads, pull trailers, and take long trips, which puts a lot of demand on the battery. A battery that could meet that demand would be large, heavy, and expensive. So, now, Farley claims that, for large EVs, "the economics are unresolvable". Seems likely he is preparing shareholders for a multi-billion dollar writeoff of "Blue Oval City". Last, and most absurd, Farley insists Ford "will be the Porsche of off-road", meaning he wants to raise prices, a lot. Farley is a buffoon.
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As Matthew said, apparently, in the real world, a heavier shell retains it's momentum better than a lighter shell. The propellant charge in a larger gun is going to be larger than the charge in a smaller gun. If the same charge is pushing a larger shell, seems the PSI on the back of the larger shell will be lower, because the burning propellant can only generate a set amount of hot gas, and it has a larger space to expand into. The issue I have been wrestling with is I have been looking for the velocity of SC Cordite, so I can perform some recoil calculations, but have not been able to find it. I'm sure the difference in die size would made a difference too, as a smaller die size means more sticks of Cordite can fit in a given space, with more surface area exposed, so the burn rate is higher, but at this point, I will settle for any velocity spec for SC.
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@WALTERBROADDUS iirc, the issue with Britannic was that the weather was hot, and a lot of portholes were open. As the ship settled from the mine damage, open portholes were pulled below the waterline, making widespread flooding inevitable. Titanic might have been able to survive a mine or torpedo, in cold weather, and the damage was limited to one compartment....though I recall HMS Audacious sank from a mine hit. Did Audacious have the remote control WT doors that Titanic had, or did each door need to be closed manually? Were some WT doors left open on Audacious? Some accounts I have read of the sinking of PoW say that several WT doors on the port side were left open when the engagement started, as they were on the ammo passing route for the AA guns. Then the crewmen abandoned their posts, leaving the doors open, assisting the progressive flooding on the port side that doomed the ship.
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@AtholAnderson read up on "Operation Creek", a British commando attack on the Ehrenfels. That ship, along with three other Axis ships, were interned in the neutral port of Goa. British intelligence traced radio transmissions about British ship movements to Goa harbor. Of the four Axis ships in the harbor, British agents, had gotten on board Ehrenfels, at another port, before the war. Their inspection revealed the Ehrenfels was of particularly stout construction, and the decks were clearly reinforced for gun mounts, so the ship, from inception, was designed for easy conversion to a Q-Ship. Based on that assessment, the Ehrenfels because their target for the raid. They were right.
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@gruntforever7437 in the three years since I posted that comment, I have continued to look in to the issue. The Navy had no choice about whether to proceed with the South Dakotas. The House added language to the annual Navy appropriation bill in June, 1918, urging the Navy to make a start on the ships authorized in 1916, but not yet started, which included the South Dakotas and Lexingtons. When the legislation got to the Senate, the Senate changed the wording from urging, to demanding, the Navy make a start on those ships. This was reported in the newspapers at the time. Apparently, Admiral Taylor, the chief designer, was not happy with the design, and drew up something he liked a lot better, but it was bigger and more expensive, so it was a no-go.
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@davidharner5865 The Tennessees and Colorados were significantly different than the New Mexicos inside, due to the turbo-electric drive. The New Mexicos had the boiler rooms amidships, and the engine rooms all in line with the shafts. The TE powered ships had the boiler rooms along the perimeter of the hull, to also act as a secondary torpedo barrier, while the tubro-generator sets were along the centerline, inboard of the boiler rooms. Only the electric motors were in line with the shafts. Admiral Strauss at BuOrd made an interesting comment about the increased elevation of the Tennesse's guns. He had maintained, for some time, that all combat would be fought within 12,000 yards, so he said the Tennessees would never need the rage they could reach with 30 degree elevation, but, as it did not cost more to build the mounts with the greater elevation, he did not oppose it.
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@davidharner5865 Strauss was head of BuOrd. During a previous stint at BuOrd, as a young officer, he invented the concept of the superimposed turrets, as used on the Kearsarge and Virginia classes. His devotion to the "more smaller guns means more hits" school became obsessive. In newspaper articles speculating on whether the Tennessees would have 14" or 16", there was FUD inserted in the article, but no source named, that the then new British 15"/42 suffered extremely high barrel wear, while the 14" showed excellent durability, with that point expanded to claim all guns larger than 14" would probably suffer excessive wear. After Jutland, Daniels and the General Board decided on 16", for it's ability to penetrate at longer ranges. In his annual report in late 1916, Daniels said the decision was made "over the objections of some officers". Strauss requested sea duty, about a year before his stint at BuOrd would have been expected to end. There was no movement on his request for a couple months. In a public Congressional hearing, Strauss, again, trotted out his 14" talking points, pushing back on the decision his superiors had made months before. President Wilson nominated Ralph Earle, then head of the Indian Head proving range, as head of BuOrd the next day, and Strauss got his sea duty, command of Nevada. This entire row over gun size was very public and widely reported in the newspapers at the time. Daniels wasn't all bad. He had no Navy experience, but he had the General Board to advise him, and he was capable of listening, sometimes. Strauss wasn't all bad either. After the gun size row, he was still widely respected, and was appointed to a seat on the General Board some years later.
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wrt the question about AA gun alternatives to the Bofors and Oerlikon: sticks in my mind I read that one of the issues with the Vickers PomPom was that it would not run satisfactorily using USN smokeless propellant, and no-one in the US made cordite. My favorite for medium AA, in the absence of the Bofors, is the Browning 37mm, which was used by the US Army. It had the advantages of already being in production, using US materials and propellant, and offered significantly greater range than the Vickers. Modify it for proper water cooling, and implement the mods later introduced on the Army version: feed by metal link belt, from either side, and I envision a quad mount along the lines of that used with the Vickers. A replacement for the Oerlikon is a problem, because, for a close in weapon, I would want the responsiveness of a pintle mount. The Bofors 25mm that the 40mm was based on was too heavy. iirc There was a pintle mount version of the Vickers, but then the propellant problem resurfaces. The Hisso, in US service, was horrible unreliable. I'm thinking of the M4 version of the US 37mm, as it was significantly lighter than the M1 version, and was used successfully on a free mount on PT boats. The 37mm has a lower rate of fire than the Oerlikon, and a lower muzzle velocity, but, if it does hit, the 37mm shell will do a lot more damage than a 20mm.
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@RedXlV even if the ship designers were careless enough to put M1 and M4 ammo in the same magazine, mixed from rack to rack, seems the way the ammo is mounted would be enough of a signal to the ammo passers. The M1 originally used a 9 round rigid clip, but, I am assuming the mod to metal link belt is implemented for shipboard quad mounts. The M4's loop magazine was intended for aircraft use and had to be bolted in place, with cartridges loaded into the mag one at a time, after the mag was mounted on the gun. That is so awkward I wonder why it wasn't changed when the M4 was mounted on PT boats. The M4 would probably be converted to rigid clips, like the M1 originally used. So, even in a carelessly design magazine on a ship, the passers would know, if the ammo is in a metal link belt, it is for an M1, and if it is in a rigid clip, it is for an M4. In the magazines, the loading tables for the belts and clips would be designed to make it obvious if the loader was trying to load the wrong size round. You are correct that the M4 had a lower muzzle velocity than the M1, but in this context, compare to the Vickers PomPom and the Oerlikon. The Vickers and Oerlikon have very nearly the same range, while the M4 appears to top both of them, with a maximum range of 8,875 yards, vs 3,800 to 5,000 for the Vickers LV/HV respectively, and about 4,800 yards for the Oerlikon.
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@ph89787 As I read Second London, while the total fleet wide tonnage limits were gone, the treaty only appears to allow for replacements for existing ships, and the treaty still limited the pace at which ships could be replaced. Wasp was the replacement for Langley, and limited by the fleet tonnage limits of Washington. If Congress would be willing to fund another 20,000 ton carrier, they probably could have been persuaded to go 23,000 tons, which was the limit imposed by Second London. Going to 23,000 might allow the Navy to address the one real vulnerability in the Yorktown design: the boiler and engine rooms were not staggered. When the haggis started to hit the fan and Congress authorized two more carriers, iirc, the language of the legislation allowed for 40,000 tons of carriers, but the Navy built a 20,000 ton Yorktown, and a 27,000 ton Essex. The Navy certainly could have made a case to Congress, if they had a 23,000 ton "improved Yorktown" design in hand, that, Congress funding anything else would delay construction, so Congress should authorize 46,000 tons of carriers.
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@ph89787 Congress abandoned undersized carriers after Ranger. The Yorktowns were limited to 20,000 as that was all the displacement the Navy had to work with, until Langley was reclassified. I have little doubt FDR could have won approval for a 23,000 ton Wasp, if the displacement had been available, and won approval for 46,000 tons of carriers in 38, if a new 23,000 ton design had been available for immediate construction. The major pivot point in USN carriers, to my eye, is when they sank an overlarge part of the displacement quota, and money, into the Lexingtons. You may have heard Drac's reply, a couple weeks ago, to my question about the huge cost overruns on those ships. The bottom line, at that time, the Navy had no idea what it was doing, when it was building the Lexingtons. We were lucky they turned out as well as they did. For the tonnage those two ships soaked up, we could have built three Yorktowns, with enough left over to build Wasp as another full sized 20,000 ton carrier.
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@AdelineLowry That is the nightmare scenario I have offered in the past: leave Pearl alone, and only attack the Philippines. Because the US had not swept up all the Spanish colonies in the Pacific, but only the best parts, the Philippines and Guam, Spain sold the rest of it's holdings, the balance of the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls, to Germany. The Japanese swept up all these islands during WWI, and held them after the war under a League of Nations mandate. For the USN to get a relief expedition to the Philippines, it would need to traverse a shooting gallery of Japanese held islands. USN command, and the President, would probably recognize this was suicidal, but could they stand up to US civilian demands to "save our boys". It was easy to say "no" when the battleships sank at Pearl, but what if the fleet was intact? I think it was October 20 of 21 that Drac did a piece on USN Tactics 39-45, and I wondered at that time if USN policy was to write off the Philippine garrison if it was attacked. To answer your question, if the US was goaded into trying to relieve the Philippines, I envision the fleet being picked apart by Japanese subs, until it is weakened enough for a major strike by IJN carrier air, with the IJN battleships mopping up the remains. An even better scenario, from the Japanese perspective, is to not attack the US at all. Bypass the Philippines and only attack British and Dutch possessions. The Germans had been beating on the UK and Netherlands for 2 years, without provoking the US enough to bring the US into the war. Why not let that sleeping dog lie in the Pacific too?
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@UNSCForwardontodawn Alrighty, first, Wiki says the Sutherland dock, after it's 1927 expansion, is 210 meters/690 feet long, 27 meters/88.6 feet wide and max water depth over the sill at high tide is 9.75 meters/32 feet. My 1928 USN port directory, which may have old data since Sutherland was expanded in 27, says 637' overall/630' over the blocks, 84' wide and depth at sill of 31' 4". The 1928 directory also lists Mort's graving dock at Woolwich: 850' overall and over the blocks, 83' wide, and max depth over the sill of 28'. KGV and Renown are both too wide for either dock. A Deutschland would fit. So lets use Deutschland as a template, and, as a cost and time saving expedient, use the twin 15"/42 turrets in RN storage for the main armament. Beam would probably need to be increased from the Deutschland's 68' as the twin 15"/42 turret and gun sets will weigh about 300mt more each than the triple 11"s on Deutschland.. So what happens to the two shiny new ships? They get deployed to Malaya, instead of PoW and Repulse, and are sunk, but they might hold their own in the Java Sea, if they were not used for Force Z. Plan B: USS Wasp would fit. What would happen if the Aussies had two carriers the size of Wasp, except with a decent amount of protection? By 41, the two carriers have air groups composed of Skuas for the scout bomber role, and Buffaloes, as the Aussies, Kiwis, Dutch and RAF all flew Buffs in that theater in 41. The two carriers are deployed with Force Z. The twin engine bombers the IJN used would be meat on the table for Buffs. The location was within range of Zeros, but would the IJN have Zeros available to escort the bombers? Some of the smaller carriers still had Claudes at that time, so the supply of Zeros may have been restricted. When the Aussies stripped their Buffs down, they held their own for a while. So, if the Aussies bought carriers, PoW and Repulse have a fighting chance, as would the force in the Java Sea, until the IJN brought their A game with Zeros.
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So, what, specifically, don't people like about Vance? He seems to be in a no-man's land, where ardent Trumpers look at his "never Trumper" comments, while the never-Trumpers look at his pro-Trump comments. And, with Harris presumably heading the Dem ticket, opening the door to openly racist thought and speech, Vance's non-white, non-Christian wife is another issue. How could a Trump administration be pushing Christian nationalist (aka white supremacist) ideology, when the second lady is neither?
There is a precedent for replacing a VP candidate who turns out to be toxic. We old geezers remember when Tom Eagleton, was replaced as McGovern's running mate in 72.
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@TraditionalAnglican I agree on the intelligence aspect. Everything would have had to go exceptionally well for a good outcome, like a sighting report by a US sub on the 5th. The USN probably had a pretty good idea of the combat radius of Japanese aircraft. Given the course of the air wing as plotted by radar on the island, the US force could have zeroed in on IJN force, if it was already in the approximate area. Hitting the IJN fleet while the air wing was attacking Pearl would have been ideal as there is little left minding the store, except the CAP. The 5"/38 came out in the mid 30s, and several classes prior to the Fletcher were armed with at least a couple of 5"/38s in the all singing, all dancing, power enclosed turrets with integral ammo hoist, which gave them a rate of fire advantage. As for radar: there is a photo of USS Phoenix leaving Pearl on the 7th, with West Virginia and Arizona burning in the background. It has what looks very much like a radar antenna on top of the gun director at the top of the superstructure. The BBs escorting the carriers were a pair of Kongos, so they were vulnerable to heavy cruisers. It would have been a brawl, but the IJN ships would be so outnumbered, some of the USN DDs would probably have gotten through to the carriers. However, as you said, the fleet running away in the opposite direction could have been an option too.
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Did the RN consider a more radical rebuild of the QEs, comparable to the rebuild the Italians did with the Andrea Doria class, with the hull lengthening and more than doubling engine power? The thought of 5 totally modern, 28+ kt QEs is appealing. The first thought of "why not" would be the improvements would push displacement over the 35,000 ton limit as the Wiki entry shows the QEs displacing over 32,000 tons. The rebuilds of the Dorias and Kongos added some 4-5,000 tons, which would have put the QEs over the limit. But, as measured for treaty purposes, without consumables, the QEs are listed in the treaty text at 27,500, so it looks like there is enough room to do the lengthening. Such radically updated QEs would nearly render the KGVs redundant.
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@rodrigogoncalves6165 yes, a nice anchorage, but you need repair facilities, like drydocks. That was the point of the British executing the St Nazaire raid, to disable the only dock in France that could accommodate Tirpitz. The USN wanted to base ships in the Philippines, but needed adequate repair facilities. The Dewey drydock was built in Maryland, in 1905. At the time, it was the largest floating dock in the world. It was then towed across the Atlantic, through the Med, through Suez, across the Indian Ocean, and into the Pacific, to get it to Subic Bay. The newspapers reported the Navy did the tow itself, using a couple colliers and a supply ship, because no commercial towing company, that had proper, sea-going, tugs, would attempt it. I'm sure suitable floating docks could have been built in Italy and towed to Spanish Atlantic ports, but it might have been simpler to send the German ships to Naples for work.
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@WALTERBROADDUS I would not think the idea would be "out of the box" since the necessary data was in the printed gunnery tables, well before the war started, so someone else had to be thinking the same thing. As math works the same everywhere, I expect the Germans could calculate the equations just as well as the USN could. Your thought about what to do with the removed powder is a good one. Off hand, I don't know exactly how much the charge would be reduced to reduce the MV the required amount, but I'm sure someone 80 years ago had calculated that, otherwise, specs for reduced charge firing wouldn't be in the gunnery tables. Knowing the German fetish for organization, Bismark probably had reduced charge bags already made up. So, when they wanted to shoot through PoW's belt, they used a full charge for the wider danger space and higher kinetic energy, and they grabbed the smaller bags for lobbing shells at Hood that could punch through the deck.
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@damndaniel2880 So, you are assuming someone assassinated Darlan in June of 40. With the chain of command broken Admiral Muselier, having been named head of the Free French Navy by de Gaulle on July 1, issues his first order to all freedom loving French sailors to follow his lead to push the Boche out of France. So, when the RN shows up on July 3rd, Gensoul follows orders, and weighs anchor to be escorted past Gibraltar, rendezvous with Richelieu and Jean Bart and steam to England for refit, primarily replacement with British AA armament for which ammunition can be resupplied. So, when Bismark attempts it's break out, Richelieu, Dunkerque and Strasbourg are in Scapa, ready for action. The French squadron makes for the Denmark strait, because it's a farther run and the French ships are faster, while KGV and PoW, being slower, make the shorter trip to the strait between Iceland and the Faroe islands. So the three French ships engage, heading straight for the Germans, as all of their main armament is forward, and this approach provides the smallest target for the Germans. Then Richelieu's wonky ammunition blows up three of it's barrels, and they only have four spares on Jean Bart. Richelieu retires, while Dunkerque and Strasbourg, with their thoroughly tested high velocity 13" guns, press the attack. Yes, could be interesting.
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@jamesd3472 My suspicion is that the Admiralty's architects had determined that the combination of 16" guns with the speed and armor they wanted in the KGVs was a no-go. Design work on the KGVs started when 16", as well as 15", guns were still legal. Doing a bit of back of the envelope figuring, I get an estimate for the 3-triple 15" turrets considered for the KGVs as being some 850 tons heavier than the 14" arrangement they settled on. 16" would probably be even heavier, unless they cut back the number of guns. The Littorios and Bismarks mounted 15", but they also significantly exceeded treaty displacement limits. The North Carolinas mounted 16", but are considered underarmored. The South Dakotas mounted 16", but were slow, in spite of using bleeding edge powerplant technology that was not available to the Brits when the KGVs were designed. The escalator clause of Second London allowed the return to 16" guns, if a party refused to sign the new treaty by April 1937, which the Japanese said in 34 that they would not do, but the tonnage increase was not specified. The escalator clause said the parties would try to negotiate tonnage escalation to a new point. So, because of that poor planning, the UK and US wasted over a year arguing about the new tonnage limit, the US wanting 45,000 while the UK looking for something in the 41-42,000 ton range. Once the tonnage increase was agreed, then the UK proceeded with the Lion class, but, by then, battleships were pretty much irrelevant and the Lions with their 16" guns were stillborn.
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@Strelnikov403 as originally built, the Renowns were very thin skinned as well. Hood's 12" thick belt does not cover much, before it is replaced by a 7" belt, with a 5" belt above that. The 12" thick portion is less than 9' high, with 3' of that below the waterline, according to drawings by the USN. The 13' thick belt on a Colorado class BB was 17' high, with 8'10" of that below the waterline. iirc, Drac noted that the problem with battlecruisers is, the moment you put battleship size guns on it, there is an overwhelming temptation to put it in line against real battleships. If you keep the battlecruiser in the "armored cruiser/second class battleship" range, with guns noticeably smaller than those of a BB, the temptation to routinely go against BBs starts to disappear because, all other things being equal, the smaller shells can't penetrate a BB's armor.
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@johnshepherd8687 I don't think we are discussing "accelerated" carrier development. We are discussing what was available in the late 20s. Yes, fighters would be embarked, Fairey Flycatchers for the RN and Boeing FBs for the USN. I figure the US has the two Lexingtons, while the RN has the three Courageouses, Eagle and Hermes. Both Argus and Langley left in port because they are too slow. The USN did figure aircraft were becoming too fast for machine guns in the early 30s and started developing the 1.1. BuOrd spent years on that thing, finally putting it in production in the late 30s, but it still didn't work right. The Mk II Vickers had reliability issues too, but it was available in the 20s. Later marks resolved those issues in the early 30s. As I said, it would be a precursor to Coral Sea or Midway, at 85mph instead of 150. Like the IJN, the RN would probably have an advantage in the effectiveness of it's torpedo planes too, because the USN lost interest in torpedo planes. Ranger is said to have been originally built with no torpedo magazine.
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@willpat3040 You are going by the tables on Navweaps? The muzzle velocities are different. On the Mk 7 gun, the AP is fired at 2500fps, the HC is fired at 2690. On the Mk 6 gun, the AP is fired at only 2300fps, while the HC is fired at 2635fps. The different guns use a different charge. The Mk 6 uses a 535lb charge. The Mk 7 uses a 660lb charge. The tables do show how the lighter Mk 13 shell loses momentum faster than the Mk 8, which weighs 800lbs more. In the Mk 6 gun, the lighter Mk 13 starts out at 2635fps vs only 2300 for the Mk 8. But, 30,000 yards out, the Mk 13 has slowed to 1375, while the heavier Mk 8 is steaming along at 1490.
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@willpat3040 It is a combination of weight of shell, and muzzle velocity. MV for the 2110lb Mk 3 shell, in a Mk 1 16", is 2600fps, using a 590lb charge. MV for a 2240lb Mk 5 shell, in a Mk 5 gun, is reduced to 2520fps, with a smaller 545lb charge. The 2700lb Mk 8 shell, in a Mk 6 gun, is fired at only 2300fps, using an even smaller 535lb charge. Everyone wants to hit with maximum kinetic energy. The equation is E=M(V squared), so the most efficient way to increase kinetic energy would seem to be to increase velocity, but high velocity guns tended to have issues with dispersion and rapid barrel wear. Then someone noticed that heavier shells retained more velocity at range. Using the tables on Navweaps, the Mk 3 was traveling at 1656fps at 17,300yds,, the Mk 5 travels at 1629 at 20,000yds, and the Mk 5 travels at 1604 at 20,000, nearly the same velocity at impact as a Mk 3, at longer range, in spite of a slower muzzle velocity, and delivering a lot more weight, hence more kinetic energy. Losing a bit of extreme range to obtain the greater kinetic energy at combat range is immaterial, as the chances of hitting anything at more than 30,000 yards are pretty slim. So subsequent marks of 16"/45 guns and AP shells trended to heavier shell, smaller charge, and lower muzzle velocity, for better accuracy, better penetration, and better barrel life.
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@Ralph-yn3gr the US' intent in calling the conference was to stop all new ship construction, because the US didn't want to spend anything. They probably could have gotten a waiver for one of the Lexingtons, by arguing parity with Hood, but the US didn't want to spend the money. I have read that the UK was inclined to allow a single ship displacement limit of 42-43,000, because of Hood, but the US insisted on the hard 35,000 limit. It actually would probably have been cheaper to complete a Lexington as designed, than to break up all the battlecruisers that were in process, and start over with a new design that was under the 35,000 limit. It was even cheaper to complete Colorado and West Virginia for 16" armed, "post Jutland" parity, because the ships were already in an advanced stage of construction. Bottom line: US took the cheapest possible route to having a 16" armed 3:2 ratio with Japan.
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@stuross85 The WNT left the RN with more tonnage than the USN. While the quota for both USN and RN was the same, 525,000 tons, the actual retention list totals were far apart: 500,650 for the USN and 580,450 for the RN. The adjustments that allowed completion of Colorado, West Virginia and the Nelsons brought them closer: 525,850 for the USN, almost dead on the quota, and 558,950 for the RN, so the RN had about 33,000 tons, almost an entire treaty battleship more, than the USN. These tonnages are all in the treaty text. While the RN, with the Nelsons, had 2 BBs with 16" guns and the USN had 3, the RN had 13 ships with 15" guns and 5 with 13.5" guns, while the USN had 9 with 14" guns, though with more guns per ship, than the RN 15" BBs, and 4 with 12" guns. That's why, in my post below, I said I would tend to give the UK the stink eye about it's crying about not having any 16" ships. If I was dictating treaty terms, the RN would have scrapped Thunderer and Centurion, to bring it's initial tonnage down to 534,950, less than 10,000 tons over it's quota, and it could start building 16" ships when the treaty's planned replacement program started in the 1930s. So, for what it's worth, I agree with Admiral Sims.
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@stephenknowles1420 my opinion is worth what you paid for it :) I have held that the Deutschlands were the last of the armored cruisers. Nothing is battleship grade, not the armor, not the armament, not the displacement, nor are they as fast as treaty cruisers or battle cruisers of the same vintage. Dunkerque is, by my measure, a battlecruiser: big guns, and a glass jaw, with it's 8.9" belt. Scharnhorst, with it's 13.8" belt, I view as a BB, if an under gunned one, because it can hold up fairly well to fire from a BB. Scharn certainly took a lot of punishment before it finally went down, while Dunkerque was disabled by only four hits from Hood, two of which penetrated it's main belt.
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@AtomicBabel She was dead in the water and listing, but not sinking, before the sub finished her off. If she had power, she would almost certainly have been salvageable. When I was on the Lex, we had portable, submersible pumps, in racks, all over the ship. They were brass cylinders maybe 6-8" in diameter and 3 feet long. One rainy day, I was detailed to pump out a bomb elevator that had flooded from the rain. Grab a pump from the rack, attach a hose to the top end of the pump, attach the other end of the hose to a nearby port in the hull to dump the water overboard, plug the pump in to power, and watch the water go away. No power, and all these pumps become useless. Pumping is limited by the number of portable generators you can bring on board, and salvage becomes orders of magnitude more difficult.
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@garrettledford1147 Given the knowledge available in 1918, how would I prepare for a war 20 years later, that I would not know was coming, and did not know what technology would be ascendant? I would have looked at Hood, and the Italian Caracciolo class and decided that fast battleships were the way to go. Not thin skinned Lexingtons, not slow South Dakotas and certainly not the even slower Colorados, 3 of which had not yet been laid down due to the intervention of WWI. I probably would have laid down half a dozen ships with the size and power of the Lexingtons, but with the armor of the South Dakotas. We are talking a USN version of a G3. Of course, it takes 3 years to build a capital ship. The earliest I could get anything laid down would be 1919, so they would all be incomplete when the treaty went into effect, and, being way over treaty limits, they would not be completed, no matter how many other battleships the US offered to scrap to save them, but scrapped or used for target practice when 75-80% complete. All a titanic waste of money and effort, and the US goes into WWII without Colorado or West Virginia.
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@jamesd3472 As I read First London, it sounds like the replacement schedule as laid out in the Washington Treaty was simply deferred through 1936. The replacement sequence for the RN as laid out originally was the four Iron Dukes in 34, but First London had them scrapped without replacement. For 35, the schedule called for Tiger (which First London scrapped without replacement), QE, Warspite and Barham. For 36: Malaya and Royal Sovereign. 37: Revenge and Resolution, 38: Royal Oak. 39: Valiant and Repulse. 40: Renown. 41: Ramillies and Hood. I see things that beg questions be asked, like why Valiant would be retained for a few years after the other QEs had been scrapped. The ships are all named specifically in the text of the treaty, so the UK must have had it's reasons. So, given the scrapping sequence, and as the Iron Dukes and Tiger were already gone, the implication is the KGVs were intended to replace QE, Warspite, Barham, Malaya and Royal Sovereign.
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@timengineman2nd714 The RN was not in a bind wrt tonnage after First London. With the Nelsons, the RN was at 558,950, but, when First London deleted the Iron Dukes and Tiger, that drew the RN down to 430,450, roughly 95,000t below their 525,000t limit, so they had headroom for two KGVs before firing up the cutting torch for anything. The USN came out of the treaty at 525,850t. First London deleted both Floridas and Wyoming, so the USN had 68800t of headroom, a bit short of enough for both North Carolinas. The replacement schedule for the USN isn't as scrambled as the RN's: Arkansas and both New Yorks in 35. both Nevadas in 36. both Pennsylvanias in 37. Mississippi in 38, New Mex and Idaho in 39, Tennessee in 40, California and Maryland in 41. Then First London pushing everything back 5-6 years.
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@and15re1 from my reading, the RN sort of backed into the entire idea of a monitor in WWI. The RN was using obsolete battleships for bombardment, as the US did in WWII. The President of Bethlehem Steel, which owned the Fore River shipyard, was negotiating with the Admiralty, in November 1914, for a contract to build 20-30 submarines for the RN, when the Admiralty officials asked if he had anything else useful around. Greece had contracted with a German yard to build a new battleship, but the turrets and guns had been subcontracted to Bethlehem Steel. Bessie could not make delivery to the German yard, due to the British blockade, so the 4 twin turret and 14"/45 gun sets, and 4,000 rounds of ammo, were offered to the Admiralty. The Admiralty snapped them up and threw together the first modern monitors, the Abercrombie class, with shallow draft and huge torpedo bulges. That started the monitor building program, with guns taken from the obsolete Majestic class battleships and Drake and Cressy class cruisers. My suspicion is the US never went that way, because, in WWII, they already had a very large supply of obsolete battleships and didn't see the sense in building new hulls to carry the obsolete guns that were already afloat on the battleships. If the RN had been able to source more turret and gun sets, the way they sourced the sets from Bethlehem, they probably would not have been stripping obsolete warships either. Oh, the submarines? Bethlehem got away with selling the guns while the US was neutral, but, when President Wilson got wind of the submarine deal, he had the subs impounded until the US entered the war.
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The USN's naming conventions were not that organized at the time. Monitors, and armored cruisers, could both be named after states, while a battleship could reuse a historical name, like Kearsarge. As you said, the monitors, and the armored cruisers, were renamed when naming battleships after states became formalized. Florida was used as the target in a live fire exercise in 1908, where the turret was hit by a 12" shell and sustained some damage. Florida was using that turret in a live fire exercise targeting the San Marcos (formerly USS Texas) in 1911, so, presumably, the Navy had replacement parts available for the Florida's turret.
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@kemarisite Looking at the Sheffield and Stark, cruise missiles appear to hit only several feet above the waterline, where they would hit the side armor of a BB. Additionally, the Iowas don't have aluminum superstructures, but steel, with a higher melting point, so fire damage is not as severe as in a modern ship. I think of radar guidance as having ADD. it will home in on whatever gives it the best return at the moment, which would be the long, tall, flat side of the hull. Sheffield was hit in the side of the hull, just about amidships. Stark was hit in the hull, just below the bridge. On an Iowa, hits in those locations, only several feet above the waterline, would go splat against the armor.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 are you assuming the naval treaties exist, or not? We need to look at the precise language of the WNT, however, for some reason, the full text I have referred to in the past is not coming up in a search today. As I recall, the language of the treaty related the tonnage limits to replacement ships, implying that a power could retain more than it's quota worth of ships, but would have to start drawing down the surplus as new, replacement, ships were built. In the original treaty retention list, the RN was well over it's 525,000 ton limit. Even after the Nelsons were added, and four old ships eliminated in exchange, the RN was still over it's 525KT limit. If my read is correct, the US could have retained more older ships, if it wanted to, up to the moment it was granted authority to complete West Virginia and Colorado as replacements for the two Delawares, which would then compel adherence to the 525kt limit. If the US, in April 1917, had taken a page from the RN and cancelled all the Colorados and Tennessees outright, to clear the slipways for DD construction, then all the South Dakotas and Lexingtons are scrapped because they exceed treaty maximums, the USN would be stuck, not only with the Delawares, but also the South Carolinas and some of the pre-dreadnought Connecticuts to fill it's tonnage quota. Potential use for pre-dreadnoughts? Before US entry into WWI, it engaged in several "big stick" waving exercises, invading Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. As there was no opposing naval force, the USN used a variety of obsolete ships, battleships, armored cruisers and monitors, in those operations. In a post WWI environment, and a shortage of modern capital ships, I could see the US continuing to use pre-dreadnoughts in big stick waving exercises to frighten the locals. I doubt a Connecticut would be any deterrent to a Nelson though.
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@erichammond9308 the pompom's shortfall is short range. The 25mm has a significant advantage in range. Navweaps gives a max ceiling, for the high velocity version of the pompom MV 2300fps, which Japan did not have, of 13,300ft, vs 18,000 for the Type 96. If the Japanese had licensed the Italian 37mm, they would have a more formidable AA defense as it threw a larger shell than the Type 96, with a higher ceiling, 16,400ft, than the pompom, with a loading system that eliminated the reload stoppages of the Type 96. And the Italian twin 37mm, was available from 1932.
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@jacobdill4499 I thought about that. The US was building to the 35,000 ton limit. Using vertical 13.5" armor, vs new, and sloped, 12" would add a lot of weight. Given the rate that the US cranked out battleships, they did not seem to be armor production capacity limited, like the UK was. Looking at the build times for the KGVs, the first ship completed in good time, but the build times got longer and longer. Anson and Howe were laid down 6-7 months after KGV and PoW, but commissioned 18 months after KGV and PoW. Considering the rate the RN was losing battleships in 41, having those last two KGVs finished a bit earlier would have been nice.
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@rupertboleyn3885 everything you say is true. However, as I remind my Canadian friend when he starts complaining about the 50 old DDs the US handed over to the RN in late 40, you use what is available. Belt armor bolts on, so the Admiralty could always change out the 13.5" when better material was available. I have read that the 14" on the KGVs was designed to fit the same cradle as the 13.5". Navweaps says 54 of the old 13.5s were still in inventory in 1939. What mongrels Anson and Howe could have been, with US belt armor from the South Dakotas, and guns from the Iron Dukes, Considering that, over the course of 41, the RN had lost Hood, Barham, Prince of Wales, and Repulse, and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were disabled, a couple of mongrels may have been welcome.
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@gerardlabelle9626 the newspapers of the time reported there was a consensus among the delegations at the conference that 12" guns were obsolete. Of the three largest navies, the USN was the only one required to retain ships with 12" guns. France retained three 12" armed Dantons, which commissioned in 1911, and received licenses to start building replacements in 1927 and 29. The Floridas were also 12" armed, and commissioned in 1911. but the US did not receive licenses to begin construction of replacements before the 1930s, or authority to improve side armor and upgun the 12" ships, like France and Italy did. I went through the annual spreadsheets published by the Bureau of Supply and Accounts and found that, in the late 1920s, the USN spent some $6.6M modernizing the Floridas, bulges, deck armor, conversion to oil fuel, when the WNT called for them to be scrapped in 34. Washington was 80% complete when work was stopped. The $6.6M spent on the Floridas, already obsolete due to their 12" guns, was just about what was needed to complete Washington, which would have been expected to serve for 20 years. But completing Washington would give the US too many "post-Jutland" ships. I think the real issue separating "pre" from "post" was the size of the guns, not the date ships were laid down or designed. In July 1916, SecNav Daniels announced, with the General Board agreeing, that Jutland had proven the need to go to larger guns, which could penetrate at longer range. If they settled on 15" as the "post-Jutland" size, then the RN would have 13 ships in commission that would be defined as "post-Jutland", even though some of those 15" ships were at the battle, and everyone else would be demanding authority to build a compensating number of ships If they settled on 16" as the "post-Jutland" size, then the UK would need to spend the money to build three Nelsons. So, the delegates engaged in some Orwellian doublethink that said Hood was "post", to avoid spending more money on a third Nelson, while the Tennessees with their advanced torpedo protection and all-or-nothing armor scheme were "pre", so the US could complete Colorado and West Virginia, to replace the obsolete Delawares.
