Youtube comments of Steve Valley (@stevevalley7835).

  1. wrt the main armament, in my reading, it was head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss, previously known for being the father of the superimposed turrets on the Kearsarge and Virginia classes, that was advocating for the 14". As Drac said, Strauss maintained that engagements would always be at 12,000 yards or less. At that range, the 14" could penetrate well enough, and, being lighter, more could be carried. In a newspaper article speculating whether the Tennessees would have 16" rather than 14", there was some FUD injected into the debate, claiming the 16" had an alarmingly high wear rate, and claims that the British 15"/42 also had a very short service life, while the 14" had an excellent service life. Strauss held the line on the 14", until the summer of 1916. Jutland made it clear his 12,000 maximum engagement range was unrealistic, and, that summer, Daniels announced, with the agreement of the General Board, the next class, the Colorados, would be armed with 16" guns. In his annual report in the fall of 16, Daniels said this decision was made "over the objection of some officers". Strauss requested sea duty. There was no movement on his request for sea duty for a month or two. Late that year, in Congressional testimony, Strauss, again, rolled out his talking points for the 14", publicly pushing back on the decision made months before by Daniels and the General Board. President Wilson moved the next day to appoint then head of the Indian Head test range, Ralph Earle, as head of BuOrd, and Strauss was given command of the Nevada. The SecNav annual reports from 15-16 and newspapers of the same period made for some fascinating reading about this debate.
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  25. Fascinating discussion. Not long ago, I speculated on a triple main armament. Even found a speculative drawing of Bismark with a three-triple main armament. Like you, I wondered why they did not go triple, as, having built the Deutschlands and Scharnhorsts with triples, they should have been in their comfort zone with them. The only concern I had was that, with the horizontal sliding breech, the barbette would need to be larger, which might cause a problem for Anton, given the width of the hull at that point. However, with only three turrets, seems the superstructure could be moved aft, so Anton and Bruno would be where the hull is wider. I posted about this thought on a Navy group on Facebook. Knowing that you lurk that group from time to time, what did you think of that discussion? As for the 105mm DP secondary, iirc, Jackie Fisher was an advocate of a greater number of 4", vs the 6" secondary the RN was going to in the run-up to WWI. The two classes Fisher had a direct hand in, Renown and Courageous, had the infamous triple 4", while QE and Revenge had 6". Can't help but wonder why the RN did not go with the QF 4", rather than the BL. With the QF's fixed rounds, both the bag man and rammer could be eliminated, reducing the crowding that plagued that triple mount. wrt the triple screw design, I have read that the Germans found a triple screw layout made it easier to negotiate the turns in the Kiel Canal. Looking at how they have the rudders laid out: one either side of the center screw, I wonder if they were going for a thrust vectoring effect. I speculate the drill when transiting the canal was to make the trip on the center screw only. With only the center screw providing thrust, it would be running faster than if all three were turning, producing a stronger stream. With the twin rudders, whichever way the helm was turned, the broad side of one rudder or the other would be turned into that high speed stream from the center screw, vectoring the thrust. Really enjoyed this post. Thanks!
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  43. 13:30 mark, SecNav Daniels did assent to the Tennessees having 14" guns, but the driver in that decision was the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss. This was one of the more bizarre episodes at BuOrd. Strauss was of the opinion that engagements would always be at 12,000 yards or less, the 14" could penetrate at that range well enough, and, being lighter, more 14" could be mounted. There was public discussion whether the Tennessees would carry 14" or 16" in 1915, but disinformation about the 16" was being fed to the press. In one lengthy article about the Tennessees, there are a couple paragraphs about how the 16" was subject to extremely high barrel wear, and claims that the British 15" was also subject to very high wear, with a barrel life of less than 100 rounds. So, the Tennessees were ordered with 14". Jutland disproved Strauss' talking points in favor of the 14" and, in July of 1916, SecNav Daniels announced that the next class, what we know as the Colorados, would carry 16" guns. In his annual report for that year, Daniels says that the decision was made over the objections of some officers. Strauss offered his resignation and requested sea duty, effective upon appointment of a successor. A few weeks passed, and Strauss seems to have been dissatisfied with the pace of selection of his replacement. Strauss trotted out his talking points in favor of the 14" again, in a public Congressional hearing, months after the General Board and Daniels had decided on the 16". President Wilson nominated Ralph Earle, then commander of the Indian Head test range the next day. The Senate approved Earle that day, and Strauss was gone from BuOrd. The Tennessees appear to have the same diameter barbette as the Colorados, 31ft. The twin 16" turret is slightly lighter and the part of the turret that extends down into the barbette is about 6" smaller diameter, so it certainly appears feasible to have regunned the Tennessees while under construction. After commissioning, when the dispersion problem with the triple 14"/50 mounts was discovered, if it crossed the Navy's mind to regun with the 16", it was quickly dismissed, as the WNT prohibited increasing gun size, except for France and Italy.
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  50. On the question of the KGVs being built as Lions, the treaty would not have allowed it, in the same time frame. The treaty required the parties to negotiate a displacement escalator, when it was determined that a non-signatory to the treaty was building a larger ship. The US and UK did not finish those negotiations until mid 1938. so, at the very least, KGV and PoW would have been laid down a year and a half later. Being laid down in the second half of 38, neither would have been in service when Bismark attempted it's breakout. I looked up where all the other RN capital ships were on the day of the battle in Denmark Strait. If the KGVs were not yet in service, the RN would probably have kept the Nelsons close to the UK. How would they be deployed to catch Bismark? How would Denmark Strait play out with both Nelsons, or Nelson plus Hood? If the Admiralty had decided to leverage existing material on hand, to speed construction, there were actually 8 twin 15" turrets in hand: the four from Courageous and Glorious, and the four that were on the Erebus and Roberts class monitors. Laying down only two Vanguards in late 38. rather than 5 KGVs would put less of a load on industrial capacity, so might result in a faster build. but I would not bet the farm on both being in commission by May 41. If they did make it into commission by late 41, then scratch one of only two modern battleships with Force Z. A Vanguard may not have had the same vulnerability that PoW had, but the Japanese would probably have kept beating on it until it sank.
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  73. The Italians being able to develop the Libyan oil fields in the 30s is a nightmare scenario. First, the Germans would have recognized that their war effort would be greatly aided by that oil, and Libya would have been far more stoutly defended, as João Rita posted. For openers, imagine an Italian fleet with unlimited fuel and aggressively lead, with cover from land based air. Early in the war, the RN was still trying to defend their interests in the far east, as well as patrolling the North Atlantic against German capital ships, so the odds against the Italians are not as overwhelming as they would appear on paper. The choke point between Sicily and Tunisia could have been one intensively defended point of obstructing Brit supplies to Egypt and squadrons of torpedo and dive bombers could have been based in Italian occupied Ethiopia to make supplying Egypt via the Red Sea equally problematic. I can see the Brits pushed/starved out of Egypt. A defensive line from Aqaba to Gaza looks appealing, but, with the Italian fleet dominating the eastern Med, that line could easily be outflanked. The Brits would probably have to pull back to a line from Basra to the Turkish border to defend the Iranian oil fields, where were being developed at that time. The Germans would probably move to preemptively occupy Algeria and Morocco to vigorously oppose any attempted landing, which would make the Libyan oil fields immune to air attack from the west. Axis occupation of all of North Africa would also make the Ploiesti oil fields out of range of air attack.
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  78. wrt the collapse of the naval treaties, Japan gave formal notice in 1934 that they would drop out of the treaty system at the expiration of First London, at the end of 36. Italy did not participate in the Second London treaty, due to the other parties being upset about Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. The Washington Treaty had licensed France to build up to 70,000 tons of battleships, beginning in 27 and 29, and that license was good until used, not subject to the continuation of the freeze on BB construction in the first London treaty. Dunkerque and Strasbourg used some 53,000 of the 70,000 ton allotment, so, when Richelieu was laid down in October of 35, it put France blatantly in violation of the treaty. Bottom line, by the time the Second London conference started, the US and UK were the only powers trying to comply with the treaty at all. The US insisted on the gun size escalator, to be triggered in April 37, if any party to the treaty system had not signed on to the Second London treaty. As Japan had given notice two years earlier that it would drop out of the treaty system, it was a virtual certainty that the escalator clause would be tripped. The tonnage escalator was nowhere near as clear. It would be tripped if it was determined that a power that was not a party to the treaty began construction of a ship that was not treaty compliant. When the clause was tripped, the powers participating in the treaty were to confer and agree on a new tonnage limit. Yamato was laid down in November 37. Intelligence reports regarding the amount of material being ordered for Yamato made it clear the ship would significantly exceed 35,000, so, at the start of 1938, the US and UK conferred on where to put the new tonnage limit. From my reading, the UK wanted a 43,000 ton limit, as that was the largest the RN facilities could support, while the US wanted 45,000. Negotiations continued for about six months before the US got the 45,000 ton limit it wanted for the Iowas. So, the short answer is the treaty system died a death of a thousand cuts, over a period of several years, starting in 1934.
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  81.  @AsbestosMuffins  in a newspaper article on the decision to go to 16", the long running debate was recapped, with the note that the Navy had the same argument when it went from 12" to 14". Soon after the decision was made on the Colorados, there was discussion of changing the New Mexicos and Tennessees to 16". A Navy spokesman was quoted that the New Mexicos were too far along and such a change would have been prohibitively expensive. The barbettes on the Tennessees, from what I have found, were the same diameter as those on the Colorados, 32 feet. The twin 16" turret is slightly lighter than the triple 14", and the part of the 16" turret that extends down into the barbette is 6 inches smaller in diameter, so seems to me the 16" turret should fit a Tennessee fine. Neither California nor Tennessee had been laid down yet. I wonder how close they came to issuing a change order on the Tennessees to go to 16"? What probably made their decision was that the guns and turrets were on order and there would probably be cancellation charges if they made the change. Would they have made the same decision if they knew of the dispersion problems those tripe 14" mounts would suffer? Imagine the impact on the Washington Treaty. With 16" guns, the Tennessees would have been regarded as "post-Jutland", so, with them and Maryland, the US would have it's three "post" ships, and West Virginia and Colorado would be broken up. If the US completed West Virginia and Colorado, it would have five "post" ships, so the Japanese would demand to complete Tosa, to be it's third "post" ship, meeting the 5:5:3 ratio, while making a good argument they could built one ship over treaty limit, because of Hood. Then the UK would need to build four Nelsons for parity.
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  90. The Colorado class has provided hours of entertainment speculating on alternate treatments of the class. Drac didn't really note it, but the Colorados were a 1916 design. Maryland was laid down only days after the US entered WWI, but the other three were delayed until after the war, being laid down in 1919-20. This delay had the result of three of the class still building at the time of the WNT. West Virginia and Colorado were completed, in exchange for the two Delawares being scrapped/demilitarized, while Washington was used for target practice. One alternate scenario: the USN takes the same path as the Admiralty in cancelling outright the Colorados, for the same reasons the Admiralty cancelled their 1914 BB program. The same decision would also result in Tennessee never being laid down, and possibly California, on which little progress had been made, being cut up on the slipway to clear it for higher priority ships. Where would that leave the USN in 1922? None of the Tennessees or Colorados ever completed, and all the postwar South Dakotas and Lexingtons exceed treaty limits. Another avenue of inquiry is how could the Washington have been saved? It appears that the money spent modernizing the Floridas in the 1920s, equaled or exceeded the money it would have cost to complete Washington. So the US completes Washington, and scraps the two Floridas. If the UK complains, give them a license to build a third Nelson, but, as the RN is still well over it's tonnage limit, building another Nelson would require two Iron Dukes be scrapped. Similarly, if the Japanese demanded to be allowed to build another Nagato, they would have to scrap a Fuso or Kongo to make the tonnage available, so, net, they would gain little for all the money spent.
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  97. wrt the question of the Washington treaty being delayed for 3 years. That puts the start of the conference at November 24, during the US election. President Harding died in August, 23, so Coolidge is POTUS, running for a second term. From my reading, the US called the Washington conference because there was a sense that Congress would withdraw funding for the current construction program, regardless what other countries did, so Harding decided to try to get other countries to limit construction in sync with the US. In that light, Washington would have been completed, but all the Lexingtons and South Dakotas could very well have been cancelled and cut up on the slipway, regardless what anyone else did. In reality, Coolidge would probably have started the conference a month or two earlier, as a campaign ploy. In Japan, the quake was in August, 1923. Amagi was laid down in December 20. Without the delays due to the treaty negotiations and conversion to a carrier, Amagi would have been in the water, and safe, when the quake hit. The second pair of Amagis were scheduled to be complete in December 24. There would have been an argument that the second pair of Amagis needed to be scrapped. Both Tosas would be complete. None of the Kiis or 13s would be complete. So, net, the IJN gains the two Tosas and first two Amagis. As the US would have unilaterally scrapped the Lexingtons in 22-23, there would have never been a clause allowing conversions that exceeded the treaty 27,000 carrier limit, so the second pair of Amagis, and the Kiis, are all broken up, rather than be converted. In the back of my mind is the thought the G3s and N3s were a bluff. When the US and UK were negotiating the tonnage escalator in 37, the UK was looking for a limit around 42,000, because that was what their facilities could handle. As the G3 and N3 exceed that displacement, I suspect they were not intended to actually be built. Of course, a 1924 Washington conference could very well have failed, entirely. In February 1927, Coolidge called a conference in Geneva to limit total tonnage of smaller ships, as the original Washington treaty limited capital ships. The conference failed. I have read the British were making comments to the effect "the US is trying to buy parity on the cheap". The US would probably walk in to a 1924 Washington conference with the same idea: force other nations to draw their naval strength down to what the US had. The other nations would probably react the same way they did in 27, and, effectively, tell Coolidge to take a flying leap.
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  98. wrt the KGVs being built with 15"/42s. During the design process, the Admiralty's own technical analysis branch determined that a 9-15" armament would give the best combination of firepower, protection, and speed. Someone, I think First Sea Lord Chatfield, clung to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory, and pressed for 14". Just as raising the height of the armor belt caused B turret to be reduced from 4-14" to 2, I would expect the same increase in armor to result in B turret being reduced from 3-15" to 2. The switch from 16" to 14" in Second London appears to have been pressed for by the UK. Without someone in the Admiralty pushing for 14", the gun size limit would probably have been left at 16". First London had extended the construction moratorium, so it would not have been possible to start the KGVs any earlier than they were historically. KGV and PoW were laid down on New Year Day in 37, the first day after the First London moratorium expired. Guns were not the only bottleneck in the construction of the KGVs. British production capacity for armor had also atrophied since the end of WWI. I have read that some of the armor for the KGVs had to be contracted out to a Czech firm. When most of the Iron Dukes, and Tiger, were scrapped in the early 30s, many of their 13.5" guns were retained. I have read that the KGV's 14" was designed to fit the same mount as the 13.5". In the back of my mind is the thought that, had there been a shortage of 14", the Admiralty had a contingency plan to mount 13.5" in their place on the KGVs.
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  118.  @robertf3479  Langley also had folding funnels on the port side of the flight deck. Jupiter's boiler and engine rooms were located well aft, so the funnel location was an easy adaptation. Ranger replicated that funnel location, but had more funnels because of the greater boiler capacity. That approach was not an option on the Lexingtons because the boiler room location had already been set closer to midships, same as Kaga. The options with the more midships boiler room location were an island with a funnel, which the aviators opposed, or entirely flush decked, with the stack gas trunked aft. and directed away from the flight deck. Furious had the stack gas trunked aft and exiting from grills on the aft corners of the flight deck, which was a particularly bad location and the ducting inside the hanger turned the after part of the hanger into an oven from heat soak. Argus had a similar setup, but, less powerful engines, so less hot gas to vent. As I said, it was luck that the Lexingtons turned out as well as they did. With the US' lack of experience with carriers, they could easily have used the same solutions as Kaga. Unlike the Japanese, Italians and Brits, the USN, for whatever reason, did not do major reconstructions on it's older ships in the 30s, so, if the Lexingtons had been built like the Kaga, they would have entered WWII with the same configuration, while Kaga had been rebuilt with a small island, full length flight deck and a downward curving funnel midships in place of the long ducts.
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  134. wrt the question about armament alternatives for the KGVs. I have read that the RN was fundamentally dissatisfied with the 16" used on the Nelsons due to their high barrel wear, and were looking for a lower velocity, more durable gun. Why in the world the RN did not buy US 16"/45s is beyond me, other than the possibility that they simply were not available yet, when the KGVs were fitting out. From time to time, someone floats the idea of stripping the 15"/42s off of the R-class and installing them on the faster KGV hull, in place of the 14" I found some estimates, at 1915 prices for RN 13.5" guns and twin turrets. Assuming those prices would be close to those for a 15", I adjusted for inflation to 1937 prices. Dismounting the guns from the Rs, and installing them in new build triple turrets for the 5 KGVs would only save about 1M pounds, far short of the amount needed to pay for an additional KGV, and the RN loses the use of the Rs. Using four of the original twin turrets would require a longer hull, pushing displacement over the treaty limit, as we see with Vanguard, so that is a non-starter. Using three of the original twin turrets would fit in the 35,000T KGV hull, but the ship, with only 6 heavy guns, would be outgunned by any other battleship it would likely run into, and the total savings for the five KGVs would be a bit over 3M Pounds, still less than half the cost of building an additional KGV, and they lose the use of the Rs. Other than buying the US 16"/45, what the RN did was the best option.
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  145.  @scarecrow2097  newspaper reports of the time make for fascinating reading. The Naval appropriation bill the House passed had funding for more Connecticuts. Senator Hale demanded the Navy buy smaller ships, on the order of 12,000 tons, rather than more 16,000 ton Connecticuts, and he held up the appropriation bill until the appropriation for two Connecticuts was changed to the smaller Mississippis. The backstairs chatter the newspapers were reporting was that Hale, who represented Maine, was trying to get the contract for Bath Iron Works. At that time, Bath was building one of the 15,000 ton Virginias, having difficulty with a ship that size, and the Navy was very dissatisfied with Bath's progress. As it turned out, the Navy could not design a ship of less than 13,000 tons, which still exceeded what Bath could comfortably build. Newport News was low bid, for one Mississippi. The William Cramp yard bid a price that exceeded that of News for one ship, but bid a lower price for building both of the Mississippis. In the back of my mind, knowing the contracts for the Mississippis were entirely politically motivated, I will observe that the Cramp yard is in Philadelphia, One of the Senators from PA had a lot of juice, was the head of the state party machine, and also sat on the Naval Affairs Committee, so I would not reject the proposition that the Senator advised Cramp how to bid for the contracts. The ships were a failure for the USN because of their small size. They were a bit slower, and had significantly less range than the Connecticuts, so were mostly relegated to coastal patrol, separate from the rest of the fleet. And yet, being obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, and of little use to the USN, SecNav Daniels still exploited the Greeks to a horrendous degree. iirc, the newspapers were reporting the price Daniels extracted from Greece was about double what the ships were worth. From the Greek perspective, the Mississippis might have come in handy in 1912, but in 1914, if the Ottomans had received the two new Dreadnoughts building in the UK, the Mississippis would have been dead meat. One positive note, the Mississippis fit in the drydock in Piraeus. A Connecticut would have been too big.
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  146. wrt the USN building 16" armed battleships, the "more smaller guns vs fewer bigger guns" argument raged for some time in the Navy Department. Head of BuOrd, Joseph Strauss was the main driver of the "more smaller guns" school. When Jutland demonstrated the need for being able to penetrate at greater range, Strauss was overruled by the SecNav and General Board. In his 1916 annual report, SecNav Daniels said the decision to go to 16" was made over the objections of some officers. When the decision to go to 16" was made in the summer of 1916, there was speculation in the press about the New Mexicos and Tennessees being upgunned to 16" during construction. A Navy spokesman said that the cost to make the changes would be prohibitive. The article did not make clear if the Navy spokesman was talking specifically about the New Mexicos, which had been laid down the previous year, or the Tennessees, as well, which had not yet been laid down. The 14"/50 was ordered into production, off the drawing board, with no test program. Having taken that shortcut, the first production 14"/50 was test fired at about the same time as the prototype 16". Strauss' 1915 report speaks glowingly, at length, of the virtues of the 14", and briefly mentions the 16". If the 14"/50 had been subjected to an in depth test program, the dispersion issue that dogged these guns may have been discovered before production started. Given the timelines of events, I think the most probable situation would be the New Mexicos built with 14" and Tennessees built with 16". The two Tennessees, and three Colorados, would give the USN 5 16" armed "post-Jutland" ships. At the same time, the Japanese could argue they were entitled to a 42,000 ton ship, because of Hood, and complete Tosa, as well as Nagato and Mutsu. So, then the RN is allowed to build four new ships, so that, combined with Hood, the RN has parity with the USN at 5, and the IJN has 3.
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  147. Returning to the question of the UK selling it's West Indies colonies to the US in exchange for the US canceling the UK's debt from WWI, which I brought up in the Q&A on the shore bombardment video of May 12th, I have done further reading on the WWI debt issue. The UK had made substantial loans to it's allies prior to US entry in April 1917. From that point on, the US bore the financial burden. As it worked out, the amount owed to the UK by the other allies was almost equal to the amount the UK owed to the US. On August 1, 1922, Arthur Balfour wrote a note to the French ambassador to the UK, words to the effect that the UK did not want to lean so heavily on France, and the other allies, for repayment of their debts. The UK would rather cancel all the debts owned to it, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was pressing the UK so hard for repayment, the UK needed the cash. The content of this note was publicly published by the UK government, which, to me, gives the note the color of an official offer by the UK government to cancel the war debts owned to it, if it is relieved of it's debt to the US. As noted in my May 12th question, extrapolating the price the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands to the total land mass of all the UK held islands, plus British Honduras, comes out to $4.15B, which equals the $4B of principle owed, plus a portion of accrued interest. What a different world it would have been, had the UK, effectively, paid it's debt to the US with dirt, rather than gold, and, in accordance with the Balfour note, then cancelled all debts owed to it, cutting the debt, and corresponding drag on the economies of the other allies, in half.
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  168. For Ninja, the KGV 14" armament seems to follow the "more smaller guns means more hits" theory. I have been looking into that issue, as most of the justifications offered do not make any sense. The Admiralty produced a wide variety of designs for the KGVs with 14", 15", and 16" guns. In the fall of 35, the alternatives were analyzed by the Technical Division of Naval Staff. Their conclusion was that a 9-15" armament provided the best balance of hitting power, speed, and protection. The analysis said "The 14" gun ship should be ruled out, unless required by treaty." The Sea Lords agreed to go 15". Then, the US said it would be open to the upcoming Second London treaty imposing a 14" limit, contingent on Japan agreeing. A year earlier, December of 34, Japan had withdrawn from the treaty system. At that time, Japan said it's withdrawal was due to it's demand for parity with the US and UK. Japanese representatives said at the time, they were open to a new treaty, as long as the new treaty gave Japan parity. The US and UK were not going to give Japan parity, so I don't see how anyone could have taken the US offer of 14", contingent on Japan's agreement, seriously. The designs for KGVs with the different armament schemes show the 9-15" armament weighs less than the 12-14" under consideration. As the 15" armament has fewer guns, the lower parts count would indicate the 15" armament would cost less. Clearly, someone wanted the 14" armament badly enough to go against the Technical Division's analysis, against the issue of weight, and against the issue of cost. The only reason I can think of is adherence to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory.
