Youtube comments of AFGuidesHD (@AFGuidesHD).
-
112000
-
21000
-
15000
-
12000
-
8300
-
7900
-
5400
-
5000
-
4600
-
4400
-
3800
-
3100
-
2800
-
2500
-
2500
-
2400
-
2400
-
2200
-
2100
-
2000
-
1800
-
1800
-
1700
-
1600
-
1400
-
1300
-
1300
-
1200
-
1200
-
1200
-
1200
-
1100
-
1000
-
1000
-
901
-
874
-
798
-
774
-
739
-
710
-
701
-
563
-
561
-
553
-
527
-
515
-
505
-
503
-
497
-
475
-
465
-
437
-
437
-
432
-
411
-
404
-
401
-
370
-
351
-
347
-
337
-
334
-
325
-
319
-
307
-
299
-
292
-
290
-
288
-
286
-
271
-
266
-
265
-
239
-
210
-
204
-
203
-
203
-
203
-
200
-
194
-
186
-
183
-
181
-
178
-
173
-
169
-
167
-
164
-
153
-
150
-
144
-
141
-
140
-
134
-
132
-
130
-
121
-
120
-
119
-
111
-
110
-
110
-
107
-
105
-
105
-
104
-
101
-
100
-
95
-
91
-
90
-
90
-
87
-
87
-
87
-
85
-
85
-
85
-
84
-
83
-
83
-
82
-
77
-
75
-
71
-
71
-
70
-
69
-
66
-
66
-
64
-
63
-
62
-
62
-
58
-
57
-
54
-
54
-
54
-
54
-
50
-
50
-
49
-
49
-
47
-
47
-
46
-
46
-
45
-
43
-
43
-
42
-
42
-
41
-
41
-
40
-
39
-
37
-
37
-
37
-
35
-
35
-
35
-
35
-
34
-
34
-
34
-
33
-
33
-
33
-
33
-
33
-
32
-
32
-
31
-
31
-
31
-
29
-
29
-
29
-
28
-
28
-
28
-
28
-
How can it be argued that British intentions were wholesome and pure when Chamberlain said to his cabinet on 20th March "we should attack Germany" and on the 30th March "he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany" if more evidence is needed for such a British conspiracy for war, Joseph Kennedy reported to Washington after his conversation with the foreign minister; "England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." on 22nd March and; "Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" on 24th March.
If their intentions were so wholesome to merely defend Poland from big bad Germany that clearly was planning to invade them, why did Georges Bonnet feel the need to say "We should go to the utmost limit including the use of threats to bring in Poland" ?
After actually looking at all the evidence from the British side, Simon Newman concluded:
What finally convinced the British Government that this policy had to be adopted was the fear that Poland might give in to pressure from Germany to remain neutral in return for some acceptable solution of the Danzig problem. The British had to prevent this eventuality because they considered that it would be detrimental to their interests; so detrimental, in fact, that they were prepared to risk a war to prevent it. Such an agreement, coming in the wake of a long string of German successes culminating in the occupation of Prague, the annexation of Memel, and treaties with Slovakia and Romania, would represent a further blow to Britain's prestige and influence and seriously undermine her power to organize resistance against Germany in the future. Furthermore, it would mean the loss of the eastern front which strategically was essential in a war with Germany. These were the options which the Foreign Office had all along been trying to keep open. Rather than accept their foreclosure, the British preferred to go to war.
Robert Vansittart was somewhat more open and honest about the outbreak of war, rather than any "n-nooo Germany started it" mythology nonsense. He was indeed honest and said "yes we started it to prevent Germany from becoming a hegemon" that means, even if they were to become a hegemon peacefully through treaties with Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Poland and so on.
28
-
28
-
28
-
27
-
27
-
26
-
26
-
26
-
26
-
25
-
25
-
25
-
25
-
25
-
25
-
24
-
24
-
24
-
24
-
24
-
23
-
23
-
22
-
22
-
22
-
22
-
22
-
21
-
21
-
21
-
21
-
21
-
20
-
20
-
20
-
20
-
20
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
19
-
18
-
18
-
18
-
18
-
17
-
16
-
16
-
16
-
16
-
16
-
16
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
15
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
14
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
Imagine calling a young lad who fought to defend his country from the communists in hellish conditions "a coward". They didn't fight for Berlin, they fought for Europe alongside their German, Italian, Romanian, Slovakian, Danish, Belgian, Croatian, Finnish, Norwegian brothers.