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@johnshepherd9676 If the US had built the South Dakotas, that means an individual ship limit of some 42-43,000 tons, instead of 35,000. So the Admiralty would not have built the Nelsons. They probably would have proceeded with the G3s, as they had been formally ordered, and complied with the 16" gun limit, which the N3s did not. Probably with some corners cut to reduce the displacement to the low 40s. The SoDaks would have a third more guns, throwing slightly heavier shells, with a larger bursting charge, at higher velocity, with a higher rate of fire per gun, and the after turrets would have a wider firing arc. On the other hand, the G3s could steam rings around the SoDaks. If they were forced to go toe to toe, I would give it to the SoDaks, because they can throw so much steel.
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@johnshepherd9676 OK, you are talking complete replacement, so the USN makes a quantum leap in size, speed, and firepower, from the Tennessees, to the SoDaks, on the schedule that the Colorados historically occupied. That means Iowa, the one assigned to Newport News, would be laid down in April 1917, because News had the slipway available. The other ships would be suspended for the duration of the war, as the Colorados were. Laid down in 1919, the other SoDaks would be incomplete at the time of the treaty, and, exceeding the 35,000 ton limit, would not be allowed to complete. If the SoDaks replace the Tennessees as well, that means SoDak is laid down in Brooklyn in May 17, and Montana is laid down at Mare Island October 16. So three are complete before the treaty goes into effect. If the US had one SoDak, I think the Brits would call it a wash with Hood.
In my readings on the Washington conference, the UK suggested a 43,000 ton limit for individual ships. It was the US that insisted on the hard 35,000 limit. So, if anyone else had 43,000 tonners, the UK would certainly insist they have a sufficient number of ships of that size, for parity. If the US had three SoDaks complete, the Brits would demand two more 43,000 ton ships, for parity, which brings us back to two somewhat slimmed down G3s. More Admirals, or J3s, would only mount 15" guns, and the UK would want 16". for parity. Of course, all this between the US and UK is not happening in a vacuum. If the UK and US both had 43,000 tonners, the Japanese would demand they be allowed to complete one or both Tosas, for proportional parity.
Getting back to your original SoDak vs Nelson question, the previous gunnery assessment stands: the SoDaks way outgun whatever the UK had in the works. G3s would have a significant speed advantage over the SoDaks, the Nelsons would not. The G3s could run away before they were crippled, the Nelsons could not.
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@somethinglikethat2176 I don't even play Drac on TV, but I have a project in mind. I think the TBD gets a bum wrap for it's performance at Midway. Up to that point, the plane had done well. There are no surviving TBDs in museums anywhere. The Lexington is, of course, a war grave, and cannot be disturbed. However, there are several TBDs in the debris field around the ship. Due to the cold, dark, and oxygen starved conditions at that depth, photographs have shown the planes to be well preserved. My project would be to salvage the TBDs in the Lexington debris field, for restoration and display at the USN aviation museum in Pensacola, and selected other museums around the US.
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@davidlow8104 iirc, the objective of the treaty was to cut spending. If the UK had built 45.000 ton Nelsons, then the US would have wanted to complete three South Dakotas and Japan would have wanted to complete the Tosas for parity, and the spending would continue to spiral. The first London treaty extended the battleship construction moratorium through 1936, so any ships that were scrapped, beyond those First London required to be scrapped, could not have been replaced. By the time Second London went into effect, battleship building capacity had atrophied from lack of use. Look at the build times for the KGVs. In discussions in another forum, it appears the Admiralty ordered the five ships of the class laid down essentially simultaneously, when it knew the UK lacked the industrial capacity to build five simultaneously. Consequently, delivery times for the first two, KGV and PoW were not too bad, but deliveries became progressively later on the subsequent ships. With new construction capacity so constrained, they had no option but modernize older ships.
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@kingquackie7284 lets see. Akagi at 36K standard load and 66+25 spare aircraft (numbers plucked from Wiki), Kaga 38Kt standard for 72+18 spare vs Shokaku at 26Kt standard, for 72+12 spares. This is the same sort of question as with the Lexington conversions vs purpose built carriers. Shokaku has a roughly equal size air group on 10K tons less displacement, so if Akagi and Kaga has not been built, the IJN could have built, with a bit of fibbing, three Shokakus instead, for a net gain of 1 hull and an extra 72 plane air group available. The difference would really only matter when Japan was still pretending to abide by the treaty, so the correct comparison would be Agaki and Kaga, vs more Sōryūs at 16KT standard and 63+9 spares. Foregoing Akagi and Kaga would enable 4 more Sōryūs, with a net gain in deployable air group of 114 planes and a net loss of 7 spares. On the US side, foregoing Lexington and Saratoga would have freed up enough tonnage to allow construction of 3 Yorktowns, with enough tonnage left over to build Wasp as a 20,000 ton improved Yorktown.
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@davidlow8104 the 1922 treaty intent was to stop spending. If everyone was fine with having another arms race, building all the ships planned at the time, there would probably not be a treaty until 1930, when the depression forced a cut in spending. The 1930 treaty would probably look a lot like the historical First London treaty: suspension of shipbuilding, with the fleet size drawdowns of the WNT. If 1920s building programs had been pursued, I would suspect strategy to be much more battleship-centric, as that is what the fleets have to work with. Without the WNT, Akagi, Kaga, Lex and Sara would have been completed as originally designed, rather than converted to carriers. That would postpone development of naval air by close to a decade.
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@calvingreene90 taking out escorts is easier said than done as they are usually a smaller target, can move at a higher speed and are more maneuverable. I think I grasp what you are saying: suppress the triple A by sinking the ships at the edge of the formation, and work your way in to the main target. Thing is, a sub lining up a shot has lots of time: multiple periscope sightings and a TDC to perform the calculations. A pilot of a TBD doesn't have any of that, and he has the pressure of dozens of people trying to kill him as he lines up the shot. A TBD driver has to estimate distance to target, target speed, and amount to lead the target, all calculated in his head. One of the theories of why all the torpedo planes missed Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the Channel dash is that the pilots were used to shooting at freighters steaming at 10-12 kts. The battleships were steaming at 30, and the pilots simply didn't lead them enough when dropping the torp. Error in the amount to lead the target can be reduced by dropping closer, but there is an inner limit to the drop zone as the torp needs time to come back up to running depth after the deep plunge it takes from being dropped, and then the warhead has to arm itself. Meanwhile, the target can see the TBD coming long before it drops, and start taking evasive action. At Coral Sea, TBDs dropped close to 20 torps at Shōkaku without result. Yes the early Mk 13 was a sorry excuse for a torp, but zero for twenty? That is how hard it is to hit a ship at high speed with a torp, even a big ship.
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@RedXlV My take on the Nelsons is the US was sniveling about having 3 Colorados, which were under the treaty 35kt limit, so close to completion being scrapped, so was allowed to complete 2 Colorados, in exchange for scrapping the two Delawares that the treaty would have allowed the US to keep. The UK didn't have any treaty compliant ships under construction, so was compensated by being allowed to build the Nelsons, in exchange for scrapping 4 ships the treaty allowed them to keep. The compensation for France and Italy, for the US and UK being allowed to complete two new ships were their own new construction windows in 1927 and 1929, which the other signatories were not given. The US and UK construction windows did not open until 1931. The first London treaty extended the battleship holiday to 1936, but the construction windows given to France and Italy starting in 27 and 29 were good until used, so, the Dunkerques and first two Littorios could be laid down in the early 30s, using those 27 and 29 construction windows, while everyone else was still shut down. If France had completed two of the Normandies and Italy completed two of the Caracciolos, using the same forbearance that the US and UK used, then they would have lost the 27 and 29 construction windows and not been able to build the Dunkerques and Littorios.
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@RedXlV the objective of the treaty was to reduce spending, so, if the RN had three treaty busting battle cruisers, their scrapping list for other ships would have been even longer than it already was, to keep total tonnage under the limit. If BCs were to be regarded as a separate class from BBs, and the RN had the three treaty busters, plus Renown, Repulse and Tiger. then the US would demand it be allowed to complete an equivalent tonnage of Lexingtons and Japan would want to complete enough of the Amagis to have a proportional tonnage. when combined with the Kongos. All this BC building sort of defeats the intention of the treaty to reduce spending. On the other hand, if the US was content to scrap Colorado and West Virginia, or use them for target practice, like Washington was, the Nelsons would not have happened, and France and Italy would not have had the 27 and 29 construction windows, so the Dunkerqes and Littorios are not built in the early 30s. That leaves Italy entering the war with only the four rebuilt Cavours and Dorias as they could not have started work on the Littorios until Italy withdrew from the treaty system in 36, leaving Littorio and Veneto with a completion date in 41 or 42, if ever. The Richelieus would be laid down as a response to the Bismarks, in 37, later than historically,, unless the drydocks were occupied by the Dunkerques being laid down to respond to the Scharnhorsts. The French would be just nicely started on the Dunkerques, see the Bismarks laid down, realize how inadequate the Dunkerques are, and start over. This all ends up with the Richelieus being incomplete hulls destroyed by allied bombing or broken up for scrap by the Germans.
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@olivergoodridgeify I have read a bit about them. According to what I have read, they proceeded with Hood, as a replacement for the BCs lost at Jutland. They started reworking the design for the other Admirals, based on their analysis of Jutland, until they reached the point where the other Admirals were effectively, a different class than Hood, and such a patchwork of adaptations that they decided to chuck the mess and start over with a clean sheet. The irony is the 1919 design for the Lexington class BCs, the design that was laid down, is said to be heavily influenced by Hood, even though, by the time the Lexingtons were green lighted, the Brits had said they didn't want any more ships like the Hood.
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@CTXSLPR who couldn't have gone full CV? The Japanese gave notice in late 34 that they would not participate in the treaty after the end of 36, so they could build all they wanted. Ark Royal used the last of the RN's carrier tonnage, except there was a clause in the treaty that carriers in service or building at the time of the treaty were "experimental" and not held to the treaty's 20 year replacement cycle. Hermes, Eagle and Argus all fit that criteria, so the RN could have refitted all three as sub tenders, for instance, and freed up enough tonnage for two more Ark Royals. If they measured the age of the Courageous class carriers from when they commissioned as "large light cruisers", rather than as carriers, they were all 20 years old by 37, so they could all have been replace by new build carriers as well. The Brits laid down four 23,000 ton Illustrious class carriers in 37, so they probably had one of these replacement scenarios in mind at the time. Only the USN had all it's tonnage quota tied up in relatively new carriers and was still trying to abide by the treaty, until 38.
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@Kato Ho Ten Soeng the thinking at the turn of the century was that the large guns would not fire very often in an action. The standard ammo storage for the big guns on USN ships was only 60 rounds/gun. The reload cycle for a 12-13" was very slow also. So, the idea was the 8" on the upper level would keep up a hot, rapid, fire, while the 12 or 13" would carry out it's arduous reload cycle, and, occasionally, fire. But, the USN discovered that, if they worked on the ergonomics of the big gun mounts, and trained the crews a bit, reloads took a lot less time. The reload cycle time of the USN 13"/35 was reduced from 5 minutes, to 1 minute, vs the 30-45 second reload cycle for the 8" in the upper section. I have read a US Naval Academy gunnery text book from 1915 that compares different turret designs and it says that the only advantage they really realize from the superimposed turrets, vs two separate turrets, is a weight savings. Of course, by 1915, the Navy had figured out the real solution was superfiring turrets, rather than superimposed turrets. There were two USN classes with superimposed turrets: the Kearsarge class (identifiable by low freeboard and round turrets) and the later Virginia class (more reasonable freeboard and flat-sided turrets)
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@davidknowles2491 I'm sure the designers intended the quad turrets to be reliable. I looked in to the choice to revert to 14" on the KGVs. The decision seems to have been driven by the "more guns equals more hits" theory. The initial plan was for the KGVs to mount 12-14", but the armor deck was raised, and that extra weight required B turret to be reduced to a twin. As one book I read said, that decision, which reduced the armament to only 10 guns, undercut the reasoning to go to 14" in the first place. Admiralty analysis of the various design proposals said that 9-15" gave the best balance of firepower, speed, and protection, and explicitly said the only reason to go to 14" was if required by treaty. I also looked in to the triple turrets on the Nelsons. They also had many faults, most of which had been corrected by the mid 30s, but the basic design of the systems slowed the rate of fire to only about 1.6 rounds per minute, vs 2 rounds per minute on the KGVs, so adopting the Nelson design, in spite of it being debugged by 36, was a no-go.
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@morat242 The Japanese wanted a more favorable ratio to the US and UK, but the US said that was not going to happen, so the best way to save face would be to at least complete Tosa, which would put the IJN 26,000 tons over their limit, vs the historical retention list putting them 14,000 tons below their quota. The Japanese could have made a credible argument that they were entitled to a 42,000 ton ship, because of Hood. If the USN Tennessee class was deemed "post-Jutland", then they, combined with the three Colorados that were completed, would make 5 "post-Jutland" ships, at zero additional cost vs historical expenditure, vs Japan's 3. Maybe give the US clearance to upgun the Tennessees to 16", if they want to, to make a 5:3 ratio of 16" gun, post-Jutland ships. Then the UK would be entitled to 4 Nelsons, which they might have trouble paying for, on top of their load of war debt.
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@bkjeong4302 At the time, 1906ish, "normal cruisers" covered a pretty wide range, from 3,000 ton "scout cruisers" with 4" guns, to "armored cruisers", like the Minotaur class of 14,600 with a mix of 9.2" and 7.5" guns. With dreadnoughts mounting 12" guns, where would you go with something superior to a Minotaur? More 9.2", or bear the expense of developing something larger than a 9.2", but smaller than a 12", or mount the 12" guns that have already been developed for the dreadnoughts? Minotaur was 519' overall, with a beam of 74.5ft. Invincible was 17,250 tons, 18% more than Minotaur, 567ft, 9% longer than Minotaur, with a beam of 78.5ft, only 4 feet wider than Minotaur. Invincible was 2.5kts faster than Minotaur, so she could keep up with the scout cruisers. Looking at the specifications, seems the Invincibles were an evolution of the cruisers the Admiralty had been building. Putting the Invincibles up against real battleships would be a doctrine failure. They should probably have been used the way the Courageouses were, in light cruiser squadrons.
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@kemarisite as an exercise, I ran a scenario where the USN developed the 4"/50, instead of going to 5" for battleship secondaries. A twin 4" mount was developed during WWI. The mount was very light and, from the numbers I see, did not weigh any more than a single 5"/51. The guns were set very close together, so I wonder about dispersion, though information I see does not say they suffered that problem. Range was similar to the casemate mounted 5". The 5'/51 has better armor penetration, but BB secondaries are for plinking torpedo boats and DDs, which are not armored, so does the armor penetration superiority of the 5" really matter? The dual mounted 4" still had a screw breech, so no rate of fire advantage over the 5", but, with twice as many guns, the throw weight of the 4" battery is greater. So, everywhere you see a main deck mounted casemate 5" on a USN BB, imagine a twin 4" instead. Then, when aircraft become a thing, design a 4" DP mount, like the British DP Mk 19, fit a sliding breech to double the rate of fire, and maybe clip the gun down to 45 calibers in length to reduce inertia. A twin 4/45 DP mount would weigh less that the combination of 5"/51 and 5"/25 that the US BBs had in the 30s, with twice as many guns that could be used in either mode, in those same main deck locations. That would also leave the 01 deck above the twin 4" mounts open for light AA to be installed. But no, the USN went 5" The 51 cal version was too heavy to retrofit Clemsons. They probably decided the 25 cal was too short ranged to be a DP gun. If they had developed the 4" instead?
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The Nissan plants in Mexico appear to build the low priced sedans, Sentra and Versa, for the US, as well as other models for Latin America. The larger, more profitable, models, are built in their three plants in the US. So the Trump tariffs would not be devastating to Nissan.
The thinking in another forum I read is that MITI would not allow Nissan to be completely owned by a non-Japanese company. If that is the case, the most likely scenario is the non-Japanese operations being sold off, with US operations most likely going to Hyundai, non-US operations going to a Chinese company, and the Japanese operations staying with the rump Nissan, in Japanese hands.
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@vikinggamer9545 Thank you! I have been wondering where that 17.3" number came from. The slide in the presentation appears to be using the "EFF" numbers. I was looking at the numbers on the Navweaps page about the specific guns. The 14"/45 page has two tables, from different sources, which are roughly in agreement. Why is there such a discrepancy between those two sources and the numbers generated by the "Facehard" program for the British 14? Other questions that come to mind: If the 14"/45 could penetrate any likely BB belt (13-14") out to 22,000+ yards, as shown in the "Facehard" tables, why did the Admiralty pursue a 16" for the Lions? Seems, if their thinking was consistent, the Lions would have been designed with 3 or 4 quad 14" turrets. Why did doctrine dictate closing to 16,000yds, if the 14" could penetrate any likely belt at 22,000+, because that doctrine puts the RN ships at a disadvantage, starting every engagement with their "T" crossed? What makes "decisive range" decisive, and distinct from engagement range? I'm thinking "decisive range" is the range where the belt armor can be penetrated for a magazine kill shot, while "engagement range" is the range where chunks can be shot off the edges of the target, slowly degrading it. As I think I noted elsewhere, this is all very reminiscent of a debate that went on in the USN in 1915, where the 14" advocates also hinged their argument on assuming engagements would be at medium range, in their case, 12,000. The 14" advocates ultimately lost that argument as Dogger Bank and Jutland demonstrated that engagements could be fought at longer ranges, so the USN advanced to the 16", that could better penetrate at those longer ranges.
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Peter Egan wrote a column for Road & Track some 35 years ago on the same topic of collecting, in his case, cars. His inspiration was when a total stranger called him at home one evening demanding to be told which cars to collect. Peter tried to explain, just as Ian does, that you collect what interests you. When I hear a "what do I buy" question about collectables, the asker is either looking for "collectables" that he wants to make a big pile of money off of, or he is trying to impress other people. He obviously doesn't care about the actual item, because, if he did, he would not need to ask the question because he would gravitate toward something specific. If I was going to "collect" something, it would be some of the fake hack jobs, like a couple Ian has reviewed. because I find it amusing what some charlatans try to pass off on the unaware. The problem, of course, is the charlatans don't price their wares like the worthless hack jobs they are.
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@GaldirEonai water escape from aircraft is a routine part of pilot training in the USN. At NAS Pensacola they have a device called the "Dilbert Dunker", which is a mockup cockpit sitting on a steeply inclined track. The pilot trainee is strapped in the cockpit, it runs down the track, hits the water and flips upside down. Then the pilot unstraps and swims out. They also have a "helo dunker" that does the same thing, with full complement of cockpit crew and passengers. The helo dunker drops in the water, rolls inverted, then everyone has to get unstrapped, find a window or door and get out. iirc the Marines also have a helo dunker. There are several videos on youtube of these devices in use. Back in my day, there was another water escape training exercise, for a bail out scenario: The pilot candidate is strapped into a parachute harness, tied to a line from a motor launch. He's tossed in the water and the motor launch tows him around Pensacola Bay while he tries to get out of the harness.
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@scottgiles7546 I'm not sure Jackie "lost it" at all. His thinking did not always align with everyone else's, which can cause a person to be dismissed as being around the bend. The Courageouses were forced upon him by higher ups in the government, who decreed that nothing larger than a cruiser should be started, because, they were sure the war would be over before new capital ships could be built from the keel up. What Jackie really wanted was a third Renown, but the government would not let him have it. There are some hilarious bits on The Dreadnought Project about the gestation of the Courageouses. Basically, TPTB decreed "nothing bigger than a cruiser", but failed to define how large a cruiser could be. Jackie exploited that loophole to build 20,000 ton cruisers with 15" guns. If he had been around the bend, he would not have had the presence of mind to notice that loophole, and exploit it.
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Difference between a stump speech and debating: reading a teleprompter, vs thinking on the fly. Biden's performance validated everything the naysayers have been saying. What if Putin or Xi catches him on an off day?
I'm old enough to remember when LBJ said he was not going to run for another term. The date of that announcement was March 31, 1968. His VP, Humphrey, was the candidate that fall, Humphrey only lost to Nixon by a thin margin, and Nixon didn't have near the baggage that Trump has.
Newsom should not run, if he values his dignity. His ex-wife is playing nookie with one of Trump's spawn. Can you imagine the nasty, vicious, highly personal, things she will say about Newsom?
I think Biden is enough of an adult to realize he hurt himself a lot last night, and willingly step aside, before he is pushed. They have just short of two months to get their house in order, before the convention.
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@satern7473 a good question. I have read that the Sharnhorsts also approached a convoy, realized it was escorted by HMS Malaya, and turned tail. My fun scenario involves convoy HX84. That convoy with Jervis Bay as escort, left Halifax on October 28, 1940. From September, into December of that year, the handover of the US destroyers to the RN was taking place, in Halifax. The USN transferred those destroyers with full magazines and torpedo tubes. What if half a dozen of those DDs tagged along with HX84, and Scheer found itself facing a squadron of angry Clemsons, instead of only Jervis Bay? As it happened, some of those old DDs were en route to the UK, but not with the convoy, heard Jervis Bay's radio traffic and rushed to help, but arrived too late.
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I played around with a scenario like that a while back. It seems evident that Darlan's loyalties were "flexible". Gensoul was following orders received, over Darlan's signature, to resist the British. The pivot point is Reynaud going across the channel to the UK, forming a government in exile, and ordering all loyal French forces to rally to him, rather than surrendering. Darlan would probably follow Reynaud. That would have Richeleau and Jean Bart making the shorter trip to the UK, and Gensoul bringing his force to the UK. First order of business would be sorting out the loyal crewmen who wanted to fight on, from those that want to call it a war. Manning the best ships with loyal crews, training, and upgrading things like AA armament, replacing the French single shot 37mm guns with Vickers pompoms, for instance, would probably all happen at Scapa. So, everyone is in place for Bismark's breakout. For simplicity of communications, all the French ships sail together, and they make for the Denmark Strait, because they are faster, so can cover the longer distance quicker. Meanwhile KGV, Prince of Wales, Hood, and Repulse make for the channel south of Iceland. So the engagement starts, but, then Richeleau suffers three guns out of action due to premature detonation of the shells, and pulls back, leaving the somewhat thin skinned Strasbourg and even thinner skinned Dunkerque to duke it out.
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wrt Japan signing Second London. First change is the gun size escalator would not be triggered, as the trigger was Japan not signing the treaty. Second change, if Japan built Yamato as anything remotely treaty complaint, 35-40,000 tons, western intelligence would never have caught on. Reportedly, it was the amount of material being ordered for Yamato that indicated it was well over treaty limits. The fact that Japan was building battleships in late 37 would not ring alarms, as the Kongos would start to age out in 40. If the displacement escalator is not triggered, the Iowas and Lions are never conceived. There was not much of Japan's 81,000 ton carrier allotment left after Kaga, given that Hōshō and Ryūjō were both under 10,000 tons. They probably could have built Sōryū, but there would not be enough tonnage left to build any of the other pre-war carriers, so the 23,000 ton limit does not come into play, as long as Japan holds to the treaty.
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wrt the High Seas fleet not being scuttled, Italy did take a number of Austrian and German destroyers and cruisers into it's service as war reparations, many of them lasting into the 1930s, though Italy did change out the guns for Italian types. Considering the loss of da Vinci, and the obsolete condition of most of the RM's BBs, if the RM was inclined, I could see them welcoming the Bayern and Baden into their service. The French would probably prefer the Italians have those two than complete the Caracciolos. It seems that, what freaked the French the most about the Caracciolos was their 28kt speed. From my readings, the MN did a study of what was needed to juice up the incomplete Normandies to match the Caracciolo's speed. As if lengthening the hulls and installing a more powerful powerplant was not exorbitant enough, France built capital ships in drydocks, and they did not have drydocks long enough to allow the lengthening of the Normandies that would be required. While the Badens had 15" guns, larger than the 13.4" on the Normandie and Bretagne classes, they were only 2 ships, and they topped out at 21kts.
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wrt the question about USN carriers that were faster than their BB escorts, and the concept of the "super-cruiser". What if the Alaskas were conceived of as "carrier consort", rather than "cruiser killer"? When the battleship holiday ends in 1937, the USN decides that 28kts is perfectly fine for BBs as the USN is still thinking in terms of a line of battle, so builds the North Carolinas and South Dakotas as they were. Meanwhile, with the mindset of carriers being a "scouting force", addressing the problem of consorts for 33kt carriers, with the Alaskas, rather than arguing over the tonnage escalator clause with the UK for six months, then building the wildly expensive Iowas, because the Alaskas were powerful enough to defeat anything anyone else had that was capable of 33kts.
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wrt the question about USN 5" gun ammunition interchangeability. From my reading, the 5/25 used "fixed" ammunition, ie the shell and propellant charge came assembled in one piece, which would make for faster loading, but, at 80lbs, for the round, crew fatigue would be a greater factor. Most models of the 5/51 used propellant in bags, making for slow loading. Neither the 5/25 or 5/51 had a power rammer, both required loading shell and propellant into the breach by hand. The 5/38 used semi-fixed rounds: separate shell and metal cased propellant charge. With the semi-fixed ammo, the shell and it's propellant charge were each lighter than the fixed 5/25 round, so less crew fatigue, but, in the 5/38 mounts with power rammers, the loaders only needed to drop the shell and propellant in the loading tray and the rammer seated them in the breach, so loading speed was equal to loading a single. fixed round in a 5/25 and twice the speed of a 5/51. So, while the 51, 25 and 38 may appear to use the same shell, I would not count on being able to pry the shell off of a fixed 5/25 round and use it in a 5/38 with the 38's propellant charge. I would be even more doubtful of using a 5/25 round as is, in a 38.
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Yes, Dearborn has a vary large Middle Eastern population. The city used to host an Arab Festival, until Christian extremists kept showing up, trying to create an incident. A few years ago, some gun nutters walked into the Dearborn PD headquarters, to complain about being rousted, because they had been walking down the street brandishing assault rifles. They walked into the police station, still carrying their assault rifles, tactical vests, and wearing face masks. There were immediately about six policemen, with guns drawn, ordering them to drop their guns. I live near Dearborn. These incidents have been local news.
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@bkjeong4302 I agree, the hit on Hood was a golden BB, but the vulnerability was there. The Brits rained shells on Bismark for how long, and never found a vulnerability like that? Yes, Kirishima was even older than Hood, but had been modernized. Washington didn't find a vulnerability on it like Hood's, so shot it to bits the slow way. As someone else said upthread, there were not that many WWII engagements of WWI vs WWII BBs that came to a clear conclusion, one of them sinking. Washington vs Nagato or Littorio vs Queen Elizabeth, one on one, would have been interesting, but never happened.
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@pedrofelipefreitas2666 it appears such a ship would have been within Japanese capability, if they settled for "average" amounts of armor, vs the exceptionally thick armor of the Yamato. The Kii. basically an uparmored Amagi, and the Number 13, were estimated to make 29.75-30kts. According to Wiki those classes had 11.5"-13" belts and 4.7"-5" decks, vs Yamato's 16" belt and 9" deck and Iowa's 12.1" belt and 6" deck. The 13, with it's four, twin 18" turrets, modernized for late 1930s thinking on secondary/AA armament, could have been an interesting alternative, and it's 47,000 ton displacement might have been close enough to the treaty limit for western intelligence agencies to not twig until it was too late to design and built a reply. An updated Kii, with 16" armament and 42,000 ton displacement almost certainly would have flown under western intelligence's radar.
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@bkjeong4302 oh yes, I have noted your stated opposition to all BBs. You would have a hard time selling that to the USN in 38 tho. In defense of BBs, they can carry more AA than a CL or DD, and if they have to take a torpedo to protect the carrier, they can take the hit better than a CL or DD. Having them along helps in situations like Guadalcanal, where Washington and SD were detached from the carrier force to kill off a Kongo. The ultimate Steve Plan for late 30s BBs rests on a couple of assumptions: BB guns are very expensive and take a long time to make, and making the guns for the NCs and SDs took a lot of material and manpower away from making more cruiser and DD guns. While the Pennsylvanias and New Mexicos were updated significantly in the late 20s/early 30s, next to nothing had been done with the Tennessees and Colorados since they were built, so those last two classes may have been in significantly worse material condition that the earlier ships. The triple 14" turrets in the Tennessees and twin 16" turrets in the Colorados use the same diameter barbette, and the twin 16" turret and gun combination is about 70 tons lighter than the triple 14". So, the Steve plan is to use the NC class plan known as XVI-C with the 9-14" gun option, which gives the 13.5" belt and 30kt speed. Scrap the two Tennessees and move 6 of their turrets, with the rebuilt and upgraded 14"/50 Mk 11 to NC and Washington. When the escalator clause triggers, use the same ship design, for the four SDs, while scrapping the Colorados and moving three of their twin turrets with the newly rebuilt 16"/45 Mk 8 to each of the new SDs. Then we have 6-30kt BBs that can hang with the carriers pretty well, carry lots of AA, and put the hurt on any enemy fast cruiser force that manages to get within gun range of the carrier force, and it's done relatively cheap, quick, and without burdening the Naval Gun Factory. Then when someone proposes the Iowas and Alaskas, people ask "all that expense and work, for a lousy three knots over what we already have?" That is probably what did the Lions in more than anything else. They were only a couple knots faster than the KGVs, the 14" on the KGVs were proving effective, so the Lions didn't offer enough of an advantage to really motivate anyone to push ahead with them.
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@jamesb4789 Several good comments in your post. The US agreed to the Second London treaty, which had the gun size reduction, so if command wants to give the stink-eye to someone, give it to their own leadership. If the NCs had been built with the lighter 14" guns and ammo, they would have been faster. If the NCs had been built with twin 16" turrets, instead of triples, to save weight, they would have been faster. Something in the American psyche always wants bigger and more.
Everything I read says the General Board was very happy with the 9-14"/30kt option, because it had the armor to get stuck in against BBs, and speed to better hang with carriers, everyone, except Reeves. It seems Reeves' mind set was it's all about the carriers, everywhere, all the time, and anything that impedes carriers to the slightest degree needs to be tossed out. So, he seems to have rejected the 30kt option in the expectation that the BBs would never, ever, be operating with carriers, while the guys who always want more and bigger guns, pounced on the chance to load up on 16", as soon as the escalator clause tripped, regardless of impact on speed. Just for good measure, there was a large faction crying for battle cruisers to hang with the carriers, but, with the treaty and power plant technology constraints, that would have required sacrifice of armor, which would put them behind the 8-ball if they got stuck in against real BBs.
So, with factions pulling in different directions, the compromise design that could do everything fairly well, the 9-14"/30kt, was tossed aside, in favor of ships that had lots of big guns, but speed compromised and armor compromised. As for the SDs, I find it interesting that SD was laid down the day after Lion. Both with 9-16" guns, but Lion was a hair over 40,000 tons and could make 30kts, on the same 130,000shp that SD had, without the benefit of SD's 600psi powerplant.
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@jamesb4789 again, you make a lot of good points, but my take on Reeves' position was that, in his search for the perfect, he missed an opportunity to get "pretty good", and got "what were we thinking with these tubs?" instead. iirc the Brits looked at a KGV with 9-15 or 16" guns and the extra weight required too much sacrifice of armor. The Brits and US should have agreed on the tonnage escalation in Second London beforehand. All the treaty text says is they can go to 16" guns, but it only says the signatories need to consult and try to come to an agreement on tonnage increase. The US and UK spent the first half of 38 arguing about how much to increase the tonnage. The Brits were looking for around 42,000, as that was the largest their facilities could build and service, while the US was holding out for 45,000, so they could build the "perfect" BB that could match carrier speed, and have a lot of really big guns, and have a lot of armor. That's why I pointed out earlier that the fat, slow, SD was laid down the day after the 40,000 ton, 30kt, 9-16" gun Lion was laid down. If the US was OK with 30kts, instead of holding out for 33, they could have built better ships than the SDs, starting in 39.
Impact on the RN of a 40,000 ton limit written in to the escalator clause? While the first three KGVs were ordered in 36. Anson and Howe were not ordered until April 28 of 37, four weeks after the escalation clause was triggered. If the escalation clause in the treaty offered 40-42,000, without all the negotiating the US and UK did later, Anson and Howe could have been ordered to the Lion design. As it was, by the time they got around to the Lions, they already had five KGVs building, and the incremental improvement offered by the Lion was probably not enough to maintain enthusiasm for getting them built. By the same token, if the NCs and SDs had been capable of 30+kts, the incremental improvement offered by the Iowas, may not been enough to get them built, when the USN already had 6 BBs building.
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@TheJudge2017 Essex class ships found work through the 50s and 60s. Some became specialized ASW carriers. Some became helo carriers, predecessors to the purpose built LPH of the 60s. The "ultimate Essex" may have only been an exercise to see what could be done with them, like the "Tillman battleships" of the WWI era. There is always an itch to see an asset in hand, and try to do something with it, like the WWI vintage twin 15" turrets that spawned HMS Vanguard, or the incomplete Lexington class battlecruisers, that were converted to carriers that were very wasteful of the one asset in short supply: carrier tonnage quota. A year or so back, I looked into the eye-popping cost overruns on the Lexingtons, which ended up costing far more than the early projections that were sold to Congress, or the cost of new, purpose built, carriers, but those hulls were sitting there, so there was a temptation to try to use them.
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If the KM had not tried to use planes the Luftwaffe was interested in, it probably would not have had to compete with the Luftwaffe. The KM was already using the Arado 196. Removing the 196's floats, with their attendant weight and drag, would do wonderful things for the plane's speed, range and payload, and the Luftwaffe isn't interested in it, so no conflict. Of course, they could steal a design for a dedicated carrier plane. Brewster Aeronautical was so corrupt and disorganized that German spies could probably have walked off with drawings for the F2A and SBA in broad daylight without anyone noticing and the BMW 132 was, in size, weight and power, nearly a drop in replacement for the Wright Cyclones the Brewsters used.