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  178.  @solutionless123  the arms trade in general has always been a bit shady. Basil Zaharoff, an agent for Vickers, had a tendency to oversell their products. An incident relayed in "Reilly Ace Of Spies", pitted Riley, a British spy, against Zaharoff, for contracts for new ships for Russia. Riley maneuvered himself into position as the representative in Russia for Blohm und Voss. Reilly then advised British Intelligence, that, if B&V won the contract, he would forward full sets of drawings of the ships to the British government, giving the British government an incentive to hobble Zaharoff's efforts, cost Vickers a fortune in profits, cost thousands of British shipyard workers their jobs, to gain intelligence about German ship design. meanwhile, Reilly would pocket a massive sales commission from B&V. The US government made sizeable trade concessions to Argentina to aid US yards in winning the contracts for the Rivadavias, even though the Curtis turbines the ships were equipped with were considerably inferior to British Parsons turbines. The Admiralty bought some 14" guns that Bethlehem Steel had built for the Greek battleship that was building in Germany. The Brits discovered the gun design was defective, the guns tended to droop. I have not seen specific numbers, but I have read that the price Chile paid for Latorre and the destroyers was at a significant discount to their original contract price. Latorre was no longer a new ship, and was becoming obsolete by 1920. The destroyers were from an order for six Chile had placed before the war. Chile received two destroyers just before the war started, but the other four were requisitioned by the Admiralty. One of the four was sunk at Jutland. The other three were very active during the war, with HMS Broke being involved in two particularly lurid brawls. The two ships that Chile had received new from the builders in 1914 lasted until 1945, but the three that had been with the RN during the war went to the breakers in 1933. I wonder how serviceable those three had been for several years before they were scrapped, as Chile rang up Thornycroft in 1928 and ordered six more destroyers.
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  199.  @michaelsnyder3871  intelligence operations always involve a degree of guesswork. Remember the conversation between Charlton Heston and Hal Holbrook, as Rochefort, in "Midway"? Heston asked how much of the IJN correspondence they could actually read. Holbrook said words to the effect "we don't really read them. we see a hint here, a glimmer there". Heston says "you're guessing!" That is about it, educated guessing. The Admiralty designed the Admiral class battlecruisers, based on their best guesses about the Mackensens. The Alaska class cruisers were designed based on best guesses about an IJN class of heavy cruisers. The 1938 conference between the US and UK regarding where to set the new displacement limit, was based on their best guess about the size of the Yamato, and their own facilities. Reportedly, the UK wanted a limit of 42,000 due to limits of facilities around the empire (which really makes you wonder if the G3 and N3 were intended to be built, or a bluff, only bargaining chips to be traded away for concessions by other parties to the treaty), while the US wanted 45,000, because that was what was needed to achieve their goals for speed, protection, and firepower. The only thing the US and UK could be reasonably sure of was that Yamato was going to be considerably over 35,000, which triggered the escalator clause. The estimates of how much over 35,000 could have been colored by the parties own agendas. I have read that the assessment was Yamato would be 45,000, which was what the US wanted. I wonder if British Intelligence was saying 42,000, because that was what the Admiralty wanted? The actual data in hand was imprecise. As we saw with Bismark and Littorio, you could be significantly over the treaty limit, without the UK and US catching on. That is why I suggest that, had Yamato not been so far over the limit, but closer to Bismark and Littorio, the US and UK might have not had the confidence to call the IJN on it, and increase the displacement limit.
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  233. wrt the question on the F2A, as Drac said, the first problem was weight. The early models were quite agile. "Pappy" Boyington praised it's handling. But the Navy wanted armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, more guns, more ammo, and weight grew. Besides a disastrous impact on performance, the increased weight lead to more landing gear failures. In Aussie hands, the planes were put on a diet: all the armor, except that directly behind the pilot, was removed. The wing 50 cal machine guns were replaced with .303s. Besides the reduced weight of the .303 guns and their ammo, putting the weight reduction out on the wins would also reduce rotational inertia, which improves roll rate. The life raft and Brewster provided radio, which did not work worth a hoot, were also removed. As modified, the Aussie Buffs apparently pretty much held their own against the early Japanese army fighters. Another problem was the engines installed on the Aussie and far east RAF Buffs. There was apparently a shortage of Wright Cyclones, so the planes built for export were fitted with worn out airline castoffs (the DC-2 used the Cyclone) that had been 'refurbished" by Wright. Whether due to the engines being refurbs, or the fundamental design of the engine, I don't know, but the Buffs in far east service also tended to overheat and blow out their oil. Given that the Cyclone was also used in the SBD and B-17, I would lean toward laying the engine's ill temper in the export Buffs on their state of wear, in spite of being "refurbished". Best moves to improve the Buff, besides the weight reduction program the Aussies gave them, would be actual, new, Cyclones, or Pratt Twin Wasps, like the earlier, Grumman-built, F4Fs had. Or, take the entire program away from Brewster and give it to someone who knew how to run an aircraft factory, and had capacity available.
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  236. Drac, I started looking in to the Courageous class "large light cruisers" some days ago. There are two narratives about them that I see repeated over and over: 1: they were built with shallow draft to operate in the Baltic. and, 2: they were converted to carriers because of the Washington treaty. I can't find any support for either of those narratives that makes any sense. As you point out in your piece on the Courageouses, the Germans could send any capital ships into the Baltic that they wanted via the Kiel Canal. If the Courageouses were the only big gun ships the RN could get into the Baltic, they would be dead meat when the entirety of the High Seas Fleet came over the horizon. If the RN could get other capital ships into the Baltic, there is no reason to build the Courageouses. The WNT appears to not regard the Courageouses as "capital ships". The Courageouses do not appear on the capital ship disposal list, nor the capital ship retention list, nor is there any verbiage that I can find in the treaty compelling their conversion. Why were the Courageouses built? One person on another forum has offered a scenario that makes sense: the Courageouses were built as cruiser killers that were small and cheap enough, in relative terms, to build in large quantity. That scenario has the virtue of making sense. The Courageouses cost a third less than the Renowns, and used fewer of the limited inventory of twin 15" turrets per ship, allowing more of them to be built. Have you ever heard of this alternative to the generally accepted scenarios?
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  245. USN procurement choices in 1936. That is a "target rich environment", especially BuOrd. It wasn't just the ineffective Mk 14 detonators. The air launched Mk 13 torp suffered multiple failure modes including the motor not starting, sinking, running too deep and running erratically. In a live fire exercise in the summer of 41, of 10 Mk 13s fired, only 1 ran hot, straight and normal. Once BuOrd was convinced the failures were not all pilot error and went to work, the faults were corrected and the Mk 13 was an excellent weapon, by late 44. Then there was the 1.1" AA gun. Looked good on paper, liquid cooling and an automatic ammo feed system so it could fire continuously, with a larger shell and greater range than the 25mm AA guns then available. But the 1.1" had multiple jam modes, plus the human factors issue of not having adequate room for the loaders to do their job. The Navy produced a color newsreel film about Midway that has several short looks at a couple 1.1s, firing. In the first 3 looks, the 1.1" in the foreground is blasting away with all 4 guns and looking very formidable. In the 4th glimpse, only the gun on the right end is firing, the other three are all stopped. The 1.1's faults were never corrected. If BuOrd was not going to conduct adequate development programs and deliver reliable weapons, they should have overcome their "not invented here" bias and bought weapons from other services. so we would have gone into the war with Brit Mk VIIIs in subs, Brit Mk XIIs in aircraft, and Bofors AA guns.
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  253. wrt the question about the 14" guns on the KGVs, British cordite seems to be considerably less dense than USN smokeless powder. While the weight of the charge in the British guns is less, the chamber size of the British guns is significantly larger. This is also true of the 16"/45 used on the Nelsons vs the 16"/45 used on the US Colorado class. The muzzle velocity of the British guns is a bit lower, but a lower muzzle velocity results in a higher trajectory and steeper angle of fall, which is better able to penetrate deck armor. The debate about whether to stay with 16", or having more guns by downscaling to 14", was a long standing debate. The USN had had exactly the same debate 20 years earlier. The head of BuOrd insisted that engagements would always be fought at 12,000 yards or less, a 14" could penetrate well enough, and, being smaller, more 14" could be carried. The USN General Board looked at the engagement ranges at Jutland, overruled the head of BuOrd, and made long range gunnery the priority. As Drac said, the choice for the KGVs was dependent on the same condition that the head of BuOrd had specified in 1915: engaging at short range. I have another theory about the move to 14" guns. UK industry's capacity to make large guns had atrophied since WWI. The guns for the KGVs had to be ordered by late 35, before the change to 14" was specified by the Second London Treaty, to meet the construction schedule for the ships. I have read that the new 14" was designed to fit in the same cradle as the earlier 13.5"/45. When Tiger and most of the Iron Dukes were scrapped in the early 30s, the Admiralty retained many of the 13.5" guns. Navweaps says 54 of those guns were in inventory in 1939. It may be possible that the Admiralty designed the KGV gun mounts for backward compatibility. If there was a development or production problem with the new 14"/45, I think it is possible the Admiralty was looking at completing some or all of the KGVs with the 13.5" as a stopgap.
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  264. wrt the question about the RN pushing for the reduction to 14" guns in Second London. Nothing prevented the Brits using 14" guns in the earlier treaties, if they wanted to do that to provide, what in their assessment, was a better balanced ship. The French had built the Dunkerques well below treaty maximums in both guns and displacement. Seems it's more a matter of the RN trying to use the treaty to force everyone else to build what the RN wants, rather than everyone else working their own design within the original parameters. This was done again wrt carriers. Seems the Brits did a survey of their repair facilities around the empire and found that some facilities could only handle a carrier of 23,000 tons, not the 27,000 tons the earlier treaties had allowed. So, Ark Royal was built to 22,000 and the Illustrious class built to 23,000. And, Second London cut the carrier tonnage limit to what the Brits wanted to build, not what any other party was capable of building. The "escalator clause" of Second London only covered the gun size increase from 14" to 16". It did not include the displacement increase. The displacement increase was negotiated between the US and UK in early 38, and, again, the Brits tried to limit the increase to the 41-42,000 ton range, the largest British facilities could handle. The US held out for 45,000, which they finally got in mid 38, enabling the Iowas. Without so much time wasted due to British obstruction wrt the tonnage increase, the US could have skipped the slow, cramped, South Dakotas and gone straight to the Iowas that they really wanted.
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  268.  @BrigadierBill  iirc, Germany was trying to get on the Naval Treaty system, as it would supersede the limits of the Versailles treaty. The allies were trying to find some way to prevent the construction of the Deutschlands, which complied with the letter of the Versailles treaty. A switch to the Naval Treaty system would manifest itself one of two ways: the Deutschlands would be classified as cruisers, with gun size limited to 8", which would make them slow, underarmed, heavy cruisers, or the ships would be made larger/more expensive, mounting guns up to 16". So, presume the allies allowed Germany to join the treaty system early enough to forestall construction of the Deutschlands, what happens, is the question? I would expect that Germany would go straight to the Scharnhorsts. Without already having the 11" gun in hand, because the Deutschlands were not built, Germany would probably go straight to 15", buying the technology, if not the guns themselves, from Italy, if need be, to advance the construction schedule. The knock-on effects would be interesting too. If Germany was allowed to build 35,000 ton battleships, pleas to France to build the Dunkerques below treaty limits would probably fall on deaf ears. Without Strasbourg clogging up the St Nazaire drydock. Jean Bart could have been laid down at the same time as Richelieu, so they both would have been commissioned just as France fell, and escaped to French West Africa. As Dunkereque and Strasboug would not exist, the Mers el Kabir attack would probably not have happened as all that would have been there would be two hopelessly obsolete battleships and a handful of DD.
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  269. Very interesting interview. Thanks for offering it. A couple observations: no-one is ever fully prepared for war. I have yet to hear a General or Admiral not say "if we had had another year (or two), to prepare, we would have been in a better position". As a wise man once said "no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy". wrt the USN figuring out that a thrust across the Pacific to defend the Philippines or Guam would run a gauntlet of Japanese held islands: the Marianas and Carolines had been Spanish colonies prior to 1899. With the US having paid Spain to give up it's claims to the Philippines and Guam for payment of some $12M, Spain sold the Marianas and Carolines to Germany for about $4M. Japan, as an ally of the UK, rolled up these German colonies in WWI, and continued to hold them under a League of Nations mandate. The US could have avoided that situation by buying all the Spanish colonies in 1899, rather than cherry picking the two properties they did, thus preventing any potential enemy sitting astride the supply lines to the Philippines. wrt the US having bases in the Caribbean: I did some back of the envelope calculations of the value of all the UK held islands, plus British Honduras, by extrapolating what the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917. As it turned out, the total value of the West Indies colonies was just about equal to the debt the UK owed the US after WWI. At the same time, Arthur Balfour wrote a note to the French ambassador to the UK saying that, if it was up to the UK, it would forgive France's debt to the UK, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was demanding repayment in full, with interest, in cash, the UK needed the cash from France. If the UK had signed over the colonies to the US, it would wash out the UK's debt to the US. Then the UK could follow through on Balfour's proposal and cancel all the debts owed it by it's allies, because, again, allied debts to the UK were almost exactly what the UK owed the US, so, again, the debts wash out. Then the Caribbean becomes essentially a US lake. This colony for debt swap was widely discussed in the press at the time, but Lloyd-George and President Harding both said "no". On the USN's severe shortage of scouts: this became glaringly evident in a pair of exercises in early 1916, when the weather was less than ideal. The DDs that were supposed to do the scouting were forced back to port, while the BBs plowed ahead, with no idea what lay over the horizon. It did not go well for the "attacking" force. Shortly after the US entered WWI, capital ship construction was given much lower priority, so that resources could be focused on addressing the US' deficiency in scouting and ASW forces. Three of the Colorado class, which had not been laid down, were postponed until after the war, and work on Maryland, Tennessee and California was slowed to a crawl. Maryland and Tennessee were laid down in April and May, respectively, of 1917, days or weeks after the US' declaration of war, escaping the postponement that delayed the other three Coloradoes. Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare Feb 1, announcing it's intention to sink without warning neutral flagged ships, including those from the US, in the designated war zone, reneging on a promise made in 1915. As if that was not enough of a defacto declaration of war on the US, the Zimmerman telegram was a further provocation. Bottom line, unlike 1941, the US' declaration of war in April was not a response to a surprise, but a culmination of a long series of provocations that afforded the US plenty of time for planning prior to making the declaration. I can't help but wonder if there was discussion in the Wilson administration and the Navy Department to take a page from the Admiralty's book of 1914 and cancel the Tennessees and Coloradoes outright, for the same reasons, before Tennessee and Maryland were laid down, and scrapping California on the slipway (a photo from March of 17 shows all that had been assembled of California was the keel and bottom of the hull), so that three more slipways, steel and manpower would be available to address the USN's critical shortage of smaller ships.
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  277. @Ranari's Brawling Channel oh, goody! Another alternate history question. OK, so the US goes to the Washington treaty committee and snivels that the Japanese have 4 battle cruisers and the Brits have 4 battle cruisers, but the US doesn't have any. After much discussion, the committee settles on breaking out BCs as a separate class of capital ships, with a quota of, say 120,000 tons total, with that tonnage deducted from the allotment for BBs. Lets further say that the same mechanism used for carriers is used for BCs, so that 2 currently under construction that exceed the 35,000 ton limit can be completed. That gets the US two Lexingtons built as BCs, and two built as carriers. So, what would the USN do with them prior to the war? Occurs to me that with crazy fast CVs and BCs, the USN could develop tactics for a fast raiding force: planes find and assess the target, maybe soften it up, then the BCs finish them off. They could influence USN tactics to favor speed to the point where the North Carolinas and South Dakotas aren't built, unless they are lightened and lengthened enough to top 30kts. How would the Lexingtons be updated? I have seen models built by people speculating on that question, and they came out looking very much like Iowas. How would that work out? USN architects look at the speed and armor requirements, and the 35,000 ton limit, in the mid 30s and declare it "impossible", so nothing is laid down, while they wait. Japan gave notice they would no longer abide by the naval treaties on Dec 19, 1934, so the USN architects pull out a clean sheet and start working on a design assuming the collapse of the treaties. With the conclusion of negotiations with the Brits on June 30 of 38, setting the displacement limit at 45,000 tons, which is what the US wanted, contracts for the Iowas are issued on July 1, 38, one year sooner than historical. Iowa and New Jersey laid down Nov 1, 38, because North Carolina and South Dakota are not clogging up the ways. Both launch in June 40 and commission in April/May 41. Two more Iowas are laid down in 39 and commission in 42, because the South Dakotas aren't clogging up the ways at Newport News and Fore River. Then the last pair of Iowas is laid down in Brooklyn and Philly the day after Iowa and New Jersey launch, commissioning in 43. The question then is are the Montanas laid down, or is all the capital ship material used for the Essex swarm?
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  286.  @Dave_Sisson  The US taking over all the West Indies colonies would require some artful spin. The US had prohibition at the time, and a significant industry in the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, was rum production. Puerto Rico had been defined as part of the US, and Puerto Rican citizens as citizens of the US by the Jones Act, so Puerto Rico had prohibition, but the US apparently did not impose prohibition in the Philippines. The Caribbean was pretty much an American lake anyway. The US invaded Haiti in 1915, and invaded the Dominican Republic and Mexico in 1916. Cuba? The US invaded a second time in 1906. The US intervened in Central America so many times that British Honduras would have been an exceptionally handy base. Besides, from my readings, by 1920, British Honduras had more trade with the US than with the UK. The West Indies were not particularly of strategic value to the UK, as most of the UK's colonies are around the Indian Ocean, but the West Indies are on the US' doorstep, and control access to the Panama Canal. I added a postscrip to my question in the post last month: there was a lot of chatter in US newspapers at the time about what a great deal it would be for the US to swap the IOUs the UK had written for the islands, but Lloyd George said no, Harding said no and the Prince of Wales said no. I wish I could jump in the WABAC machine and ask why they were against it. It's not like the UK never gave up a territorial claim before. There was a lot of trading real estate back and forth when the border between the US and Canada was set at the 49th parallel. The US had been buying land from other powers since 1803. I don't understand what the problem was. I would jump at the chance to pay a debt with dirt, instead of gold.
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  307. KGV turret faces are an interesting topic in themselves. Since the turn of the century, a sloping turret face had been the thing, to better deflect an incoming shell upward. The KGV turret face is near vertical. According to some of my reading, the thinking was that a shell coming in on a high ballistic trajectory would hit a sloping face near square, increasing it's chance of penetration. So the KGV turret face was designed vertical, so the high angle shell would strike a glancing blow, decreasing the probability of penetration. But, to get the vertical face, while keeping the trunnions where they needed to be for turret balance, required the front of the turret to be very short. The quad turret front on the KGVs is so short it doesn't cover the top of the barbette, so the turret has an armored skirt in front of the turret face, to cover the barbette. So, instead of an inbound shell penetrating a sloping turret face, on the KGV, the high shell hits the vertical face and is deflected downward. iirc, angle of incidence equals angle of deflection, so the shell would probably hit the deck, not that skirt that covers the barbette. To hit the skirt, the shell, or bomb, would need to fall vertically. But Admiralty fighting instructions said to close to 12-16,000 yards, where trajectories are flatter. At 16,000 yards, the angle of fall of a shell from Bismark is only 10.4 degrees, nearly square to the KGVs vertical turret face. So, seems they built a turret optimized for 20,000+ yards on a ship that was supposed to engage at 16,000 or less.
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  317.  @kemarisite  wrt to the 1.1" jamming issue: there is a color film about Midway that was produced by the Navy. In that film are 2, maybe 3, good shots of a pair of 1.1s firing. In the first shot or two, the guns look very formidable. In the last shot, on the mount in the foreground, only the right side gun is firing. As you said, the loading machine was designed so that the guns could be reloaded while firing, so 3 out 4 guns on that mount have stoppages for something other than a reload. So, in maybe 5 seconds total, of those two mounts, a total of 8 guns, firing, the camera caught 3 stoppages. The early 1.1 mounts were made by Ford Electric. While faster than the 96 mount, they were also unreliable. Later 1.1 mounts made by GE were reliable, and retained for use with Bofors guns when the 1.1s were discarded. It's a hard choice between the two, because of the 1.1's unreliability. A couple drydocks back, someone asked Drac what he would do if he was in charge of USN procurement in 1935. I added to his response that, as BuOrd had already been working on the 1.1 for a few years, and it still wasn't satisfactory, and the 40mm Bofors was in production in 35, I would be sending a cablegram to Sweden, inviting Bofors to send a demonstration team over, pronto, followed by production orders for mass numbers of Bofors to be installed on everything from DEs on up. iirc, The Navy finally did have a shootoff, between the 1.1, Bofors, the 37mm the Army was using and the Vickers, which the Bofors won, but valuable time had been lost.
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  333. The question of why only two Nelsons vs three Colorados and two Nagaots was discussed at length in another forum recently. No really satisfying answer had been determined. The WNT divided ships into "pre-Jutland" and "post-Jutland" groups. Hood was placed in the "post-Jutland" group, in spite of being a pre-Jutland design, with a few modifications. But the US Tennessee and California, both laid down after Hood, were deemed pre-Jutland, but the Colorados, essentially repeats of the Tennessees. except for the upgrade to 16" guns, were deemed post-Jutland. One of the participants in that other forum is a professional historian, who has the minutes of meetings held at Secretary Hughes' home, between some of the delegates. Materials from that era quote British officials as saying outright that Hood was not really post-Jutland. Hughes talks about "efficiency" in the meeting minutes, without really describing what he means by that term. There apparently was very little discussion of technical issues. Running the math, the throw weight of the 12-14" battery on a Tennessee is almost identical to that of the 8-16" battery of a Colorado. The 16" guns have more penetration at range, but the larger number of 14" guns give a greater probability of a hit. This was the subject of a titanic argument in the Navy Department in 1915-16. My seat of the pants suspicion is that Hood was officially deemed post-Jutland as a piece of diplomatic art, because the UK needed three "post-Jutland" ships, because of the Nagatos, but did not want to pay for a third Nelson.
