Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  9. your lack of research don't cut it! ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him. The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair" Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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  23. The Village Anus wrote Unlike the prick Big Woody who quotes just about anyone who writes sonething likes and that he can find on Wikipedia. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Just keeps getting better and better.I should be charging for this. Monty failed once and that was continuously so i see how you like him. Ya Alan Brooke and the Germans who were there didn't know but you in your hive of hallucination does?You know who wasn't there? Bernard Law Montgomery.Not sure if it's dementia,delusion or denial Little Villa cobbles together falsehoods & fantasy while scuttling facts not previously encountered making discussion itself intolerable. It took 6months after failing at Monty Garden for Bernard to cross the RHine and that was with Simpsons 9th US ARMY The Hurtgen mistakes does not turn Market Garden's failure into a success. Also, the Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure. Get use to and over it. Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary. Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedell-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" This from the BBC https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. From Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road. From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 63 General Browning cautioned General Gavin "Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges,it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it
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  24. Enjoy!Hastings and Beevor are both Pritzker Military Literature Award Winners, and both members Royal Society of Literature & Royal Historical Society. And you mop puddles at the Adult Theater - so you have that going for you.I also quote Dr Niall Barr who has a PHD and lectures at King's College on Military History. HQ blaming Montgomery Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
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  29. Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored. The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. - German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. - The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA. - The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge - Page 304 Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke was disturbed when he heard Monty's account "it looks to me as if Monty with his usual lack of tact has been rubbing into Ike too much Monty advice".Too much "I told you so"* Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory" It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  34. Ah Lyndon playing in the latrine again - At least 6 people quoted here think you are full of it "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major is even less charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces. Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak. Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 254 In terms of the Anglo-American divide the Sicilian episode demonstrated that antagonism was not confined to American officers.Montgomery's behavior made enemies of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder as well as their staffs. The much vaunted rivalry between Patton and Montgomery was minor compared to the depths hostility that had developed with the Royal Air Force.Tedder told Patton that Monty was "a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of himself as Napoleon - he is not"
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  47. Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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  48. Monty was an idiot,even the Russians used the Broad front thrust. British author of Military History, Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer
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  59. Little Villa your favorite perv admits it after the war The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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  61. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions". General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt The Facts were more than Little Villa or Cornhole could bare
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  62.  @johnburns4017  Brits always fight to last colonial, usually Australians.Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like OMG. Try quoting actuall historians and books with page numbers you knob.Puddles are you monty's little swiss boy you keep repeating bullshit and you know it.And here is what Bradley said From Bradley,A Generals Life,Page 299 Gen Bradley wrote "the news of the German escape from the Falaise Gap was a shattering disappointment - one of my greatest of the war.a golden opportunity had truly been lost.I boiled inside,blaming Monty for the blunder". From The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks. From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 39-40 By September 15,disquieting intelligence about the Arnhem area had come to light.ULTRA AND Dutch intel had detected elements of the 9th& 10 SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem (Monty later admitted he ignored this) They were not far from the planned British drop zones.Intelligence specialist Maj Brian Urquhart as greatly alarmed by the reports.He already thought that Market Garden was at best a bold gamble ,at worst sheer madness.He was adamantly opposed to it.The Intelligence intercepts were correct.The photographs revealed the presence of camouflaged enemy tanks and self propelled guns in the wooded area near Arnhem "From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Center of Military History,The United States Army,The Sigrfied Line CampaignPage174 Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal. Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on ArnhemCounting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred) Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
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  63. Wipe Monty's cack out of your eye sockets you carnival barker .You again have displayed your extraordinary ability not to think .Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics Fromhistorynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them.    Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it    Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe BTW babbling Burns it's 80 yrs starting last week that Monty led one of the largest retreats in Military History @ Dunkirk.It's also 75 years ago last week for Victory in Europe.See what a Super Power can do in just 5 yrs.Even correcting all the damage done by the crumbling crown and it's rancid runt got themselves into - You're welcome Johnny Giovanni
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  71. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September, Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops Billy E.T. Williams who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "*At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"​* Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"*
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  72. The operation failed because of a failure in planning, intelligence, and a lack of understanding of the terrain's nature. There was also a mistaken belief that the Germans had been all but defeated. Even before the start of the operation, many feared that Montgomery’s plan was too optimistic. The Polish airborne unit commander declared that the plan was flawed and kepy mentiong "but the Geremans,the Germans" He meant that Montgomery’s aims were simply too ambitious and that he was asking too much of his men. Montgomery also assumed that the paratroop unit could retain their landing zones and the bridges for a given period of time. Paratroops were only lightly armed, and without support from ground troops and tanks, they could not hold out for long. The British General was wrong to believe that airborne troops could resist assault from ground troops supported by armor for several days. Crucially Montgomery failed to understand the terrain that he expected his men to fight in. The roads in the Netherlands were narrow, and that the ground around them was unsuitable for armor. This was a fundamental error- Montgomery had simply assumed that his tanks could rapidly make their way to the landing zones by using only the roads. During the battle, the roads became death traps for many British units. They soon became clogged with burned-out tanks and vehicles. This critically delayed the ground forces coming to the support of the paratroopers in Arnhem in particular. Perhaps the Montgomery plan's biggest failing was that it assumed that the Germans had been decisively beaten and that any counter-attack that they could launch in the area would be limited.
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  78. Bernard didn't sort squat in the Ardennes he had to apologize to IKE for suggesting he did,and Churchill addressed this at Parliament. You just keep repeating bullshit hoping someone as bereft as you believes it.Monty's orders were to fall back Harmon and Collins thankfully ignored him.And Monty never showed up to direct at Monty Garden, like a real Field marshall Walter Model.Of course the armored column didn't arrive until 3 days later and the 82nd was left to take on armored cars,halftracks with Mounted mg-42s and 20mm AAguns mounted. The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British.Montgomery's disasterous press conference and the clamour of the British Press had stoked a rampant Anglophobia in the USA and especially among Senior American Officers in Europe.And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence.Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory" .It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/memoirs.pages/marsh.pages/ardennes.campaign.htm Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action. Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK." "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Lightning Joe Collins did alot of the shoving at the North Shoulder of the Ardennes.Collins found himself on the northern side of the German 'bulge' at the start of their Ardennes offensive. He played a major part in the defeat of the German attack, disengaging on his eastern front and turning south to attack the northern shoulder of the 'bulge', blocking the German transport routes through St. Vith The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise." Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes. 16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces. Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector. While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US. From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page415 Montgomery wrote on December 15th "that Hitler's plight was so dire that he cannot stage major offensive operations" (Oops,on December 16th the Ardennes offensive began.The twisted twirp wasn't even right for a day.)
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  81. Cleaning latrines no doubt in your case,you have elementary reasoning or perhaps none at all . Monty had 4 full years to cross a 30 mile channel - what was the problem - Hollwood?Ya best let the bigboys get it sorted ♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.​ ♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore ♦Hollywood didn't make 32,000 Tommies surrender at Tobruk ♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did. ♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel for 4 full years - after getting driven into it ♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty ♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown. ♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later. ♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin then couldn't even make it to Arnhem - Monty did ♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group,IKE did. Then Bernard was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them ♦Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did. ♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Bernard bathing little boys Nigel Hamilton reported them in The Full Monty . ♦Hollwood wasn't "evacuated" from: Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 Want to know who was?
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  87. what author, book and page number??? Monty isn't studied except as a bad example and didn't cross the channel for 4 full years - only with the big boys after the dunkirking. Blumentriit didn't know the GIs were propping up the snogging wanker Bernard for political purposess. IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters" Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties" Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July. I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586*​ "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies​ in Normandy"
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  88. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool. The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole Chronicles The dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar. Here you go from Crerar himself From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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  97. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September, Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops Billy E.T. Williams who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"​ Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"*
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  120. Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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  122.  @matso3856  good job Mats - read "It Never Snows in September" Monty owns this.Regardsless of what Cornhole barks Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.His distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944. The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 64 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation.
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  123.  @matso3856  Here's some I've condensed parts instead of copying the whole page From "It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,page 9 Kershaw states"Heinz Harmel 10TH SS Commander was still able to give one of the most lucid accounts of the battles for Nijmegen and Arnhem I have ever heard Kershaw states "I've told the story in their own words".He also interviews 12 other German Soldiers who were present at Market Garden.Kershaw states that "offered were diaries and unpublished personal accounts for perusal that did much to paint a realistic scene". From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks' From 'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900. There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North From " It Never Snows in September" pages 304-05 Robert KershawBy 19 september there were 17 German battalions assembled around Arnhem & 15 around Nijmegan .Local German superiority was often achieved because Airborne units had to be dispersed to cover Hell's Highway and hold out under pressure. These slappies literally try to change history 75 yrs after the fact.
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  125. THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not, "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. --German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. --The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA. --The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed. Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,p. 356 On January 18,determined to mend fences,Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory". It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  129. Burnhole Monty actually hid after his failed operation and did not attend the after battle council.Where Ramsey,Tedder and many others waited to pound him for his john burns like performance BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.414-19 Almost every feature of Operation Market Garden,in fact simply reaffirmed what already had become evident in North Africa that Montgomery was generally incapable of conducting anything but solid defenses or attacks with generous lead times,massive materiel superiority and no urgent dead lines. Market Garden had revealed Montgomery' serious lapses in planning as well as severe shortcomings in in operational and tactical command.There was little cooperation between the various staffs responsible. Also lacking was any liaison between the Airborne Army and and those units responsible for ground troops and tactical air power. Montgomery's operation timetable was ambitious to the point of recklessness. Montgomery the man whose main criticism of Eisenhower was his lack of grip,remained remarkably out of touch with day to day operations and incapable of controlling events.He only got as far as Nijmegen and even then never got across the Waal.At no stage during the battle did he visit XXX Corp HQ and not until 23 September when it was almost over did he visit Dempsey at Second Army HQ.According to Freddie DeGuingand,CoS, Montgomery appeared to let things go their own way How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
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  143. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole ChroniclesThe dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar .Here you go from Crerar himself From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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  147. Cheers hey mate,hi mate,hitey ho mate.get a room you rubes.Your boys were driven into the channel.IKE and the GIs gave them 4 full years to cross the English Channel.What was the problem?30 miles the GIs came 3500 miles and supplied the failed English Army again,just like the last war.Should have left your goose stepping cousins have you It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - Corelli Barnett From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors.While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa.Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it.Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. .Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable,rather than what was tactically attainable From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 Erwin Rommel - "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education".
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  160.  @davidrendall2461  Yes I've read your posts on TIKs original OMG board and you make many compelling points.But his boards are peppered with shall we say creative license.Much like Monty's memoirs and dispatches.Also many on TIKs board say your uncle was wrong but I don't think so but since shit rolls down hill Monty gets off scott free - as he did many times before. And Rommel however didn't roll down one elevated lane open to tank/artillary fire. I've said the UK had great soldiers but he wasn't among them.Would have liked to seen what O'Conner,The Auch,Dorman-Smith,Slim,Alexander or Gott would have done given the same benefits. Monty belittled and berated everyone he came across with not alot to show for the talk. Just not buying this 70 mile debacle in the Netherlands was the fault of a General(Gavin) who many Monty fan boys conveniently blame for a hastily slapped together operation. That and the fact he wasn't British. When right from the start panzerfausts were taking out XXX Corp tanks south of Valkenswaard .I unfortunately have been reduced and sucked into salty exchanges by some of those slappys.Beevor was right Monty may have had funtioning aspergers .It was only a matter of time before he popped off to the wrong guy.I guess it depends on who's ox is getting gored.Too much group think on some of these boards .As Patton said " If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking."Anyway have enjoyed reading your takes and insights unlike many of the finger pointers
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  168. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  171. Cornhole,Your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones .One almost needs a bucket when you post! So Brooke,Ramsey,Keegan and Tedder are full of shit but you a monty nutthugger are to be believed.LMAO - say that out loud and see how it sounds From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Even John Keegan The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan. Cornhole are you Monty's little Swiss Boy?
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  175. This just keeps getting earier and easier. BTW how is it Monty got driven into the ENGLISH channel,and never got Dunkirked after the GIs arrived? Read Monty's confession Monty's misadventures - where was he when this debacle started coming apart everywhere almost immediately? Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses at the Belgian border until the Troop support and supply flights went over at 2:30 in the Afternoon?Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why didn't Monty or the Others think to put the bridging equipment up front?17 bridges over 12-13 canals might have come in handy ON TIME don't you think? All 4 Senior British officers and not one thought of this glaring over site - that explains why the RN & RAF was much better led than anything Monty came up with. Try reading what the top officers in the Alliance had to say Alan Brooke's own words​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak Fancy some more little villa?
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  176. Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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  179. Correct,This operation was condemned at it's inception it shouldn't have been considered let alone launched. And good men paid the price for Monty and IKE ignoring the red flags Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p. 43 "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse." The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald Pages 199-200 Perhaps the real fault of the plan was overambition​.Yet all of the handicaps possibly could have been overcome had the British ground column been able to advance' as rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. Another glaring fault was dependence upon but one road.​ In any event, the ground troops were delayed for varying amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal bridge in Nijmegen. Combined with the kind of resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the West might be down but they were not out. page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be maintained. Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust." September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.329 On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. (ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet)
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  181.  @akgeronimo501  Model was playing chess and Monty with himself From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them, Monty rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 167 It probably would have been difficult for Warren of the 82nd to hold both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge against the combined might of Kampfgruppe Henke,the SS recon.battalion and other reinforcements from the 10th SS panzer Division .In that sense his mission was somewhat unreasonable,it reflected the unrelenting problem the 82nd AB faced in Market Garden namely how it was to hold the Groesbeek heights while at the same time capturing the Nijmegen bridges,especially with only part of the division on the ground.This was the great flaw in the OMG Design and Warren's soldiers paid the price for it.The sad reality was the push for the bridge had failed and was almost preordained to do so. From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 331-332 Because the Allied route of advance was so constricted and slender any German counter attack was disruptive,no matter how strong or weak.Truck drivers were spending as much time taking cover in the ditches as driving their vehicles,instead of roaring north to Arnhem,tankers & infantrymen were absorbed into pushing the Germans away from the vital road .As a result of all these problems,ammunition,food and gasoline were running dangerously low for Horrock's frontline units as well as the 82nd AB. The amiable Horrocks realized he was actually fighting 3 distinct battles:one to keep the corridor open,one to hold the Groesbeek Heights and one to make it to Arnhem.Obviously this is too much,and it was a direct result of market garden's overly ambitious nature,not to mention everything had to go right for the operation to succeed (this snippett right here is just some of the evidence of how far Montgomery was in over his head.) From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 228 Gavin knew he faced a staggering task.He tried to rise to the challenge of a bad plan without complaint and achieved a remarkable success.The 82nd could hardly hold the Groesbeek Heights and take the key bridges at the same time.With the presumption of minimal German opposition - there was no margin of error for the operation.Which was open to the assumption of maximum risk.Most of the tactical objectives were outside,not within the landing areas
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  186. www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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  189. This fools errand should never have been considered let alone launched.Way too many moving parts to coordinate. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th Brereton and Dempsey along with most of Allied HQ warned the Laggard Monty not to play looses with men's lives.But the creep seeking glory ordered it forward Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.256-257 The crucial link ups between airborne and ground forces was more problematic; they were interlinked and interdependent. So much that the failure to capture of just one objective could lead to the failure of the entire undertaking. Given that no large-scale airborne operation mounted by the Allies or Germans had ever previously secured absolute mission success, there was a strong probability that Market Garden would fail. Market Garden was founded on flawed suppositions, massaged intelligence, the neglect of past lessons and the acceptance of innumerable risks, which substantially reduced its chances of success even before it was placed in front of Eisenhower. The idea of conducting multiple lift operations against deep and well defended objectives was fundamentally unsound and can only be deemed a blunder of truly staggering proportions. And required repeated daytime airlifts to far inside enemy territory more that 300 miles from Allied Transport bases 1)Monty was a no show - in every army that marched except evidently yours the commander is responsible for what does and does not occur under his watch during his Operation 2) Monty or the guys right under him Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur sat on their arses until 2:30 in the afternoon on the 1st day at the Belgian border waiting for the planes to fly over .Did they some how think they'd catch up? Had they left at day break they would have made the bridge at Son. That the Gerries blew up in the afternoon 3) Of Monty/Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur NOT ONE thought to put the bridging equipment up front. How ignorant of so called veteran officers. Didn't they think going over 17 Bridges and 12-13 rivers/canals that might come in handy at some point in time? Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  195. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole ChroniclesThe dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar. Here you go from Crerar himself From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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  212. In The Last Offensive, the U.S. Army’s official account of Operation Varsity and the final drive into Germany, Charles B. MacDonald, a veteran infantry​ officer who had served with the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, in Europe in World War II, stated that with the weak condition of German units east of the Rhine, “some overbearing need for the special capability of airborne divisions would be required to justify their use, ” and that the specific need never existed. the objectives were important, the ground forces could have taken them without difficulty, and in all likelihood, with fewer casualties. As evidence, he pointed out that the amphibious crossings faced very little resistance; the two American divisions in the river assault, the 30th and 79th Infantry Divisions, lost a total of forty-one killed, 450 wounded, and seven missing. James A. Huston, in his book, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II, agreed with MacDonald, adding that “had the same resources been employed on the ground, it is conceivable that the advance to the east may have been more rapid than it was.” Jack Ariola US Soldier in side a glider "the anti-aircraft fire was so thick we could have got out and walked on it. Bullets and FLAK were coming thru the glider and every time one hit the bottom glider and came out the top it sounded like the crack of a whip only 10 times louder Otto Leitner, German Lieutenant "with so many aircraft it was difficult not to hit something. I ordered my men to keep firing in the hope to fill the sky with metal and damage the aircraft"
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  222. How come Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student was able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November Montgomery This from Seth 1422 who throttled your sorry self Sunset on the first day, September 17, was at 19:50, darkness was at 20:30. When the Irish Guard halted at 19:30 it also was not in contact with the enemy, so advance in darkness was not impossible. Sunrise on the 18th was at 07:15, meaning that the Irish Guards did not move for half of the available daylight on the second day. No Irish Guard tanks were destroyed immediately, but instead contact with the enemy was made around 16:00. It should also be noted that according to JOE Vandaleur’s own account, he had lunch with his cousin and a female reporter, then went for a swim in a roadside villa before starting the Guards moving on September 18th. Whatever resistance they did ultimately encountered late that afternoon could have only been an increase on what they might have faced with a swift advance at 07:30. So that is the place where swifter advance was possible. The Irish Guards had suffered badly the first day, so I understand their reluctance to smash ahead. But if that formation was spent it should have been rotated out before dawn. These delays only made the Germans better able to obstruct the road. According to the one British officer Major Hibbert of 1st para starting here https://youtu.be/50ogHjrQFBE?t=2282 in this video they had disabled the charges on the Bridge. So if accurate and I believe he would know Horrocks tankers sitting back on the Nijmegen Bridge could have made it. But they didn't move even though elements of the 82nd wanted to carry the fight forward.It's interesting....and unfortunate
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  238. LMAO EVERYONE? you bark bombast expecting to be taken at your word that has more holes than one of Monty's battle plans,it was the deal 89 men lost their lives crossing the Rhine to carry the column in and they stop for what? There was only one gun on the road according to the Germans themselves. We never expect much from you and you never fail to disappoint. You never found a source for your 2 armies on the flanks - because they only exist in you bent imagination. It's better to be thought a fool than open your mouth and remove all doubt Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. *Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial Arnhem,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced Arnhem,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. So the Germans/GIs/Irish Guards there - then are in agreement - XXX Corp was not only slow but stopped.Set the scotch down and go to bed.
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  240. Mikey You yammering ham - Bradley wasn't there he was in Luxembourg. And Monty almost got relieved he did nothing THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. --German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. --The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA. --The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed. So both Collins and Harmon ignored monty who wanted to fall back then VII Corps went forward to finish off 2nd Panzer and sent 9th Panzer retreating. The British lost 200 KIA while GIs lost 8,500 killed and the Germans had more in 6 weeks of fighting mike kenny you lying lump
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  241. Bradley took Normandy while the poof Bernard camped around Caen with the largest Bombing of the Normandy Campaign, Naval guns 12 miles away lobbing shells in also with Air corp right across the channel and the laggard still muffed it My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day.Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken. IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day" My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651 On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American General, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command.
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  242. again you talk shyt bradley and collins took their objective,monty needed the massive bombings and shellings. Try reading a book or have your handler or mum do it for you. Then you may leave some sources. or try using the the search bar above to relieve me of furthering your education. Monty and you both need to be spoon fed. US forces captured over 3/4 of the prisoners. Truth hurts - always does. Russia and the USA were now dealing the cards slappy. St. Lô 1944: The Battle of the Hedgerows, by Steven J. Zaloga Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, commanding the German 84th Army Corps, the battle was “a monstrous blood-mill, the likes of which I have not seen in my 11 years of battle.” By the beginning of July 1944—three weeks after D-Day—Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy, was not progressing as rapidly as anticipated. The British Second Army had yet to secure one of its primary objectives, the pivotal crossroads city of Caen, effectively halting its advance on Paris before it began. To block the Second Army the Germans had deployed a staggering force of tanks and armored fighting vehicles along a tight 20-mile front. Farther to the west the American First Army under Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley had just achieved its first tactical objective by seizing the port city of Cherbourg, on the northern tip of the Cotentin Peninsula.“The Battle of the Hedgerows involved no dramatic advances or decisive maneuvers,” Zaloga summed up. “It was a grinding battle of attrition.” The ultimate butcher’s bill was staggering. In less than three weeks of brutal, relentless fighting the First Army suffered more than 40,000 casualties.American troops occupied Saint-Lô proper on July 18. The Battle of the Hedgerows and capture of what remained of Saint-Lô and its neighboring towns opened the gate to Bradley’s Operation Cobra, which enabled Patton’s historic armored breakthrough and race across France, the liberation of Paris and, in less than a year, the defeat of Germany
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  256. TheVilla Aston scribbled in crayon What fairytales? Eisenhower made the decision to prioritise Market Garden over the Scheldt. -------------------------------------------------------------------- You are pathetic - you really are I have produced evidence by British sources and Alan Brooke himself dozens of times then you run away attmepting to convince others of your disturbed views somewhere else.Monty ignored the Scheldt even later blaming the CanadiansALL British Historians and Officers,except D'Este From Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex. British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" - Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
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  278. There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration: General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp .In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges. Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area." There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armored units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.
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  288. What other gems have you mined for us you poltroon? None of the objectives were met : ♦One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all ♦Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare ♦The V-2s were still being launched ♦The massive deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for suppliesfor an operation that size ♦Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. ♦The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation,exposure and disease. ♦And all of the Netherlands live stock was sent/driven to the Reich as the Wehrmacht fell back. The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the Germans for assisting the allies. ♦Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as Montgomery boasted ♦Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army ♦400,000 Dutchmen - thu out the War were sent to work as slave laborers for the Reich in defense industry or on bunker/tunnel projects ♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. ♦Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” ♦Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” ♦Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became Field Marshalls and another who became a senior General believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.
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  300.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  This operation was condemned at it's inception. How could anyone suppose that Montgomery would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of commander capable of conducting a fast,,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image Guards Armored crossed the Nijmegen Bridge at 7:10PM the Nite of Sept 20th.Three and a half days after the operation started surprising no one. Horrocks stated the tanks would arrive on time and in force well neither happened. Monty not only mismanaged this he never planned on the Germans fighting back and ignored ULTRA warning about the 9th & 10th Panzers refitting there Too many flights - too long of flights and not enough daylight. But Bernard promised IKE he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem. Even the British planners going over Operations Linnet/Comet rightfully stated their concern that the element of surprise would be lost. As the flights starting 50 miles west of London were just over 300 miles total - one way. As soon as the flights reached the coast German units(15th Army I believe) all along the scheldt estuary would radio back about enemy formations approaching so the element of surprise was completely lost. I don't think you know how truly daft this daisy bernard was - you realize he had canaries,bunnies and other sorts of pets traveling with him in that circus wagon of his. No one ever mentions why really the previous two operations were cancelled - because the British planners thought them fool hardy.Just adding 2 more airborne divisions doesn't make it sound just more problematic. But Monty looking for a head line couldn't help himself .And IKE allowed him and his dimwitted single thrust a long leash to hang himself with it. Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. The Germans got the britsh supplies and left smart ass notes thanking them. Has that army done a hurried thing ever? The Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that get you the title of Field Marshall You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site? Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November None of the above have a damn thing to do with the 82nd,Gavin or Browning.Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job There is a reason TIK doesn't write a book because he'd get filleted with archived history .
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  303. Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcover by Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears. Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.' So Montgomery ignored: Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong
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  304. You've lied once - continuosly Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors,"Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."* ULTRA decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed the various units from Normandy had been ordered to western Holland to refit and subsequent intercepts indicated that this included the II SS Panzer Corp. Not until September 15 had SHAEF high command taken note that the corps two divisions the 9th & 10th Panzer seemed to encamped at Arnhem. Montgomery's senior commanders almost to a man voiced skepticism about Market Garden. Beetle-Smith grew anxious enough to alert Eisenhower, who hesitated to intervene in tactical dispositions but authorized Smith to raise the issue with the field marshall. Smith flew to Brussels on Friday,48 hrs before the assault was to begin and suggested strengthening the force to be dropped at Arnhem. "Montgomery ridiculed the idea and laughed me out of his tent" Smith later reported *"he waved my objections airily aside" For 7 miles from the Belgium border to Valkenswaard the XXX Corp drive stopped cold for 12 hrs Um no you misguided monty fanboi, when the Air Marshalls finally found out from IKE they warned Monty - too many flights - too long and not enough daylight. There were SIX HUNDRED more flights than D-Day. This debacle was originally Linnet then Comet then Monty Garden.But he told IKE anyway he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem Historynet dot com Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it
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  318.  @arcanondrum6543  great posts, A Bridge too Far was so accurate that Monty didn't appear in it either. It was a horribly disjointed,overly ambtious plan contrived by a damaged little man looking for attention and glory . Monty ignored & discounted the basic logistical reality of not only one road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had lot of practice doing this type of operation coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. The German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. IKE's broadfront not monty's debacle of sandwiching a whole armored corp down one elevated lane.The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  322. CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..." The Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson Given British grievous disappointments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the fragile nature of any military alliance,General Montgomery was an extremely poor choice to command an Allied Army Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion.Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen Rub-a-dub-dub Burns in the tub http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/26/books.booksnews Prof Hamilton, who was befriended by the field marshal at age 11 and knew him well for the last 20 years of his life, has no doubt of the nature of Monty's feelings. "These were quasi love affairs. He became really passionately involved with these young men - and then, more and more, boys, who he would call 'my sons'. They were nothing of the kind, of course, but in his own personality he would frame them in this way. "I myself have more than 100 very loving letters from him. My relationship with him wasn't sexual, in the sense that it wasn't acted upon, but I had been through enough years at British boarding schools to know what kind of enormous affection and feeling he had for me. "And I wasn't alone, this was a consistent pattern in Monty's life." One boy was Lucien Treub, Montgomery's "little Swiss friend", who met him at 12, and told Hamilton how the Montgomery would bathe him personally and rub him down so he would not catch cold "I've interviewed him several times and he was quite clear he didn't feel there was any molesting going on, but it's a tricky area," Prof Hamilton said.