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@kemarisite I thought about a single or twin 1.1, on an improvised mount to give the PT guys in the Solomons a bit more hitting power than the Oerlikon, but it may be too heavy. If the USN had adopted the 37mm, they probably would not have bothered with the 1.1. When the 37mm evolved to the M9 version, I can see the USN stealing the design of the Japanese twin Vickers mount, and the UK quad Vickers mount, as in the pic Drac showed. The specs, Navweaps for the Bofors and a 1944 Army manual for the Browning 37mm: ceiling: Bofors 22,299ft, Browning: 18,600ft, range Bofors 11,133 yards, Browning: 8,875 yards, projectile weight; Bofors HE: 1.985lbs, Browning HE: 1.34lbs, rate of fire 120rpm for both. For the Vickers Mk VIII: ceiling 13,300ft (HV version), range 5,000yds, projectile weight HE HV 1.81, HE LV 2.0lbs, rate of fire 115rpm.
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@kemarisite alrighty, we have established (?) that the Browning 37mm M1/M9 (metallic link belt fed both right and left feed versions) could take the place of a Bofors or Vickers well, including single, double and quad mounts. Oerlikon alternatives? The low velocity M4 37mm, as used in the P-39 weighed 213lbs, light enough for the PT guys to use on a free mount. Fires the same 1.34lb HE round, but at only 2000fps, vs the 2600 of the M1. Range 8,875yds (that is what Navweaps says, but that is the same as the M1 and I question it due to the lower muzzle velocity, The Army manual does not give a range for the M4) vs 4,800 for an Oerlikon. 125rpm, much slower rate of fire than an Oerkilon, but hit a plane with that size shell, he'll know it. Or, there is another alternative. The Wickes class DDs were originally supposed to have a 1lb Maxim/Nordenfelt/Vickers gun as AA armament. I have seen pix of early production Wickeses with one Maxim mounted behind the #1 4" mount and another on top of the aft deckhouse, and they were on free mounts. The USN switched to the 3"/23 because they could not get enough Maxims. An update of the 1pounder Maxim could provide that last ditch firepower, but, with the M4 already in production, I don't know why they would bother with the Maxim. Wiki says the 1 pounder weighed 410lbs and only had a range of 4,500 yards. So, there you have USN medium and light AA: M1-M9 37mm in single, twin and quad mounts for midrange, and free mounted 37mm M4/M10 for last ditch.
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@edwarddunne2758 they are a bit before the dreadnought era, but I would nominate the USN 8"/40 and 12"/40. The USN had switched to smokeless powder, without really understanding the implications of the slower burning powder. The guns started blowing off their muzzles and chases with disturbing frequency, which puzzled BuOrd, because chamber pressures were as expected. Further testing revealed that, because the powder burned slower than black or brown powder, pressure in the gun was still building as the shell ran down the tube, so pressure in the chase was far higher than expected. The solution was to install a strong liner, and hoop the tube to the muzzle, to reinforce it. The early British 12"/35 and 12"/40 has a problem with "steel choke". A ridge would form in the liner after some use. When the ridge grew large enough, the shell would hit it with enough force to start the fuse, so the shell would detonate at the muzzle or shortly after leaving the muzzle. By WWI, the USN was also discovering "copper choke", where material from the driving bands on the shells built up in the bore, creating the same issues with detonating shells, stuck shells, and exploded guns. Copper choke was more of a maintenance problem, while the USN 40 cal guns and the British steel choke were more design problems. Drac has made some disparaging comments about some of the French battleship main guns, which had a shorter range than the ship's secondary armament, but that could have been a function of the French turrets only elevating to 12 degrees.
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@gregorywright4918 I don't think the entire cost of the Lexingtons had been appropriated in 1916. The government usually funds things on a year by year basis. In reading about the Washington treaty over the winter, the thought in the back of the minds of several US officials was that Congress was going to cut off funding for the ships already under construction, whether they had the treaty or not. I remember Congress cutting off funding for the Clinch River breeder reactor and the SST that Boeing was working on, and, more recently, we saw how the production run of Zumwalt class destroyers was cut off. According to the Wiki article, conversion cost for the Lexingtons was $22.4M each, on top of the sunk cost of $6.7M, vs $27M for a purpose built carrier of comparable size. On the other hand, Ranger only cost $15.2M, so they could have built two Rangers for less than the conversion cost of the two Lexingtons, and embarked air groups of nearly the same size because Ranger was more efficient at carrying aircraft. People may complain that Ranger was a waste of displacement because it was so less capable than a Yorktown, but you could build a Ranger out of the displacement that a Lexington wasted vs a Yorktown, because of it's inefficient design.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 The USN had a shortage of crewmen, guns, and material. They couldn't man all the ships they had. Congress was laid up in late 1813. I have read that her crew and guns were diverted to the squadron on Lake Erie. Frigate John Adams was undergoing refit in Boston at the start of the war. She was moved to New York, but did not go to sea until early 1814, taking the peace negotiators to Europe under a flag of truce. The frigate Adams was undergoing conversion to a Sloop of War in the Washington Navy Yard at the start of the war. She didn't get to sea until January 1814. Damaged by a grounding, she was in Hampden, Main, and burned when British troops took that city, in September 14. The frigate New York had been laid up in the Washington Navy Yard since 1803, and was burned when the British took the city in 1814. Frigates Boston and General Green had also been laid up in Washington in 1803, and deemed too far gone to repair in 1812. They were also burned when the British took the city in 1814.
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@centurion_a4136 I was investigating the WNT a while back. The UK was open to a 42-43,000 ton limit for individual ships, but the US wanted the 35,000 ton limit. The ships of each nation were divided as "pre-Jutland" or "post-Jutland", and the Nelsons were built for "post-Jutland" parity with the US and Japan. There appears to be more than a bit of political art in the "pre" vs "post" classifications, as Hood, laid down after the battle, was deemed "post" even though it was designed before the battle, while California and Tennessee, both laid down after Hood, were deemed "pre-Jutland", so the US could complete Colorado and West Virginia, to combine with Maryland to be the US' three "post" ships. To make the Nelsons faster would have required either a lot less armor, or a lot more engine, which would exceed the 35,000 ton limit. At that time 23kts was deemed adequate for a battleship. The US South Dakota class, which was cancelled for treaty compliance, was designed for 23 as well.
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wrt the question about battleship guns being downsized at the turn of the century, as Drac said, the key development was smokeless powder. Black power burns very rapidly, so building a gun with a longer barrel is pointless, as the charge would be fully burned before the shell exited a barrel longer than 30 calibers, or so. The smokeless powders that were introduced around the turn of the century burned much slower, enabling longer barrels. As Drac said, I suspect the issue driving the downsizing was weight, because you really are not comparing the weight of a black or brown powder burning 13"/35 to a smokeless burning 12"/40. but the weight of a smokeless burning 13"/40 to a 12"/40. Gun weight plays a role in ship size, and cost. The BB4 Iowa was built as a smaller, cheaper, battleship, than the Indianas, just as Mississippi and Idaho were built as a smaller, cheaper, alternative to the Connecticuts, and downsizing from a 13"/35 to a 12"/35 played a role in downsizing the entire ship.
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With regard to BuOrd and the Mk 14, the problem may be, not only the designers trying to protect their reputation, but, also, a degree of deference being given to the "experts". In the USN, the Mk 13 aerial torpedo, and the 1.1" AA gun joined their pantheon of designs that looked good on paper. The Tennessee class BBs could have had 16" guns, if not for the advocacy of the 14", by Admiral Strauss at BuOrd. The Nelsons could have had more effective guns, except for the embrace, by the RN Director of Naval Ordinance, of the light shell/high velocity theory, a theory that the Germans seem to have also embraced, considering Bismark's 15" shells were close to 200lbs lighter than a British or Italian 15". I am still trying to discover the real reason the KGVs mounted 14" guns. The 14" armament was neither lighter, nor cheaper, than the 15" alternative. The official excuses offered by most scribes, including Raven, make no sense. The only thing I can think of is embrace by either DNO, or someone else at the highest level of, or higher than, the Admiralty, embraced the same theory as Strauss, which had been discredited 20 years earlier.
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@AWPtical800 I did some comparison last night. According to the tables on Navweaps, the 14"/50, as modified in the mid 30s had a slight advantage over the 12" in range and penetration. Additionally, the USN had a surplus of 14"/50s in inventory. There were enough of the 14" guns to provide two sets of 12 each as spares for the 5 BBs that used them, with 35 left over, enough to arm 4 battlecruisers with 6 or 7 each, with a full set if spares. On the other hand, the 12" was lighter, so, for the same weight, more 12", of nearly the same performance as the 14", could be mounted. More guns means a greater probability of a hit with each salvo.
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@podmonkey2501 the Brits had "large light cruisers" with 4-15" guns, in WWI. The Washington treaty seems to have respected the classification of the Courageouses as "cruisers", as they are not listed among the capital ship retention or disposal lists. HMS Furious was initially intended to be armed with 2-18", but still a "large light cruiser". We could establish a rule that, to be a battleship, a ship had to be armored against it's own guns at "typical combat range", but "typical combat range" proved to be a moving target as guns and fire control systems improved. By that measure, the Alaskas are not battleships, because their guns could punch through their own 9" belt at anything under 30,000 yards, but then the North Carolinas would also not be battleships as their guns could penetrate their 12" belt at anything under 30,000 too. And no one would want to publicly call their ship a "battleship" or "cruiser" as it would tip off potential adversaries about how well protected they are.
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@paulgoyne6926 it could be that the "more smaller guns equals more hits" school had it's adherents in the German Navy. In the USN, Admiral Strauss at BuOrd argued in 1915 for putting 12-14" guns on the Tennessees, rather than fewer, 16" guns, as the probabilities say the more guns you have firing, the more hits you will get, and smaller, lighter, guns means you can mount more guns on a ship for a given amount of weight. I have been studying the Admiralty's decision to put 14" guns on the KGVs. The only possible explanation, which is, to a degree, confirmed in the Garzke book, is someone at the top, or above the top, of the Admiralty, was a devotee of the "more smaller guns" theory, some twenty years after it had been discredited.
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@paulgoyne6926 as you said, it is a balancing act, between armor, armament, and speed. Comparing a Kaiser to a KGV, because the displacements are very close, speed and number of guns are the same, but the Kaiser appears to have more armor, a 13.8" belt, vs KGV's 12", according to Wiki, for instance. Using the weights on Navweaps. a set of 10 German 12" weighs 518,500 kg. The 13.8" guns as intended for the Mackensens would give gun size parity, but weighed 73.5mt, so, for the same weight, the Kaisers could only mount 7 of the 13.8", without sacrificing armor or speed. So going 12" on the Kaisers is still a "more smaller guns" choice.
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@matehavlik4559 It is an interesting question. After the US took the Philippines and Guam, Spain sold the rest of it's Pacific holdings, the balance of the Marianas, the Carolines, and a couple other bits to Germany. When WWI started, Japan, being allied with the UK, occupied the German colonies. After the war, the League of Nations gave Japan a mandate to hold all the former German colonies north of the equator. So, would Spain have held all of it's Pacific colonies until 1941, or sold everything, including the Philippines and Guam, to Germany? If Spain sold everything to Germany, then Japan would have held the Philippines and Guam in 1941.
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@bkjeong4302 I was reading "Castles of Steel" tonight. The book says that, in early 1898, the Kaiser was openly saying he would buy, or simply take, the Philippines, if the opportunity presented itself. The Germans were too slow when the opportunity, US declaration of war on Spain, came. The Germans did not arrive in Manila Bay, in strength, until about a month after Dewey's arrival. Their play, at that late date, was to hope the US failed. Bottom line is the Kaiser was very interested in the Philippines, and would have taken them if the German Asiatic squadron had been quicker on the jump and gotten there first. Without the Philippines, would the US have been interested enough in the Pacific to claim Samoa and Wake in 1899? Would the fleet have been move to Hawaii? Would the IJN try to attack the fleet in San Pedro?
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@drafty9580 for the heck of it, I tried to find a sale price for Florida, but came up empty. She was broken up in a navy yard, so no labor and material cost for the breakup. The newspapers said the metal was offered for bid, but did not report what the winning bid was. A dozen years earlier, Dreadnought was sold for scrap, for $176,000. The first question would be could the Netherlands buy Florida and Utah for less that it cost to build De Ruyter? I have not found construction cost for De Ruyter. Of course, the second question is would the Netherlands want two slow, old, ships?
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wrt the more smaller vs fewer larger guns question, this argument raged for decades. In the USN, it was the head of BuOrd, during the teens, Joseph Strauss, that promoted the more/smaller option. As Drac said, the argument for more, smaller guns, always depends on an artificial restraint. Strauss insisted that all combat would be at 12,000 yards, or less. Since a 14" could penetrate well enough at that range, they could put more of them on a ship and increase the probability of a hit. The Tennessees could have been built with 16", there was active speculation they would be, reported in the newspapers, but Strauss pushed through the 14" option. Jutland satisfied the General Board and SecNav that engagements would be fought at considerably more than 12,000, so Strauss was overruled when guns were specified for the Colorados. In his annual report that year, SecNav Daniels said the 16" decision was made over the objections of some officers. That same argument arose again, in the design of the KGVs. In the Admiralty's own analysis, a 9-15" armament would provide a more satisfactory ship, but the decision was made to go to 12-14" instead. It is probably worth noting that Admiralty fighting instructions at the time required closing, as fast as possible, to 16,000 yards, or less, before fully engaging. Again, the artificial restraint: not requiring the KGVs to be effective at greater ranges, made the 14" look like the better option. I give the credit for the Admiralty clinging to an obsolete doctrine, against the recommendations of Admiralty technical staff recommendations, to Admiral Chatfield, who was First Sea Lord from 1933 to 38.
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@janwitts2688 They couldn't build more Admirals, because the 35,000 treaty tonnage limit was still in effect. That is the problem with trying to mount four 15/42 turrets. Vanguard was well over 40,000 tons too. From what I have read, the KGVs acted like they were overloaded as it was, tending to bury their bow, for instance. Installing three of the Nelson class triple 16", already designed so only need to build, would add another 500 tons over the 10-14" setup. Going to the three twin 15/42s would reduce displacement by 1900 tons. While the KGVs would need to be reinforced, and probably some armor sacrificed, to take the weight of the 16" turrets, nothing would need to be reinforced for the switch to two 15/42s. The individual 15" guns weigh more than the 14", but the twin 14" turret is 145 tons heavier than the 15/42 turret, more than making up for the 32 ton heavier each guns. The twin 15/42 turret weighs about half what the quad turrets weigh. To this non-engineer, sounds like adjusting the size of the barbettes for the diameter of the 15/42 turret would be the largest part of the modification needed.
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@notshapedforsportivetricks2912 it may be a matter of the facilities they had to do the construction and maintenance. Dock 4, in the Brest Arsenal is only 656 feet long. Docks 8 and 9, which were built during WWI are 820 feet, but it seems they don't like having 8 or 9 occupied by a years long build. Dunkerque and Richeleau both exceeded Dock 4's length, so they built the main hull in Dock 4, then floated them over to 8 or 9 to have the bow built on, and, in Richeleau's case, add on the stern as well. Prior to construction of the Normandie dock, the longest drydock in St Nazaire was 758'. Longest in Lorient was 669'. Longest in Marseille was 698'. The Lyons were 638' overall. If the Lyons had a longer foc'sle, they rapidly start losing options for a drydock for repair. At 638' the Lyons were already too long for any of the drydocks in Toulon.
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@michelangelobuonarroti4958 The RM considered converting Caracciolo to a carrier. Where would the money come from? The RM was building DDs steadily through the 1920s. They had lost 9 in the war, but received 10 DDs from Austria and Germany as war reparations and used most of them into the 1930s, so their war losses were more than made up. Shortly after the war 17 obsolete DDs were scrapped, but they had built 35 new DDs during the war, so the RM was not short of DDs vs before the war. Never the less, the RM built 28 more DDs by the mid 1920s. A 1,000 ton Destroyer cost about 100,000 GB Pounds. To put that in perspective, a QE class BB cost about 3M GBP and an R-class cost about 2M GBP. So, by my figures. if the RM had put a moratorium on DD construction through 1925, that would have freed up the equivalent of 2.8M GBP. Then it's a matter of figuring the cost to convert Caracciolo. The hull had been built up to the weather deck and launched, but I don't know if the engines and boilers had been installed, or paid for. Courageous and Glorious were complete, serving, ships when converted, and their conversions cost about 2M GBP each. Bearn, which was somewhat smaller, had been launched to clear the slipway before the decision to convert to a carrier was made. The budget for the conversion was 66.33M Francs, in 1923, which works out to about 883,000 GBP. I have read that Bearn was selected for conversion as less progress had been made in building her as a battleship, so there was less battleship material to remove to make the conversion. The budget to convert Lexington was $22.4M US, which works out to 4.89M GBP. Lexington was quite a bit larger than Caracciolo, the hull being on the ways about 25% complete, with no machinery installed. So, it really comes down to how much more work Caracciolo would need. Was it an empty shell, or was a large portion of the machinery already in place? There probably was the money to convert Caracciolo, but the RM decided it's strategy would be built around torpedo boats and subs, so that is where the money went.
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@michelangelobuonarroti4958 I could see retaining the Elenas while the debate raged about the direction the RM would take, to retain the experienced personnel. Probably, once the decision was made to cut the capital ship force, the Elenas, and their senior crewmen, because expendable. They scrapped Alighieri around 1928 too, to reduce running costs. The Destroyer building program started in 1919, with 3 laid down late that year, 4 laid down in 20, 5 in 21, 2 in 22, 3 in 23, 4 in 24 and 8 laid down in 25. That is where all the money was going. At the end of the day, the expenditure to convert Caracciolo to a carrier would be a lot to invest in something as experimental as a carrier for the RM, considering the state of the battleship force, but completing Caracciolo as a battleship had it's hurdles too.
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Regarding the question on shell caliber, was there consideration of main armament throw weight at the Washington Conference? If main armament was limited to 8-16" or 9-15" or 12-14" the total weight of shells fired by the 16", 15" and 14" batteries would be quite close, while giving designers choices whether to plan for the greatest penetration, or sending a greater number of shells downrange, thus increasing the probability of a hit. Verification would also be simpler. It's easier to count the number of guns, and measure the bore, than to estimate displacement. If the treaty set limits for the US and UK for 15 battleships, and limiting the main armament as described, there would not be any incentive to build wildly huge ships, because tonnage beyond that really needed to support the treaty limited battery would be a waste of material and money. If a spendthrift country decided to build 42,000 ton ships, they would not have more firepower than a 32,000 ton ship.
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@gregorywright4918 yes, there is a decided risk to trying to do a hardware cheat, instead of simply lying. Drac's piece on the County class cruisers pretty much implies the ships were planned from the start to be up armored, probably beyond the treaty's 10,000 tons, as soon as the treaty fell apart, or they figured no-one was looking. Ever notice how the belt armor is installed on a KGV? Looks like a slab simply bolted on the side of the hull. Would have been exceptionally dangerous for the Admiralty to design the KGVs at 35,000 tons, without that belt armor, planning to up armor it the same way the Counties were up armored when no-one was looking, or didn't care anymore. A too sudden start of the war would have had the KGVs making the Renowns look robust and survivable. Of course, as things worked out, with the US and UK agreeing on a displacement increase in June of 38, the belt armor could be installed while the ships were still building, and no-one would care if they ended up being 38,000 or 40,000 tons, but the risk that things would not work out that way, when the KGVs were being designed, was astronomical. That's why I like my armament limitation scheme better than a displacement limitation scheme. It's harder/riskier to cheat.
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@alganhar1 the treaty specifically allows France and Italy to lay down 35,000 tons of capital ships, each, in 1927, 1929, while everyone else could not start building again until 1931. When First London extended the capital ship building moratorium through 1936, France and Italy retained the rights to lay down the ships under their 1927 and 1929 permits. Those ships became the Dunkerques and first two Littorios. France's battleship "France" found a reef and sank in 1922. The Washington treaty allowed immediate replacement of ships lost by accident. France used the left over tonnage from the Dunkerques and France, to build Richelieu.
Yes, France and Italy deferred using their 1927 and 1929 construction permits, but the question remains, why were France and Italy not allowed to build new, "post-Dreadnought" ships immediately, as the US, UK, and Japan were?
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@beigethursday1352 One convoy the Scharns intercepted was escorted by HMS Malaya. Malaya apparently had not been modernized like the other QEs, so it's 15" guns would have been limited to the original 20 degree elevation. 20 degrees gives a 15/42 a range of 23,734yds. Scharn's guns could elevate to 40 degrees, giving a range of over 40,000yds. So a Scharn could hang outside of Malaya's range and shower shells on it with impunity, and Scharn's superior speed can be used to maintain that distance. On paper, the Scharn's shells could not penetrate the thickest parts of Malaya's armor. My theory of the nature of a heavily armored citadel is the only thing it does is prevent the engagement being brought to a sudden end by a direct hit to a magazine or engine room. Lay enough rounds on target, and the target will eventually be shot to bits, without the citadel being penetrated. I have a hunch that is what happened to Bismark: no single fatal hit through the heaviest armor, but the ship progressively shot to bits until it could not carry on the engagement, then the Germans tried to salvage their pride by scuttling it. So, by the information I have at hand right now, when the Scharns intercepted the convoy escorted by Malaya, they might not have been able to sink Malaya, but they could probably have pounded it to the point where Malaya would have all it's armament disabled and dead in the water.
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@DurinSBane-zh9hj Probably the same situation as previously discussed wrt the two Scharns engaging Malaya. The Scharn's guns have a far greater range than that of a 15/42 in a turret that can't elevate above 20 degrees. However, as discussed above, with WWII gunnery technology, the farthest Scharn ever hit anything was 26,000 yards, which is still slightly longer than the maximum theoretical range of a 15/42 as installed in Ramilies or Malaya. When both of the Scharns engaged Renown, Renown held it's own, but Renown was just out of an extensive modernization and was a far more capable ship than Ramilies or Malaya. Considering that the Scharns were out to attack convoys, declining to engage a convoy, without even trying to fend off the obsolete BB, seems a step too far on the damage-phobic scale.
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wrt the USN building battlecruisers in the 1920s, some of the material I have read about the WNT says the UK was open to an individual ship upper limit of 42-43,000 tons, ie Hood size ships, it was the US that demanded the hard 35,000t limit. The US' position at the conference was that it didn't want to spend anything on anything. To get battlecruisers built would require getting them laid down earlier. The Lexingtons were authorized in the 1916 appropriation, but construction was suspended before they were laid down, due to the change in priorities after the US entered the war. Meanwhile, the head of BuOrd, Strauss, was a fan of the 14" gun, and actively opposed the 16". When the 14" guns for the Tennessees were ordered, 14" were also ordered for the battlecruisers, as that is what the preliminary designs called for. It was not until mid summer 1916, when the SecNav and General Board analyzed Jutland, overruled Strauss, and decreed that future capital ships would have 16" guns. Keep in mind, in 1914, the USN had no modern cruisers, only an accumulation of obsolete armored and protected cruisers. The scenario to get battlecruisers built would need to go down along the lines of Congress being suitably impressed by the Battle of the Falklands, and stampede into adding battlecruisers to the 1915 appropriation that included the Tennessees, using the extra 14"/50s that had been ordered. The designs that used the 14"/50s were generally under 35,000 tons. Then get the long slipways built at the yards and get them laid down, before the US enters the war. With the earlier start, laid down in late 16-early 17, they would be complete before the Washington Conference.
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@phoenixjz4782 I have read that, after the French shelling, the Faà di Bruno, a WWI monitor mounting two 15"/40 guns, was towed to Genoa to act as a floating battery. When the British came calling, the Bruno only got off about three rounds before the Brits hit the power cable from shore, shutting the Bruno down, so if they had an attractive target, the Brits could hit it. After that, about four more of those 15"/40s were pulled from the armory and installed around Genoa. The Brits must not have liked 15" shore batteries, because they didn't call at Genoa again.
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In June 1912, in the run up to the First Balkan War, the Greek navy bought two V-1 class destroyers from the Vulcan yard in Germany that had been completed for the German Navy. At the same time, Greece ordered six 120 ton torpedo boats, all new construction, that would not be delivered for a year, thus of no help in the situation Greece was in in 1912. Given that the torpedo boat concept was largely obsolete by 1912, Greece had not bought any torpedo boats since the 1880s, and the boats were slow, only 24kts, so they could be run down and sunk by any destroyer of the time, this deal doesn't quite smell right. The thought occurs that, as Vulcan then had to build two more V-1 class ships for the German navy, and the German navy had to wait an additional year for delivery of their order, were those torpedo boats the price Greece was compelled to pay to get it's hands on the desperately needed V-1s?
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@lukedogwalker In WWI, the RN monitors were purpose built, but generally used guns scavenged from obsolete battleships and armored cruisers. The one advantage the monitors had over the battleships, other than the huge blisters, was they were shallow draft. I would think the Germans could have achieved the same thing by pulling the 11" turrets off of the pre-dreadnoughts they had been allowed to keep, for new build monitors, or, simply install huge bulges on the pre-dreadnoughts. WWII was fundamentally different from WWI, as it did not have the static battle lines that were within range of seaborne artillery long enough to bother building specialized ships. That would argue for just putting one of the pre-dreadnoughts, as is, at the head of the column, and, if it runs into shore batteries or a mine field and sinks, small loss.
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@WALTERBROADDUS lets compare the New Yorks to the Sangamons. Length S: 553'oa, NY 573'oa. Beam, S: 75'. NY: 95'. Speed: S: 18kts, NY 21kts. The New Yorks can accommodate a flight deck both longer and wider than a Sangamon, and have a higher speed, so they can handle any aircraft a Sangamon can, with safer flight operation. Greater beam means a wider hangar with room for more aircraft. The Wyomings and New Yorks are flush decked, so clear off the superstructure to the main deck, then build the hangar directly on the deck, with the barbetts providing a variety of places to house the elevator machinery. Magazines are already in place, so install bomb elevators in a couple of the barbetts to get the payloads to the deck. Keep the casemate mounted 5"51s to take on any commerce raiders that might have ambitions of attacking the convoy. If I could convince C&R this was a good idea, might even propose the USN buy the Rivadavias from Argentine, if the hulls were still sound, as they are even longer, wider and a bit faster than the New Yorks. They would probably need a complete refit of electrical and mechanical system, and more work to build the hangar as they have a step down quarterdeck, like the Pennsylvania and Nevada, but they would not require a builder's slipway.
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@sergarlantyrell7847 I really hate waste. There were several ships in advanced stages of construction, and their elimination resulted in a lot of money being spent to extend the lives of old ships instead. My proposal would be that any ship that had been laid down prior to January 1, 1921 could be completed, provided a corresponding amount of tonnage of old ships was scrapped. This was done in the case of the US BBs West Virginia and Colorado, which were completed in exchange for the Delaware class BBs being scrapped. I would let anyone with ships already under construction do whatever they want. This system would be self-limiting as the ships being scrapped approached the new ships in capability, thus offering no incentive to replace them. Example: the IJN would be allowed to complete the two Tosa class BBs, but they would need to scrap the two Fuso class BBs to make enough tonnage available. But if the IJN wanted to complete Amagi and Akagi, because they were so large, they would need to scrap three of the Kongos, so they really aren't gaining much with the Amagis. The USN could complete Washington, in exchange for scrapping Florida. Completing two of the larger South Dakota class BBs would require scrapping of Utah, Wyoming, Arkansas and New York, again, rapidly approaching the point of diminishing returns for spending to complete two new BBs.
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Drachinifel, does your RN budget info make it possible to estimate the total running cost for, say a Revenge class battleship during the 30s, crew pay, food, clothing, benefits, fuel, ammunition, repair and maintenance? Reason I ask: some time ago, I was commenting on the fact that, while the USN had extensively modernized the New Mexico class BBs in the early 30s, they did very little work on the Tennessees and Colorados. The consensus answer, was "no money". It occurs to me that, just because the London treaty says the USN could operate a certain number of BBs, doesn't mean that it had to operate that many. I'm wondering if the Wyomings, New Yorks, Nevadas and Pennsylvanias were all laid up from 32-38, how much funding would be freed up that could be used to modernize the Tennessees and Colorados? Thanks!
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@RedXlV Drac did not address the cost. Building a bigger hull, and putting more guns on it, will raise the cost. If the Exchequer did go along with it? The US Congress didn't want to spend anything. and the head of BuOrd was a tireless promoter of the 14" gun, over the 16". When the British introduced the 15", I saw a lot of FUD in the US press, claiming the British 15" was subject to such a high rate of wear it was nearly useless, therefore the US 14" was better.
Starting with the Pennsylvanias, the US was mounting 12 guns, up from 10 on the Nevadas, which were contemporaries of the 8 gun QEs. I doubt putting more guns on the QEs would impact USN policy, because, in the USN's eyes, they had the more heavily armed ships anyway. What finally tipped the General Board and SecNav to 16", was their analysis of Jutland, in summer 1916. Their hands were tied as far as the Colorado class was concerned. The 1916 Navy Act, which authorized the Colorados, Lexingtons and South Dakotas, put a cost limit on the Colorados, so they could not be anything but a Tennessee modified with 8-16". There was no cost limit in the Act for the South Dakotas, so they escalated to 12-16", on a substantially larger hull: 60 feet longer and 9 feet wider.
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@theamericanpotatonamedphil4306 the Lexingtons had one major drawback, vs the early British carriers, they were built after the Washington Treaty. The treaty defined any carrier, built or building, at the time of the treaty as "experimental" and not subject to the treaty's 20 year replacement cycle. The RN could have built replacements for Argus, Eagle, and Hermes, whenever they wished. I have read that Argus was disarmed and converted to a tender in the 1930s, to free up the tonnage for Ark Royal. The US could do the same with Langley, and so she was converted to a tender to free up tonnage for Wasp. As the Lexington conversions did not start until after the treaty, they could not be replaced until they aged out, in the late 1940s, according to the treaty. The Lexingtons were very wasteful of the one commodity that was in short supply, tonnage. A Yorktown could carry nearly the same size air wing, on a third less displacement. Even Ranger had a larger hangar than Lexington. How much did the Lexingtons contribute to USN design expertise? The Ranger followed the lead of Langley, not Lexington. Like Langley, Ranger had the boilers far aft, with hinged, deck edge, funnels, and, as originally planned, had no island. Two Rangers could have provided all the operational experience as the two Lexingtons did, on less than half the displacement, and at dramatically lower cost.
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@kemarisite Thing is, Italy had it's own war with Turkey in 1911-12, the spoils being possession of Libya and some islands off the Turkish coast. I doubt Turkey would be happy allied with Italy only a couple years after that war. I haven't studied WWI enough to understand how Turkey came to be allied with Germany and Austria. Would Turkey be neutral, if Italy aligned with Germany? A neutral Turkey means not only would the Dardanelles campaign not have happened, the entire "Lawrence in Arabia" thing would not have happened. Austrian troops that opposed the Italian army would be available on the western front, as well as the Italian army, but the Brits would not be fighting in the middle east either. Without losing in WWI, Atatürk would not have been a national hero, and the Ottoman Empire might survive intact. We could even flip the WWI Turkey/Italy thing around. If Italy was allied with Germany, would Turkey align itself with the UK and France, to recover Libya after defeating Germany/Austria/Italy?
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@grumpyoldman-21 Italy's territorial ambitions in WWI were not the only area the country was shortchanged. Have you looked at the provisions of the Washington treaty? Italy and France were supposed to have parity. The ships France was allowed to keep were 3 semi-dreadnoughts and 7 dreadnoughts. Italy's retention list amounted to 5 dreadnoughts, 4 small pre-dreadnoughts and the da Vinci, a dreadnought that had suffered a magazine explosion and sank in 1916, that the Italians were trying to salvage. Even including ships that were hopelessly obsolete, and wrecked, Italy's retention list was still 40,000 tons short of France's, yet Italy was given the same replacement schedule as France. If Italy had still been entertaining thoughts of battleships, instead of the swarms of destroyers that it continued to build all through the 20s, that naval treaty would have been an insult, as it effectively locked Italy into a battle line half the size of France's for over a decade.
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wrt to the claim to "win all 50 states", according to Wiki, Trump did "win" all the state delegations in 2020, whether they were chosen by primary, caucus, or back room dealmaking. But like his claim that he won more votes than he did in 16, neither sweeping state delegations, nor winning the second largest number of votes for an office, in a general election, makes you the winner. He is feeding his "victim" narrative, just like his attempts to provoke the judge in court today. He wants to be admonished, he wants to be sanctioned. He would love to be tossed in jail for contempt. Because it all feeds his "victim" narrative. If he can provoke the judge to really lose his temper and say something outside the guardrails, then he has grounds for appeal. Trump is expert at keeping things tied up in court, for years.
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Drac, in the live stream segment yesterday, there was some discussion of the QEs, in theory, being capable of 28kts. The first thought that comes to my mind, as QE and Valiant received new powerplants during their rebuilds, why did they not install more powerful plants so the ships could make 28kts? Looking at the WNT, I see that improvements are limited to torpedo and aircraft defense, not to exceed 3,000 tons. Alterations in side armor and main armament are explicitly prohibited, except in the case of France and Italy. Given the other changes made in specifications in Second London, why were terms not inserted that would give the other parties the same latitude in upgrading ships as Italy was implementing on it's battleships of similar age?
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@timengineman2nd714 some sources say that NC and Washington initially had vibration issues at normal speeds and it took some experimenting with different screws to reduce the vibration. I'm responding to Drac's comments that the people in a position to know were saying the QEs could have made 28 if they had been fitted with small tube boilers. Their rebuilds in the late 30s offered the opportunity to do that, but they didn't. According to the text of the WNT, the QE's displacement was only 27,500 tons, so they had plenty of headroom to the 35,000 ton limit, more than a Tennessee or Colorado, they could use to make improvements, like lengthening the hull to improve speed more, like the Japanese and Italians did. Thanks for posting your dad's experience. I have read elsewhere that that the NCs had better speed capability than the South Dakotas, in spite of the lower power plant. Had not expected to see 30+. I presume the ship was lightly loaded at the time.