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  337.  @SPR-Ninja  the promoters of 14" always base their position on the ships being able to close to a range where the 14" can penetrate. During 1915-16, Admiral Strauss at BuOrd kept insisting that engagements would always be fought at 12,000 yards, or less. SecNav Daniels and the General Board overruled Strauss in the summer of 16, after Jutland proved it was practicable to engage at longer range. Admiralty fighting instructions that the KGVs were designed for also dictated engagements be fought at relatively short range, less than 16,000. An Admiralty analysis of a KGV with 14" guns and a hypothetical 15" KGV showed the 15" gunned ship would have a penetration range advantage on the order of 1,000 yards. There was another factor one book brought up about those Admiralty fighting instructions: the instructions were, in part, based on the assumption that the remote gun directors would be knocked out, so the ship would need to be close enough for the guns to hit anything under local control. Apparently, Bismark's remote directors were knocked out. Scaling off of the map of the engagement I find on-line, KGV and Rodney appear to have been following the fighting instructions and been within 16,000 yards, but Bismark couldn't hit anything with turrets under local control, so the premise of the fighting instructions, that you could hit anything under local control at that range appears to be wrong. But the "why 14"?" question, and why change the treaty limit, as nothing prevented the KGVs being built below treaty limits, are still there. Raven says the UK pushed the treaty change to prevent the US and Japan building 16" ships, but, by going to 14", the UK handed the French, Italians, and Germans, gunnery superiority with their 15" ships, so that makes no sense. The only thing that makes sense is someone clinging to the "more smaller guns equals more hits" theory and everything else is excuses, intended to obfuscate embrace of a theory that had been discredited twenty years earlier. Bottom line, I figure the KGVs did OK. Three of them squared off against other capital ships, and survived. (there are some claims that Lindemann wanted to finish off the PoW, but was overruled by Lutjens) The only one to be defeated, was defeated by aircraft.
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  338.  @jarmokankaanpaa6528  I agree with everything you say, in general. There are circumstances where a deck hit might be easier or preferable. In the case of Hood, iirc, Hood was heading, more or less, toward Bismark, so the target presented by the hull would appear smaller, a shell would hit at an angle, limiting it's penetration, and there was no way to mitigate the angle of impact. But the deck target area offered would be the same as if Hood was on a parallel course. The armor penetration table for Bismark's guns doesn't go below 20 degrees, because a hit at that angle would ricochet off, but there is a way to mitigate that angle of impact issue on a deck hit: use a reduced charge. My theory is that Bismark's gunners knew their business, only loaded the main charge in the guns, fired at a higher angle, going for a deck hit, and the eyewitness testimony by Captain Leach of a deck hit is correct. Unfortunately, the extracts from USN gunnery tables that I have access to are partial, so I can't find the exact angle of fall at the range, approx 19,000 yards, where Hood was hit, and the characteristics of Bismark's guns would be different. As close as i can come is a USN 14" at 14,500 yards: angle of fall at full charge 12 degrees, 5 minutes. For a reduced charge: 20 degrees 53 minutes, which is getting to the angle where a shell could punch through Hood's deck armor. The actual shot being at a longer range, the angle of fall on Hood would be greater. On the side hit issue, the term I could not recall last night was "danger space". For that same USN 14" the danger space with a full charge and a 20' high target was 31 yards. From the drawings and pix, Hood appears to have had between 25 and 30 feet of freeboard midships, so the side hit danger space would be correspondingly larger. Hood's beam was 104ft, or a bit over 34 yards. Given the angle Hood was at, the effective range difference between the near side and far side of the deck would be quite a bit larger than 34 yards. Captain Leach testified that Bismark was firing half salvos, and two hit short and one long, or one short, two long, he didn't recall which, and he had an "impression" the fourth shell landed near the mast.
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  358.  @thehandoftheking3314  As I understand, you are asking about a WWI scenario similar to the WWII scenario of recycling the turrets from the WWI Courageous class battlecruisers on HMS Vanguard as a time and cost saving expedient. These are some of the issues to run into recycling guns and turrets from the 1890s on new-build ships circa 1914: First, the turrets are 20 years old. Turrets from the 1890s vintage Majestic class battleships were installed on monitors during WWI to provide fire support. First issue was the turrets needed to be modified to allow much higher elevation, so they could fire to a greater range. The second issue, discovered after the monitors were in use, was the systems in the turrets, like the hydraulics, were old and brittle and frequently broke down. Another issue was that the older guns, being designed for short range, were only 25-35 caliber, so inaccurate at longer range. Another problem was some pre-1900 guns were designed for black or brown powder and performance was sub-optimal with smokeless or Cordite. The USN had a particularly bad run in the early 1900s as their designers did not understand the dynamics of smokeless and the 8"/40s and 12"/40s that were, supposedly, designed for smokeless blew their muzzles off with disturbing regularity, requiring an extensive rebuild and reinforcement program be implemented. Then there was the safety issue. Early turrets were designed with single stage hoists operating in the open. There was a disastrous incident on USS Georgia in, iirc, 1904 where an ember in the gun from a previous shot (they didn't have air purge systems in the guns then either) touched off the first bags rammed for the next shot. The flames shooting out of the breech ignited the other bags sitting on the hoist, Burning chunks of propellant fell down the open hoist and ignited more bags in the handling room at the bottom of the hoist, next to the magazine. Probably the only reason Georgia didn't go up like a Roman candle was USN smokeless is a bit less volatile than Cordite. Some 35 men died. They retrofitted trunks and shutters around those open hoists, but later turrets, with two stage hoists, are much safer. Then there is the simple issue of size. Early pre-dreadnought guns were typically 12". By WWI, 14-15 inch guns were the thing.
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  368. The Caribbean could have been a virtual US lake, from 1922. Arthur Balfour sent a letter to the French ambassador to the UK in 1922, which was openly published by the UK government, saying that, if it was up to the UK, they would cancel the debts owed it by the allies, and forego reparations from Germany, but, as the US was demanding debt repayment in cash, the UK had no choice but to demand repayment from it's allies, in cash. As an exercise, some time ago, I looked in to the market value of all the British colonies in the Caribbean circa 1920. Using the price per square mile that the US paid Denmark for the Virgin Islands in 1917, I found the value of all the British held islands, plus British Honduras, almost exactly equaled the entire UK war debt to the US, specifically equal to all the loan principle and about half of accrued interest. Coincidentally, the war debts owed by the other allies to the UK almost exactly equaled the UK's debt to the US. Hypothetically, if the UK had bartered it's West Indies colonies to the US, which would make the Caribbean approaches to the canal a virtual US lake, the UK could then cancel the debts owned it by all the other allies as it would be a wash with the cancellation of UK debts to the US. What a different world the interwar years would have been if all that debt had vanished. There was a lot of chatter about a US/UK land for debt swap in US newspapers at the time, but President Harding said no, Lloyd George said no, so that was the end of it.
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  378.  @rickyc8958  The RM's issue seemed to be more a matter of fuel and leadership. Some things I have read about the Caracciolo class are not very complimentary, like that the torpedo protection was inadequate. That being said, after all the money spent updating the Cavours and Dorias in the 30s, they were well short of state of the art too. At lease the Caraccoilos started out with better speed capability. It's doubtful that the Caracciolos could have been completed before the Washington Treaty went into effect. The Caracciolo was built up enough to launch, to clear the ways, in the spring of 20. If Italy had had the money, which it didn't, that one could probably have been completed by the end of 21. Ansaldo had Columbo about 5% done, overall. The Orlando and Odero yards had made even less progress on their ships. If Italy had the money, which it didn't, it could have argued at the Washington conference that, as the US and UK were both allowed to complete two ships after the treaty went into effect, Italy should receive the same courtesy, but if they did that, then Italy would not have had the 1927 and 1929 BB construction windows, which they used to build the first two Littorios. Given a choice between two updated Caracciolos and two Littorios, I would go with the Littorios every time. The other issue with completing the Caracciolos is most of the 24 guns that had been made for them had been diverted to other uses. 7 of the Ansaldo built guns had been transferred to the army, which mounted 4 of them on railroad carriages that were on the firing line for almost 2 years. The other two Ansaldos were mounted on a monitor of particularly eccentric design, and spent a few months on the firing line. Two of the Terni built guns were installed as shore batteries near Venice, which left one Terni as a spare. Four of the Pozzuoli built guns were used as shore batteries at Brindisi. Two Pozzuolis were installed on an improvised monitor that foundered in a storm. Two more Pozzuolis were installed on improvised monitors that survived the war. So, of the 24 guns built for the Caracciolos, there were only 3 Ansaldos, 1 Terni and 4 Pozzuolis that were in new condition and could be made available. This is where it gets complicated. The guns were supposed to all have the same ballistic performance, but they were different designs. The Pozzuolis were designed by Armstrong, the Ternis by Vickers and the Ansaldos were a monobloc design by Schneider. By 1919, I don't think this mess could have been cleaned up at anything resembling reasonable cost to get even two Caracciolos built, and if they did, they would have lost authority to build two Littorios a dozen years later. And that is probably far more than you anticipated learning about the Caracciolos.
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  410. ​ @admiralrover74  in general, that would be the case. I looked up the specific information for the 14"/45 and 15"/42, and it almost looks like the 14" was designed to replicate the performance of the 15", in a smaller, lighter package, rather than exploiting twenty years of advances in technology to produce a higher performance gun. The tables on Navweaps for these guns are expressed in degrees of elevation required to reach a specific range. For the 14": 13.75 degrees reaches 20,000yds, 19.25 degrees reaches 25,000. For the 15": 13.8 degrees reaches 20,000, 19.2 reaches 25,000. For the 14" striking velocity at 20/25K are 1563fps/1459. For the 15" @ 20/25k: 1556fps/1461. Angle of fall 14" @20/25K: 18.2/26.4. For the 15" @ 20/25K: 18.3/26.3. Armor penetration: 14" @ 20/25K: 11.2"/9.5" 15" @ 20/25K: 11.7/10.2". What was a 14" capable of in 1935? The USN rebuilt it's 14"/50s in the mid 30s and significantly improved their performance over their 1915 configuration. Performance of the rebuilt Mk 11 guns: range: 12 degrees yields 20,000yds and 17.6 gives 26,000 (not a typo, the tables do not give an elevation for 25K for an AP shell) Impact velocity (muzzle velocity was 2700) @ 20K/25K: 1588/1455. Penetration @20/25K: 13.75/11.27". Angle of fall at 20/25K: 16.33/24.8. According to the footnotes of the tables, the penetration data for both US and UK guns were calculated using a USN formula, so they should be comparable to each-other. Bottom line, for the typical BB armor belt of 13-14", the US 14" can penetrate at longer range than either British gun, and it's flatter trajectory will produce a wider danger space, improving the odds of a hit. The cost of the higher performance for the US gun is higher barrel wear due to the higher muzzle velocity, barrel life being on the order of 200 rounds, vs 340 for the 14"/45.
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  431.  @cycloneranger7927  that question was being asked when 16" guns were selected for the Colorados in 1916. iirc, the official answer from the USN was that the New Mexicos would not have been cost efficient to try to convert during construction. Tennessee and California were not laid down until after the decision on the Colorados had been made, in the summer of 16. From what I can find, the barbettes of the Tennessee's are the same diameter as those on the Colorados: 32 feet. The part of the twin 16" turret that extends down into the barbette on the Colorados is actually about 6" smaller in diameter than the triple 14". I'm going by memory here, but sticks in my mind that the turrets for the Tennessees had not been built yet, when the decision was made to go to 16" for the Colorados, they were still in design. So, yes, by everything I see, it would have been feasible to build Tennessee and California with 16" guns. Now, we get to the complications. BuOrd had ordered 14"/50 guns for the New Mexicos, Tennessees, and the battlecruisers, in one lot. The Navy had those 14" guns coming out it's ears. Shifting the Tennessees to 16", with so much money already sunk into building the 14"/50s would have had Congress in an uproar about the waste. Then we get to the Washington Naval Treaty. In a feat of diplomatic art, Hood was deemed "post-Jutland" even though it was designed before the battle. Tennessee and California, both laid down after Hood, and with a more advanced armor and torpedo protection system, were deemed "pre-Jutland", while the Colorados, a near-repeat of the Tennessees, but with 16" guns, were deemed "post-Jutland". I lay the difference between the "pre" and "post" ships to the Tennessees having 14" guns. If the Tennessees were built with 16", it would have been nearly impossible to insist they were "pre" ships. With Tennessee and California 16" armed and deemed "post-Jutland", the US would not have been allowed to complete Colorado or West Virginia. After the treaty went into effect, upgunning the ships was prohibited. As for getting more speed out of the standards, you are dealing with multiple problems with the turbo-electric ships, because, even having more steam, you would need to install uprated turbines, uprated generators, and uprated final drive motors. The interior arrangement of the ships was specialized for TE drive, making it impossible to shift to modern geared turbines, for anything resembling a reasonable cost. And the ships were still short and fat. Lengthening them to improve speed would add even more cost, and, as they were already over 30,000 tons, there may not have been enough room left before hitting the 35,000 ton treaty limit, to lengthen them enough to significantly improve speed. The Italian Andrea Doria class gained about 4,000 tons in their rebuild, but they started far below the 35,000 ton limit.
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  456.  @WaverleyWanderer  your question sounds close to what I proposed in the ship profile post Q&A a couple days ago: what if the WNT gave the RN two licenses for future BB construction in 1927 and 29, like France and Italy received, instead of being allowed to build the Nelsons immediately. As Todd said, the bar on BB speed had been raised significantly by 1930. In planning the KGV,s seems the Admiralty did not even seriously consider 16" guns when First London permitted them. I ran some quick estimates and the three triple 15" armament proposed for the KGVs would have weighed 850 tons more than the 14" armament the ships ultimately received. I would suspect that, with 1930 powerplants, it could be impossible to build a heavily armored. 28 kt, ship with the weight of 9-16" guns. I'm sure there was a reason the Admiralty wanted 14" guns on the KGVs, and negotiated the gun size reduction in Second London. The Admiralty didn't revisit 16" guns until the collapse of the treaty system allowed them to increase displacement to over 40,000. Considering the alternative, I suspect that, with the two licenses in hand, the RN would not have responded to the Deutschlands, as they apparently didn't even consider the Deutschlands enough of a threat to spend the money to modernize both Renowns at that time. Most likely, and best outcome, for the RN, would be to see the first two Littorios laid down in 34, and use the licenses to advance the timeline for the KGV class, laying down KGV and Prince of Wales in 36, with Duke of York and Anson laid down on January 1 of 37. That would have the RN, at the time of Bismark's breakout, with four KGVs in commission, instead of two KGVs and two old, slow, Nelsons.
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  460.  @baronungernthebloody553  there was no "American military giant" until WWII. TR postured with the "Great White Fleet", but most of those ships were obsolete when they made the trip around the world. The US could handle Spain in 98, but declined an opportunity when it only took the Philippines and Guam, instead of all of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific. I wonder if the US could have engaged in WWI prior to April 1917, as it had been involved in "big stick" waving exercises in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in 16. When the US did engage in WWI, it was with French artillery and French and British aircraft. By some accounts, the Navy Bill of 1916 was in response to British interference in US trade. By some accounts, the RN was seizing neutral US ships carrying goods to neutral European countries, on the possibility of the goods being transshipped to Germany,, then selling the cargoes, and sometimes the ships, and the crown pocketing the proceeds. The 1916 bill was intended to build a fleet capable of standing up to the RN. Interest in building a fleet "second to none" came to a screeching halt when the Harding administration took office in 1921. Secretary Hughes' initial treaty proposal was an immediate stop to all capital ship building, because the US didn't want to spend another dime and wanted a way out from under the contracts with the shipyards. The treaty was supposed to give the USN parity with the RN, but reality is far from it. Look at the retention lists. The treaty gave the RN more tonnage, more ships and more firepower than the USN. The original Hughes proposal had the US retaining six battleships with 12" guns, while West Virginia, Colorado and Washington, all in an advanced state of construction, would be scrapped. Even the oldest ships retained by the RN in Hughes' proposal had 13.5" guns with substantially more throw weight, and they were newer than the 12" gun USN ships. The RN was also given licenses to build the Nelsons. The Colorados and Nagatos were 1916 designs. The Nelsons were a six year newer design that could fully exploit wartime experience. The US was clearly negotiating from a weak position, and everyone knew it, but the objective was to stop US spending on ships. Frankly, I'm amazed the USN got the money for the carrier conversions. When Calvin Coolidge was POTUS in the mid 20s, seeing a request by the Army for money for aircraft, asked "why can't they buy one aeroplane, and take turns flying it?"
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  464. wrt the question about substitutes in the absence of the 20mm and 40mm guns, in my reading about the navy's AA gun competition, while the Vickers performed fairly well, apparently it did not function well using USN smokeless powder, and no-one in the US made cordite. Given that issue, I'm thinking they would have gone with the 37mm. The 37 apparently had a tendency to jam, but a proper cooling jacket may have solved that. The army version had a water chest, and, the crew was supposed to stop firing every 60 or 90 rounds, and flush water through the gun to cool it. The manual for the gun says if it jams, it's because it's too hot. The 37 was developed into a model that could be fed from either right or left, with simple modification, and switched from rigid clips, to metal belt ammo. The 37 has a significantly higher ceiling than the Vickers, though not quite as high as the Bofors. Given that the gun and ammo were already in production in the US, I would think logistics would have won the day and the 37mm would have been adapted. The 20mm Hispano never seemed to work right for the US, which is why US fighters tended to have .50 cal machine guns instead. Here's an odd thought. The aircraft version of the 37mm was light enough to use on a free mount, as was done on PT boats. A while back I looked at the numbers, and, iirc, the aircraft 37mm had range performance competitive with the 20mm. While it's rate of fire was slower, the weight of the shells was greater, so each would do much more damage to the target. If I was running BuOrd, I could see the M1 in twin and quad mounts replacing the Bofors, and the M4 replacing the Oerlikon.
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  490.  @pyronuke4768  I found an interesting clause in Second London: minimum values for a "capital ship": 17,000 tons and 10" guns. Anything smaller than than runs into the maximums for a cruiser: 10,000 tons and 8" guns. Second London does not explicitly limit the number of ships of a type, but the limit, is implicit, as the only mention of an exception to replacing ships when they age out, by the rules of the treaty, is when a ship is lost or destroyed by accident. Germany's Panzerschiff were exempt, because Germany was not a party to the naval treaty system when they were built. The Panzerschiff complied with the limits imposed by the Versailles treaty. Another factor is how much the county's industrial base for building warships had deteriorated between the wars. To complete the KGVs, between 40 and 42, they had to order the 14" guns in December 35. Some of the armor for the KGVs had to be contracted out to a company in Czechoslovakia. A couple weeks ago, I fired up SpringSharp to see what I could come up with, if the Admiralty had kept the armor and 13.5" armament when the Iron Dukes were scrapped, and needed something quick and cheap. I used the length and beam of Renown, deepened the draft 3 feet to improve beam strength of the hull, installed a KGV power plant, as it was already designed and in production, 5" deck armor, assuming it was bought out, maybe US STS, with 4 Iron Duke main turrets and the Iron Duke belt armor. The Iron Duke belt was skimpy, a narrow 12" band at the waterline, with 8" above. Outside of the skimpy belt, it worked out really well. SpringSharp gave a top speed of 29kts, stable gun platform, good sea boat, roomy and comfortable for the crew. The displacement came out over your 25,000. It was somewhere in the low 30s, within treaty limits. With your 25,000 limit, you will probably come up with something like Dunkerque. Roughly the same armor, armament, and speed, as my "HMS Expendable", but Dunkerque had the compromised armament layout, and everything was custom made and, thus, optimal, but expensive. Mine has a more flexible 2 twin turrets at each end, and is quick and cheap to build due to extensive use of existing material.
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  491.  @pyronuke4768  I understand what you are going for. We have to be mindful of the existing constraints. If you wait until the haggis hits the fan, to render the treaty irrelevant, you end up with something like the Alaskas, ordered in 40, but, by the time they are in commission, almost all of the IJN cruisers they were intended to kill had already been sunk. We need something that can commission in 40-41, which means it must be started during Second London. The RN was in a good position to build a lot of capital ships, except it didn't have the industrial capacity anymore. Second London said capital ships age out at 26 years. That means the RN can commission one ship in 40, two in 41, and 8 in 42. The UK only had the capacity to build the 5 KGVs new, from the keel up, not the 11 ships they could have commissioned. In the USN, Arkansas aged out in 38, the New Yorks in 40, and the Nevadas in 42, a total of 5, but, over that period, the US built 2 North Carolinas and 4 South Dakotas, so, looking at the situation from 1937, they had no more "replaceable" ships. The Italians, if they were abiding by Second London, could have called Roma and Impero replacements for two Cavours, leaving the two Dorias eligible to be replaced in 42. If you want to be Japanese, Russian or Dutch, you can do anything you want. The material you can buy from other countries would probably be limited by national security concerns of the selling countries. You are unlikely to be able to buy the latest and greatest guns and high pressure power plants from anyone you wish. Example, Vanguard was laid down 2 years after the South Dakotas, but Vanguard's plant ran at 350psi, rather than the 600psi of the South Dakota plant. There is also a logistics problem Different country's guns use different propellant. When the Admiralty bought some US made 14" in 1914, they had to buy US smokeless powder for them through the war. They tried RN cordite, but saw a significant loss of muzzle velocity and range. If you want to be the USN, you need to wait until Congress decided to ignore the treaty limits in mid 38. Then grab as much off the shelf hardware as possible, to speed construction, so they are in commission in 41. The USN had an abundance of new 14"/50s on the shelf. Maybe combine some of them with a 120,000hp Hornet powerplant. I have great fun with alt history scenarios, but, I dig into the details to see what was realistically possible.
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  495.  @Pavlos_Charalambous  iirc, the British naval advisors to Greece were recommending they buy more torpedo boats and destroyers, instead of sinking so much money into one or two big ships, but seems the politicians had other ideas. I read about how, when ordering Salamis, the Greek PM authorized a ship with three turrets that, iirc, could fit in the drydock. As soon as the PM was out of the country for a few days, a handful of movers and shakers in Parliament sent Vulcan a change order for the larger, more expensive, more heavily armed version that was actually built. When the PM arrived back in Greece and saw what they did, he tried to reverse the change order but Vulcan refused to allow the reversal. Vulcan really tended to play hardball with Greece. In 1912, Greece needed new destroyers desperately. They bought two V-class ships that Vulcan had built for the German navy, but, to compensate Vulcan for having to schedule two more Vs for the German navy, Vulcan required Greece to buy more torpedo boats. That is something I noticed about the battles of Elli and Lemnos: the Greek torpedo boats were a non-factor. I gather the Aetos class had empty tubes. The Niki and Thyella class ships must have had torpedoes on board. But the only Greek torpedo attacks I see mentioned are a couple raids in harbor, sinking an Ottoman ironclad that had been pretty much reduced to a hulk, and a gunboat, and the torpedo boats used on those occasions seem to be the oldest ones in Greek inventory.