None of them would have known what secretive agreements the Allies would make with the communists, for all they knew the Soviets were coming for their country too.
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
12
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
99.9% of people have never gone through the primary sources, namely "Documents on British Foreign Policy, German Foreign Policy and US foreign policy" So they have utterly no idea of what actually went on. It's astonishing to read telegrams such as:
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"Chamberlain said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March.
"The existence of a threat of economic measures from the 19th July onwards, however, clearly made the atmosphere somewhat unfriendly" - Gerald Shepard, 10th August.
"The Poles had threatened severe economic reprisals and were privatley making threats of military action. Beck thought that Danzig had climbed down and published his success in the press." - Roger Makins, 14th August.
"It still seems to me that the detente might have been achieved had it not been for the actions of the Polish government in sending what amounted to an ultimatum on the night of August 4th." - Gerald Shepard, 4th September.
Among many others, to today's narrative that never even mentions Danzig let alone the Polish ultimatum of August 4th. It's just "one day Germany invaded Poland" or perhaps "they used a false flag attack to justify their otherwise unjustified invasion".
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
@cinesonicvibes "it’s an oversimplification to suggest Britain "started" the war."
No, the oversimplification is that Germany started it 'because they invaded Poland' and totally ignore everything the Brits and Poles did from March-September.
"how do you disregard for other countries' sovereignty"
The same way we do when USA invades Iraq, Russia invades Ukraine, Hungary invades Slovakia and, you know, every other 'aggressive war' in history.
"Hitler’s Public Statements, In Mein Kamp"
As for your last post, a complete regurgitation of the usual 'justification' for starting war against Germany, even using MK as an excuse which clearly shows you don't know what you're talking about. As Poland is mentioned only in a positive light in MK. And I doubt you would accept that Polish aggressive diplomacy on Lithuania and Czechoslovakia would give justification to Germany declaring war on Poland, would you ?
There is no evidence that Germany had plans on Poland, before say, May 39, after Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to at least plan for the contingency (yes that's right, TIK would tell you Germany had planned it since 1937, but the Wehrmacht actually didn't have a plan until Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to formulate one in April 39) and after the British intervened in German-Polish negotiations, fearing a possible German-Polish agreement settling their outstanding issues.
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Exactly, I like this analogy also. Instead of "look mate, I know you really want that toy, but it did belong to the other guy 20 years ago and its universally accepted as a German city" Chamberlain said, by implication "don't give it to them, if the other kid tries to get it back, we'll fight them with you (wink wink)".
Alexander Cadogan in his diaries however, says the guarantee was only meant to help the negotiations with Germany, not totally cut them off (oops). So either maliciously or simply stupidly, the British intervention in German-Polish relations did lead to catastrophe, as we all know, but few know these finer details.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
"We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March.
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved. We should do our best to produce a situation that will lead to war" - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that if action was to be undertaken in circumstances at all favourable to us, or if the threat of action was to be an effective deterrent, Germany must be faced with war on two fronts simultaneously. Poland was therefore key to the situation." - Cabinet Meeting, 29th March
"The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th
March.
"No doubt it would be impossible to prevent Poland from being overrun. The Chiefs of Staff, indeed, thought that Poland would likely be overrun by Germany within two or three months." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March.
"I gather Mason-MacFarlane will approve our action today." - Alexander Cadogan, 31st March.
Explanation: Chamberlain feared that Poland would make an agreement with Germany, settling issues between Germany and Poland. Chamberlain also knew that Britain could do nothing to help Poland in case of a war.
As for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it was a response to Chamberlain's encirclement policy known as "the peace front", the British were negotiating with the USSR to have their own version of such a pact, only difference is that Russia would be directed against Germany instead of remaining neutral in Germany's favour.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Saeronor "Garbage"
Literally everything I said was a fact. Deny it all you want.
"this "desire" to form an agreement is an invention of yours"
Hitler and Ribbentrops conversations with Beck would say otherwise. But let me guess "Hitler lied all the time apart from when he said something about invading a country or something that reinforces my views"
"Britain did nothing similar in 1934 "
Britain hadn't spent the previous several years making a fool of itself in European politics, laying down ultimatums and not living up to them. From Italy in Ethiopia or Czechia in 38,39.
"is your fabrication based on incredulity."
It's an opinion shared by the King of Italy, regent of Hungary, foreign minister of Romania and numerous diplomats. So not quite a fabrication, unlike the "Germany invaded Poland because of the Glewitz incident" myth you probably subscribe to.
