Comments by "Doug JB" (@dougjb7848) on "The Drydock - Episode 245 (Part 1)" video.

When B is superfiring, it has 360^ rotation, greatly increasing “flexibility of firepower.” Putting it at deck level restricts it to roughly same rotation arc as the other two — if all turrets are rotated abaft one beam, and must shift to the other, they must all rotate through the entire arc. Even if C is superfiring, it does not have 360^ rotation — the first superstructure deck blocks it.
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@kanrakucheese High quality coal, bauxite, chromium, cobalt, copper, manganese, germanium and magnesium. Basically any element that is used to produce high strength alloy steel, electrical components and glass.
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@kieranb7582 Pearl Harbor Exemplified by “Bay's decision to paint the Japanese Zero fighters green (most of the aircraft in the attack were painted light gray/white), even though he knew that was historically inaccurate, because he liked the way the aircraft looked and because it would help audiences differentiate the ‘good guys from the bad guys’”.
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is well known the RN now have the problem relatively under control, and that it is the RAF who now suffer the largest casualties in this area. And what do you think the Argylls ate in Aden. Arabs? Yours etc. Captain B.J. Smethwick in a white wine sauce with shallots, mushrooms and garlic.
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Not entirely. When KM began drafting Bismarck’s successor, he demanded guns larger than 15”. Additionally his RoE for open water operations demanded long range and high ability against merchants and capital ships alike, which complicated the design process.
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So … you posited that a modern battleship would carry composite-type armour rather than steel-based. I countered that use of composite-type armour would have drawbacks in warships that land-based vehicles don’t pose, eg single hits destroying entire plates and making that section of the hull vulnerable to any enemy weapon. You responded with a list of modern anti-ship weapons that would pose even greater threat to super-hard, large-slab composite armour, increasing likelihood that a hit will crack / destroy the plate and leave that section of the ship completely unarmoured (which is very bad). And you confirmed that, for most part, land vehicles are “if a hit penetrates, it kills the vehicle immediately” whereas most ships don’t die to single hits, at least not immediately, unless the enemy is throwing nukes. Short of that, destroying the composite armour of a section of a ship hull would reduce future resistance to conventional weapons compared to a penetrating hit on a steel-based armour, which does not have same effect. (If a hit penetrates, it makes a hole and does damage, but doesn’t destroy the protective ability of the armour still on the ship). Then you acknowledge “navies don’t have armoured ships any more” specially because of the enormous increase in the killing power of anti-ship weapons, making one wonder why you would even start a conversation about relative qualities of these armours. And then you closed with a plain insult. Good on ya, I guess?
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They wanted the story of their gross mismanagement and / or deliberate misconduct throughout the investigation into the Number Two turret explosion to go away, right now, and be forgotten. The threw away a large amount of the physical evidence, put much of the rest into the turret, welded it closed and walked away.
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And perhaps a hose.
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Disagree. Tank armour must resist both kinetic energy and chemical-action shaped charge penetrators, whereas warships must resist kinetic energy and chemical-explosive warheads. For the latter purpose, composite armour is not as much an advantage as in the former. There’s an exponentially enormous difference between the energy delivered by a tank’s 120mm DU or HEAT impacting at 1000m/sec, and a battleship-caliber shell or modern anti-ship missile. If a 1000kg 16” AP shell penetrates a battleship-grade steel armour, it makes a hole and continues on. The same shell hitting composite armour would impart so much energy that a slab of armour of the size needed for warship armour would fracture into many pieces and lose all protective ability against further hits. Composite armour is stupendously expensive even compared to mil-grade armour steel. Even USN would struggle to afford a problem squadron of battleships armoured with composite slabs. Also, all ships flex while operating. Composite armour plates cannot flex, in any dimension, meaning slabs the size needed for warship armour would be at risk of simply breaking under the enormous stresses placed on them by X0,000 tons of ship going up and down and rolling and pitching constantly. Making the armour in smaller slabs to allow the flex would create millions of weak points.