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@jamesb4789 That is true, in general. The QEs were designed from the outset for more speed, so they trended longer and narrower that USN battleships of the time. A US Pennsylvania class is 600' at the waterline with a beam of 97'6", and plods along at 21kts with 31,500hp. A QE, of about the same vintage is 643'9" at the waterline with a beam of 90'7" and was designed for 24kts with 75,000hp. When QE and Valiant were rebuilt in the late 30s, their new boilers did nudge power up to 80,000, but, as you say, the bulges offset the power increase. It could be the Admiralty interpreted the WNT's prohibition on "reconstruction" conservatively and declined to put as much power in the QEs as late 1930s technology allows. or the people Drac was quoting were blowing smoke.
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@a2rgaming863 Yes, there have been post-WWII boats similar in size to the PT. The Norwegians developed the Nasty class in the late 50s: 80'5" long, powered by two turbocharged Napier Deltic diesels, with a 45kt top speed. The USN was among the buyers of the type, for use in Vietnam. Also in the 50s, the Soviet Union developed the Project 183R/Komar class, 83'4", powered by 4 diesels delivering 4,800hp for 44kts. The Komar was armed with P-15 Termit/Styx surface to surface missiles. A Komar operated by the Egyptian Navy because the first ship to sink another ship with a missile, an Israeli destroyer, in 1967. Following Soviet/Russian models have grown well beyond classic PT boat size, but still top 40kts.
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@gregorywright4918 nothing in the Navweaps article indicates the Japanese used anything but the inertia pistol at that time, regardless whether the torp is surface, sub or air launched. Nets probably could have saved California, which was only hit by two. West Virginia and Oklahoma were hit with as many as nine, each. I read somewhere along the line that inspection of West Virginia indicated that a torp had gone right through the hole created by a previous torp. I have no idea how large a hole a torp warhead would tear in a net, but it's hard to believe that all nine, or even seven of nine, would be stopped, if they are all fired at the middle of a stationary 600 foot long ship. The two hits on California were pretty far apart, one just aft of B turret and one just forward of X turret. I don't see a diagram of the hits on West Virginia, but a diagram for Oklahoma shows a pretty tight group, with only #6 at a distance from the rest, with the other eight all hitting between 160ft and 280ft from the bow.
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@glennsimpson7659 sure enough. I had known how the San Giorgio ended up scuttled, but had not read the last line of the Wiki paragraph about Tobruk. As you say, some 39 British torpedoes were found stuck in her nets. So, we come back to the question of the pistol's tolerance of the rapid deceleration the torp would experience hitting a net. British torps used a magnetic pistol, which apparently proved unreliable. I can't fine anything definite, but the British pistol probably had an impact function as well. How the British pistol impact function worked, I can't find in a brief search. Was it, literally, a plunger on the nose of the torp, or a trembler switch? Navweaps calls the Japanese pistol an "inertia" type, which sounds to me like a trembler switch. A photo I found of a torpedo armed Beaufighter shows a very prominent plunger on the nose of the torp, but a cutaway drawing of a Japanese Type 95 shows the fuse pocket in the side of the torp, just like a German aerial bomb, which used a trembler. I would assume that, having developed a reliable pistol, the Japanese would use it on all models of torps, not just the Type 95. So, the question is, did the British torps not detonate in San Giorgio's net because the plunger did not happen to directly hit a cable of the net? Would a Japanese torp detonate under the same circumstances, because of it's trembler switch pistol?
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@Nemisiscreed I read an account a while back, it might have been in "Big Gun Monitors" that, in retrospect, was hilarious. The normal routine for monitor operations along the occupied Belgian/French coast was for the monitors to drop anchor out of range of the German batteries, rig a torpedo net to their seaward side, and lob shells into a rail yard or canal for several hours, then head back to England for tea. The Germans had installed a new 11" gun, without the British observing the work. One day, monitors showed up near the new gun. The Germans held their fire as the monitors did their normal routine of dropping anchor and rigging torpedo nets, well within the 11" gun's range. Then the battery opened up, showering the monitors with shells. Some of these monitors could only make about 7kts, so they were desperately trying to waddle their way out of range as the Germans were trying to get zeroed in on them. I don't recall now, if the Germans scored a solid hit on any of the monitors, but, iirc, one shell did go through the torpedo bulge of one of them.
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I can see that point about IJN command thinking 25mm was adequate. The USN developed the 1.1", or about 27mm. Bofors developed a 25mm gun at the same time as the 40, because a lot of people didn't think anything as big as a 40 was needed. By the late 30s, aircraft were larger and faster, and the swing to larger AA guns started. If there had been more technology sharing among the Axis powers, Japan could have obtained a production license for the Breda 37mm gun, which would have been more effective than the 25, both in terms of shooting a larger round, and, as magazines could be stacked in the Breda's loading machine, eliminating reload stoppages.
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@jakemillar649 it would probably asphyxiate or burn everyone in the turret to death. There was a case, prior to WWI, when the propellant ignited as you suggest. At that time, there was no air purge system in guns. The gunners were instructed to look in the tube for embers and flames, before ramming the next round. On a 12" four propellant bags were used, rammed two at a time. The gunners rammed the first two bags, and ignition was almost instant, as inspection after the fire showed the rammer was still in the fully extended position. There were no safety shutters on hoists then either. When the flames shot out of the breech, they ignited the other two bags that were still on the hoist. Hoists were not in enclosed trunks then either, so chunks of burning powder rained down to the handling room, igniting more bags of powder. Somehow, the magazine was not ignited, so the ship didn't go up like a Roman candle. Some 35 men died that day.
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@kemarisite The 5.25" had semi-fixed ammo. The shell alone weighed about 80 lbs. The 4.5", prior to the Mk 4, had fixed ammo, which contributed to a higher rate of fire, 12 rpm vs only 7-8 rpm for the 5.25, but the fixed round weighed 87lbs, which slowed rate of fire due to crew fatigue, just like the 5.25. In the back of my mind is the thought that designing a gun to fire the heaviest shell a man can lift does not work out in practice. The 4"/45 Mk 16 was designed as a DP weapon. It fired fixed ammo, so featured a rof of about 15-20 rpm, and the round only weighted 65lbs. Unfortunately, seems that Jackie Fisher was the only Admiralty honcho that figured a 4" was large enough for a capital ship secondary, so, when Warspite was rebuilt, and Jackie long gone, she retained most of her obsolete 6" casemate guns, and received only four twin 4"/45 Mk 16 mounts. Speculating, had they replaced all the 6" with twin 4"/45s Mk 16s, (the single 6" and twin 4" weigh almost the same, about 21,000kg) Warspite may not have been so banged up by aircraft on so many occasions, meanwhile, thin skinned DDs and treaty cruisers at Narvik and Matapan, instead of facing several 6" shells, would face a hail of 4" fire from nearly twice as many guns with triple the rate of fire.
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@kemarisite in retrospect, being able to throw more steel at aircraft would have been beneficial to Bismark. On the other hand, were the 150s better for Graff Spee? Theoretically, Ajax and Achilles could have stayed out of range of the 105, and, with Graff having only two 11" turrets, one of the cruisers would not take any return fire. The range issue is more interesting on Warspite. The 6" PIX mounts could elevate, at best, to 17.5 degrees, which would give a range of less than 15,000yds, while the 4" could manage over 19,000. Fisher certainly seemed to think that 4" quick fire guns were preferable, as the two WWI classes where he dictated the design, the Renowns and Courageouses, had the triple 4" secondaries. Yes, the triple mount didn't work out so well, but it's clear where his thinking was going: throw a lot more shells and increase the probability of a hit. Even in a better protected ship than a DD, a hail of 4" may not penetrate the belt, but they'll make a mess of the upper works, gun directors, command staff on the bridge.
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@kemarisite I was looking at the range tables on Navweaps when I wrote that. The 150 was about the equal of the British 6" wrt range, so Ajax and Achilles would be expected to give as well as they got, regardless of range. The somewhat shorter range of the 105 opens the possibility of engaging beyond it's range, at least in theory. Whether the Brits could hit anything at 20,000 is another matter. If the light cruisers closed to 12-16,000, and Graff had an all 105 armament, twice as many guns with twice the rate of fire, the cruisers would be pretty badly chewed up. Once the hail of small caliber fire has taken out the gun directors, radio antennas, Morse lamps, signal flag halyards, and command officers on the bridge, the effectiveness of the light cruisers would have been sharply reduced.
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@joshthomasmoorenew well, would that violate the orders from General Marshall that the Japanese commit the first "overt act"? Apparently, the Japanese force was between 200 and 275 miles from Hawaii, so a round trip of 400 to 550 miles. A P-36 has a range of about 600 miles. A P-40 has a range of about 700 miles. Fly out to the Japanese force, figure 20 minutes of full throttle engagement, and the survivors would probably run out of gas before they got back to Hawaii. And they would be escorting horizontal bombers, primarily B-18s. Can't hit a ship worth a lick with horizontal bombers, unless they come down to low altitude. If Mitchell had tried that, probably a lot of brave Americans would have died, for little damage to the Japanese fleet. That being said, with surprise lost, the Japanese could have turned around, and headed for home. That sets up the nightmare scenario of an intact US fleet, and enormous pressure on the President to send the fleet to reinforce the Philippines, with Japanese subs picking them off, all the way.
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@RedXlV there are two schools of though wrt Mutsu's status. Wiki shows a commission date in October, a couple weeks before the start of the conference. Under treaty rules carriers in commission, *or building*, when the conference started, were regarded as experimental and exempt from the treaty replacement schedule, which exempted Langley, Eagle, Argus and Hermes. The treaty parties could be flexible, if they wanted to, or they could leverage the treaty to beat someone down by being rigid. If the US and UK have severe size envy issues over the Nagatos, it would be a lot easier, and cheaper, to regun the Nagatos, than for the other parties to build new, clean sheet, battleships. I could even suggest it would be cheaper for the UK to settle it's size envy issues by giving the IJN a couple dozen 15"/42s out of spares inventory with which to regun the Nagatos. Interestingly, according to NavWeaps, the 15"/42 and 16.1"/45 weigh almost exactly the same. That way, the Japanese save face by keeping both Nagato and Mutsu, without having a "bigger one" than the UK.
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@dylanthomas12321 my term for running a company for financial manipulation is "Welchism", after Jack Welch, who ran GE into the ground. If you haven't noticed, Boeing, once a leading US manufacturer, after 20 years of Welchist management, had driven equity Billions of dollars into the red, while their reputation for sound engineering is in tatters. Welchist management put all their profits, and more, into stock buybacks, while cutting corners in engineering and product quality. By the standards I was educated to, Boeing has been bankrupt for a number of years now, because they owe more than they own. They just haven't defaulted on any of their mountain of debt, yet.
Have you noticed how high VW's warranty claims expense is? Like at Boeing, shoddy quality is a sign of Welchist management. In 2022, VW's global warranty expense was 3.9% of sales. For context, Ford, which is pilloried in the US for high warranty claims, has a claim expense of 2.9%; Hyundai, with it's repeated issues with defective engines, pays out 2.8%. BMW 1.7%, Renault 1.3%. Honda 1.2% Toyota 0.7% So, does VW improve quality to reduce it's warranty claims expense? I don't hear one word about that. All I hear from VW is how they want to raise prices even more, while taking from the line workers in the plants.
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@kemarisite good question about the range table. If such a thing was foreseen, I can see someone finding a math whiz to make that addendum to "the book". The more likely scenario though, would be a ship like the Pennsylvania, with both 51s and 25s, needing more ammo for one type vs the other, which, in itself, makes the case for replacing all the 25s and 51s with 38s, as was done on the BBs rebuilt after Pearl. I really can't throw bricks at the Brits for their variety of guns, not to mention the Vickers 2 pounder being made in both low and high velocity versions, ammo not interchangeable, as the variety of ages of ships in service in WWII, made such variations inevitable.
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@Knight6831 my favorite what if would be if the third cancelled Revenge, Resistance, was completed as a third Renown, using the three surplus turrets that ended up on monitors. The Admirals were started as answers to the Mackensens, but then delayed as work on the Mackensens was slowed, except Hood was completed, so that it, plus the two Renowns, would make up the battlecruiser losses from Jutland. If Resistance had been built, so there would be three Renowns to replace Jutland losses, would Hood have been completed, or cancelled with the other Admirals?
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@Knight6831 I'm not so sure the French were that far behind. The Bretagne isn't that far off the pace of the Iron Dukes, and both classes were laid down in 1912. The primary difference between the Normandie and Revenge classes, both laid down in 1913-14, is the French went for a large number of 13.4" guns, while the Revenges went with only 8 of the new 15". That debate, more smaller guns vs few larger guns, raged in the USN until Jutland proved combat at longer range was viable, so the French were not necessarily backward for specifying the 13.4" before the war started. They are very close in displacement, though the Revenges appear to have a slight speed advantage. Hood was designed during the war as a reply to the Mackensens, and G3 was an entirely postwar design, so can't really be compared to the pre-war French designs.
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@unemployed_history_major4795 two hulk questions in one day! A hulk is a ship that generally has been stripped of weapons, and maybe means of motive power and repurposed. If you read or saw "Les Miserables" the main character is held in a prison hulk, an old, unseaworthy, ship of the line, being used as a cell block. Hulks can be used for accommodation, or office space. USS constitution was used as a receiving ship for some years, with the weather deck enclosed, "cabbed over", so it could be used as working space, which made the ship impossible to sail.
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@gregorywright4918 yes, I agree, no experience. That was a major risk in tying up half the US' tonnage allotment in only two ships, which forced the choices for later ships to smaller designs. What if the Lexington's design was totally wrongheaded and irrecoverable? The treaty would not have let the US replace them for 20 years. We were lucky they turned out as well as they did. The navy opting for ineffectively small designs in the absence of the Lexingtons is not a sure bet. C&R had drawn up a 35,000 ton, 32kt design in 1920, which had the key feature of the hull flairing out, above the waterline, aft, so the hangar could be 64' wide all the way to the fantail. The designers knew how to get more aircraft into a carrier of a given displacement, but they were hamstrung by the requirement to use the battlecruiser hulls, which had been sold to Congress with wildly lowballed estimates.
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@Concealed1911 My rack on the Lexington was on the starboard side, aft, one deck below the hangar, next to the Chief's mess, so must have been just about over the screws. Loudest noise I heard was usually the ventilation system. There were some places where I could hear an electrical hum. As the Navy's training carrier, "full" speed was the norm, as she was running air ops almost continuously. One day I happened to be in the wheelhouse and noticed the engine room telegraph pushed all the way to "flank". Never was really aware of the engines, except when the throttle was pushed to the last notch. Then she would really shake. The most irritating noise? The Lex steamed back and forth across the Gulf of Mexico, which required making 180 degree turns, at full speed, when she ran out of open water. The most irritating noise, often just as I was sitting down to chow, was the 1MC barking "heel to port", as she started one of those full speed turns.
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@gregorywright4918 Japan gave notice in 34, as the Kongo rebuilds were starting, that it was leaving the treaty system at the end of 36, so they would not have cared what anyone thought of their enhancing the Kongos. Even as much as the Kongos were improved, they actually still came close to the WTN tonnage limit.
I think the US and UK had a grip on just how huge Yamato was. Second London had a vague tonnage escalator. The clause said that if a power who was not a party to the treaty (like Japan, which dropped out effective the end of 36) built a ship of tonnage exceeding treaty limits, the powers in the treaty were to negotiate an answering tonnage limit increase among themselves. Yamato was laid down in late 37. By the beginning of 38, the US and UK were arguing about how far to push the new limit, with the UK wanting 42,000, while the US wanted 45,000. The US won the argument, but they wasted six months arguing.
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@joshthomas-moore2656 Repulse was a bit faster, with slightly larger guns, but fewer of them only 6 vs 10. The major difference was Repulse's inadequate AA armament. When PoW was dispatched to the far east from the UK, Repulse was already in the Indian Ocean, to chaise raiders. By 42, all the Revenges were also in the Indian Ocean. I am thinking the RN dispatched Repulse and the Revenges to the Indian Ocean, because of the lack of airborne threat that they could not defend themselves against adequately. So yes, PoW was, by far, the greater loss, because she was better able to defend herself against aircraft, so was better suited to operate in the Med or North Sea.
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@kemarisite The Wiki article says, after the war, Skoda diversified into turbines, power generation, machine tools, and railroad locomotives and carriages. Germany's first slice of Czechoslovakia, in 38, brought them to the outskirts of Plzeň, which, I would expect, expedited capture of the Skoda works before they could be destroyed.
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@WALTERBROADDUS I see your point, but it's the imbalance in the investment between the two experimental weapons systems, more than ten times the money allocated to zeps than to carriers. I did a bit of swaging, and figure that the US could have built a decent carrier conversion for less than they were willing to spend on R38 alone, $2.5M. The surviving Invincibles probably each went to scrap for about the same price as Dreadnought: $176,000. Six Clemson class DDs were cancelled in early 1919, a year and a half after being ordered, so I expect their powerplants were in an advanced stage of construction, so could be completed for relatively little additional money. Two Clemson plants would give an Invincible modern, geared, turbines, a bump from 40,000shp to 55,000shp and 8 oil fired boilers in place of the original 31 coal burners. Then add for the conversion, which would probably be more than that spent on Jupiter, if they wanted to do a decent job. and you have a carrier that can show a decent turn of speed, 25 feet longer and 13 feet wider than Langley. But nope, they wanted to spend the money on R38, which broke up during a test flight in the UK, before the USN even took possession.
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wrt the question about Pearl Harbor being ready for the attack on December 7th, the intercept would have been too late, even if handled expeditiously in Hawaii. The radiogram arrived in Hawaii at 7:33am. The Japanese had specified their ultimatum be delivered in DC at 1:00pm. which was 7:30am in Hawaii. It is safe to assume that the Japanese considered 7:30am too close to arrival time of the attack for the US to set up a defense, so the message, even if handled expeditiously, would not have helped much. The film also dramatizes the consideration of possible targets of the Japanese attack, with the Malay Peninsula, aka the Kra Peninsula, specifically mentioned. The delivery time of the ultimatum in DC, 1pm, tips the target. At that hour, it was the middle of the night in Malaya. Of the possible attack targets, Hawaii was the only one where it would be daylight at that hour. The best shot at being ready for the attack was the radar contact at 7:02am. The wind that morning was light, from the northeast. A tactic that has crossed my mind is have a DD turn on it's smoke generator, and start making laps around Ford Island. The Japanese could not hit what they could not see.
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@DELTATROOPER5555 Looking at the spreadsheet of Tillman specs in the Wiki article, appears Tillman III had a speed of 30kts. With that sort of speed capability, they might have been out with the carriers...but that isn't the question you asked. wrt avoiding the WNT, the US instigated the WNT because the Harding administration didn't want to spend anything building new capital ships, so, if there was no treaty, or there was a loophole large enough to sail a 63,000 ton battleship through, the US would not have built it anyway...but that isn't the question you asked either. To the question you did ask, a rebuilt and modernized Tillman would probably look very much like an Iowa, just as the rebuilt West Virginia looked quite like a South Dakota. The actual Iowas would still be a clean sheet design, rather than a modified Tillman, because designers are constantly having "better ideas".
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@Maty83. I'm pretty confident that even the lowest file clerk in the Admiralty design office knew more about designing battleships than I ever will. I'm sure there were sound reasons for designing the KGVs the way they did. What puzzles me is why that reduction of the gun size limit to 14" was put in the treaty. The US was the only other power still paying any attention to the treaty, so why make a change that will only restrain an ally, someone you want to have powerful ships, because you are on the same side? Same thing with the reduction in carrier displacement from 27,000, where it had been since 1922, to only 23,000. I understand why the Brits designed Ark Royal the way they did, to maximize the number of drydocks around the empire that she would fit in, but, again, why constrain the US to only build what the UK wanted to build due to it's internal infrastructure limitations? That's like the US demanding that no-one else be allowed to build a ship that could not fit through the Panama Canal. They went through that again on the displacement increase. The US wanted 45,000 tons, because that is what they needed for a 33kt ship, but the UK held out for a 42,000 ton limit, because that was the largest RN facilities could handle. They argued about it for six months, when they needed to be building, not arguing.
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@genericpersonx333 actually, no, they did not have a lot of latitude regarding which ships were retained. Other conference attendees wanted to force Japan to retain Settsu, and scrap the newly completed Mutsu. The whole idea of the treaty was to stop spending on capital ships. Secretary Huges' initial proposal was immediate halt to all capital ship construction, including ships that were in an advanced state of construction, and retain older ships until they aged out at 20 years of age. I did see a newspaper report that conference attendees were in general agreement that 12" guns were obsolete, but only allowed the US to replace the two Delawares with two Colorados, while leaving the USN with 4 other 12" gunned ships, while Washington was used for target practice. I did a bit of back-of-the-envelope figuring, and the US could have completed Washington for about the same amount as they spent modernizing Florida and Utah, only half a dozen years before Florida was scrapped and Utah was converted to a target ship. The Kongos, being less than 10 years old, armed with 14" guns, and fast, were no where near being replaced.
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Did some more reading on this issue last night. The 16"/45 completed trials in late 1914. To get the 14"/50 on the New Mexicos, instead of the 16"/45, they were ordered off the drawing board, without a prototype being built and tested. A prototype 14"/50 finally completed trials in August, 1915. In July, 1916, SecNav Daniels announced that, due to multiple examples from the war, the next generation of BBs would have 16" guns. On December 21st of 1916, months after the train had left the station wrt what size guns future BBs would have, Strauss was quoted in newspapers, again, promoting the 14" and insisting BBs would never engage at more than 12,000-13,000 yards. On December 30th, Strauss was transferred out of BuOrd, to command Nevada. Seems like Strauss was stubborn to the edge of irrationality in his promotion of the 14". Without his obstruction, it's quite possible the New Mexicos would have had the 16", and probable that the Tennessees would have had the 16". Wonder how that would have impacted terms of the WNT? The Admiralty could not build 8 Nelsons. By Drac's work, the 16", in improved 1930s form, was slightly inferior to the 15"/42, implying that a US argument that, while the 16" had a bigger bore, it was actually the equal of the 15" and no more, so the US BBs were actually comparable to the Revenges and Queen Elizabeths. But the data Drac was using for his comparisons would have been secret at the time.
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wrt the question about USN battlecruisers, prior to the SecNav's proposal in 1915, which was adopted in the 1916 Navy Bill, formal requests by the SecNav for battle cruisers were made for 1, along with 2 battleships, in 1911, and for 2 battlecruisers, along with 4 battleships, in 1912. Battleships were always given priority, to replace obsolescing battleships, to maintain strength.
As we know, Congress only approved 1 battleship in 1912, Pennsylvania, and 1 in 1913, Arizona.
If battlecruisers had been authorized in 12 and 13, the design prepared by C&R in late 1912 was 920ft long, 97ft beam, 42250 tons, 10" armor belt, 8-14" guns, 16-6" guns, and turbine power providing speed of 29kts. This is a significantly larger ship than either Tiger or Kongo.
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@michaelmoorrees3585 Thanks for the reply. Not all engines are "interference" engines. It is only "interference" engines where the pistons will collide with the valves if the belt breaks. As others have said, most timing belts have a replacement schedule, usually a pretty conservative one. A coworker's Hyundai Excel had a 60,000 mile belt replacement interval, and an interference engine. He never had the belt replaced. The original one broke around 180,000, so he donated the then rusty, dozen year old car to a charity.
I'm surprised Drac was being towed by a strap. In the US, tow trucks that lift one end of the car off the pavement and pull the car as a trailer have been SOP for a century. I have a photo of my Grandfather with the tow truck his shop used, in the 1920s. For the last 30 odd years, the thing has been a flatbed, that gives the broken car a piggyback ride to the shop.
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@cha0sr1pper as it happens, I have been trying to research the history of the USN 12"/40 and have been reading a lot of BuOrd annual reports. The early reports 1900-1905 are very helpful, but after that lost a significant amount of content, shrinking from some 95 pages to 35. By the early 20s, the annual reports were nearly content free, only numbering about a dozen pages. In the 1911 report, Admiral Twining said he was omitting information he judged "tedious and uninstructive". Information that vanished from the reports included listings of individual shop orders for guns, with the gun numbers, and incident reports, such as an exploded 12" gun on USS Georgia that was well covered by newspapers, but completely unmentioned in the BuOrd annual report. So, if I were head of BuOrd in 1919, I would restore that "tedious and uninstructive" information, so that future historians can find the information they are looking for.
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@F-41927 Some time ago, I was reading about the French Navy considering how much it would cost to lengthen and upengine the incomplete Normandie class ships to approach the 28kt speed of the Caracciolo class, found the cost was exorbitant and sold them all for scrap. I considered whether it would be productive for the French to claim the three incomplete Mackensen class battlecruisers, which were designed for a 28kt speed, tow them back to France and finish them, using the guns built for the Normandies. The bottom line was that the Mackensens still had an obsolete armor scheme, inadequate torpedo protection, the French 13.4" guns were obsolete and, if France had completed those three ships, they would have lost the two battleship constriction windows allocated to them by the Washington Treaty, which they used to build the two Dunkerque class ships, which had a more modern armor layout, better torpedo defense, and higher performance guns. So, in the long run, France was better off letting all the German ships go to scrap.
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On the question about completing Carraciolo, the RM built a significant number of destroyers and torpedo boats during the 1920s, so there was money available for naval construction. Some years ago, I took a stab at producing cost estimates for the construction of destroyers and completion of Carraciolo, as a battleship. If the RM had foregone something on the order of half of the destroyers they built, they would have had the funds to complete Carraciolo.
Could they have completed Carraciolo post-Washington treaty? The treaty allows for immediate replacement of ships lost due to accident. As daVinci blew up by accident, it would probably be a legitimate move to say Carraciolo was the replacement for daVinci, even though the explosion on daVinci predated the treaty.
Carraciolo was, apparently, not broken up until 1926. Somewhere between Mussolini becoming Prime Minister in late 22, and the elections of April 1924, when the Fascists lead the winning coalition, a door could have opened to allow Carraciolo to be completed as a figurehead of the new regime. Apparently, the RM was more interested in building up it's destroyer force.
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@paulgoyne6926 your comment ties in to a thread going on a previous post. I think the assertion that three Canadian QEs would simply replace the three KGVs on the original retention list, or Thunderer and two GKVs, is correct. The RN might even get the Nelsons, in place of the Iron Dukes as well. The US did not want that conference to fail, for domestic, political, reasons, so was very lenient with the UK. The UK was the only power to come out of the treaty well above it's tonnage quota, with numerical superiority, with firepower superiority, and with two ships of entirely postwar design, but the US got what it wanted: an excuse to cancel the 1916 capital ship building program.
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@johnshepherd8687 my suspicion is, had Tennessee and California both been built with 16" guns, then, assuming you buy the story that West Virginia and Colorado were completed to approximate the 5:5:3 ratio of 16" gun ships with the Nagatos, then West Virginia and Colorado would not have been completed. That scenario would have the Delawares carrying on into the early 30s, and Florida and both Wyomings entering WWII as "first line" battleships. I put a question to Drac in guide 220 that would have about the same result: Daniels realizes. in Feb of 1919, that his decisions wrt the South Dakotas had rendered the Colorodoes obsolete, so, rather than throw good money after bad, Daniels orders Maryland cut up on the slipway and the other three cancelled before they were laid down, then the Lexingtons and South Dakotas are canceled for treaty compliance, what happens? Unfortunately, he declined to address that question. An even worse scenario is if Daniels had taken a page from the Admiralty's book, and canceled both the Coloradoes and Tennessees when the US entered the war in April 1917, as neither Tennessee nor Maryland was laid down yet, and all that was built of California was the bottom of the hull. Then, to get the USN to the 525,000 ton treaty limit, the USN would need to retain the Delawares, the South Carolinas and some of the Connecticut class.
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Many thanks for responding to my question about the RN exploiting the "experimental carriers" clause of the WNT. I suspected budget would be the stumbling block. If one wanted to really game the system, then convert the three "experimental" carriers to tenders, remove part of the flight deck, as was done with Langley, then lay them up, to reduce running costs, because the object of the exercise is to free up the carrier tonnage, not create more tenders. Then, when the war starts, rebuild the flight decks and they become carriers again. The R-class BBs could have been laid up in the 30s, also to reduce running costs. Even with those economy measures, it would probably still be a long pull to find the 3M Pounds each for more Ark Royals.
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wrt the question about battlecruisers, it occurs that the battlecruiser was a development of the pre WWI Armored Cruiser concept. Armored Cruiser armament topped out at 10" with the US Tennessee and Italian Pisa classes, when their contemporary battleships carried 12". Armored Cruiser top speed was a few knots faster than pre-dreadnoughts. Battlecruisers made the final step in adopting battleship size guns. That final step was also their downfall, as, the moment they adopted battleship size guns, it was inevitable they would be put up against battleships, where their vulnerability was exposed. I put the Deutschlands and maybe the Scharnhorsts, down as the final expressions of the armored cruiser concept, large, armored, faster than battleships, with sub-battleship size guns.
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@jakemillar649 I'm thinking Akagi, in battlecruiser form, had the most potential. I'm not sure the G3s and N3s were really a serious proposal. The G3s were 856 feet long, displaced over 48,000 tons. When the US and UK were arguing about the tonnage escalator in 38, the UK wanted to set the limit at 42,000, because that was the most their facilities could handle, so I suspect the G3 and N3 were a bluff. Most of the other BBs that were cancelled were really too slow to be relevant in the 40s. The Tosas and Nagatos would make a nice division of 26kt, 16" armed BBs, but the IJN did not make much use of it's BBs. The IJN heavily used the Kongos however. I bet they would have made good use of Akagi too. Amagi, would not have been completed due to the earthquake damage that prevented her being completed as a carrier. The most useless cancelled ship? I'm thinking either Washington or any of the 1920 South Dakotas, due to their low speed. The Lexingtons, as battlecruisers, could at least keep up with the carriers, and add some AA fire. They might have mixed it up with the Kongos if they had been in the right place at the right time, like heavyweight boxers with glass jaws squaring off against each-other.
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@bkjeong4302 I think the other Admirals had already been broken up by the time the conference started. You know my opinion of the Lexingtons as carriers: horribly inefficient at carrying aircraft and wasteful of the one resource in limited supply: aircraft carrier tonnage. Yes, I have noticed your opinion of big gun ships before. As posted above, I would have favored the US being granted licenses for future capital ship construction, rather than finish anything on the slipway in 22, but, considering the Admiralty still considered 23kts as a perfectly acceptable speed for a battleship in 1930, I suspect anything built in the early 30s would have been as irrelevant as any WWI holdover, except, with future knowledge, I know Coolidge would not build anything, nor Hoover, so FDR could have gotten the North Carolinas started a year or two sooner.
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Drac, you have mentioned the friction between the US and UK in the 1920s. One contributor was the UK's war debt. Apparently the UK wanted to pay by exporting manufactured goods to the US, but the US had protectionist trade politics, did not want British goods, but cash instead Did anyone explore the UK transferring real estate to the US instead? At that time, the British Empire was centered around the Indian Ocean. The West Indies were not strategic to the UK, but they were strategic to the US, abutting the US coast, and controlling access to the Panama Canal. The UK West Indies holdings: all the islands, plus British Honduras, but not British Guyana, total some 22193.5 square miles. Extrapolating the price the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917, gives a value for the UK holdings of about $4.150B. UK debt to the US after WWI, by what I have seen, was some $4.277B. Seems that, rather than arguing about a discount to face value, and a 60 year payment schedule. the UK could sign over the West Indies colonies, the US extinguish the debt, and we are square. addition: Drac, never mind. I found lots of discussion of this very suggestion in newspapers of 1920-1923. Seems many were in favor of such a trade, except Lloyd George and President Harding.
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@williamgoin139 that is why, if I was running the Washington Conference in 1922, I would have introduced throw weight into the capital ship specifications, setting the main battery at 8-16", or 9-15", or 12-14" per ship, so each nation could choose whether they wanted to fire fewer, larger shells, or more smaller shells, but they would all be sending the same weight of fire downrange, roughly 17,000lbs, give or take about 1,000. As 12" shells were so much smaller, roughly 870 pounds, vs 1400 for a 14", I would define 12" as obsolete, as ships with such small guns were so far off the throw weight target range. 12" armed ships would not be subject to the treaty replacement schedule and could be replaced at any time at their nation's convenience, if I ran things.
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wrt the question about the USN in WWI, specifically, Battleship Division Nine. By some accounts, the RN was running out of men. They were using several pre-dreadnoughts as convoy escorts. The RN needed the men from those pre-dreadnoughts to man new destroyers and cruisers, so looked to the US to take over the job the pre-dreadnoughts had been performing. One criteria, as every drop of oil in the UK had to be shipped in, through the gauntlet of U-Boats, was that the US battleships be coal-fired. The initial squadron was New York, Wyoming, Florida, and Delaware. After some consultation with his British counterparts, Admiral Rodman made adjustments, adding Texas and Arkansas to the squadron, and sending Delaware back to the US. The jobs they did, like escorting iron ore carriers from Norway to the UK were not glamorous, but necessary. The pic Drac showed was the initial squadron arriving at Scapa on December 7, 1917.
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wrt the Kongos. considering they were still vulnerable to large bore fire, and given the IJN's forward thinking wrt naval air resulting in the treaty limits being gamed by certain ships being designed for easy conversion to carriers, a nightmare scenario has the Kongos all being converted to carriers in the 1939-40 time frame, rather than conceived as carrier escorts. When the Kongos went in for "modernization", spies in the yards would think nothing was amiss when the turrets came off, or when the superstructures were removed, or when the boilers and turbines were replaced, but would panic when the hangar deck bulkheads started to be erected, and by then it would be too late for the USN or RN to build more carriers to offset the greater IJN carrier strength before the war started. Lacking the Kongos, the IJN could have deployed the Nagatos instead. In the Solomons campaign, for instance, not losing one Nagato to cruiser fire might have resulted in two Nagatos being on hand when the USN brought SD and Washington.