"I believe we covered that one already,"
Perhaps but just to be sure here's Poland's position in August: "In Beck's opinion the best chance of maintaining peace is for us to remain calm and firm without any compromise to negotiate".
"and yet Germany, despite having far larger army already at that point, did not "intervene""
Indeed, no doubt Germany still hoped for a compromise from Poland. After months of silence and "aggressions" (I am putting this in quotes because no doubt it would offend you to suggest that threats to bomb Danzig were "aggression" even though I bet you'd call a German threat to bomb Warsaw as "aggressive") from Poland, it became somewhat clear this wasn't going to happen.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@maxfan1591 Two small exceprts:
What finally convinced the British Government that this policy had to be adopted was the fear that Poland might give in to pressure from Germany to remain neutral in return for some acceptable solution of the Danzig problem. The British had to prevent this eventuality because they considered that it would be detrimental to their interests; so detrimental, in fact, that they were prepared to risk a war to prevent it. Such an agreement, coming in the wake of a long string of German successes culminating in the occupation of Prague, the annexation of Memel, and treaties with Slovakia and Rumania, would represent a further blow to Britain's prestige and influence and seriously undermine her power to organize resistance against Germany in the future. Furthermore, it would mean the loss of the eastern front which strategically was essential in a war with Germany. These were the options which the Foreign Office had all along been trying to keep open. Rather than accept their foreclosure, the British preferred to go to war. Of course it was recognized that the ideal 'long and durable' eastern front was a combination of Poland and the Soviet Union. But the Russians were considered unreliable allies, unless directly threatened.
The demonstration that Poland could be won for Britain might arrest the slide towards Germany that was gathering such rapid momentum. At the time, not even Churchill quarrelled with this appreciation. What was the alternative? To insist on Russian participation at the outset, it was feared, might throw Poland into Germany's arms, thereby creating a buffer state between Germany and Russia, a zone of benevolent neutrality as wide as Germany herself with no hope of a Russian challenge in the future and ensuring freedom of action for Hitler in the West. But the position of German hegemony that this implied was precisely what the British 'peace front' was supposed to prevent. Furthermore this extension of German power would once again have been accomplished overnight and without a struggle; another 'bloodless victory', as Halifax might have put it. On the other hand a Polish commitment against Germany would almost certainly result in open conflict between the two countries, leaving Germany victorious and Russia threatened, while reducing the pressure on the West and creating the prospect of a more viable eastern front. The problem was that the Poles would never commit themselves against Germany without a commitment from Britain. It was ironic that this meant a promise to uphold the status quo in Danzig, the most volatile spot in Europe. For the British had always considered it to represent one of the strongest cases for revision in favour of Germany. It seems reasonable to argue that in choosing the path that they did in March 1939, the British Government took upon themselves a certain measure of responsibility for the conflict that ensued. They were fully aware of the probable consequences of their decision. The guarantee reduced the likelihood of a settlement between Germany and Poland and increased the probability of a clash between them. It is hardly acceptable to argue that Beck would have been intransigent anyway, even admitting that his attitude towards Hitler's hitherto rather polite initiatives had been firm all along. For we simply cannot predict how Polish policy would have evolved without
the guarantee. What we do know is that there was no agreement over Danzig and that the issue resulted in war.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@liquidrock8388 "During the winter months, the unrest in Czechoslovakia continued to grow. Slovakia in particular called for more independence which caused the government in Prague to send troops into the province and to install a new provincial government – a mistake, Henderson tells us. One day later, on 11 March 1938, Tiso, the deposed Slovakian prime minister, approached Berlin for help and made his province a German protectorate. Henderson then suggested to the Czech ambassador at Berlin that the Czech government get in touch with Hitler as well; Prague reacted positively and delegated not only the Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, but also the new president, Hacha – an indication that Prague was ready to conclude an agreement on the spot. On 15 March 1938, the negotiations resulted in the creation of another German protectorate, covering the lands of Bohemia and Moravia.
Henderson believes that the seizure of this part of Czechoslovakia was not based on a strategic German plan and sets out a number of reasons to support his thesis; he also states that if Hacha had really felt that he had been forced to accept a solution with which he could not identify, he could have stepped down; instead, Hacha stayed at his post until the end of WW2. Henderson criticizes the creation of the Protectorate because Hitler reaped world-wide criticism; at the same time he speaks of a German annexation of the provinces involved, but this term is not really applicable in this case, because the Protectorate was never integrated into the Reich – it maintained its own administration, its own currency, even its own army. The inhabitants did not have to do military service for Germany, and Germans needed a visa to enter the area."
