Comments by "AFGuidesHD" (@AFGuidesHD) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  22. "It still seems to me that the detente might have been achieved had it not been for the actions of the Polish government in sending what amounted to an ultimatum on the night of August 4th." - Gerald Shepard, 4th September. "Frankly, Chamberlain is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans. He feels there is a great body of public opinion in England headed probably by Eden and Churchill who will suggest to the Poles that they give up nothing and that they have Hitler on the run. This, of course, will mean war" - Joseph Kennedy, 30th August. "After Rydz-Smigly's speech yesterday, thousands of Poles joined in, shouting 'we demand Danzig'" - Daily Mirror, 7th August "The Polish Commissioner to Danzig telephoned the President of the Senate at 1 o'clock in the morning, and half an hour later sent him an ultimatum. That same morning he had risked a panic by sending away women and children, and at the same time the polish press had talked of bombing Danzig." - Gerald Shepard, recounting the events of August 4th. "In view of indications of increasing Polish intransigence since conclusion of the Anglo-Polish guarantee agreement..." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd April. "The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March. "War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March. "Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March. "We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March. There's an incredible story to be told when you go through the primary sources in "documents on british foreign policy" yet incredibly these are never mentioned by mainstream popular historians.
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  32. "We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March. [1] "England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March. "Beck stated that Poland had no intention of marching unless Poland were attacked." - Anthony Biddle Jr., 23rd March "Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March. "War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March. "The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that if action was to be undertaken in circumstances at all favourable to us, or if the threat of action was to be an effective deterrent, Germany must be faced with war on two fronts simultaneously. Poland was therefore key to the situation." - Cabinet Meeting, 29th March [1] "The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March. [1] "No doubt it would be impossible to prevent Poland from being overrun. The Chiefs of Staff, indeed, thought that Poland would likely be overrun by Germany within two or three months." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March. [1] "I gather Mason-MacFarlane will approve our action today." - Alexander Cadogan, 31st March. The information is there. Its just Anglophile historians tend to totally ignore it. I wonder why ?
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