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@themanformerlyknownascomme777 your scenario might have happened. During the Washington conference, the UK was willing to accept an individual ship limit around 42,000 tons. An intellectually honest position, due to Hood. The US wanted 35,000, to keep costs down. At the first London conference, with the depression on, the UK was proposing lowering the tonnage limit well below 35,000, to constrain costs. The Dunkerques were built the size they were as a compromise: large enough to deal with the Panzerschiff, but lower cost than a treaty max ship. First London put a fleet tonnage limit on cruisers. While the USN continued to build 10,000 ton cruisers, the Admiralty looked at it's commitments. I recently reread "Fifty Ships That Saved The World", which said the Admiralty's assessment was that German surface raiders would be more of a threat than U-Boats, so wanted more cruisers. The Admiralty's decision was to build somewhat undersized cruisers, so they could have more cruisers, within the treaty's fleet tonnage limit. While a 42,000 ton limit was possible, what each country actually builds is a balance of what they can pay for, and how many ships they want, within the treaty's fleet tonnage limits. I am pretty confident that, whatever limits the US and UK agreed on, Germany and Italy would cheat by 6-7,000 tons, because that is small enough overage to get away with. The Yamato would have been what it was, as Japan had dropped out of the treaty system, so was unconstrained. What tipped off the US and UK that Yamato exceeded treaty limits was the amount of material being ordered for her. Intelligence like that is vague. Apparently, the US and UK thought Yamato would be somewhere in the mid 40,000 range, so negotiated the tonnage escalator appropriately. I suspect that, if Japan had opted to build Yamato at 45.000, the US and UK would not have twigged that she exceeded treaty limits in time to start work on the Iowas and Lions.
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@arivael somewhere along the line, I read that Churchill wanted to send a "new" battleship, to impress the natives, hence the long trip from the UK to Singapore, rather than using units that were closer. They knew that Repulse was not a front line ship as it had been relegated to the Indian Ocean by then, along with the Revenges, where it busied itself looking for commerce raiders. QE and Valiant, with their heavy rebuilds, could, at least, look like modern ships, and they would not be held back by Hermes. By some accounts, there was a suggestion that Hermes tag along with PoW as she rounded the Cape just as Hermes was coming out of refit at Simon's Town, but the idea was rejected because Hermes could not keep up with PoW. Other carriers? Ark Royal had been sunk in November. Illustrious had been in the US for refit, steamed to Jamaica in November, then collided with Formidable on the way back to the UK in December, and went back in the yard for repair. Formidable had also been in the US for repair, until the trip back to the UK, and the collision, then undergoing repair until early February. Victorious was patrolling the Denmark Strait looking for Tirpitz and Scheer. Indomitable ran aground in the West Indies in early November while working up. Eagle was in the UK for refit and repair, having suffered a fire in the hangar and serious powerplant problems. Hermes was the only carrier available.
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@arivael you are correct, I did forget Furious. I checked. During October 41, Furious was carrying aircraft to Jamaica for ASW patrol. From November into March 42, Furious was undergoing refit in the Philadelphia. Navy yard. Returned to the UK in April. In the UK back to refit for completion of installation of radar. Joined the Home Fleet in July. I have heard that story about Indomitable too. She ran aground in the West Indies on November 3rd. By November 3rd, PoW was approaching Freetown, Sierra Leone, arriving there November 5th, and departing for Cape Town on the 7th. The log I have access to does not say where in the West Indies Indomitable grounded, but it's 4,440 miles from Jamaica to Freetown. If Indomitable had made for Freetown the day she grounded, she would have had a hard time catching up to PoW as that looks like about a 6 day trip. wrt carriers in the Med, I don't think Force H had a carrier between when Ark Royal sank in November and when Eagle joined H February 23rd. Meanwhile, Victorious was the only serviceable carrier with the Home Fleet. Hermes was the only option, but if she was sent with Z with her usual handful of Stringbags, she would have been nothing but another target. Two of the Kongos were off on the Pearl Harbor op at that time, though the Admiralty had no way of knowing that. As it was, the Japanese knew the Brits were sending battleships, so they reinforced the bomber groups in Indochina. I expect that, had QE and Valiant been sent instead, the Japanese would have dealt with them the same way.
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@jamesd3472 it would have made sense for the French and Italians to claim unfinished German ships as reparations. It crossed my mind that the Mackensens would be a better option than completing the Normandies, and the guns already built for the Normandies were the right size for the Mackensens. Of course, the Normandies were not completed either. France was broke. The US was pressing for war debt repayment, in cash. The UK was also pressing France for repayment of war debt, in cash, because it needed the cash to pay it's debts to the US. And France had a large war zone to rebuild. For the Italians, they could have easily finished Caracciolio, but they didn't want to go that way. They put their money into destroyers instead. France and Italy did claim several German and Austrian cruisers and destroyers, completed ones, as reparations. France and Italy each received a Tegetthoff as reparatons. France used it's one for target practice. Italy stripped the guns off it's Tegetthoff and installed them as shore batteries, then scrapped the hull.
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I hold that Captain Leach's eye witness account is correct. In the inquiry, Captain Leach said he had been looking directly at Hood when the inbound salvo of four shells landed. He said two landed short, and one long, or vice versa, he did not recall which, and he had an "impression" something hit near the mainmast. He kept looking at that spot for a few moments to see if something would happen, then the column of fire erupted from just about the same place he thought something had hit. I say Captain Leach is correct, it was a deck hit. Legions of armchair Admirals say the angle of fall at that range was too shallow to penetrate Hood's deck. However, firing with a reduced charge was SOP in the USN. USN gunnery tables published in the 30s give trajectory data for both full charge and reduced charge firing. Firing with a reduced charge, reduces the muzzle velocity. With reduced velocity, the shell needs to be fired at a higher angle to reach the target range, which results in a steeper angle of fall. All Bismark's gunners needed to do was know their business: at that range, they had to fire with reduced charge to punch through Hood's deck, so leave out the fore charge and only fire with the main, brass-cased, charge. Why would Bismark be going for a deck hit, ignoring the armchair Admiral's protests about "danger space"? RN fighting instructions said to close as rapidly as possible, only turning to bring the aft turrets to bear after closing to within 16,000 yards. All Bismark had to shoot at, with a relatively flat trajectory, is the front of Hood's superstructure. If they aimed for a deck hit, they had all of Hood's deck area as target.
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@buzzardbeurling The penetration curve for Bismark's guns shows an angle of fall of 20 degrees or more, is needed to penetrate 80mm of armor. As an analog to Bismark's guns, use the USN 14"/50. 1935 USN gunnery tables show, with a full charge, and a muzzle velocity of 2600fps, the angle of elevation of 8 degrees, 38.9 minutes reaches 14,500 yards, with a resulting angle of fall of 12 degrees, 5 minutes, too shallow to penetrate. The same gun, and the same shell, using a reduced charge, with a muzzle velocity of 2000fps, uses an elevation of 15 degrees 14.4 minutes to reach 14,500, with a resulting angle of fall of 20 degrees, 53 minutes. At 14,500 yards, or more, the angle of fall is steep enough to penetrate, rather than ricochet off, of Hood's deck, when using a reduced charge. What facts support your argument?
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@buzzardbeurling I certainly have read about testing, as you describe, using a reduced charge to simulate a 20,000 yard hit at 5,000 or so. Didn't the Brits do that in their post-war testing of Baden? The USN tables show reduced charge trajectories at all the same range increments as the full charge trajectories. There were no computers then. All those trajectories had to be calculated by hand. Seems a large undertaking for something that would only be used for a few tests. It is probably safe to assume that everyone involved in setting gunnery policy in the 30s is dead now, so all we have are things that are handed down, and possibly distorted in the process. I don't know if you are familiar with the plant Ford Motor built at Willow Run to build B-24s. A lot of nonsense has crept into the narrative about that plant over the years. I heard an absolute howler, from a supposed "expert" a week ago. According to him, Wayne County was going to tax Ford for every plane that came off the assembly line. Utter nonsense. The government owned the plant, everything in it, and everything that came out of it, and, at that time, the Federal government did not pay local tax, so it would be impossible for Wayne County to tax those B-24s. I know the government had title to the planes, because I read the provisions of the original contract, in the Federal Register, not in an article someone wrote decades later. If I find myself in the hereafter some day, there are some people I want to find and talk with. Jackie Fisher is one. Sergio Marchionne is another. Until then, there are some questions I will not have a definite answer for.
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wrt cruiser evolution, my take: Early in the 20th century, there were three classes of cruisers: armored, protected and scout. The scout cruisers could function as the leader of a destroyer squadron or, as the name implies, scout on their own. I would call the Omaha class a good example of the scout cruiser morphing into the light cruiser. Protected cruisers were bigger, more heavily armed and armored. I would call the protected cruiser, like the Olympia, the predecessor to the heavy cruiser. The armored cruiser was even more heavily armed and armored. The US and Italian armored cruisers mounted 10" guns in their last pre-WWI iterations, when the battleship standard was 12". Some call armored cruisers "second class battleships". Greece called the Averoff, a Pisa class armored cruiser, a battleship. The first USS Maine has been described as both an armored cruiser and a second class battleship. The armored cruiser concept, guns larger than a heavy cruiser, but smaller than a battleship, returned with the Deutschlands, Scharnhorsts and Alaskas.
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@Tepid24 as you said, you are looking at the extremes, not the average BB "gun of the era", which would be the basis for the definition. Dunkerque and Scharnhorst were not of Renown's era, but 20 years newer too. It appears that Renown, in 1930s configuration, had a 9" belt. The guns of Dunkerque and Scharnhorst could easily punch through. Navweaps shows the French 13" penetrating 11.48" at over 30,000 and Scharn's 11" penetrating 11.47" at 20,000. On the other hand, Renown's 15" could penetrate Dunkerque's 8.9" at 30,000 yards, but would need to get within 15,000 to penetrate Scharnhorst. A KGV could punch through Renown or Dunkerque at 25,000, but, again would need to close to under 15,000 to penetrate the strongest part of Scharnhorst. fwiw, at North Cape, Duke of York opened fire at less than 12,000, By my measure, Renown and Dunkerque were both battlecruisers, because they are so vulnerable, while Scharnhorst is a BB, even though underarmed.
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@emperordave3006 if the 14" limit had held, it would only impact the US and UK. France and Italy already had 15" gunned ships under construction and Japan had dropped out of the treaty system. The UK settled on the 14"/45, with only average muzzle velocity and average size shell, for a 14", so they were not going for exceptional performance. The USN 14"/50s that were rebuilt in the 30s had a higher muzzle velocity, but it came at a price: barrel life about a third less than the British 14"/45. They had an even more powerful 14" under development, which they dropped like a bad habit when the escalator clause tripped. With the French, Italians and Germans all going for high velocity 15", the US going to extra heavy shells, and the Japanese going to even bigger guns, the British 14", and not a high performance 14" at that, mystifies me.
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@bluemarlin8138 The US and UK did overcome national pride to use the Bofors and Orlikon, and the hedgehog. The RN also used the F4F, F4U and TBF, along with a variety of other US designed and built aircraft. You hit on one major problem: logistics. The US guns were designed to use USN smokeless. The British gun was designed for cordite. USN smokeless appears to be more energy dense than cordite. The chamber volume of the British gun is 34,000cuin, while the chamber of the US gun is only 23,000 cuin. When the British were running the Abercrombie class monitors, with US 14" guns in WWI, they had to import US smokeless powder for them. When they tried cordite in the US guns, they suffered significant loss of range. We see the same difference in chamber volume with 14" guns. The US built guns on the Abercrombie had a 15,332cuin chamber. The 14" guns on HMS Canada had 23,500cuin chambers and the 14" on the WWII KGVs had 22,000cuin chambers.
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wrt the Force Z aircraft carrier question and Churchill trying to cover himself. I doubt that the Admiralty had a clue, when PoW set sail for the far east on October 24th, that all six large IJN carriers would be off on the Pearl Harbor op by the time PoW arrived in the far east. Seems that the reasonable assumption would be that if the Japanese made a move on Malaya, they would have air cover. Second point, assuming the range of a G3M or G4M with a torpedo load was unknown, and most bombs could not hurt PoW critically, bombs could hurt Repulse. So, seems irresponsible that the possibility of airborne attack on Force Z could be handwaved away.
Hermes was finishing repair in Simonstown on November 16th. Hermes' usual air wing was a handful of Swordfish. The RN was starting to receive Martlets, but the early Martlets did not have folding wings, and, iirc, the wingspan of an F4F is too wide to fit on Hermes' elevators. At that time, it seems all the Martlets were in the UK anyway. The Buffalo had a slightly smaller wingspan, just small enough to fit on Hermes's elevators, and there were plenty of Buffalos in Singapore. So the only practicable way to get a credible CAP for Force Z would be to send Hermes. Meanwhile, get the information from Brewster to fabricate tailhooks in Singapore, and train the RAF pilots in carrier ops. When Hermes arrives, put the Swordfish ashore and load as many Buffalos as would fit on the ship.
Bottom line, given the gyrations that would be needed to give Force Z a CAP, if that Hermes/Buffalo scenario even occurred to anyone, I figure Winny rolled the dice, then tried to cover his rear when it went wrong.
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@lukedogwalker there are things I read that simply don't make any sense. I have been looking in to the choice of 14" for the KGVs. One narrative says the British were forced to go 14" by Second London, but it was the British that pushed for 14" in the treaty, and their decision to go 14" was made before the conference started. Another narrative says the 14" armament was chosen for lower cost. Drac's piece on the KGVs shows the estimated weight for the 12-14" originally planned was higher than that of the 9-15" alternative, and the 14", having more guns, means more parts to be forged, fabricated, and machined. I don't see how it is possible for the 14" set to cost less with more material and a higher part count than the 15" alternative. I picked up the Garzke/Dulin book at the library last week. They talk about the "more smaller guns means more hits" school of thought driving the decision. That has the ring of truth to it, because the USN had the same argument in 1915-16. I read about the debate in the USN from the annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy, and newspaper reports, written at the time. I have visions of someone at the top, or above the top, of the Admiralty, clinging to that obsolete theory, ignoring that the French and Italians were both building 15", ignoring that the US made it's support for 14" contingent on Japanese support, ignoring that the Japanese were not going to support it because they already said they were dropping out of the treaty, and forcing the 14" gun. There was no need to write 14" into the treaty, as there was nothing in the treaty prohibiting building under treaty limits. The French had built 13", then 15", and the Italians were building 15", when the treaty limit was 16". My take is, whoever it was that forced the 14" gun on the RN, had it written into the treaty, and the fake narratives about treaty compliance and cost created and disseminated for political cover. It may sound bizarre, but no more bizarre than Admiral Strauss' antics at BuOrd, pushing 14".
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@gregorywright4918 the only preceding 14" guns in the UK were export only, wire wound, designs circa WWI, produced by Elswick and Vickers. Logic would dictate that, when they started working on the Lions, they would have used three of the quad 14" turrets that Vickers already had in production to expedite the ships, but no, they started with a clean sheet triple 16" design. The French, Italian, and German battleships that were building in 39, were the same ones that had been building in 36, but the 14" guns that were deemed competitive in 36, were seen as uncompetitive in 39? That is another aspect of the 14" gun KGV that doesn't make any sense.
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@gregorywright4918 I was reading the section of the Garzke/Dulin book on the Dunkerques a couple days ago. Not only did the quad turrets result in the least amount of weight per gun for the turret, they based the design on the quads that had been designed for the Normandies, which saved significant time and money in design. The Normandie turrents had originally been designed for only 15 degrees of elevation, so increasing elevation was one of the modifications that had to be made. Then, when they designed the Richelieus, they scaled up the same turret design. The KGV turrets were designed for 40 degrees of elevation and had the powder magazines below the shell rooms, the opposite of the WWI RN BBs. The Nelson turrets were designed for 40 degrees of elevation and had the powder magazines below the shell rooms, the first RN turrets meeting the new specifications. The Nelson turrets could have been used on the KGVs with only sleeving the mounts down for a 15" gun, saving even more time and money than the French saved by recycling the Normandie design, and they also benefited from 15 years of debugging, but no, the Admiralty wanted a clean sheet quad.
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Yes, Biden's debate was terrible. But look at the nutty stuff that comes out of Trump's mouth, like how he can't wash his hair because of dripping faucets, or the electric boat and shark thing. Or, going back a few years, Trump talking about American soldiers, in the revolution, capturing airports. Or the time he made a mistake about the path of a hurricane, so drew in the path he had predicted on a map with a black Sharpie, to blame someone else for the mistake.
In the last couple of years, Biden has, at times, spoken haltingly. His advocates always brush it off by reminding people he has a stutter. But look at the expression on Biden's face in the group photo from the G7 conference in Italy two weeks ago. He really does not look fully aware of where he is.
Bottom line, neither is really fit for office. Each can have good days, and bad days, but can we accept someone in that position that could have an incoherent moment when there is a crisis?
Who is an alternative? Kennedy? With a worm in his brain?
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wrt the question about the USN's superimposed turrets, these were the brainchild of a young officer at BuOrd named Joseph Strauss. Strauss was the same bright spark who, years later, as head of BuOrd, decreed that the 14" was the perfect gun, because combat at ranges greater than 12,000 yards would never happen.
As Drac said, improvements in rate of fire of the main guns rendered the superimposed turrets redundant. Someone else in the Navy Department figured out that, what was needed in the large turrets, was paying a little attention to ergonomics, and training the crews better. The Navweaps article on the 12"/40, the gun mounted on the Virginias, shows the rate of fire improving from 0.66 round per minute when the ships were first commissioned, to 2 rounds per minute after the modifications to turret ergonomics and training had been implemented in 1906.
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@calenedgar3722 given that bulkheads are pierced by pipes, electrical conduits and ventilation ducts, chance of fully dry compartments, after all these years, would be pretty slim. On the other hand, I remember watching a documentary about Arizona, years ago, maybe 91, where a diver looking over the wreck found a porthole with the glass not broken, and the steel cover had been closed before the ship sank. There was a bit of water at the bottom of the space between the porthole glass and the cover, but most of the space between the glass and the cover was still filled with air.
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@carlcarlton764 The SBA took forever to get into production because Brewster was already running at capacity building Buffalos, so SBA production was handed off to the Naval Aircraft Factory in Sept 38. NAF had it's hands full too, and with the SBD in the pipeline, the NAF didn't give the SBA, now the SBN high priority, so they only built a handful by 42, when the SBN was obsolete, so the project was dropped. Brewster was a dumpster fire of a company, notorious for late delivery and terrible build quality. The only people who were bigger crooks than Jimmy Work, who owned Brewster, were Brewster's export agents, long time independent arms dealers, the Miranda brothers, dba Brewster Export Company, who, when not doing time in the federal pen for violating the US arms embargo on Bolivia, were embezzling from Brewster. The Royal Navy did have the Skua for a fighter in 39. If Force Z had had a carrier, it probably would have had Skuas embarked. Only problem is the Mitsu Nell bombers that attacked Force Z were faster than a Skua.
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@RedXlV I have the exact numbers in my notes, somewhere, wrt how much was spent on da Vinci and how much more it would cost to complete Caracciolo. The amount spent on the salvage op, as far as it got, was far short of the cost to complete the new ship. A lot of what was spent on da Vinci would have been spent to clear the wreck anyway. As with Oklahoma, an air pressure bubble was created in the hull and crews worked inside to remove the fuel, ammo and guns, and cut away the superstructure to lighten the hulk. Because the inverted hull drew more water than the ship did upright, a channel had to be dredged to the drydock. I have read that the RM preferred the Pozzuoli guns, which were designed by Armstrong. The Ansaldoes were a monobloc design by Schneider, which were a lot lighter than the wire wound guns from the other two companies. In the back of my mind is the thought the RM gave seven Ansaldos to the army because they didn't quite trust them. The best reassignment of guns I can think of is to put two of the Ansaldoes that the army did not use in the first shore battery at Brindisi. The second battery at Brindisi was not finished until after the war, so install the two Ansaldoes from the monitor Faà di Bruno in that battery. That frees up four Pozzuolies. Cancel the four small monitors that were not completed until after the war, which frees up four more Pozzuolies. That leaves two Pozzuolies that were installed in improvised monitors during the war as spares. The other two Pozzuolies were on the monitor that sank. With four Ansaldoes installed at Brindisi, that leaves 1 new gun as a spare, and the four that were used as railroad guns during the war. Historically, all seven of the army Ansaldoes appear to have spent WWII in the armory at La Spezia. The next problem is spares, for when the original set of guns need to be relined. Either spend a lot of money making up another eight, or be content for the ship to be laid up for a couple months while it's one set of guns is overhauled. As for the armor, I have seen a speculative drawing of added armor at the main deck level. I have also seen a photo of the incomplete hull just before work stopped during the war. In the photo the decking only covers part of the hull, and I can see that there are no builkheads beneath the decking, I appear to be seeing the top of the turtleback and the decking being installed is temporary, to keep the weather out, until work is resumed. If that is the case, it would be easier to add armor directly on the turtleback before completing the ship.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 repairing Arizona was probably like restoring an antique car: anything is possible, given enough time and money. When Maine was raised from Havana harbor, they built a cofferdam around it, inspected the wreck, then cut off the blown up part, built a new bow on what was left, towed it to deep water, and scuttled it. They could probably have done the same thing with Arizona, except the scuttling part, tow the intact part to Bremerton for rebuild. I have read that #1 turret was pretty well destroyed, and #2 was not exactly factory fresh, only yielding it's guns, as serviceable. The turrets on Oklahoma appear to be the same diameter as those on Arizona 27ft 11.5 inches, so, potentially, Okie's turrets could be salvaged to repair Arizona, but, in a world of infinite resources, someone would want to rebuild Okie too.
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@jonathanj8303 Argentina wanted to sell the Rivadavias, but the US vetoed any sale as it didn't want other parties to get their hands on some of the US technology in the ships. Greece had contracted for a new-build battleship with the Vulcan yard in Germany, but the Ottoman battleships, later known as Agincourt and Erin, would be delivered long before the new Greek ship was ready, so Greece went shopping for something ready for immediate delivery. I looked up the numbers. The check the US received for the old ships was $12,535,275.96. Idaho commissioned in early 1919. According to the spreadsheets published by the Navy Bureau of Supply and Accounts, by June 1919, the US had spent $11,108,167.87 on Idaho. Some after commissioning tweaking ran the bill up to $11,798,598.41 by June 1921, so Idaho was indeed free to the USN, net of the sale of the old ships. Considering that any Greek ship would be going up against Agincourt and Erin, the Mississippis would have been meat on the table: slow and weakly armed. The Rivadavias would have made it a contest, but Argentina couldn't sell.
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@johnshepherd8687 somewhat covered this question in a thread below. After SecNav Daniels and the General Board decided in summer 1916 that the Colorados would receive the 16"/45, there was discussion in the press of upgunning the New Mexicos and Tennessees. The New Mexicos were actively under construction at that time, and a Naval officer is quoted in the press as saying they were too far along to be upgunned at any reasonable cost. Tennessee and California had not been laid down yet, but the USN had 14"/50 production in high gear, so the guns for those two ships were in process. However, the barbettes in the Tennessees seem to be the same diameter as the Colorados, 32 feet, the twin 16" turret is slightly lighter than the triple 14", and the part of the 16" turret that extends down inside the barbette is about 6 inches smaller in diameter, so there should not be any problem upgunning the Tennessees. Now, on to your question: The treaty divided battleships into "pre-Jutland" and "post-Jutland" groups. The Tennessees were deemed "pre-Jutland" in spite of them being laid down after the battle and having state of the art armor and torpedo protection. The only reason I can think of for that classification is because they had 14" guns. Put 16" on the Tennessees and there is no way they could be called "pre-Jutland". For everything else to be status quo, with the Tennessees deemed "post-Jutland", Maryland would be the US' third "post" ship, and Colorado and West Virginia would be used for target practice, along with Washington, or scrapped incomplete. If the US insisted on completing West Virginia and Colorado, that would give them five "post" ships. Japan would rightfully, say that they are entitled to have three "post" ships, due to the 5:5:3 ratio, and demand to be allowed to complete Tosa. Tosa was to have displaced about 39,900 tons, over the treaty limit, but, again, the Japanese could claim a right to one 40K ton ship, because of Hood. Let's take a quick math break. If Japan scrapped Settsu and demilitarized Kongo instead. then added Tosa, that would put their capital ship tonnage at 313,720 vs a quota of 315,000, so the IJN is golden. That would leave the UK building four Nelsons for parity. So that is the difference, either the US loses West Virginia and Colorado, or the Japanese gain Tosa and the UK gains two additional Nelsons.
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@johnshepherd8687 the USN did retain the Floridas through the 20s. For the fleet drawdown in First London, Florida was scrapped and Utah became a target ship. Colorado and West Virginia replaced the two Delaware class BBs. Delaware was scrapped and North Dakota became a target ship, until it was replaced by Utah a decade later. The US was below it's tonnage quota until the Delawares were replaced by the Colorados, bringing the US' total to 525,850, vs a quota of 525,000. For the US to drop the Delawares, that results in the second case, where the IJN gets the Tosa and the RN builds two additional Nelsons, for 5:5:3 relationship in "post-Jutland" ships, with the US' five. For the RN to build two more Nelsons, they would probably need to get rid of all four Iron Dukes, because the RN was well over it's quota. With two more Nelsons, and without the Iron Dukes, the RN comes in at 528,950 tons, vs a quota of 525,000.
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@johnshepherd8687 I see what you are saying. I create alt histories as a hobby (much winter weather in Michigan, with little else to do), but I require my alt histories to be practicable, ideally pivoting on one decision being made slightly differently.
Yes, your scenario would be interesting. I have not gamed that out. It could go something along the line of 14" being the baseline for BB guns, with 15" and 16" both classified as above baseline. That would give the RN 13 "above baseline" ships, the USN 6 and IJN 2. First take, the RN doesn't get the Nelsons. Below baseline ships eligible for immediate replacement: so the USN completes the other three Colorados, to replace the Delawares and Floridas. Within the displacement limits of the original treaty, Japan could not add any new ships, as it had no below baseline ships to replace. Looks really unbalanced though, with a 13:9:2 ratio of "above baseline" ships.
Could go with a throw weight model. 12-14", 9-15: and 8-16" have surprisingly similar throw weights. Decree that the 12-14" ships and 8-16" ships equal, the 8 and 10 gun 14" ships, and anything with 12", substandard and subject to replacement. Decree the IJN Tosas and Amagis verboten due to their 10-16" armament being too superior to the throw weight model. That would give the RN 11 slightly below par ships, and the Renowns and all of the 13.5" ships qualified for immediate replacement due to excessively weak armament. The USN, assuming all the Colorados completed, 11 ships on plan, and the rest qualified for replacement. The IJN 6 ships on plan, and the Kongos qualified for replacement.
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I did not see mention of the Cruiser Mk III, which introduced the Nuffield built Liberty engine. That tank brings the question, why the Liberty? I gather than Nuffield wanted a "proven" design, but an obsolete one? The Curtiss Conqueror, was almost exactly the same size and weight, but, being a decade newer design, put out about 50% more power, and had the valve train enclosed, instead of the rockers and valves exposed to the environment, as was the case with the Liberty. Given the unreliability of the Nuffield Liberty in North Africa, I can't help but think the Conqueror would have been a better choice.
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@Knight6831 I don't think the US getting involved over a handful of US citizens on a British flag ship would happen. Lusitania was sunk in May of 15. The US didn't get into WWI until after Germany had had a long running sabotage program in the US destroying property and killing Americans, and after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in Feb 17 and sinking US flagged ships, and after Germany tried to induce Mexico to commit to invading the US, if the US entered the war on the UK's side. If "something" significant enough to bring the US in, in 39, did happen, two outcomes: 1: the US sends troops and equipment into France during the sitzkreig, aka "phony war", strengthening defenses enough that the Battle of France in May-June of 40 bogs down into a rerun of WWI. or 2: the US doesn't move until the invasion of France. France's collapse was so fast the US would not be able to intervene on the ground, so the balance of 40 and 41 go as they did historically: the US providing material to the UK so they can hang on, while US forces are built up enough to intervene effectively.
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wrt the G3 carrier conversion question, I do not find anything in the Washington treaty that is relevant to the conversions of Courageous and Glorious.
All capital ships of each nation are listed on either the retention list, or disposal list. The Courageouses are on neither list. My takeaway from that omission is that, as the Admiralty had called them "light cruisers" since inception, the treaty respected that, called them "cruisers", and grandfathered them, just as all the armored cruisers that exceeded treaty limits in displacement and gun size were grandfathered.
The treaty clause about converting existing or building ships to carriers does not apply to the Courageouses either. The clause only relates to the conversion of ships that exceed the treaty limit of 27,000 tons. Even after conversion, the Courageouses were well under 27,000, so the treaty clause would not apply.
First London would have provided an incentive to reclassify the Courageouses as anything but cruisers due to the establishment of cruiser fleet displacement limits, but the conversions were already done, so First London did not cause their conversion either.
My suspicion is Courageous and Glorious were converted due to an Admiralty assessment that they would make better carriers than they did cruisers. Given the cost of the conversions, I almost wonder if the Admiralty would have been better off if it had built new, optimized, carrier hulls, transferred the machinery from the Courageous class hulls, then scrapped the Courageouses as a mistake.
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The competition between the UK and Germany was not passing without the notice of the US. With both powers developing 15" guns, the US responded by developing the 16"/45, proof firing it in 1914. So how did the New Mexicos and Tennessees come to have 14" guns? The head of BuOrd decided that battleships would never engage at more than 12,000 yards. Below that range, the 14" would penetrate well enough, and, being smaller and lighter than the 16", more guns could be mounted. Of course, a year later, the British and German fleets engaged at over 15,000 yards, and the 16"/45 that had been discarded as excessive and redundant, suddenly became the gun to have. What award would you suggest for the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss?
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@kemarisite interesting. Their problem was incomplete combustion? I have read of the British trying different diameters of cordite sticks. Sticks in my mind I have heard of hollow cordite sticks, to increase surface area, to increase combustion speed. It seems the energy density of RN cordite is quite a bit lower than USN smokeless, as British guns tend to have much larger chambers. The 16"/45 on the Nelsons has a 35,205cuin chamber, while the 16"/45 Mk I as used on the US Colorados, has a 23,506cuin chamber. During WWI, the RN tried cordite in the US built 14" on one class of monitors, and found a significant reduction in range, vs that obtained with USN powder. One wonders if the British issue with incomplete combustion would have been addressed by switching to USN smokeless, so there is less charge to burn in the first place.
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@josephenders1893 One of the movies I saw, where the ship sat adrift for several hours, maybe "The Enemy Below", maybe "Action In The North Atlantic", showed one of the firemen lighting an oil fired boiler. He first picked up a metal wand, maybe 3-4 feet long. Tied a piece of cloth or wick material to the end. Opened the cover of a little cup on the front of the boiler, which was full of fuel oil. Dipped the wick in the oil, then lit it with a match. Then he stuck the wand through an access port in the front of the boiler near one of the burners, and turned on the oil valve to the burner. It follows that they need electricity first, to run the fuel pumps and blowers for the boiler, so that would come from an auxiliary diesel driven generator, that is started by a battery, or power from shore. At some point, the turbo-generators are cut in, so the ship can go on full internal power. Then, you can see about starting the main engines. In one of Drac's pieces from his US trip, he was in the boiler room of a ship, and might have touched on some of the procedure.
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@Drachinifel true enough. When the Italians rebuilt their 4 pre-WWI BBs in the 30s, they lengthened the hulls by about 35 feet, as well as increasing power from 30,000 to 75,000shp. to push them from 21kts to 26. While building a USN equivalent to a Queen Elizabeth would be a good start, there would not be any follow-through in the 30s. In effect, we would be creating the 1920 South Dakotas. 43' longer than a QE, 15' wider, with 60K shp vs 56K, and 23kts. But, unlike the RN, there would be no major updates in the 30s. If you or I were the typical age of the head of the General Board in 1915, we would be retired, if not dead, long before 1935, so would not be around to make the reengining happen, meaning the ships are stuck at 23kts. There would be no rebuild of the superstructures either, which is why I specified abandoning casement mounted 5/51s in favor of putting them all on the weather deck. In the USN of the 30s, the only updates we could expect would be replacing the 5/51s on the weather deck with 5/25s and 1.1s.
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The other wrinkle is our advance knowledge of the Washington Treaty. Without our intervention, Maryland was the only Colorado in commission at the time of the treaty. The US negotiated a clause allowing completion of West Virginia and Colorado, in exchange for the disposal of the two Delawares, which the original treaty retention list had included. The Colorados were under the treaty's 35,000 ton limit. As we are talking longer ships with more powerful engines and higher speed capability, essentially 1920s South Dakotas, which displaced 43,000, the US would probably not be able to work that exchange to complete two after the signing of the treaty. So, all the future vision BBs would need to be in commission before the end of 1921, meaning they need to be laid down before 1919. New Mexico was launched 4/13/17 at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and Tennessee was laid down a month later, launching 4/30/19, so we can't get more out of Brooklyn. Mississippi was launched 1/25/17 at Newport News. NN laid down Maryland 4/24/17, launching on 3/20/20, so we can't get more out of NN. Mare Island didn't launch California until 11/20/19, so can't get another BB out of that yard. Only opportunity to advance construction schedule in a yard known to have capacity to build BBs is at NY Shipbuilding. That yard launched Idaho on 6/30/17, so Colorado could be advanced from it's actual lay down date of 5/29/19 to somewhere in August of 17.
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@WALTERBROADDUS the Philippines were on a path to independence. A new constitution had been written and a civilian Philippine government established. Plus, the Philippines are on the other side of the world. Value to the US government, and value as perceived by the US population could have been very different. But, the islands were still US territory, so let's assume that FDR can get a declaration of war through Congress. What would be the US response, especially if the Japanese had not gone directly after Clark and Subic on the first day, but rather landed on Mindanao or Leyte, rather than Luzon, to minimize initial loss of American lives. In the historical timeline, the US population probably recognized the fleet was damaged and the Philippine garrison beyond help. If Pearl had not been attacked, and the fleet was intact, what would the population's response be to the Philippine garrison being left for dead? But, if the US did move to reinforce the Philippines, they would be steaming past a long line of Japanese held islands, as the IJN chips away at the fleet with subs and both land and carrier based aircraft. Saipan sits directly astride the direct line from Hawaii to the Philippines and had been garrisoned by Japan since the late 30s, FDR could recognize that a relief mission would be suicidal, but refusing to launch the mission would be politically suicidal. What to do? Launch the mission, but recognize it's a one way trip and only send ships of minimal value, like the obsolete battleships? So the US replicates Force Z, at four times the scale?
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@johnshepherd8687 Yes, the USN had plenty of BBs by the time the Alaskas entered service. In fact, if the IJN had sent out a cruiser swarm, like the Alaskas were supposed to intercept, the cruiser swarm would probably run into BBs instead. I think the Brits, USN and Italians were 100% correct in building nothing but treatymax BBs in the 30s. I suspect it was only a small group in the USN that saw the shiny things the French, Germans and Dutch had/planned, and decided that the USN "had to have it too", and, when the war engulfed every part of the world except the Americas, they were able to get funding for their pet project. Sanity was restored with the end of the war, and the Alaskas were shoved straight into mothballs, and stayed there until they went to the breakers, while the Iowas were reactivated for Korea, and stayed in service well into the 50s, then mothballed again, and reactivated again in the 80s.