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
"It still seems to me that the detente might have been achieved had it not been for the actions of the Polish government in sending what amounted to an ultimatum on the night of August 4th." - Gerald Shepard, 4th September.
"Frankly, Chamberlain is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans. He feels there is a great body of public opinion in England headed probably by Eden and Churchill who will suggest to the Poles that they give up nothing and that they have Hitler on the run. This, of course, will mean war" - Joseph Kennedy, 30th August.
"After Rydz-Smigly's speech yesterday, thousands of Poles joined in, shouting 'we demand Danzig'" - Daily Mirror, 7th August
"The Polish Commissioner to Danzig telephoned the President of the Senate at 1 o'clock in the morning, and half an hour later sent him an ultimatum. That same morning he had risked a panic by sending away women and children, and at the same time the polish press had talked of bombing Danzig." - Gerald Shepard, recounting the events of August 4th.
"In view of indications of increasing Polish intransigence since conclusion of the Anglo-Polish guarantee agreement..." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd April.
"The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March.
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March.
There's an incredible story to be told when you go through the primary sources in "documents on british foreign policy" yet incredibly these are never mentioned by mainstream popular historians.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
"We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March. [1]
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Beck stated that Poland had no intention of marching unless Poland were attacked." - Anthony Biddle Jr., 23rd March
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that if action was to be undertaken in circumstances at all favourable to us, or if the threat of action was to be an effective deterrent, Germany must be faced with war on two fronts simultaneously. Poland was therefore key to the situation." - Cabinet Meeting, 29th March [1]
"The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th
March. [1]
"No doubt it would be impossible to prevent Poland from being overrun. The Chiefs of Staff, indeed, thought that Poland would likely be overrun by Germany within two or three months." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March. [1]
"I gather Mason-MacFarlane will approve our action today." - Alexander Cadogan, 31st March.
The information is there. Its just Anglophile historians tend to totally ignore it. I wonder why ?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
And that isn't even accounting for the British conspiracy to start a war against Germany.
"We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March.
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
"Some prophets of evil see the German economic system spreading and ousting us from the world markets, but is that to be apprehended?" - Alexander Cadogan, 1938.
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"Poland today on war footing" - Biddle, March 26th 1939
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that if action was to be undertaken In circumstances at all favourable to us, or if the threat of action was to be an effective deterrent, Germany must be faced with war on two fronts simultaneously." - Cabinet Meeting Minutes, March 1939 [23/98]
"No doubt it would be impossible to prevent Poland from being overrun. The Chiefs of Staff, indeed, thought that Poland would be likely to be overrun by Germany within two or three months." - Cabinet Meeting Minutes, March 1939 [23/98] (proof that the British KNEW Poland would lose any war with Germany)
"THE FOREIGN SECRETARY reported that he had now received a telegram from Berlin in regard to relations between Germany and Poland, In effect, the upshot of the report was that Herr (German Leader) was now dealing with these negotiations himself, but that not much progress was being made. This was attributed to the fact that the Poles were adopting a more intractable attitude since they had obtained our guarantee." - Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 1939
"Germany does not wish to risk a show-down with the Great Powers of the West." - Raymond H. Geist, 3rd April.
"The Polish Commissioner to Danzig telephoned the President of the Senate at 1 o'clock in the morning, and half an hour later sent him an ultimatum. That same morning he had risked a panic by sending away women and children, and at the same time the polish press had talked of bombarding Danzig." - Gerald Shepard, 10th August.
"Burckhardt is greatly disappointed that efforts towards a detente have been definatley shattered by the Polish ultimatum of August 4th. He is distrustful of Beck and pessimistic about Polish intentions which he considers unduly warlike." - Gerald Shepard, 11th August.
"The Poles had threatened severe economic reprisals and were privatley making threats of military action. Beck thought that the Senate had climbed down and published his success in the press." - Roger Makins, 14th August.