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  497.  @davidlow8104  Drac has commented in the past that the IJN's building program was unsustainable due to the projected budget consuming so much of government revenue, so the IJN program would collapse of it's own weight. The US was demanding repayment, in full, of it's ally's war debt. When the depression hit, France immediately defaulted. The UK and Italy made partial payments as best they could, until Congress passed legislation that defined partial payment as a default, punishable by the same sanctions. With nothing to lose, the UK and Italy stopped making payments entirely. From that, I take that the five powers that were parties to the treaty were all under significant financial stress in 1930. Converting an existing battlecruiser to a carrier is very expensive. Converting Courageous to a carrier cost some 2M GBP, about the same as the cost to originally build her as a "large light cruiser". Building Ark Royal, from the keel up, cost 3M GBP, for a more capable ship with a larger air group. Converting an old battlecruiser to a carrier would have the same capacity restrictions as the Courageouses and Lexingtons, as well as the cost of an entire new powerplant: replacing direct drive turbines with geared turbines, replacing coal fired boilers with oil fired, converting coal bunkers to oil tanks, adding torpedo protection. The four G3s would barely be enough to replace the coal fired battlecruisers that survived the war, so I would expect the Renowns and Hood to be retained as they were. Likewise, the four N3s would barely replace the 12" armed dreadnoughts, let alone the 13.5" armed Orions, KGVs, and Iron Dukes The fleet size drawdown motivated by the state of the economy and the hypothetical 1930 treaty would probably see the last of the coal fired ships scrapped, rather than see any of them converted to carriers.
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  498. Washington Treaty era alt history. Right in Steve's wheelhouse. Historical basis: The 1916 Navy Bill had a cost limit on the first four BBs, which we know as the Colorados. There was no cost limit on the following six BBs, which we know as the South Dakotas. USN priorities changed when the US entered the war, and capital ships were put on the back burner. In June 1918, Congress included an amendment in the annual Navy Bill, requiring the Navy Department to make a start on the ships authorized in 16, but not yet started. That would be the three remaining Colorados, Lexingtons and South Dakotas. SecNav Daniels proceeded per plan. The Steve alt: Daniels says the 42,000 ton design, which Congress had approved, made the Colorados obsolete, so building the remaining three would be a waste. He proposes completing Maryland with 14"/50s, as BuOrd head Strauss had ordered them in quantity far in excess of need. Skip the 16"/45, and go straight to the 16"/50, laying down the South Dakotas as soon as practicable. There is a South Dakota class drawing dated 5-3-18, planned to be laid down in 1919. That drawing shows the ships with a displacement of 42,500 tons. 400 tons of that being reserve boiler feed water, and 1600 was fuel, which were omitted from treaty displacement calculations. Historically, the UK was willing to accept an individual ship displacement of 42,000 tons, due to Hood, so the South Daktoas, per the 1918 drawing, are golden. The final construction drawings for the South Dakotas are dated April 25, 1919, approved by Franklin Roosevelt, as "acting" SecNav. So we are looking at them being laid down in late 1919, at the earliest. There is no way they would be complete before the treaty, just as the three later Colorados were not complete, historically. Japan demands to be allowed to complete Tosa, because of Hood, giving Japan three "post-Jutland" ships with 16" guns, one being of 40,000-ish tons. Given the 5:5:3 ratio, that would mean the US could complete 5 of the South Dakotas, but Japan objects to the US having that many ships of that size, and the US doesn't want to spend that much money. The compromise reached is the US completes two South Dakotas, and is allowed to up-gun Maryland, Tennessee, and California to the 16"/45, if it wants to, giving the US 5 "post-Jutland", 16" armed, ships. The UK is then allowed to build one ship of up to 42,000 tons, and 3 32-35,000-ish ton "post-Jutland", 16" armed, ships.
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  535. Thank you for your reply. It appears that I can request my local library to transfer in a 1919 edition of Jane's, so I can look into this further. A 1920 or 21 edition would be preferable, but none are available in my area. I don't think Congress would have objected to going straight from the Tennessees to the SoDaks. Congress approved the SoDaks as designed, and the Colorados were not that much of an advance over the Tennessees. The Colorados had the advantage of being within the 35KT limit of the 1922 treaty, so the US was able to swap the Delawares for Colorado and West Virginia, as the Brits swapped 4 older BBs the treaty allowed them to keep for the clean sheet design Nelsons. Yes, the SoDaks exceeded the treaty limit by some 7-8KT. As carriers, the Lexingtons exceeded the treaty limit of 27KT, but the US got a clause added to the treaty allowing 2 conversions at 30KT, and apparently they were allowed another 3KT for their torpedo protection. How could the SoDak's displacement be reduced? The first thing that comes to mind would be deleting the #1 and #4 16" turrets with their associated barbettes, magazines, and extensions of the armor belt, then shortening the barbettes of #2 and #3 turrets to lower them to deck height. Somewhere between the flexibility in displacement cap, the allowance for torpedo protection and putting the SoDaks on a displacement reduction program, two SoDaks probably could have been completed, maybe three. If the entire Colorado class had been cancelled, the USN would be some 90KT short of the RN's battleship tonnage. Add the 40KT of the two Delawares to the existing 90KT deficit and there would be tonnage available for three SoDaks. Have you done a piece on the SoDaks? I haven't seen one.
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  536. wrt the two questions about the Courageouses, my first thought is that the cruiser fleet tonnage limits of First London would make it imperative the Courageouses be scrapped as soon as possible, as each Courageous scrapped would make tonnage available to build three new cruisers. On the other hand, by the time of First London, the Deutschland was building, and the Admiralty might think the Courageouses were the perfect thing to kill Deutschlands. As for a no Courageouses at all scenario, Jackie had tried to have a third Renown class, probably as Resistance, built, but his request was refused. The turrets were in hand, from the cancelled R-class ships. They probably would have ended up on monitors, or used on Hood, instead of the Mk II turrets being built from scratch. Regarding the impact on naval aviation, the Washington treaty does allow conversion of two ships that would otherwise be scrapped to be converted. The Wiki article on the G3s says there is no photographic evidence any of them were actually laid down. The G3s were so huge that they could probably not be cut down enough to get under the 33,000 limit anyway. The Lions were scheduled to be scrapped for treaty compliance. They are significantly shorter, and a bit beamier, than the Courageouses. Fit a modern, oil fired, plant, and their speed might be improved significantly. But the cost would probably be so great that the Admiralty would probably be better off building a clean sheet design. Without the Corageouses, something like Ark Royal would probably have been built in the late 20s.
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  596.  @IanLthestig  As Walterbroadous said, torps of the time were not self-propelled, but riding on the end of a pole mounted on the bow of a sub, like the Hunley, or a steam powered launch. Another point is the confusion about terminology. When Admiral Farragut said "Damn the torpedoes" the torpedoes he was referring to are what are now called "mines". With the spar torpedo, the boat would ram the warhead against the side of the ship, and the tip of the warhead would embed in the wooden hull. The launch would then pull away to a safe distance and detonate the warhead by means of pulling a rope. As the spar torpedoes were usually delivered by surface vessels the defense system adopted was a boom made of logs, floating on the surface, so an attacking torpedo boat would be stopped before it was close enough for the spar to reach the hull. Eons ago, I read of a successful attack, in spite of the log boom, so I looked it up. An attack against the Confederate ironclad Albemarle was lead by Lt William Cushing on the night of October 28, 1864. The Albemarle was defended by a log boom, but the logs had been in the water a long time and were covered with moss and slime. The logs were slippery enough that Cushing's launch rode up and over them, and the attack was successful, with the warhead holing Albermarle at the waterline. The ironclad quickly sank. Cushing had detonated the warhead immediately on contact and the concussion threw him and all his crew in the water. Most of the crew were captured, but Cushing and one other crewman were able to evade capture and make their way back to Union lines. For this action, Cushing received the "Thanks of Congress". The Cushing family seems to have produced men with an exceptionally large pair. Cushing's brother, an army artillery officer, received the Medal of Honor posthumously for defending his position at the Battle of Gettysburg.
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  614.  @christopherrowe7460  the USN did have a lot of input from the RN in carrier design. Stanley Goodall was seconded by the Admiralty to the USN during the war and was a major conduit of information between the USN Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Admiralty's chief constructor Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt. Goodall provided in depth information about Hood to the USN. Friedman's book on carriers goes on to describe the continuing exchange of information between the USN and RN in the 20s, The RN went to larger carriers during the war. As soon as the war ended, enthusiasm for carriers waned significantly and Eagle and Hermes were both long builds. Seems the IJN took the rational approach to carriers. Hosho was laid down in 1920, when Akagi and Kaga were both intended as big gun capital ships. It would be interesting to see where IJN carrier design would have gone without the intervention of the treaty, and that special clause the US wanted, allowing the conversion of outsized battlecruisers. Yes, the USN was designing 35-39,000 ton carriers before the treaty. You know how we Americans roll, always want to have a bigger one. But reality, and a tight fisted Congress, resulted in Langley. I have read that, until the intervention of the treaty and availability of the battlecuriser hulls, the Navy was planning on converting a second collier. As for the dimensions of US carriers, beam is dictated by the Panama Canal. The need for speed, the more wind over the deck, the safer air ops are, as well as USN "scouting group" doctrine, dictates the length to beam ratio of a cruiser/battlecruiser. If I was in charge in the 20s, Langley would have been followed in 3-5 years, by Ranger. Even looking at Ranger, I can see the lineage going to Langley, not the Lexingtons. Ranger has the same far aft positioned boilers, with swiveling, deck edge funnels, as Langley. Ranger, as originally planned, was flush decked, same as Langley. The USN did not return to the Lexington's layout with midships boilers and an island, until Yorktown.
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  617.  @stanleyrogouski  I looked up the AA armament SD had when completed in March of 42: (8) .50 machine guns, (28) 1.1" (I take that as 7 quad mounts), and (16) Oerlikons, along with (16) 5"/38s. That was a substantial increase from what had been originally planned. Prince of Wales had (16) QF 5.25" in twin turrets, (32) 2 pounder pompoms (which I take to be (4) octuple mounts), and (80) UP projectors. The SD's 1.1 mounts can engage more targets at the same time, but PoW's pompoms will do more damage to anything they get zeroed in on. Without the golden BB torpedo hit that killed power to many of the mounts on PoW, there isn't much to choose between the two, and SD had it's own wonky electrical system issues. Repluse had not been modernized like Renown, and was somewhat deficient in AA, by 1941 standards: (8) 4" and (2) octuple pompoms. For the heck of it, I proposed sending the newly rebuilt QE and Valiant as Force Z, with their places in Alexandria being taken by Malaya and Revenge, and Malaya's place in Force H taken by Prince of Wales. Rebuilt QE and Valiant: 20 4.5" in twin turrets, 4 octuple pompoms, and 4 quad .50 machine guns. I could make a case that QE and Valiant, together, could put up more AA than PoW and Repulse, combined, and the QEs might even have an edge on a pair of SDs. Even more interesting: there was a suggestion that Hermes join Force Z, but she was rejected as too slow to keep up with PoW and Repulse. Hermes could keep up with QEs just fine, but I doubt it would occur to anyone in Singapore to make up tail hooks for some of the Buffalos the RAF and RAAF were flying so that Hermes could have some proper fighters to provide a CAP.
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  641. I posted a comment related to this earlier, which the net seems to have eaten. There was a debate in the USN on this very topic during WWI. The head of BuOrd from 1913-16, Admiral Strauss, seemed dead set against the 16"/45. Strauss seems to have been of the opinion that optical gun direction systems would never be improved, and battleships would never engage at more than 12,000 yards. In his view, the greater range and long range penetration ability of the 16"/45 was unneeded, while the 14"/50 penetrated well enough at less than 12,000 yards, and, being lighter, more could be mounted on a ship. The 14"/50 could not penetrate battleship belt thickness armor at more than 12,000. In the 1915 BuOrd annual report, Strauss sneers at the mounts in the Tennessees being designed for 30 degrees of elevation, vs the 15 degrees of the New Mexicoes, because, in his view, that much elevation will never be needed. Even more disturbing, was the disinformation about the 16" being fed to American newspapers at that time. One story that appeared in several papers in early 1915, a couple months after the Battle of Dogger Bank, which proved that capital ships could engage at much greater distance than 12,000 yards, said that the 16" suffered very high erosion, the British 15"/42 only had a life of 100 rounds, and the 14"/50 was more durable. Barrel life data on Navweaps shows exactly the opposite: the early 15" and 16" both more durable than the 14". In an article published in early 1916, Strauss is directly quoted as saying the 14" is the equal of the 15"/42, and, again, rattles on about how USN guns can penetrate "heavy armor" at 12,000 yards. A few months later, the Battle of Jutland, again, demonstrated that battles can be carried out at far grater ranges than the 12,000 that Strauss kept rattling on about. Strauss had his way with the New Mexicoes and Tennessees, but, the need to reach and penetrate at ranges of 15,000-20,000 yards, having been demonstrated twice, SecNav Daniels announced the Coloradoes would be armed with 16" guns. In the 1916 SecNav annual report, Daniels says the move to 16" is being made over the objection of some Naval officers. Also in late 16, Strauss was transferred out of BuOrd and given sea duty.
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  655.  @gregorywright4918  I am more familiar with US history. You may be right. The UK did return Java to the Netherlands and some possessions to France after Napoleon's defeat. I do not see mention of any possessions sold for cash or barter in the late 19th or early 20th century. I don't know enough about British politics to know why, other than maybe pride. I can think of several reasons why President Harding would not be interested. Congress passed a law requiring all debtors to repay their war debts, in full, in cash, on time, with interest. Some of the large debtors, including the UK, opened their negotiations with the assertion that all the US' loans should be entirely forgiven. as the US' contribution to the war effort. One reason I can think of that Harding would not be interested is that the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, were famous for rum production, and prohibition was the law of the land in the US. The US apparently did not impose prohibition in the Philippines, but prohibition was the law in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Due to proximity to the US, prohibition would probably have been imposed on all the West Indies colonies, putting a lot of people out of work and stirring resentment of the US. Another reason that comes to mind is that US immigration policy in the 20s was very restrictive and blatantly racist. Some of the newspaper articles from the early 20s that I read noted that the British tended to treat citizens of color better than the US treated it's black citizens. Most of the British West Indies islands have populations that are 80-90% of African decent. I can see Harding and his cabinet, given their biases, taking one look at large numbers of blacks, out of work because rum production is shut down, coming to the US looking for work, vs a nice, big, pile of cash, and grabbing the cash, in spite of the payment schedule negotiated with the UK being 62 years.
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  702.  @gregorywright4918  the lack of bases and drydocks was the vulnerability of the "thruster" plan exposed in 34. There was no way to repair damage suffered steaming past the mandates to reinforce the Philippines, and the force would need to steam past the mandates again to get to the facilities at Pearl. The King George dock in Singapore was not completed until the late 30s, and it was captured by the Japanese. Neither of the docks at Cockatoo Island could accommodate the largest battleships and carriers. It wasn't until the Cook dock was completed in 45 that Sydney could repair anything afloat. The buildup of the Philippine military should have started as soon as the islands became a commonwealth, with it's own civilian government, in 35. The Philippine military was woefully under-equipped. Apparently, they had M1917 Enfields. We made over 2M of those rifles, so there had to be large numbers of them available in US inventory. The army was extremely short of artillery. The US had provided a few WWI 75mm guns, but hundreds more of those guns were in inventory. The Philippine air force had 48 P-35s. The Air Corps was replacing 36s with 40s and B--18s with 17s and 25s, so 36s and 18s could have been provided. The Air Corps decided it didn't like dive bombers, so the A-17s were retired in 38, when only a couple years old. The A-17s could have been provided. The other shortfall was training. Instead of keeping the Philippine Scouts concentrated in US Army units, the Scouts could have been reformed into training cadres and used to train the Philippine troops. If bringing the Philippine forces up to scratch had begun in earnest as soon as the "thruster" plan was found to not be viable, then the only US personnel left in the islands would have been at Subic, a number small enough to be evacuated with the USN surface elements. At the end of the day, if relief didn't come in six months, Filipino soldiers could ditch their uniforms, blend in to the civilian population, and wage a guerilla war for years. Blending in to the civilian population was not an option for an American, so those men were doomed.
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  755. The naval treaties have been brought up in comments a couple times recently, and that got the wheels turning wrt the Deutschlands. Some articles mention that, as the allies were trying to figure out a way to prevent their construction, Germany offered to break up Deutschland on the ways, if the allies agreed to replace the naval limitations of the Versailles treaty with the existing naval treaties between the five powers, with a capital ship quota of 125,000 tons, vs 175,000 for France and Italy. Ultimately, France opposed the proposal and it was dropped. What if Germany had come under the 5 power treaties? The Deutschlands would immediately be outlawed as cruisers as their 11" guns exceeded the treaty limit. However, Germany then could go directly to the Scharnhorsts, which were comfortably under the naval treaty's 35,000 ton limit for battleships. Drach's video on Scharnhorst says that Germany had lost the ability to build really large guns, so, instead of the desired 15". the Scharns received the 11" developed for the Deutschlands. But if the Deutschlands are not built, then that 11" gun is not developed either. By the time the Deutschland would have been laid down, the treaty change agreed, Deutschland broken up on the ways, and the Scharnhorsts designed, Hitler was in power. By 34, Hitler could ring up his buddy in Rome and say "hey Benny, could Ansaldo run off some extras of the 15"/50 it's making for your Littorios? I have an idea." So, which would work out better for the allies? With the treaty switch, the Deutschlands, which churned up their share of mischief early in the war don't exist, but the Scharnhorsts are more potent.
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  758.  @coltaxe100  There would actually be two different "if you coulds', one with the naval treaties and one without. Without treaties and an unlimited checkbook, the sky is the limit, especially if you include contracting with yards in Canada and the US. With the treaties, then you get out the calculator and a copy of Jane's to see what decisions to make differently. wrt Carriers, the Washington treaty specified that all carriers in service or building at the time of the treaty were deemed "experimental" and not subject to the 20 year replacement schedule, so they could be replaced at any time. Argus, Eagle and Hermes all fit that criteria. Eagle was not efficient as a carrier, but had a bit of size and a bit of speed, not fast, but fast enough to cruise with QEs, so it might be worthwhile to retain. Argus had no speed, and Hermes had no size. so remission both as seaplane tenders to free up the tonnage to build a second Ark Royal. Depending on the assessment of the situation, Renown and Repulse had size and speed, and could have been converted to carriers, after the treaty collapsed, faster than new carriers could have been built from the keel up. As for BBs, instead of building the Nelsons, the RN could have taken deferred construction windows, like France and Italy did, so they could have built two, modern, fast, BBs in the early 30s, rather than the eccentric and slow Nelsons. Outside of that, the RN really couldn't do anything more within the framework of the treaties. The 1930 London treaty extended the BB building moratorium through 1936. KGV and Prince of Wales were laid down New Year's day of 1937. The other three KGVs had all been laid down by July of 37. Really, when it comes to BBs, the Brits did about as well as they could, within the limits of the treaty, without having 20/20 foresight.
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  759.  @greg_mca  the first thing is carrier aircraft tend to be built stronger to withstand the rigors of carrier ops. The first day out when I was on the Lexington, I was taking a shortcut through the hanger when, with no warning, I heard *WHAM*. I was wondering what part of that old ship had broken, when a guy walking with me said "plane landed". I also, by luck, got a photo of an A7, that had just trapped. The deceleration was so strong the pilot can be seen in the photo thrown several inches away from his seatback, in spite of the harness he was wearing. I used to know at what deceleration rate a person's eyeballs will pop out of their sockets. Obviously, the deceleration on a carrier landing is safely below that limit, but not hugely below it. Consequently, a land based plane, like a Hurricane or Spitfire, will usually require structural strengthening, in addition to the expected arresting hook and life raft. The strengthening will usually degrade performance due to the extra weight. The aircraft will be changed to suit the ships, not the other way around. The Brits were hurting for single seat fighters in 40. They bought the Grumman F4F, know in British service as the Martlet. The Martlet I, like all early Wildcats, did not have folding wings, so the Brits tended to leave them ashore. The Martlet II introduced Grumman's folding wing feature to the Royal Navy, so more of the planes could be accommodated on board. When Drac does his video on the Graf Zepplin, he may get into how the 109s and Stukas were modified for carrier service. If you get a chance, see "Ships With Wings", a British 1941 production. It gives some good looks at Swordfish and Skuas coming up the elevator with their wings folded. A lot of that footage was shot on the Ark Royal, less than a year before it was sunk.
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  775. wrt the question about reusing existing guns to expedite battleship construction, the first option that crosses my mind is to have the Admiralty retain all of the 13.5" Mk V heavy shell guns when their original ships were scrapped. By my figuring, that would be 80 guns, plus whatever spares were in inventory to support the ships originally built with them. Using the 13.5s would also comply with the reduction in gun size to 14" in Second London. Alternately, the USN apparently had ordered 14"/50s for the battlecruisers at the same time as the guns were ordered for the Tennessee class BBs, then the battlecruisers moved on to the 16"/50, leaving the USN with a large, surplus inventory of new 14" guns. Reportedly 119 14"/50s were built, to support only 5 BBs that used them. Even allowing for 24 spares, 2 complete sets of replacements, to support the USN BBs, USN need would be 84 guns, leaving 35 available for potential sale to the UK, enough for 2 KGVs, plus a full set of spares. The problem with using the US guns would be powder, as they would need to be fed USN smokeless, rather than cordite, for optimal performance. During WWI, the RN used US built 14"/45s on one class of monitors. They experimented with cordite in them and, reportedly, suffered a significant loss of range. The problem with any existing 13.5" or 14" gun would be turrets, which are also time consuming to build. Salvaged 13.5" would have twin turrets. USN 14" would require new turrets to be built. Twin turrets are not weight or space efficient, which becomes an issue when complying with the treaty displacement limits, and the displacement limit was not increased until mid 1938. The gun size escalator triggered in April 1937. The return to 16" guns a year before the displacement limit increase makes me want to cast a lustful eye on the triple 16" turrets on the Nelsons, moving them to more capable hulls.
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  778.  @johnfisher9692  I understand where you are coming from, but the hazard is in sacrificing good enough for better, to the point that nothing ever gets built. At some point, a design needs to be frozen, so it can be built, while the designers keep working to improve on that design for the next generation. The other hazard is, of course, that a design element could be entirely wrongheaded, and the subsequent design heading even farther off in the wrong direction, before the flaw in the logic is discovered. An example of the first case is the first generation carriers. Eagle and Hermes were six year builds. The Lexingtons were seven year builds, and C&R was complaining, in it's annual reports, about how disappointed they were in the slow progress. Akagi and Kaga were also slow builds. In the case of the Lexingtons, I am thinking the delays, and the huge cost overruns, were the result of a massive number of change orders as new ideas were birthed, or experience was gained with Langley. In comparison, Ranger was built in only 3 years, with only a $2M, about 10%, cost overrun. Ranger had one major change order while construction was underway: the addition of an island, which probably accounts for a good share of that $2M overrun. I have no doubt that the original $23M conversion cost for the Lexingtons was intended to be accurate. The estimate given in 1922 for a clean sheet dedicated carrier was $27M. Extrapolating Ranger's cost to 20,000 tons gives a cost of $28M. Lexington's cost ballooning from $23M to $40M was probably unforeseen and the result of starting the ships when the USN was still too far down the learning curve. A few days ago, I asked my local public library to transfer in a copy of Friedman on carriers to see if he can provide conformation of my suspicions that the Lexington's cost overrun, was due to change orders.