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wrt the Caribbean, I did some research into WWI debts a while back. The US had bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917. As Drac noted, the bulk of the remaining islands were UK possessions. I extrapolated the price per square mile the US had paid for the Virgin Islands to the land area of all the UK island possessions in the Caribbean, plus British Honduras, and found that a fair price for those UK possessions would be a bit over $4B US, enough to cover the entire principle of UK war debt to the US, plus part of the accrued interest. The amount other allies owed the UK, which had financed WWI, until the entry of the US in 1917, almost exactly equaled what the UK owed the US. On August 1, 1922, the UK government published a note from Arthur Balfour to the French ambassador to the UK, which was widely considered to be for US consumption. The note said that, if it was up to the UK, the UK would cancel the debts owed it by it's allies, but, as the US was pressing the UK for payment, in cash, the UK had no choice but to press it's allies for repayment, in cash. So the bottom line is, if the UK had signed over it's Caribbean possessions to the US as repayment of it's debts, then cancelled all debts owed it by it's allies, as those debts would be a wash with the debts owed to the US, the acrimony through the 20s and early 30s created by the pressures for repayment would have been greatly reduced. Such a scheme was widely discussed in the newspapers at the time. But President Harding said no. Lloyd George said no. Even the Prince of Wales weighed in, "no".
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@aliceosako792 This is somewhat related to the question on the post a few days ago. I see an opportunity. I looked in my 1928 USN port directory, and there were no drydocks in Singapore longer than 500 feet. With the Sutherland and Fitzroy docks already existing, and too narrow to accommodate capital ships, as well as too short, the only place I see at Cockatoo Island for a larger dock is where the two old long slipways are. So, I would try to negotiate a deal with the Admiralty where, if the Admiralty covered the cost of a drydock that could accommodate the RN's largest ships, saving them a trip back to England for major work, then the RAN would have all it's ships built in yards in England, rather than building anything at Cockatoo. That way Australia gets a very large dock, and maintenance business from the RN, and UK yards pick up business from the RAN. A larger dock at Cockatoo would certainly have come in handy. A County fits nicely in Sutherland, but I have seen a pic of a carrier in Sutherland , where the edges of the flight deck overhang the edges of the dock, and they probably could not have closed the gate behind it if the stern had an extra coat of paint on it.
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@nnoddy8161 off the top of my head, game changer at Java Sea and Sunda Strait, because they were heavy surface engagements with IJN cruisers and destroyers. Probably non-event at Coral Sea as that was a USN fast carrier group. PoW and Repulse would probably not get involved at Guaduacanal due to the close quarters, but Perth, if surviving, might get into it. Seat of the pants hunch is Exeter, if surviving, would stick with the PoW and Repulse. PoW would stand out in the Dutch East Indies theater as being one of the very few with a really decent AA suite. Houston's AA armament had been augmented since she was built, totaling, by then, 8-5"/25s and 4-1.1". Marblehead and the 4 pipers had obsolete 3" AA guns. The wild card would be what would happen to the Dutch cruisers, if they survived? Not being constrained by "Not Invented Here" they seem to have mounted a significant number of 40mm Bofors. Would the force be able to defend itself against air attack in the Java Sea?
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@Knight6831 it was a wonderful deal for the UK. They had such a wealth of capital ships that they didn't have anything smaller than a 13.5" gun after the cull, and over a dozen ships with 15" guns, and, iirc, they had not actually started building any of the N3s or G3s, so they didn't suffer the waste of cutting up incomplete ships. Meanwhile, the USN, MN and RM were all stuck with old tubs mounting 12" guns. The IJN came off pretty well, once they successfully overcame demands to scrap Mutsu, with the smallest guns mounted being 14". The RN alone, had a treaty retention list that totaled well over their 525,000 ton quota too. And in spite of already having numerical, displacement, and firepower superiority, the UK successfully argued to be allowed to build two clean sheet, 16" armed ships, the Nelsons. It was a huge win for the UK. Breaking the UK/Japanese alliance didn't cost the UK much either, imho. The intent of the alliance was to use the Japanese to keep an eye on German and Russian ambition in the Pacific. Post revolutionary Russia was not much of a military threat, and Germany had been stripped of it's Pacific colonies. Instead, Japan was occupying the former German colonies north of the equator, bumping up against UK and Australian possessions, so, now, it was Japan that was looking like the threat to UK interests.
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@Knight6831 The original retention lists, before adjustments for the two Nelsons and two Coloradoes, had the RN at 22 capital ships, with a total tonnage of 580,450, and the USN had 18 capital ships with a total tonnage of 500,650. The quota was 525,000. The US traded the two Delawares for Colorado and West Virginia, leaving it at 18 ships with a total tonnage of 525,850 tons. The RN scrapped four 13.5" armed ships to build the Nelsons, drawing the RN down to 20 capital ships with a total tonnage of 558,950, with the Nelson's design being a generation newer than the Coloradoes, which had been ordered in 1916. The four RN ships scrapped for the Nelsons, Thunderer, King George V, Ajax and Centurion, each mounted 10-13.5" guns, turbine powered, with a top speed of 21kts. The only obsolete feature of these ships vs USS Nevada, was that they were coal fired. By scrapping them, in favor of the Nelsons, the RN avoided the cost of oil conversion and adding torpedo bulges. Somewhere in my notes, I have the cost the USN paid to have the 12" armed Floridas and Wyomings, as well as the 14" armed New Yorks, all converted to oil and fitted with torpedo bulges. By my figures, the USN could have completed Washington for what it spent modernizing the two Floridas, with Florida going to the breakers and Utah being demilitarized less than ten years later. From my reading, it appears the only coal fired, 13.5" RN ships that survived the treaty cull, the Iron Dukes and Tiger, did not have a Farthing spent on Modernization in the 20s, continuing coal fired and unprotected against torpedoes until they were scrapped/demilitarized in the early 30s.
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@Knight6831 I read "The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor" last winter. I remember a push to force the IJN to scrap Mutsu as there was a view the Japanese had cheated and commissioned her when she was not really ready for service, which the other powers eventually backed down on, and I remember France being very put out that the treaty treated it as an equal of Italy, but I don't recall a concerted effort to get rid of Hood. To get right down to it, Hood's main armament was the same as a Revenge, and arguably inferior to a Colorado, with protection inferior to both. Maybe if someone has a copy of that book in their personal library, they can look up Hood in the index for any specific reference. From my perspective, Hood was only one ship, and she commissioned in May of 1920, a year before the Washington Conference was proposed. The horse had clearly left the barn wrt Hood, so it was time to put on the big boy pants and let Hood slide as grandfathered.
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Everything I read about the Lexingtons, and their, what, 3rd or 4th design, says they were inspired by the Hood. Yet, before the Lexingtons were laid down, the Admiralty decided it didn't want any more ships like the Hood, scrapped the other three Admirals on the ways, after spending some 1.6M Pounds on them, and went back to the drawing board. The USN pressed on with the thin skinned Lexingtons regardless. Another case where the Washington Treaty probably saved the USN from making another mistake. The flaw in the thinking behind the battle cruiser is there are some situations where running is not an option. The US forces off Samar Island in 44, known as "Taffy 3" were wildly outmatched, but running was not an option. They had to stand and fight.
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@vikkimcdonough6153 first, to hit anything with a battleship shell, you pretty well need to see the target. Scaling off of Google satellite view, Battleship Row is nearly 3 miles inland from the beach. Viewing from a low angle, the top of Missouri's mast is completely obscured by land, trees, and buildings. The Japanese would be pretty much shooting blind, as any spotter planes they send up would have P-40s all over them, unless the Japanese established total air superiority first. Even with air superiority, any spotter planes that survived the hail of AA fire that would be directed at them from the ships and surrounding land, only a small portion of the shells would hit anything. It would be a golden BB for those shells to hit anything vital. I read an interesting observation in "The Grand Fleet" a few weeks ago, words to the effect that unless the British battlecruisers were hit in the magazine, they stood up pretty well to gunfire. As for the TBD Devastator, it gets a bum wrap. The TBD performed well at Coral Sea, without a single loss to enemy action, though the torpedoes came up short. The TBDs were slaughtered at Midway because of a fatally botched attack. Blame luminaries like Stanhope Ring. I give secondary "credit" for the fiasco to Mitscher for not taking charge and setting the argument between Ring and Waldron. I'll throw in a dishonorable mention for Ray Spruance, because he was in command of TF 16. At Coral Sea, the TBDs, SBDs and fighters met at a rally point and attacked the Japanese formations together. The man who managed the strikes at Coral Sea, the man they needed at Midway. Aubrey Fitch, was on his way stateside, as his previous command, Lexington, had been sunk.
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From the numbers I can find, the murder rate in Chicago is 15/100,000 in 2021, half the rate of the worst states. Chicago's rate is lower than some other cities in Illinois. Champaign's rate in 2021 was 18/100,000. In 2020, the gun homicide rate in Rockford was 17/100,000 and 25/100,000 in Peoria. The murder rate in Chicago doesn't even put it in the top five cities, nationally, But Chicago has a large population, so the total numbers are higher, and every media outlet has an office in Chicago, so it is easy for them to cover the city. The Republicans are trying very hard to make this a "liberal" issue, or a racial issue, but gun violence is more a red state issue than anything else, with cities like Memphis, St Louis and New Orleans having significantly higher murder rates.
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@hatchcrazy I would offer the intervention of President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes, in an unintended manner. Without the Washington Naval Treaty, and Congressional tightfistedness in the 20s, the USN would have built the six South Dakota BBs in the 20s that would have been just as obsolete and near useless in 41 as the "standards" that preceded them. Without the intervention of the treaty, and Congress, the six Lexington class battlecruisers would have been built. Of course, you could also argue that the 1916 Naval Act that authorized the South Dakotas, Lexingtons, and Colorados, was politically motivated and unrealistically ambitious, so Harding and Hughes were correct in their stated intent of reining it in.
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@Brian Barrigar As Drac said, the US did provide a frigate, Crescent, to Algiers, in 1798. In 1800, the US ambassador to Algiers reported that the ship was not being maintained and was starting to rot. In 1806, Crescent, rotten and leaking, was broken up. If the pirates continued to neglect "free" ships like that, they would not have much of a force, as the ships would be falling apart before a large number could be accumulated from tribute paying nations.
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@calvingreene90 that is about what I have read. The RN had the budget to build an entire division of four battleships of one class. The USN did not have that sort of money, two per year was all they could afford, so they standardized the performance, speed and turning circle, so different classes could maneuver together, while still making incremental improvements in protection and armament. What puzzles me is why the Coloradoes were proceeded with after the war, when Navy decision making after they had been ordered in 1916 had made them obsolete. In early 1919, work on Maryland had proceeded slowly, as it was given low priority and the other three had not been laid down yet. They could have broken up Maryland on the slipway, cancelled the other three before they were laid down, and put the money into the bigger, faster, South Dakotas, until the treaty happened. If the USN had taken a page from the Admiralty when the US entered the war in April 1917, they would have cancelled Maryland and Tennessee before they were laid down, and broken up California on the slipway. I found a pic of California taken in late March of 17, and all that was built was the flat, bottom part of the hull, so there would not have been much waste in breaking it up.
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The replacement of the Oerlikons with Bofors keys into something I have been pondering: It seems that I have seen pix of single, free mount, 2pdr Vickers here and there. Would such a free mount Vickers be a better last ditch weapon than an Oerlikon? The HV Mk VIII has equal or slightly better range and altitude than the Oerlikon. The Oerlikon used a 60 round drum, vs the earlier, single mount Mk II Vickers using a 14 round belt. The Oerlikon has a much higher rate of fire, so, in spite of the 60 round mag, the Oerlikon runs dry in 8 seconds, vs the Vickers with it's 14 round belt stopping for reload after 7.3 seconds. The Oerlikon shell weighs .271lbs vs 1.81lbs for the HV Vickers. So, while the Oerlikon has a higher rate of fire, the amount of steel thrown by a Vickers over the 7-8 seconds between reloads is greater. Would everyone have been better off with phalanxes of free mount Vickers, instead of Oerlikons?
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wrt the Italian Francesco Caracciolo class battleships, it took three weeks, but I think I figured out a scenario where Italy could have gotten two into commission. Immediately after WWI, Italy built 10 new destroyers. So, convince Admiral Giovanni Sechi that they should finish what they started, before starting something else, and divert the funding from the DDs to building Cristoforo Colombo, which was second farthest along when work was suspended in 16, far enough along to be launched. Work actually was resumed on Francesco Caracciolo, launching on 12 May, 1920. Continue working on the two as funding allows, until the Washington treaty intervenes to halt work. As Italy, and France, were allowed to lay down new BBs in 27 and 29, years ahead of any of the other powers, plead that scrapping the 2 existing hulls and starting over in only 5 years is excessively wasteful, and have a clause added to the treaty allowing any signatory power to lay up existing, incomplete, ships, until the treaty allows new construction to resume, if the incomplete ships comply with treaty limits,. As the Caraccilos were designed to displace 34,000T, they would comply with treaty limits. So Italy updates the design of Caracciolo and Colombo, adding more deck armor, deleting the casement mounted secondary armament in favor of modern turrets, and potentially, preparing new, more advanced and powerful boilers and turbines, for when work is resumed in 27 and 29 respectively. With the two Caracciolos built to late 20s standards, they would only require addition of AA armament to be brought up to 1940 standard. That would eliminate the need to rebuild the Cavours, with the funding and material thus freed up, being available to speed the fitting out of Roma and complete Impero. As Drach said, 1941 would find the Brits facing 6 modern BBs that could run rings around most of the British capital ship inventory.
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@Spectre578 what you would be describing is essentially the Admiralty's J3 battlecruiser proposal: 43,800t with 9-15" in triple turrets. The J3 was rejected as it did not use an all or nothing armor scheme, so the Admiralty moved on to the G3, which far exceeded Hood's displacement. On to the meat of your question. To enable it, the treaty would need to set the displacement limit at Hood's, 41,200 as the treaty measured it, or 42,000 because it's a rounder number, rather than 35,000. iirc, the Admiralty wanted enough tonnage for 15 treaty compliant battleships and 15 times 35,000 comes out to 525,000t, which is where the treaty set the limit for the RN and USN. With the limit at 42,000/ship, the RN would need to have a limit of 630,000t. OK, lets say the other parties went for a 630kt limit, 378kt for Japan. Besides the original treaty retention list, the RN could also retain the other three Orion class, which would put them at 647950t. Building two J3s, at 42,000t each would require scrapping all four Orions to bring them to 639950t. The IJN had the two 40,000t Tosas and the two 41,200t Amagis building. To maintain the 5:5:3 ratio, the IJN could complete any two. With their historical retention list totaling 301,320, they would have approximately 77kt of headroom, but while the RN would be scrapping existing ships and lowering their total tonnage and drawing down closer to their 630kt limit, the IJN would be building up to it's limit, so the other powers might not be in a forgiving mood if the IJN wanted to overshoot by 3-4,000 tons to complete two Amagis. Construction of the Tosas was farther along, and, well, they could lie a teeny bit, claiming each Tosa only displaced 38,000t, 2,000 tons lighter than in fact. Thing is, the Tosas could make about 26kts, about the same as a Nagato, so the Tosas would probably spend a lot of time in port, because they couldn't keep up with the carriers. Building two Amagis instead would probably require scrapping either a Fuso or a Kongo, which reduces the gain of building the two Amagis. How would this shake out for the USN? A quota of 630kt would result in an initial retention list for the USN of a lot of appalling old junk: the two South Carolinas, and four of the Connecticut class pre-dreadnoughts. Lets assume Washington is completed in exchange for two Connecticuts, in addition to West Virginia and Colorado replacing the other two Connecticuts and the two South Carolinas. Now, the US could waggle it's finger at the RN and IJN both having 42,000 ton ships and demand parity. According to Friedman's breakdown of the weights for the South Dakotas and Lexingtons, both classes come in under 42,000t, without fuel and boiler water, so the US could hold it's breath and stamp it's feet until the other parties agree to let the US complete 3 of them. But would the US want to complete them as designed? The whole idea behind the US calling the conference was to get out from under the building program that was started by the 1916 naval act. The US could easily say the Delawares are good enough, and scrap everything on the slipway. So, your 1941 lineup: the RN gains two bad-ass battlecruisers, the IJN gains two battleships that sit in port because they can't keep up with the carriers, and the USN has one additional Colorado class, that is even less able to keep up with anything than a Tosa.
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@p.a_thomas661 I have been reading "Sea Of Thunder". which was mentioned by one of the panelists, this week. The second half of the book is mostly about Leyte Gulf. Halsey wanted to meet the Japanese around dawn, so wanted to close at 16kts to get the timing right. iirc, Halsey went to bed to catch a few hours of sleep. Whoever was OOD, during his nap, I forget who, had speed increased to 20kts. When Halsey awoke, he ordered speed reduced to 16kts again. I would take that sequence to indicate that 20 was closer to "normal speed", and 16 was at Halsey's discretion for tactical advantage.
Kurita was making 18kts when steaming between Brunei and the Philippines, to conserve fuel, but stepped it up to 24kts, while steaming through the Sibuyan Sea. According to Wiki, Nagato lost some speed as a result of it's modernization a few years earlier, so would have been just about at full speed at 24.
The book does not give exact speeds for Nishimura's force. The author quotes the Japanese extensively, from both their immediate postwar interrogations and memoirs. The lack of detail about Nishimura's force, the entire battle is covered in only a couple pages, may be due to the low number of survivors on the Japanese side?
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The Mississippis were sold to Greece in the summer of 1914. As a quick path to a USN scout cruiser, they could have pulled the 7"/45 tertiary battery off of the Connecticuts. Historically, most of those 7" were removed from the Connecticuts during the war with the intent of deploying them as field artillery. Most of the Maine class predreadnoughts were in the reserve squadron by then. Their 6"/50 secondaries could have been used on scout cruisers as well. The British were clearly desperate for serviceable guns for monitors. The Lord Clives used 12"/35s pulled off Majestic class pre-dreadnoughts. As an exercise, I looked at what the US could have sold the UK for monitors, if FDR was making decisions, rather than Wilson. Settled on the 12"/40, after modification to resolve their habit of blowing their muzzles off. There were 6 twin 12"/40s on the three Maine class ships, and 4 more turrets on the Arkansas class monitors. The guns on all these ships were expendable by 1914: the Maines were in reserve, and most of the monitors found a new use as sub tenders. The Illinois class was also in reserve, but it gets complicated. The Illinois had an early mod of the same Mk IV turret, but mounted 13"/35s. According to my pre WWI US Naval Academy gunnery text, everything in the turret was mounted to the turntable. The turntable was made of common steel plate and angle iron. So the drill would have been to make a new turntable for the turrets from the Illinois class to accept 12"/40s, then pull the guns, mounts, and lugs from three of the Virginias to equip the Mk IV turrets. That would give the RN 16 gun and turret sets to build monitors around.
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@GUYCLIP I just happen to have some relevant information close at hand: Bofors projectile weight 1.985lb, rate of fire 120rpm, max altitude 22,299ft, max range at 45 degrees 11,133yds. Breda 37mm (Italian): projectile weight 1.814lbs, rate of fire 120rpm, max alt 16,400ft, max range at 45 degrees 8,530yards. Vickers "pompom" (40mm, high velocity) projectile weight: 1.81lbs, rate of fire 115rpm, max alt 13,300ft, range 5,000yds. US Army M1 37mm, projectile weight 1.37lbs, rate of fire 120rpm, max alt 18,897ft, max range 9,049 yds. So, of the guns available to the allies, Bofors, Vickers and M1, the Bofors was the best performing. The best available to the axis, early in the war, was the Breda. The German 37mm had better range than the Breda, but it was single shot, could manage about 30rpm. Later in the war, the Germans did come out with a naval mount, automatic, 37mm, but the ship that really needed that sort of firepower, Bismark, was already sitting on the bottom of the ocean. The other factor is reloading. The Bofors and Breda loading machines allowed stacking of clips, so the guns could fire continuously. The M1 used clips that had to be changed out when empty and the Vickers used bins that were so big and heavy crewmen needed a crane to change them out.
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@deidryt9944 with Ranger, and, perhaps, a pair of proto-Yorktowns, of more reasonable size. C&R knew how to design a ship to be more efficient at carrying aircraft in the early 20s: build the hull broader aft to maximize the length of the hangar. They could not do that with the Lexingtons because they were already committed to the battlecruiser hull shape, with a long, tapered stern. Ranger, on half the displacement, had a longer hanger than a Lexington. I figure the USN was lucky that it did not make a gigantic mistake when designing the Lexingtons. As they aged, the worst thing that happened was the midships elevator became useless as it was too small. Akagi and Kaga were originally built with a short main flight deck and flying off decks from both hangar levels, a huge and expensive mistake that they had to extensively rebuild the upper decks to correct in the late 30s. The other problem was, with the Lexingtons, the USN burned nearly half of it's treaty allotment for carriers, crimping their future building.
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@konst80hum the Axis could have gotten into Palestine or Syria anyway via amphibious landings anywhere in the eastern Med, flanking the Brit lines in Egypt. RAF airpower on Cypris could impede such an invasion, but the RM, and airpower based on Crete, could make reenforcing and supplying Cypris as costly as holding Malta. If the Brits were forced to pull back to the Persian Gulf, holding those oil fields, they could be supplied with food, clothing and refined fuels from India. Only manufactured goods: weapons, vehicles and ammo, would have to be shipped from England. The only real downside to the Allies of evacuating the Med, is they would not be able to bomb the oil fields and refineries in Romania. On the other hand, by skipping landing in Morocco, campaigning all the way across North Africa, landing on Sicily and the Italian mainland, the clock could be advanced by a year or more on the Normandy invasion, aimed directly at the heart of the conflict, in Berlin. If Churchill laid it out that way: giving up Egypt, so that force can be concentrated on Berlin to end the war sooner, he would be OK.
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@ric8868 probably not "data", as much as the pilots saying "we're getting slaughtered, what can we do to knock down the AA fire?" Some AA guns had shields, so, if they were facing the strafing plane, the crew had some protection. Some AA mounts, like USN Bofors, would be mounted in a tub, so the crew could duck behind the tub wall. A lot of AA crews simply ran for cover. I have read accounts of crews of Italian escorts running for cover, as the 20mm shells from a Beaufighter tore into them. The tactics of combining Beaufort torpedo bombers, strafing Beaufighters, and Blenheim bombers all hitting a convoy at once, were developed by Pat Gibbs (DSO, DFC & bar) while he was stationed on Malta.
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@kemarisite The 1.1 had several different ways it jammed. I read an account from one Gunner's Mate that there was one jam that could not be seen from either above or below the gun, but could only be checked for and cleared by feel. He became very popular on his ship because he was so good at clearing that particular jam. The 1.1 had an equalizer in it, so it was quite smooth to fire. The Type 96 may shake like a leaf, and need to stop for a reload every few seconds, but, it may have been more reliable than the 1.1. There is a color film of the battle of Midway that has three or four brief looks at a pair of 1.1 mounts firing. In the first couple of looks all four guns on the mount in the foreground are firing. In the last look, only the right side gun is still firing. So, in a total of less than ten seconds of when the camera was on that mount, three of the four guns failed under combat conditions. I think I would rather have the vibrating Type 96, if it was more reliable than the 1.1, and the 1.1 sets a low bar.
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@scott2836 are we talking about the same gun? The only 37mm M3 I know of is the single shot anti-tank gun. The Browning designed 37mm AA gun started as the M1, with the original clip feeding system. Army manual TM-9 235 gives the ranges as maximum: 6200 yards vertical, ie 18,600 feet, and horizontal range of 8875 yards. With self-destroying HE rounds the range is shortened to 3960 yards vertical, ie 11,860 feet, and 4070 yards horizontal, with a muzzle velocity of 2600fps, and an HE shell weighing 1.34lbs. The Vickers Mk VIII pompom, according to Navweaps had an altitude max, with the high velocity ammo, of 13,300 ft, and horizontal range of 5,000yds. The USN Bofors had a max ceiling of 23,500 feet and a horizontal range of 10,750 yards, with a muzzle velocity of 2890fps and am HE shell weighing 1.985lbs. The Bofors tops the Browning on every parameter, but the Browning tops the Vickers. John Browning originally designed the gun around the end of WWI. In the 30s, Colt made some improvements, and it went into production in 1939, one year after the Navy put the 1.1 into production. Given when it was designed, if development had been pressed more urgently, seems reasonable it would have gone into production years earlier. The Browning had a tendency to jam but, being an army gun, it was burdened with a clumsy cooling system. According to the manual, after every 60 rounds, you had to stop firing and pump water through the barrel to cool it. The manual says, if it jams, it's because it has overheated, due to the crew not executing the cooling cycle. Of course, a navy mount would have a proper water jacket to eliminate the cooling problems.
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@pedenharley6266 I'm partial to the Italian Pisa class, because they completely abandoned casemate mounted guns. Turret primary, turret secondary, and flocks of 14 pounders on post mounts for plinking torpedo boats. Only beef I have is the 14 pounders were a bit undersized for really hurting the 1000+ ton DDs that were being built at the same time as the Pisas. The Rurik, built by Vickers for Russia, looks great, and the tertiary armament is 4.7", but they are still in casemates. If I was designing the perfect armored cruiser for the USN, it would look like the Rurik, with 10" primaries, for hitting power, twin turret 6" secondary for rate of fire, and flocks of 4"/50s on deck mounts for plinking torpedo boats.
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wrt the RAN having capital ships in the 20s and 30s, the photo shown of Cockatoo Island shows the problem: lack of a drydock large enough. The Sutherland dock, the one with the carrier in it in the photo, was only about 88 feet wide and 690 feet long. My USN 1928 port guide says there was a privately owned drydock in Sydney that was 850 feet long, but only 83 feet wide. Neither is wide enough for a battleship or battlecruiser, or the pre-war Ark Royal. Meanwhile, a floating drydock of 50,000 tons capacity was not deployed in Singapore until 1929, and the King George VI dock in Singapore was not opened until 1938. Of course, Singapore was overrun in early 42, so the RN lost the use of the KG-VI dock. Sydney did not have a sufficiently large drydock until the Cook dock opened in 45. So, what was the RN thinking when it sent Hood and the Renowns on visits to Austrailia in the 20s and early 30s, when there were no adequate facilities to repair them if something happened? More importantly, why did the RN build the KG-VI in Singapore, where it could be overrun by the Japanese, who were showing their hostile intentions by then, instead of in Australia, where it would be more secure?
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@arivael There really was not a need to recycle turrets off the Rs. The RN had the four turrets off Courageous and Glorious in storage, which eventually found a home on Vanguard, They had two turrets on Erebus class monitors left over from WWI. They had another turret on Marshal Soult, and another spare in storage, which were both used on the Roberts class monitors in 1940. The 15" guns themselves were quite a bit heavier than the 14". As an exercise, I ran up an estimate of three triple 15"/45s that were originally intended for the KGVs, using the weight of a Littorio turret, and they came out 850 tons heavier than the 10-14" armament. The old 15"/42s were about 3 mT heavier, each, than the 15"/45. In the back of my mind is the thought that the Brits pushed for the reduction to 14" guns because they could not get the speed and protection they wanted, within treaty displacement limits, with 15" guns. The escalator clause in Second London only allowed larger guns. It did not have a set increase in displacement. The treaty said the parties were to negotiate an increase in displacement. The UK and US argued about displacement until mid-38. All the KGVs were laid down in the first half of 37, so the quad turrets were most likely already in production. A switch to triple 15s would only delay completion of the ships. I figure the Admiralty had good reason to choose the 14" armament, and good reason to stay with it when the gun escalator clause was triggered.
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@arivael I have seen the drawings of a KGV with 3 triple 15". I don't buy the argument the politicians wanted the 14" to keep the old ships with 15" relevant. If that was the case, why not lower the limit to 15"? Cost? I bet it costs more in manpower and machining time to make 10-14", rather than 9-15", because you have to perform every operation one extra time. The weights I was using in my estimate: 10x14" @ 80.865mT =808.65mt, 2xquad turrets @ 1557mt = 3114mt 1xtwin turret @ 900.5mt. Grand total 4823.15mt. 9x15/45 @ 98.6mt = 887.4. 3xtriple turret @1595mt = 4785. grand total 5672.4. Yes, the Littorio turrets had thicker armor, but that was the only triple 15" turret at that point in time, that came to mind. The Italians had a distinct advantage too; they were lying. Look up the proposed British J3 battlecruiser of 1920: handsome ship, 9-15/50s in three triple turrets, and a displacement over 40,000 tons.
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@arivael I'm sorry, but I do not agree. At the time Second London went into effect, France and Italy each had battleships with 15" guns building. Unlike the WNT, I do not see any clause in Second London that clearly exempts currently building ships from the gun size reduction. Was the UK thinking they could wave their piece of paper at the French and Italians, and they would go "pshaw, we'll have to scrap the 15" guns we are building and start from scratch with a 14" design", the way new ships being built were scrapped for the WNT? If they tried that, the French and Italians would have responded with a remarkable variety of creative gestures, and gone back to building their 15" guns. In effect, that is what happened as Italy dropped out of the treaty system, and France continued with the Richelieus as designed. The only country that complied with the 14" limit was the UK, so the story that the UK sought that change to, in any way, protect their own older ships, makes no sense. Because Japan had already given notice, iirc in December of 34, that they were going to drop out of the treaty system, then the escalator clause, which was apparently demanded by the US, would certainly be tripped on April 1, yet the UK persisted in building the KGVs with the 14" guns, rather than waiting three months. Everything I see says that, whether they admitted it, or not, the UK wanted 14" guns for some sound reason related to the KGVs themselves.
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@TheParkerrrrrr6 Being built in the US, most of the internal systems, would have been US sourced. The guns were Bethlehem Steel versions of standard USN guns. According to the Wiki entry, the contract with Argentina gave the USN the option to buy the ships, but, as they used 12" guns, while the USN had moved on to 14", the USN saw the ships as obsolete and didn't want them. Apparently it got very nasty for Argentina as they very much wanted to sell the ships just as WWI was breaking out. But the UK was keen that the Germans not get them. The Germans were keen that the Brits not get them. Ditto for Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The US didn't want it's naval secrets sold to any third party, so leaned on Argentina, hard. So, as they say, the poo rolled downhill to Buenos Aires and they had to pay the $20+M for them that they really could not afford.
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@johnfisher9692 actually, it would have probably hurt shipbuilding even more as it would give navies an incentive to hang on to their old tubs. The variation I thought would be interesting would be to set the total fleet tonnage limits where they were 525,000 tons for the UK and US, 315,000 for the IJN. Once they scrap down to those levels, then the parties could build new, but would have to scrap a corresponding tonnage of old ships at a 1:1 ratio, and, just to make it interesting, make it legal to complete ships that had already been laid down, that exceeded the treaty limits. What would happen quite soon is ships being built would not offer a large enough improvement over what would be scrapped to make it worth the bother. Example, let Japan complete the two Tosas, and to keep their total close to the treaty limit, scrap the Fusos. That would probably be worthwhile. But to complete Akagi and Amagi, they would have to scrap three Kongos. That is not such a clear choice. For the US to complete Washington and two of the South Dakotas, they would have to scrap Florida, Utah, Wyoming, Arkansas and New York. To complete one more South Dakota, the US would need to scrap Texas and Oklahoma, because the South Dakotas were nearly twice the size of the older ships. Of course, the UK would cry a river, because it had not laid anything down. All it had was drawings of G3s and N3s.
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@arivael I'm sorry, but I cannot agree. Taking your last point first, yes, imho, the gun size reduction was futile, and doubtless, self-interested. Same thing with the carrier tonnage reduction to 23,000 tons. I can make a case for the WNT. I cannot make a case for Second London as it is so blatantly packed with UK self-interest. Article 25 is what triggered the tonnage increase. 25 was not triggered until Yamato was laid down in late 37, and, because of section 25, the UK and US argued for the first half of 38 about how much the tonnage increase would be: the UK trying to set the limit around 42,000 and the US demanding 45,000. If Second London exempted the Richelieus, seems it would have said so. The WNT was very detailed, explicitly saying two Colorados could be completed, in exchange for two Delawares and the RN could build the Nelsons, in exchange for Thunderer and the three surviving KGVs. There is no specific exclusion language that I can find in Second London. Of course, laying down Richelieu was, itself, a violation of the WNT and First London. Yes, France signed Second London. and Italy didn't, but they were both ignoring it. And, as noted above, the Admiralty could not have laid down Lions in April of 37, because they exceeded 35,000 tons. The displacement of the Lions was not permitted until mid 38. What they could have done was lay down all of the KGVs starting in April, using the 15" design. Alternately, if they wanted to keep their schedule, lay down the first three to the 14" design, then, when Anson and Howe were ordered on April 28, 37, three weeks after the gun escalator clause was triggered, order to the 15" design. They didn't do that. All five were ordered to the 14" design.
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@johnfisher9692 I think I understand what you are driving at. Thing is, the RN started with a large advantage. Dug out my notes from a few years ago. For the WNT, the RN scrapped 8-21kt, turbine powered, Dreadnoughts with 12" guns, 8 with 13.5" guns, plus 6 battlecruisers. What the RN scrapped was close to the entire USN strength of Dreadnoughts as of 1920. The USN only had 18 21kt dreadnoughts in commission before the treaty. The treaty had the RN scrapping ships that were newer and more powerful than ones the USN was keeping. Your plan would cement in the RN's roughly 2:1 superiority over the USN. Whether the UK was entitled to a 2:1 superiority over the USN is a different matter, which I would rather not get into as it tends to raise passions. As for the Admiralty quickly laying down several G3s and N3s, the easy solution would be to apply the same strategy the WNT used to divide carriers into "experimental" and non-experimental categories: all carriers under construction as of November 12, 1921, before the conference started, were considered "experimental". That being said, I would have no problem, if the IJN completed two Tosas, and the USN completed 3 South Dakotas (maintaining a roughly 5:3 ratio), if the RN built 3 N3s, instead of the two Nelsons they did build, or completing the other three Admirals, if they had not already been broken up.