"Polish mentality causes me to feel considerable foreboding." - Pierppont Moffat, 18th August
"If the President is contemplating any action for peace it seems to me the place to work is on Beck in Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 23rd August
"I can only urge the importance of Poland accepting the proposal for direct negotiations and thereby putting herself right in the eyes of the world" - Nevile Henderson, 30th august
"It still seems to me that the detente might have been achieved had it not been for the actions of the Polish government in sending what amounted to an ultimatum on the night of August 4th." - Gerald Shepard, 4th September.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 "During a conversation with Ambassador Bullitt on the 24th March, I stated that all diplomatic negotiations started by London would have no possibility of success, so long as the British government decides not to accept definite and precise obligations. It is childish and criminal to hold Poland responsible for war or peace. It must be asserted once and for all that the responsibility rests principally with England and France. Ambassador Bullitt agreed completely with my views. The following day, the 25th, he informed me that, adopting my views, and exercising the authority he was accorded, he had instructed the American ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, to call at the residence of Prime Minister Chamberlain, and to repeat everything to him, emphasizing, categorically, the responsibility of the British Government. In order to strengthen the efforts of the American Ambassador in London, I called the attention of Ambassador Bullitt to the fact that it is possible that the British may treat the efforts of the United States with contempt. He answered that I am probably right, but that nevertheless the United States has at its disposal the means to bring pressure on England." - Juliusz Lukasiewicz 29th March.
"I asked Kennedy about the conversation which he is said to have had recently with Mr. Chamberlain concerning Poland. Kennedy was surprised and declared categorically that a conversation of such significance never took place. At the same time, and contradicting his own assertion, Kennedy expressed displeasure and surprise that his colleagues in Paris and Warsaw should talk so openly about this conversation." - Edward Raczynski, 29th March.
"It was difficult for me to judge what effect the conversation with Mr. Kennedy could have had on the position of Mr. Chamberlain, but I believe that it was not without meaning, since from what Bullitt told me, the British government was very much concerned with the American opinion and wished to maintain close relations with Washington. I was very pleased that Ambassador Kennedy's conversation with Chamberlain had led the latter to adopt a surprisingly firm stand on Danzig." - Juliusz Lukasiewicz, 29th March.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 "this is simply historical fact"
It's interpretational narrative, not fact.
"were no longer prepared to negotiate away"
Because they felt stronger ?
"That assumption had proven disastrously wrong"
Who's assumption ? Germany made no secret of it's desire for eastern expansion, it's talked about in every other diplomatic dispatch regarding Germany. This is where the 'appeasement' narrative clashes with reality. The British were well aware of German desires, firstly on the racial lines, but also of eastern expansion. Newman argues that the British merely delayed war from breaking out in 1938, due to military reasons. The French military also advised their government that they would lose war if it broke out in 1938. It wasn't because the French leaders 'appeased' Germany, it's because they had military advice not to start a war. No leader would start a war if their military says they would lose.
"Negotiations with Germany were futile"
Similar to the 'Germany couldn't be trusted' argument, is that this argument is defeated in June 1940, upon the French agreement made with Germany. Contemporarily, one could say "Putin is untrustworthy" or even "Trump is untrustworthy", for withdrawing from xyz agreement. Yet I know full well plenty of countries will make agreements with Russia and America none the less. As the Soviets did with Germany in 1940, despite the none existent trust between those countries.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 "If your argument is going to hinge on Germany's actions being somehow morally justified"
Why do you say "somehow" ? Is self determination not a democratic principle now ? Or is it only for everyone who isn't German ? Which seems to be the case.
"provide justification for Germany’s documented atrocities, crimes, and injustices"
I don't think it is. Nor do I need to provide justification, for there isn't any. No country has ever provided sufficient justification for atrocities, other than general justifications like 'security for ourselves in a free world' etc, etc,. I could give countless examples of atrocities committed by America and Britain, but no doubt you would dismiss that as 'whataboutism' or some such.
"Tell me, who in your opinion was in a meaningful position geographically, geopolitically, or militarily to oppose German aggression"
I don't believe I did. But I'll answer again: Everyone. If the your argument, and the common Allied argument is that 'Germany had to be stopped'; 'they were morally bad and it was right to start a war against them' etc,. then surely, such a view would be universally shared ?. It's interesting that in reality it wasn't. Most governments of Europe were basically "what is going on, why is this happening guys ?".
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 "it was effectively presenting an ultimatum under conditions"
Poles didn't see it that way. Quote: "I had a long talk with Ciecanowski who takes the view, judging by the accommodating way in which Hitler is dealing with Poland..." - Oliver Harvey, 6 February.
Of course they were concerned about the demand of Danzig, and weren't prepared to give it back at first opportunity, the Germans however, were planning to play the long game, this was obviously scuppered by March 31st.
Began? like, 19th century ? Drag Nach Osten is a famous one, British, French and Americans were all expanding and Germany was left in the dust.
"spontaneous"
Is it difficult to conceive that they were both had elements of 'predetermined vague ideas' as well as spontaneous reactions to events ?