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  792.  @joelmontgomery4837  Of the three battlecruisers, Renown was the only one with a modern AA suite. Probably would have ended up the way Z historically did. As an exercise, I put together some timelines and found an alternate Force Z that would have been more capable against aircraft, and salve Somerville's bruised pride. Due to the shortage of battleships, Somerville was stuck with Malaya as his flagship, which he didn't like. So, instead of continuing around Africa, on it's way to the far east, PoW pulls in to Gibraltar to be Somerville's flagship. Historically, shortly after that time Force H and the force from Alexandria were both engaged in diversionary actions to distract from a British land offensive in Africa. Use those diversionary actions to cover the transfer of Malaya to Alexandria. At the same time, Revenge delivered a convoy to Aden, so then have Revenge steam up the canal to Alexandria. With Malaya and Revenge in place, QE and Valiant, both with modern AA, become Force Z and make for Singapore. Hermes finishes it's refit at Simonstown and makes for Singapore. A workshop in Singapore fabricates arresting hooks that are fitted to some of the RAF Buffalos based there. When QE, Valiant and Hermes meet up in Singapore, all but one or two of Hermes' Swordfishes are put ashore and as many Buffalos as possible put on board to provide a CAP. Some sources say there was consideration of Hermes joining PoW in South Africa, but not pursued as Hermes could not keep up with PoW, but the dozen or so Stringbags she normally carried would not have been useful as the battle occurred.
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  808.  @beedrillbot121  I haven't give an alternate WWI as much thought as you. Given that Germany already held most of the Marianas, I would say it's guaranteed that von Spee would head his squadron to Guam and knock it off, which would give von Spee a home port Germany could call it's own. There is a possibility that, with Germany declaring war on the US and intervening in Mexico, the other European powers say "oh, that was random", sit back for a while and see what develops. If Huerta told the Mexican population that, while the US started the war, Mexico (with Germany's help) is going to retake all the territory the US stole from it and restore the Mexican borders of 1824. would the rebels put their revolution on hold, and line up behind Huerta for the greater good of Mexico? Hispanics constituted a large part of the population of the SW US, but the Angeloes often treated them as badly as African-Americans. Would the Hispanics be loyal to the US, or form a fifth column to aid the Mexicans? Germany would be in it for oil concessions. The UK would be looking at it's primary economic rival, Germany, and it's up and coming economic rival, the US, bleeding each-other. The UK may choose to sit back and watch, while selling war material to both at a tidy profit. Would the US put up a fight, or sue for peace? The German army had 4.5M men, the US Army had 200,000, so a small portion of the German army could overrun the US Army. Most of the US population and industry wee outside of the disputed area, but most of the oil was in the disputed area. The reason the US was so hopped up about Tampico was that it was the site of the first Mexican oil boom, and US oil companies wanted that oil.
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  811.  @TheJuggtron  I read a book about the Washington conference last winter, but I was more focused on the US and UK activities. iirc, the Australian member had some input into the decision making, but I don't recall what that was specifically. A bit of background: Australia became independent of the UK in 1901. New Zealand declined to join the Australian federation, so became a dominion of the UK in 1907: self-rule for internal affairs, but foreign affairs directed by the UK. While Australia formed the RAN, a division of the RN was assigned to defend New Zealand, largely funded by Wellington and increasingly manned by Kiwis. There was no formal New Zealand navy until 1941. Australia's GDP, hence it's ability to fund a navy, was about 5% of that of the UK. New Zealand's GDP was about 20% of Australia's. Australia had funded and operated a battlecruiser. New Zealand funded the construction of a battlecruiser, then gifted it to the RN. By the time of the WNT, both of those battlecruisers were nearly ten years old, with an entire war's worth of hard running. I don't think either country would want a badly worn, obsolete, coal-fired, battlecusier. How about the UK expressing it's gratitude for the gift of HMS New Zealand and the contributions during the war of HMAS Australia, by gifting Courageous and Glorious to the two countries? Nearly new, oil fired, state of the art weaponry. If Australia did take on both Courageouses, they probably never would have bought the two County class cruisers. If the Kiwis had a Courageous, they probably could not afford any other cruisers of any description. Of course, the other fly is the Courageouses were too big for the Sutherland drydock at Cockatoo Island, the dock being 210 meters long and the ships 240 meters. The RN would have to gift the Aussies a floating drydock too.
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  814.  @colinhunt4057  I agree that Sea Lion was probably postponed, iirc it was not officially canceled, due to the lateness of the season, rather than entirely due to the resilience of the RAF, as some narratives claim. And, as you said, the river barges that had been commandeered for the sea lift needed to be released to resume their commercial hauling. At the moment, I am reading a speculative alt history of Sea Lion, that draws a lot from German preparations and planning for the invasion. I think it was serious, as England was very much back on it's heels, due to the loss of equipment in France. iirc, Ian on Forgotten Weapons, noted some 90% of army inventory of Bren guns had been lost in France, along with vast numbers of tanks, artillery, and anti-tank guns. Have you seen the sort of things being issued to the Home Guard? Some folks were handed a length of pipe, with a WWI bayonet welded on the end. What changed my thinking about the motives for invading the Soviet Union was my chance hearing of that recording of Hitler from 42. According to Hitler's statements in that recording, the negotiations in late 40 were an attempt to pull the Soviets into the Axis. Hitler was proposing the Soviets would be allocated Iran and India. Apparently, the Soviets also wanted the Balkans. The way to get to the Balkans from the Soviet Union, was through Romania, which threatened German oil supply. Hitler said that, by the time Molotov headed back to Moscow in November 40, he was sure the Soviets wanted a war, so he acted proactively and attacked first. Of course, that left no resources for invading the UK.
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  823.  @marktuffield6519  Thanks for the tip. I reviewed that video. As noted previously, my reading on the X-Lighters is completely at odds with what the speaker states. They were not laying around in British ports, waiting for the Baltic op, as the speaker claims. The speaker also does not disclose that Courageous, as built, missed that draft parameter by several feet, and was barely an improvement over Renown. He glosses over just how Fisher proposed to provoke the Germans into invading Denmark. And, if Germany did invade Denmark, would that allow enough time for the Danish/Swedish/British alliance the speaker claims? In 1940, it took Germany all of 6 hours to crush all resistance in Denmark. If the British tried to land on those two Danish islands that sit astride the straits, they would probably find them already occupied by the Germans. Looking at a map of that area, I see plenty of bays that the Germans could anchor old pre-dreadnoughts in, to create instant shore batteries. And that map that Fisher supposedly drew? Drawn in 1917, two years later. Was he trying to give the Baltic op the color of a serious plan, after the fact? Would not be the first time someone tried to rewrite history for personal benefit. All in all, I have trouble taking that speaker seriously. Here is something for your aviation enthusiast side. I presume you are aware of the Battle of the Coral Sea. I also presume you know of the Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bomber, and how they were slaughtered at Midway. You may know that Lexington was sunk at Coral Sea, and the wreck found in 2018. You may also be aware that a cluster of aircraft were found on the ocean bottom that had slid off the Lexington's deck as she sank. An expedition is scheduled to set sail in May, to attempt to recover some of those aircraft. At 11,000 feet, this is the deepest salvage ever attempted. Their targets are an F4F Wildcat that was flown by both Jimmy Thach and Butch O'Hare, and as many as all seven TBDs that are laying there. At present, there are no TBDs above water, anywhere in the world. Due to the cold, dark, oxygen starved, water, the planes are in good condition.
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  852. wrt changes in Second London, from my reading, Second London seemed to be more about the UK trying to push everyone else down to the sort of ships the UK wanted. I have read that Ark Royal was built the way she was, under the Washington limit of 27,000 tons, to maximize the number of drydocks around the empire that could accommodate her, so the treaty tried to push everyone else's carriers down to the same size. The UK had to build smaller cruisers to obtain the number of cruisers needed in the tonnage allowance available. The treaty tried to force everyone else's light cruisers down to the same size. Nothing in the earlier treaties said the UK could not build battleships with 15" or 14" guns. The French, and Italians, were perfectly happy to build 15" guns, when the treaty allowed 16". But someone in the Admiralty was pressing for 14". The decision to go 14" on the KGVs had been made before the Second London conference started. So, again, Second London was used to try to force everyone else down to the gun size the UK wanted to use. Same mindset came up when the US and UK were negotiating the displacement escalator in early 38. The UK was pushing for a 42,000 limit, as that was the maximum their facilities around the empire could accommodate. The US wanted 45,000, so the Iowas could be the ships they wanted. As we see with Lion, nothing prevented the UK building what suited it's needs, even if it was under the official limit. The consistent mindset in the UK, was to use the treaty to try to prevent anyone building anything more powerful than what the UK wanted to build. I could point out that Lord Chatfield was First Sea Lord from January 33 through September 38, so he was in a position to influence the design of the KGVs, Second London, and the negotiations for the battleship tonnage escalator.
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  879.  @gregorywright4918  yes, I am assuming a twin 4" mount, which the USN experimented with on a couple Clemsons. Looking at the photos of the mounts in use, the issue is clear. There was not enough deck room on the foc'se of a Clemson for the crew required to operate a twin mount. (all data taken from Navweaps) weight of a 5"/51 with single mount: 15.36-17.26mt. Weight of a twin 4"/50, guns and mount, 12.33mt. Rate of fire is the same, 8-9rpm, but adoption of a sliding breech, combined with the 4" fixed ammo could double that. Weight of the 5" common shell: 50lbs, vs 33 for the 4". Charge in common shell 5": 1.73lbs, 4": 1.39lbs. Range to penetrate 2" of armor 5": 8000yds, 4": 6300yds. So the twin 4" mount can fire more steel, with more charge than a single 5". Go to a sliding breech, and the twin 4" can fire a lot more steel and a lot more charge. Yes, the 5"/51 can penetrate more armor, but the DDs and torpedo boats that would usually be attacking are not armored. It would take a light cruiser to stand up to the 4". Yes, the 5"/51 has more range, 18,800yds @ 25 degrees, than the 4": 15,000yds @ 19.9 degrees, but torpedo boat armament was aimed by the Mk 1 eyeball, and, particularly hull mounted casements offered such a poor view of potential targets that maximum range is probably academic. I took my investigation one step farther: cutting the 4"/50 down to 45 calibers, and mounting them in a copy of the British Mk XIX mount. The result was lighter than the combination of a single 5"/51 and a single 5"/25, while being able to throw more steel than either of the 5" guns, and freeing the upper deck for more light AA armament. Yes, I am assuming the 1.1" for light AA, as that is what they had.
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  880. My thoughts? Farley is an idiot. I will explain. In spite of Trump openly campaigning on putting tariffs on Canadian and Mexican cars, Farley is crying that he wants steep tariffs on Toyotas and Hyundais, not Fords, regardless of where they are built. As you said, the models Ford builds in Mexico are the Bronco Sport, Maverick, and Mach-E. Farley said, publicly, a couple years ago, he wants to get out of the two row SUV market, where the Bronco Sport and US built Escape are, because, he complains, there is too much competition in that segment, so he can't charge as high a price, with as fat a profit margin, as he wants. So, cutting Bronco Sport and Maverick production off from the US, would give Ford an excuse to shift prospects into the larger Bronco, or Ranger pickup, which are more expensive. Farley committed some $5.6B for "Blue Oval City", a greenfield battery and assembly plant to build electric F-150s. Why F-150s? That is Ford's most profitable product. A few days ago, he claimed to have just discovered that F-150s have poor aerodynamics, and people with F-150s carry heavy loads, pull trailers, and take long trips, which puts a lot of demand on the battery. A battery that could meet that demand would be large, heavy, and expensive. So, now, Farley claims that, for large EVs, "the economics are unresolvable". Seems likely he is preparing shareholders for a multi-billion dollar writeoff of "Blue Oval City". Last, and most absurd, Farley insists Ford "will be the Porsche of off-road", meaning he wants to raise prices, a lot. Farley is a buffoon.
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  902.  @davidharner5865  Strauss was head of BuOrd. During a previous stint at BuOrd, as a young officer, he invented the concept of the superimposed turrets, as used on the Kearsarge and Virginia classes. His devotion to the "more smaller guns means more hits" school became obsessive. In newspaper articles speculating on whether the Tennessees would have 14" or 16", there was FUD inserted in the article, but no source named, that the then new British 15"/42 suffered extremely high barrel wear, while the 14" showed excellent durability, with that point expanded to claim all guns larger than 14" would probably suffer excessive wear. After Jutland, Daniels and the General Board decided on 16", for it's ability to penetrate at longer ranges. In his annual report in late 1916, Daniels said the decision was made "over the objections of some officers". Strauss requested sea duty, about a year before his stint at BuOrd would have been expected to end. There was no movement on his request for a couple months. In a public Congressional hearing, Strauss, again, trotted out his 14" talking points, pushing back on the decision his superiors had made months before. President Wilson nominated Ralph Earle, then head of the Indian Head proving range, as head of BuOrd the next day, and Strauss got his sea duty, command of Nevada. This entire row over gun size was very public and widely reported in the newspapers at the time. Daniels wasn't all bad. He had no Navy experience, but he had the General Board to advise him, and he was capable of listening, sometimes. Strauss wasn't all bad either. After the gun size row, he was still widely respected, and was appointed to a seat on the General Board some years later.
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  913.  @AdelineLowry  That is the nightmare scenario I have offered in the past: leave Pearl alone, and only attack the Philippines. Because the US had not swept up all the Spanish colonies in the Pacific, but only the best parts, the Philippines and Guam, Spain sold the rest of it's holdings, the balance of the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls, to Germany. The Japanese swept up all these islands during WWI, and held them after the war under a League of Nations mandate. For the USN to get a relief expedition to the Philippines, it would need to traverse a shooting gallery of Japanese held islands. USN command, and the President, would probably recognize this was suicidal, but could they stand up to US civilian demands to "save our boys". It was easy to say "no" when the battleships sank at Pearl, but what if the fleet was intact? I think it was October 20 of 21 that Drac did a piece on USN Tactics 39-45, and I wondered at that time if USN policy was to write off the Philippine garrison if it was attacked. To answer your question, if the US was goaded into trying to relieve the Philippines, I envision the fleet being picked apart by Japanese subs, until it is weakened enough for a major strike by IJN carrier air, with the IJN battleships mopping up the remains. An even better scenario, from the Japanese perspective, is to not attack the US at all. Bypass the Philippines and only attack British and Dutch possessions. The Germans had been beating on the UK and Netherlands for 2 years, without provoking the US enough to bring the US into the war. Why not let that sleeping dog lie in the Pacific too?
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  914. @UNSCForwardontodawn Alrighty, first, Wiki says the Sutherland dock, after it's 1927 expansion, is 210 meters/690 feet long, 27 meters/88.6 feet wide and max water depth over the sill at high tide is 9.75 meters/32 feet. My 1928 USN port directory, which may have old data since Sutherland was expanded in 27, says 637' overall/630' over the blocks, 84' wide and depth at sill of 31' 4". The 1928 directory also lists Mort's graving dock at Woolwich: 850' overall and over the blocks, 83' wide, and max depth over the sill of 28'. KGV and Renown are both too wide for either dock. A Deutschland would fit. So lets use Deutschland as a template, and, as a cost and time saving expedient, use the twin 15"/42 turrets in RN storage for the main armament. Beam would probably need to be increased from the Deutschland's 68' as the twin 15"/42 turret and gun sets will weigh about 300mt more each than the triple 11"s on Deutschland.. So what happens to the two shiny new ships? They get deployed to Malaya, instead of PoW and Repulse, and are sunk, but they might hold their own in the Java Sea, if they were not used for Force Z. Plan B: USS Wasp would fit. What would happen if the Aussies had two carriers the size of Wasp, except with a decent amount of protection? By 41, the two carriers have air groups composed of Skuas for the scout bomber role, and Buffaloes, as the Aussies, Kiwis, Dutch and RAF all flew Buffs in that theater in 41. The two carriers are deployed with Force Z. The twin engine bombers the IJN used would be meat on the table for Buffs. The location was within range of Zeros, but would the IJN have Zeros available to escort the bombers? Some of the smaller carriers still had Claudes at that time, so the supply of Zeros may have been restricted. When the Aussies stripped their Buffs down, they held their own for a while. So, if the Aussies bought carriers, PoW and Repulse have a fighting chance, as would the force in the Java Sea, until the IJN brought their A game with Zeros.
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  938.  @jamesd3472  My suspicion is that the Admiralty's architects had determined that the combination of 16" guns with the speed and armor they wanted in the KGVs was a no-go. Design work on the KGVs started when 16", as well as 15", guns were still legal. Doing a bit of back of the envelope figuring, I get an estimate for the 3-triple 15" turrets considered for the KGVs as being some 850 tons heavier than the 14" arrangement they settled on. 16" would probably be even heavier, unless they cut back the number of guns. The Littorios and Bismarks mounted 15", but they also significantly exceeded treaty displacement limits. The North Carolinas mounted 16", but are considered underarmored. The South Dakotas mounted 16", but were slow, in spite of using bleeding edge powerplant technology that was not available to the Brits when the KGVs were designed. The escalator clause of Second London allowed the return to 16" guns, if a party refused to sign the new treaty by April 1937, which the Japanese said in 34 that they would not do, but the tonnage increase was not specified. The escalator clause said the parties would try to negotiate tonnage escalation to a new point. So, because of that poor planning, the UK and US wasted over a year arguing about the new tonnage limit, the US wanting 45,000 while the UK looking for something in the 41-42,000 ton range. Once the tonnage increase was agreed, then the UK proceeded with the Lion class, but, by then, battleships were pretty much irrelevant and the Lions with their 16" guns were stillborn.
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  980.  @and15re1  from my reading, the RN sort of backed into the entire idea of a monitor in WWI. The RN was using obsolete battleships for bombardment, as the US did in WWII. The President of Bethlehem Steel, which owned the Fore River shipyard, was negotiating with the Admiralty, in November 1914, for a contract to build 20-30 submarines for the RN, when the Admiralty officials asked if he had anything else useful around. Greece had contracted with a German yard to build a new battleship, but the turrets and guns had been subcontracted to Bethlehem Steel. Bessie could not make delivery to the German yard, due to the British blockade, so the 4 twin turret and 14"/45 gun sets, and 4,000 rounds of ammo, were offered to the Admiralty. The Admiralty snapped them up and threw together the first modern monitors, the Abercrombie class, with shallow draft and huge torpedo bulges. That started the monitor building program, with guns taken from the obsolete Majestic class battleships and Drake and Cressy class cruisers. My suspicion is the US never went that way, because, in WWII, they already had a very large supply of obsolete battleships and didn't see the sense in building new hulls to carry the obsolete guns that were already afloat on the battleships. If the RN had been able to source more turret and gun sets, the way they sourced the sets from Bethlehem, they probably would not have been stripping obsolete warships either. Oh, the submarines? Bethlehem got away with selling the guns while the US was neutral, but, when President Wilson got wind of the submarine deal, he had the subs impounded until the US entered the war.
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  987.  @brendonbewersdorf986  are you assuming the naval treaties exist, or not? We need to look at the precise language of the WNT, however, for some reason, the full text I have referred to in the past is not coming up in a search today. As I recall, the language of the treaty related the tonnage limits to replacement ships, implying that a power could retain more than it's quota worth of ships, but would have to start drawing down the surplus as new, replacement, ships were built. In the original treaty retention list, the RN was well over it's 525,000 ton limit. Even after the Nelsons were added, and four old ships eliminated in exchange, the RN was still over it's 525KT limit. If my read is correct, the US could have retained more older ships, if it wanted to, up to the moment it was granted authority to complete West Virginia and Colorado as replacements for the two Delawares, which would then compel adherence to the 525kt limit. If the US, in April 1917, had taken a page from the RN and cancelled all the Colorados and Tennessees outright, to clear the slipways for DD construction, then all the South Dakotas and Lexingtons are scrapped because they exceed treaty maximums, the USN would be stuck, not only with the Delawares, but also the South Carolinas and some of the pre-dreadnought Connecticuts to fill it's tonnage quota. Potential use for pre-dreadnoughts? Before US entry into WWI, it engaged in several "big stick" waving exercises, invading Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. As there was no opposing naval force, the USN used a variety of obsolete ships, battleships, armored cruisers and monitors, in those operations. In a post WWI environment, and a shortage of modern capital ships, I could see the US continuing to use pre-dreadnoughts in big stick waving exercises to frighten the locals. I doubt a Connecticut would be any deterrent to a Nelson though.
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  996.  @gerardlabelle9626  the newspapers of the time reported there was a consensus among the delegations at the conference that 12" guns were obsolete. Of the three largest navies, the USN was the only one required to retain ships with 12" guns. France retained three 12" armed Dantons, which commissioned in 1911, and received licenses to start building replacements in 1927 and 29. The Floridas were also 12" armed, and commissioned in 1911. but the US did not receive licenses to begin construction of replacements before the 1930s, or authority to improve side armor and upgun the 12" ships, like France and Italy did. I went through the annual spreadsheets published by the Bureau of Supply and Accounts and found that, in the late 1920s, the USN spent some $6.6M modernizing the Floridas, bulges, deck armor, conversion to oil fuel, when the WNT called for them to be scrapped in 34. Washington was 80% complete when work was stopped. The $6.6M spent on the Floridas, already obsolete due to their 12" guns, was just about what was needed to complete Washington, which would have been expected to serve for 20 years. But completing Washington would give the US too many "post-Jutland" ships. I think the real issue separating "pre" from "post" was the size of the guns, not the date ships were laid down or designed. In July 1916, SecNav Daniels announced, with the General Board agreeing, that Jutland had proven the need to go to larger guns, which could penetrate at longer range. If they settled on 15" as the "post-Jutland" size, then the RN would have 13 ships in commission that would be defined as "post-Jutland", even though some of those 15" ships were at the battle, and everyone else would be demanding authority to build a compensating number of ships If they settled on 16" as the "post-Jutland" size, then the UK would need to spend the money to build three Nelsons. So, the delegates engaged in some Orwellian doublethink that said Hood was "post", to avoid spending more money on a third Nelson, while the Tennessees with their advanced torpedo protection and all-or-nothing armor scheme were "pre", so the US could complete Colorado and West Virginia, to replace the obsolete Delawares.
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  998.  @johnshepherd9676  OK, you are talking complete replacement, so the USN makes a quantum leap in size, speed, and firepower, from the Tennessees, to the SoDaks, on the schedule that the Colorados historically occupied. That means Iowa, the one assigned to Newport News, would be laid down in April 1917, because News had the slipway available. The other ships would be suspended for the duration of the war, as the Colorados were. Laid down in 1919, the other SoDaks would be incomplete at the time of the treaty, and, exceeding the 35,000 ton limit, would not be allowed to complete. If the SoDaks replace the Tennessees as well, that means SoDak is laid down in Brooklyn in May 17, and Montana is laid down at Mare Island October 16. So three are complete before the treaty goes into effect. If the US had one SoDak, I think the Brits would call it a wash with Hood. In my readings on the Washington conference, the UK suggested a 43,000 ton limit for individual ships. It was the US that insisted on the hard 35,000 limit. So, if anyone else had 43,000 tonners, the UK would certainly insist they have a sufficient number of ships of that size, for parity. If the US had three SoDaks complete, the Brits would demand two more 43,000 ton ships, for parity, which brings us back to two somewhat slimmed down G3s. More Admirals, or J3s, would only mount 15" guns, and the UK would want 16". for parity. Of course, all this between the US and UK is not happening in a vacuum. If the UK and US both had 43,000 tonners, the Japanese would demand they be allowed to complete one or both Tosas, for proportional parity. Getting back to your original SoDak vs Nelson question, the previous gunnery assessment stands: the SoDaks way outgun whatever the UK had in the works. G3s would have a significant speed advantage over the SoDaks, the Nelsons would not. The G3s could run away before they were crippled, the Nelsons could not.