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  323. TIK is a revisionist and this plan was cancelled twice for obvious reasons. It was cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications. Too many flights, too long of flights and over 2hrs less daylight than the D-Day drops in June. And that wasn't even factoring in unfavorable weather conditions - that did arise. The planners earlier stated when the massive flight formations hit the coast the German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach losing all element of surprise. Remember OVERLORD 2 months earlier was 30 miles across the channel,maybe another 20-30 miles inland these flights were almost 300 miles ONE WAY from air fields 50 miles west of London up into NE Netherlands around Arnhem. The Dutch Army who wasn't really consulted stated going right up highway 69 was one long choke point surrounded flood plains,polder marshes and drainage ditches - it had been war gamed before the war started. Also thousands of experienced, well-fortified enemy soldiers still had to be dislodged from key positions they inhabited. Fallschirmjäger General Kurt Student had dropped into that exact area in 1940 he was very familiar with the area and perhaps the best tactical commander on any front Absolutely not,the objective was to cross the Rhine,and the Port of Antwerp was needed for that.All else is bullshit to cover for this failure .Monty and Ike own this debacle - not the soldiers. TIK/YOU ignores all of this as it doesn't get Monty or the Britsh off of the Hook
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  331. The Auk had just won 1st El Alamein,the army group was on the up swing.Tim Collins,Dr Niall Barr and Corelli Barnett spell this out very well in Desert Generals Docu that puts a spotlight on the Monty Myth.O'Connor got caught because he was out front reconnoitering as ULTRA wasn't fully functional as this was a year and a half before the 2nd battle of El Alamein. He led one of the most brilliant military campaigns of the war. In two months, the XIII Corps/Western Desert Force had advanced over 800 miles, destroyed an entire Italian army of ten divisions, taken 133,000 prisoners, 400 tanks and 1,292 guns at the cost of 500 killed and 1,373 wounded - a remarkable military achievement. This led Adolf Hitler to send the Deutsches Afrikakorps under Erwin Rommel to try and reverse the situation .But in true Churchill form he stuck his nose in where it didn't belong After O'Connor's great victory he removed 50,000 crack/experienced troops from the desert to Greece. That proved disasterous in both places. To take the 6th Australian Division, along with part of 7th Armoured Division and most of the supplies and air support was just too much Monty caused a lot of problems in British command before ever coming in contact with the U.S.Officers. In the desert Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines in the Mediteranean while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet the Monty didn't grab airfields or open any ports later - this continued into Italy - Normandy. I'm assuming you watched that Desert generals docu - Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined those mine fields at he ridge of Alam Halfa that helped shored up defense/blocking line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point.Then The Torch Landings were looming which forced Rommels hand and FDR sending 300 Shermans and 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers. Also factor in complete Air Superiority All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and later deflecting blame that was - all thru the war really. Conningham & Cunningham wanted to strangle the shit as he basically ignored the Naval and Air Corps tremendous efforts while cleverly crafting his own over the top narrative. As I'm sure you know the allied supply lines were 100 miles away in Alexandria and Rommel's unfortunately for him stretched back into Libya and the port of Tripoli - 1,000 miles away. None of the above advantages were of monty's doing,it was the Allies 2 yrs of toil and he reaped the benefit Also for a while Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were with out ULTRA as the Gerries had added another wheel to the Enigma.Throwing off Bletchley Park for a few months,becoming operational conveniently in late August '42 - just when Monty was taking command.Monty didn't go on the offensive for 9 weeks - which is precisely what Auchinleck wanted.When Winston found this out he couldn't just turn around and sack Monty - who was one lucky little Tosser
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  332. Sources were left,I'm not repeating what was laid out - pretty straight forward,that confidence was restored read Desert Generals!!! Monty was on the side of Russia/USA. Bradley was right as others pointed out Monty won with advantages that any other competent General would have won/done also.I'll take all the historians i have read words over fanboy revision. Churchill hamstrung himself by sacking The Auk,if you watched the Docu Winnie bit his lip when he found out Monty wasn't moving either.Realizing he pulled the pin too early on Auk & Smith.Later Churchill spouts drivel to cover his cock up by saying there were no victories before monty and no defeats after. Most allied officers knew damn well that wasn't accurate.Hell even Freddie his CoS said Monty had a unique ability to sense what the Germans were up to - something along those lines. The team at Bletchley Park needed a bucket when reading that. Monty made a big mess of things in Normandy faffing up Caen/Falaise/OMG - that is a fact. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 254 In terms of the Anglo-American divide the Sicilian episode demonstrated that antagonism was not confined to American officers.Montgomery's behavior made enemies of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder as well as their staffs. The much vaunted rivalry between Patton and Montgomery was minor compared to the depths hostility that had developed with the Royal Air Force Tedder told Patton that Monty was "a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of himself as Napoleon - he is not" That's from a PHD who teaches History at King's College and lectured at Sandhurst
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  334. Let's review Mr Brooke shall we. Here is a great book by another good British Historian look what the supposed Highest soldier in Britain said and you may note the authors response.BTW the comments were taken from Brooke's own memoirs so I understand why he and Bernard were chums Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts read pages 162-163 About - Marshall "almost impossible to get him to grasp the true concepts of a strategic situation/understanding About - Churchill - "temperamental like a film star" and "peevish like a spoilt child" with "no long term strategic vision...he can never grasp a whole plan About - Lord Gort "brain has lately been compared to that of a glorified boy scout who just fails to see the big picture" About - Eisenhower "literally knew nothing of the requirements of a commander in action" and "had a very,very limited brain from a strategic point of view" About - Secretary Eden "was dangerous,rather obstinate featherhead-and with no strategic sense About - Gen Alexander "had many fine qualities but no very great strategic vision....it was very doubtful whether he was fit to command his Army" About - Adml MountBatten "Quite irresponsible,suffers from the most desperate illogical brain,always producing Red Hearings" There is a pattern emerging - evidently no one on the allied side but Brooke had any grasp of strategy. Just because these accomplished men disagreed with Brooke it didn't follow they were all dunderheads. His diaries are post war fiction,it was he who had not fully grasped tactics and strategy at important stages of the war making process It is clear from his diaries of his subsequent attempt to rewrite history - Andrew Roberts For a guy that got kicked off of the continent he comes across as a rather arrogant,condescending tosser .All hat and no cattle as they say in Texas
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  347. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches *Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este*​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  351. The whole plan was assinine,SHAEF knew the deep water port of Antwerp would have been to open to keep the operation supplied.5 tanks made it to The Nijmegan,even if more showed up they would have been blasted with the Reich and Ruhr right there.Cornhole reads Monty coloring books,the nearest port of supply was Cherbourg 499 miles away,but to johnny boy that's brilliance From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" Let's see. 1)Arnhem because of a crap plan by an amatuer wasn't captured. 2)The rocket sites weren't touched and still operating 3) In the nine days of Market Garden combined losses-airborne and ground forces killed, wounded and missing amounted to more than 17.000. 4)The deep water Port of Antwerp was still closed and needed for massive supplies 5)The Nazi reprisals included the Dutch Honger Winter that starved/froze at least 21,000 of its citizens to death. 6)Monty wasn't there to direct while Student and Model were in fact conducting a clinic on speed and placement of everything available
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  352. This was previously from Achilles Smith and well presented Just a few points, have you read or referenced the 82nd AB Division Field Order No.11 of 13 September 1944, it explains a lot of detail but it may be complicated for those whom haven't served in an military environment; it explains the mission, the regimental task, tactical study of the terrain, enemy situation in operational area, it has lots of nice grid references and etc. It shows why the Grosebeek Heights was taken; it's key terrain (that's an area you deny to the enemy) and the intelligence estimate provided a fairly accurate assessment of German forces; none of this "1000 tanks" business. TIK have you read or referenced 1st British AB Corps Operational Instruction No.1 and its mission designated by the Airborne Forces Ground Commander of Operation Market to the 82nd AB Division, it illustrates context. -Gavin's book 'Airborne Warfare' provides a good account of the operation, here's a nice quote: “At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D1) General Browning directed the CG (Commanding General) of the 82d ‘not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek, - Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands’This expression of the Corps commander’s evaluation of the separate portions of the mission given the 82d Airborne Division was most helpful since the Divison was to be so widespread”. The book also provides more insight into the rationale behind the planning phase -There is a follow up quote from Browning: “I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend”, this is from the US official history book; The Siegfried Line. --From the Captain Westover Letter of July 1945, quote: “For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I (Gavin) quote the 82d's mission:‘The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task’. This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized." -The "1000 tanks" nonsense is easily dismissed by the Situation of Enemy Forces in Field Order No.11, and the single line from the after action report of the 2Bn/505 is conjuncture, based on rumour and carried out only by one reconnaissance patrol. From the Beevor video, you display confusion and uncertainty over issue but you have displayed this as though Gavin himself was predominated over this rumour. -Also you side with Poulussen over the Lindquist misunderstanding and came to your own conclusions, that it's a "cover-up" in your words. Except the Lindquist pre-drop instructions is corroborated by Captain Chester Graham of the 508th; "Prior to the Holland jump I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation". Indeed, it was in Field Order No.11 of September 1944 that the 508th was to "Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility and be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at Nijmegen on instruction of Div Comdr". The interpretation was flawed with hindsight and the "evidence" was the books from Poulusson and Neillands, which is featured at the start of the Beevor video.I agree Seth 1422 dragged both of these not historians over the coals.Neither were historians and Poulussen couldn't identify an M-1.Pretty damning when you can't recognize one of the most widely dispersed weapons in one of the war's bigger battles Read Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality, he spells it all out and is the Official historian of the Air Historical for the Royal Air Force, with responsibility for writing documented narratives on RAF operational activity. He has a PhD from King's College in London William Buckingham,(Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944)with a PhD explains the massive Air effort that Monty barely recognized or considered because he wasn't really a army commander much less a Field Marshall. Like Model for instance who could adapt and change as the circumstances unfolded and changed
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  371. Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this.The little villa has his head so far up monty's ass he can tell us what he had for lunch .The RAF didn't want to drop too close to the bridges because of AA guns. You monkeys in a mango tree swinging from limb to limb slinging feces.Hoping there are some thicko's out there as bent as you From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel. Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed From With Prejudice,by Marshal of the Royal Air Force,Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
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  376. -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians. Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been. Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics The Germans and Americans both logged XXX Corp stopped on 20 September at 1700 hrs(9PM)-That's 3 days and it is a fact Viktor Graebners 9th SS stopped the Paras on the 1st morning - they had Haalf Tracks with mounted Anti-Aircraft guns that shredded some GIs.And APCs with mounted mg42s and some AT guns 75 mms. The 82nd had the most objectives over the largest area. they had the City, the Bridges,and LZ/DZ on the heights. Ist off it was Monty's terrible plan ,then XXX Corp took their time after successful Panzer Faust attacks took out 9 tanks after just 3 miles,stopping the whole column - that made 7 miles NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November. Probably because unlike Monty ,Model was an actual Field Marshall
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  377. Outside of your posts being full of shit they were pretty good.And Ryan interviewed perhaps more German and Allied Officers than anybody not at Nuremburg. Monty lied incessantly and belittled damn near everyone he came across - stop acting offended and was given that title to assuage his bruised ego,He faffed everthing from Caen,Falaise,Market Garden A PHD at King's College who lectured at Sandhurst From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem A Pulitzer Prize Winner From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding a bad mistake on my part Not only did Brooke,Tedder and Ramsay all point right at Monty,only later did he admit it.Hastings,Hart,Beevor,Bennet,Barnet,Barr,Kershaw,Keegan also back that up From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted Again, None of the objectives were met -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair he more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life​.
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  388. https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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  389. Burns you really should go to a library - once your ankle monitor gets removed and the restraining order is rescinded.ENJOY From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.616 July 17,1944 The RAF had dropped a concentration of 7000 tons of bombs to help the ground troops break through the German defense ring.Around evening Air Marshall Tedder had called IKE and and mentioned Monty had stopped his armor from going any farther.IKE was mad as Monty was drawing up his "administrative tail".The Americans got Saint-Lo,taken in fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow and settled in the streets From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day. Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile? The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress From My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - august 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day" My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651 On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American general, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front, as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command. Some of the London papers have reflected this feeling. Ike has a first class problem on his hands."
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  390. BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p414-19 Almost every feature of Operation Market Garden,in fact simply reaffirmed what already had become evident in North Africa that Montgomery was generally incapable of conducting anything but solid defenses or attacks with generous lead times,massive materiel superiority and no urgent dead lines. Market Garden had revealed Montgomery' serious lapses in planning as well as severe shortcomings in operational and tactical command.There was little cooperation between the various staffs responsible. Also lacking was any liaison between the Airborne Army and and those units responsible for ground troops and tactical air power. Montgomery's operation timetable was ambitious to the point of recklessness. Montgomery the man whose main criticism of Eisenhower was his lack of grip,remained remarkably out of touch with day to day operations and incapable of controlling events.He only got as far as Nijmegen and even then never got across the Waal.At no stage during the battle did he visit XXX Corp HQ and not until 23 September when it was almost over did he visit Dempsey at Second Army HQ.According to Freddie DeGuingand,CoS, Montgomery appeared to let things go their own way How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
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  394. From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,489​-490 The scapegoating of Sosabowski and his men was a spiteful,unwarranted and unforgivable slur on a competant,conscientious commander whose only crime was to refuse to play Whitehall politics to Brownings satisfaction, and upon the courageous men whose only failing was an inability to walk on water -The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all.To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control, specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road bridge -The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September,after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness.This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM).The GA did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition.Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs. -The same lack of urgency was on display when the Grenadier Guards on the evening of 20 September with the North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed -North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed -Illness could explain Horrocks contradictions in his Garden orders and intentions.Responsibility does not lie soley with him but with his superiors​ but with the petronage the British Army used to allot Senior command positions
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  395. From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations. Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and september 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions.Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities that tended to run counter to those aims Browning who handed over to Brerton that all 17 Bridges had to be sized with thunderclap surprise.And stressed that time constraints meant any arrangements at this stage had to be binding,before imposing a series of conditions and constraints *From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 * the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal.(Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances. (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days) From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks
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  398. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches *Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este*​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  405. Beevor's Arnhem is the single most exhaustive and best description and sourced of Operation Market Garden written.Kershaws "It Never Snows in September" covers the German perspective,both basically agree it is the fault of the so called Field Marshall Montgomery failed foreray.Unlike the revision of this host and th rags he quotes. It is written with the benefits of an exhaustive research of the British, American, Dutch and German records, the book provides amazing detail to "The Bridge Too Far" in Arnhem, Nethlerlands. The whole plan suffered from the plain fact that it relied on a single road of attack by the British XXX Corps where going off the road was a near impossibility due to the wet, boggy polders, obvious to anyone who has spent any time in The Netherlands (they rarely use fences in pastures as a dug ditch will quickly fill with water creating a natural barrier). The failure to listen to Dutch military personnel about the geographical defeat of the plan was just another in a string of Montgomery ego led disasters. The utter evil -- absolutely barbaric and shocking to the conscious -- actions of the Nazi SS, the German commanders in The Netherlands, the Dutch SS and the average German soldier are properly detailed and the Dutch people would rightly demand a fuller accounting of the barbarous actions during those months. The author thoroughly explores the lack of planning by Montgomery and Browning, the willful self delusion of Montgomery borne from an ego that held little regard for the futility and needless death of British and American troops. Reluctantly and very mistakenly Eisenhower put American Divisions under the command of the British General Montgomery in what turned out to be the greatest loss of any American Airborne Division -- before or since. Montgomery should be a national disgrace to the British, that is clear. Eisenhower began acting as a politician in deferring to Monty's superhuman ego, and abdicated his role as general commanding in a war. The greatest suffering was then endured by the Dutch people. Epic in its tragedy. A lesson in failed leadership by the British and American commanding generals. A shock and outrage to the conscious in the inhumanity and pure evil of the German army. A story that needs to be retold -- and very well done.
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  418. 1st off mantueffel was getting his shit shoved in by Patton's 3rd Army not Monty who wanted to withdaw.And I don't owe you sir an explanation after your rant assholes like little villa were pissing on the honor of dead GIs previously. Hasso had no idea who was doing what on the allied side. Also Monty lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, he told the Field Marshall you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise THE ARDENNES:BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,page 647*CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive . Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views Oh and whether you admit it or not Monty was a major player at Dunkirk along with Brooke and Gort.Caen - ass kicking,took it in 43 days when he said he'd have it in 1Only took it after 7000 tons of ordinence were shot or dropped from Naval guns(per mile) and Allied BombersFalaise he played politics.Epsom,Goodwood look them up yourself .Market Garden is totally on Monty.
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  419. Watch that video I linked by proffessionals - then you may tackle history Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.Holes got blasted in this very bad plan from Arnhem all the way down below Valkenswaard Fanboy distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal. From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  426. Irish Guards there How about Lt.Col. Vandeluer? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson? Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south.By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial Heinz Harmel? Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced LT John Gorman? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair" How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie? ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408 on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his dsiquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
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  429.  @street_cheeks  you are getting your wires crossed try reading below Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes Campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. --German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. --The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA. --The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed. Monty lied - the GIs actually thru him into a detaining cage look that up on Mark Felton's Board. Rumors ran rampant there was a monty look alike.Smacked the wisp around a tad,served him right for wanting to retreat then claiming vctory Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,p.356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  435. Cornhole Monty's Market Garble changed the game.The brits were out as a player and the Allies couldn't jump over it because Monty already had most of 3 Air Borne divisions wiped out Page 409 from Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb "There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare" Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...." From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves.Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this
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  436. There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration: General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges. Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area." There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland
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  446. Ah more of Monty's apologists poking their heads out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan.Allied HQ finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 70 mile lane with no room for maneuver during a wet autumn is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  450. You and history have but a fleeting acquaintance Pinhead Monty dawdled and in fact crossed after Bradley/Hodges/Patton/291st Enginneers .Do readers of the comment sections a favor - next time you're pulling numbers and opinions out of your ass,get your head out of there 1st you need a suppository in your mouth and a history lesson Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!! Montgomery in Europe 1943-45,by Richard Lamb pages 360-362 "British 6th Airborne had lost 30% of it's personnel killed and wounded;the Air landing brigade,which came in gliders had lost over 70% of its equipment The Army that needed to keep casualty count low lost over 3,100 men crossing the Rhine north of Wesel The disparity between the number of lives lost at Wesel and the 2 earlier American crossings is striking Casualty figures for the Rhine River crossings tell a grim story. Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded. Simpson's 9th US Army had to wait and cross with Montgomery;they suffered 491 casualties crossing south of Wesel.The US 17th Airborne Division lost 921 Paratroopers and 350 air crew(all with Montgomery's 21st Army Group) Then they lost another 841 casualties crossing south The sad fact is Monty rode the GI's coat tails.The only reason IKE went along with anything the he proposed was to give Stalin and the Soviets a look of solidarity
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  454. Monty ignored & discounted the basic logistical reality of not only one road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had lots of practice doing this type of operation because of all their mauled divisions coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. This means that German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST What would the Wehrmacht have done, assuming Arnhem was successful? The Ruhr was what 50 miles away if that! The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. Does anyone think the Wehrmacht under Hitler was going to roll over and surrender in the fall of 1944? Specially after the allies demanded UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER? A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  465. even the comment sections need buckets when reading your posts You keep refuting yourself with the stupidity of your own statements.None of the objectives were met -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
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  468. ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944).ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum. On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
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  469. 1st off XXX Corps did not cross the damn bridge until 7:10 PM on the 20th - a full 3 & 1/2 days,suppose to be there in two.2ndly Lord Carrington stopped in his tracks after crossing just 10 miles away. And 3rd Monty was a no-show unlike an actual Field Marshall Walter Model. Any idiot that thought it a good idea to shoehorn a whole amored column over 70 miles on an elevated lane surrounded by polder marshes shouldn't even be leading a boy scout assembly = MONTY GARDEN Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." Monty admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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  471. Does this video address ♦ If Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. ♦And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job
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  474. From the Germans there/then 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance* "It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p.129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.143 18 September,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platton attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge. They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park. SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions so reality exists,Bad Bernard Planning 'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North OMG was cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications. Too many flights(700 more than D-Day), too long of flights and over 2hrs less daylight than the D-Day drops in June. And that wasn't even factoring in unfavorable weather conditions - that did arise. The planners earlier stated when the massive flight formations hit the coast the German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach losing all element of surprise.
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  478. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches *Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este*​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  485. Um no Monty ignored & discounted the basic logistical reality of not only one road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had lots of practice doing this type of operation because of all their mauled divisions coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. This means that German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST What would the Wehrmacht have done, assuming Arnhem was successful? The Ruhr was what 50 miles away if that! The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. Does anyone think the Wehrmacht under Hitler was going to roll over and surrender in the fall of 1944? Specially after the allies demanded UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER? A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  493. https://youtu.be/duOYnIGivys?t=1580 even time stamped it where you need to learn https://youtu.be/Amo1f1_Hvho?t=2140 by a British PHD,in your case piled higher and deeper https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe You are welcome Swiis Boy Burns,pretty impressive huh coming across an Ocean just to carry Monty back across a channel
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  521. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. Monty Didn't seize Caen (day one objective) for over a month. Didn't close Failaise pocket. Didn't capture Rommel's army at El Alemian and took high losses just to win by default, Didn't trap Afika Corp in Tunisia, couldn't capture any vital channel ports, Didn't open Antwerp's approaches when it was wide open, Didn't even make it to the half way point in MarketGarden (Arnhem was only end of first half), Didn't get past Nijmegen for over 6 months.... I could go on and on. His failures are the stuff of legend. Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak. More Monty victims Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
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  524. The 82nd has nothing to do with the British XXX Corp showing up late and bernard not showing up at all.The whole concept for Operation Market-Garden was premised on the FALSE idea that the German Wehrmacht was in a shambles in September, 1944. This notion underrates the expertise of German military planners to reconstitute new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him. The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. *Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs*​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair.
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  529. From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 292 Despite Montgomery's message to IKE that he thought there was still a "sporting chance" of taking the bridge at Arnhem he must have sensed by then that a terrible disaster was taking place,which would considerably damage his reputation. After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles .And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.The very next day Monty wrote in his diary "I am very doubtful now if 1st airborne will be able to hold out and we may have to withdraw them". And the fact he never visited Horrocks during the entire battle confirms the impression that he was keeping his distance,a rare event for the "Master" From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  539. Davie doesn't read he creates - and not very good either from John Frost's book - A Drop Too Many *"We had been given to understand that the key Nijmegen Bridge had been captured by the Guards Armoured Division, and the saga of the river crossing by the U.S. 82nd Airborne in daylight against most formidable opposition was left untold" From Frost when speaking of Patton's 3rd Army (They liberated him), "All ranks of this Army, when they saw our red berets, would say: 'Arnhem. Aye. We'd have gotten through. Yes, sir. We'd have gotten through.' I could not help believing that they would have. There was nothing slow or ponderous about them and they didn't stop for tea or the night for that matter." Those were the words of an Englishman of note. Fascinating. ​ Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, p. 333-Tom Hoare,who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: *'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords,* were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. *"There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  551.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  tony I've read 43 books on the war and the personalities involved in the last 5 yrs . IMHO it goes back to Winston being impatient in July early August '42. He insisted on Auchinleck and Dorman - Smith going on the offensive immediately after the 1st victorious grueling battle of El Alamein July1 - July 27 so 4 weeks. As long as Jerry wasn't attacking and how could they as the were shorter on everything than even 8th Army. They(8th Army) immediately went into training two fresh divisions along with planting a massive mine field on the ridge at Alam Halfa - and I forget the tactical importance of that but it did figure in with the terrain. They HAD to resupply,reinforce and refit,the equipment(trucks,tanks,artillery,etc;) - something about sand and moving parts. So Churchill wanted them to move immediately and it simply wasn't practical. He screwed up O'Connor(after his victory) by taking 50,000 of his troops a year earlier moving them to Greece/Crete that proved disasterous in all 3 places. But Churchill forgot that and started meddling in Auchinleck's busness. It was in Correlli Barnett's DESERT GENERALS or "Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" by R.W. Thompson (both informative with sources) that state Churchill sacked them because they both agreed on the afore mentioned process. This was the very thing that infuriated/drove Alan Brooke nuts - read Winston's War or Masters and Commanders on that. Great Statesman but Winston should not have been allowed anywhere around a war room or battle plan. Here is the kicker and it has been stated in all of the books on the Desert campaign that Ive read. Auchinlech/Dorman-Smith stated very candidly,bravely needed 6 weeks to resupply,reinforce and refit - makes perfect sense. So Churchill relieved them and called over General William "Strafer" Gott whose plain got shot down When the Army and Winston then call up Montgomery he tells them he'll take 8 weeks.Which he did Aug13-Oct13) . That really pissed off Winston as he just relieved a winning General who told him that. So Churchill painted himself politically into a corner and couldn't relieve Monty now or the country would call for his head. This is covered very well in in the Desert Generals video on YT with historians Niall Barr,Tim Collins,Corelli Barnett,Nigel Hamilton and a few others just watched it 2 weeks a go and worth another look/listen *https://youtu.be/W4XVMEdghGk* Here it is Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" by R.W. Thompson, p57*​ Auchinleck explained his reasons to Churchill for not committing the green 44th division untrained in the desert and un acclimated.The Prime Minister argued but Auchinleck was adamant.Churchill turned upon Dorman Smith "do you say that too,why don't you use the 44th Division?" *Smith supported his Chief,"the 44th isn't ready,Sir" Because these two officers acted as they did that Morning a division was not squandered and many men's lives were saved, but they set the seal on their own professional doom" wrote John Connell The judgement of Lt.Gen. Brian Horrocks is especially valuable in this context: "as we know the Prime Minister wanted the 8th Army to launch an immediate offensive. It says much for Auchilecks moral courage that ,at this time, when he was convinced that such an offensive would have little chance of success ,and he was under a cloud, he refused to attack until he was satisfied his troops were trained & reorganized. The 44th HC straight from the U.K. with out any desert experience would have been in on this attack. They might well erect a monument to Auchinleck who unquestionably saved them heavy casualties."