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I also believe that Drach is discussing barrel length of large-caliber (beyond 8”) naval guns, not vehicle-mounted. 1:13:20 right here he’s addressing the difference between a dirty great big gun and a middling-big gun, and a vehicle-mounted 4-6” gun. If an 88mmL71 experiences a given degree of barrel bend, it has a better chance of hitting a target 2000m away than a 8” or 16” gun with the exact same amount of barrel bend but which is firing at a target 15km away.
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Where (in which ships) did USN use locomotive diesel engines instead of steam turbines with reduction gearing?
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@skeltonpg Most DEs? Evarts (97 completed) and Cannon-class (72): locomotive-derived diesel driving generators Buckley-class (148): Two Foster-Wheeler Express "D"-type water-tube boilers driving GE generators. Edsall (85): locomotive-derived diesels driving propellers via gearing. Rudderow (21): steam-driven turbo-electric Butlers (83): steam turbine and geared machinery Dealey (13) steam turbine and geared machinery Nothing else built in high number until the 46 Knox, which used steam turbine and gearing. So about 250 of DEs used locomotive diesels, ~ 45% of some 560 built.
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@skeltonpg Your original comment was that “most DEs used locomotive diesels instead of steam boiler.” If you’re going to change to “most DEs used some form of non-steam power to drive generators, rather than any kind of power driving reduction gearing,” then yes that’s accurate. Turbo or diesel electric drive also has the advantage that it’s more flexible. Ships can alter shaft RPM much more quickly than turbine and gearing, helping them to stalk UBoats.
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@skeltonpg Battery-hybrid is not needed for a turbo or diesel electric system to allow variable shaft RPM; it’s a feature of the “base” propulsion system that the electric motors that actually spin the shafts can deliver higher or lower speeds, regardless whether they are powered by diesel or steam turbine.
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@skeltonpg He already did https://youtu.be/Ga36q3vHncM Diesels or turbo electric don’t employ reduction gearing, which is one of their benefits. 35:50 “… Response to need to change speed was considerably faster … able to engage full reverse … cross connect in event of damage to some engines and other motors … And he’s not talking about battery-hybrid systems; he’s talking about straight up “power source to generator which in turn rotates screw shaft.” It wasn’t just “substitution for other systems” that encouraged diesel or turbo electric systems.
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@rogersmith7396 To add more to what you wrote, there are many factors and forces involved in how one type of armour performs compared to another. The strongest known alloy steels in their strongest tempers are stronger than the strongest titanium alloys in their hardest temper.
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@kmech3rd Is it only … wah’fer thin?
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How, with what forces, would the RN have sunk any IJN capital ships in 1942? Even if Force Z hadn’t been sunk, Glorious or Ark Royal not been lost, RN would have had little ability to project power into the South Pacific during 1942. They were still battling for survival in the North Atlantic and Med.
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@riverraven7359 As I wrote in my earlier comment, “where would RN have projected power into the South Pacific,” because after early 1942 the IJN didn’t deploy major naval surface units around Singapore or in the Indian Ocean. After early 1942, major IJN units stayed out of the Indian Ocean with the exception of the great Raid of April; within a few months of that, developments in the Solomons and Midway precluded any more major Japanese forays into the Indian. Even negating the losses the RN has suffered to that point, they likely would not have been a major part of the 1942 South Pacific campaigns, where they would have had good chances to sink IJN capital ships. Their ships had shorter operational range, and would likely have been held as defense against any sudden moves by the IJN (the Allies could not have known how focused both sides would be on Solomons and that the IJN simply wouldn’t try anything west of Malaysia). After mid-1944, when the KM posed much less threat of open ocean warfare, and the RN was able to confidently deploy major power into the Pacific, the IJN was so attenuated that that many appearances of their capital ships were as decoys for the few units still capable of strong action. Allied forces almost squabbled over who would get first crack. Not a value judgment. Just my interpretation of these situations.
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@timsytanker Umm. Dude? While UK was at war with Germany and Italy after Sept 1939, the war against Japan did not start until Dec 1941. 1942 was literally the first chance the RN would have had to sink IJN ships. HTF would RN sink any IJN carriers or battleships in 1939?
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