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  1014.  @calvingreene90  taking out escorts is easier said than done as they are usually a smaller target, can move at a higher speed and are more maneuverable. I think I grasp what you are saying: suppress the triple A by sinking the ships at the edge of the formation, and work your way in to the main target. Thing is, a sub lining up a shot has lots of time: multiple periscope sightings and a TDC to perform the calculations. A pilot of a TBD doesn't have any of that, and he has the pressure of dozens of people trying to kill him as he lines up the shot. A TBD driver has to estimate distance to target, target speed, and amount to lead the target, all calculated in his head. One of the theories of why all the torpedo planes missed Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the Channel dash is that the pilots were used to shooting at freighters steaming at 10-12 kts. The battleships were steaming at 30, and the pilots simply didn't lead them enough when dropping the torp. Error in the amount to lead the target can be reduced by dropping closer, but there is an inner limit to the drop zone as the torp needs time to come back up to running depth after the deep plunge it takes from being dropped, and then the warhead has to arm itself. Meanwhile, the target can see the TBD coming long before it drops, and start taking evasive action. At Coral Sea, TBDs dropped close to 20 torps at Shōkaku without result. Yes the early Mk 13 was a sorry excuse for a torp, but zero for twenty? That is how hard it is to hit a ship at high speed with a torp, even a big ship.
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  1016.  @RedXlV  the objective of the treaty was to reduce spending, so, if the RN had three treaty busting battle cruisers, their scrapping list for other ships would have been even longer than it already was, to keep total tonnage under the limit. If BCs were to be regarded as a separate class from BBs, and the RN had the three treaty busters, plus Renown, Repulse and Tiger. then the US would demand it be allowed to complete an equivalent tonnage of Lexingtons and Japan would want to complete enough of the Amagis to have a proportional tonnage. when combined with the Kongos. All this BC building sort of defeats the intention of the treaty to reduce spending. On the other hand, if the US was content to scrap Colorado and West Virginia, or use them for target practice, like Washington was, the Nelsons would not have happened, and France and Italy would not have had the 27 and 29 construction windows, so the Dunkerqes and Littorios are not built in the early 30s. That leaves Italy entering the war with only the four rebuilt Cavours and Dorias as they could not have started work on the Littorios until Italy withdrew from the treaty system in 36, leaving Littorio and Veneto with a completion date in 41 or 42, if ever. The Richelieus would be laid down as a response to the Bismarks, in 37, later than historically,, unless the drydocks were occupied by the Dunkerques being laid down to respond to the Scharnhorsts. The French would be just nicely started on the Dunkerques, see the Bismarks laid down, realize how inadequate the Dunkerques are, and start over. This all ends up with the Richelieus being incomplete hulls destroyed by allied bombing or broken up for scrap by the Germans.
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  1030.  @kemarisite  as an exercise, I ran a scenario where the USN developed the 4"/50, instead of going to 5" for battleship secondaries. A twin 4" mount was developed during WWI. The mount was very light and, from the numbers I see, did not weigh any more than a single 5"/51. The guns were set very close together, so I wonder about dispersion, though information I see does not say they suffered that problem. Range was similar to the casemate mounted 5". The 5'/51 has better armor penetration, but BB secondaries are for plinking torpedo boats and DDs, which are not armored, so does the armor penetration superiority of the 5" really matter? The dual mounted 4" still had a screw breech, so no rate of fire advantage over the 5", but, with twice as many guns, the throw weight of the 4" battery is greater. So, everywhere you see a main deck mounted casemate 5" on a USN BB, imagine a twin 4" instead. Then, when aircraft become a thing, design a 4" DP mount, like the British DP Mk 19, fit a sliding breech to double the rate of fire, and maybe clip the gun down to 45 calibers in length to reduce inertia. A twin 4/45 DP mount would weigh less that the combination of 5"/51 and 5"/25 that the US BBs had in the 30s, with twice as many guns that could be used in either mode, in those same main deck locations. That would also leave the 01 deck above the twin 4" mounts open for light AA to be installed. But no, the USN went 5" The 51 cal version was too heavy to retrofit Clemsons. They probably decided the 25 cal was too short ranged to be a DP gun. If they had developed the 4" instead?
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  1032.  @vikinggamer9545  Thank you! I have been wondering where that 17.3" number came from. The slide in the presentation appears to be using the "EFF" numbers. I was looking at the numbers on the Navweaps page about the specific guns. The 14"/45 page has two tables, from different sources, which are roughly in agreement. Why is there such a discrepancy between those two sources and the numbers generated by the "Facehard" program for the British 14? Other questions that come to mind: If the 14"/45 could penetrate any likely BB belt (13-14") out to 22,000+ yards, as shown in the "Facehard" tables, why did the Admiralty pursue a 16" for the Lions? Seems, if their thinking was consistent, the Lions would have been designed with 3 or 4 quad 14" turrets. Why did doctrine dictate closing to 16,000yds, if the 14" could penetrate any likely belt at 22,000+, because that doctrine puts the RN ships at a disadvantage, starting every engagement with their "T" crossed? What makes "decisive range" decisive, and distinct from engagement range? I'm thinking "decisive range" is the range where the belt armor can be penetrated for a magazine kill shot, while "engagement range" is the range where chunks can be shot off the edges of the target, slowly degrading it. As I think I noted elsewhere, this is all very reminiscent of a debate that went on in the USN in 1915, where the 14" advocates also hinged their argument on assuming engagements would be at medium range, in their case, 12,000. The 14" advocates ultimately lost that argument as Dogger Bank and Jutland demonstrated that engagements could be fought at longer ranges, so the USN advanced to the 16", that could better penetrate at those longer ranges.
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  1073.  @bkjeong4302  oh yes, I have noted your stated opposition to all BBs. You would have a hard time selling that to the USN in 38 tho. In defense of BBs, they can carry more AA than a CL or DD, and if they have to take a torpedo to protect the carrier, they can take the hit better than a CL or DD. Having them along helps in situations like Guadalcanal, where Washington and SD were detached from the carrier force to kill off a Kongo. The ultimate Steve Plan for late 30s BBs rests on a couple of assumptions: BB guns are very expensive and take a long time to make, and making the guns for the NCs and SDs took a lot of material and manpower away from making more cruiser and DD guns. While the Pennsylvanias and New Mexicos were updated significantly in the late 20s/early 30s, next to nothing had been done with the Tennessees and Colorados since they were built, so those last two classes may have been in significantly worse material condition that the earlier ships. The triple 14" turrets in the Tennessees and twin 16" turrets in the Colorados use the same diameter barbette, and the twin 16" turret and gun combination is about 70 tons lighter than the triple 14". So, the Steve plan is to use the NC class plan known as XVI-C with the 9-14" gun option, which gives the 13.5" belt and 30kt speed. Scrap the two Tennessees and move 6 of their turrets, with the rebuilt and upgraded 14"/50 Mk 11 to NC and Washington. When the escalator clause triggers, use the same ship design, for the four SDs, while scrapping the Colorados and moving three of their twin turrets with the newly rebuilt 16"/45 Mk 8 to each of the new SDs. Then we have 6-30kt BBs that can hang with the carriers pretty well, carry lots of AA, and put the hurt on any enemy fast cruiser force that manages to get within gun range of the carrier force, and it's done relatively cheap, quick, and without burdening the Naval Gun Factory. Then when someone proposes the Iowas and Alaskas, people ask "all that expense and work, for a lousy three knots over what we already have?" That is probably what did the Lions in more than anything else. They were only a couple knots faster than the KGVs, the 14" on the KGVs were proving effective, so the Lions didn't offer enough of an advantage to really motivate anyone to push ahead with them.
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  1076.  @jamesb4789  Several good comments in your post. The US agreed to the Second London treaty, which had the gun size reduction, so if command wants to give the stink-eye to someone, give it to their own leadership. If the NCs had been built with the lighter 14" guns and ammo, they would have been faster. If the NCs had been built with twin 16" turrets, instead of triples, to save weight, they would have been faster. Something in the American psyche always wants bigger and more. Everything I read says the General Board was very happy with the 9-14"/30kt option, because it had the armor to get stuck in against BBs, and speed to better hang with carriers, everyone, except Reeves. It seems Reeves' mind set was it's all about the carriers, everywhere, all the time, and anything that impedes carriers to the slightest degree needs to be tossed out. So, he seems to have rejected the 30kt option in the expectation that the BBs would never, ever, be operating with carriers, while the guys who always want more and bigger guns, pounced on the chance to load up on 16", as soon as the escalator clause tripped, regardless of impact on speed. Just for good measure, there was a large faction crying for battle cruisers to hang with the carriers, but, with the treaty and power plant technology constraints, that would have required sacrifice of armor, which would put them behind the 8-ball if they got stuck in against real BBs. So, with factions pulling in different directions, the compromise design that could do everything fairly well, the 9-14"/30kt, was tossed aside, in favor of ships that had lots of big guns, but speed compromised and armor compromised. As for the SDs, I find it interesting that SD was laid down the day after Lion. Both with 9-16" guns, but Lion was a hair over 40,000 tons and could make 30kts, on the same 130,000shp that SD had, without the benefit of SD's 600psi powerplant.
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  1077.  @jamesb4789  again, you make a lot of good points, but my take on Reeves' position was that, in his search for the perfect, he missed an opportunity to get "pretty good", and got "what were we thinking with these tubs?" instead. iirc the Brits looked at a KGV with 9-15 or 16" guns and the extra weight required too much sacrifice of armor. The Brits and US should have agreed on the tonnage escalation in Second London beforehand. All the treaty text says is they can go to 16" guns, but it only says the signatories need to consult and try to come to an agreement on tonnage increase. The US and UK spent the first half of 38 arguing about how much to increase the tonnage. The Brits were looking for around 42,000, as that was the largest their facilities could build and service, while the US was holding out for 45,000, so they could build the "perfect" BB that could match carrier speed, and have a lot of really big guns, and have a lot of armor. That's why I pointed out earlier that the fat, slow, SD was laid down the day after the 40,000 ton, 30kt, 9-16" gun Lion was laid down. If the US was OK with 30kts, instead of holding out for 33, they could have built better ships than the SDs, starting in 39. Impact on the RN of a 40,000 ton limit written in to the escalator clause? While the first three KGVs were ordered in 36. Anson and Howe were not ordered until April 28 of 37, four weeks after the escalation clause was triggered. If the escalation clause in the treaty offered 40-42,000, without all the negotiating the US and UK did later, Anson and Howe could have been ordered to the Lion design. As it was, by the time they got around to the Lions, they already had five KGVs building, and the incremental improvement offered by the Lion was probably not enough to maintain enthusiasm for getting them built. By the same token, if the NCs and SDs had been capable of 30+kts, the incremental improvement offered by the Iowas, may not been enough to get them built, when the USN already had 6 BBs building.
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  1091.  @kemarisite  alrighty, we have established (?) that the Browning 37mm M1/M9 (metallic link belt fed both right and left feed versions) could take the place of a Bofors or Vickers well, including single, double and quad mounts. Oerlikon alternatives? The low velocity M4 37mm, as used in the P-39 weighed 213lbs, light enough for the PT guys to use on a free mount. Fires the same 1.34lb HE round, but at only 2000fps, vs the 2600 of the M1. Range 8,875yds (that is what Navweaps says, but that is the same as the M1 and I question it due to the lower muzzle velocity, The Army manual does not give a range for the M4) vs 4,800 for an Oerlikon. 125rpm, much slower rate of fire than an Oerkilon, but hit a plane with that size shell, he'll know it. Or, there is another alternative. The Wickes class DDs were originally supposed to have a 1lb Maxim/Nordenfelt/Vickers gun as AA armament. I have seen pix of early production Wickeses with one Maxim mounted behind the #1 4" mount and another on top of the aft deckhouse, and they were on free mounts. The USN switched to the 3"/23 because they could not get enough Maxims. An update of the 1pounder Maxim could provide that last ditch firepower, but, with the M4 already in production, I don't know why they would bother with the Maxim. Wiki says the 1 pounder weighed 410lbs and only had a range of 4,500 yards. So, there you have USN medium and light AA: M1-M9 37mm in single, twin and quad mounts for midrange, and free mounted 37mm M4/M10 for last ditch.
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  1098.  @edwarddunne2758  they are a bit before the dreadnought era, but I would nominate the USN 8"/40 and 12"/40. The USN had switched to smokeless powder, without really understanding the implications of the slower burning powder. The guns started blowing off their muzzles and chases with disturbing frequency, which puzzled BuOrd, because chamber pressures were as expected. Further testing revealed that, because the powder burned slower than black or brown powder, pressure in the gun was still building as the shell ran down the tube, so pressure in the chase was far higher than expected. The solution was to install a strong liner, and hoop the tube to the muzzle, to reinforce it. The early British 12"/35 and 12"/40 has a problem with "steel choke". A ridge would form in the liner after some use. When the ridge grew large enough, the shell would hit it with enough force to start the fuse, so the shell would detonate at the muzzle or shortly after leaving the muzzle. By WWI, the USN was also discovering "copper choke", where material from the driving bands on the shells built up in the bore, creating the same issues with detonating shells, stuck shells, and exploded guns. Copper choke was more of a maintenance problem, while the USN 40 cal guns and the British steel choke were more design problems. Drac has made some disparaging comments about some of the French battleship main guns, which had a shorter range than the ship's secondary armament, but that could have been a function of the French turrets only elevating to 12 degrees.
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  1124. wrt the more smaller vs fewer larger guns question, this argument raged for decades. In the USN, it was the head of BuOrd, during the teens, Joseph Strauss, that promoted the more/smaller option. As Drac said, the argument for more, smaller guns, always depends on an artificial restraint. Strauss insisted that all combat would be at 12,000 yards, or less. Since a 14" could penetrate well enough at that range, they could put more of them on a ship and increase the probability of a hit. The Tennessees could have been built with 16", there was active speculation they would be, reported in the newspapers, but Strauss pushed through the 14" option. Jutland satisfied the General Board and SecNav that engagements would be fought at considerably more than 12,000, so Strauss was overruled when guns were specified for the Colorados. In his annual report that year, SecNav Daniels said the 16" decision was made over the objections of some officers. That same argument arose again, in the design of the KGVs. In the Admiralty's own analysis, a 9-15" armament would provide a more satisfactory ship, but the decision was made to go to 12-14" instead. It is probably worth noting that Admiralty fighting instructions at the time required closing, as fast as possible, to 16,000 yards, or less, before fully engaging. Again, the artificial restraint: not requiring the KGVs to be effective at greater ranges, made the 14" look like the better option. I give the credit for the Admiralty clinging to an obsolete doctrine, against the recommendations of Admiralty technical staff recommendations, to Admiral Chatfield, who was First Sea Lord from 1933 to 38.
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  1136.  @michelangelobuonarroti4958  The RM considered converting Caracciolo to a carrier. Where would the money come from? The RM was building DDs steadily through the 1920s. They had lost 9 in the war, but received 10 DDs from Austria and Germany as war reparations and used most of them into the 1930s, so their war losses were more than made up. Shortly after the war 17 obsolete DDs were scrapped, but they had built 35 new DDs during the war, so the RM was not short of DDs vs before the war. Never the less, the RM built 28 more DDs by the mid 1920s. A 1,000 ton Destroyer cost about 100,000 GB Pounds. To put that in perspective, a QE class BB cost about 3M GBP and an R-class cost about 2M GBP. So, by my figures. if the RM had put a moratorium on DD construction through 1925, that would have freed up the equivalent of 2.8M GBP. Then it's a matter of figuring the cost to convert Caracciolo. The hull had been built up to the weather deck and launched, but I don't know if the engines and boilers had been installed, or paid for. Courageous and Glorious were complete, serving, ships when converted, and their conversions cost about 2M GBP each. Bearn, which was somewhat smaller, had been launched to clear the slipway before the decision to convert to a carrier was made. The budget for the conversion was 66.33M Francs, in 1923, which works out to about 883,000 GBP. I have read that Bearn was selected for conversion as less progress had been made in building her as a battleship, so there was less battleship material to remove to make the conversion. The budget to convert Lexington was $22.4M US, which works out to 4.89M GBP. Lexington was quite a bit larger than Caracciolo, the hull being on the ways about 25% complete, with no machinery installed. So, it really comes down to how much more work Caracciolo would need. Was it an empty shell, or was a large portion of the machinery already in place? There probably was the money to convert Caracciolo, but the RM decided it's strategy would be built around torpedo boats and subs, so that is where the money went.
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  1154. wrt the USN building battlecruisers in the 1920s, some of the material I have read about the WNT says the UK was open to an individual ship upper limit of 42-43,000 tons, ie Hood size ships, it was the US that demanded the hard 35,000t limit. The US' position at the conference was that it didn't want to spend anything on anything. To get battlecruisers built would require getting them laid down earlier. The Lexingtons were authorized in the 1916 appropriation, but construction was suspended before they were laid down, due to the change in priorities after the US entered the war. Meanwhile, the head of BuOrd, Strauss, was a fan of the 14" gun, and actively opposed the 16". When the 14" guns for the Tennessees were ordered, 14" were also ordered for the battlecruisers, as that is what the preliminary designs called for. It was not until mid summer 1916, when the SecNav and General Board analyzed Jutland, overruled Strauss, and decreed that future capital ships would have 16" guns. Keep in mind, in 1914, the USN had no modern cruisers, only an accumulation of obsolete armored and protected cruisers. The scenario to get battlecruisers built would need to go down along the lines of Congress being suitably impressed by the Battle of the Falklands, and stampede into adding battlecruisers to the 1915 appropriation that included the Tennessees, using the extra 14"/50s that had been ordered. The designs that used the 14"/50s were generally under 35,000 tons. Then get the long slipways built at the yards and get them laid down, before the US enters the war. With the earlier start, laid down in late 16-early 17, they would be complete before the Washington Conference.
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  1320.  @themanformerlyknownascomme777  your scenario might have happened. During the Washington conference, the UK was willing to accept an individual ship limit around 42,000 tons. An intellectually honest position, due to Hood. The US wanted 35,000, to keep costs down. At the first London conference, with the depression on, the UK was proposing lowering the tonnage limit well below 35,000, to constrain costs. The Dunkerques were built the size they were as a compromise: large enough to deal with the Panzerschiff, but lower cost than a treaty max ship. First London put a fleet tonnage limit on cruisers. While the USN continued to build 10,000 ton cruisers, the Admiralty looked at it's commitments. I recently reread "Fifty Ships That Saved The World", which said the Admiralty's assessment was that German surface raiders would be more of a threat than U-Boats, so wanted more cruisers. The Admiralty's decision was to build somewhat undersized cruisers, so they could have more cruisers, within the treaty's fleet tonnage limit. While a 42,000 ton limit was possible, what each country actually builds is a balance of what they can pay for, and how many ships they want, within the treaty's fleet tonnage limits. I am pretty confident that, whatever limits the US and UK agreed on, Germany and Italy would cheat by 6-7,000 tons, because that is small enough overage to get away with. The Yamato would have been what it was, as Japan had dropped out of the treaty system, so was unconstrained. What tipped off the US and UK that Yamato exceeded treaty limits was the amount of material being ordered for her. Intelligence like that is vague. Apparently, the US and UK thought Yamato would be somewhere in the mid 40,000 range, so negotiated the tonnage escalator appropriately. I suspect that, if Japan had opted to build Yamato at 45.000, the US and UK would not have twigged that she exceeded treaty limits in time to start work on the Iowas and Lions.
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  1323.  @arivael  you are correct, I did forget Furious. I checked. During October 41, Furious was carrying aircraft to Jamaica for ASW patrol. From November into March 42, Furious was undergoing refit in the Philadelphia. Navy yard. Returned to the UK in April. In the UK back to refit for completion of installation of radar. Joined the Home Fleet in July. I have heard that story about Indomitable too. She ran aground in the West Indies on November 3rd. By November 3rd, PoW was approaching Freetown, Sierra Leone, arriving there November 5th, and departing for Cape Town on the 7th. The log I have access to does not say where in the West Indies Indomitable grounded, but it's 4,440 miles from Jamaica to Freetown. If Indomitable had made for Freetown the day she grounded, she would have had a hard time catching up to PoW as that looks like about a 6 day trip. wrt carriers in the Med, I don't think Force H had a carrier between when Ark Royal sank in November and when Eagle joined H February 23rd. Meanwhile, Victorious was the only serviceable carrier with the Home Fleet. Hermes was the only option, but if she was sent with Z with her usual handful of Stringbags, she would have been nothing but another target. Two of the Kongos were off on the Pearl Harbor op at that time, though the Admiralty had no way of knowing that. As it was, the Japanese knew the Brits were sending battleships, so they reinforced the bomber groups in Indochina. I expect that, had QE and Valiant been sent instead, the Japanese would have dealt with them the same way.
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  1325. I hold that Captain Leach's eye witness account is correct. In the inquiry, Captain Leach said he had been looking directly at Hood when the inbound salvo of four shells landed. He said two landed short, and one long, or vice versa, he did not recall which, and he had an "impression" something hit near the mainmast. He kept looking at that spot for a few moments to see if something would happen, then the column of fire erupted from just about the same place he thought something had hit. I say Captain Leach is correct, it was a deck hit. Legions of armchair Admirals say the angle of fall at that range was too shallow to penetrate Hood's deck. However, firing with a reduced charge was SOP in the USN. USN gunnery tables published in the 30s give trajectory data for both full charge and reduced charge firing. Firing with a reduced charge, reduces the muzzle velocity. With reduced velocity, the shell needs to be fired at a higher angle to reach the target range, which results in a steeper angle of fall. All Bismark's gunners needed to do was know their business: at that range, they had to fire with reduced charge to punch through Hood's deck, so leave out the fore charge and only fire with the main, brass-cased, charge. Why would Bismark be going for a deck hit, ignoring the armchair Admiral's protests about "danger space"? RN fighting instructions said to close as rapidly as possible, only turning to bring the aft turrets to bear after closing to within 16,000 yards. All Bismark had to shoot at, with a relatively flat trajectory, is the front of Hood's superstructure. If they aimed for a deck hit, they had all of Hood's deck area as target.