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  553. Monty wasn't a real Field Marshall like Walter Model. Bernard never even showed up at Monty Garden.Major Tony Hibbert on the BBC docu said you could almost here XXX Corp.Evidently the Germans/Irish Guards/82nd are in agreement - no revision to be had. Great Book Try September Hope and A Magnificent Disaster also From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shortfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so. Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun, Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp. General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the initiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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  554. So a Man with a PHD is full of it?Had not I got the same thing from other authors you may have a point. How about the Gerries in It Never Snows in September ?Why do you think the 82nd got filleted crossing the Waal. Just so "LORD" Carrington could tell them no dice? Is Lt.Brian Wilson of the Irish Guards or Heinz Harmal of 10 Panzer both full of it? In any other Army the overall commander is responsible right or wrong for what happens but not Bernard? How about Brooke and Ramsay,Tedder and Bedell-Smith pointing right at Monty? And Monty was in fact getting his picture painted and stating that it would make a big stir at Sandhurst's graduation or sumsuch - Hastings,Beevor,Keegan all have wrote it and they leave a bibliography with references. Horrocks also told Tucker/Cook I believe that Guards armor would come up expediently and in force - and none of that occurred This operation was so dis jointed start to finish - it should have never been considered let alone hatched. And what ever your Uncle did after the war doesn't take away from his 1st hand experience in real time.The asshole Monty wanted to keep going afterward. Do you really think if the Allies got to Arnhem Model wouldn't have dropped the bridge?Or 88's open up on it enfilade . As you stated 4 yrs ago the Ruhr was only 2 lefts/rights there & back On one of these boards- a poster who was in the US Army in Germany during 1970's NATO said in joint exercises while in a helicopter right over some British Tanks under trees he couldn't see the tanks(nor did he know their where abouts).Not with out thermal radar enhancement could the crews see them. Which obviously wasn't available in the '40s. So what Brian Urquhart stated was very plausible and very likely factual either by pictures or radio dispatches. Don't join the group think here. As Patton stated "if everyone is thinking alike than someone isn't thinking" From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will limit the forces which can be maintained." Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust." From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 244 I put the responsibility for the operation squarely on the shoulders of Montgomery,who launched it then refused to listen to anyone who wished to modify a bad plan.Finally,he made the incredible statement that the operation was 90% successful.- Brian Urquhart,2003 Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH "I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
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  555. re read what i wrote,I know who your uncle was,years ago i saw a video he was lecturing or interviewed at Cal Berkley. He wasn't happy then about what transpired - in his own words Go watch the Desert Generals on YT Dr Niall Barr,Tim Collins,Corelli Barnett,Nigel Hamilton. I'd link it but they get bounced. Anyway The 82nd,The Germans,Irish Guards all stated the Guards Amored tanks sat they were there . Weak sauce blaming vetted sources because you don't like their findings I'm not a MacArthur or Clark fan either. Guys like O'Connor,Collins,Middleton,Krueger,Slim,Simmonds were much better than those knobs. Monty was shyt and almost cost an alliance and in fact did after the war. Actual participants were sourced and you question the guys quoting them? But Poulussen/Neilands write rags 70 yrs later and that gets traction?LMAO. As you told Cornell I'm a user not a pusher. All these guys full of it c'mon you've been converted by carnival barkers if you believe that. Beevors Books were released 3 -4 months before I could read it here state side. Hardly pandering to the American Market It's called research evidently the British like everyone to take their word for it. Right now I'm reading Winston's War by Hastings - very balanced .I had read Overlord/Armageddon also - I recommend them. Read Willaim Weidner - Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap very well sourced. Again Monty may have been shot had Brooke not punched his ticket You throw credible evidence under the table to rescue a questionable commander.Prove them wrong,America has nothing to do with the fact the BEF didn't cross their own channel in 4 years. Does the UK always have blame assigned before your allies arrive? 3 miles in Monty's plan was getting blasted by Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans. TIK's hive of hallucination is one big echo chamber. There is a Dutch Poster on here somewhere who lived along the HighWay and studied the battle here is what he said. Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November how come indeed
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  557. Courtesy of Answers Questions down thread In his 1947 book Airborne Warfare page 75, about Browning. Have people stopped reading books? July Letter 1945: Dear Captain Westover: Your letter of July 17th to my Chief of Staff, regarding operation MARKET, has come to my attention. First, let me say that I am very glad to find the Theater Historian's Office taking a close interest in this operation. Those of us who participated in the operation consider it a model airborne show. I have had the good fortune to be present at the planning of most of our operations in the ETO and to have participated in four of them. The 82d Airborne Division's participation in MARKET was well conceived and very well planned considering the short time available (6 days). The mechanics of its execution were almost perfect. The entire operation was conducted on an extremely marginal scale. I do not believe that one battalion less could have done the job, and if the Germans had committed one good battalion more at any point of our perimeter we would have been in serious difficulty. We, therefore, appreciate your interest in the operation and any of my Staff will be only too glad to try to answer any questions you may have at any time. For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I quote the 82d's mission: "The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task." This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized 13 September 1944: 82nd Field Order No.11, 508th will “Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal Crossing at Nijmegen on order of Div Comdr”
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  558. Cherry picking creatively leaving out 13 September 1944: 82nd Field Order No.11, 508th will “Seize, organize and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal Crossing at Nijmegen on order of Div Comdr” Who's the Commander, You ask UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P157 General Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to the effect that the division was "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished In his formal order General Browning stated: "The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Groesbeck is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task Monty/IKE/Horrocks own it.1st Para get slaughtered they're gallant,82nd get slaughtered and blamed.Sorry Graebners 9th got across before Frost arrived at the Bridge.Not his fault,just like the 101 getting a Bridge blown right in front of them,so called able minds at the top let down the boys in baggy pants. Carrington should never have led men in battle and damn sure not referred to as "LORD".And as you probably know Bernard was getting his picture painted.The fact Guards Armor didn't cross until 7:00Pm the 20th and god knows where the 43 Wessex was One group wanted to carry the fight forward another sat - this we know.Enemy gets a vote have to adjust accordingly. It appears Monty shrunk from responsibility, sad fact is he never appeared at all AGAIN From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - Their words
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  559. Dave Rendall - Horrocks had said Guards Armoured would come over in full force and on time. Well neither happened and the Airborne foot soldiers were left to take on APCs/Halftracks with mounted MG42s and self propelled 20 mm Anti aircraft guns. A real Field Marshall (not Monty) would have seen this coming but how could he as he never even showed up.The 82nd got attacked from the city, on the heights were the landing zones were and from across the bridge from Victor Graebners 9 SS .As Helmuth von Moltke stated “No Plan survives first contact with the enemy.” I like the way Mike Tyson said it “Everyone has a plan 'till they get punched in the mouth.” Any way Monty had absolutely no plan "B" he was in fact a Moron who couldn't conceive how anything could go wrong. And IKE is culpable for not having the balls to tell the urchin to sit down and shut up. Montgomery and IKE own this not the soldiers who were misled That quote about Browning was from 1955,not '66 or '93 - simply sourced by them. Had the Bernard actually been there then maybe he could have tidy'd up the battle Field Unlike a real Field Marshall Walter Model he chose to get lost. You've deflected everything presented ignoring Germans there,Irish Guards there,GIs there, I'm sure they colluded years ago to confound you. All those are full of shyt - US Army archives? Everything presented? - your insight is provincial revision, I have much more but you appear to have made your mind up regardless of evidence to the contrary. Hell somewhere I left Ramsay/Tedder/Brooke comments regarding this debacle The truth is you give those toffy nosed bastards like Carrington/Monty a pass for their many cock ups leading up to and including Nijmegen. Look up the Vandeleurs and the walk abouts. This plan was a disjointed abortion from the beginning losing 9 Sherman's in the 1st 3 miles to Panzerfaust teams. Robert Kershaw wrote the book It never Snows in September and has an interview on YT - look it up.....or not. I'm sure I made up the fact there were almost twice as many flights as Overlord for Monty Garden. Flights were also longer and days shorter - much Why didn't "LORD" Carrington use his tank radio and call ahead to the Irish Guards who were supporting the Waal River Crossing ( 10 tanks I've read)- tell them it's a no go then? instead of letting GIs getting slaughtered and not Tommies - guess it depends on whose OX is getting gored. Ring me up when you write your novel and get vetted/peer reviewed.
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  562. So Dave goes on a pub crawl 49 yrs after the battle with the lads from the BEF pointing out for one reason or another why he speculates some of the GI objectives were not met. And admits the Heights are a dominating feature - thanks for that smashing bit of insight. Can't seem to remember the fact the Tommies were indeed tumbling along because I'm not seeing alot. Only part of 82nd landed the 1st day,many more came in with Artillery and supplies the following 2 days . It's GIs fault 4 Tanks show up on the 3rd day crossing the Nijmegen Bridge and maybe out of ammo ? He's going to have to try harder .Like the plan was shit and it's author not around. We know were Model/Student were,how about Monty?Biggest Para drop in history up until that point and somehow he couldn't be inconvenienced to bother popping in? Also I stated/quoted previously that Dave forgets/ignores Browning made his statement about ordering Gavin in 1955 - it's sourced - his words Did Dave run up and back down the Groesbeek Heights carrying Mortar tubes?the smallest being the M2 that weighed 42 lbs,I reckon you'd have to tote along some ammo too. If you want to step up in class to the preferred M-1mortar a 44.5-pound tube, a 46.5-pound mount, and a 45-pound base plate,the total package is almost 100-pounds heavier than the 60mm mortar but it had a 3,000 yd range - bitch lugging it though .How about carrying M30s/M50s over his shoulder? As the drop zones were attacked twice?ON FOOT?Then back down again? And realize the 9th SS had indeed crossed the Nijmegen Bridge in APCs/Halftracks/ Kübelwagen’s the APCs had mounted MG-42s,halftracks had 20mm AA guns mounted and some self propelled. With units fighting in Nijmegen City,the Bridge ,the Heights - reality exists and the enemy gets a vote The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 p. 495* “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation. As General David Fraser recalled "Nevertheless I remember the impressive silhouette of the long bridge across the Maas (Meuse) at Grave. This had been captured by the American airborne troops and took us across the first main water obstacle at about ten o’clock in the morning of 19th September. By then the operation had been running for over forty hours and was already well behind schedule."
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  570. @ninjakid6 he didn't and because you aren't well read on the matter isn't my problem. It seems you and history have but a fleeting acquaintance.Did you read Beevor,Hastings,Keegan,Kershaw,Bennett,Barnett,Hart,Barr,McManus,Weidner - did you watch that Desert general Video? British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
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  571. ninjakid6 - good no sense in blaming the 82nd Airborne who fought valiently then.Plenty points right at Monty and IKE From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports. He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders;he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy." Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance northwards from Nijmegen to their support. There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke, he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfactory" This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory. Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed. Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged, "in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well." The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
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  581. John Keegan wrote Monty's rigidity, slowness, narrow-mindedness and inability to evolve his military ideas beyond First World War tactics were evident. In fact, Brooke and Alexander were frequently exasperated with him, among other British commanders. Not entirely clear to me is why he was kept on - supposedly he was beloved by British citizens but that is a poor excuse for keeping on an inept commander when the case is made that better generals were waiting in the wings. Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that. General Whitely . IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare". Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians. After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role. For a host of reasons Montgomery's usefulness came to an end in Normandy,probably with in a few weeks of the invasion.Any other British General could have done as well as Montgomery did at Caen;and very few would have handled the Battle of the Falaise Gap so incompetently Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle. There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
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  583. Folly of the Generals is a very well thought-out effort and is also a detailed critique of the entire Allied high command strategy in western Europe in 1944. David Colley presents specific points on what might have been accomplished and where. Details the American penetration of the Siegfried Line in mid-September and how their advance into Germany at Wallendorf would have succeeded .The once stout Panzer Lehr Division was a far cry from a division. It consisted only of a panzer grenadier battalion of company strength, an engineer company,six 105-mm. howitzers, five tanks, a reconnaissance platoon, and an Alarmbataillon (emergency alert battalion) of about 200 men recruited from stragglers and soldiers on furlough in Trier. That was all left from the strategic & tactical bombing of the Falaise Pocket In the feeble hands of units like these had rested German hopes of holding the Allies beyond the West Wall long enough . The German Officers interviewed later couldn't believe their luck when the the advance was called back to fuel Monty's debacle - shameful really. The high command of either Eisenhower and certainly Montgomery was pretty much rigid,static and unimaginative. They didn't take advantage of opportunities to advance toward and across the Rhine in September of 1944. While Monty was dithering at Falaise or mismanaging affairs around Arnhem that were poorly planned and more ineptly executed .They also poorly deployed forces and reinforced those failures instead of sending men and materials (especially gasoline and ammunition) to points that might have made a significant difference. Like crossing the Rhine at several other places that were available to them in/around September 15th with troops already there - mainly Hodges 1st US Army with Gen.Gerow's V Corp and Gen "Lightning Joe" Collins VII Corp . Colley presents specific details on what might have been accomplished and where. The British Chief's of Staff should have put Montgomery in his place. His meager misguided efforts that had extended the war by many months
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  587. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2IArekP8ws cornhole you are pathetic From Tony Hibbert not the cornhole chronicles.Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..." Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex Montgomery,Making of a General,by Nigel Hamilton,page 278 Montgomery's stepson John Carver talked about his "....schizoid tendencies engendered by his upbringing..." Cornhole,Your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones .One almost needs a bucket when you post! So Brooke,Ramsey,Keegan and Tedder are full of shit but you a monty nutthugger are to be believed.LMAO - say that out loud and see how it sounds From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Even John Keegan The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan Cornhole are you Monty's little Swiss Boy?
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  594. Jean Pierre Burns From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co.1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944,Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  603. Don't take this board for it's word the Germans there/then 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked *"the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance* "It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p.129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.143 18 September,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platton attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge. They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park. SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions so reality exists,Bad British Planning 'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North
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  606.  @nickdanger3802  Tell VILE the to stop accessing his ample backside.Denial and revision aren't acceptable answers.Specially when quoted from Parliament.WE should be charging VILE for this From a professor who lectured at Sandhurst and is Employed at King's College Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War. https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee120/book/export/html/237 Americans Fuel Britain’s War Needs The two critical questions of importance to Britain for war with the Germans were whether oil would be available and if they could pay for it. *The United States was responsible for two-thirds of total world production and, therefore, the answer to whether oil would be available was yes. To help Britain overcome the question of payment on March 1941, the Lend Lease was instituted. This removed the problem of finance as a constraint on American supply to Britain, since, with the Lend Lease, American oil could now be lent and repaid later. The neutrality legislation which had placed restrictions on the shipment of supplies was also gradually lifted to help loosen restrictions on shipment of supplies to Britain. Thus, by spring 1941, all the important steps had been taken to ensure adequate flow of oil from America to Britain Although there were temporary shortages, there was never a serious oil supply crisis in the US . The overall production record in the US was quite good - from 1940-1945, America’s overall production increased by 30% from 3.7 million barrels per day to 4.7 million barrels per day. Meanwhile, between December 1941 and August 1945, the Allies consumed 7 billion barrels of oil, 6 billion of which came from the United States It is also interesting to note that the wartime oil output was more than ¼ of all oil produced in the US from the time of Colonel Drake to 1941! 8https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc* Why couldn’t Britain pay? Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States. From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources. But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States. Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most. The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies. No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” Said by Churchill after Pearl Harbor. "Now they say that the allies never helped us, but it can't be denied that the Americans gave us so many goods without which we wouldn't have been able to form our reserves and continue the war," Soviet General Georgy Zhukov said after the end of the War. "We didn’t have explosives, gunpowder. We didn’t have anything to charge our rifle cartridges with. The Americans really saved us with their gunpowder and explosives.” "I want to tell you what, from the Russian point of view, the president and the United States have done for victory in this war," Stalin said. "The most important things in this war are the machines.... The United States is a country of machines. Without the machines we received through Lend-Lease, we would have lost the war."
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  614. John Burns - isn't that cute putting diamonds next next to his own carnival barking and attempting to pass it off as fact to get the surly snot off of the hook isn't going to fly.AGAIN quit pulling history from your ample backside. From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 4"When Eisenhower strayed from his Broad Front Advance and gave Montgomery permission to launch Market-Garden,he made his worst decision of the war .Market Garden was a bad idea because it took the focus off of Antwerp - and Antwerp mattered the most.Without the necessary supplies,the Allies had no chance of sustaining a victorious push into Germany. In essence Market Garden was based on Hope.Hope that Nazi-Germany was just about finished,hope that the weather would hold,hope that all bridges would be captured intact,hope that all the equipment would work properly.Hope that most of the German opposition would be over-aged invalids The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp*Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force,Lord Tedder,Deputy Supreme Commander AEF,Cassel & Co,1st edition, copyright 1966,Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal. From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 ...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
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  621. TIK your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. This debacle was lost because of Monty didn't have the balls to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall Modell and XXX Corp sloth . Perhaps your secondary school instructors can interest you in military history.Monty faffed up everything he touched he was back at his caravan playing with bunnies,birds and based on the FULL MONTY - some of the lads Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine." Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely . IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare" Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion.Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak.
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  624. I've read 30 books on the ETO Monty was a shyster,Churchill screwed up - Monty Took 4 more weeks than Claude Auchileck wanted (who BTW was a hell of a general) .He even benefitted the most from ULTRA as it was then fully operational. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued . He had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery.And only with 2 fresh Divisions moved over from the Nile Delta(coutesy of Dorman-Smith) and the Torch Landings(courtesy of IKE) forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.The RAF and RN (great job by both) had swept the skies and seas clean of any resupport from the Reich.Rommel couldn't move during the day because of Connigham's Air coverage,who BTW hated Monty for grabbing so much credit that belonged to others Claude Auchinleck and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved and General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. The BEF had 1,100 tanks and 225,000 men. FDR agreed to send Churchill after Trobruk - the 300 tanks and 100,105 mm howitzers Montgomery built NON of that Rommel had 200 tanks,90,000 men ,low on fuel,food, water
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  641. This is fun Johnny how about the Tommies who were there.Shocking I'm sure you'd agree Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945 .By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem So Johnny you have answers just not the right ones
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  648. No TIK - IKE's sources were stretched from loaning 16 divisions to monty at one time or another both Simpson's 9th and Hodges 1st had to bail out the laggard at one time or another .And both got away from the rube ass soon as possible. So you are either unread or bending the facts - I expect that from lampshades like John Burns - not you. The shortage was not because of Middleton Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes.16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group. The Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector . While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US Also Monty claimed he knew this was coming and no one listend .He got drummed around so much for telling tales This from a Pulitzer Prize Winner The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p. 415 Montgomery wrote on December 15th "that Hitler's plight was so dire that he cannot stage major offensive operations" (Oops,on December 16th the Ardennes offensive began.The twisted twirp wasn't even right for a day.)
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  652. Operation Market Garden​ where a British Pathfinder was captured on 17 September with the radio and the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. Also where The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed. Dave Hack unlike you they were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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  674. British trucks Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. [1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further. [1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47 "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281 Yet Montgomery had been unable to avoid lowering his logistical sights from arguing for a forty-division offensive to settling for an eighteen-division advance. For one thing, he had on his hands an embarrassing fiasco of British logistics which increased his dependence on American help. Some 1,400 British three-ton lorries, plus all the replacement engines for this model, had been discovered to have faulty pistons rendering them useless. That represented the loss of 800 tons a day. "There's A War To Be Won, The United States Army In World War II" by Geoffrey Perret, page 371 The transportation crisis was made worse by square-wheeled British mobility. In North Africa and again in Italy it took the British up to three times as long to move a soldier or a ton of supplies as it took the Americans. (footnote 37) During the pursuit, the British supply system virtually collapsed when thousands of brand-new but useless British trucks fell apart almost as soon as they hit the road. Three U.S. divisions were immobilized: The 26th, 95th, and 104th had come to fight but couldn't get out of Normandy because their trucks-and hundreds more-were taken to haul supplies for Montgomery. (footnote 37, page 588; John P. Lucas papers: diary, November 15, 1943: "Now I am stopped, not by the enemy but by the British inability to move. Their transport is so inferior . . ." USAMHI Archives. See also Lucian K. Truscott Jr., Command Missions (New York: 1954), 188.) "Eisenhower A Soldier's Life" by Carlo D'Este, page 591 The Red Ball continued in a modified form until the pursuit ended, a heroic but ultimately futile effort to keep the wheels from coming off the great Allied war machine, which had become a casualty of its own spectacular triumph. (footnote 31) To make matters worse, at a crucial moment fourteen hundred newly introduced three-ton British trucks broke down almost immediately with cracked piston rings, leaving the British 21st Army Group without crucial transportation and dependent on U.S. assistance. (footnote 32) (footnote 31, Christopher C. Gabel, The Lorraine Campaign, U.S. Army monograph, 1985. to long to copy talks about overloading trucks, tire shortages, supply Paris, and the French rail system that had not been repaired yet) (Footnote 32, The author cites Perret, which is above)
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  676. Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside" Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, Monty ignored him. Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies. There's more but I'd have to start charging you and TIK
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  689. There was nothing there it was the truth the fighting was miniscule with bernard half heartedly faffing around.Even Rommel in his private papers to other officers wondered what he was doing.Claude Auchinleck with much less had won 1st alamein.There was virtually no fuel,water or supplies getting thru. An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p418-19-20 .The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front. The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again Despite the enthusiasm for the amphetamine benzedrine which was issued in tens of thousands of tablets "to all eighth Army personnel by Montgomery pursuit after Alamein was hardly relentless". Rommel had escaped with the core of his army despite the advantage in tanks,an artillery superiority of 12:1 and an intimate knowledge of Axis where about and weakness thanx to ULTRA and other intelligence BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis,XVIII - In Africa Montgomery was incapable of finishing off Rommel even when his tanks were numbering in single digits and his plans were fully known to British intelligence BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p249-250 ,on 20 December LT Gen. von Sponeck of the 90th Light Division told his staff "Nobody can see any escape. The British outnumber us enormously. The puzzle is why are they following us so slowly? Time and again they have allowed us to dodge encirclement" The British Generalship under Montgomery remained unequal to the task of finishing them off. BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.256 Afrika Korp Gen.Johann Cramer said after the war "El Alamein was lost before it was fought,we had not the petrol....*Rommel had known for a long time the campaign in North Africa was hopeless because of the petrol shortage"* BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p262-65 The figures largely speak for themselves. The German and Italian tanks through out the 2nd half of 1942 in Rommel's words were "decrepit and barely fit for action". Comparisons are even more striking At Galaza 800 British tanks vs 280 German tanks At 1st Alamein 159 vs 50 At Alam Halfa 524 vs 203 At 2nd Alamein 910 vs 234 The total of this ever bludgeoning Allied tank strengths by 5 November it was at 15:1 and the rest of the year hovered at between 10 & 13:1.By November 9th the British 8th Army had established an anti-tank superiority of 30:1 and artillery superiority of 12:1
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  691. Stop reading the Cornhole Chronicles and try some historians From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary.Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
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  694. Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." (Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." "Montgomery's Memoirs page 276 " "The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September." Oh others blame him also Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside" Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, Monty ignored him. Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies.
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  705.  @billballbuster7186  Why don't you go visit monty's statue in Arnhem - oh,that's right there isn't one. 11,000 go into Arnhem 2,100 come out Jr commanders aren't libel for the boss's baffonerey - MONTY GARDEN. One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure.Where was monty - biggest air drop in History up to that point and he couldn't be bothered as HIS plan came apart from the very beginning Thicko the only thing you source is your ample backside.I left direct quotes from actual participants upthread.Reread them they are in English or have your handler do it for you.One road with polder marshes on both sides. The column made it awhole 3 miles before being stopped by panzerfausts Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle. There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  711. ​ @sean640307  Center of Military History,The United States Army,The Sigrfied Line CampaignPage174 Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on Arnhem Counting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours. Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem .At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured Division. *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred) From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked; at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst. "It was a lost chance" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 228 Gavin knew he faced a staggering task.He tried to rise to the challenge of a bad plan without complaint and achieved a remarkable success.The 82nd could hardly hold the Groesbeek Heights and take the key bridges at the same time.With the presumption of minimal German opposition - there was no margin of error for the operation.Which was open to the assumption of maximum risk.Most of the tactical objectives were outside,not within the landing areas UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P157 General Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to the effect that the division was "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished In his formal order General Browning stated: "The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Groesbeck is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task." From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend." With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted More Monty victims Giovanni Pierre created 28 Sept 2013 John Burns created 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell created 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston created 20 Nov 2013
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  715.  @sean640307  SEAN, the Dutch Army had advised going west and north over terrain that could support armor. They could fan out and flank the Gerries. Instead of the polder marshes and flood plains that surrounded most of Hell's Highway which basically created choke points that the Gerries exploited. Oh and then there is this. Horrock's words The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine. But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September, Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops *Billy E.T. Williams who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"*​ Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. *Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"
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  719.  @akgeronimo501  great posts - I won't waste my time reading this Crown's Comics here's another from a poster Thrasherback who read the book-cover to cover. The author makes absolutely outrageous claims based entirely on uninformed information and mistaken facts, and draws outlandish conclusions that are amateurish and embarrassingly naïve at best. His major contention that had the Waal River bridge been secured when the British arrived at Nijmegen on September 19, the British would have had 48 hours to relieve their compatriots at Arnhem is a laughable observation. I'll ignore for the moment that 76 out of 260 American paratroopers of Company C of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion and Company H and Company I of the 504th Parachute Infantry were KILLED, and another 119 wounded crossing the Waal and along the river's far bank in their suicidal effort to get the British across the river, only so that the British could cross the bridge and then STOP for over twenty-four hours on the far bank? Adamantly refusing to drive on to Arnhem(Carrington). Hey, I'll even go the author one further, I'll also ignore the fact that XXX Corps should have been in Nijmegen on September 18. But I'll get back to that one. Meanwhile, I'll address some of his more ridiculous claims. I'll start with the easiest lie to refute. That would of course be the author's contention that *"There is an official statement in which General Gavin admits that he alone was responsible for the shift in priority from capturing the Waal Bridge to defending the Groesbeek Heights." Really? When did General Gavin issue "official statements" after the battle?*(he didn't) If the author ever plans to write another book about Operation Market, I strongly suggest he take a quick glance at British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. In it, he'll find General Browning's explicit orders to the 82d Airborne Division that the high ground around Groesbeek is the 82d Airborne Division's primary objective, and all the division's other objectives, including the Waal bridge, are to be considered secondary to the high ground. General Gavin did make an off-hand comment that he agreed with General Browning's prioritizing of the high ground, but he never said it was his decision, as it was clearly General Browning's. If I were writing a book about Operation Market, I would have started with British Airborne Corps' Operational Order Number 1. The author's entire assumption of the 508th Parachute Infantry easily taking the bridge if only given the chance, and "Authentic documents however prove that in fact no pre-jump orders were issued, as claimed by General Gavin," is equally libelous. Let's take the latter first, and quickly. Both General Gavin and Colonel Roy Lindquist have attested in writing to the fact that the evening before departing England General Gavin instructed Colonel Lindquist to try for the bridge if circumstances warranted it. Perhaps there is no official documentation because Gavin's instructions to Lindquist were contrary to Gavin's orders from Browning, which the author has yet to find in British Airborne Corps Operational Order Number 1 through his "well-founded" and "meticulous" research. And that leads me to the 508th Parachute Infantry. The 508th Parachute Infantry actually landed with explicit orders, and they were the most demanding of any unit, American or British, in the entire operation. The regiment was stretched paper-thin the minute it landed. The First Battalion was to move 5 or 6 miles to the outskirts of south-central Nijmegen, primarily to block the Nijmegen-Groesbeek Road. If the situation then allowed, First Battalion was supposed to send a platoon into Nijmegen to try for the bridge. After sundown First Battalion dispatched a platoon from Company C, which quickly became lost inside the city. Later that night, First Battalion sent Company A and Company B into the city, both of which also became hopelessly lost inside the city, and were thrust into a firefight with elements of both Colonel Henke's defenders, and the arriving 9 SS Panzer Division's armored reconnaissance battalion. By sunrise they had made no progress toward the bridge when General Gavin started receiving reports of a German assault against the landing zones. That would be the assault the author describes as "the German attack was only local and there was no need for the withdrawal of the three companies in Nijmegen who were making good progress in capturing the Waal Bridge." Well, as we have just seen, the two, not three companies were hardly making "good progress in capturing the Wall bridge." They were in fact, stopped cold in their tracks. And "the German attack that was only local," did overrun and nearly annihilate the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company D which had been left behind to hold the landing zones, and did consist of three full non-local kampfgruppe or 250-300 men each with twenty non-local armored vehicles (Pumas) supported by nearly a non-local regiment of artillery. The 508th Parachute Infantry's Company G was in a perfect assault position, amazingly the author got that much correct. But it's hardly that simple when you're conducting a major combat operation. Company G was nearly alone in guarding the 82d Airborne Division's eastern flank, specifically the critical road out of Cleve in Germany. The very road that the Germans utilized a day later to launch another "non-local" attack which consumed all of the 508th Parachute Infantry, and eventually the British Coldstream Guards for three full days. Strangely, in all the author's "meticulous research" he missed two salient facts. General Gavin initially planned a coup de main against the Waal bridge on September 17 by jumping the 508th Parachute Infantry's Company B, followed by two gliders carrying a pair of 37mm antitank guns. But General Browning and the Air Corps strenuously objected, and joined to have the plan scrapped. The author's "meticulous research" also missed General Gavin's having devised a two-prong attack to capture the bridge on September 18 by moving elements of the 504th Parachute Infantry down from the north, and elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry up from the south. But General Browning quickly vetoed the plan. Sadly, the 504th Parachute Infantry's proposed route would have brought it into contact with a then virtually undefended railroad bridge. If the author is that interested in finding an element of Operation Market "Lost," I strongly suggest he look much further south. He can begin at the tiny village of Elst. Or he can spend his "meticulous research" analyzing the British 1st Airborne Division's operations, and explain how two-thirds of an entire airborne division were initially blocked from reaching the bridge in Arnhem by a para-military police force, and handful of converted German flack gunners, and a German training company. But I'd start with Elst, and explain an entire armored corps being held up for an entire day by a pair of 8mm guns. Much was "lost" in Operation Market. But little of it involved the American operations. While the British airborne division struggled to seize a single bridge at Arnhem, the 82d Airborne Division captured five bridges across an area of twenty-five square miles, and two of those bridges were larger than the bridge in Arnhem. British XXX Corps decided to stop and rest and maintain its tanks for the night south of Eindhoven, throwing their entire drive irrecoverably behind schedule. A second division could have easily leap-frogged the lead division to maintain the momentum of the drive. But they failed to do so. Field Marshal Montgomery's plan was brilliant. His only flaw was using British command. By the way, a number of local Dutch have done amazing work in documenting Operation Market, especially the 82d Airborne Division's role in the operation. But sadly this author is not one of them. He takes a serious world event, and applies the analysis and insight not worth of a kindergarten student
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  733. Montgomery the Field Marshall p.171 by R.W. Thompson - R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" - You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd. -Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. -Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. -And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site -Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job https://www.youtube.com/s/gaming/emoji/7ff574f2/emoji_u2666.png
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  734. -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it ​the English drank too much Tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent,if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate *yet the Guards Armored Division did not move*​ ​While the Germans used the windfall respite to organise their blocking line. From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge - we were stopped. I never felt so much despair The more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life​.