"is flawed"
I know, that's why I used an analogy to demonstrate the flawed idea.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Only if you're ignorant of everything else that happened (which Anglo-American historiography naturally wants you to be). Many diplomats at the time did in fact blame Poland for escalating the tensions, they also blamed the British guarantee for hardening Polish policy towards Danzig. Just a few quotes to demonstrate this:
"The Polish Commissioner to Danzig telephoned the President of the Senate at 1 o'clock in the morning, and half an hour later sent him an ultimatum. That same morning he had risked a panic by sending away women and children, and at the same time the polish press had talked of bombing Danzig." - Gerald Shepard, recounting the events of August 4th.
"Guns, which stand guard over Poland's honor, are trained on Danzig. If the Danzig authorities intend to face Poland with a fait accompli these guns will roar." - Marshall Rydz-Smigly, 6th August
"After Rydz-Smigly's speech yesterday, thousands of Poles joined in, shouting 'we demand Danzig'" - Daily Mirror, 7th August
"The League of Nations negotiator is greatly disappointed that efforts towards a detente have been definitely shattered by the Polish ultimatum of August 4th. He is distrustful of Beck and pessimistic about Polish intentions which he considers unduly warlike." - Gerald Shepard, 11th August.
"It still seems to me that the detente might have been achieved had it not been for the actions of the Polish government in sending what amounted to an ultimatum on the night of August 4th." - Gerald Shepard, 4th September.
And then what is the story behind the British guarantee? Why did they guarantee Poland, a country that Germany was negotiating with to amicably remove issues between the two ?
"We should attack Germany, not in order to save a particular victim, but in order to pull down the bully" - Neville Chamberlain, 20th March.
"England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." - Joseph Kennedy, 22nd March.
"Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" - Joseph Kennedy, 24th March.
"War, and war now with a near eastern front. Without war the desired results may never be achieved." - Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28th March.
"The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany." - Cabinet Meeting, 30th March.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
It does seem that way. Had Hitler really wanted war, and genuinely wanted to make Poland 'the aggressor' under such conditions. He would have ordered Forster to go ahead with the disarmament of Polish 'customs officers' in early August. What on earth am I talking about you ask ? Obviously something Anglo-American historians have kept out of their stories, namely the Polish Ultimatum to Danzig of August 4th. The most alarming part of the Ultimatum: "I do not doubt that you, Mr. President of the Senate, have no doubts that such an infringement of the fundamental rights of Poland would under no pretext be tolerated by the Polish Government. Should the above-mentioned abuses take place the Polish Government will retaliate without delay against the Free City." This of course preceding Marshall Rydz-Smigly's speech of 6th August stating "Guns, which stand guard over Poland's honor, are trained on Danzig. If the Danzig authorities intend to face Poland with a fait accompli these guns will roar." and as reported by the Daily Mirror on 7th August "After Rydz-Smigly's speech yesterday, thousands of Poles joined in, shouting 'we demand Danzig'".
There is a copy of the Ultimatum from Danzig, sent to the German foreign office, that also states that Forster/ Danzig would seek advice from the Fuhrer on what to do. Given that Roger Makins reported on 14th August "The Poles had threatened severe economic reprisals and were privately making threats of military action. Beck thought that Danzig had climbed down and published his success in the press." it would seem that the Fuhrer's orders were to 'back down' rather than facilitate a possible Polish attack on Danzig.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@augnkn93043 The point is that you can't on the one hand say Britain was morally right to "defend" Poland from "German aggression" and then on the other turn a blind eye to the Russian invasion for "practical geopolitical reasons", especially so as Britain gave Poland to the Soviets in 1945 anyway, which utterly defeats the whole "we defended Polish independence" schtick.
WW2 was such a disaster for Britain, which is why it's so hard for us to come to terms with what we did. So it is much easier to do, as TIK does in this video, to go in knots and circles to rationalize how actually it was Germany that declared war on Britain. As I mention, even when we pretend that Germany was this uniquely rogue power that hated Poles and had long planned for war with them, it is still the Chamberlain government making a sovereign decision to make war on Germany.
hint: its not true, because ironically one of Hitler's biggest criticisms from Germans in 1939 was that he was too weak on the Poles, he admired Pilsudski too much, and saw in Poland a state that had a common enemy - Russia. Britain knew of this, and knew that Germany and Poland were having negotiations on solving their outstanding issues. Leading Chamberlain to make the guarantee on 31st March. As is recorded on 30th March in a Cabinet meeting "The Prime Minister said that he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany."
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1