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  1329.  @buzzardbeurling  I certainly have read about testing, as you describe, using a reduced charge to simulate a 20,000 yard hit at 5,000 or so. Didn't the Brits do that in their post-war testing of Baden? The USN tables show reduced charge trajectories at all the same range increments as the full charge trajectories. There were no computers then. All those trajectories had to be calculated by hand. Seems a large undertaking for something that would only be used for a few tests. It is probably safe to assume that everyone involved in setting gunnery policy in the 30s is dead now, so all we have are things that are handed down, and possibly distorted in the process. I don't know if you are familiar with the plant Ford Motor built at Willow Run to build B-24s. A lot of nonsense has crept into the narrative about that plant over the years. I heard an absolute howler, from a supposed "expert" a week ago. According to him, Wayne County was going to tax Ford for every plane that came off the assembly line. Utter nonsense. The government owned the plant, everything in it, and everything that came out of it, and, at that time, the Federal government did not pay local tax, so it would be impossible for Wayne County to tax those B-24s. I know the government had title to the planes, because I read the provisions of the original contract, in the Federal Register, not in an article someone wrote decades later. If I find myself in the hereafter some day, there are some people I want to find and talk with. Jackie Fisher is one. Sergio Marchionne is another. Until then, there are some questions I will not have a definite answer for.
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  1343. wrt the Force Z aircraft carrier question and Churchill trying to cover himself. I doubt that the Admiralty had a clue, when PoW set sail for the far east on October 24th, that all six large IJN carriers would be off on the Pearl Harbor op by the time PoW arrived in the far east. Seems that the reasonable assumption would be that if the Japanese made a move on Malaya, they would have air cover. Second point, assuming the range of a G3M or G4M with a torpedo load was unknown, and most bombs could not hurt PoW critically, bombs could hurt Repulse. So, seems irresponsible that the possibility of airborne attack on Force Z could be handwaved away. Hermes was finishing repair in Simonstown on November 16th. Hermes' usual air wing was a handful of Swordfish. The RN was starting to receive Martlets, but the early Martlets did not have folding wings, and, iirc, the wingspan of an F4F is too wide to fit on Hermes' elevators. At that time, it seems all the Martlets were in the UK anyway. The Buffalo had a slightly smaller wingspan, just small enough to fit on Hermes's elevators, and there were plenty of Buffalos in Singapore. So the only practicable way to get a credible CAP for Force Z would be to send Hermes. Meanwhile, get the information from Brewster to fabricate tailhooks in Singapore, and train the RAF pilots in carrier ops. When Hermes arrives, put the Swordfish ashore and load as many Buffalos as would fit on the ship. Bottom line, given the gyrations that would be needed to give Force Z a CAP, if that Hermes/Buffalo scenario even occurred to anyone, I figure Winny rolled the dice, then tried to cover his rear when it went wrong.
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  1347.  @lukedogwalker  there are things I read that simply don't make any sense. I have been looking in to the choice of 14" for the KGVs. One narrative says the British were forced to go 14" by Second London, but it was the British that pushed for 14" in the treaty, and their decision to go 14" was made before the conference started. Another narrative says the 14" armament was chosen for lower cost. Drac's piece on the KGVs shows the estimated weight for the 12-14" originally planned was higher than that of the 9-15" alternative, and the 14", having more guns, means more parts to be forged, fabricated, and machined. I don't see how it is possible for the 14" set to cost less with more material and a higher part count than the 15" alternative. I picked up the Garzke/Dulin book at the library last week. They talk about the "more smaller guns means more hits" school of thought driving the decision. That has the ring of truth to it, because the USN had the same argument in 1915-16. I read about the debate in the USN from the annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy, and newspaper reports, written at the time. I have visions of someone at the top, or above the top, of the Admiralty, clinging to that obsolete theory, ignoring that the French and Italians were both building 15", ignoring that the US made it's support for 14" contingent on Japanese support, ignoring that the Japanese were not going to support it because they already said they were dropping out of the treaty, and forcing the 14" gun. There was no need to write 14" into the treaty, as there was nothing in the treaty prohibiting building under treaty limits. The French had built 13", then 15", and the Italians were building 15", when the treaty limit was 16". My take is, whoever it was that forced the 14" gun on the RN, had it written into the treaty, and the fake narratives about treaty compliance and cost created and disseminated for political cover. It may sound bizarre, but no more bizarre than Admiral Strauss' antics at BuOrd, pushing 14".
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  1363.  @RedXlV  I have the exact numbers in my notes, somewhere, wrt how much was spent on da Vinci and how much more it would cost to complete Caracciolo. The amount spent on the salvage op, as far as it got, was far short of the cost to complete the new ship. A lot of what was spent on da Vinci would have been spent to clear the wreck anyway. As with Oklahoma, an air pressure bubble was created in the hull and crews worked inside to remove the fuel, ammo and guns, and cut away the superstructure to lighten the hulk. Because the inverted hull drew more water than the ship did upright, a channel had to be dredged to the drydock. I have read that the RM preferred the Pozzuoli guns, which were designed by Armstrong. The Ansaldoes were a monobloc design by Schneider, which were a lot lighter than the wire wound guns from the other two companies. In the back of my mind is the thought the RM gave seven Ansaldos to the army because they didn't quite trust them. The best reassignment of guns I can think of is to put two of the Ansaldoes that the army did not use in the first shore battery at Brindisi. The second battery at Brindisi was not finished until after the war, so install the two Ansaldoes from the monitor Faà di Bruno in that battery. That frees up four Pozzuolies. Cancel the four small monitors that were not completed until after the war, which frees up four more Pozzuolies. That leaves two Pozzuolies that were installed in improvised monitors during the war as spares. The other two Pozzuolies were on the monitor that sank. With four Ansaldoes installed at Brindisi, that leaves 1 new gun as a spare, and the four that were used as railroad guns during the war. Historically, all seven of the army Ansaldoes appear to have spent WWII in the armory at La Spezia. The next problem is spares, for when the original set of guns need to be relined. Either spend a lot of money making up another eight, or be content for the ship to be laid up for a couple months while it's one set of guns is overhauled. As for the armor, I have seen a speculative drawing of added armor at the main deck level. I have also seen a photo of the incomplete hull just before work stopped during the war. In the photo the decking only covers part of the hull, and I can see that there are no builkheads beneath the decking, I appear to be seeing the top of the turtleback and the decking being installed is temporary, to keep the weather out, until work is resumed. If that is the case, it would be easier to add armor directly on the turtleback before completing the ship.
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  1377.  @johnshepherd8687  somewhat covered this question in a thread below. After SecNav Daniels and the General Board decided in summer 1916 that the Colorados would receive the 16"/45, there was discussion in the press of upgunning the New Mexicos and Tennessees. The New Mexicos were actively under construction at that time, and a Naval officer is quoted in the press as saying they were too far along to be upgunned at any reasonable cost. Tennessee and California had not been laid down yet, but the USN had 14"/50 production in high gear, so the guns for those two ships were in process. However, the barbettes in the Tennessees seem to be the same diameter as the Colorados, 32 feet, the twin 16" turret is slightly lighter than the triple 14", and the part of the 16" turret that extends down inside the barbette is about 6 inches smaller in diameter, so there should not be any problem upgunning the Tennessees. Now, on to your question: The treaty divided battleships into "pre-Jutland" and "post-Jutland" groups. The Tennessees were deemed "pre-Jutland" in spite of them being laid down after the battle and having state of the art armor and torpedo protection. The only reason I can think of for that classification is because they had 14" guns. Put 16" on the Tennessees and there is no way they could be called "pre-Jutland". For everything else to be status quo, with the Tennessees deemed "post-Jutland", Maryland would be the US' third "post" ship, and Colorado and West Virginia would be used for target practice, along with Washington, or scrapped incomplete. If the US insisted on completing West Virginia and Colorado, that would give them five "post" ships. Japan would rightfully, say that they are entitled to have three "post" ships, due to the 5:5:3 ratio, and demand to be allowed to complete Tosa. Tosa was to have displaced about 39,900 tons, over the treaty limit, but, again, the Japanese could claim a right to one 40K ton ship, because of Hood. Let's take a quick math break. If Japan scrapped Settsu and demilitarized Kongo instead. then added Tosa, that would put their capital ship tonnage at 313,720 vs a quota of 315,000, so the IJN is golden. That would leave the UK building four Nelsons for parity. So that is the difference, either the US loses West Virginia and Colorado, or the Japanese gain Tosa and the UK gains two additional Nelsons.
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  1381.  @johnshepherd8687  I see what you are saying. I create alt histories as a hobby (much winter weather in Michigan, with little else to do), but I require my alt histories to be practicable, ideally pivoting on one decision being made slightly differently. Yes, your scenario would be interesting. I have not gamed that out. It could go something along the line of 14" being the baseline for BB guns, with 15" and 16" both classified as above baseline. That would give the RN 13 "above baseline" ships, the USN 6 and IJN 2. First take, the RN doesn't get the Nelsons. Below baseline ships eligible for immediate replacement: so the USN completes the other three Colorados, to replace the Delawares and Floridas. Within the displacement limits of the original treaty, Japan could not add any new ships, as it had no below baseline ships to replace. Looks really unbalanced though, with a 13:9:2 ratio of "above baseline" ships. Could go with a throw weight model. 12-14", 9-15: and 8-16" have surprisingly similar throw weights. Decree that the 12-14" ships and 8-16" ships equal, the 8 and 10 gun 14" ships, and anything with 12", substandard and subject to replacement. Decree the IJN Tosas and Amagis verboten due to their 10-16" armament being too superior to the throw weight model. That would give the RN 11 slightly below par ships, and the Renowns and all of the 13.5" ships qualified for immediate replacement due to excessively weak armament. The USN, assuming all the Colorados completed, 11 ships on plan, and the rest qualified for replacement. The IJN 6 ships on plan, and the Kongos qualified for replacement.
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  1388. wrt the G3 carrier conversion question, I do not find anything in the Washington treaty that is relevant to the conversions of Courageous and Glorious. All capital ships of each nation are listed on either the retention list, or disposal list. The Courageouses are on neither list. My takeaway from that omission is that, as the Admiralty had called them "light cruisers" since inception, the treaty respected that, called them "cruisers", and grandfathered them, just as all the armored cruisers that exceeded treaty limits in displacement and gun size were grandfathered. The treaty clause about converting existing or building ships to carriers does not apply to the Courageouses either. The clause only relates to the conversion of ships that exceed the treaty limit of 27,000 tons. Even after conversion, the Courageouses were well under 27,000, so the treaty clause would not apply. First London would have provided an incentive to reclassify the Courageouses as anything but cruisers due to the establishment of cruiser fleet displacement limits, but the conversions were already done, so First London did not cause their conversion either. My suspicion is Courageous and Glorious were converted due to an Admiralty assessment that they would make better carriers than they did cruisers. Given the cost of the conversions, I almost wonder if the Admiralty would have been better off if it had built new, optimized, carrier hulls, transferred the machinery from the Courageous class hulls, then scrapped the Courageouses as a mistake.
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  1404.  @WALTERBROADDUS  the Philippines were on a path to independence. A new constitution had been written and a civilian Philippine government established. Plus, the Philippines are on the other side of the world. Value to the US government, and value as perceived by the US population could have been very different. But, the islands were still US territory, so let's assume that FDR can get a declaration of war through Congress. What would be the US response, especially if the Japanese had not gone directly after Clark and Subic on the first day, but rather landed on Mindanao or Leyte, rather than Luzon, to minimize initial loss of American lives. In the historical timeline, the US population probably recognized the fleet was damaged and the Philippine garrison beyond help. If Pearl had not been attacked, and the fleet was intact, what would the population's response be to the Philippine garrison being left for dead? But, if the US did move to reinforce the Philippines, they would be steaming past a long line of Japanese held islands, as the IJN chips away at the fleet with subs and both land and carrier based aircraft. Saipan sits directly astride the direct line from Hawaii to the Philippines and had been garrisoned by Japan since the late 30s, FDR could recognize that a relief mission would be suicidal, but refusing to launch the mission would be politically suicidal. What to do? Launch the mission, but recognize it's a one way trip and only send ships of minimal value, like the obsolete battleships? So the US replicates Force Z, at four times the scale?
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  1407. wrt the Caribbean, I did some research into WWI debts a while back. The US had bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917. As Drac noted, the bulk of the remaining islands were UK possessions. I extrapolated the price per square mile the US had paid for the Virgin Islands to the land area of all the UK island possessions in the Caribbean, plus British Honduras, and found that a fair price for those UK possessions would be a bit over $4B US, enough to cover the entire principle of UK war debt to the US, plus part of the accrued interest. The amount other allies owed the UK, which had financed WWI, until the entry of the US in 1917, almost exactly equaled what the UK owed the US. On August 1, 1922, the UK government published a note from Arthur Balfour to the French ambassador to the UK, which was widely considered to be for US consumption. The note said that, if it was up to the UK, the UK would cancel the debts owed it by it's allies, but, as the US was pressing the UK for payment, in cash, the UK had no choice but to press it's allies for repayment, in cash. So the bottom line is, if the UK had signed over it's Caribbean possessions to the US as repayment of it's debts, then cancelled all debts owed it by it's allies, as those debts would be a wash with the debts owed to the US, the acrimony through the 20s and early 30s created by the pressures for repayment would have been greatly reduced. Such a scheme was widely discussed in the newspapers at the time. But President Harding said no. Lloyd George said no. Even the Prince of Wales weighed in, "no".
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  1413.  @Knight6831  The original retention lists, before adjustments for the two Nelsons and two Coloradoes, had the RN at 22 capital ships, with a total tonnage of 580,450, and the USN had 18 capital ships with a total tonnage of 500,650. The quota was 525,000. The US traded the two Delawares for Colorado and West Virginia, leaving it at 18 ships with a total tonnage of 525,850 tons. The RN scrapped four 13.5" armed ships to build the Nelsons, drawing the RN down to 20 capital ships with a total tonnage of 558,950, with the Nelson's design being a generation newer than the Coloradoes, which had been ordered in 1916. The four RN ships scrapped for the Nelsons, Thunderer, King George V, Ajax and Centurion, each mounted 10-13.5" guns, turbine powered, with a top speed of 21kts. The only obsolete feature of these ships vs USS Nevada, was that they were coal fired. By scrapping them, in favor of the Nelsons, the RN avoided the cost of oil conversion and adding torpedo bulges. Somewhere in my notes, I have the cost the USN paid to have the 12" armed Floridas and Wyomings, as well as the 14" armed New Yorks, all converted to oil and fitted with torpedo bulges. By my figures, the USN could have completed Washington for what it spent modernizing the two Floridas, with Florida going to the breakers and Utah being demilitarized less than ten years later. From my reading, it appears the only coal fired, 13.5" RN ships that survived the treaty cull, the Iron Dukes and Tiger, did not have a Farthing spent on Modernization in the 20s, continuing coal fired and unprotected against torpedoes until they were scrapped/demilitarized in the early 30s.
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  1421.  @vikkimcdonough6153  first, to hit anything with a battleship shell, you pretty well need to see the target. Scaling off of Google satellite view, Battleship Row is nearly 3 miles inland from the beach. Viewing from a low angle, the top of Missouri's mast is completely obscured by land, trees, and buildings. The Japanese would be pretty much shooting blind, as any spotter planes they send up would have P-40s all over them, unless the Japanese established total air superiority first. Even with air superiority, any spotter planes that survived the hail of AA fire that would be directed at them from the ships and surrounding land, only a small portion of the shells would hit anything. It would be a golden BB for those shells to hit anything vital. I read an interesting observation in "The Grand Fleet" a few weeks ago, words to the effect that unless the British battlecruisers were hit in the magazine, they stood up pretty well to gunfire. As for the TBD Devastator, it gets a bum wrap. The TBD performed well at Coral Sea, without a single loss to enemy action, though the torpedoes came up short. The TBDs were slaughtered at Midway because of a fatally botched attack. Blame luminaries like Stanhope Ring. I give secondary "credit" for the fiasco to Mitscher for not taking charge and setting the argument between Ring and Waldron. I'll throw in a dishonorable mention for Ray Spruance, because he was in command of TF 16. At Coral Sea, the TBDs, SBDs and fighters met at a rally point and attacked the Japanese formations together. The man who managed the strikes at Coral Sea, the man they needed at Midway. Aubrey Fitch, was on his way stateside, as his previous command, Lexington, had been sunk.
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  1438. wrt the Italian Francesco Caracciolo class battleships, it took three weeks, but I think I figured out a scenario where Italy could have gotten two into commission. Immediately after WWI, Italy built 10 new destroyers. So, convince Admiral Giovanni Sechi that they should finish what they started, before starting something else, and divert the funding from the DDs to building Cristoforo Colombo, which was second farthest along when work was suspended in 16, far enough along to be launched. Work actually was resumed on Francesco Caracciolo, launching on 12 May, 1920. Continue working on the two as funding allows, until the Washington treaty intervenes to halt work. As Italy, and France, were allowed to lay down new BBs in 27 and 29, years ahead of any of the other powers, plead that scrapping the 2 existing hulls and starting over in only 5 years is excessively wasteful, and have a clause added to the treaty allowing any signatory power to lay up existing, incomplete, ships, until the treaty allows new construction to resume, if the incomplete ships comply with treaty limits,. As the Caraccilos were designed to displace 34,000T, they would comply with treaty limits. So Italy updates the design of Caracciolo and Colombo, adding more deck armor, deleting the casement mounted secondary armament in favor of modern turrets, and potentially, preparing new, more advanced and powerful boilers and turbines, for when work is resumed in 27 and 29 respectively. With the two Caracciolos built to late 20s standards, they would only require addition of AA armament to be brought up to 1940 standard. That would eliminate the need to rebuild the Cavours, with the funding and material thus freed up, being available to speed the fitting out of Roma and complete Impero. As Drach said, 1941 would find the Brits facing 6 modern BBs that could run rings around most of the British capital ship inventory.
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  1444.  @Spectre578  what you would be describing is essentially the Admiralty's J3 battlecruiser proposal: 43,800t with 9-15" in triple turrets. The J3 was rejected as it did not use an all or nothing armor scheme, so the Admiralty moved on to the G3, which far exceeded Hood's displacement. On to the meat of your question. To enable it, the treaty would need to set the displacement limit at Hood's, 41,200 as the treaty measured it, or 42,000 because it's a rounder number, rather than 35,000. iirc, the Admiralty wanted enough tonnage for 15 treaty compliant battleships and 15 times 35,000 comes out to 525,000t, which is where the treaty set the limit for the RN and USN. With the limit at 42,000/ship, the RN would need to have a limit of 630,000t. OK, lets say the other parties went for a 630kt limit, 378kt for Japan. Besides the original treaty retention list, the RN could also retain the other three Orion class, which would put them at 647950t. Building two J3s, at 42,000t each would require scrapping all four Orions to bring them to 639950t. The IJN had the two 40,000t Tosas and the two 41,200t Amagis building. To maintain the 5:5:3 ratio, the IJN could complete any two. With their historical retention list totaling 301,320, they would have approximately 77kt of headroom, but while the RN would be scrapping existing ships and lowering their total tonnage and drawing down closer to their 630kt limit, the IJN would be building up to it's limit, so the other powers might not be in a forgiving mood if the IJN wanted to overshoot by 3-4,000 tons to complete two Amagis. Construction of the Tosas was farther along, and, well, they could lie a teeny bit, claiming each Tosa only displaced 38,000t, 2,000 tons lighter than in fact. Thing is, the Tosas could make about 26kts, about the same as a Nagato, so the Tosas would probably spend a lot of time in port, because they couldn't keep up with the carriers. Building two Amagis instead would probably require scrapping either a Fuso or a Kongo, which reduces the gain of building the two Amagis. How would this shake out for the USN? A quota of 630kt would result in an initial retention list for the USN of a lot of appalling old junk: the two South Carolinas, and four of the Connecticut class pre-dreadnoughts. Lets assume Washington is completed in exchange for two Connecticuts, in addition to West Virginia and Colorado replacing the other two Connecticuts and the two South Carolinas. Now, the US could waggle it's finger at the RN and IJN both having 42,000 ton ships and demand parity. According to Friedman's breakdown of the weights for the South Dakotas and Lexingtons, both classes come in under 42,000t, without fuel and boiler water, so the US could hold it's breath and stamp it's feet until the other parties agree to let the US complete 3 of them. But would the US want to complete them as designed? The whole idea behind the US calling the conference was to get out from under the building program that was started by the 1916 naval act. The US could easily say the Delawares are good enough, and scrap everything on the slipway. So, your 1941 lineup: the RN gains two bad-ass battlecruisers, the IJN gains two battleships that sit in port because they can't keep up with the carriers, and the USN has one additional Colorado class, that is even less able to keep up with anything than a Tosa.
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  1457. The Mississippis were sold to Greece in the summer of 1914. As a quick path to a USN scout cruiser, they could have pulled the 7"/45 tertiary battery off of the Connecticuts. Historically, most of those 7" were removed from the Connecticuts during the war with the intent of deploying them as field artillery. Most of the Maine class predreadnoughts were in the reserve squadron by then. Their 6"/50 secondaries could have been used on scout cruisers as well. The British were clearly desperate for serviceable guns for monitors. The Lord Clives used 12"/35s pulled off Majestic class pre-dreadnoughts. As an exercise, I looked at what the US could have sold the UK for monitors, if FDR was making decisions, rather than Wilson. Settled on the 12"/40, after modification to resolve their habit of blowing their muzzles off. There were 6 twin 12"/40s on the three Maine class ships, and 4 more turrets on the Arkansas class monitors. The guns on all these ships were expendable by 1914: the Maines were in reserve, and most of the monitors found a new use as sub tenders. The Illinois class was also in reserve, but it gets complicated. The Illinois had an early mod of the same Mk IV turret, but mounted 13"/35s. According to my pre WWI US Naval Academy gunnery text, everything in the turret was mounted to the turntable. The turntable was made of common steel plate and angle iron. So the drill would have been to make a new turntable for the turrets from the Illinois class to accept 12"/40s, then pull the guns, mounts, and lugs from three of the Virginias to equip the Mk IV turrets. That would give the RN 16 gun and turret sets to build monitors around.
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  1480.  @scott2836  are we talking about the same gun? The only 37mm M3 I know of is the single shot anti-tank gun. The Browning designed 37mm AA gun started as the M1, with the original clip feeding system. Army manual TM-9 235 gives the ranges as maximum: 6200 yards vertical, ie 18,600 feet, and horizontal range of 8875 yards. With self-destroying HE rounds the range is shortened to 3960 yards vertical, ie 11,860 feet, and 4070 yards horizontal, with a muzzle velocity of 2600fps, and an HE shell weighing 1.34lbs. The Vickers Mk VIII pompom, according to Navweaps had an altitude max, with the high velocity ammo, of 13,300 ft, and horizontal range of 5,000yds. The USN Bofors had a max ceiling of 23,500 feet and a horizontal range of 10,750 yards, with a muzzle velocity of 2890fps and am HE shell weighing 1.985lbs. The Bofors tops the Browning on every parameter, but the Browning tops the Vickers. John Browning originally designed the gun around the end of WWI. In the 30s, Colt made some improvements, and it went into production in 1939, one year after the Navy put the 1.1 into production. Given when it was designed, if development had been pressed more urgently, seems reasonable it would have gone into production years earlier. The Browning had a tendency to jam but, being an army gun, it was burdened with a clumsy cooling system. According to the manual, after every 60 rounds, you had to stop firing and pump water through the barrel to cool it. The manual says, if it jams, it's because it has overheated, due to the crew not executing the cooling cycle. Of course, a navy mount would have a proper water jacket to eliminate the cooling problems.