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  742.  @jthunders  wrote To fire him would’ve caused big problems politically and threaten the alliance. Yet Marshall would have done it and Churchill would have had to go along with it had the point been pressed Churchill himself seems to have had mixed feelings about Monty. Burns is right though, he did handle himself well during the Ardennes offensive, at least the military aspect if not the political ------------------------------------------------------------------- It came closer than most think,and Monty held a shoulder but then wanted to withdraw from that when Joe Collins went on the offensive.IKE should have just left Collins alone he commanded the advance anyway.Part of the Problem was Bradley actually ran 1st Army - Hodges was kept around because he had been a lifer though modern tactics had passed him by not unlike Bernard,though he was lucky enough to be around for a big allied victory as history showed that really couldn't be lost.But IKE certainly made errors,he should have been sent packing along with the sod Monty From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, he told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise." Collins was above all was an effective leader forward thinking and fast on his feat able to adjust to changing circumstances He put himself at all time in the front of the action. He studied tactics, and took advantage of the advent of armor and airpower, much more so than many of those generals who came through command and in fact in charge like static stumblers,Monty and Bradley,Hodges. Collins was, in short, creative, studious, personally brave, and quick to lead and direct those around him respected combat acumen. From Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British.Montgomery's disasterous press conference and the clamour of the British Press had stoked a rampant Anglophobia in the USA and especially among Senior American Officers in Europe.And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence.Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed From Ardennes 1944 - by Sir Antony Beevor - Page 304 Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke was disturbed when he heard Monty's account "it looks to me as if Monty with his usual lack of tact has been rubbing into Ike too much Monty advice".Too much "I told you so" From Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences,Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  769. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.108 Arnhem could not be captured unless all else below it was secured 1st. In addition it was necessary to capture and hold an area of high ground south east of Nijmegen at Groesbeek only a few miles from Germany. German possession of the heights would have left XXX Corp's eastern flank dangerously exposed to counter attack. Never the less Montgomery's plan required 100% mission success something unkown in large scale Airborne operations. Failure to capture a single objective would jeopardize the entire XXX Corp offensive Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. Moreover, it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance"
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  782. he's right monty doesn't show up, Monty ignored & discounted the basic logistical reality of not only one road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had lots of practice doing this type of operation because of all their mauled divisions coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. This means that German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST What would the Wehrmacht have done, assuming Arnhem was successful? The Ruhr was what 50 miles away if that! The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. Does anyone think the Wehrmacht under Hitler was going to roll over and surrender in the fall of 1944? Specially after the allies demanded UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER? A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  791. You girls and your knitting circles - when your done cleaning your teeth with your fingers try leafing thru pages of a history book with them 1. Dr Forrest C.Pogue,interviews,US Army Military Institute,1947Montgomery's intelligence officer, Brigadier E.T. Williams. Pogue quotes Williams as telling him when Bradleys troops came up to the inter-army group boundary line, "Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. *We [Williams and Freddie De Guingand, Montgomery's Chielf of Staff] were indignant on Bradley's behalf." Quoted in Rohmer's "Patton's Gap" and in Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy," p. 449,450. 2. Maj-Gen. Francis De Guingand, "Operation Victory," p. 407. "My impressions at the time were that he [Montgomery] had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group*......*It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group commander [Bradley] as to the limit of his northward movement." Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery. 3. Stafford Diary from Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441 Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary." 4. Hansen Diaries, Sunday, August 13, 1944, reads: "It is suggested in G-3 [Operations] that we were ordered to hold at Argentan rather than continue the drive to Falaise since our capture of that objective would infringe on the prestige of forces driving south [British/Canadians] ... Accordingly, our forces were held at Argentan and subsequently refueled while the British were still short of their objective [and] permitted much of the strength in the pocket to escape eastward toward the Seine." 5. Ralph Ingersoll, in his book, "Top Secret," writes about Patton's Third Army and the Falaise Gap: "Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the ... boundary line." Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 190 George Patton and others said the same thing. He was guessing that the reason Montgomery halted the Americans was a combination of jealousy and ignorance of the situation. As it turned out, it was a pretty accurate guess. 6. Both British Air Chief Marshals Sir Arthur Coningham and Sir Arthur Tedder said that Montgomery was responsible for the 'halt order.' According to Antony Beevor, Tedder said, "One of Monty's great errors was at Falaise. There he imperiously told US troops to stop and leave the British area alone. He didn't close the gap
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  794. More BS from the Cornhole Chronicles https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance.*Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through the Germans and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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  807. Vile Asston has shit on dead GIs blaming them for Monty's misadventure who never showed up for his own operation and Tankers that in fact sat and did not move. Pissing on dead GIs sent so his D-Day daddy who really wasn't so explain this Vile Asston.Just a coincidence?Sure it is ,of course Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 So Vile the Germans/GIs/Irish Guards are all in agreement. The Tanks sat after the 82nd crossed the Waal and Monty unlike a real Field Marshall Walter Model was nowhere around From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored. The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile..Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun, Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it *the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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  808. ​ @mathewm7136  the allies not that minstrel stopped it. O'Connor and Auchinleck/Dorman-Smith built that Desert Army. And Auchinleck won the 1st battle of El Alamein against ROMMEL. With ULTRA now supplied enemy movements. And the RAF and the RN strangling Rommel's supply lines and strafing the AK's columns during the day. Long before Monty sashayed in to the picture. The British & Allies won that Desert War but Monty took the credit. FDR himself gave Churchill 317 new Shermans and 94 105 mm self-propelled guns when news of the surrender at Tobruk came in. Along with the Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria. After that Monty dithered with much greater forces - a malevolent drag on American Supplies,Men and materiel An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p418-20 The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front.The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted. Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again" *The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddel-Hart,p.521​​ Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point​British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable" R.W. Thompson, Churchill and the Montgomery Myth, p. 92, 105. Retired British General Sir Francis Tuker offered perhaps the best appraisal of Montgomery's generalship: "If Monty is the best commander we had in the last war, then our standard could not have been very high." Raymond Callahan, Churchill and His Generals, p. 215. The truth is that Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery was probably the worst senior commander of any major combatant nation during World War II. British historian R.W. Thompson wrote, "Montgomery was completely formed as a soldier at the end of the First World War. He did not grow after that. He became increasingly efficient, but he did not absorb a new idea. At fifty he was the same man he had been at thirty..." Thompson quotes one of Montgomery's officers saying, "Monty was living in 1918 and never left it."
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  814. Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public ,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war. From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 Erwin Rommel - "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces,, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare .The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wad "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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  821. Cornhole you poor trampled cabbage leaf Monty was awful at commanding. Terrible. As in, no fucking good here you go 3 of the 4 Historians will tell you how bad all British https://youtu.be/duOYnIGivys?t=1419 -Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was. -Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore, -Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did. -Hollywood didn't tell Britain to not cross the 30 mile channel for 4 full years after Dunkirk. -Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown. -Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later. -Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin and didn't even make it to Arnhem,Monty did--Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group and was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them -Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete -Hollywood didn't say that a British Historian/Scholar with a PHD did. The Crown always fights to the last colonial, usually Australians
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  827. Novelist Grandiose played you two deluded dweebs like a cheap violin.You're just upset that he's better at it than you tired twits - you make me Larf Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex Ike and Monty:Generals at War,by Norman Gelb,page 329 Monty's egocentric nature made it impossible for him to respond to complex situation in which he found himself by insisting he had not been mistaken about anything. Monte,Making of a General,by Nigel Hamilton,page 278 Montgomery's stepson John Carver talked about his "....schizoid tendencies engendered by his upbringing..." Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role. For a host of reasons Montgomery's usefulness came to an end in Normandy,probably with in a few weeks of the invasion.Any other British General could have done as well as Montgomery did at Caen;and very few would have handled the Battle of the Falaise Gap so incompetently Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..." Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 320 The poor performance of the British 2nd Army in Normandy had tied Monty's hands.He did not expect the Germans to be that good.But when the Americans broke the German lines at St Lo instead of turning the Americans loose on the open German flank,Montgomery stopped the Americans at Argentan and sent them North east to Paris-orleans gap.There were simply too many bitter pills on Montgomery's desk.He could not allow the Americans,especially George Patton to take Falaise away for m his 2nd British Army regardless of the cost
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  846. Dave hack when you are done with your fauntleroy fantasies read or have read to you what the Germans stated 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215,Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance It Never Snows in September Robert J Kershaw, p.231-233 on the 1st day of the landings the Hohenstauffenn captured a British Officer in possession of the ground marking instructions to indicate drop zones "It Never Snows in September" page 285 Robert Kershaw XXX Corp was paying the price for committing it's entire offensive force along one road to reach the besieged airborne divisions.It's forces snarled up in such a narrow corridor that was proving difficult. "It Never Snows in September" page 306 Robert Kershaw​ XXX Corp advancing along one easily defended road was never able proportionally to match the German build up,and achieve the odds ratio necessary for rapid success. More specifically it was never able to push forward sufficient infantry by ground or fly them in by air,to secure what were essentially infantry objectives. This was of crucial signifigance because General Gavin's 82nd Airborne lacked sufficient infantry to storm the Nijmegen bridges before the arrival of XXX Corp on 20 September "It Never Snows in September" page 307 M-G was condemned therefore,to move in the Allies favor only at XXX Corps laborious pace through the airborne corridor.Progress was made difficult and the road cut on at least 2 occasions by the sudden deployment of newly arrived German Panzer & infantry forces. If you ask me nicely I'll provide the Irish Guards and GIs stating much of the same - MONTY GARDEN
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  852. You change the content then post it you bent freak here is what happened Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp. From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,p. 219 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:* "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  876. Burns go share your novels with your special needs class or the Poles that got ran thru the shredder .You troubled tosser get help. In case your handler didn't read it to you last time,from a PHD of course to you it means piled,higher and deeper - MONTY GARDEN ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p49 Major General Richard Gale who converted the British Airborne from a small group of Raiders into a conventional parachute brigade in confidence told Major G.G. Norton in the '70s then curator of the Airborne Forces Museum *"that he would rather have resigned his command than execute MARKET as it was foisted on Urquhart".It is unclear if Gale made his views clear to Browning at the time ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright,we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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  880. "Sigh" Monty intended to get a headline then didn't show up. Again from the top - all British Officers from the meetings in September all privy to info & intel. Alan Brooke??? "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." Monty admitting it after the war??? The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." (Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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  911. Burns you've done enough drugs to send sniffer dogs into early retirement .You seem angry did Monty miss your bubble bath - like he missed showing up for Market Garden Quiz: Who was Ground Commander for Operation Market?And why didn't he show up? From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude
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  925.  @johnburns4017  you lampshade you've lied once - and that has been continuously ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. ♦And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November - you make me LARF Johnny
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  949. https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance.*Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it. Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through the Germans and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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  963. This channel is a shabby hamlet of fauntleroys and toffey nosed bastards. Britain fought to the last colonial - usually the ANZACs.As far as monty the molester Gerries weren't impressed by his pathetic plan 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park. 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, *Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further. The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity. They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.' It was a lost chance It Never Snows in September Robert J Kershaw, p.231-233 on the 1st day of the landings the Hohenstauffenn captured a British Officer in possession of the ground marking instructions to indicate drop zones "It Never Snows in September" page 285 Robert Kershaw XXX Corp was paying the price for committing it's entire offensive force along one road to reach the besieged airborne divisions.It's forces snarled up in such a narrow corridor that was proving difficult.
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  988. Total Bullshit because of British generalship Ya know Dunkirk,Singapore,Torbuk,Dieppe,AGAIN THE USA had to sail men/material/food/fuel 3,500 miles.Britain basiclly sat on the sideline while the GI's adminsistered the coup de gras to the Reich at the Ardennes as Monty showed his wares by ducking out of Monty Garden.Go ahead haed across the channel and brag yourself up to other Europeans who remember the tale a lot different.Specially the Czechs and the French When interviewed in 1945, Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place General Gunther Blumentritt : We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt.
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  989. The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south*. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
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  990. Yup your boys faffed it up,Caen,Falaise,Monty Garden.Back to mopping the adult theater Johnny From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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  1000. Dave Hack unlike you they were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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  1012. Carrington stopped in Lent and Harmal explained to Robert Kershaw that there were not artillery installations between Nijmegen-Arnhem just a couple of units 'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North. 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 201. SS Captain Carl-Heinz Euling came to a decision "the 1st enemy tank was able to pass over the road bridge during the evening of 20 september,the railway bridge had already fallen* 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet - On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. While conferring with Monty, Bedell-Smith called attention to the ULTRA dispatches indicating the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were now located in Arnhem. Owing to this danger, Smith urged Monty to shift an additional airborne division to drop near Arnhem. But Smith recalled "Montgomery ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily away" (The Siegfried Line campaign : U.S. Army in World War II,by Charles B.MacDonald,p.122)
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  1013. @Johnny Carroll Little villa ignores post after post for 5 yrs now asking for evidence when it's provided he runs away to another board and repeats his drivel. That's why he and Burns either are the same guys or suffer froms the same delusions and denials as they simultaneosly flock to the same discussions. Chester Wilmot was a cheerleader(war coorespondent) who accompanied Monty's Army, so some of the master's novelish mischief obviously rubbed off on him ask little villa if he'd like pretty much all of SHAEF's statements on the matter. Which he gleafully ignores,men there in real time and in the know. Monty owns it at Caen,Falaise and Monty Garden. Even Monty's Men like Horrocks and Deguingand point at Monty when they were no longer under him Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more. *Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated. The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQ "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare" The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
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  1022.  @ToolTimeTabor  History isn't predicated on what you believe. Frost's men were static in buildings. Gavin's were on foot in the open against mobile opponents - so reality exists. The 82nd had their objectives spread to hell and back,oh and there was an 88 in Hunnar Park.And the Arse Monty unlike Model was nowhere around - stay on point. Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why did the same three guys leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* Beginning to think you may be one of the supposed host's aliases ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p310-311 101st AB Division Objectives -Eindoven -Son Bridge -St Oedenrode Bridge -Veghel Road and Rail Bridges -Wooded Areas 1st AB Division Objectives -Arnhem -Arnhem Road Bridge -Pontoon Bridge -Railway Bridge -Wooded Areas 82nd AB Division Objectives -Nijmegen -Hueman Bridge -Malden Bridge -Hatert Bridge -Honinghutie Road & Rail Bridge -Grave Bridge -Nijmegen Road and Rail Bridges -Groesbeek Heights DZ/LZ
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  1024.  @thevillaaston7811  from the RAF Historian the Britsh themselves cancelled it as linnet and Comet for many obvious reason Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance" Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.195 With the shortening of days,reduced number of hours this time of year,the increase in distance, the complications due to a late start due to bad weather General Williams pointed out it would not be possible to conduct more than one lift a day. Williams had a deserved reputation for close cooperation - he had commanded troop carriers in Husky,Neptune and Dragoon and was one of the most experienced of all Allied Airborne commanders Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.196 Lift details are some what of technical character which is why few historians address them in any detail.They concern time involved in turning around aircraft for the 2nd & 3rd lifts, the range from UK bases to their objectives in Holland,weather an visibility conditions and the co-ordination of the air lift with fighter Escort and Flak suppression operations. All of these were interlinked Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.198 At the beginning of September 1944 Lt.General Brereton had already warned Eisenhower that it would be very difficult to stage an airborne operation as far east as the Rhine River from bases in the UK (SHAEF in a memorandum) Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
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  1029.  @ToolTimeTabor  If I agreed with you we'd both be wrong.I used your words my friend try reading what you wrote.Blather on a real Field Marshall was dealing the cards though German. Again what you said last year that we agreed upon - What if they drop the Bridges immediately? That's how pathetic a plan going up a single road with no room to manuever really is with so many other moving parts. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that. A Pulitzer Prize winner The Guns at Last Light,bt Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's intelligence chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. page270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944).ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum. On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role. ULTRA decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed the various units from Normandy had been ordered to western Holland to refit and subsequent intercepts indicated that this included the II SS Panzer Corp. Not until September 15 had SHAEF high command taken note that the corps two divisions the 9th & 10th Panzer seemed to encamped at Arnhem. Montgomery's senior commanders almost to a man voiced skepticism about Market Garden. Beetle-Smith grew anxious enough to alert Eisenhower, who hesitated to intervene in tactical dispositions but authorized Smith to raise the issue with the field marshall. Smith flew to Brussels on Friday,48 hrs before the assault was to begin and suggested strengthening the force to be dropped at Arnhem. *"Montgomery ridiculed the idea and laughed me out of his tent" Smith later reported *"he waved my objections airily aside" One Guy had access to this and Bettle Smith brought it up to him. And Gough/Gavin/Browning or Brereton weren't privy to it
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  1030. No I don't think so consistent in grasping for straws perhaps.If you were anywhere near consistent as you think you would have used the Gough excuse long ago but doesn't move the needle much either way.Try reading previously what was left I'm not chewing my cud twice.Ignoring terrain reports,Intel warning of the 9th & 10th refitting in Arnhem. One lane 70 miles much of it elevated surrounded by marsh and drainage ditches. The Wehrmacht was falling back on it's supply lines and reinforcement of men & machines available right there in the Ruhr by rail - what brainiac ignored that? A Field Marshall should have factored that in as an actuall Field Marshall in gray did. Also not opening the Scheldt approaches to the port that would have been needed had this debacle somehow really made it to Arnhem - as you squirm for forlorn reasions they didn't. Way too many moving parts has been pointed out by better read/informed/suited than here to discuss the matter accurately There wasn't room for anything to go wrong what so ever. Too many choke points easily to defend with the polder marshes and flooded ditches restricting the advance to one road . Many of the arguments made were by British Officers for cancelling them when planning for Operations Linnet/Comet. That was before Bernard adding the 82nd/101st Airborne Divisions to that to become MARKET GARDEN. It was condemned from it's inception and scarcely a trained military man couldn't spot it. Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Bourg-Leopold until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site? Bernard was either negligent in not pointing that out to these men or didn't appoint the right people or the fact he was a vacant husk as many concluded long ago. This from a Dutch Poster Why was Field Marshall Walter Model able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November ?
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  1035. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson) Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking, the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson)
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  1042.  @johnlucas8479  Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113​ yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it." Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance" Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.196 Lift details are some what of technical character which is why few historians address them in any detail.They concern time involved in turning around aircraft for the 2nd & 3rd lifts, the range from UK bases to their objectives in Holland,weather an visibility conditions and the co-ordination of the air lift with fighter Escort and Flak suppression operations. All of these were interlinked Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.198 At the beginning of September 1944 Lt.General Brereton had already warned Eisenhower that it would be very difficult to stage an airborne operation as far east as the Rhine River from bases in the UK (SHAEF in a memorandum)
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  1047. Browning ordered the Drop Zones taken 1st.they had to fight repeated attacks there.Had 1st para held theirs it's a good chance they get resupplied. The 82nd had nothing to do with Monty's poor planning and XXX Corps slow progress or the Germnas still between Nijmegen and Arnhem Or the Gerries pouring in from the Ruhr.Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger.The Amoreed column made it only 7 miles the 1st day and got completely stopped after just 3 miles by units with panzerfausts The 1st Para almost got wiped out the 82nd didn't.The 82nd stayed mobile and protected it landing zones to get resupplied.Drops came in for 3 straight days and LZs got attacked 3 X.Had Monty been this stickler to detail that loons like this place proclaim he would have noticed this.Unlike Model,Montgomery wasn't really a Field Marshall - more like a field mouse From Carlo D'este,Decision in Normandy From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable*1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road Monty ignored him
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  1056. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.​ Monty demanded this operation then doesn't show up to direct it when the reality of it coming apart immediately is evident. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. Source Daly, James. Proposed Airborne Assaults in the Liberation of Europe: Cancelled Allied Plans from the Falaise Pocket to Operation Market Garden (p. 175) 3 September After the cancellation of Linnet Montgomery continued to look for opportunities to use the First Allied Airborne Army during 21st Army Group’s advance into the Low Countries. Although previous airborne plans had included river crossings as objectives, particularly Axehead and Linnet, even a cursory glance at the map confirms that the many rivers and canals in Holland and Belgium would inevitably become obstacles to the Allied rate of advance. As Anthony Tucker-Jones puts it in The Devil's Bridge: The German Victory at Arnhem, 1944, “Model, Student and Bittrich [the German Generals in charge of local forces], or more precisely their men, had performed miracles during the hard-fought battle for Arnhem. Stragglers, teenagers, trainees, old men and Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine staff somehow stopped three airborne, three infantry and one armored division. Forming ad hoc battle groups, they literally fought Operation Market Garden to a standstill. This was a quite remarkable achievement and represented a major blot on Field Marshal Montgomery’s reputation that he could never quite escape.” Tucker-Jones shows how Germany’s victory at Arnhem went far beyond Montgomery’s fatal underestimation of the Nazis’ will to fight. Monty's most notable mistake of all was his high-handed dismissal of the clear intelligence of Bittrich’s Panzer divisions being deployed right in the area of the attacks. Armored half tracks-mounted a 75mm, StuK 40 L/48,APCs mounted MG42s, or a 75mm PaK 42 L/70
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  1058. Dave Hack you are worse at commenting than Monty commanding if one can imagine The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth. Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine." Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
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  1071. Get your head wound looked at dave hack,then have some history read to you Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.*​ Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow" Monty admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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  1085. Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road. The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby The Guns at Last Light,page 282,by Rick Atkinson The new bridgehead over the Waal failed to uncork failed to uncork the advance to Arnhem as Montgomery had hoped. After a 35 hr delay at Nijmegen,XXX Corps vanguard sat for another 18hrs .Enemy raids on Hell's Highway played hob:reinforcements from the 43rd Division took 3 days to travel 60 miles in reaching the Irish Guards and 82nd Airborne .Gavin concluded after 4 yrs british veterans were excessively cautious,nurturing what he called "Why die now" sentiments.He found Colonel Tucker in a farmhouse near the rail bridge seething at the delay. "What in the hell are they doing,why the hell don't they get on to Arnhem" Tucker demanded. September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself.'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks' "Six Armies in Normandy" by John Keegan - Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. With the principal organizations scattered in far-flung locations they never met to coordinate and resolve Market Garden’s obvious flaws or question its contradictions Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Montgomery & his colleagues threw away all that they had learned since 1939 about the speed & reaction of Hitlers Army..Its brilliance at improvisation,its dogged skill in defense,its readiness to punish allied mistakes. Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'este - From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex No myths just the ones being made up by revisionists 7 decades after the facts, it was a crap plan by a small minded man.
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  1100. Correct,This operation was condemned at it's inception it shouldn't have been considered let alone launched. And good men paid the price for Monty and IKE ignoring the red flags Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p. 43 "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse." The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald Pages 199-200 Perhaps the real fault of the plan was overambition​.Yet all of the handicaps possibly could have been overcome had the British ground column been able to advance' as rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. Another glaring fault was dependence upon but one road.​ In any event, the ground troops were delayed for varying amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal bridge in Nijmegen. Combined with the kind of resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the West might be down but they were not out. page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be maintained. Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust." September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.329 On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. (ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet)
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  1115.  @brucebartup6161  troll? My Uncle was with the 12 armored Division under Gen. Patch so what . doesn't change the fact Monty got 1100 men killed - A-HOLE. From History net operation varsity allied airborne assault over the rhine river Some have speculated that the airborne phase of the assault may have been unnecessary for the success of the overall operation. Montgomery has been accused of using the airborne troops to ‘put on a good show’ and to further his own reputation. The Americans, on the other hand, saw Montgomery as a pompous and sought to enhance his public image and tried to take credit for success even when it was not due him. For Operation Varsity, the northern route into the industrial heart of Germany was now wide open. The cost had been high. The 6th Airborne had suffered 590 killed and another 710 wounded or missing. Several hundred of the missing later turned up to rejoin their units, however. The 17th Airborne had 430 killed, with 834 wounded and 81 missing. Casualties among the glider pilots and the troop plane pilots and crews included 91 killed, 280 wounded and 414 missing in action. Eighty planes were shot down, and only 172 of the 1,305 gliders that landed in Germany were later deemed salvageable. A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne 158 on D-Day. Operation Varsity, March 24, 1945, was the worst single day for Allied airborne troops. Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale! Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded.
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  1132. Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road. The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby From The Guns at Last Light,page 282,by Rick Atkinson The new bridgehead over the Waal failed to uncork failed to uncork the advance to Arnhem as Montgomery had hoped. After a 35 hr delay at Nijmegen,XXX Corps vanguard sat for another 18hrs .Enemy raids on Hell's Highway played hob:reinforcements from the 43rd Division took 3 days to travel 60 miles in reaching the Irish Guards and 82nd Airborne .Gavin concluded after 4 yrs British veterans were excessively cautious,nurturing what he called "Why die now" sentiments.He found Colonel Tucker in a farmhouse near the rail bridge seething at the delay. "What in the hell are they doing,why the hell don't they get on to Arnhem" Tucker demanded. From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders . Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening From It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks' From "Six Armies in Normandy" by John Keegan - Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. With the principal organizations scattered in far-flung locations they never met to coordinate and resolve Market Garden’s obvious flaws or question its contradictions From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Montgomery & his colleagues threw away all that they had learned since 1939 about the speed & reaction of Hitlers Army..Its brilliance at improvisation,its dogged skill in defense,its readiness to punish allied mistakes. From Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'este - From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex No myths just the ones being made up by revisionists 7 decades after the facts, it was a crap plan by a small minded man.
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  1142. Pretty straight forward little villa,go up there praisng your favorite poof Monty. And why are you soliticing another poster's approval? Hoping he comes to the same lopsided conclusions as yourself,when the post doesn't seem to indicate that at all This from The Dutch Review Allied forces had liberated the south of the Netherlands. But as the forces pushed further north, the failure of Operation Market Garden impeded their progress. The obvious and literal cause of the famine was a German blockade enacted in retaliation to a Dutch railway strike that aimed to help the Allied invasion of the country The Allied forces failed to seize a bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. They decided to focus on other parts of the liberation process first, including capturing the French ports of Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk. Their progress into Germany slowed down at the time because they couldn’t use the port of Antwerp How did people survive the Hunger Winter? Between 18,000 and 22,000 people died during the Hunger Winter, most of whom were older men. When we talk about survival rates, it’s important to remember that it was not just the supply of food hampered by the blockade. It was also the supply of heating fuel: coal.When it came to heating, people desperately burned furniture and dismantled whole houses to get fuel for their fires. Adults had to contend with only 1000 calories of food by the end of November 1944 — but that dropped to 580 calories a day by February 1945. Even the black market was empty of food. Antwerp wasn't opened because Monty never ordered it opened until his debacle failed
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  1143. little villa,If I agreed with you we’d both be wrong. Like you Monty never showed up so you both have that going for you. When mum visits you over there at the center have her read you these below - it's in English With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  1151.  @thevillaaston7811  Going to shit on more GIs today asshole like you have since 2013 or was that 2010 from memory tell that tale you cad. And produce the post where I bad mouthed cancer suffers. Like every thing else you twist that to fit your demented narrative. The fact is you're a steaming pile and you know it to gain favor with other revisionists. Ya 48-50 GIs got killed crossing the Waal and of the 138 wounded many more died later and according to knobs like You they're at fault. Ya regale for us VILE how Dunkirk was the fault of French/Belgians/Dutch.And Market Garden is the fault of the GIs/Poles/Canadians. And Singapore that of the New Zealanders/Aussies. While for 4 years Monty couldn't cross his own channel and you badmouth/back stab those who so stupidly came 3,500 miles in ships loaded with supplies/provisions/men/materiel to help the Crown with it's mess. Your "LORD" Carrington sat on his ass while the 82nd wanted to carry the fight forward. Go watch the BBC Docu on the operation or read "It Never Snows in September" the Germans shed light on it also. Big difference in a so called Field Marshall that never showed up as a real one in the form of Model who conducted a clinic in modern mobile warfare. As a Dutch poster who has studied the battle said Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November..Probably because unlike Monty ,Model was an actuall Field Marshall Montgomery was influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..."