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@tomaseidtner8116 the foremost problem Greece has to consider is the size of it's largest drydock. The Averof and the Mississippis barely fit. As for "merchants", do you have in mind Basil Zaharoff? Zaharoff did contribute a huge pile of money, far in excess of the Averof bequest that covered the down payment on the armored cruiser, to the Greek intervention in the Turkish civil war, but apparently not anything for the Green Navy. Where Zaharoff could have made a difference with a well timed donation was a few years earlier. Drac mentioned the battles of Elli and Lemnos. The Ottoman cruiser Hamidiye had broken out into the Med and was raiding Greek shipping. The Averof was the only ship in the Greek navy that had the speed, armor and firepower to chase down and kill the Hamidiye, but, if the Averof took off to chase down the Hamidiye, there would not be enough of a Greek force remaining near the Dardanelles to keep the rest of the Ottoman fleet bottled up. iirc, the commander of the Averof defied orders to pursue the Hamidiye and stayed on station at the Dardinelles, waiting for the Ottoman attempts to break their fleet out. Where Basil could have made himself useful: the preceding Ottoman Sultan had ordered a new protected cruiser, essentially a repeat of Hamidiye, from Ansaldo. When that Sultan was overthrown, the new Ottoman regime refused to pay for the ship, so it sat, unfinished, on the slipway, until Italy went to war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912, whereupon Italy seized the ship and completed it for the RM. Seems to me that if the Greek PM, who was well acquainted with Zaharoff had sent a well timed wire "Bas old buddy, the Averof family has made a wonderful contribution to the Royal Hellenic Navy for a new cruiser. There is another cruiser sitting on the slipway at Ansaldo that the Ottomans defaulted on. Maybe you could see your way to help us out with the purchase of that ship?", then the RHN would not have been in a bind when the Hamidiye broke out, because it would have a second capable cruiser.
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@tomaseidtner8116 before the war, Greece had ordered the Salamis from Vulcan in Germany. Salamis was to be armed with 8 US built 14" guns, so a credible threat to Goeben. They bought the Mississippis because the Salamis would not be ready when the two Ottoman ships building in the UK were complete. After the war, the incomplete hull of Salamis was still at the Vulcan yard. Vulcan wanted to complete it and deliver it to Greece, and get paid. Greece didn't want it as, first, being a pre-war design, it was obsolete, and, second, Greece didn't have the money. The issue was in court for several years. iirc, Greece ended up paying cancellation charges to Vulcan to get out of the contract, but I forget how much. Another path would be for Greece to demand the two surviving Tegetthoffs as war reparations. iirc, what actually happened to them is one went to Italy, which was scrapped, and the other went to France, which used it for target practice. Greece would still have the running costs of the two battleships. The really low cost alternative is to prohibit Turkey retaining Goeben. Turkey kept Goeben because the Turkish Republic had displaced the old regime and the new Republic was not seen as a threat.
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In 1898, the US took the Philippines and Guam from Spain, but left the balance of the Marianas and Carolines in Spanish hands. In 1899, Spain sold the Marianas and Carolines to Germany. During WWI, Japan took the Marianas and Carolines away from Germany, and held them trough the interwar years under a League of Nations mandate. What if the US, in 1898, had perceived that having the islands astride supply lines from Hawaii to the Philippines in the hands of potentially hostile powers was dangerous, and demanded Spain hand over the Marianas and Carolines to the US, giving the US control of points of interest such as Saipan, Tinian and Truk. While the Japanese could overrun any island in those areas as easily as Guam or Wake, it would take time and resources, possibly inhibiting other operations. How would the US controlling such a wide swath of the western Pacific impact the situation in 1942?
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wrt the question of US built battleships for the Ottoman Empire, Argentina was trying to sell the Rivadavias. If the Ottomans opted to buy the Rivadavias, instead of, or together with, the "Gin Palace", they still would have would up empty handed. By the time the Rivadavias were sorted out and ready for delivery, it was spring of 1915, and, as Drac said, they would be unable to get into the Med. The US government may have blocked delivery to the Ottomans in early 15 anyway. Bethlehem Steel won a contract from the Admiralty to build subs. When the Wilson administration got wind of the deal, the subs were impounded until the US joined the war on the UK's side. The alternative would be for the USN to sell a "mistake". The USN knew the Mississippis were a mistake, so sold them to Greece. The South Carolinas were also a mistake as their inadequate speed left them steaming with the pre-dreadnoughts, rather than the other dreadnoughts. The US might have been willing to part with them in the summer of 14, if the Ottomans waived enough money around, and had not already purchased the Rio.
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@voqiir3802 I assume you are referring to the Ottoman buying the Rivadavias. The Ottoman Empire joined the war October of 1914. Rivadavia was not complete until December, 1914, and Moreno was not complete until February of 15. Yes, the legality of Churchill seizing both of the Ottoman ships when they were on the brink of the Ottoman crews taking possession, was questionable. Buying the Rivadavias would have a couple issues. First, Armstrong would need to decline to guarantee the French loan, and Bethlehem Steel would need to be willing to guarantee a larger loan. Second, the US government would need to have a more casual attitude about the sale of military technology. Argentina had been exploring selling the ships before they were complete, and, with rising tensions in Europe, there were several interested parties. The US government put significant pressure on Argentina to not sell the ships. The other scenario, the Ottoman buying the South Carolinas from the USN, in response to Greece buying the Mississippis solves the delivery time frame issue as the Mississippis were sold in the summer of 14. That would require Armstrong declining to guarantee the French loan, to keep the Ottoman shopping. But who would guarantee the loan to pay for the US ships? The deal that comes to mind might be where the USN uses the proceeds from the sale of the two South Carolinas to pay for a forth New Mexico, with the new ship built by Bethlehem Steel, provided Bethlehem guarantees the loan for the sale of the old ships. The treaty after the war required Turkey to make the French loan good, but the President of Bethlehem Steel would have had some very nervous shareholders until then.
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@voqiir3802 OK, so the question is what could the Ottoman have bought in the US at that time? According to Wiki, the order for Resad V was placed June 8, 1911, at an estimated cost of 2.5M GBP, which was financed internally, built to a modified KGV design, which held cost down. It is still looking like the most likely purchase in the US would be a sister of the Rivadavias. Most US battleships were designed by the Navy, and the US government may not want to share it's latest designs. The Rivadavias were designed by Bethlehem Steel, during a competition for the Wyoming class, but rejected by the Navy in favor of it's own design. As it's own design, Bethlehem could have had more freedom who they sold ships to. The Rivadavias were priced at $10.7M USD each, while the price of Resad V, converted to USD at the time would be $12.15M, so the Ottoman are saving a bit of money. Bethlehem's Fore River yard launched Rivadavia August 26th, 1911, so the slipway was clear less than three months after receiving the order. My bet is Bethlehem Steel would lay the keel for the Ottoman ship at Fore River sometime in the fall of 1911. Resad V was laid down at Vickers December 6th, 1911. So far, the schedule is the same, and the US ship costs less. But the Brits were very good at building battleships. Vickers had Resad V built and ready for handover in 2 years, 8 months. It took Fore River 4 years, 7 months, to complete Rivadavia. With the keel laid in fall 1911, the Ottoman ship would not be completed until spring 1916, and would promptly be impounded by the US government. The only way the Ottoman would have a chance of taking delivery of the ship is if the William Cramp yard built it. Cramp got Wyoming from keel laying to commissioning in 2 years 8 months so would just make it under the wire before the Ottoman Empire entered the war. Cramp had launched Wyoming May 25, 1911, so the slipway was clear when the Ottoman ordered their ship. It would just be a matter of waiting for the material to be delivered from the steel mills. Bethlehem would probably want the ship built in it's own yard however. It would be an interesting test of wills, the Ottoman wanting an earlier delivery, and Bethlehem wanting to maximize profit by building the ship in it's own yard.
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@voqiir3802 first, a correction to my above comments, Bethlehem Steel did not buy the Fore River yard until 1913, so any prospective transaction in 1911 would have been between the Ottoman and the Fore River yard, which created the design for the Rivadavia class. What you suggest is possible. Did the UK immediately offer compensation for the ships it seized? The way the Germans "sold" Goeben and Breslau to the Ottoman two weeks after the seizures in the UK would probably make the Brits think Germany and the Ottoman were already defacto allies. Another thought comes to mind: it would have been as unknowable in 1911 as the four-plus year build time, but the Curtis turbines that powered the Rivadavias were not very good. Delivery of both ships to Argentina was delayed due to the turbines being defective. Just before the Rivadavias were built, USS North Dakota was built for the USN, also with Curtis turbines. The Curtis turbines in North Dakota proved so troublesome that they were replaced in 1917, at a cost of some $700,000, the equivalent of $19.5M today. If the Ottoman tried for a new built ship with 14" guns, instead of 12", they would make another discovery: the early US 14" guns tended to droop, as the British discovered with the ones they bought. I'm thinking the best the Ottoman could have done in the US was to buy the two South Carolinas from the USN, with their more reliable triple-expansion engines and well tested 12"/45 guns.
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@readingrailroadfan7683 interesting question. The other two Amagis, Takao and Atago, had been laid down in late 1921, so, arguably, could have been completed under the treaty provision allowing conversion of ships under construction. The earthquake was in September 1923. According to a book on IJN ships I read, Takao and Atago were not stricken and broken up until April, 1924, so, under the terms of the treaty, one could have been completed as a carrier. The treaty also allowed new construction of replacements for ships lost to accident. I suppose you could argue that Amagi could be replaced under that clause by new construction from the keel up. Building the replacement to the same size as Amagi, which exceeded the treaty limit, might not be allowed.
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Going to Corpus? Paying a visit to the Lex? I did a cruise on the Lex in 70. I don't know how much of the ship is open, but from the hanger, iirc, if you go down a hatch on the starboard side, just forward of the elevator, down one deck and head aft, the passageway ends at the entrance to the Chief's mess, In that space at the end of the passageway is a foam proportioner, racks of drums of the chemical for the proportioner, and my rack. That space must be just about over the screws. The ride was smooth and quiet, until they gave the throttle that last notch, then things would start to shake. As the Lex sailed back and forth across the Gulf at full speed so new pilots could get their practice in, she would run out of water and need to do a 180 degree turn, at full speed. I swear the OOD had it in for me as I would just be settling down for chow and the 1MC would bark "heel to port" and I would have to grab my tray so it didn't slide off onto the deck.
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Tiger and most of the Dukes were scrapped per the First London Treaty. Tiger was sold in 32, as were three Dukes. Iron Duke herself had the armor stripped off, to be "demilitarized". iirc, (if anyone knows for sure, jump in here) Tiger and the Dukes were never converted to oil fuel, and never had torpedo bulges fitted. The Admiralty did retain several of the turrets, and 13.5" guns. iirc, officially, the mount interchangeability between the 13.5" and 14" was so prototype 14" could be test fired with the existing mounts. In the back of my mind is the thought that the interchangeability was designed in, so, if there were production delays in the new 14", 13.5" from inventory could be installed on the KGVs instead. According to Navweaps, 54 13.5" guns were in Admiralty inventory in 1939. enough to equip all five KGVs, if need be, but not enough to have a spare set in hand whenever a ship needed a replacement set in a hurry.
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@DanielSilverthorn during the war, prior to US entry, a German raider steamed into Newport News for repairs, supplies and fuel. In a hot second, UK and French warships were steaming just outside the US' three mile limit, waiting for the raider to attempt a breakout. The USN dispatched an obsolete battleship from the reserve squadron to patrol off Newport News, in case the UK and French ships violated US neutrality and steamed into port to attack the raider. I suspect if von Spee attempted a passage through the canal, the US would accept payment of the toll and pass the ships. But by the time they reach the Atlantic end of the canal, there would be a reception committee on it's way. If von Spee was not intercepted right at the canal,, any ship bound for the Atlantic from the canal would pass through a string of UK and French held islands, so almost certain to be detected.
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@SkywalkerWroc yes, Caracciolo was a pre-war design. Torpedo protection was almost nil, so bulges would need to be added. One of the several photos I found of her showed the hull being closed up when work was suspended. It appears that what was at the main deck level was a wooden, temporary deck, held up by wooden temporary framing. I can see what may be the main armor deck below where the wooden temporary decking has not yet been installed.
So the work to bring Caracciolo up to reasonable 1920s spec would be reenforcing the deck armor, before closing up the hull, install oil fired boilers and geared turbines, in place of the coal burners originally specified, and adding the torpedo bulges. Many of the boiler rooms were arranged along the sides of the hull, much as the boiler rooms in the Lexingtons were arranged to act as a secondary torpedo protection. It would be interesting to see if boiler technology had advanced enough to free all of those side boiler rooms, so they could be replaced by a Pugliese system.
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@Axel0204 I'm not Drach, but my 2 cent's worth. On paper, the 1.1 is the more effective gun. From the data I have found, the projectile of the 1.1 weighed .917lbs vs .55 for the 25mm. Max altitude for the 1.1 is 19,000ft vs 18,040 for the 25mm. While the 25mm had a higher cyclic rate of fire, reloading dropped the effective rate of fire down to 120-110 rpm vs the 1.1's 100rpm. The 1.1 had a loading machine with space for two clips. The loading machine would automatically switch from an empty clip to the full one, so the empty could be replaced without stopping fire. The one major problem with the 1.1 was it's variety of ways of jamming. From my readings, by the end of the war, the gunner's mates had figured out how to make the gun operate reliably as they were not pulled from service, but rather transferred to lower priority ships as they were replaced by Bofors in combat ships, so the gunners had time to work out the problems with them.
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@Mree17 I remember Charleton Heston on a talk show promoting the film at the time, and, yes, he noted the use of a lot of archival film, tho not necessarily from Midway, but probably later in the war. I am referring to the new footage featuring the actors. There was one real howler where the actors walked from the flight deck onto the starboard elevator, which the Lex didn't have in WWII, and as they stood on the elevator and talked, the elevator descended to the hanger, then, with the conversation over, the actors walked past the camera, heading away from the hanger, in other words, they were all headed toward walking overboard. I have been on that elevator.
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@gregorywright4918 The IJN was using the Vickers through the 20s and early 30s. Navweaps cites complexity of manufacture, unreliability, (the IJN version was based on the Mk II) low rate of fire and short range, as reasons to look for a new gun. In the mid 30s, 25mm was regarded as adequate to take a plane apart, hence the grouping around that size: 25 from Hotchkiss and Bofors, and 28mm (1.1") from the USN. Thing is, even the twin 25mm mounts were still on a hand cranked mount, like the 40mm guns were, and probably far too slow to track a close-in target, like an Oerlikon could. I have seen pix of a single Type 96 on a free mount. Wonder if the USN ever tried a single 1.1 on a free mount?
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@marinepixel6325 I think the only appeal of the Tennessees was that they exceeded treaty limits in both displacement and gun size. First London, for the first time, limited total cruiser force displacement, the same way that the WNT limited battleship and carrier force displacement. If the USN had poured money into basically gutting out the hull and starting over with modern powerplant, ventilation, secondary armament, fire control, as soon as the fleet limits of First London went into effect, the USN would want to get rid of them because, for the same displacement of the three Tennessees, they could have four completely new, modern, fast, heavy cruisers, with several thousand tons of quota left over.
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@benwilson6145 Yes, I know where Suez City is. What I would do is steam all the ships into the canal. On each ship in sequence, cut power. Then, as the ship loses way, turn the bow into one bank or the other, let momentum carry the stern forward until the ship is crosswise to the canal, then scuttle it. After the 1973 war, it took from May through December to clear all the shipwrecks in the canal, and that was during peacetime, not during a war with periodic air raids on the salvage operations. The thing about using lighters and tugs to unload ships at Suez City is most of those vessels are in Alexandria, and they could not get to Suez City, because the canal is blocked. The biggest fly in the plan is, at the best speed of the Rambs, it would take three days to steam from Massawa to Suez, with the RAF and any Royal Navy elements in the area fighting them every inch of the way. It might be better to use only the six destroyers, because, with their speed, the amount of time the Brits would have to oppose the operation would be cut nearly in half.
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chris younts I don't have a copy of Jane's at my fingertips, so I resorted to using Wiki. According to the Wiki entries, NM was refitted with geared turbines in the early 30s, as you said. Her two sisters were originally equipped with Curtis turbines, which were also replaced in the early 30s with geared turbines. So yes, they were all reengined, as you said, but they were not all initially built with T-E systems. As NM was the only one built with T-E, her engine spaces were probably not optimized for T-E, which facilitated the conversion to the geared turbines. Again, according to Wiki, both of the Tennessees and all three Colorados were built with T-E and none of the articles on those five ships mention replacement of the TE systems among the many modifications made over the years. Maryland was hit forward by a torpedo at Saipan. The Wiki article mentions her return to Pearl was done running astern so as to not put pressure on the bulkhead where the damage was. The Wiki article doesn't mention it, but I have read elsewhere that running that distance at any sort of sensible speed was only possible due to her T-E drive. Reversing turbines usually offer only a small fraction of the power available from the forward running turbines. In the case of T-E drive, reversing the drive is done by simply reversing polarity of current flow, so the full power of the turbines, generators and motors is available in both directions. Interesting conversation. I now have a much more granular understanding of early 20s battleship drive systems than I did this morning.
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chris younts Again referring to Wiki, NM's original T-E drive generated 27,500hp. The conventional turbines in her sisters generated 32,000. The difference probably due to the power loss inherent in converting from mechanical power to electricity, then converting the electricity back to mechanical power, as Drach notes in the video. They could make 21 knots. After their modernization, which increased displacement by 1400 tons, the new boilers and turbines, which took advantage of performance improvements made since the originals had been installed 15 years earlier, generated 40,000hp, and the ships could reach 22kts in spite of the increase in displacement. The cage masts were gone, a new superstructure was built and they looked modern for 1932. The navy putzed around for years about modernizing the Tennessees and Colorados, but, outside of installing some 5/25s and a couple 1.1s didn't do much with them. Imagine if the second London treaty had not had the escalator clause, or the USN had not expected the escalator to be triggered, while designing the North Carolinas, they would be looking at new BBs with only 14" guns, vs the Colorados with 16" guns and might have seen what could be cone with the Colorados. Imagine Colorados being rebuilt in 1938 with superstructures like West Virginia had in 44, with the bulges that had been planned for years but not installed until after WVa was sunk, with AA armament appropriate for the 1938 threat environment (think 4 twin 5/38 mounts and about 10 1.1 mounts) then take a page from the Italian's book, gut out the engine spaces and install the latest high pressure, high temperature boilers and turbines, and use the room freed by removal of the generators and motors to install physically larger boilers and turbines. The Italians increased power in their old BBs from 30,000 to 75,000 and bumped speed from 21 to 26kts. The original T-E system in the Colorados only generated 28,900hp. Unfortunately, my computer received a new version of ,Net a couple months ago and SpringSharp no longer works. Maybe someone with a working SpringSharp can plug in the Colorado specs and see how much power it would take to push them to 27-28kts and see if that sounds feasible. If WVa and Maryland could turn 28kts, they might have been with the carriers, instead of at Pearl, on Dec 7. Even if WVa was at Pearl, flying into the teeth of 4 or 5 1.1" mounts would have made a much more interesting morning for the Kate pilots attacking the ship, and the bulges would have made the Kate pilot's efforts less productive.
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@WALTERBROADDUS I agree, no battle of the Denmark Strait. Actually, with QE being some 4-5 kts slower, the Brits might not have intercepted Bismark in the first place. From the accounts I read, all the hits on Bismark came from PoW. Take PoW out of the engagement and Bismark might not have been damaged. If Bismark isn't damaged, it doesn't turn around and make for the French coast. Yup, with QE, instead of PoW, the battle wold have gone vastly better, for the Germans. Now, if you want to send QE and Valiant to Malaya as Force Z, I would be OK with that, because we all know what happened to Force Z and I hate to see a ship as new as the PoW be sunk. Looking on the bright side of them being in Force Z, they would not be sitting ducks in Alexandria in mid December, when Italian frogmen with limpet mines came calling. Actually, with the AA added to both in their rebuilds, they might have had a sporting chance as Force Z.
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wrt the USN abandoning the "standard battleship" template, that is one of the historical pivot points that could have gone in a different direction very easily. The 1916 Navy Act specified a price limit for the first 4 battleships, the Colorados, but had no price limit for the other 6. The battleships being drawn starting in 1917, were 42,000 ton, 23kt concepts, using the newly developed 16"/50. Three of the Colorados were suspended before they were laid down, due to wartime change in priority. In June of 1918, Congress added language to the annual Naval appropriation bill compelling the Navy to make a start on the ships that had been authorized in 1916, but not started, due to the wartime change in priority, meaning the balance of the Colorados, Lexingtons, and South Dakotas. Meanwhile, BuOrd had ordered 14"/50s for the battlecruisers, when they were originally ordered, which were now surplus because the battlecruiser design had evolved to using the 16"/50. Were I in Daniels' shoes in June 1918, I would have proposed to Congress cancelling the three Colorados, as the previous decision to go larger and faster with the next class had rendered them obsolete, complete Maryland with 14"/50s, as the guns were in hand, abandon the 16"/45, and go directly to the South Dakotas. Of course, that would have had repercussions twenty years later, as Colorado and, especially, West Virginia, proved useful in WWII.
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@bkjeong4302 I would propose that, if the Yamatos had never been laid down, in favor of more Shokakus, they would have four additional carriers, as four Yamatos were laid down. Two additional carriers would probably commission in 41. None of the additional Essex class carriers would be available significantly earlier than 43, because the design, which exceeded Second London limits, did not exist earlier. Things would have gotten very dicy off Guadalcanal in November of 42, as there would have been no battleships to reenforce the shattered flotilla that had met the Japanese the first night. Without building the Yamatos, the IJN could have opted for a more aggressive rebuild of the Nagatos, which were significantly faster than the USN standards to begin with. Without modern US battleships, there would have been no controversy about Halsey failing to meet the "center force". With more dedicated carriers, the Ises would not have been converted, so they would have been available for the center force in place of the unbuilt Yamatos. With no battleships to pound Kirishima into scrap at Guadalcanal, she could have joined her two sisters in the center force, along with Nagato and the two Ises (one of them would have been sunk in place of Musashi) Lots of moving parts in this scenario.
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@bkjeong4302 actually, I don't think the US would gain 10 Essexes, due to the late start, due to design availability. By my count, the USN could gain 8, by replacing all battleships: (2) built in Philly, (2) in Brooklyn, and 1 each at News, Fore River, Norfolk, and NY Shipbuilding. Meanwhile, starting the war with two more large carriers, potentially, the IJN could have brought more force to Coral Sea, and finished off Yorktown. With only two carriers at Midway, and Hornet's air group totally ineffective, it falls to Enterprise's two squadrons of SBDs to do fatal damage to the IJN carriers. One, or more, IJN carriers might have been able to limp home for repair. Starting the war with two additional carriers, the IJN might have brought more force to Santa Cruz, and finished off Enterprise. The next question is how the USN brings the Essexes into the theater. Do they bring them in one at a time, as they work up, so the first ones are always outnumbered and could be sunk by overwhelming IJN force? Or, do they hold the Essexes in the US or at Pearl, until they can form up a 4 carrier battlegroup that can defend itself?
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@MartinCHorowitz I have lived on a museum ship, the Lexington....of course, she wasn't a museum. at that time, 50 years ago. In keeping with the intent of your question, if I was going to live on a ship today, go big, battleship or carrier. Roomier and quieter. When I toured the LST that is a museum in Muskegon, MI, a couple things I noticed: in the crew birthing space, I could hear water slapping against the hull. On that LST to get from the chow line in the galley, to the enlisted tables to sit down and eat, requires carrying your tray and drink down a vertical ladder. No such nonsense on the Lex. Lots of room. right next to the chow line to sit and eat. Only issue I had eating on the Lex was the tendency of the OOD to order a 180 degree, full speed turn, at chow time. I would be just sitting down to eat, and the 1MC would bark "heel to port". I had to hang on to my tray and drink until she finished that turn. Of course, that would not be a problem in a stationary museum ship.
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@bryant7201 I am assuming everything proceeds on the historical timeline, except the Pearl Harbor op does not happen. Japan attacked the Philippines on December 8, ie the same day as Pearl. The USN can sit tight in it's fortified harbors, and let the Philippine garrison be starved/slaughtered, or it can act. In my scenario, the American people and Congress force an expedition to "save our boys" in the Philippines, in effect forcing the USN into the response that fits the IJN doctrine. Keep in mind that the League of Nations handed the former German colonies north of the equator to Japan after WWI: that means all of the Marianas, except Guam, all of the Carolines, Palau, and all of the Marshalls. That is about 3,000 miles, between Wake and the Philippines peppered with Japanese held islands supporting flying boat and sub patrols, to keep IJN advised of the USN's position so that a trap can be laid. And the IJN will be closer to repair bases than the USN. It's only 1544 miles from Manila to Hiroshima, but 5445 from Manila to Pearl Harbor. I wouldn't bet on there being any functional repair facilities still intact at Subic when the USN showed up. So, the USN is cut up by Japanese subs and the occasional carrier strike on the way to the Philippines, then runs into Japanese land based air in the Philippines, then another gauntlet of subs on the way back to Pearl. I would almost want the IJN carriers to stay out of the way, hang back in the South China Sea, then add their air wing to the land based air to intercept the USN when it arrives. Chop up the US carriers in the "decisive battle" then pick off the battleships and the other major units as they limp back to Pearl.
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@hughfisher9820 The Wiki article says there was a treaty limitation that forced the Dunkerques to be the size they were, but I reviewed the text of both the Washington and 1930 London treaties and found no such reduced limitation in the text, France was allowed 70,000 tons total, and a max of 35,000T each. Another part of the Wiki article says the Brits were pushing for a reduction in the tonnage limits in the 1930 treaty, and France sought to support the British position, then apparently carried through and built the small ships even though the treaty did not in fact include the reduced limits. In the back of my mind is the thought there was a reluctance to spend any more on the two ships to make them treaty-max, and hope everyone else followed their lead. Wishful thinking is rarely a sound strategy. Given Mussolini's territorial ambitions, where were displayed through the 20s and early 30s in reoccupying the parts of Libya that had slipped from Italy's grasp, it seems stunningly foolish to think he would restrain himself and not build anything more potent than the Dunkerques, even though the treaty would allow it. Of course, if the Dunkerques were built to the Richelieu design, the probable net change in the course of the war would be Dunkerque would not be so badly damaged at Mers El Kébir. would have made it's way to Toulon with Strasbourg, where they were both scuttled, so, net, zero change in their part of the war.
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Some articles about the Washington treaty don't have it quite right as they say carriers in existence or building at the time of the treaty don't count toward the treaty limit. Chapter 1, article 8 of the treaty says carriers in service or building as of November 12 of 21 are "experimental" and are not subject to the replacement schedule laid out in Chapter 2, but it does not say anything about their tonnage not counting. The USN converted Langley to a seaplane tender to free up the tonnage for Wasp. With Ark Royal, the RN was at it's 135,000 ton limit. The Illustrious class was ordered in early 37, after Japanese withdrawal from the treaty became effective at the end of 36. It occurs that the RN had the option, in the early 30s, of reducing Argus, Eagle and Hermes to seaplane tenders, as Langley was, freeing up enough tonnage to build two more Ark Royals. Did the RN give that option consideration?
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@bkjeong4302 I think we covered this before. While the landings already happened, equipment and supplies continue to be unloaded and taken ashore for days after the landing. Samar was on the 25th. The landings were on the 20th, so there should have been plenty yet to be unloaded, and no doubt, piles of supplies and equipment staged near the beach. If I was Kurita, I would not have engaged Taffy 3. I'd ring up flank speed and blow past them, because only the 3 US DDs were fast enough to keep up with the IJN BBs, and they would be occupied by the smaller IJN units. If Oldendorf's old BBs move to intercept, refuse to engage and blow past them too. Shoot up everything in sight at the beachhead, then exit via Suirgao Straight, assuming there is room to maneuver past the wreckage from the night before, or play it safe and go around Mindanao.
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@richardcutts196 the treaties would have prevented the proposed changes in Tiger too. You could not increase the main guns or side armor. You could only improve torpedo and anti-aircraft protection. When the US started modifying the mounts in it's older battleships to increase elevation, there was an argument about whether the modification was a change in the mount that the treaty prohibited. Once the treaty tonnage was increased to 45,000, in mid 38, I doubt the increase in displacement from the plug would be an issue, especially if the lengthened Revenges were deemed their own replacement as most of them would age out in 42 anyway. The long lead items, that British industry was capacity restricted on, were big guns and armor. By reusing the guns and armor of the Revenges, it might expedite the work. Modernizing the QEs also relieved the gun and armor capacity issue. What I don't know, is if lengthening the Revenges as proposed would be any faster, or cheaper, than building new from scratch. The QE rebulds were less ambitious, and took three years.
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A couple of interesting questions today.
re the Short/Kimmel question, as mentioned some weeks ago in the "you are Kimmel, waking up on Dec 6th, knowing the attack is coming" question, what I would really like to try is swathing the entire harbor in a smoke screen. It probably isn't in "the book", so Kimmel probably would not have thought of it, but having a destroyer on standby, with steam up, specifically to steam laps around Ford Island laying smoke at the first sign of an attack, would have been interesting. The Japanese could not hit what they could not see.
re Fletcher vs LCS. imho, the LCS better use it's speed advantage to run away. Doesn't matter what sort of fancy radar the LCS has, if the Fletcher has chaff launchers. Blind the radar, and the Fletcher uses gun direction by the Mk I eyeball, which the LCS isn't equipped for. If the LCS is foolish enough to close the range to try and hit without radar guidance, then it gets blanketed by the Fletcher's 40mms. How long can the LCS' lone gun maintain that rate of fire before the barrel overheats? The 5/38's slower rate of fire allows more cooling time. Then, as Drach said, a Fletcher can take hits from a 57mm a lot better than an LCS can take a hit from a 5/38. I have read that assessments of the LCS indicate they can be disabled by a single hit from an RPG. Would even near misses from a 5/38 damage the LCS' hull enough to slow it or sink it?
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@kurumi394 The US and UK were trying to comply with the treaty. Japan gave notice it would drop out of the treaty system, effective 1936, in 1934, so the IJN could build anything it wanted. While Second London had the gun escalator clause, from 14" to 16" built in to it, the tonnage escalator was not explicit. The treaty only said that the parties would try to come to an agreement before increasing tonnage. The Admiralty laid down KGV and PoW on New Year's Day, 1937, the earliest day they could under the treaty, rather than wait for April, when Japan's refusal to sign the new treaty triggered the gun escalator clause. A debate ran for the first half of 38 between the UK and US about how much to increase the tonnage limit. The UK held out for something in the 41-42,000 ton range, the largest UK facilities could handle, while the US held out for 45,000. The US won that debate, enabling the Iowas. So that is why there is so much incrementalism in US and UK battleship development in the late 30s. It's all due to the treaty's incremental approach to increases in gun and displacement.
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@DisSabot the nightmare scenario I have floated a couple times is what if the IJN converted the Kongo class ships into carriers in 39 or 40. If they had done that, the IJN would still have had 6 large, fast, carriers, even if they lost 4 at Midway, vs the USN only having 4. Then Hornet was lost at Santa Cruze, then Wasp was torpedoed. The IJN would have pretty much had it's own way in the Pacific for the balance of 42 and 43. It took until the end of 43 for the USN to get 6 Essex class carriers in service, to allow it to meet IJN air on equal terms. Until then, it would be up to USN subs to carry the load, as anything on the surface, without air cover, dies. The US would eventually win, as the IJN could not make up it's losses like the US could, but it would have taken several years past 45.
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@blogsblogs2348 one real problem with that idea, iirc, at that time, 1938, the FAA demanded that every aircraft have a navigator. The Hurricane, being single seat, falls down on that score. If the FAA wanted something more capable than the Skua, they could have bought SB2U Vindicators, a bit more speed, a bit more range, and a bit more payload, and was available in 38. The SBD had more of everything than the SB2U, but did not enter production until 40.
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My first thought is the incoming US administration is blatantly, proudly, EV-hostile. Then add the challenge of building out EV infrastructure in Central And South America, and the western hemisphere may be the last bastion of ICE vehicles.
Mexico has a free trade agreement with the EU. A couple weeks ago, a free trade agreement was reached between the EU, and several South American countries, including Brazil, which has a well developed car industry. The EU nations have not yet ratified the agreement. I can see the western hemisphere becoming the supplier of ICE vehicles to the EU.
If VW was moving production to Mexico, I would expect the first candidate to be the EU market Tayron, which is presently built in Wolfsburg, as the US market gen 3 Tiguan, is the Tayron, built in Puebla. It would be relatively simple to simply stop building the Tayron in Wolfsburg, and import the model from Mexico. That being said, I would be perfectly fine with the Golf being built in Puebla as well.
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@Alex-cw3rz we know the Brits are going to use the same tactics, head straight for the German ships at high speed and wind the range down to about 15-16,000 yards. With that approach, the belt armor doesn't matter, because it isn't facing the enemy. Given the frontal area available to shoot at, vs the deck area, and knowing that the most likely error in aim will be estimating range, I figure the trick for the Germans is to use a reduced charge, fire into a high trajectory and go for a deck hit. Not only could Bismark punch through Hood's deck, Prinz Eugen could easily punch through Repulse's deck. Even if the British ships survived to their "decisive" range of 15-16,000, Bismark could penetrate Hood's 12" belt, and Prinz Eugen could penetrate anything short of the thickest part of Repulse's belt. imho, Tovey was correct, send one strong ship, and one weak one, to each passage.
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@tomdolan9761 I tried giving Leyte Gulf the alt history treatment, with the southern force being the section lead by the Kongos, going around Mindanao, rather than through Surigao, and attacking Taffy 1, to try and provoke Kinkaid moving his force off station to aid Taffy 1. But, in retrospect, Kinkaid did not send any help to Taffy 3, passing the buck to Halsey, so my alt history approach would have failed. Kinkaid appears to be content to see the Taffies slaughtered, rather than leave his defensive position in the Gulf. So the only alternative would be a unified center force, hitting Kinkaid head on. One interesting thing I noticed, Kurita literally crossed Shima's wake. Shima stopped to refuel at Coron, departing at 0200 on the 24th for Surigao. He could have waited about three hours, then fallen in like as Kurita passed Coron. With the forces of Kurita, Nishimura, and Shima combined, they are just about a match for Seventh Fleet. With Halsey successfully decoyed away, it would have been an epic brawl.
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Humorous take on the shrinkage of the immediate WWI battleships and battlecruisers. I have suspected for a long time that the G3 and N3, both around 48-49,000 tons, were a bluff, and a bargaining chip, at the Washington Conference, because, when negotiating the displacement escalator in 38, the UK was pressing for a 42-43,000 ton limit, due to infrastructure limitations.