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  1493.  @arivael  I'm sorry, but I cannot agree. Taking your last point first, yes, imho, the gun size reduction was futile, and doubtless, self-interested. Same thing with the carrier tonnage reduction to 23,000 tons. I can make a case for the WNT. I cannot make a case for Second London as it is so blatantly packed with UK self-interest. Article 25 is what triggered the tonnage increase. 25 was not triggered until Yamato was laid down in late 37, and, because of section 25, the UK and US argued for the first half of 38 about how much the tonnage increase would be: the UK trying to set the limit around 42,000 and the US demanding 45,000. If Second London exempted the Richelieus, seems it would have said so. The WNT was very detailed, explicitly saying two Colorados could be completed, in exchange for two Delawares and the RN could build the Nelsons, in exchange for Thunderer and the three surviving KGVs. There is no specific exclusion language that I can find in Second London. Of course, laying down Richelieu was, itself, a violation of the WNT and First London. Yes, France signed Second London. and Italy didn't, but they were both ignoring it. And, as noted above, the Admiralty could not have laid down Lions in April of 37, because they exceeded 35,000 tons. The displacement of the Lions was not permitted until mid 38. What they could have done was lay down all of the KGVs starting in April, using the 15" design. Alternately, if they wanted to keep their schedule, lay down the first three to the 14" design, then, when Anson and Howe were ordered on April 28, 37, three weeks after the gun escalator clause was triggered, order to the 15" design. They didn't do that. All five were ordered to the 14" design.
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  1495.  @tomaseidtner8116  the foremost problem Greece has to consider is the size of it's largest drydock. The Averof and the Mississippis barely fit. As for "merchants", do you have in mind Basil Zaharoff? Zaharoff did contribute a huge pile of money, far in excess of the Averof bequest that covered the down payment on the armored cruiser, to the Greek intervention in the Turkish civil war, but apparently not anything for the Green Navy. Where Zaharoff could have made a difference with a well timed donation was a few years earlier. Drac mentioned the battles of Elli and Lemnos. The Ottoman cruiser Hamidiye had broken out into the Med and was raiding Greek shipping. The Averof was the only ship in the Greek navy that had the speed, armor and firepower to chase down and kill the Hamidiye, but, if the Averof took off to chase down the Hamidiye, there would not be enough of a Greek force remaining near the Dardanelles to keep the rest of the Ottoman fleet bottled up. iirc, the commander of the Averof defied orders to pursue the Hamidiye and stayed on station at the Dardinelles, waiting for the Ottoman attempts to break their fleet out. Where Basil could have made himself useful: the preceding Ottoman Sultan had ordered a new protected cruiser, essentially a repeat of Hamidiye, from Ansaldo. When that Sultan was overthrown, the new Ottoman regime refused to pay for the ship, so it sat, unfinished, on the slipway, until Italy went to war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912, whereupon Italy seized the ship and completed it for the RM. Seems to me that if the Greek PM, who was well acquainted with Zaharoff had sent a well timed wire "Bas old buddy, the Averof family has made a wonderful contribution to the Royal Hellenic Navy for a new cruiser. There is another cruiser sitting on the slipway at Ansaldo that the Ottomans defaulted on. Maybe you could see your way to help us out with the purchase of that ship?", then the RHN would not have been in a bind when the Hamidiye broke out, because it would have a second capable cruiser.
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  1502.  @voqiir3802  I assume you are referring to the Ottoman buying the Rivadavias. The Ottoman Empire joined the war October of 1914. Rivadavia was not complete until December, 1914, and Moreno was not complete until February of 15. Yes, the legality of Churchill seizing both of the Ottoman ships when they were on the brink of the Ottoman crews taking possession, was questionable. Buying the Rivadavias would have a couple issues. First, Armstrong would need to decline to guarantee the French loan, and Bethlehem Steel would need to be willing to guarantee a larger loan. Second, the US government would need to have a more casual attitude about the sale of military technology. Argentina had been exploring selling the ships before they were complete, and, with rising tensions in Europe, there were several interested parties. The US government put significant pressure on Argentina to not sell the ships. The other scenario, the Ottoman buying the South Carolinas from the USN, in response to Greece buying the Mississippis solves the delivery time frame issue as the Mississippis were sold in the summer of 14. That would require Armstrong declining to guarantee the French loan, to keep the Ottoman shopping. But who would guarantee the loan to pay for the US ships? The deal that comes to mind might be where the USN uses the proceeds from the sale of the two South Carolinas to pay for a forth New Mexico, with the new ship built by Bethlehem Steel, provided Bethlehem guarantees the loan for the sale of the old ships. The treaty after the war required Turkey to make the French loan good, but the President of Bethlehem Steel would have had some very nervous shareholders until then.
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  1503.  @voqiir3802  OK, so the question is what could the Ottoman have bought in the US at that time? According to Wiki, the order for Resad V was placed June 8, 1911, at an estimated cost of 2.5M GBP, which was financed internally, built to a modified KGV design, which held cost down. It is still looking like the most likely purchase in the US would be a sister of the Rivadavias. Most US battleships were designed by the Navy, and the US government may not want to share it's latest designs. The Rivadavias were designed by Bethlehem Steel, during a competition for the Wyoming class, but rejected by the Navy in favor of it's own design. As it's own design, Bethlehem could have had more freedom who they sold ships to. The Rivadavias were priced at $10.7M USD each, while the price of Resad V, converted to USD at the time would be $12.15M, so the Ottoman are saving a bit of money. Bethlehem's Fore River yard launched Rivadavia August 26th, 1911, so the slipway was clear less than three months after receiving the order. My bet is Bethlehem Steel would lay the keel for the Ottoman ship at Fore River sometime in the fall of 1911. Resad V was laid down at Vickers December 6th, 1911. So far, the schedule is the same, and the US ship costs less. But the Brits were very good at building battleships. Vickers had Resad V built and ready for handover in 2 years, 8 months. It took Fore River 4 years, 7 months, to complete Rivadavia. With the keel laid in fall 1911, the Ottoman ship would not be completed until spring 1916, and would promptly be impounded by the US government. The only way the Ottoman would have a chance of taking delivery of the ship is if the William Cramp yard built it. Cramp got Wyoming from keel laying to commissioning in 2 years 8 months so would just make it under the wire before the Ottoman Empire entered the war. Cramp had launched Wyoming May 25, 1911, so the slipway was clear when the Ottoman ordered their ship. It would just be a matter of waiting for the material to be delivered from the steel mills. Bethlehem would probably want the ship built in it's own yard however. It would be an interesting test of wills, the Ottoman wanting an earlier delivery, and Bethlehem wanting to maximize profit by building the ship in it's own yard.
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  1534.  chris younts  I don't have a copy of Jane's at my fingertips, so I resorted to using Wiki. According to the Wiki entries, NM was refitted with geared turbines in the early 30s, as you said. Her two sisters were originally equipped with Curtis turbines, which were also replaced in the early 30s with geared turbines. So yes, they were all reengined, as you said, but they were not all initially built with T-E systems. As NM was the only one built with T-E, her engine spaces were probably not optimized for T-E, which facilitated the conversion to the geared turbines. Again, according to Wiki, both of the Tennessees and all three Colorados were built with T-E and none of the articles on those five ships mention replacement of the TE systems among the many modifications made over the years. Maryland was hit forward by a torpedo at Saipan. The Wiki article mentions her return to Pearl was done running astern so as to not put pressure on the bulkhead where the damage was. The Wiki article doesn't mention it, but I have read elsewhere that running that distance at any sort of sensible speed was only possible due to her T-E drive. Reversing turbines usually offer only a small fraction of the power available from the forward running turbines. In the case of T-E drive, reversing the drive is done by simply reversing polarity of current flow, so the full power of the turbines, generators and motors is available in both directions. Interesting conversation. I now have a much more granular understanding of early 20s battleship drive systems than I did this morning.
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  1535. ​ chris younts  Again referring to Wiki, NM's original T-E drive generated 27,500hp. The conventional turbines in her sisters generated 32,000. The difference probably due to the power loss inherent in converting from mechanical power to electricity, then converting the electricity back to mechanical power, as Drach notes in the video. They could make 21 knots. After their modernization, which increased displacement by 1400 tons, the new boilers and turbines, which took advantage of performance improvements made since the originals had been installed 15 years earlier, generated 40,000hp, and the ships could reach 22kts in spite of the increase in displacement. The cage masts were gone, a new superstructure was built and they looked modern for 1932. The navy putzed around for years about modernizing the Tennessees and Colorados, but, outside of installing some 5/25s and a couple 1.1s didn't do much with them. Imagine if the second London treaty had not had the escalator clause, or the USN had not expected the escalator to be triggered, while designing the North Carolinas, they would be looking at new BBs with only 14" guns, vs the Colorados with 16" guns and might have seen what could be cone with the Colorados. Imagine Colorados being rebuilt in 1938 with superstructures like West Virginia had in 44, with the bulges that had been planned for years but not installed until after WVa was sunk, with AA armament appropriate for the 1938 threat environment (think 4 twin 5/38 mounts and about 10 1.1 mounts) then take a page from the Italian's book, gut out the engine spaces and install the latest high pressure, high temperature boilers and turbines, and use the room freed by removal of the generators and motors to install physically larger boilers and turbines. The Italians increased power in their old BBs from 30,000 to 75,000 and bumped speed from 21 to 26kts. The original T-E system in the Colorados only generated 28,900hp. Unfortunately, my computer received a new version of ,Net a couple months ago and SpringSharp no longer works. Maybe someone with a working SpringSharp can plug in the Colorado specs and see how much power it would take to push them to 27-28kts and see if that sounds feasible. If WVa and Maryland could turn 28kts, they might have been with the carriers, instead of at Pearl, on Dec 7. Even if WVa was at Pearl, flying into the teeth of 4 or 5 1.1" mounts would have made a much more interesting morning for the Kate pilots attacking the ship, and the bulges would have made the Kate pilot's efforts less productive.
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  1549.  @bryant7201  I am assuming everything proceeds on the historical timeline, except the Pearl Harbor op does not happen. Japan attacked the Philippines on December 8, ie the same day as Pearl. The USN can sit tight in it's fortified harbors, and let the Philippine garrison be starved/slaughtered, or it can act. In my scenario, the American people and Congress force an expedition to "save our boys" in the Philippines, in effect forcing the USN into the response that fits the IJN doctrine. Keep in mind that the League of Nations handed the former German colonies north of the equator to Japan after WWI: that means all of the Marianas, except Guam, all of the Carolines, Palau, and all of the Marshalls. That is about 3,000 miles, between Wake and the Philippines peppered with Japanese held islands supporting flying boat and sub patrols, to keep IJN advised of the USN's position so that a trap can be laid. And the IJN will be closer to repair bases than the USN. It's only 1544 miles from Manila to Hiroshima, but 5445 from Manila to Pearl Harbor. I wouldn't bet on there being any functional repair facilities still intact at Subic when the USN showed up. So, the USN is cut up by Japanese subs and the occasional carrier strike on the way to the Philippines, then runs into Japanese land based air in the Philippines, then another gauntlet of subs on the way back to Pearl. I would almost want the IJN carriers to stay out of the way, hang back in the South China Sea, then add their air wing to the land based air to intercept the USN when it arrives. Chop up the US carriers in the "decisive battle" then pick off the battleships and the other major units as they limp back to Pearl.
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  1612.  @Captain_Seafort the Washington treaty specified when each capital ship could be replaced. The Kongos were older. The Washignton treaty specified Kongo could be replaced in 34, Hiei and Haruna in 35, and Kirishima in 36. Fuso and Yamashiro could be replaced in 37 and 38 respectively. The Ises could be replaced in 39 and 40. The Japanese were planning replacements in the order the treaty specified. First London pushed replacements out 1936. Second London defined a capital ship as overage and replaceable at 26 years of age. That revision would make the QEs the first to be replaced, as they were older than the Revenges, with the exception of Malaya, which commissioned the same day as Revenge, Feb 1, 1916. Under the terms of the treaty, the Revenges could not have been replaced until 42. When the long lead items for the KGVs were ordered in 1936, that was the treaty replacement schedule. QE would age out in December 1940. KGV commissioned in October 1940. Warspite would age out in March 41. Prince of Wales commissioned in January 41. Barham would age out in October 41. Duke of York commissioned in August 41. Valiant would age out in January 42. Anson commissioned in April 42. Malaya would age out in February 42. Howe commissioned in June 42. This begs the question "if that was the case, why did they spend so much rebuilding some of the QEs in 37?" I would suspect a mid-course correction by the Admiralty, to extend the life of the QEs, and replace the Revenges instead. The outbreak of the war cancelled the retirement of any ships, and probably accelerated work on the KGVs. It would have been interesting to see, if the treaty stayed in effect, and war had not broken out until 43, if the commissioning of all of the KGVs was slow-walked until 42, when the Revenges would age out.
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  1645.  @michelangelobuonarroti4958  Caracciolo had a lot of obstacles to overcome. First, it was a pre-Jutland design. I have seen drawings of a proposal to add armor on the weather deck, which just looks wrong to me. Interestingly, I have seen a photo taken in December 1915, shortly before work was suspended, where they appear to be installing the weather deck. The odd thing about that photo is there are no compartment bulkheads visible below the unfinished part of the deck, only what appear to be a temporary, wood, support structure, which implies the deck being installed is only intended to be temporary, to keep the weather out. Caracciolo's armor turtleback was only one deck below the weather deck, so what I see below the temporary deck would be that armor deck. If that is the case, than the horizontal armor could quite easily be improved when the temporary deck is removed. Second protection issue is the lack of a torpedo defense system. However, Caracciolo appears to have boiler rooms along each side, with more boilers in centerline boiler rooms, so the boiler rooms along each side would tend to provide some protection. Additionally, torpedo bulges could be added. The guns are another problem. The guns were sourced from three different vendors, with each vendor building to a different design. The guns were supposed to have similar ballistic performance, but I would want all eight guns to be of the same design, just to be sure. Three of the guns were a Vickers design, built by Terni. Two of those were installed in a shore battery near Venice. Nine of the guns were a monobloc design by Schneider, built by Ansaldo. Of those nine, two were installed in the monitor Faà di Bruno and the other seven were turned over to the Army. The Army installed four of those seven on railroad carriages and sent them to the front to shell Austrian troops. Twelve were built to an Armstrong design by Pozzuoli. Two of those were installed on a monitor that foundered in a storm, four were installed in shore batteries at Brindisi, two were installed on improvised monitors that were on the firing line late in the war, and the last four were installed in monitors after the end of the war. Saving eight unused guns, of the same design, for the ship, would require prior planning to shuffle the other guns among the recipients. As for the budget issue, the RM was building destroyers all through the 1920s. The RM laid down 29 destroyers from 1919 through 1925. As a rule of thumb, I use 100,000 GPB for the price of a destroyer, and Caracciolo probably would have cost 3M GPB or more, so, considering how far advanced work was on Caracciolo, enough could have been saved by cancelling some of that destroyer building program to cover the cost of the battleship. The most interesting thing about Caracciolo being completed is it would have required far less modernization in the 30s than the older battleships, which would free resources to work on Roma and Impero. But then, I have wondered over the years, if the modernization were not done at all, would that have freed enough resources to complete Roma and Impero when they could have been useful?
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  1647.  @ibbi32  I doubt that a Konig would be converted, because it's slow. Maximizing wind over the deck makes for safer air ops, so speed is particularly desirable in carriers. As for cost to convert a complete, serving, capital ship to a carrier, as an example, Courageous and Glorious cost about 2M Pounds each to convert to carriers, while Ark Royal, of about the same displacement, cost 3M Pounds to build from the keel up. The USN's analysis was in the same neighborhood, it was somewhat less expensive to convert the existing, incomplete, Lexingtons to carriers, than to build a carrier from the keel up, but I don't have those figures at my fingertips. The next factor to consider is efficiency as a carrier. According to Wiki, the Courageous could carry 48 aircraft, while Ark Royal could carry 72, in theory, but more like 50-60 in reality, on the same displacement. The difference between Lexington and Yorktown, in terns of efficiency as a carrier is much greater. Again, using Wiki's numbers, Lexington (CV-2) could carry 78, while Yorktown (CV-5) could carry 90, on a third less displacement. Even the little Ranger had a larger hangar than Lexington. I put a lot of this inefficiency of the Lexington down to the US' lack of experience with carriers when the Lexington's conversion was designed, while, buy the time Courageous and Glorious were converted, the RN had been running serious carriers for several years. The other factor to consider is time. Courageous and Glorious took an inordinate amount of time to convert. Both started conversion in 24. One did not complete until 28 and the other 30, while Ark Royal only required a little over 3 years from keel laying to commission. The slow pace of the conversions may have been a matter of labor strikes or lack of enthusiasm on the part of the RN, but that is only my theory. When the Courageous and Glorious were taken in hand for conversion the RN was under pressure from the Washington Treaty, to reduce BB tonnage, so they could have officially started the conversion process before the RN was really ready.
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  1652. wrt the Chesapeake, unfortunately, my local public library decided to cull it's collection last summer, and "Six Frigates" was one of the casualties. (so was "The Grand Fleet"). Going by the Wiki entry, yes, some of the crew had been transferred from Constitution. This brings up a couple issues that I would like to see answers to. First: Constitution is generally said to be armed with 24 pounders, Chesapeake, with 18 pounders. Are the ballistics of these two size guns exactly the same? Without sighting systems, accuracy is dependent on the experience and skill of the gunner. Taking a gunner experienced on a 24 pounder, and hand him an 18 pounder, is he going to be able to hit anything, until he becomes acclimated to the smaller gun? Second, I doubt BuPers had an elaborate system for selecting men to man a ship at that time. How were the men transferred from Constitution, or any other ship, selected? If the Captain received an order "transfer 100 men to Chesapeake", what will his selection criteria be? My experience, and human nature, say that the Captain will select his worst crewmen to transfer off his ship: the idiots, the screw-ups, the discipline problems. Lawrence, an experienced, successful, Captain, had just transferred from a 440 ton sloop of war, to a 1200 ton frigate. How familiar was he with the handling characteristics of the Chesapeake? Yes, this all sounds like excuse making. On paper, the two ships were evenly matched. But getting into the details, I do need to wonder if the issues i mentioned played a part in handicapping Chesapeake.
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  1653.  @eiwtsexiang  I might be able to help with questions 4 and 6. I am not sure where the figure of 22 capital ships for the 1916 Navy act comes from. What I have always seen was a program for the (4) Colorado class, three of which were completed, (6) Lexington class battle cruisers and (6) South Dakota class battleships. The act also called for (10) scout cruisers, but that doesn't add up to 22 ships either. Chief designer Admiral Taylor was not happy with the South Dakota design, and drew up an alternative that was a bit larger, and a bit faster, which was also more stable. It may have also had a slightly shallower draft, as the existing South Dakota design was causing concern with regard to passing through the Panama Canal locks. Taylor's improved design was rejected for cost. I have seen newspaper reports, in the immediate aftermath of the war, where SecNav Daniels was saying he was going to propose another major building program, but the incoming Harding administration had other ideas, so the second building program was never enacted. As for the shrinking number of funnels on newer ships, that probably relates to the number of boilers. Newer technology allowed the needed amount of steam to be produced by fewer boilers. New York was built with 14 coal fired boilers. When she was converted to oil fuel, the 14 boilers were replaced by only 6 oil fired boilers. HMS Valiant was originally built with 24 oil fired boilers, and two funnels. In a modernization in the early 30s, the two funnels were trunked into one very broad funnel. In her 1939 rebuilt, the 24 boilers were replaced by only 8 new boilers, and the broad funnel was replaced by a much smaller one. One bit for question #7, as far as the USN was concerned, Jutland made the case for going to 16" guns, due to the demonstrated need to penetrate at longer range. Until that time, the head of BuOrd, Admiral Strauss, championed the 14", saying that a ship could carry more of the smaller guns, which would translate into more hits. Strauss predicated his assessment on his opinion that engagements would always take place at 12,000 yards or less, where the 14" could penetrate. Jutland disproved the 12,000 yard limit on engagements, so SecNav Daniels and the General Board overrode Strauss' assessment. Strauss requested to be relieved at BuOrd and be given sea duty.
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  1656.  @nullanonsonemmenoiocosascr6676  There was a mention of the Caracciolos in the Q&A on battleship hulls of a few days ago. I'll repeat a couple points; the Caracciolos were criticized for inadequate torpedo protection. The Pugliese system apparently was invented in 1917, after the Caracciolos were designed. Construction of the hull of Caracciolo was advanced beyond where the Pugliese system could have been installed at construction, so considerable rework would have been required to provide sufficient internal space in the hull for the system. Ansaldo had not made as much progress on the hull of Columbo, so less rework would have been required. The Odero and Orlando yards had hardly made any progress on their ships. I covered in the previous post how the guns built for the Caracciolos had been repurposed during the war, so more would have had to be built if construction of the ships had continued. Italy did not have the finances to support a capital ship building program, without shortchanging something else. Immediately after WWI, Italy continued building destroyers. As the Caracciolos were intended as a response to the British QE, I will assume their cost was about the same as a QE 3M GBP. I will further assume that the cost of an Italian DD is about the same as a British DD: about 100,000 GBP. So to clear the cost, after the war, to build two Caracciolos, assuming Caracciolo was 50% done and Columbo was 5% done, the cost to complete wold be roughly 4.35M, or the cost of 43 DDs, or almost all of the DDs the RM laid down through the 20s, and that doesn't include the cost to rework Caracciolo to incorporate the Pugliese system. The delays in construction would put the ships in the clutches of the Washington treaty. Italy could argue that, as the US and UK were both allowed to complete 2 new BBs in the early 20s, the treaty should offer the same courtesy to Italy, so only two Caracciolos could have been built. Because Italy chose not to complete two Caracciolos, they were given two BB building windows opening in 1927 and 1929, that were good until used. Italy used those two windows to build the first two Littorios. If two Caracciolos had been built, Italy would not have had those new construction windows. so the first two Littorios could not have been laid down until 1937. If Littorio and Veneto were not laid down until 37, Veneto would probably have been completed, but Littorio not completed for the same reason Impero was never completed. Littorio was built by Ansaldo, in Genoa. Due to Genoa's proximity to France, Littorio would probably have been moved to a perceived safer location in an incomplete condition just before the war broke out, as Impero was, and the disruptions to work that Impero suffered would have been visited on Littorio. As it turned out, Italian concerns about the exposed position of Genoa were well founded as both the French and UK fleets showed up and shelled the daylights out of Genoa harbor. These visits didn't end until 42, when the Italians installed 4-15" shore batteries on the heights above Genoa. Ironically, the 15" guns installed had originally been built 25 years earlier, for the Caracciolo class ships. Bottom line, the cost to Italy to complete 2 of the Caracciolos would be 43 DDs that were needed to escort convoys to North Africa, and two Littorio class BBs being available in 1940, Littorio never being completed and Roma and Impero probably never laid down. The RM was vastly stronger without the Caracciolos.
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