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  1164. Iriving Burns you indoctrinated dweeb,have your handler at the group home there get you out into the court yard and off your ample backside .Every senior officer blasted Bernard for it after he demanded and recieved top priority .No one was shocked the stammering little snot got worked - AGAIN as before The Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe 11 September 1941-8 May 1945 “There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, informed me that at General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings. I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division, presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission. I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, he still insists, we will go in as planned. The Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe 3 October 1941-8 May 1945Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton It absolutely was a plea to change the order. A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit *Arnhem,by William Buckingham,PHD;p.489-90*​ The scapegoating of Sosabowski and his men was a spiteful,unwarranted and unforgivable slur on a competant,conscientious commander whose only crime was to refuse to play Whitehall politics to Brownings satisfaction, and upon the courageous men whose only failing was an inability to walk on water The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control, specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road Bridge The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September,after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM) The Guards Armored did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition.Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs. The same lack of urgency was on display when the Grenadier Guards on the evening of 20 September with the North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed
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  1165. Oh Johnny there's more,see when you come in from the land of make believe even the disadvantaged like you can learn something.Not good Johnny not good Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak Fancy some more? More from Bernard from his Memoirs, Monty says: [quote] “My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles, and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could reorganise sufficiently to stop us. Montgomery Memoirs page 267; [quote] “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1 Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so” [end quote]
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  1171. Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945.By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  1180. From the Top,even Brooke couldn't defend him From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.*Alan Brooke* was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay he wrote in his diary.Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  1185. thicko that's a lie I left the evidence but being bent and in the government home for the unfortunatesyou keep repeating drivel.Monty was going to get sacked for wanting to fall back then claiming he did it anything.The same little coward that didn't even show up at Monty Garden wanted to fall back THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Montgomery's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On that day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. - German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. - The Americans suffered 75,482 dead,wounded and missing - The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed. Shameful oh and the USA had to supply the trucks as this happened - AGAIN Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.[1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further. [1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group" p.47
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  1186. thicko that's a lie I left the evidence but being bent and in the government home for the unfortunatesyou keep repeating drivel.Monty was going to get sacked for wanting to fall back then claiming he did it anything.The same little coward that didn't even show up at Monty Garden wanted to fall back THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Montgomery's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On that day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled. - German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing. - The Americans suffered 75,482 dead,wounded and missing - The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed. Shameful oh and the USA had to supply the trucks as this happened - AGAIN Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.[1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further. [1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
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  1200. "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....." Monty later admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 *In his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway." For not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. *Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply . Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, p. 151 - Montgomery:"1st Army have withdrawn 6th Division - ready to launch attack to the Rhine with British 2nd Army on October 12th." Ramsay: this afforded me the que I needed to lambaste him for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery .Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply . Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow" Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
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  1202. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 437 Bedell Smith the showed De Guingand in strict confidence a telegram from Marshall to Eisenhower saying that it would be quite unacceptable to give Montgomery command of any substantial American Forces.He informed Eisenhower that the latter had the full confidence of the President himself and the whole of America in handling the campaign.DeGuingand then saw Eisenhower who mentioned the damage being done by Montgomery's indiscreet remarks.Eisenhower explained he was tired of the whole business (Montgomery's behavior) and that it was "now a matter for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a decision"The threat was clear;either he or Montgomery would have to be removed,and given Marshall's forthright support for the Supreme Commander,it was obvious that it was Montgomery who would have to go.Eisenhower had finally reached the point of no return with Montgomery.Many commentators and historians have expressed surprise that he had been so patient. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 438 DeGuingand considered this deposition "too frightful to contemplate" and asked IKE a stay of execution for 24 hrs so that he could speak to Monty.When Freddie returned to Monty and told him he might have to go "he was genuinely and completely taken by surprise and found it difficult to grasp.Montgomery's bluff,after all his arguments and threats had finally been called."What shall I do,Freddie? he asked his Chief of Staff,and DeGuingand drafted a placatory message which Montgomery duly signed.Ultimately as on so many other times during the war,it was Eisenhower who made the relationship work.Montgomery later related to Brooke that the command question was settled and that it would be quite useless to open it up again - which what was preciously what Brooke had previously told him. From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 477 Brooke and the other chiefs of staff should never have allowed Churchill to dictate minor detail,nor to sack Generals and Admirals on a whim(the Air Marshalls got off lightly). Probably the worst example of picking the wrong man and backing him come what may,was in Brooke's constant support for Montgomery,who should have been dismissed once it became clear that he could not operate in a coalition environment,but whose retention soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War
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  1210. https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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  1227. Good Post though 2 yrs old I had read his memoirs also.Ramsay was as good as they came.Just a few gleanings.He had planned much of the D-Day landings and had great insight into tactical and logistical manners understanding what was needed moving forward. Much of SHAEF evidently was against OMG The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay,p.152 - On the eve of the Arnhem Operation Montgomery had made the following entry into the 21st Army Group log: from a purely British point of view Antwerp had never been a vital necessity. The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, p. 151 - Montgomery:"1st Army have withdrawn 6th Division - ready to launch attack to the Rhine with British 2nd Army on October 12th."(Author's Footnote p.152 - This indicates that even after the failure,Montgomery still intended to move toward the Ruhr before opening the Scheldt) Ramsay: this afforded me the que I needed to lambaste him for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed .Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply .Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay p. 159 "the Army was far behind organising as I knew they would be as they entirely under estimated their task and Monty had not given the Canadians sufficient support for the work (Author's Footnote In fact ,Montgomery had finally committed himself without reservation to the Scheldt campaign in a directive issued on 16 October, after receiving 3 "hurry up" messages from Eisenhower during the previous week)
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  1228. sources oh really the river crossing in broad daylight that killed 89 and wounded 151 of the 82nd in what Horrocks callant the most gallant attack he witnessed in the whole of the war. How can you get a mouth full of of food with your head up bernard's backside? Not that you'd complain about that How about some academia instead of arses like dave hac Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594. Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  1236. revisionist bullshit The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed From With Prejudice, by Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsay ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" - Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
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  1238. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations in person Monty captured neither the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex. British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
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  1240. dave try some actual history Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Capt. David Fraser who as a Grenadier took part in the Battle of Nijmegen wrote later "with out Antwerp, I do not believe that Market Garden could possibly have been exploited for the purpose for which it was devised. Operation Market Garden was as an exact sense ,futile .It was thoroughly a bad idea, badly planned and only tragically redeemed by the outstanding courage of those who executed it". He also believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Fraser recalled in his memoirs "Nevertheless I remember the impressive silhouette of the long bridge across the Maas (Meuse) at Grave. This had been captured by the American airborne troops and took us across the first main water obstacle at about ten o’clock in the morning of 19th September. By then the operation had been running for over forty hours and was already well behind schedule." -Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.
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  1244. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  1248. Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary. From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co.1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal. From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  1255. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113​ yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it." Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance" Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.196 Lift details are some what of technical character which is why few historians address them in any detail.They concern time involved in turning around aircraft for the 2nd & 3rd lifts, the range from UK bases to their objectives in Holland,weather an visibility conditions and the co-ordination of the air lift with fighter Escort and Flak suppression operations. All of these were interlinked. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.198 At the beginning of September 1944 Lt.General Brereton had already warned Eisenhower that it would be very difficult to stage an airborne operation as far east as the Rhine River from bases in the UK (SHAEF in a memorandum)
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  1262. he only won with overwhelming supplies in men,materiel and munitions.Even you could have won in N.Africa Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role. -Montgomery was very much a set-piece general whose mental rigidity and egotism left him unable to respond when battles didn't go exactly as he planned.And whose skills and abilities were grossly inflated by the British press and political leadership.Montgomery who was busy fighting with set piece tactics from the last war; Montgomery never learned the tactics of high speed mobile warfare.Unfortunately, Bradley and Eisenhower most probably aquiesed to Mongomery's demand for the sake of Allied unity.ButMonty, was lacking the flexibility for independent thinking necessary to adapt to changing conditions. . -(Chapter 10: General Montgomery's Bitter Pills, page 312) I would submit that Prime Minister Churchill and the CIGS Allen Brooke were culpable in this ruse as well, as they were committed to ensuring the press showed the British in the best possible light. Having the Americans close the Gap, could well have finished the war early and showed the British to be struggling with manpower and unable to compete in a mechanized, mobile war, where the Americans truly were the masters. -American commanders Eisenhower and Bradley covering for Montgomery in the interest of harmony in the allies camp.it was Monty's bruised ego that he would not permit the Americans (and Patton in particular) to be praised for what his British 21st Army Group had failed to accomplish. Monty's efforts to attack south and close the gap were curiously half-hearted. Rather than a full-blooded push using his experienced British divisions, Monty entrusted the effort to two Canadian and Polish units in which he had shown little prior confidence. Why? Certainly, Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton by both American and British press and the innuendo that Monty's troops weren't doing their part. -Montgomery's campaign shortcomings which led to this result were manifested in his failure to capture Caen and the Port of Antwerp on the allied timetable, his failure to close the Falaise Gap until it was too late, and his carefully orchestrated "showcase" British 2nd Army crossing of the Rhine (when elements of Patton's 3rd Army and General Courtney Hodge's U.S. 1st Army were already across). Montgomery's crossing, which was augmented by U.S. Airborne troops, resulted in some 5,000 allied casualties.
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  1269. What report?From whom - source please From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later * From page 19* ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp* From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." *He didn't defeat squat,in the desert,Normandy,Netherlands or the Ardennes he was along for the ride.When auchinlech was fired Monty didn't move.Between the Navy,Air Corp,ULTRA and the US Army & supplies he simply hitched a ride.Ike knowingly kept the British relevant in order to keep them in the alliance so that American soldiers would not have to shoulder the entire casualty burden on the Western Front. As Bradley said, Montgomery rarely won a battle any other competent general wouldn't have won as well or better. Gelb also notes, that Montgomery was not only famously insensitive and deliberately insulting to his brothers in arms, but he was capable of outright lies if he thought it would elevate him above potential rivals
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  1270.  @6handicap604  some great insight and responses,Johnny reads from the Cornhole Chronicles and pulls facts from his ample backside From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group.IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign.Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies.IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks, yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public ,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war. "Monty's memoirs are the greatest work of fiction since chaste and fidelity were added to the French marriage vows"
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  1273. The evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered? The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles As the Dutch poster Oddball SOK stated on this board Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944. So tell me, how come ?How come the Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Monty/Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
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  1293. No they didn't arrive on time they only made 7 miles the 1st day.And the bridge at son was blown up.Seriously, get lost kid, go away. You're obviously British and are being patriotic about this Arnhem, Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, p. 333-Tom Hoare,who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords, were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. *"There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major less than charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces. Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all."
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  1294. Oh lookie monty fanbois taking a break from taking a break - you windbags have lied once and that has been continuously Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow" Monty admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth
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  1297. This monty circle jerk is laughable go across the channel and ask the euros - shouldn't take you 4 yrs like it did monty. But burns still has his restraining order and ankle monitor so who knows The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be be Patton in Lorraine,Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson) Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September,Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson) Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"
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  1299. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. Also the Germans falling back on their stores of Men,material,tanks and artillary,while the allied port to support this debacle wasn't even open ♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. ♦The Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that get you the title of Field Marshall ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site? ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job
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  1307. And it was very clear from the beginning that only one drop a day was doable as there were simply not enough trained air crews/pilots/planes to go around because of: OMG = Operation Monty Garden or more appropriately "Oh My God" ♦There was already 24/7 strategic bombing going on of the Reich and Bomber Harris and Hap Arnold were not cutting their crews for Monty or anyone else ♦OMGwas cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications. ♦D-Day had 30 mile flights across the Channel. ♦Market Garden had 300 mile flights(one way) into NE Netherlands ♦D-Day had 900 flights. Market Garden had 1600 Flights ♦D-Day was June 6th.Market Garden was September 17th And had over 2 hrs less daylight to do all that in ♦So there were 700 MORE FLIGHTS than D-Day. They were 300 miles away in North East Netherlands not 30 miles across a channel. And 2 hrs less daylight to do it in. SMDH With Monty's pathetic plan, the HEER only needed to focus on a single road and cut it off. More over , thanks to Monty , the allies were very lacking supplies , which if he had been clearing out the Germans north of Antwerp that was agreed to , it could by now not only supply him , but the American armies as well. ♦Ambition over reaching capability, shameful but expected With that in mind this is Montgomery's fault through and through, This comes back to bite Monty in the ass, this is not Eisenhower's or Gavin's fault , the Americans halted 2 other US armies and gave ALL of the supplies to one of his allies instead , in this case Montgomery , to execute his operation to end the war by Christmas. The Folly of Generals, by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be Patton in Lorraine, Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem.
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  1310. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309-310. The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs*​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent.If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night
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  1316. BurnHole It seems you and history have but a fleeting acquaintance From The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks. * https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1* Churchill warned Roosevelt that his country would not be able to pay cash for military supplies or shipping much longer https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc Why couldn’t Britain pay?Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States. From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources. But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most. The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
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  1317. *https://scarfandgoggles.wordpress.com/tag/100-octane/ * 100 Octane fuel and the Battle of Britain from the Scarf and Goggles Social Club March 2019 The Royal Air Force had agreed to a limited supply of 100-octane fuel in 1938, but the outbreak of war placed supply routes under threat until the USA invoked a revised Neutrality Act in late 1939; allowing large quantities of 100-octane fuel to be shipped from the United States. Those supplies began to reach front-line squadrons in bulk through the first half of 1940 and would see its first use in battle in defending the evacuation of Dunkirk, immediately prior to the Battle of Britain.Delivering those supplies was a fleet of tankers that was forced to brave not only the rigours of the North Atlantic but also the concentrated attacks of submarine and surface vessels. In total 29 fuel and oil tankers were sunk in the Atlantic during the period of the Battle of Britain, with the loss of 260 merchant sailors https://www.forces.net/heritage/history/battle-britain-inside-story-how-we-beat-luftwaffe 100 octane and the Battle of Britain part two “The near parity of Spitfire and Bf 109 should take into account the fact that the Germans used 87 octane fuel while by the time of the Battle of Britain, the RAF had overcome the limitations of the Neutrality Act to secure from the United States supplies of incomparably superior 100 octane fuel."This vastly improved the performance of the (Spitfire’s) Merlin engine, particularly the rate of climb. Speed was also improved.”
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  1318. Middle east oild fields weren't producing much back then you got most of your petrol from guess where? https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee120/book/export/html/237 Americans Fuel Britain’s War Needs The two critical questions of importance to Britain for war with the Germans were whether oil would be available and if they could pay for it. The United States was responsible for two-thirds of total world production and, therefore, the answer to whether oil would be available was yes.To help Britain overcome the question of payment on March 1941, the Lend Lease was instituted. This removed the problem of finance as a constraint on American supply to Britain, since, with the Lend Lease, American oil could now be lent and repaid later. The neutrality legislation which had placed restrictions on the shipment of supplies was also gradually lifted to help loosen restrictions on shipment of supplies to Britain. Thus, by spring 1941, all the important steps had been taken to ensure adequate flow of oil from America to Britain In May 1941, even while the US was not yet in the war, Roosevelt appointed Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to the additional position of Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, becoming once again the nation’s top oil man, or Oil Czar. Ickes had to turn around an industry that was coping with surplus to one that would maximize output and avert shortage. He had a huge liability, as the oil industry detested him from the previous encounters. While he had come to their aid in 1933, he subsequently had become very critical of the industry. Mobilizing the oil industry into one giant organization under government direction had been done quickly and efficiently in Britain but turned out to be different and difficult in the US. Ickes, however, managed to work closely and pragmatically with the industry and succeeded in disarming the hostility and ensuring effective cooperation in mobilizing the industry. Harold Ickes’ hand was strengthened when he was promoted to Petroleum Administrator for War (PAW) from Petroleum Coordinator while still Secretary of interior. Even as PAW, Ickes realized that, unlike the case in Britain, coordinating unity among the many competing US forces (Congress, the Administration, the companies, the press, etc.) in the US was very difficult. He managed to gradually establish an effective government-industry partnership and sought antitrust exemption from the Justice Department. Although there were temporary shortages, there was never a serious oil supply crisis in the US. The overall production record in the US was quite good - from 1940-1945, America’s overall production increased by 30% from 3.7 million barrels per day to 4.7 million barrels per day. Meanwhile, between December 1941 and August 1945, the Allies consumed 7 billion barrels of oil, 6 billion of which came from the United States It is also interesting to note that the wartime oil output was more than ¼ of all oil produced in the US from the time of Colonel Drake to 1941!
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  1322. From Six Armies in Normandy,by John Keegan In just 30 days, Patton finished his sweep across France and neared Germany. The Third Army had exhausted its fuel supplies and ground to a halt near the border in early September.Allied supplies had been redirected northward for the normally cautious General Montgomery’s reckless Market Garden gambit. That proved a horrible scheme to leapfrog over the bridges of the Rhine River; it devoured Allied blood and treasure, and accomplished almost nothing in return. Meanwhile, the cutoff of Patton’s supplies would prove disastrous Scattered and fleeing German forces regrouped. Their resistance stiffened as the weather grew worse and as shortened supply lines began to favor the defense. There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration: -The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. -The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. -General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps. In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges. -Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem. -Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. -Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway, the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. *Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. "*. . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area." There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area _Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, “The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.” IKE even stopped the Southern Thrust (the successful one) to support the ingate and he still faffed it
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  1330. The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." ( from Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard Eisenhower's Armies, by Dr Niall Barr, page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. "During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place" Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..... "The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knockout blow." Foot Note: ("Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219") How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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  1341. Monty didn't even show and after the war admitted 'A bad mistake on my part". He told IKE the Air marshalls were all on board when in fact they hadn't been consulted. He told the Air marshalls Ike agreed with him and that's an order ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p49 Major General Richard Gale who converted the British Airborne from a small group of Raiders into a conventional parachute brigade in confidence told Major G.G.Norton in the '70s then curator of the Airborne Forces Museum "that he would rather have resigned his command than execute MARKET as it was foisted on Urquhart" .It is unclear if Gale made his views clear to Browning at the time *Eisenhower's Lieutenants p.310 by Russell Weigley*​ "General Browning, whose British Airborne Corps would be located in the 82nds sector...as late as the afternoon of D plus 1 rejected a plan for a strong effort against the Nijmegen rail and highway bridges and instructed the 82nd to concentrate on holding the Groesbeek Heights instead." Sabastian Ritchie - "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glarying weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him* saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him .Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. With the principal organizations scattered in far-flung locations they never met to coordinate and resolve Market Garden’s obvious flaws or question its contradictions.
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  1342.  @warspite1807  Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcoverby Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears. Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.' How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
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  1348. Bernard wasn't there until after hostilities,like showing up after the Funeral The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports. He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders; he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy. Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 292 Despite Montgomery's message to IKE that he thought there was still a "sporting chance" of taking the bridge at Arnhem he must have sensed by then that a terrible disaster was taking place,which would considerably damage his reputation.After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles.And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.The very next day Monty wrote in his diary "I am very doubtful now if 1st airborne will be able to hold out and we may have to withdraw them". And the fact he never visited Horrocks during the entire battle confirms the impression that he was keeping his distance,a rare event for the "Master" A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
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  1358. D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263-264 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns.Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved .Conningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African campaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit .Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields. Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook.Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power. D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p185 The RAF was furious especially when Montgomery pretended that everything had gone according to plan. ALL air preparations had been calculated on establishing forward airbases for Spitfires and Typhoons with in a few days Now because of the shallow depth of the the beach head,any airfield they built would be well within the range of German Artillery.*There was little room left for fuel depots,supply dumps.repair workshops,base camps,field hospitals and vehicle parks.Almost every orchard and field in the area was crammed. *"The British were so crowded they overflowed in to our area" Bradley later stated a tactical remark concealing his degree of frustration Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p 326 Apart from having secured the beachhead,little else Monty was doing was working .No one forgot his promise about how quickly Caen would fall to him - over a month would pass before he took it or how he would advance steadily to places by anything like the dates he predicted Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p 331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
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  1359. D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p 320-21 Field Marshall Brooke flew to France at midday to see Monty. The gulf between the claims he made before the operations began and the reality of the situation revealed after his press conference was becoming a major embarrassment.Journalists thru back at him what they had been told before the offensive.On July 20 Operation Goodwood was called off officially. For the troops who had taken part the situation was a bitter disappointment after all the promises* My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher "Lack of progress on the British front at Caen has produced BBC coverage that is almost exclusively American.The British Public has become so annoyed at the coverage of events in France that our British hostess switched off the radio while her American Officer guests were listening to the late news" Triumph and Tragedy:The Second World War by Winston Churchill. Winston S Churchill to General Montgomery:"For my own secret information,I should like to know whether the attacks you spoke of to me,or variants of them,*are going to come off* .It certainly seems important to the British Army to strike hard and win through otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies that which will lead to dangerous recrimination The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122 The British had only advanced 6 miles and taken 2,000 prisoners by July 20th.Their casualties totaled more than 4,000 men and about 500 tanks,more than 1/3 of all the tanks brought to Normandy This is nowhere near the results Montgomery had led everyone to expect The discontent was wide spread many senior Allied leaders felt they had been had,taken by promises Montgomery had no intention of fufilling or had been unable to fufill.Harry Butcher Eisenhower's aide said others were discussing "who would succeed Monty when he was sacked" The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122-23 Goodwood damaged Monty's prestige and he never fully recovered.Eisenhower was "disappointed and angered" by the difference between Montgomery's promise and his performance Air Marshall Tedder "redoubled" because Monty had deceived the Air Forces
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  1366. Irving Burns that's horseshit leave the link or STFU. The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy. How come Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November Three miles from the start panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans blocking the road and stopping the column.General Brian Horrocks and Col. Joe Vandeleur waited for the planes to fly over at 1400 hrs on the 17th.Did they somehow think they would catch up to them when their loads were dropped? After stopping just 4 hrs later.Montgomery owns this disaster. He would have been relieved in the US Army,shot in Germany or Russia This is from Montgomery Memoirs Chapter 16 "My PLAN was to drive hard for the Rhine across all obstacles. para 4 I have already explained the direction of the thrust would be towards Arnhem and why. The essential feature of the PLAN was the laying of a carpet of airborne forces across five major water obstacles which existed on the general axis of the main road through Eindhoven to Uden, Grave , Nijmegen and thence to Arnhem" Clearly Montgomery stated it was his Plan not just an idea.How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
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  1375. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Monty even admitted - a bad mistake on my part From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"  From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
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  1395. @Johnny Carroll I've already ran Vile Asston thru with the logistics before but the oozing boil conveniently gets amnesia.There were over 2 less hours sunlight on September 17 than on June 6th there were 700 more flights and not right across the channel into France but up into N.E.Netherlands,so reality exists.Yet crickets on why Walter Model a real Field Marshall was there to direct in person and Bernard was no where around for Monty Garden. Read this book it explains alot From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. The key issue was lack of natural illumination, the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days) From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke.It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so. Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Compant HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
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  1400. Monty the pathetic show pony that had demanded the debacle then disappeared. All 3 Top Commanders under Monty point right at him Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
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  1401. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan Monty owns this disaster He campaigned for and got it,BTW he never showed up on the front like the Real Field Marshall Model .When your done cleaning your tooth with your finger try flipping the pages of a history book But this is all still on Monty problems arose everywhere that either he or his plans were involved. Monty didn't show up to direct his own operations as it was coming apart rather quickly and by the seams Max Hastings The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945; referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  1420. Slappy so which one of theses guys who all state the same thing is wrong.Brooke,Tedder,Ramsay?Unlike you they were there Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  1421. Glowing tributes,LMAO,by the ill informed,O'Connor,Auchinleck,Slim,Tedder,Ramsey,Conningham,Adml Cunningham - all infinitely better officers than the bragging laggard Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333. Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle. "There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was." The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 ​Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
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  1423. Um No Monty was suppose to capture messina, and block the straight but as is well known after Palermo Patton had to take Messina also From The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.61 "on the northern shore of Sicily,Patton drove his units to Messina, They reached the city several hours before the British appeared on the scene .Patton proved their merit and excellent ability in combat. From The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p 62-63*​ Montgomery's 8th Army crossed the Straight of Messina from Sicliy to the Italian toe,then made slow progress in the mountainous terrain.A British Division was ferried to the heel,where Italians helped the soldiers disembark.Clark's 5th U.S. Army assaulted the beaches around Salerno. The Germans massed against Clark and came close to driving his men from the shore .As the battle raged 2 conditions quite apart from the combat infuriated Clark. -First instead of hurrying up the Italian boot to help Clark,Montgomery seemed to dawdle in the toe,making at best a leisurely advance,pausing from time to time to rest and reorganise his troops. - Second,a public relations office in Alexanders headquarters,which issued periodic advisories to guide news paper coorespondents called for them to "play up" Montgomery. A letter from Montgomery several days later hardly improved Clark's disposition. "it looks as if you may be having not too good a time," Monty had written, "and I do hope that all will go well with you.We are on the way to lend a hand".Clark replied in sarcastic fashion "it will be a pleasure to see you again at an early date" and then added "please accept my appreciation for your assistance by your skillful and rapid advance". But then Clark added "situation here well in hand" Clark's army won his battle at Salerno and opened up the toe for Montgomery .As the Germans withdrew slowly to the North so in Italy the 47 yr old Mark Clark took Salerno,Naples & Rome and Monty lost Palermo/Messina to Patton in Sicily. See what happens when he wasn't given preference even though Alexander gave him the inside roads in Sicily
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  1425. Go away kid your British and obviously being nationalistic Patton schooled your hero on Sicily and the anemic Mark Clark even out performed the proven berk in italy.Neither of those men got driven off off the continent or waited 4 yrs to come back but had to come 3,500 miles to escort the plodding Monty across.Tell your stories to Europe who saw those backsides beating it up the gangplanks at Dunkirk having to cover the retreat.Your PM emphatically begged and cajoled the POTUS to get involved in fact stated when asked how he planned to win the war - "I shall drag in the United States".Since you obviously don't go to the Library here's what you'll find if you did All these men were there From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 254 In terms of the Anglo-American divide the Sicilian episode demonstrated that antagonism was not confined to American officers. Montgomery's behavior made enemies of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder as well as their staffs.The much vaunted rivalry between Patton and Montgomery was minor compared to the depths hostility that had developed with the Royal Air Force*Tedder told Patton that Monty was "a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of himself as Napoleon - he is not" Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..." Yet with the notable exception of the allies decisive November 1942 victory at El Alamein,where air cover and naval blockade of German supplies,plus ULTRA weighed heavily - the battlefield records of the “combat experienced” British commanders prior to mid-1944 featured little to brag about From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page320 The poor performance of the British 2nd Army in Normandy had tied Monty's hands. He did not expect the Germans to be that good. But when the Americans broke the German lines at St Lo instead of turning the Americans loose on the open German flank,Montgomery stopped the Americans at Argentan and sent them North east to Paris-orleans gap.There were simply too many bitter pills on Montgomery's desk. From Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,p 438 Montgomery had served the Allied cause well during the Battle of the Bulge.But his egotism and irrepressible tactlessness did neither himself or Allied unity any good at a critical moment when important decisions affecting both him and it were about to be made.The military attache' at the American Embassy in London reported back to Washington "I have the strong impression that most British Officers,including many in the influential War Office are much less enthusiastic over Montgomery than is the British Public*. *Lord Ismay in the House of Commons expressed the wish that someone would "muzzle" or better still chloroform Monty. "I have come to the conclusion that his love of publicity is a disease,like alcoholism or taking drugs and that it sends him equally mad."
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  1433. Sorry churchill almost removed him for not only being ineffective but not reporting events accurately to cover up his mistakes and lack of accomplishments D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p183-84 Any thought of pivoting on Caen as Montgomery had claimed,had become impossible in the 1st few days a pattern of attrition had been established. Monty had to change his approach,although he refused to admit this later.On June 11 after a meeting with Bradley Monty wrote DeGuingand that his objective "was to pull the germans on to 2nd Army so that the US 1st Army could extend & expand. this rather more modest assessment was hardly in keeping with his earlier pugnacious declarations! Inaction and a defensive mentality are criminal in any officer - however Senior He had told this to senior Officers 2 months before the invasion and "Every officer & man must be enthusiastic for the fight and have the light of battle in his eyes The problem was that Montgomery partly for reasons of morale partly for pride could not admit that any of his plans had gone wrong. He created resentment among his colleages by claiming that he always intended to pull the bulk of the Panzer Divisions on to his front,to give the Americans the great chance of a break out. ​ D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p195 There had been mutterings about the uselessness of British Tanks before the Invasion.Colonel Lord Cranley was obliged to address the men on the subject.he was quite aware of of the faults in out tanks "but,it's no good grousing as we would get no others so we make the best of things".The diary of a Britsh officer in Hinde's brigade read on Sunday june 11 "the squadron left to try to take a position and had to return rapidly losing 4 tanks. After 4 years of preparation for the invasion why are our tanks so inferior" D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p229 Eisenhower was fuming with impatience,yet Monty refused to be hurried and 21st Army HQ provided SHAEF with little information.Montgomery had mentioned to Dempsey on quite a few occasions "there's no need to tell IKE". Monty liked to keep objectives vague,often with metaphors,so if there was a breakout he could claim credit for it and if the operation ran into the sand he could say that they had simply been tying down the German forces to help out the Americans From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 234-35 Eisenhower's frustration with Montgomery is not hard to understand.The confident messages had been sending out about a "showdown" simply did not tally with the truth. From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263-264 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns.Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved .Conningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African campaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit .Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields.