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@johnfisher9692 I wish I could remember which of the books I read, when looking in to the armament decisions on the KGVs, but one of the books had about two pages of the Admiralty's own technical analysis of several different design proposals. The conclusion was that an armament of 9-15" would give the best balance between speed, protection, and firepower. The analysis continued that the only circumstance where they should go with 14" is if required by a treaty. This was before Second London made exactly that change in specification. All this was going on before the treaty, because the British battleship building capability had atrophied to the point that the decisions had to be made and the guns and turrets ordered in late 35, not after Second London had been negotiated. Had they gone with the 9-15" armament, they would have probably had the same weight issue they did with the 14" armament when the armor scheme was revised, so the KGVs would have ended up with an 8-15" layout. One of the talking points in favor of 14" was more guns could be carried, increasing the probability of a hit. One book I read said that the reduction from 12 to 10 14", due to the armor change, largely defeated the reason for going to 14" in the first place.
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@markjoenks2217 I'll take a crack at that one. Historically, after the US seized the Philippines and Guam, Spain sold the rest of it's Pacific holdings to Germany, which included the balance of the Marianas, the Carolines, and Marshals. As an ally of the UK, Japan rolled up the German possessions in the Pacific, and continued to occupy the colonies north of the Equator under a League of Nations mandate after the war. In the absence of a Spanish-American war, the first pivot would be whether Spain sold it's Pacific colonies, including the Philippines and Guam, to Germany. If Spain did sell, then Japan would take them in 1915, and would continue to hold them in 1941. If Spain did not sell, Spain was neutral in WWII, and Franco and Axis leadership were buddies, so Japan, realizing Spanish possessions were not a threat, may bypass them, on it's way to Malaya and Borneo. Historically, Japan did not invade Macau, the Chinese colony of neutral Portugal, but Japan did appoint "advisors" to the Macau government. Such an arrangement could probably have been arrived at in the Spanish Philippines. Everything else, including the attack on Pearl, would probably have happened anyway, to preclude US interference in Japanese expansion into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
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Drac, re the time delay on questions, when I ask a question, I write it down, with the date that I asked it. I don't have a problem waiting a year, with one exception: sometimes, in the interim, I have found an answer to the question. and would like to delete my question. For instance, last October, on Drydock 216, I asked who made the decision to put 14" guns on the KGVs. I am now satisfied that the decision was made by First Sea Lord Chatfield, and I would like to withdraw that question. I also deleted a question on the piece about Jervis Bay a day after I posted it, as I found an answer. How should we communicate to you to delete a question you may have selected for answer? The first solution that comes to my mind is for you to backcheck that a question is still on the post, before you research it, unless you think it would be informative for the rest of the community.
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@AddumEnied battlecruisers have length and speed going for them. But, the hull is the wrong shape. A battlecruiser's stern is long and tapered, for speed, but it does not have much buoyancy to support a hangar and flight deck. Look at the hull form of a Yorktown, for instance. The aft part of the hull is much fuller, so it can support more weight.
Compare Kongo to Courageous. Courageous is 4' narrower, but 80 feet longer. Courageous could carry 48 aircraft, according to Wiki, for it's 24,000 tons, normal load. A converted Kongo would probably be in the same ballpark wrt aircraft capacity. Yorktown, at 25,500 full load, was 16 feet shorter than Courageous, but 20 feet wider, and could carry 90 aircraft. I have had some vigorous discussions, over the years, about the wisdom of converting the Lexingtons, as the USN could have built three Yorktowns, and built Wasp as another full sized carrier, for the displacement of the two Lexingtons, and had more aircraft deployed, with more operational flexibility, and more surviveability. In the 1920s, the one carrier resource that was limited was tonnage. Battlecruisers are very wasteful of that tonnage, for the number of aircraft they can carry.
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@KingoftheWinterWolves13 When President Harding called the conference, the estimation was that Congress was going to withdraw funding for the building program that was then in progress, regardless. So Harding decided to try and negotiate a treaty so everyone else would stop building too. It is quite possible that the South Dakotas and Lexingtons would have been cancelled by 22 or 23, even without the treaty.
A conference in 25 may well have failed. President Coolidge, who became President when Harding died in 1923, called a conference to further limit naval strength in 1927. The conference was a failure. From what I have read, the US was trying to get the other powers to draw down their fleets to the size the US was willing to fund, which wasn't much. There has been a fable, for decades, that, when the US Army asked for more funding to buy aircraft, President Coolidge supposedly said "why can't they buy just one aeroplane, and take turns flying it?" I have read that the UK delegation left the 27 conference proclaiming "the US is trying to buy parity on the cheap".
Without the Washington conference, the UK-Japan alliance may have remained in force for some years. The UK might have been able to restrain the Japanese building program, before economic reality forced the Japanese to pull back on their program some. There would be no restraint on Japan fortifying the former German colonies in the Pacific that Japan retained after the war via a League of Nations mandate.
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@jacqueshejeije7499 the one that has Tosa completed, and Kongo converted to a carrier? Does not have a name, or number. My winter hobby is creating alt histories, and the Washington treaty provides multiple variations.
Example: In June of 1918, Congress put a clause in the annual Navy appropriation bill demanding the Navy make a start on the capital ships that had been authorized in 1916, but not laid down due to the change in priorities in 1917. Congress had authorized the 6 42,000 ton battleships in the 1917 Navy appropriation bill. Those points are both true.
The alt history: SecNav Daniels says to Congress, in 1918, that the 42,000 ton battleships make the Colorados obsolete, so recommends cancelling the three Colorados not yet laid down as a waste of taxpayer's money. Additionally, as the Navy had a large quantity of 14"/50 guns, and Maryland's construction is not far advanced, Maryland be completed with a 12-14"/50 armament, rather than be a logistics headache as the only ship in the fleet with 16"/45s.
Then the Washington treaty prevents construction of the South Dakotas. As Colorado and West Virginia were never laid down, Delaware and North Dakota are retained. As the three "post-Jutland" US battleships, Tennessee, California, and Maryland, all have 14" guns, the treaty allows them to be upgunned to 16", for parity with the 16" armed UK and Japanese battleships, but the US never pursues the upgunning of those three ships, due to cost.
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@johnfisher9692 yes, Scharnhorst was laid down before the A-G treaty. According to Wiki, 3 days before the treaty was signed. This could get into the hair splitting that diplomats do. The assembled part of Scharnhorst did not exceed the Versailles limit of 10,000 tons, until after the A-G treaty was in effect. Second London was part of the treaty system that the A-G treaty brought Germany into. Again, the assembled part of Bismark did not exceed 35,000 tons until after the displacement escalator had triggered. To answer your original question, there would be honest and dishonest ways to bring Bismark in under 35,000. Some of the dishonest ways I can think of would be to leave the Caesar turret and barbette ashore until Hitler abrogated the A-G treaty. Or only install part of the armor. Recall Drac has commented on a class of British cruiser that rode curiously high in the water, when first commissioned. But a refit on the eve of war added a lot of armor, as if it had been planned that way. Here's a hilarious way to claim a reduced weight: claim Bismark was going to mount (4) Scharnhorst 11" turrets. That saves over 300 metric tons, per turret. Bismark with a dozen 11" would be an interesting sight. Could not penetrate a KGV belt unless at close range, but could knock a lot of parts off the edges of a KGV. We know that 11" had the range and the accuracy to start scoring hits pretty far out.
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@Captain_Seafort the Washington treaty specified when each capital ship could be replaced. The Kongos were older. The Washignton treaty specified Kongo could be replaced in 34, Hiei and Haruna in 35, and Kirishima in 36. Fuso and Yamashiro could be replaced in 37 and 38 respectively. The Ises could be replaced in 39 and 40. The Japanese were planning replacements in the order the treaty specified.
First London pushed replacements out 1936.
Second London defined a capital ship as overage and replaceable at 26 years of age. That revision would make the QEs the first to be replaced, as they were older than the Revenges, with the exception of Malaya, which commissioned the same day as Revenge, Feb 1, 1916. Under the terms of the treaty, the Revenges could not have been replaced until 42. When the long lead items for the KGVs were ordered in 1936, that was the treaty replacement schedule. QE would age out in December 1940. KGV commissioned in October 1940. Warspite would age out in March 41. Prince of Wales commissioned in January 41. Barham would age out in October 41. Duke of York commissioned in August 41. Valiant would age out in January 42. Anson commissioned in April 42. Malaya would age out in February 42. Howe commissioned in June 42. This begs the question "if that was the case, why did they spend so much rebuilding some of the QEs in 37?" I would suspect a mid-course correction by the Admiralty, to extend the life of the QEs, and replace the Revenges instead. The outbreak of the war cancelled the retirement of any ships, and probably accelerated work on the KGVs. It would have been interesting to see, if the treaty stayed in effect, and war had not broken out until 43, if the commissioning of all of the KGVs was slow-walked until 42, when the Revenges would age out.
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@Thrance those superimposed turrets were the brainchild of Joseph Strauss, of USN BuOrd. I don't know if any other navy copied them. They were supposed to solve the problem of the glacially slow reload times of the 13" and 12" guns on the lower level, by putting the faster loading 8" on top to keep up fire while the large guns reloaded. Then the USN discovered if they worked on the ergonomics of the big guns and trained the men a bit, reload times improved dramatically, rendering the superimposed turret redundant. During a later tour at BuOrd, during WWI, Strauss obstructed adoption of the 16" gun, promoting the 14" instead, with the assurance that engagements would always occur at 12,000 yards or less, rendering the 16" overkill. By the summer of 1916, the RN and the Germans had disproven Strauss' theory about engagement range enough times for the General Board and SecNav to overrule him and specify the Colorado class with 16" guns. Strauss tendered his resignation from BuOrd, pending appointment of a replacement, and requested sea duty. A month or two later, possibly dissatisfied with the lack of movement on selection of a replacement, he publicly shot off his mouth, spouting his 14" talking points, pushing back against the decision made by his superiors months before. A replacement was selected and Strauss was gone from BuOrd the next day.
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Samar comes to mind as the argument against battle cruisers. The idea of a BC seems to be that, if outmatched, it can run away. Some times, running is not an option, as at Samar, where the beachhead had to be defended regardless of cost. Consider if the US had successfully argued at the 1922 Washington conference that, as both the RN and IJN had 4 battle cruisers, the US was entitled to have 4 battle cruisers as well, and 4 of the Lexingtons had been completed per the 1919 plan. Due to their high speed, the Lexingtons would have been escorting carriers, rather than sitting at Pearl on December 7th, so the Lexingtons would not have received the major rebuilds received by Dec 7 survivors, but, rather would have received the half-hearted update that Colorado, which also missed the Pearl attack, received. While the Lexingtons would have the speed to steam with TF38, they would have been short of secondary and AAA firepower, to say nothing of armor, so Halsey detaches the Lexingtons to escort Taffy 3, rather than drag them into the anticipated scrap with the northern force. So, the center force is met by 4 capital ships with glass jaws.
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@Knight6831 my take is the attack would have gone the same for the Japanese, because the Americans didn't want to believe they were being attacked. The officer who received the report from the Ward didn't want to act. The officer who received the report from the radar station didn't want to act. I think it's in "Day of Infamy" where there is a mention of a crewman trying to remove an awning that obstructed an AA gun. The man was trying to untie the knots in the ropes, rather than cutting them, because he couldn't get his brain into war mode. I have mentioned before how Second London had a vague tonnage escalator clause, requiring treaty members to negotiate an increase in tonnage, if a nation that was not a party to the treaty built a battleship that exceeded treaty limits. As soon as the UK and US figured out how large Yamato was, they started negotiating. The world is catching fire, the US and UK are the only ones still pretending the treaty meant anything, and they wasted six months arguing over 42,000 vs 45,000 tons.
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@athena139c The terms of the Washington Naval Treaty said that carriers built or building at the time of the treaty, I think they used a date in November of 1921 as the cutoff, were to be regarded as "experimental", not subject to the replacement schedule, hence could be replaced at any time. Langley, Argus. Eagle, and Hermes were all laid down/converted before that date. Ranger, being laid down well after that date did not qualify as "experimental", so could not be replaced until it was twenty years old. Langley was redefined as a seaplane tender, to release tonnage for Wasp. The Admiralty could have scrapped or redefined it's three oldest carriers to release tonnage for two more Ark Royals, but, presumably, did not have the money in the mid 30s to build more new carriers. When Yorktown and Enterprise were built, the Navy did have some extra tonnage available, including that released by conversion of Langley, the 15,000 odd tons that went into Wasp. With the Yorktowns at 20,000. that remaining tonnage could have been used to build the Yorktowns at the treaty maximum of 27,000. but the Navy's concern was having all their tonnage quota used by so few hulls.
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This question would have been better on the hull design thread, but most of the eyes are on this thread now, so: does "area ruling" apply to ship hulls the same as it does to aircraft? On aircraft, drag can be reduced by holding the cross section closer to constant. Convair did this with the F-102, F-106 and B-58: the diameter of the fuselage narrows over the wings, so that the total cross section of fuselage plus wings, is closer to the cross section of the fuselage alone where it is not adjacent to the wings. If that rule applies to ships, then an external torpedo bulge could be used where the hull narrows fore and aft, where there is no internal space for a TDS, but then fairing the bulge into the hull midships, where the hull is wide enough to accommodate an internal TDS, and thus not increasing drag as a full length bulge would. The "save the Caracciolo" project continues. Learning fascinating things.
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@HseanIraqi The Courageouses were completed in time to see some action in WWI. Before the advent of the Battlecruiser, there were plenty of armored cruisers around in the 14-15,000 ton range. The Washington treaty prohibited signatories building new cruisers in excess of 10,000 tons. The Washington treaty also prohibits signatories building ships that exceed treaty limits for anyone else. With the US, UK, Japan, France, and Italy taken out of contention, there is not a lot of shipbuilding capacity left to build cruisers that would not be constrained by the treaty, and not many countries that could pay for a really big cruiser. Postwar, the Soviets built the Kirov class, nudging 25,000 tons and over 800 feet long.
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@bkjeong4302 In 42, both the USN and IJN lost capital ships to aircraft. In 42, all the USN had that could fire faster than a 5/38 was the 1.1". In 42, all the IJN had that could fire faster than their 4" and 5" DP guns was the 25mm. Both USN and IJN carriers had CAPs, but still took losses in 42. Both the IJN and USN added more AA to their ships as the war progressed. The IJN continued to lose capital ships after 42, but US losses were sharply reduced. The only USN carrier, outside of CVEs, lost after 42 was Princeton. The difference? Introduction of the Bofors to the USN? The Bofors was more able to reach out and touch someone than the 1.1" or 25mm, and it threw a large enough shell to do damage when it got there. The Italians had developed an automatic 37mm gun in the late 30s that they installed on cruisers and BBs. It wasn't a match for the Bofors, but could outperform the 25mm. Things might have been different for the IJN if they had licensed the Italian gun, rather than the Hotchkiss.
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@whiskydeltagolf4555 considering they were looking at 18" guns and displacements well in excess of 35,000 I would say they were not really concerned with treaty restrictions. By the time they actually laid anything down for Sovetsky Soyuz, at nearly 60,000, intelligence reports on Yamato had already tripped the tonnage escalator clause in Second London, and the UK and US had agreed on a new 45,000 ton limit, which the Russian ships exceeded. Had Sovetsky Soyuz been laid down earlier, it would have tripped the tonnage escalator before Yamato did. I just skimmed over First London, and did not see a tonnage escalator, so, assuming Sovetsky Soyuz was laid down in 36, or earlier, to the 60,000 ton design, the displacement limit in Second London would probably have been negotiated higher at that time, rather than the tonnage escalator left to be negotiated later. That would have the KGVs being laid down to the Lion design, and the Iowas being built rather than the South Dakotas and North Carolinas.
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@BraydenPotter if you define dreadnought as all big guns, with nothing else but 12 pounders for plinking torpedo boats, dreadnoughts could have been built in the 1890s. The largest obstacle was probably the slow rate of fire of the big guns, which made smaller, more rapid firing guns, necessary. When commissioned, the 13" guns on the Indiana class ships of the 1890s had a rate of fire of about 1 shot per five minutes vs about 1 round per 2 minutes for the 8" secondaries. The shift to smokeless powder reduced the amount of propellant that had to be loaded, and the navy discovered that paying attention to ergonomics and doing some training did wonders for reload time. The reload time on the Indianas was cut from 5 minutes to 1 minute for the 13", while the reload time on the 8" secondaries was cut to 30 seconds. The 12" guns on the last USN pre-dreadnoughts had a rate of fire of 2 rounds/minute, the same as the 8" secondaries, which rendered the 8" secondaries a waste of space, vs mounting more 12". That's my take on the question.
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@carlcarlton764 Yes, the oldest BBs were modernized, up through the New Mexicos, which received new, more powerful, turbines, new boilers, removal of the cage masts, an extra 2" of STS deck armor, torpedo bulges, a second torpedo bulkhead, and improved AA armament in the early 30s. All the Tennessees and Colorados received in the 30s was the 5/25 and 1.1" AA battery, The Lexingtons would have followed the pattern of the Colorados.
The New Yorks and Oklahoma had 14" guns, but triple expansion engines, instead of turbines.
Yes, Sara was in Bremerton repairing torpedo damage in the spring of 42. Doing the updates at the same time as repairing the torp damage may have extended the stay in the yard. Consider if Sara had not needed the updates, and had the torp damage repaired at Pearl. That makes 3 carriers available at Coral Sea, which might have prevented enough damage to Lex to make her salvageable. Even if Lex was laid up at Pearl for repair of fire damage, having the Sara would make 4 carriers available at Midway, which might provide enough air cover to prevent fatal damage to Yorktown. Yorktown surviving Midway would make 3 carriers available at Santa Cruze, which might prevent fatal damage to Hornet. But, Sara was laid up, thousands of miles away, receiving updates it should have received before the war started, so we were always operating on a shoestring, unable to bring overwhelming force to bear.
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@michelangelobuonarroti4958 Caracciolo had a lot of obstacles to overcome. First, it was a pre-Jutland design. I have seen drawings of a proposal to add armor on the weather deck, which just looks wrong to me. Interestingly, I have seen a photo taken in December 1915, shortly before work was suspended, where they appear to be installing the weather deck. The odd thing about that photo is there are no compartment bulkheads visible below the unfinished part of the deck, only what appear to be a temporary, wood, support structure, which implies the deck being installed is only intended to be temporary, to keep the weather out. Caracciolo's armor turtleback was only one deck below the weather deck, so what I see below the temporary deck would be that armor deck. If that is the case, than the horizontal armor could quite easily be improved when the temporary deck is removed. Second protection issue is the lack of a torpedo defense system. However, Caracciolo appears to have boiler rooms along each side, with more boilers in centerline boiler rooms, so the boiler rooms along each side would tend to provide some protection. Additionally, torpedo bulges could be added. The guns are another problem. The guns were sourced from three different vendors, with each vendor building to a different design. The guns were supposed to have similar ballistic performance, but I would want all eight guns to be of the same design, just to be sure. Three of the guns were a Vickers design, built by Terni. Two of those were installed in a shore battery near Venice. Nine of the guns were a monobloc design by Schneider, built by Ansaldo. Of those nine, two were installed in the monitor Faà di Bruno and the other seven were turned over to the Army. The Army installed four of those seven on railroad carriages and sent them to the front to shell Austrian troops. Twelve were built to an Armstrong design by Pozzuoli. Two of those were installed on a monitor that foundered in a storm, four were installed in shore batteries at Brindisi, two were installed on improvised monitors that were on the firing line late in the war, and the last four were installed in monitors after the end of the war. Saving eight unused guns, of the same design, for the ship, would require prior planning to shuffle the other guns among the recipients. As for the budget issue, the RM was building destroyers all through the 1920s. The RM laid down 29 destroyers from 1919 through 1925. As a rule of thumb, I use 100,000 GPB for the price of a destroyer, and Caracciolo probably would have cost 3M GPB or more, so, considering how far advanced work was on Caracciolo, enough could have been saved by cancelling some of that destroyer building program to cover the cost of the battleship. The most interesting thing about Caracciolo being completed is it would have required far less modernization in the 30s than the older battleships, which would free resources to work on Roma and Impero. But then, I have wondered over the years, if the modernization were not done at all, would that have freed enough resources to complete Roma and Impero when they could have been useful?
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@ibbi32 I doubt that a Konig would be converted, because it's slow. Maximizing wind over the deck makes for safer air ops, so speed is particularly desirable in carriers. As for cost to convert a complete, serving, capital ship to a carrier, as an example, Courageous and Glorious cost about 2M Pounds each to convert to carriers, while Ark Royal, of about the same displacement, cost 3M Pounds to build from the keel up. The USN's analysis was in the same neighborhood, it was somewhat less expensive to convert the existing, incomplete, Lexingtons to carriers, than to build a carrier from the keel up, but I don't have those figures at my fingertips. The next factor to consider is efficiency as a carrier. According to Wiki, the Courageous could carry 48 aircraft, while Ark Royal could carry 72, in theory, but more like 50-60 in reality, on the same displacement. The difference between Lexington and Yorktown, in terns of efficiency as a carrier is much greater. Again, using Wiki's numbers, Lexington (CV-2) could carry 78, while Yorktown (CV-5) could carry 90, on a third less displacement. Even the little Ranger had a larger hangar than Lexington. I put a lot of this inefficiency of the Lexington down to the US' lack of experience with carriers when the Lexington's conversion was designed, while, buy the time Courageous and Glorious were converted, the RN had been running serious carriers for several years. The other factor to consider is time. Courageous and Glorious took an inordinate amount of time to convert. Both started conversion in 24. One did not complete until 28 and the other 30, while Ark Royal only required a little over 3 years from keel laying to commission. The slow pace of the conversions may have been a matter of labor strikes or lack of enthusiasm on the part of the RN, but that is only my theory. When the Courageous and Glorious were taken in hand for conversion the RN was under pressure from the Washington Treaty, to reduce BB tonnage, so they could have officially started the conversion process before the RN was really ready.
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wrt the Chesapeake, unfortunately, my local public library decided to cull it's collection last summer, and "Six Frigates" was one of the casualties. (so was "The Grand Fleet"). Going by the Wiki entry, yes, some of the crew had been transferred from Constitution. This brings up a couple issues that I would like to see answers to. First: Constitution is generally said to be armed with 24 pounders, Chesapeake, with 18 pounders. Are the ballistics of these two size guns exactly the same? Without sighting systems, accuracy is dependent on the experience and skill of the gunner. Taking a gunner experienced on a 24 pounder, and hand him an 18 pounder, is he going to be able to hit anything, until he becomes acclimated to the smaller gun? Second, I doubt BuPers had an elaborate system for selecting men to man a ship at that time. How were the men transferred from Constitution, or any other ship, selected? If the Captain received an order "transfer 100 men to Chesapeake", what will his selection criteria be? My experience, and human nature, say that the Captain will select his worst crewmen to transfer off his ship: the idiots, the screw-ups, the discipline problems. Lawrence, an experienced, successful, Captain, had just transferred from a 440 ton sloop of war, to a 1200 ton frigate. How familiar was he with the handling characteristics of the Chesapeake? Yes, this all sounds like excuse making. On paper, the two ships were evenly matched. But getting into the details, I do need to wonder if the issues i mentioned played a part in handicapping Chesapeake.
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@eiwtsexiang I might be able to help with questions 4 and 6. I am not sure where the figure of 22 capital ships for the 1916 Navy act comes from. What I have always seen was a program for the (4) Colorado class, three of which were completed, (6) Lexington class battle cruisers and (6) South Dakota class battleships. The act also called for (10) scout cruisers, but that doesn't add up to 22 ships either. Chief designer Admiral Taylor was not happy with the South Dakota design, and drew up an alternative that was a bit larger, and a bit faster, which was also more stable. It may have also had a slightly shallower draft, as the existing South Dakota design was causing concern with regard to passing through the Panama Canal locks. Taylor's improved design was rejected for cost. I have seen newspaper reports, in the immediate aftermath of the war, where SecNav Daniels was saying he was going to propose another major building program, but the incoming Harding administration had other ideas, so the second building program was never enacted. As for the shrinking number of funnels on newer ships, that probably relates to the number of boilers. Newer technology allowed the needed amount of steam to be produced by fewer boilers. New York was built with 14 coal fired boilers. When she was converted to oil fuel, the 14 boilers were replaced by only 6 oil fired boilers. HMS Valiant was originally built with 24 oil fired boilers, and two funnels. In a modernization in the early 30s, the two funnels were trunked into one very broad funnel. In her 1939 rebuilt, the 24 boilers were replaced by only 8 new boilers, and the broad funnel was replaced by a much smaller one. One bit for question #7, as far as the USN was concerned, Jutland made the case for going to 16" guns, due to the demonstrated need to penetrate at longer range. Until that time, the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss, championed the 14", saying that a ship could carry more of the smaller guns, which would translate into more hits. Strauss predicated his assessment on his opinion that engagements would always take place at 12,000 yards or less, where the 14" could penetrate. Jutland disproved the 12,000 yard limit on engagements, so SecNav Daniels and the General Board overrode Strauss' assessment. Strauss requested to be relieved at BuOrd and be given sea duty.
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@ronaldfinkelstein6335 I'm thinking the most likely to stuff the treaty would be the UK, instigated by the US' attitude wrt repayment of war debts. If the US debt negotiating team, headed by SecTreas Mellon and SecState Hughes, immediately after the Washington conference, stuck to the letter of the law passed by Congress: payment in full, on schedule, with stated interest, instead of the more reasonable approach taken by Mellon and Hughes, the UK could well have decided to walk out.
I suspect that the N3 and G3 were bluffs, as the Admiralty did not have facilities around the empire that could handle ships that large. Even in 1938, when the US and UK were negotiating the battleship displacement escalator, the UK still did not have facilities to handle anything much larger than 42-43,000 tons.
For a hypothetical British battleship, I would draw a development line between the J3 (a 42,000 ton Hood, with three triple 15" turrets) and the Lion, with a potential blip when Chatfield was First Sea Lord, as he seems to have been the driver of the "more smaller guns" theory that gave the KGVs 14" guns.
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@nullanonsonemmenoiocosascr6676 There was a mention of the Caracciolos in the Q&A on battleship hulls of a few days ago. I'll repeat a couple points; the Caracciolos were criticized for inadequate torpedo protection. The Pugliese system apparently was invented in 1917, after the Caracciolos were designed. Construction of the hull of Caracciolo was advanced beyond where the Pugliese system could have been installed at construction, so considerable rework would have been required to provide sufficient internal space in the hull for the system. Ansaldo had not made as much progress on the hull of Columbo, so less rework would have been required. The Odero and Orlando yards had hardly made any progress on their ships. I covered in the previous post how the guns built for the Caracciolos had been repurposed during the war, so more would have had to be built if construction of the ships had continued. Italy did not have the finances to support a capital ship building program, without shortchanging something else. Immediately after WWI, Italy continued building destroyers. As the Caracciolos were intended as a response to the British QE, I will assume their cost was about the same as a QE 3M GBP. I will further assume that the cost of an Italian DD is about the same as a British DD: about 100,000 GBP. So to clear the cost, after the war, to build two Caracciolos, assuming Caracciolo was 50% done and Columbo was 5% done, the cost to complete wold be roughly 4.35M, or the cost of 43 DDs, or almost all of the DDs the RM laid down through the 20s, and that doesn't include the cost to rework Caracciolo to incorporate the Pugliese system. The delays in construction would put the ships in the clutches of the Washington treaty. Italy could argue that, as the US and UK were both allowed to complete 2 new BBs in the early 20s, the treaty should offer the same courtesy to Italy, so only two Caracciolos could have been built. Because Italy chose not to complete two Caracciolos, they were given two BB building windows opening in 1927 and 1929, that were good until used. Italy used those two windows to build the first two Littorios. If two Caracciolos had been built, Italy would not have had those new construction windows. so the first two Littorios could not have been laid down until 1937. If Littorio and Veneto were not laid down until 37, Veneto would probably have been completed, but Littorio not completed for the same reason Impero was never completed. Littorio was built by Ansaldo, in Genoa. Due to Genoa's proximity to France, Littorio would probably have been moved to a perceived safer location in an incomplete condition just before the war broke out, as Impero was, and the disruptions to work that Impero suffered would have been visited on Littorio. As it turned out, Italian concerns about the exposed position of Genoa were well founded as both the French and UK fleets showed up and shelled the daylights out of Genoa harbor. These visits didn't end until 42, when the Italians installed 4-15" shore batteries on the heights above Genoa. Ironically, the 15" guns installed had originally been built 25 years earlier, for the Caracciolo class ships. Bottom line, the cost to Italy to complete 2 of the Caracciolos would be 43 DDs that were needed to escort convoys to North Africa, and two Littorio class BBs being available in 1940, Littorio never being completed and Roma and Impero probably never laid down. The RM was vastly stronger without the Caracciolos.
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The Langley is one that really make me want to crank up the WABAC machine and give the General Board a good talking to. My first point to them would be "You have been banging on for years about how all the capital ships need to have the same speed capability, so they can maneuver together. How can combined air/surface tactics be worked out if the carrier can't keep up?" I would propose the two Wyoming class BBs be converted instead: they can keep up with the other BBs, slightly longer than Langley, 28' wider than Langley, which might save some aircraft and pilots from going over the side and the Wyomings, alone among BBs of the time were flush decked, somewhat simplifying the job of building a hanger and flight deck on top of the hull, while the 6 barbettes provide a wide selection of locations for elevator wells. The Wyomings, with their 12" guns and coal fired boilers, were obsolescent, and, with the South Dakotas building, would soon be expendable anyway. Of course, the impact of the Washington Treaty would have been unknown at the time, but the treaty gives rise to another interesting speculation. With the two Wyomings being converted to carriers, the US could have argued that it would be shortchanged on BBs and work out a deal where, besides allowing Colorado and West Virginia being completed to replace the two Delawares, Washington be completed to replace the two Wyomings.
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@glennricafrente58 good points, though, at the time Langley was taken in hand for conversion, the Lexingtons were expected to complete as battle cruisers, not carriers. Considering Jupiter could have been sold as a functioning ship, while the Wyomings probably had a date with the breakers, along with the Delawares and Floridas when the South Dakotas completed, the money lost by temporarily foregoing the scrap value of the two BBs would not be that great. Yes, converted Wyomings would not be as fast as Couragous, for instance, but being faster than Jupiter, more wind over the deck means safer air ops, and, at 21kts, they compare very favorably to the WWII CVEs. I have offered before that the Lexingtons were horribly inefficient as carriers, and consumed far more of the USN's treaty tonnage allotment than clean sheet designs of the same capacity would have. Having the converted Wyomings in the fleet, rather than the dangerously inadequate Langley, could have persuaded the USN to take a pass on the Lexingtons, in favor of a clean sheet design, once they had gained more practical experience with the Wyomings.
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@glennricafrente58 Ideally, the Wyomings would have been converted to seaplane tenders, as Langley was, to free up the tonnage under the treaty. So, the USN would enter the war with Ranger, and 6 Yorktown size carriers, plus whatever was built after the treaty collapsed. Ideally, Ranger would have been built 2-3 years sooner. Then Yorktown and Enterprise built in 30-32, then Wasp and Hornet built as full sized improved Yorktowns with deck edge elevators in 34-37, and two additional built 36-40. Then the naval expansion act of 38, following the collapse of the treaties, included two more carriers, which would have resulted in two more built 39-41, instead of what the act actually lead to: Hornet, built to the somewhat outdated Yorktown plan, plus design work for Essex, which delayed construction.
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wrt torpedo boats in the Philippines, the USN had torpedo boats there in 41, PT boats. The USN had not built larger, steam powered, torpedo boats since 1905. The last class of torpedo boats, the 200 ton Blakely class, spent most of their time tied up in reserve in the US, as their construction overlapped the building of the first class of destroyers, the 420 ton Bainbridge class. I considered how the Blakelys could have been moved to the Philippines, given their small size and short range. The best scenario I came up with was building a cradle in the Dewey drydock to hold six of them, as the Dewey was towed to the Philippines in 1906. They would have been redundant however, as the first five Bainbridges had steamed to the Philippines under their own power in 1904.
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@patrickradcliffe3837 I would say, if, officially, Japan had stayed in the treaty system, the 1939 South Dakotas would be exactly the same as they were historically. For whatever reason, the UK wanted 14" on the KGVs, so pressed for a 14" limit in Second London. My sense is the US only agreed to the 14" limit, in conjunction with the escalator clause, designed to trip only four months after the treaty went into effect. The escalator clause was almost certain to trip, because Japan had given notice in 34 it was dropping out of the treaty. If Japan had not given notice, then there is no assurance the escalator clause would trip, so the US would not have done the kabuki dance of accepting 14" in the treaty. There was nothing that prevented the UK building below the 16" treaty limit. France, Italy, and Germany, were all building below the 16" limit. The only reason I can think of for the UK wanting the 14" limit in the treaty is political optics, they didn't want to be seen building an "undergunned" ship.
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@brendonbewersdorf986 Bearn is not that far off of Eagle's specifications, a bit shorter, and a bit slower. Both navies were trying to climb a learning curve at the time, and using what was at hand, instead of a clean sheet design. The best thing I can think of, for the French to do, is forget Bearn, and claim one of the unfinished Mackensen class battlecruisers, as war reparations, for conversion to a carrier. Trying to get a faster hull from the UK (retired battlecruiser) or Italy (Caracciolo), would require payment. Free from Germany is better.
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wrt the question about early fast battleships, during his first stint as First Sea Lord, Jackie Fisher was developing concepts for new battleships and new armored cruisers, which evolved into the "Dreadnought armed cruiser", aka battlecruiser. The design process apparently yielded a fast battleship concept, in 1905, known as "HMS Fusion", which combined armament of 10-12" guns, 45,000hp turbines for a speed of 24kts, an 11" armor belt, a length of about 620 feet, and displacement of 22,500 tons. There are a couple mentions of Fusion on line, along with the battleship and armored cruiser concepts,
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In the presentation, Drac says that, as a result of British code breaking, the RN knew the Germans were coming out and planned to intercept them. When I read about Jutland in the 60s, the events were described as the RN being on a routine "sweep" of the North Sea, searching for any German ships that may be about, and, by luck, ran into the entire German fleet, with no mention of German codes being broken. Was the fact that the German codes were broken kept secret by the British government until sometime after the material I read was written in the 60s, with the entire action being declared a lucky coincidence?
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