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  1434. From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p 306 On July 14th Montgomery wrote to Field marshall Alan Brooke saying that "the time has come to have a real Showdown on the eastern flank". Then the very next day he gave Dempsey and O'Connor a revised directive.This was more modest in it's objectives.He wanted to advance only a 3rd of the way to Falaise and then see how things stood.This may have well been more realistic assessment of what was possible, yet Monty never told Eisenhower and he never informed his own 21st Army HQ. The consequences would be disasterous for Montgomery's reputation and credibility From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p 319 - at 1600 hrs Monty signaled Field Marshall Brooke operations this morning a complete success the effect of the bombing decisive and the spectacle terrific.......situation very promising and it is difficult to see what the enemy can do at the present Few enemy tanks met so far and no,repeat no mines" He went on to claim quite erroneously that the 11th armored had reached Tilly-la-Campagne,and that the Guars Armored had taken Vimont .It was one thing to to have mislead Brooke,but he had issued a similar commonuque to the BBC and gave a press conference .One of Montgomery's Brigadiers he talked to the assembled journalists "like children".This was to produce a bitter backlash. TheBritish lost nearly 200 tanks that day.Fortunately there were 500 in reserve From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p 320-21 Gen.Eberbach was concerned by the gap between Troarn and Emieville'.Luckily for him the British had not spotted."The enmy needed only to march in that direction then there would have been a breakthrough" Once the darkness had fell according to Eberbach,"the British continued to stay immobile,as if a miricale had happened" Field Marshall Brooke flew to France at midday,when he saw Monty after lunch he "found him in grand form and delighted with his success east of Caen".Perhaps Monty was putting on a brave front.The gulf between the claims he made before the operations began and the reality of the situation revealed after his press conference was becoming a major embarrassment.Journalists thru back at him what they had been told before the offensive. On July 20 Operation Goodwood was called off officially. For the troops who had taken part the situation was a bitter disappointment after all the promises
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  1442. BURNS - Monty planned dieppe and when you clean his cack out of your nationalistic eye sockets then you may use the address bar in front of your face to relieve me from furthering your education.Burns has been pissing on the honor of the GIs for years and the last couple of years,he's been demolished with facts .Here is some of your troubleed tarts handiwork Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...." From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves.Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke Again,The pinhead blasted his last chance to be relevant .It Took 6 months - 6 months for the Rube to cross a river after his 1st attempt.The US wet nursed the failure Montgomery by continually lend him the 1st and 9th Armies and he was still the last to cross the Rhine - just like the channel but that took 4 years.Guess that's military accomplishment in London - no where else.He also blamed the canadians for being slow opening Antwerp.When in fact he had never explicitly ordered them until after his debacle At Market garden.Why don't you Burns read my post from Historians that are acclaimed
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  1444. The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy Horrocks was behind and he knew it and Roy Urquhart got stuck in an attic in OOsterbeek for a day and missed contact with his troops for two - you moron *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred) Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road. From Six Armies in Normandy,by John Keegan In just 30 days, Patton finished his sweep across France and neared Germany. The Third Army had exhausted its fuel supplies and ground to a halt near the border in early September.Allied supplies had been redirected northward for the normally cautious General Montgomery’s reckless Market Garden gambit. That proved a horrible scheme to leapfrog over the bridges of the Rhine River; it devoured Allied blood and treasure, and accomplished almost nothing in return Meanwhile, the cutoff of Patton’s supplies would prove disastrous Scattered and fleeing German forces regrouped. Their resistance stiffened as the weather grew worse and as shortened supply lines began to favor the defense.
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  1449. I should be charging for this,have the ward boy bust that boil between your ears,LMAO Burns The United States Army,Bedell-Smith,ULTRA,a Pulitzer Prize Winner and even Monty say you are full of shit AGAIN Burns Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald Page122 By 10 September, the day when General Eisenhower approved the operation, the British had remarked that "Dutch Resistance sources report that battered panzer formations have been sent to Holland to refit, and mention Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception areas." 9 A few days later the SHAEF G-2 announced that these panzer formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division and presumably the 10th SS Panzer Division. Page 143The 9th SS Panzer was the stronger with 1 armored infantry regiment, 1 artillery battalion, 2 assault gun batteries, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 company of Panther (Mark V) tanks, and increments Of engineers and antiaircraft troops. The 10th SS Panzer probably had 1 armored infantry regiment, 2 artillery battalions, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 engineer battalion, and 1 anti aircraft battalion. Page 156The possibility of counterattack from this direction took on added credence from the Dutch resistance reports of panzer formations assembling in the Netherlands. The 82d Airborne Division was led to believe that this armor was concentrating in the Reichswald. This information became "a major and pressing element in the predrop picture of German forces From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th &10th* Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" Retreat to the Reich from Stackpole Military History Series and gives an account of how many Panther Tanks both the 9th and 10th SS had just before Market-Garden:7 Sept,1944 Page 243 The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, which was commanded by 31 year old Lieutenant Colonel Walter Harzer, had 3,500 men,five tanks plus assualt guns The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which was led by 38 year old SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz Harmel, had 6,000 men,20 Panther Tanks, 40 armored personal carriers, and several guns (both flak and howitzers) That's 25 tanks and 40 APC with 20mms mounted with Flak & Howitzers on Sept 7th as ULTRA reported History of War .Org Reports by Dutch resistance & aerial photos indicated armored formations. Maj.Brian Urquhart Chief of Intel.British 1st Airborne Corp commented - "There,in the photos,I could clearly see tanks,if not on the very Arnhem landing & drop zones then certainly close to them" .He became convinced that the plan was critically flawed, and attempted to persuade his superiors to modify or abort their plans in light of crucial information obtained from aerial reconnaissance and the resistance.Major Urquhart was visited by a Medical officer whom suggested he take some sick leave. - From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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  1451.  @johnburns4017  references were given.Brooke,Ramsey,Tedder all British blamed Monty.Bedell-Smith,ULTRA and Brian Urquhart who became under Secretary of the UN all said Monty ignored every one in his last pitiful grasp for glory. Here's Monty's sodiers,I've printed these over 1 hundred times you troll Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945 .By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, Monty degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker.With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British*1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ * From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  1452.  @derekhooker7086  did you read what pathetic bullshit this asshole writes.He gets blasted and runs to another thread - real slander.I leave direct quotes from Hisrorians/Authors and he pulls opinions out of his rather robust and disgusting backside British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945; referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force over 60 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. *The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
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  1453. Look here Field Marshall Alan Brooke blamed Monty as did and Admiral Ramsey and an Air Marshall Tedder From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding"a bad mistake on my part" From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly,that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."*
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  1455. AGAIN Burns from the BBC,Everything you write is certifiable bullshit everything,About antwerp and XXX Corp https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Even the germans knew XXX Corp tanks were slow From 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war, *why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further*The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself.'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'- From "It Never Snows in September" page 307 Robert Kershaw. Market-Garden was condemned therefore,to move in the Allies favor only at XXX Corps laborious pace through the airborne corridor.Progress was made difficult and the road cut on at least 2 occasions by the sudden deployment of newly arrived German Panzer & infantry forces. The United States Army Center of Military History,The United States Army,The Sigrfied Line CampaignPage174 Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on ArnhemCounting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem
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  1456. There you go BURNS Monty and Student(along with Browning and Brererton) blaming the slowness of the XXX Corp advance - but it was still Monty's fault as Allied HQ reasoned From Market Garden Reconsidered There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges. Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area,the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland
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  1458. Pierre Puddles Pulling more nonsense out of your ample backside .At least you are remembering to sign out of one account before popping of in another.Thank your hander at the home for me John Burns babbled On the US entering WW2, it was about the British defending the USA and teaching them how to wage war. --------------------------------------------------------------------- LMAO keep posting even your bunkmates at the home don't believe that.Let's see 1776,1812 Dunkirk and Singapore say hello.Brilliant British defense - said no one ever .It was a case study at West Point at what not to do in battle.You're dive into delusion is deep even for you.Have them dial back the voltage on your Electro-shock therapy.If Monty could show the GIs to back peddle and Percivall how to stick our hands up - we'd be grateful.SMDH.Churchill was to the point of practically blowing FDR for men and material and was even in the White House when Tobruk in Libya fell.And by the time the Tub left Washintgon he took everything he could but a red hot stove.Again no serious sources except for the land of make believ you cavort in. https://anzacday.org.au/ww2-1942-an-overview-of-the-battle-for-australia The USA was fighting for Australia/NZ because obviously Britannia wasn't ruling the waves The arrival of the Americans By the end of March 1942, there was a line of Japanese-held territory directly to the north of Australia, stretching from Rabaul to Singapore. The Japanese had conquered their Asian/Pacific empire. Australians believed it was only a matter of time before Australia too was invaded. Just after the defeat in Malaya, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Curtin, declared that “the fall of Singapore opens the Battle for Australia.” Curtin was aware that Great Britain, herself facing a huge challenge from Germany in Europe and North Africa, could do little to help Australia. Already at the end of 1941, Curtin indicated that Australia would have to seek a new ally to help defend its shores – the United States. On 22 December 1941, the first American soldiers arrived in Brisbane. In February 1942, the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, decided to make Australia the main American base in the south-west Pacific. American and Australian forces would launch the fight back against Japan from Australia. Roosevelt ordered General Douglas MacArthur, the US commander in the Philippines, to proceed to Melbourne and there to take command of all allied forces in the area. Throughout 1942, Australia began providing camps, airfields and a whole range of other materials for the increasing number of American service personnel arriving in the country. See there you pathetic prat.The Aussies fought for the crown and that's how they got paid back .As I told your other sock account the English have a way of using colonials as their sandbags – ask Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and especially the Irish .No Worries though the Emerging World Power picked up the tab and wouldn't throw ANZACs under the Bus like London did
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  1459. Pierre Burns this just keeps getting easier an easier.Your novels are swirling the drain whistle britches https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1 Churchill warned Roosevelt that his country would not be able to pay cash for military supplies or shipping much longer Want more - of course you do .Pay attention there will be a test on this .Just joking I wouldn't do that to the disadvataged https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc Why couldn’t Britain pay?Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States. From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources.But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases,chiefly in the United States Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most. The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
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  1465. Marshall Never planned on a '42 invasion,43 at the earliest .As the Wehrmacht was a far cry from having the atlantic wall shored up.The folly lied in Churchill wanting to 2,000 miles out of the way up the Itallian boot in the Mediteranean rather than go over a 30 mile wide channel.Allied soldiers had taken the Po Valley in northern Italy from German forces in Italy on may 1945.That didn't include traversing the Alps Marshall proved less sure-footed in his approach to the most important strategic choice facing the United States in World War II: when and where to employ American forces on a large scale. Marshall’s support of a Germany-first strategic priority was on the mark, but his advocacy of an Anglo-American invasion of France in 1943 put him on shaky ground. Until American forces had gained more experience against the Wehrmacht, until command of the Atlantic was achieved in mid-1943 and until command of the air was secured in early 1944, an amphibious assault across the English Channel would have carried great military risk. And given that the British would have supplied the bulk of the troops for a 1943 invasion, military failure would have involved the political risk of undercutting Britain’s commitment to the war effort. Franklin Roosevelt, although overruling the chief of staff on this crucial strategic issue, came to regard him as so indispensable in Washington that, when the cross-Channel assault was finally mounted in 1944, he could not let Marshall assume command of the invasion force. The general was sorely disappointed but characteristically never uttered a word of complaint.
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  1468. Reading Citizen Soldiers by Stephen Ambrose, he interviewed Tedder and German Colonel Hans von Luck.He was in the center of things at Caen commanding the 121st Panzer Regiment of the 21st Panzer Division.He had a battery of 88s and some tanks.And he stated the trouble with Operation Goodwood(Caen) was not a lack of commitment,will or courage - they were all there.He said it was the planning and tactics that were deficient.He went on that the biggest error was leading the attack with tanks inadequately supported by infantry as von Luck had no infantry support around the 88 batteries that could have been driven off easily by British Infantry .As at Market Garden later the Gerries seem to be pointing at High Command.Happened to be the same misguided knob both times Ambrose goes on that 18 july began with massive bombardment from the air the air-7,7000 tonsof bombs delivered by 1,676 four engine bomberes and 343 mediums in what the official historian of SHAEF Dr Forrest Pogue called,"the heaviest and most concentrated air attack in support of ground troops ever attempted".While all this was going on the attempt on Hitler's life was sprung.The Wehrmacht was in dissarray yet Montgomery calls off GoodwoodEvidently Tedder was in earnst about having Monty removed as was Conningham earlier.I've read these things also from Hastings,Beevor and Atkinson to name just a few Monty was satisfied.IKE Air Marshall Tedder and the rest of SHAEFF was not after dropping more than 7,000 tons to advance just 7 miles.After the bombings and attempt on Hitlers life the battle should have been pressed on not backed out of.To bad you berks ran out of countries to blame
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  1476. No his pathetic plan was getting Tommies killed 3 miles in when 9 tanks were taken out by panzerfuasts. They made it a whole 7 miles as Urquhart disappeared for 38 hrs lathbury got wounded and Monty was having his picture painted - literally.They gave him everything. 3 US Armies were stopped to feed,fuel and facilitate the bent little freak's fantasy. Where was Monty during the largest air drop up until that time? "LORD" Carrington stopped after crossing the Nijmegen Bridge in Lent and going no further. So evidently the British award such valiant dithering by referring to him as *LORD*. And if you don't show up at all like bernard you achieve the lofty label of "Field Marshall",can't make that shit up. I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all. A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF. Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign . It was inexcusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence *As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary You can even ask your stable of Pseuds Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
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  1483. Oh my the inmate agreeing with himself Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. From those there not a monty nutthugger.Who admitted Monty was shameful,then moved to America.Monty even admits - a bad mistake on my part From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" The Pedo Monty was never there and Scarrington stopped - sounds like the John Burns Brigade.That about seals it,LMAO.Have Monty give you a bath Cornhole - maybe you'll wake up
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  1504. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan,cool to know you still pull history out of your arse The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.*I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  1515. The 82nd didn't hold up XXX Corp crawl.When they finally crossed the Bridge - they sat.Both the Gerries and 82nd witnessed it.And their own men admitted it.Numbering your opinionated piles doesn't make it accurate another PHD -From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it ​*the English drank too much tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it *the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move*​ ​While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge - we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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  1516. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/184228-battle-arnhem-anniversary-commemoration/ Guards Armoured should have been at Arnhem bridge at the time the lead elements of the division arrived at Nijmegen. As General David Fraser recalled in his memoirs "Nevertheless I remember the impressive silhouette of the long bridge across the Maas (Meuse) at Grave. This had been captured by the American airborne troops and took us across the first main water obstacle at about ten o’clock in the morning of 19th September. By then the operation had been running for over forty hours and was already well behind schedule." Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow . By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact  that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."  Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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  1518. Pop off on your media backwaters all you want - you started the condescending remarks the only thing that supersedes your ignorance is your willingness to express it.All these vetted Historians and actual participants are full of it and you are to be believed,sure. Repeat that out loud and see how it sounds From Carlo D'este,Decision in Normandy From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal* was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH "I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend." The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions..He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
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  1520. The war was fought in the past you are a simpleton who refuses historical fact.I have quoted 3 Historians with PHD's and actual participants of the battle British/German/American and you babble "I was schooled in the conventional wisdom" Have your handler take you to the library's history section.I should be charging for this! From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Theirelation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile .LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have they been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Compant HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray. Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington you'd better go it's only 8 miles To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358  LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced  - From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
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  1521. When you are done cleaning your teeth with your finger - try turning the pages of a History Book with it. The 82nd AB had 89 men killed & 138 wounded crossing the Waal,many died later of those wounds .Just to hook up with the Tankers and carry the fight forward but they sat there instead.What part of that could you not grasp?Those quotes aren't repeated just by actual participants go ask a Bobby if witnesses mean anything. 11,000 go in 2,100 come out.There is nothing new except for your steaming piles. The 82nd didn't sit there safe and sound inside their tanks while 1st Para and the 82nd fought bravely. How dare a chicken shit steaming pile like you badmouth men like that. Try sourcing something other than you backside. Are you incapable of comprehending the written word? Go back and read those eye witness accounts real men in real time,Germans/Americans/British relaying what they witnessed, pretty straight forward but evidently that concept is just a little complex for you? Oh but you have new information by people who weren't there 75 yrs ago, as you sit here kicking and screaming attempting to flip the script. It was a crap plan from a so called field marshall that never showed up unlike a German Field Marshall who did. It got blasted stem to stern much like you in the comment sections. Horrocks himself called it the most gallant act he witnessed in the whole of the war - is he full of shit too? This whole debacle was Monty's last gasp grab for glory after his many cock ups like Sicily/Caen/Falaise/OMG Look these up to if you'd like Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333*Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, *he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem when asked how he intended to win the war, Churchill responded I'll drag the United States into it.He's full of shit to?Try sourcing something other than one's ample arse. Here's another guy whose probably full of shit,boy you got a million of them From Six Armies in Normandy,by John Keegan In just 30 days, Patton finished his sweep across France and neared Germany. The Third Army had exhausted its fuel supplies and ground to a halt near the border in early September.Allied supplies had been redirected northward for the normally cautious General Montgomery’s reckless Market Garden gambit. That proved a horrible scheme to leapfrog over the bridges of the Rhine River; it devoured Allied blood and treasure, and accomplished almost nothing in return. Meanwhile, the cutoff of Patton’s supplies would prove disastrous Scattered and fleeing German forces regrouped. Their resistance stiffened as the weather grew worse and as shortened supply lines began to favor the defense
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  1528. You're an idiot hoping to achieve imbecility From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358  LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it The English drank too much tea,the 4Tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent , if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 As LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained yet the Guards Armored Division did not move ​ While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer  ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured .LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge - we were stopped. I never felt so much despair The more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne  Division continued to fight for its life​
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  1548. No Bradley later blamed Monty in his second book,Ike again aqcuiesced to the rube for political considerations/pressure from up top - that is clear.And if Ike didn't know shit like Monty bragged how would he have known what he did was so brilliant.And try book/author/page no ya know kind of helps with the credibility aspect Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 30 Dr Forrest C.Pogue,interviews,US Army Military Institute,1947 On the evening of August 12 Gen.Bradley called Gen. Montgomery's HQ requesting to send Gen Haislips XV Corps north to the boundary at Argentan toward Falaise.Bradley's request was denied' Montgomery's staff officer Brigadier E.T.Williams said he was in Freddie DeGuingand's truck near Bayreaux when Bradley's call went through;"Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back.Bradley was indignant.We were indignant on Bradley's behalf...Monty missed closing the sack Bradley,Deguingand and Williams argued in favor of the Americans moving north to Argentan to close the gap,but Monty would not change his mind Major General Francis De Guingand confirms this statement in his own book, "Operation Victory." "My impressions at the time were that Montgomery had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group Bradley as to the limit of his northward movement." Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory," p. 407 Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery. see after they were free from the runt's mismanagements they blast him,almost every officer did
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  1555. Little Villa for 4 yrs - FOUR YEARS I've left direct quotes from these Officers below who unlike your boy Wilmont were at Allied HQ meetings. You can even move your lips as you read if that helps I should be charging you for this Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him. How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak Please copy/paste/cache to avoid further delusion on your part or have the nurses there at the center do it for you. You can even share it with the poster above,whom you seem to think gives a shit what you scribble
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  1557. Thicko since 2018 when i arrived i've presented these to you evidently you are troll or have the attention span of a goat. From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" So Monty admitting it,Brooke/Ramsay/Tedder - all senior British/SHAEF officers pointing right at him presented to you yet again hasn't sunk in? Why don't you ask these guys Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 Coincidence I'm sure,of course it is 🤣
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  1559. MONTY GARDEN -- you are here to get clicks - as Geronimo stated in any other army but yours,the Commander is responsible for what happens or fails to happen under his watch - do you not read history? you try getting your hero off the hook. Poullusen was a photographer who could not identify a an M-1,You need read those books(don't lie) as it wasn't new evidence - it was evidence you didn't read. Unlike Montgomery an actual Field Marshall Walter Model showed up and directed in person.There is a reason when you blame dead memmbers and the 82nd for a fraud who wasn't around The 82nd had nothing to do with Monty's/Horrocks poor planning and XXX Corps slow progress or the Germans still between Nijmegen and Arnhem,keep deflecting it was only pointed out on your original board by about 1,000 actually dialed in history buffs.5 tanks from XXX Corp show up then sit, and the germans themselves said there was nothing to stop them,you are either hypocrite or ignorant. Where the F*** where Monty/Horrocks?there were 17 bridges over what 12/13 canals and rivers and the Largest air drop in history up to that point - where were they? -you are not off the hook for blaming JR officers and in fact attempting changing the narrative. Monty was a propped up fraud and rode everyone else's accumulative hard work to a  headline.Until the truth unraveled and it was obvious his command abilities were greatly exaggerated as IKE later figured out.Oh and there were 48-51 soldiers from the 82nd killed and 138 injured - Monty caused the disaster - The issue a debate to sir anthony - please or write a book,puhleeze.Poullusen was a photographer who could not identify a an M-1, and it wasn't new evidence - it was evidence you didn't choose read or bring up As the Dutch poster odball SOK stated and I'm paraphrasing How come Field Marshall WalterModel and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!!
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  1560. Enjoying the land of make believe are you? - the Vicar will be by the center to see ,he's a nice man.He'll take you for a walk about but you'll have to wear your ankle bracelet,you tried running away last time and that got embarrassing In 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and FranceDunkirk 1941 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya. 1942 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore. As Bradley said, Montgomery rarely won a battle any other competent general wouldn't have won as well or better. Most historians and other officers agreed Monty wouldn't attack until his strength was such as to ensure victory Even worse was his surfeit of caution. Eisenhower once said "that Monty will never willingly make a single move until he has concentrated enough resources so that anybody could practically guarantee the outcome...". Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. MAX Hastings.Armageddon: the battle for Germany, 1944-45 By 1945, the Russians cared little for British remonstrances, but they respected the power of the Americans.All those holding power in the United States recognized that only two powers would count in the post-war world, and Britain would not be one of them. Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
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  1570. YAWNING this makes me sleepy.Monty had 4 full yrs to go 30 miles and only when FDR demanded it and the GIs held his hand doing it did the little truant druid stick his toes into the channel.The French were screaming Sacre Bleu,The Gerries were snickering and Stalin and the rest of Europe were like WTF This from a New Zealander: More Englishmen turned and ran than any other point in the war. I know it hurts - the truth often does. The Poms are next to useless whenever there is an armed force oposing them that is perhaps even half as strong in men and material. The poms' most glorious land battles have been historically fought agains tribesmen with spears. A more cowardly bunch of whinging endemic losers has never taken the field.Shameful - but expected. Montgmery was an uppity little nothing who thought rather too much of his own position in things. He was about as important as a soviet latrine digger. You've just read too many crowns own comics.Britain served as an unsinkable carrier for the French invasion - and that's about it. You seem to think that Britain was important to WW2 and that people like Montgomery were important characters. Wrong. Had Montgomery never graced a battle field the result would have been the same. The reality is that the UK and commonwealth played a very very small role in the whole war. You don't want to see it because history is not important to you. You want to watch rousing movies that make you think you won the war when in reality you barely had a part in it. As for Poland - look where it was in 1939 and where it was left by its allies in 1946. And Britain absolutely shat on poor old Poland...Do you really think Britain discharged its obligations by abandoning Poland to the Russians at the end of the war?? Good Grief your view is shallow. Also, what was it that Britain do before 1941? Not much. There was the phony war followed by the Dunkirk fiasco followed by the Battle of Britain - the most overblown event in WW2 and some skirmishes in North Africa. The weak whiney, whingey, broke Poms had a treaty with Poland. I don't think that treaty said 'we won't help you if you're invaded by Russia'. That means that the Poms abandoned Poland twice. Once at the beginning of the war for not going to war against the USSR when it invaded Poland pursuant to the Ribbentrop pact and then again at the end of the war when it didn't insist on Polish indepedence. Do you understand now when I say to was abandoned by the Poms??? Evidently,Johnny a Colonial not real impressed with your inbred aristocracy 🤣
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  1576. Pulling history out of your very rank crevasse I suppose John Keegan perhaps the most learned man on WWII history and lectured at Sandhurst is full of it too The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command OMG failed because the rancid Runt didn't open Antwerp - deliberately I might add.He thought (because he was mentally ill) he could play keep away men,material and most of all fuel.Because Patton embarrassed the slow moving Monty at Sicily as he would later at Bastogne and crossing the Rhine.The Crown couldn't have that because they saw their once glorious Empire losing face - which they most certainly did From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 63 General Browning cautioned General Gavin "Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges,it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.
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  1577. Monty was superior to no one Better generals than him were let go before the drunk Winnie realized his mistake but Ike kept kissing hiney of the Crown just to shut him up but it backfired.But it didn't matter partnering with the USA meant the end of the Reich.Never tossed into the channel either Here is the rest of Monty's debacle From Market Garden Reconsidered There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges .Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and ArnhemMajor General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area." There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area,but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland pretty much the norm
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  1594. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan .One needs a bucket reading your posts.The BEF was getting very little to the war effort at this time.What they had was decent except of course for the mutt Monty who the nutthugger Little Villa here props up.The GIs never got tossed into the channel like Monty and after monty got the Paras eviscerated at OMG the GIs had to fight thru the Hurtgen thanx to the demented WWI Generals crap plan IKE had to keep feeding the pathetic berk Gi's because he was getting most of the Tommies killed at Caen,Epsom,Goodwood,Falaise and most certainly Market Garden where the Rancid Runts single thrust shit theory was absolutely shreaded - in any other army he would have been relieved .In Russia or Germany - shot . From Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...."  From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves.Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in North Africa it had become a joke . Again,The pinhead blasted his last chance to be relevant.Took 6 months - 6 months for the Rube to cross a river after his 1st attempt.The US wet nursed the failure Montgomery by continually lend him the 1st and 9th Armies and he was still the last to cross the Rhine - just like the channel but that took 4 years.Guess that's military accomplishment in the 21st Army group - no where else I should be charging for this
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  1607. You are asuming all the commanders were idiots then - you wouldn't guess enemy tanks were in that Forest after the 1st invasion in 1940 ? that was massive and not hindsight.And the 82nd couldn't hold the bridge for the 3 days as they didn't have any artillary yet ,they were still on foot. As The Reconnaissance Battalion, a 40-vehicle unit commanded by Victor Graebner's 9th ss advanced and drove them off.He had APCs with mounted mg-42s and halftracks with some 20mm AA Guns mounted and some self propelled artillery against foot soldiers with Thompson's and M-1s. Do you know what is like carrying up/down the M-30s or 150 lbs of mortar tubes/base plus ammo from the Groesbeek Heights to the bridge and parts of the city then back again as the LZs got attacked numerous times sometimes simultaneously.TIK gleefully glosses over this and the setbacks leading up to Nijmegen .Hell in JOhn Frosts book he stated had he known he would have brought AT guns and left the mortars Even if XXX Corps tankers displayed the same initiative moving down the road as the 82 nd did crossing the Waal OM-G still would have stalled.Antwerp's port of supply wasn't open because Monty ignored warnings by Brooke/Tedder/Ramsey to do so.Gerries would have reorganized North of the Bridge with reinforcements tactfully sent by Model from the near by Ruhr. Field Marshall Walter Model didn't drop either of the Arnhem/Nijmegen road bridges - because he planned on using them - that's a Commander ,however had he dropped them immediately,then what?Game/set/match.And had any stragglers made it over it was one choke point it would have been Dunkirk II as Model was bringing tanks/troops/artillary/materials in from the near by Ruhr - but some here like to dabble in delusion. Jim Gavin's decision to secure his drop zones, and re-supply probably prevented the US 82nd Airborne division from duplicating the British 1st Airborne's fate. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. TIK ignores the reality of the situation as he is a Monty fanboy The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool. He criticize General Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne for taking the time to secure his drop zones, and supplies before attempting to take the Nijmegen bridge. That is just stupid criticism from people who benefit from 20/20 hindsight. What do you call an Airborne soldier with no secure drop zones and no re-supply? You call that Airborne soldier a corpse, or a prisoner of war. Unfortunately the fate of the British First Airborne It became apparent rather quickly to the commanders on the ground that the intelligence regarding the positions, strength, and composition of enemy forces they had been given by Monty's HQ was worthless. Gavin did the only thing he could have based on the realization that Monty's intelligence on enemy forces was based on a fantasy assumption.General Gavin secured his drop zones, and his ability to resupply his men while they were fighting behind enemy lines. Market Garden resulted in the destruction of most of the British First Airborne division. Then less than 2000 or so who escaped from Arnhem had to abandon almost all of their equipment. Market Garden resulted in the loss of one Allied Airborne Division, Jim Gavin's decision to secure his drop zones, and re-supply probably prevented the US 82nd Airborne division from duplicating the British 1st Airborne's fate
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  1609. I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all.Ludendorf was right Lions led by jackasses.CLOSE? horse shoes and handgrenades. I'm not giving this fraud TIK any more Clicks.There are plenty of legitimate sources.He talks about New History or information. - it's not - it's facts he didn't bother to look up or deliberately ignored.Peruse these boards plenty of dialed in sources/posters tearing up his theories XXX Corp made it a whole 3 miles before Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans halting the column.Again XXX Corp didn't didn't start until 2 pm then quit at 6 on the 1st day Monty not only didn't show up he admitted of course after the war Big Mistake.Horrocks liked nite attacks,yet didn't attempt one. To many objectives with too many moving parts and everything needed to go off with out a hitch.TIK has deleted previous attempts to link proof from legit websites The 82nd had nothing to do with Monty's poor planning and XXX Corps slow progress,or 43 wessex disappearance or the Germans still between Nijmegen and Arnhem that brought armor the 1st day across the Arnhem Road bridge.Try reading about Victor Graebner's 9th SS that brought APCs with mounted mg42s self propelled 20 mm AA guns and halftracks.that turned back back the 82nd and sure as hell would have turned you back.Ignore 50 miles of cock ups and blame you tanker boys.The 82nd fought in the CITY,Bridge and up and down the Heights.try carrying 100-150 lb equipment around to 3 different spots.field machine guns and mortar tube,base plate,ammo,etc.They didn't have artillary dropped until late the 2nd day Plenty went wrong south of Nijmegen down past Eindoven and well south to Valkenswaard and before there even,that that guys like Poulussen,Neilands,TIK ignore .the objective was to cross the Rhine,and the Port of Antwerp was needed for that.All else is bullshit to cover for this failure ..Monty the plug ignored directives from SHAEF to open Antwerp on September 4th on the 10th he sprung the idea to grab the bridges - and glory for himself.And IKE foolishly acquiesced to get him to do something - anything.But the rube really wasn't a Field Marshall like Model.The deep water port for supply was desperately needed as it is 499 miles from Cherbourg to Arnhem but sadly monty ignored it.Monty and Ike own this debacle - not the soldiers As a Dutch poster said - How come Field Marshall WalterModel and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!!. from his Memoirs, *Monty says: [quote] “My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles, and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could reorganise sufficiently to stop us. Montgomery Memoirs page 267; [quote] “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1 Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so” [end quote]* From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p310-311 101st AB Division Objectives -Eindoven -Son Bridge -St Oedenrode Bridge -Veghel Road and Rail Bridges -Wooded Areas 1st AB Division Objectives -Arnhem -Arnhem Road Bridge -Pontoon Bridge -Railway Bridge -Wooded Areas 82nd AB Division Objectives -Nijmegen -Hueman Bridge -Malden Bridge -Hatert Bridge -Honinghutie Road & Rail Bridge -Grave Bridge -Nijmegen Road and Rail Bridges -Groesbeek Heights DZ/LZ The 82 nd had the most objectives and the furthest apart.Had Either Monty,Maj. General Roy Urqhart,Gen.William Lathbury made arrangements to secure 1st para drop zones perhaps they don't get slaughtered - that's how important they were/are and less than half the 82nd was dropped at that time
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  1620.  @ToolTimeTabor  Great story, outside of the polder marshes it was my understanding it was unusually wet autumn and of course the Gerries flooding everything on top of that.Well i believe the Dutch at least knew their way around Holland so might have given the locals a listen.And every nation has arrogant fools but they certainly suffered specially following Market Marden which decimated Arnhem,Nijmegen and parts of Eindoven.Also the horrific Honger Winter that followed,that was brought on by OMG A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies. When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Canadian Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious . In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219* "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp* The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend. "With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
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  1631.  @ToolTimeTabor  Share these with precious Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know Johnny just pull it "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak
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  1646.  @johnburns4017  babbled: A part of the exchange was that Britain would impart technology All given to the USA. 💩 --------------------------------------------------- This ones barking you are are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren't going to want to go on reading. You must stop reading Burns Big Book of Bollocks .You rubes weren't trusted, or allowed around the brilliant Manhatten Project - no offese against you amatuers. Of course your crappy sham of a nuclear program was already infiltrated by Philby and the Cambridge 5 commies. The rest we already had that,all of it. German immigrants brought much of it with them superchargers, radar. Reginald Aubrey Fessenden was a Canadian-born inventor of sonar, who did a majority of his work in the United States and also claimed U.S. citizenship through his American-born father. So you are full of shit there as well and expected. Of course you could tell us nothing about mass production or about flying either but you knew that. Many European scientists stopped on the island for a cup of coffee before heading to greener pastures. Radar was deleoped by German named Heinrich Hertz. This is why frequency is the rate at which current changes direction per second is measured in hertz. Another Burns theory crashes and Burns 🤣🖕 Wilfried Gehl, Walter Pepperl, and Ludwig Fuchs—the inventors of the world's first inductive proximity sensor in Manheim Germany. Wilhelm von Siemens developed a temperature sensor based on a copper resistor. Another one of your robust theories debunkedThe proximity fuze was developed through British and American cooperation in the early stages of World War II. It was first used against ground troops in the Battle of the Bulge (1944). Perfected right down the road in Dayton Ohio Any other gems you'd like to share with the congregation you Poultroon 🚀🚀
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  1647. Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII pages 2 and 3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150204042341/http://www2.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=fbcc446c-231f-4781-940a-3ebc3dee9f94&p=2
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  1656.  @johnpeate4544  how clever you rewrite your bollocks in italics and put red diamonds next to it. Here I FIFY 💩💩💩 Try one of the other aliases on your account Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 Type this into the search field of Youtube The Friendship Between Britain And The USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt | Timeline go to 2:30 then listen. Churchill emphatically stated his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States.” Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties" My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day" A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.275 Monty launched Goodwood on July 18,It was preceded by a massive air attack.Some 1,700 heavy bombers and plus 400 medium bombers dropped nearly 8,000 tons of bombs on the German front. On the afternoon of July 20 when the rains turned the battleground into a sea of mud,Monty, declaring himself well pleased with the results of Goodwood,abruptly halted it. It had gained six miles south of the city. The cost had been appalling:4,000 casualties and 500 tanks - over 1/3 of all the tanks in Monty's command​. Monty oversold Goodwood and his preliminary "ballyhoo" was too exultant and a disastrous miscalculation had raised expectations to an almost giddy level and then dashed them.IKE,Bedell-Smith, Tedder and the whole of SHAEF was furious with Monty Triumph and Tragedy:The Second World War, by Winston Churchill Winston S Churchill to General Montgomery:"For my own secret information,I should like to know whether the attacks you spoke of to me,or variants of them,are going to come off .It certainly seems important to the British Army to strike hard and win through otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies that which will lead to dangerous recrimination The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters" From Winston Churchill dot org After 6 June, Montgomery makes no mention of his initial failure to take the city. Monty’s failed plan to capture Caen on D-Day stalled the entire Normandy campaign. Monty had always made it perfectly clear that D-Day required an initial aggressive thrust that gained more ground and broke through the German defenses to take Caen. None of Montgomery’s pre-invasion planning,reports, or presentations ever suggested that the British would stop short of attacking and quickly taking Caen
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  1663. Never happened he almost got relieved for suggesting such .You poor trampled cabbage leaf Monty was awful at commanding. Terrible. As in, no fooking good.He held a a shoulder and wanted to with draw from that.Churchill even address parliament because the rancid runt attempted to take credit when in fact he wanted to flee as usual.Montgomery's skills and abilities were grossly inflated by the British press and political leadership The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 General Joe Collins in a memorandom on Wednesday December 27,laid out 3 options and endorsed "Plan no 2" a strong attack from the north on St Vith,complimented by 3rd Army's lunge from the south. Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not."nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen."If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise." CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one. The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61*Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
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  1675. Read Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,he spells it all out such that even indoctrinated slappies like little villa can understand. He is Official historian of the Air Historical for the Royal Air Force, with responsibility for writing documented narratives on RAF operational activity. He has a PhD from King's College in London ---------------------------------- Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.256 The crucial link ups between airborne and ground forces was more problematic; they were interlinked and interdependent. So much that the failure to capture of just one objective could lead to the failure of the entire undertaking. Given that no large-scale airborne operation mounted by the Allies or Germans had ever previously secured absolute mission success, there was a strong probability that Market Garden would fail. Market Garden was a direct product of Montgomery's resolute determination to ensure that he beat the Americans and use the Allies enormous and expensive airborne Army . In the 3 weeks preceding the Operation the combination of circumstances led to the production of one airborne plan that was quite simply pointless(Linnet) and another that bordered on suicidal (Comet) Market Garden was founded on flawed suppositions, massaged intelligence, the neglect of past lessons and the acceptance of inumerable risks,which substantially reduced its chances of success even before it was placed in front of Eisenhower. The very decision to target Arnhem was highly questionable.The town was selected Montgomery was seeking to maximize the distance between his "narrow thrust" and the American axis of advance. Yet by striking out so far to the north he both opened up his eastern flank to counter attack and readily accepted the challenge of the Waal crossing. Which could have been avoided by choosing a bridging point further south. This of course is where Market Garden ultimately came to grief. The idea of conducting multiple lift operations against deep and well defended objectives was fundamentally unsound and can only be deemed a blunder of truly staggering proportions
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  1688. the berk's top general didn't like the plan From Carlo D'este,Decision in Normandy From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable*1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Nor did his Chief of Staff - can't make this up I tell you Max Hastings Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him The Village Ass keeps refuting himself with the stupidity of his own statements.None of the objectives were met you knob -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN: ULTRA INTELLIGENCE IGNORED https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
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  1714. ENJOY https://www.history.com/news/operation-market-garden-failure-allies At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 In launching Market Garden with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies. From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 * " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."*
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  1764.  @OldWolflad  *ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,489​-490 -The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all. To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control, specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road bridge -The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September,after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness.This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM).The GA did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition.Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs. -North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed -Illness could explain Horrocks contradictions in his Garden orders and intentions Responsibility does not lie soley with him but with his superiors​ but with the patronage the British Army used to allot Senior command positions
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  1770. Literally making shit up and rearranging contentwhat a sad example.Monty not only liked little boys he was a crappy commander.That's not what Buckingham said at - you lying HOUND 🤣 - I have the book right here,VILE's already crap reputation is swirling the drain again. Here I'll even type it for you - real slow like,have the nurses at the home there read it to you.Anyone reading this can fetch the book also and this is what they shall find ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and september 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable .General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. *Yet Guards Armored did not move German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent,if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line I should be charging you for this .So the the Germans,GIs and Irish Guards all agree but you know better?🤣 Hey Vile share with the congregation how "MUM" captured some German Prisoners - you and history have but a fleeting acquiantance
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  1771. THICKO how many times at least 50 over 4 yrs ignorant knob I've presented this From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 321-322 Montgomery's official biographer remarked that Monty's bid for the Ruhr via Arnhem had proved nothing less than foolhardy Staff officers at his tactical HQ had never seen "the Master" look so quiet and withdrawn.The sacrifice of the 1st airborne had been enough .Market Garden had all but used up the striking power of the 2nd Army and lead it into a blind alley where it could do nothing. Even Field Marshall Brooke has concluded that his strategy had been at fault."Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place",he wrote in his diary The failure to secure the Scheldt estuary leading to that vital port now stood out as a glaring lapse of judgement. history of war.org Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes. World War II Database The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany . . . The higher direction of the war had been bad in the last 2 months . . . Ike’s policy was only skin-deep and anyone could deflect it.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles
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  1776. It's your Funeral - Little Villa have your friend read these to you real slow.Alan Brooke.IKE,Air Marshall Tedder,Admiral Ramsay,SHAEF CoS Beddel Smith,And Monty's CoS Freddie Deguingand.I think you are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren't going to want to go on reading. Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "*...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem With Prejudice, by Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal." Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
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  1777. Sorry Villa reread that everyone knew monty was flicked away rather easily. Again how and when did the GIs end up in the channel? Churchill himself said his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States".or "it's no longer the Big 3,more like the Big 2&1/2" .What the hell are you even attempt to be splicing in?Those were direct quotes from the books that you don't read.You're reduced to making crap up,spinning then posting it .It's your only defense ,your tiny Island wasn't shit with out the country you've been badmouthing since 2013 or was that 2010 🤣🚑 - you lying hound. Tell it to Europe,they knew who wore the pants.Go vacationing in the Czech Republic or Poland and make sure you wave the Union Jack.You'll never get thru the pearly gates telling all those fabulous fibs . So let's revisit shall we, ✔did you visit those fine Czech folks like I told you to?Did you explain why your crown sold them out to the NAZI's in 1938 ? ✔Did you explain to the French why you left them covering your retreat in 1940 while Monty was boarding the boats and they were taking bullets? Kind of explains why they came back with the GIs and took Southern France while Winnie and Brooke wanted to keep faffing around in Italy. ✔How about the Dutch did you tell them why Monty left them on the horn of the Hun and the Hunger Winter that followed after killing over 20,000 of it's citizens Your Poof didn't have the nerve to show up for an operation that he bragged would take him to Berlin that took him backwords to Antwerp?Well Blisterhead,oh and stay off the merry-go-round 🤣 Brits always fight to last colonial, usually Australians.
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  1778. This from a New Zealander More Englishmen turned and ran than any other point in the war. I know it hurts - the truth often does. The Poms are next to useless whenever there is an armed force oposing them that is perhaps even half as strong in men and material. The poms' most glorious land battles have been historically fought agains tribesmen with spears. A more cowardly bunch of whinging endemic losers has never taken the field.Shameful - but expected. Montgmery was an uppity little nothing who thought rather too much of his own position in things. He was about as important as a soviet latrine digger. You've just read too many crowns own comics.Britain served as an unsinkable carrier for the French invasion - and that's about it.You seem to think that Britain was important to WW2 and that people like Montgomery were important characters. Wrong. Had Montgomery never graced a battle field the result would have been the same. The reality is that the UK and commonwealth played a very very small role in the whole war. You don't want to see it because history is not important to you. You want to watch rousing movies that make you think you won the war when in reality you barely had a part in it. As for Poland - look where it was in 1939 and where it was left by its allies in 1946. And Britain absolutely shat on poor old Poland...Do you really think Britain discharged its obligations by abandoning Poland to the Russians at the end of the war?? Good Grief your view is shallow. Also, what was it that Britain do before 1941? Not much. There was the phony war followed by the Dunkirk fiasco followed by the Battle of Britain - the most overblown event in WW2 and some skirmishes in North Africa. The weak whiney, whingey, broke Poms had a treaty with Poland. I don't think that treaty said 'we won't help you if you're invaded by Russia'. That means that the Poms abandoned Poland twice. Once at the beginning of the war for not going to war against the USSR when it invaded Poland pursuant to the Ribbentrop pact and then again at the end of the war when it didn't insist on Polish indepedence. Do you understand now when I say to was abandoned by the Poms??? Evidently, Little Villa a Colonial not real impressed with your yarns you've been spinning 🤣
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  1783. So the hell what you're an Aussie maybe you should study the million GIs in your country. These are the guys that blamed ANZAC For Singapore, I'm sure you're on board with that.Try looking at a map,the GIs had to poke thru somewhere. The Germans were now defending their border. And the GIs still got it done and it's a war men die. My country doesn't have to apologize or answer to those who contributed so little. The Russians were taking horrendous casualties to. Poulussen was a photographer and has about had little sources but his backside. Had this assinine operation not stopped 12th army group the Germans perhaps don't set up all their blocking lines.There were 90,000 landsers inside 43 forts and the rivers in the area were flooded so bridging equipment had to be used. look what happened when Monty left Antwerp behind.Not real bright leaving a whole fooking army in your rear. As weather/distance kept sorties from being as needed. None of the objectives were met -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.(Maybe if that's your family we don't hear from you) -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
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  1799. Thanx for tagging along johnny Britsh Historian Ronald Lewin,Royal Institute for defense Studies "World War II: A Tangled Web,RUSI Journal,p82 "Thus we were brought to that dreadful day that the Alliance very nearly cracked asunder the day when Montgomery was really within a pen stroke of being removed by Eisenhower,the consequences of which I dread to think" Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.247 SHAEF and COSSAC Planning Officer, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean is quoted as calling Monty a "big cheat" in his claims: "for Montgomery to say that he was holding the Germans so Bradley could break out was absolute rubbish and a complete fabrication that only developed after he was stopped outside of Caen" Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.427 as early as August 12th Bradley's Staff had been grumbling that "the British effort appears to have logged itself in timidity and succumbed to the legendary Montgomery vice of over caution Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America. Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete
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  1811. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of command abilities.I've explained it's alright that IKE bares some of the responsibility by stringing Monty along letting him believe he was something he wasn't - a Field Marshall.Monty never ended up in the chanel after the GIs arrived imagine that. The only thing Churchill knew about military operations was mismanagement. He took 50,000 troops from O'Conner after he captured 130,000 Italians,400 tanks and 1,263 artillery pieces.Shipped them to Crete were they were routed and in turn weakened the desert forces. After Auchinleck & Dorman Smith won 1st Alamein Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance​ - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place - real bright move. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery. Bernard won with Auchinlecks plan and the fact he and Dorman -Smith laid the massive mine field in front of Alam halfa and moved over 2 fresh divisions from the Nile Delta.Churchill screwed up Monty Took 4 more weeks than Claude Auchileck wanted .He even benefitted the most from ULTRA as it was then fully operational in mid to late August of '42.In Oct/Nov the Torch Landings took place adding 109,000 more men to the scrum.Even a pathetic pillock like Burns could of won under those conditions.Berard isn't studied at Military Academies except as a bad example fired them when they explained they had to refit,reinforce and resupply and couldn't attack right away needing 6 weeks at least .real bright moves. The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61"Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself. Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable *Desert Generals by Corelli Barnett,pages 236-37Montgomery was seldom able to assess the combat effectiveness and intentions of his enemy.Barnett wrote "A student noted a typical scheme of Montgomery's dealt with 'Our sides' plans;but the enemy intentions or reactions were not imagined,either as a source of danger or opportunity. Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt.
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  1821. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. We've already discussed this thicko Monty was 12 miles from the Beaches in the summer Patton was over 300 miles inland in fall-winter w/o near the air cover or naval guns My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617​ July 19,1944, "IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile? The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress" from D-Day Overlord Dot Com The commander of the 21st Panzer Division, Edgar Feuchtinger, has 16,000 men, 146 tanks, 4 battalions of motorized infantry, about 50 guns and a battalion of Flak guns with 24 88-caliber pieces buried north of Caen. Even with Panzer Lehr in total, the German force in the sector of Caen represents 228 tanks, 150 guns of 88 mm as well as multiple canons divers. The British Forces, namely the 1st, 8th and 30th Corps 60,000 men, 600 tanks and 700 guns. That did not meet the hopes of Montgomery who, from his headquarters in Blay, was worried by the catastrophic reports of British losses since the start of Epsom. On 1 July, when Operation Epsom was stopped by order of Montgomery's command, Caen still did not fall He set up operation code-name Goodwood, which begins on July 18: 750 tanks must pierce from the east towards Bourguébus. At the same time, a diversion attack must attract enemy defenders to the west of the city two hours before Goodwood starts. Previously, 4,500 allied bombers have to destroy all targets on the British routes: they drop 7,000 tons of bombs and are backed up by naval artillery and ground artillery, which fire close to 250,000 shells The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley​ Von Mellenthin wrote - "The US 3rd Army had received orders to stand on the defensive during Market Garden, it certainly simplified our problems and gave us a few weeks grace to rebuild our battered forces and get ready to meet the next onslaught.* Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.197 Until the arrival of 2nd Panzer at Caen there was little other than Wittman's small Panzer force,to stop the British. The Germans never understood why Montgomery failed to press his advantage. Of the period around June 10th Gen Fritz Kraemer wrote: it is still incomprehensible why the enemy exerted himself with assaults in the direction of Caen and did not make a powerful drive to exploit the open Gap on either side of Bayeux.The enemy left a favorable opportunity slip.
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  1822. From the Warfare History Network Taking the city of Metz would be a challenging task for the allies. There were a series of natural as well as man-made obstacles these included, the flooded Moselle & Saar Rivers, a multitude of forts and a plethora of pill boxes. Patton’s army made attempt after attempt to cross the Moselle River but these fortresses rained heavy artillery fire down upon them making it a daunting task. These forts and pill boxes dated back to the 19th century making them almost a natural part of the landscape this made the structures much harder to detect and therefore defeat. (9) another reason the pill boxes created a challenge was, because of their small size. Two German soldiers could easily hide inside and shot a .50 caliber machine gun at the Allies and have little chance of being hit by small arms fire. So the GIs attacked at night to avoid that and mortar barrages. The Combination of these natural and unnatural defenses had made the city of Metz a formidable opponent for invaders for more then 1500 years since it is placed superbly for defense on the east bank of the Moselle River. As well as being surrounded by barbed wire and earth fortifications that had been built around the city. Its best defense however, was the fact it was surrounded by hills that were turned into dominating underground forts composed of passageways and well dug in steel and concrete doors placed in a fashion that not only concealed them but protected them from artillery fire. *There were almost 13,000 monthly sorties being flown June-Sept over Normandy that dwindled to 2,500 because of the colder weather & distance away from the coast yet unlike OM-G it still was a success driving the Wehrmacht to the Sigfreid line before turning north for the Battle of the Bulge.Monty effed up so bad SHAEF never again game him precedence Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331, Apparently even the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command. *General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
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  1829.  @thevillaaston7811  lamented:How is he supposed to know what it was like Arnhem? -------------------------------------------------- Never stopped you snogging wankers from popping off.But these guys were there - 3 of them British and they blame your personal masseuse bernard :face-blue-smiling: Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309-310. The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs*​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent.If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night
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  1843. Good to see dave and his distortions are out and about How about these guys who were actually there, then in real time, before Monty Garden even started. Roberts rightfully blasts the pathetic show pony that had demanded the debacle then disappeared Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
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  1854. NO SOURCES AGAIN - you lampshade Bradley wasn't there I told you this .Ask your special needs instructor to take you to the history section no coloring books this time . Here you go since you evidently don't know what a search engine is. That's alright you don't know what history is either. the GIs defeating the The same army that drove Bernard into the channel where evidently he gave you the Full Monty. See even the Germans themselves Mantueuffel and Model - look them up admitted Patton had them beat. Monty who knows where the wisp went maybe with you. After all he didn't show at Dieppe and Market Garden either THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,p. 647CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views. THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders to fall back he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  1856. maybe your special needs center there can turn on sponge bob or some other cartoons for you as history isn't your thing. And get your head wound looked at Two officers one was Gen Freddie Deguingand the other Billy"E.T." Williams both heard Monty's halt order as they were in the British Operational.Deguingand was Monties Chief of Staff. And Williams was the Intelligence Officer. Intelligence is something you know nothing about. And another thing you ignoranus the ports were blown up long before any Tommies or GIs got anywhere near See here you unread rube 3 different sources now you may return to your land of make believe Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441 (Stafford Diary)Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary." Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory," p. 407 Major General Francis De Guingand confirms this statement in his own book, Operation Victory "My impressions at the time were that Montgomery had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group Bradley as to the limit of his northward movement." Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery D-Day, The Battle for Normandy," p. 478 from Antony Beevor Both British Air Chief Marshals Sir Arthur Coningham and Sir Arthur Tedder said that Montgomery was responsible for the 'halt order.' . Tedder said, "One of Monty's great errors was at Falaise. There he imperiously told US troops to stop and leave the British area alone He didn't close the gap."
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  1869. Have the ward boy at the home read these for you Alan Brooks own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"*...*During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him* Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
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  1872. The Captain Westover Letter of July 1945 quote: “For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I (Gavin) quote the 82d's mission:‘The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task’ This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized." Monty was the missions commander if he didn't like HIS Order of Battle he should have made his combat assessment after reviewing it and ordered appropriate changes. But he didn't bother - ignoring not only IKE's CoS Bedell-Smith and Admiral Ramsay but his own CoS Freddie .Even his own Corp Commander General Dempsey Monty ignored ULTRA,SR Officers at Allied HQ and the build up of the Wehrmacht in and around ARNHEM - MONTY Garden
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  1882. You lying hound little villa how was it in Dempsey's notes of the 9th/10th and Taylor the intelligence officer notes of the 13th and monty never knew about it,what page number? You're pulling a John Burns plastering your demented slant as fact that a historian never said Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th Also from British notes Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance" Alan Brooke's(Montgomery's superior) own words​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." I'm getting tired of this can you just admit you're an idiot
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  1894. Johnny Burns accessing your ample backside again I see? If they've removed your ankle monitor you can go to the library. Until then chew on this The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be be Patton in Lorraine,Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stopr us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson) Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson) The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.215 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine" (Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111)
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  1906.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  again for your edification when your done cleaning that tooth with your finger do try leafing thru this book with it Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309-310. The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move." German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent.If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
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  1918. Cherry picking again,why didn't your empire cross a crappy channel in 4 full yrs ? Why bother the amatuer GIs crossing 3500 miles of Ocean to help you out of the whole you dug for yourselves? The Euros know what side your bread was buttered on,Funny you never bring up that with every other Army in Europe the BEF ended up in the Channel. And who chaperoned them back over. Or who refitted,resupplied and reinforced the Crown after being Dunkirked and carried the fight forward.Billions of dollars in military hardware were left on the French Beach during that mad dash. One of Churchill's biographers is he wrong to? Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts,p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there "No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” Said by Churchill after Pearl Harbor Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.148-49 The Governor of the Bank of England,Montagu Norman wrote in 1941: *"I have never realized so strongly as now how entirely we are in the hands of American friends over direct investments and how much it looks as if with kind words and feelings,they were going to extract these one after another."* Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.157 On march 8,1941 passed Congress the new measure insured that even when Britain's cash was exhausted the shipments kept coming. The President extracted for the British thru lend lease the most generous terms a U.S. legislature would allow, much preferable to the straight loans of World War 1,which Britain alienated U.S opinion by failing to repay Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,p.116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War. The Second World War 1939-45,p.85,By Maj.Gen. J.F.C.Fuller Britain was placed in a such a desperate situation as she must have accepted a negotiated peace with out American economic support she could not continue the struggle. Did you read that?The Crown failing to repay loans from the USA in WW1.The US didn't owe you allegiance. God forbid some sirs,lords and other assorted fauntleroys would you have to sell off their Castles or estates and perhaps go to work instead of Fox Hunting,playing polo or crikett
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  1921. Dave hack you never read the book don't lie,the gamer TIK does exactly the same thing.Mentions an Historian/Book that he doesn't reference then slides in in his own demented narrative Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 157). Crowood. Kindle Edition. Market Garden was a direct product of Montgomery's resolute determination to ensure that he beat the Americans into Germany and use the Allies enormous and expensive airborne Army. In the 3 weeks preceding the Operation the combination of circumstances led to the production of one airborne plan that was quite simply pointless(Linnet) and another that bordered on suicidal (Comet) Market Garden was founded on flawed suppositions, massaged intelligence, the neglect of past lessons and the acceptance of innumerable risks, which substantially reduced its chances of success even before it was placed in front of Eisenhower. The very decision to target Arnhem was highly questionable. The town was selected Montgomery was seeking to maximize the distance between his "narrow thrust" and the American axis of advance. Yet by striking out so far to the north he both opened up his eastern flank to counter attack and readily accepted the challenge of the Waal crossing. Which could have been avoided by choosing a bridging point further south. This of course is where Market Garden ultimately came to grief. The idea of conducting multiple lift operations against deep and well defended objectives was fundamentally unsound and can only be deemed a blunder of truly staggering proportions. And required repeated daytime airlifts to far inside enemy territory more that 300 miles from Allied Transport bases
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  1925.  @davemac1197  tore apart :face-blue-smiling:, you mean the pumpkin head that had to take one board down for libel - he's a bigger carnival barker than you. I'll leave this - from 5 top tier SHAEF Allied Officers(4 British) - perhaps you can identify them you can even ask your hero TIK o your other aliases on your account if you're stumped Alan Brooke blaming Bernard??? "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." Monty admitting it after the war??? The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." (Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith??? Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside"
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  1941. A dave Hak scribbling in his coloring bokk again "Montgomery Memoirs page 276" "The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September." So clearly Monty stated they were "my plans" that 34,000 went into arnhem and 17,000 came out - in 9 days - there's your hero & the culprit The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." ( from Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard Eisenhower's Armies, by Dr Niall Barr, page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. "During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place" Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..... "The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knockout blow." Foot Note: ("Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219") How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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  1943. The only thing causing problems was British bumbling in the form of Monty.Monty garden and Caen set everything back and that propped up fraud should have been sacked. And IKE reassigned for catering to him sending him men,materiel,tanks,trucks,artillery,fuel.Should have called back either O'Connor,Auchinleck or moved Slim over The broken old, British industries couldn't keep up leaving the USA to provide the hardware here's the real problem down below The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks. and of course another drag on supplies Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further. "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47 "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281 Yet Montgomery had been unable to avoid lowering his logistical sights from arguing for a forty-division offensive to settling for an eighteen-division advance. For one thing, he had on his hands an embarrassing fiasco of British logistics which increased his dependence on American help. Some 1,400 British three-ton lorries, plus all the replacement engines for this model, had been discovered to have faulty pistons rendering them useless. The represented the loss of 800 tons a day.
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  1966. What do you expect Kesselring to say who BTW some how wiggled off the hook for war crimes. "Ya he flanked me twice what a failure he is." Botom line Patton drove him out of Sicily. But since you want to quote Germans fine. Rommel as you know thought much more of Auchinleck. Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein" Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt. When interviewed in 1945,Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place General Gunther Blumentritt : We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets. The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7. Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference - in spite of several sorts of frailty of human nature! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944. I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph" - an excellent report! With very good wishes Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
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  1968. Here is what some reviewers said abour Harry : The author didn't have the guts to stake his reputation on a convincing and definite verdict. Tacking on the name "Patton" to this book's title is just a ploy to separate a buyer from his hard-earned cash. Don't waste your time and money on this one if your purpose is to discover what Patton's reputation was among the Germans. ========================= The author had bias and supposition from beginning. Author could magically read Hitlers mind. According to Yeide, Patton was the most lucky person in the world. The only reason he won all his battles was because the Germans didnt care about him and abandoned the battlefield allowing Patton to "fill the void" When the Germans fought the French they completely fled the area. Yet when Patton landed in North Africa the Vichy French were levels above Patton and fought valiantly till the Naval bombardment would knock them out. ========================= An exciting title but a total disappointment in the text - If you HAVE to read it get it at the library. If you have any knowledge of WWII history stay away because it is nothing but the authors premise then his ideas to support it. Big gaps in facts. WAY too many details about German combatants then nothing about the battles. The Germans would continually outsmart Patton and then just fall back for no reason and suffer heavy losses with no credit going to Patton who was causing the heavy losses. By the time I got to the Sicily invasion I couldn't finish because of the suppositions by the author. "Island was abandoned because of Italian politics, not because of anything the Allies did." Even though Hitler ordered them to not give an inch and fight to the last man Pure poppycock. ============================ The book is confusing, especially when examining the fighting in Lorraine. The Germans have a First Army. The US has a First Army. Who in the hell is attacking who at times is up in the air. Is the US First Army attacking the German First Army, or vice versa? Maybe adding the "US First Army" would have helped. The editor was asleep at the switch on that one. And the maps are hopeless to follow. ============================= Why the author felt it necessary to break down, to the brigade level, the composition of German forces in Russia (yes, Russia, a theater that Patton had nothing to do with) is beyond grasp and comprehension. And the continuous use of German names and titles was beyond distraction, that Patton did not engage perhaps to impress the uninitiated ============================== The reader should know, it is not until approximately page 250 (of 420 of text) that the author first actually provides a German assessment of Patton. Yeide contradicts himself many times throughout the book - on page 197 he details the Herman Goering Division facing Patton in Sicily as green with hardly any soldiers who had fought before. Then after the Division is shifted away from Patton to fight Montgomery on the east coast of Sicily Yeide describes them as the most powerful Axis Division in Sicily. When Patton is about to attack Metz later in the war, he says the battle is unnecessary and results in many costly casualties for no reason at all. However during the same discussion on the Metz battle, he says that Hitler refused to allow a German retreat and told his generals to fight to the death. Well which is it Mr Yeide
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  1969. they used his exact words and and present the contradictions,Yeilde hasn't won any literary awards of note. He wouldn't even make a good youtuber let alone a vetted and peer reviewed Historian Hell TIK is better and that's not exactly a ringing endorsement. Being a fan of revision i understand why you would present his sham graffiti. And read what the guy who wrote that hack piece - he is referencing Yeilde instead of checking his sources/facts like he is a credible source . Harry flat out never interviewed any of the authors who credited Patton. Yeilde makes statements like it appears that,it seems like,it maybe noted sheesh. At least twice reviewers points out his woeful descriptions and proves nothing with the maps. Stating there were impotant battles then doesn't even mark the maps properly here are more He constantly quotes German generals as saying Patton was cautious and failed to exploit weaknesses in the German lines, yet he also points out on numerous occasions that Patton was ordered to stop, or to go in a different direction, or simply ran out of gasoline and supplies because of his rapid advances. So hardly failing to exploit,in addition then saying Patton is slow and overly cautious then Patton has the Germans on the run, and on the defensive. Who does he think pushed the German Army from Normandy back across the Rhine??? He agrees with the Germans who said Patton was average at best, but scoffs at the ones that called him a brilliant tank commander. He continuously says that the Germans did not care where Patton was, and that he was mentioned in very few memoirs of the Germans. Yet there are no examples of where any other American or British generals were specifically mentioned either - in fact the Germans were retreating so quickly and losing men and material so fast, I don't think they cared who on the Allied side were shooting and killing them with increasing speed. One last thing that was mentioned were the battle maps throughout the book - they were worthless in trying to identify who were the Germans and who were the Allies. He has arrows going in numerous directions, none of which identifies what side he is trying to depict. Several times he identifies a town or village as being pivotal to a battle but then it is not even on it. :body-green-covering-eyes:
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  1973. the mongrel monty allowed Rommel to slip away time and again not wanting to risk his false stature as a history changing leader. British units didn't deploy effectively using deplorable methods filtered down from Monty's ineptitude The Rommel Papers,p.253 "It was primarily the Panzer Army's staff, led at the time by Lieut.Col. Von Mellenthin whom we had to thank for bringing the British attack to a halt" [at El Alamein] Panzer Battles Maj.Gen.FW von Mellenthin,p.145 The attacks on 15th Panzer at Alam Halfa the mine fields, artillery shelling and ariel bombing inflicted the most serious losses on remaining gasoline stocks that were almost exhausted. An armored division without gasoline is little more than scrap iron, the shortage of fuel prevented any large-scale withdrawal. The circumstances were extremely advantageous for a British counter attack, but Montgomery made no move, apart from harassing operations north and west of Qaret el Himeimat. Panzer Battles Maj.Gen.FW von Mellenthin,p.148 I do not propose to discuss British Generalship, their commanders committed many grave blunders and suffered some needless disasters. Even the best of their generals were not as dashing or versatile as Rommel. And I don't think the British ever solved the problem of mobile warfare in the open desert. In general, the British of making war is slow rigid and methodical; they trust to their sea power and vast resources of their allies, empire and dominion. It is highly probable the British Air Force Officers are more original and enterprising than those of the army, and I may remark in passing that their Mediterranean fleet produced some brilliant officers.
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  1975. How about the Irish Guards there How about Lt.Col. Vandeluer? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson? Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial Heinz Harmel? Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced LT John Gorman? Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair" How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie? ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408 on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his dsiquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself So the Germans and the Irish Guards are in agreement with the GIs - MONTY GARDEN. Do they treat you like mushrooms in Britain? - keep you in the dark and feed you crap or is it personnel preference?
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  1976. You are realizing hallucinations again Burns,Monty never crossed the 30 mile wide channel for 4 yrs,that is after getting driven into it. So fast I might add that he beat your uncles up the gangplanks.GIs had to come 3,500 miles to help the lollygagging limpwrist MONTY GARDEN This abortion of Monty's involved crossing three major rivers, three minor rivers, and criss-crossing canals, across terrain(polder marshes) where tanks couldn't maneuver away from the major roads without sinking. And we saw how that went even with complete surprise.And taking one elevated lane 70 miles with no room for manuever Bernard planned the whole thing - IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open.Which was accurate to supply this operation and everything else moving forward. The Allies couldn't keep lugging supplies 499 miles from Cherbourg. Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. ♦ And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November
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  1999. :face-blue-smiling: too bad you haven't read it as he places the blame on monty and XXX Corp. You throw names out there like you are a source . Monty ignored more facts than you Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance" Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.195 With the shortening of days,reduced number of hours this time of year,the increase in distance, the complications due to a late start due to bad weather General Williams pointed out it would not be possible to conduct more than one lift a day.* Williams had a deserved reputation for close cooperation - he had commanded troop carriers in Husky,Neptune and Dragoon and was one of the most experienced of all Allied Airborne commanders Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and he had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.108 Arnhem could not be captured unless all else below it was secured 1st.With 1st Para in Arnhem the rest would be left with 3 brigades to secure the Bridges at Grave,over the Maas-Waal Canal and the bridge over the Wall itself. In addition it was necessary to capture and hold an area of high ground south east of Nijmegen at Groesbeek only a few miles from Germany. German possession of the heights would have left XXX Corp's eastern flank dangerously exposed to counter attack. Never the less Montgomery's plan required 100% mission success something unkown in large scale Airborne operations. Failure to capture a single objective would jeopardize the entire XXX Corp offensive *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113*​ yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it." Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assesments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops. Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.147 Lacking any direct contact with Brereton or his staff,Montgomery had no knowledge of the range,weather,command,control and communication problems that would potentially accompany a airborne Rhine crossing from England. I'm tired - MONTY GARDEN
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  2007. more bombast from burns bloated backside - Johnny see the staff shrink your halucinations are getting worse.From the boys there. Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII pages 2 and 3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150204042341/http://www2.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=fbcc446c-231f-4781-940a-3ebc3dee9f94&p=2.
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  2020. Not the 82nds fault that the British units didn't deploy effectively using deplorable methods filtered down from Monty's ineptitude. Gavin did the only thing he could have based on the realization that Monty's intelligence on enemy forces was based on a fantasy assumption. General Gavin secured his drop zones, and his ability to resupply his men while they were fighting behind enemy lines. Market Garden resulted in the destruction of most of the British First Airborne division. Then about 2000 or so who escaped from Arnhem had to abandon almost all of their equipment. Market Garden resulted in the loss of one Allied Airborne Division along with John Frost's 2nd Para. Jim Gavin's decision to secure his drop zones, and re-supply probably prevented the US 82nd Airborne division from duplicating the British 1st Airborne's fate. What do you call an Airborne soldier with no secure drop zones and no re-supply? You call that Airborne soldier captured, wounded or killed. See British First Airborne The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. Montgomery discounted the basic logistical reality that he ignored not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had mastered this practice exiting the Eastern Front then proceeding to France. The German Divisions could be quickly refitted and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order.
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  2022. Sources?oh that's right your ample backside .Jerkoff the Germans had British working radios picked up on the 17th from pathfinders taken prisoner.And the Dutch themselves said taking that route was a fool's errand probably why Bernard took it. Both Brooke and Ramsay blamed him and he even admitted after the war "a bad mistake on my part" ENJOY The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,p. 219 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary From Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".
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  2031. https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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  2068. Twat waffle do you need Brooke's quote blaming bernard or his admission after the war of it. No they left at 2:35 they were still flying over why didn't they break camp at 1st light like any other army that ever mattered did - because they were British and under Monty.They made 7 miles the 1st Day and were behind over an hour.Had they gotten off their aritocratic asses earlier they could have made Son before Gerry blew the bridge.And they stopped at 6 pm with an hour of daylight.More pathetic british urgency. This whole board is nothing more than a monty fanboi revisionist section with inferiority and lies bleeding over at every post If you Carnival Barkers for the crown are going to spout such nonsense, could you at least do us all a favor and wear silly hats when you do so This way, we will know you're aren't meant to be taken seriously. Monty's plan was based on one seriously flawed assumption. Monty assumed the German Army in the West was beaten, and could not offer up a serious coordinated resistance to his army's scenic drive down a single snarled road in the beautiful Dutch county side. Monty also assumed that no one in the German Army was capable of interfering with his plans for his Airborne troops to have a nice holiday and picnic in Holland. WELL,THE ENEMY GETS A VOTE. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy - especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells - is a fool. I understand why he's your hero. - go tell your BS to the Dutch/French/Poles and Czechs
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  2069. That's rich you've done nothing but make crap up of a crumbling crown that had to acquiesce to a country they couldn't colonize. No Brooke told them before as did IKE/Ramsay. Opening the port was part of the deal as monty thought he roll over armies that rolled him off the continent previously- before the big boys were there. If that debacle somehow made Arnhem then what? They would be out of everything,ammo,food,artillery then killed/captured or driven into the river .No resupply because of those crappy austin trucks breaking down Model was bringing in men and material in fresh from the nearby Ruhr. The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. IKE's broadfront not monty's debacle of sandwiching a whole armored corp down one elevated lane. The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  2082. Ask the French,why they came back over with the GIs,because Monty and Brooke RAN away left them on the beach to cover the Royal reversal or Burns Brigade Bumbling From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.309 The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south.By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
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  2099. How come Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student was able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November Montgomery This from Seth 1422 who throttled your sorry self Sunset on the first day, September 17, was at 19:50, darkness was at 20:30. When the Irish Guard halted at 19:30 it also was not in contact with the enemy, so advance in darkness was not impossible. Sunrise on the 18th was at 07:15, meaning that the Irish Guards did not move for half of the available daylight on the second day. No Irish Guard tanks were destroyed immediately, but instead contact with the enemy was made around 16:00. It should also be noted that according to JOE Vandaleur’s own account, he had lunch with his cousin and a female reporter, then went for a swim in a roadside villa before starting the Guards moving on September 18th. Whatever resistance they did ultimately encountered late that afternoon could have only been an increase on what they might have faced with a swift advance at 07:30. So that is the place where swifter advance was possible. The Irish Guards had suffered badly the first day, so I understand their reluctance to smash ahead. But if that formation was spent it should have been rotated out before dawn. These delays only made the Germans better able to obstruct the road. According to the one British officer Major Hibbert of 1st para starting here https://youtu.be/50ogHjrQFBE?t=2282 in this video they had disabled the charges on the Bridge.So if accurate and I believe he would know Horrocks tankers sitting back on the Nijmegen Bridge could have made it.But they didn't move even though elements of the 82nd wanted to carry the fight forward.It's interesting....and unfortunate
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  2101. That''s a fact how about Alan Brooke and Admiral Ramsay you twisted tosser.What kind of idiot would disagree with these men.Monty even admitted he faffed it up,shit on any dead GIs lately Vile? From a PHD at King's College who lectured @ Sandhurst From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely Brooke was moved to write I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem From a Pulitzer Prize Winner From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding *"a bad mistake on my part"
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  2110. You make me larf "Mike's research",that's a stretch even for you - did you find that in the Lyndon Library 🤣Whittled down to nothing? there was no fighting until the 17th they were in fact refitting. Not only did Victor Graebner's 9th have APCs they had half tracks had mounted 20mm AA guns in them. From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward .No amount of your carnival barking gets Monty off of the hook. Once again cornhole you fall back on blaming men who were tasked to do the impossible. *Mike'sResearch*,Jeebis now I've heard it all. Unlike Montgomery - Model was an actual Field Marshall. I'd say Monty appeared lost but the sad fact was he never appeared at all From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - And that's from the Irish Guards and Germans. It was his crap plan by the 20th Model was bringing more tanks and artillary in by rail from the near by Ruhr
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  2113. Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald Page122 By 10 September, the day when General Eisenhower approved the operation, the British had remarked that "Dutch Resistance sources report that battered panzer formations have been sent to Holland to refit, and mention Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception areas." A few days later the SHAEF G-2 announced that these Panzer formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division and presumably the 10th SS Panzer Division Page 143 The 9th SS Panzer was the stronger with 1 armored infantry regiment, 1 artillery battalion, 2 assault gun batteries, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 company of Panther (Mark V) tanks, and increments Of engineers and antiaircraft troops. The 10th SS Panzer probably had 1 armored infantry regiment, 2 artillery battalions, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 engineer battalion, and 1 anti aircraft battalion. Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 243 How many Panther Tanks both the 9th and 10th SS had just before Market-Garden:7 Sept,1944Page 243 -The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, which was commanded by 31 year old Lieutenant Colonel Walter Harzer, - 3,500 men, -five tanks plus assualt guns -The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which was led by 38 year old SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz Harmel, - 6,000 men -20 Panther Tanks -40 armored personal carriers, and several guns (both flak and howitzers) so That's at least 25 tanks and 40 APC with MG-42s mounted with Flak & Howitzers on Sept 7th From Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
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  2126. No cornhole here is what was said you sad spin doctor.The Wehrmacht already ran Monty off the continent once. Um,they weren't impressed Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 Erwin Rommel - "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces,,Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" Patton:A Genius for War,by Carlo D'Este,page 815 General Fritz Bayerlein,the able commander of the Panzer Lehr Division and a veteran of North Africa,asses the escape of Rommel's Panzer Afrika Corp after Alamein: I do not think General Patton would have left us get away so easily Their Words
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  2141. Once again davie you picked the wrong week to quit sniffing glue "It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p,129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw ,p.141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm flak cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 143 18 september,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platoon attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks* 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were able to to maintain their positions 'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944. The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.
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  2144. There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers and they still took it with all of the moats, mines, interlocking machine guns fields of fire There were no roads across the flooded plains that would support either amor or trucks and they still took it unlike the British in 1815. It had important transport road hubs and communication leading to the Rhine river. It was a military necessity to clear it of German Wehrmacht divisions to gain avenues of approach to the Rhine. The supply lines for Patton's 3rd Army & Hodges 1st Army were overextended in September, 1944 well over 400 miles from Cherbourg. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport. The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec,not just 9 days in the Netherlands, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden in just 9 days (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure. Look at a map - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war.Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up Patton wasn't going to leave 25,000 Heer soldiers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th
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  2148. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole ChroniclesThe dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar. Here you go from Crerar himself From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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  2160. No they didn't it was Sept 20th over 72 hrs Later From 'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North. 1900 that 7 PM 3 days after a morning start taking creative license with the truth - nothing new from you.Here's another Jewel From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent.If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. '*Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance*' Try actually reading the book instead of claiming to
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  2169. Pretty much accumulative history not by actual scholars accessing military archives and of course these guys Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." - Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII pages 2 and 3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150204042341/http://www2.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=fbcc446c-231f-4781-940a-3ebc3dee9f94&p=2
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  2188. https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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  2214. And the were virually unopposed as wehrmacht was falling back after the Horrific bombing of Falaise/ I'll take Horrocks words for it,Monty over played his hand in the desert repeatedly ignoring advice of front line soldiers The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine. But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson) Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line. The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson) Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine."
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  2216. little villa bernard will see you for your FULL MONTY in the channel, bring you loofah you poof - don't have to make that up unlike you these participants were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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  2225.  @thevillaaston7811  lamented:But you may have read comments YouTube by someone calling themself 'bigwoody, and/or 'Para Dave', in which that person blamed XXX Corps, Carrington, Joe Vandeluer, and other people who were in the British Army at hat time. ----------------------------------- Vandeluer Stopped,Carrington stopped,Monty the perv doesn't even bother show up oh how dare some one point out a bent little freak villa's assinine assertions blaming the GIs because of your inferiority complex of losing you empire and being put in your place - should have let Guderian have you when we had the chancePerhaps when you clean monty's cack out of your eye sockets you'll read or have read to you the shit you smeared on the GIs - all over these boards - much of it has gone missing perhaps even TIK knew he had to clean it up.long before I said a damn thing you and burns were shitting on the GIs over here - and your love interst John cornell who got his account deleted but alas has reemarged as your bint Lyndon Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 Did i get that right little villa? Remember you stating you were here from 2010 - at least it's over on the Angus's WW2 podcast board. You pathetic pillock I never called myself para dave another one wretched from your bloated backside.And you shitting all over an actual veteran Geronimo on his board you pussy - you'd never have the guts to say shit to him face to face and read the information left.This is one big british cock up stem to stern a pissant like you shitting on americans while you give assholes like carrington - the gutless buggar stopped a free pass - the 82nd just 51 KIA and another 138 wounded crossing the waal to take the fight to arnhem,oh but carrington isn't a coward - we'll call him a lord.Read the sources - Germans themselves stated thay could have made it Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309-310. German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
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  2237. Carlo D'este From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed by Montgomery From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely Brooke was moved to write I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred) The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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  2261.  @jeffreybeigie5244  MacArthur didn't make any adjustments in the Phillipines after knowing Pearl had just been pounded.Planes were still lined up on the air fields and defensive measures weren't taken when he had a hole day to react. In his abscence GOD knows how many GIs/Phillipinos suffered horrifically and that arrogant ass is having a a film reel made about himself. He rehersed that landing bit over a Dozen times - a DOZEN AT ABOUT 3:40 A.M. on December 8, 1941, the phone rang inside Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur’s lavish apartment atop the Manila Hotel. It was MacArthur’s chief of staff, calling with the shocking news that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor earlier that morning—December 7 across the international date line in Hawaii. MacArthur, commander of American forces in the Philippines, hastened to his headquarters, where his air chief arrived shortly thereafter with a request: Major General Lewis H. Brereton wanted permission to launch a bombing raid against Japanese bases in Formosa before the Japanese could strike Clark Field, the main American air base in the Philippines. Despite repeated appeals from Brereton, however, and even several minor Japanese air raids on the Philippines, nearly seven hours went by before MacArthur finally authorized the strike By then, it was too late. At 12:30 p.m. Brereton’s B-17 Flying Fortresses were on the ground at Clark Field, being fueled and loaded with bombs for the Formosa mission, when 88 Japanese bombers and fighters attacked. Brereton’s B-17s were defenseless. Of the 17 on the ground at the time, 12 were destroyed and five were badly damaged. Not a single one was flyable. Brereton’s heavy bombers were the linchpin of the Philippines’ planned defense—but in one stroke, Japan had obliterated that threat. Why MacArthur had held back and waited for the enemy to strike first was a mystery even to his colleagues. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall couldn’t fathom “how MacArthur happened to let his planes get caught on the ground,”
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  2266. Complaints go up orders come down. Whatever Brereton did or didn't do was approved by who? A certain FM who evidently was AWOL. Antwerp was taken - the problem was opening Scheldt River and it's estuary that was mined across and had pockets of Reich resistance all over. SHAEFs directive of Sept 4th was to open up the deep water port that was the largest on the coast. It's massive port could sustain an operation the size of OMG. And as previously noted Monty was made aware of the logistical problems of almost twice as many flights as June 6th on much shorter days and longer routes. It's amazing the ignorance of people who comment o such events. Excerpt From The Brereton Diaries:11 September 1941-8 May 1945 “There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, informed me that at General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission. I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, he still insists, we will go in as planned Excerpt From The Brereton Diaries: 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 It absolutely was a plea to change the order A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit ​ Monty was a supposed Field Marshall after reviewing his battle assessment he should have changed the order of battle. General Taylor went to see him 4 days before the drops to do precisely that but Monty wouldn't budge
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  2268. Like Monty lyndon/Burnhole here lie alot. They ignore the truth because it does not get the bent freak monty.The column madeit 3 miles before the poundings started.Monty like pretty much everything he touched deserves to get drubbed only fanboys 75 yrs later try writing another narrative.Why did Robinson with no orders move his tank while Carrington who guys like Lyndon here refer to as "LORD" stay put. From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p229 Monty liked to keep his objectives vague,so that if there was a break out he could claim credit for it.And if the operation ran into the sand he could simply say that they'd been tying down the German Forces to help the Americans The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a considerable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations. Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and September 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions. Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities That tended to run counter to those aims Browning who handed over to Brerton that all 17 Bridges had to be sized with thunderclap surprise.And stressed that time constraints meant any arrangements at this stage had to be binding,before imposing a series of conditions and constraints From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke.It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp .General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial The Americans/Germans even members of the IRISH Guards agree but this is all still on Monty problems arose everywhere that either he or his plans were involved. Monty didn't show up to direct his own operations as it was coming apart rather quickly and by the seams
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  2293. '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears. Alan Brooke's own words​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
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  2295. Looks like who needed a helping hand? Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.160 "In private to Herriman. "The PM bluntly stated that he could see no prospect of victory until the United States came into the war." DeGaulle said after Pearl Harbor; "well the war is over. Of course, there are more operations,battles and struggles ahead; but the out come is no longer in doubt. In this industrial war nothing can resist the power of American industry. From now on the British will do nothing with out Roosevelt's agreement." Harold Nicolson wrote "we simply can't be beaten with America in But how strange it is that this great event should be recorded and welcomed here with out any jubilation. We should have gone mad with joy if it had happened a year ago....not an American Flag flying in the whole of London - how odd we are." Churchill had cabled to Antony Eden who was en route to Moscow - "The ascension of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory." Churchill after Pearl Harbor No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” . Type this into the search field of Youtube The Friendship Between Britain And The USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt | Timeline go to 2:30 then listen.Churchill emphatically stated his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States.” That night of December 7, 1941, Churchill wrote in a draft of his memoirs that 'saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.'
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  2311. AGAIN WATH THE VIDEO - here you go Burns You read from Nigel the Nutthugger,really next to Neilands and you noboby blows Monty more.Monty wasn't a commander he was dropped into circumstamnces he couldn't lose.The Navy and Air Force choked the Axis supply lines.He had about 3:1 ratio in manpower and 4:1in Armor and artillery.And overwhelming in Air Cover.Only closer to Algeria did the Reich have any Air Cover.Read Desert Generals,The Rommel Papers or An Army at Dawn From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle, American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 284 Montgomery relied on the effect of Allied artillery & air force rather than maneuver From Desert Generals by Corelli Barnett,pages 236-37 Montgomery was seldom able to assess the combat effectiveness and intentions of his enemy.Barnett wrote "A student noted a typical scheme of Montgomery's dealt with 'Our sides' plans;but the enemy intentions or reactions were not imagined,either as a source of danger or opportunity.
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  2314. So what you found some one who likes him his pathetic European Campaign speaks for itself Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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  2318. WATCH THE VIDEO You can print Hamilton's whole book here if you want to thicko,he's nothing but a silly scribbler not unlike yourself.Try Corelli Barrett,Max Hastings,Dr Niall Barr,Dr William Buckingham,Antony Beevor,David Bennet - you know someone with pedigree Ike orderes the Marseilles-Toulon amphibious invasion because he needed all the ways possible to get those proverbial 600 to 800 tons of supplies per day for each American infantry division. IKE NEEDED THE PORT OF ANTWERP for the shiploads of supplies he had to have everyday not worthless isolated bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem. Ike was good at thinking in strategic terms. Churchill wanted those V-weapons sights cleared because more British civilians were killed from those Crossbow launching sights than British soldiers in combat.Remember those pesky facts that EACH American Armored division required around 850 tons of supplies per DAY for sustained offensive operations. EACH mechanized or motorized U.S. Army infantry division required 600 to 800 tons of supplies for sustained offensive operations per DAY. Oddball SOK wrote and isn't it ironic that the biggest Rhine bifurcation was the WAAL at Nijmegen and the 30crps effectively HAD crossed the Rhine and all they had to do is do the same as the Germans at Pannerden Ferry:PUT TANKS ACROSS THE Pannerden and you were in free accessible German tank land !Only a small river Oude Ijssel at Doetinchem (which was there too after Market Garden ;p )and go go go into das deutsche Reich?!Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944.So tell me, how come ? How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over,under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November Just look at it at google maps: the river looks like nothing...
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  2324. It is unlikely that a person of your status among the ignorant could teach me a thing * https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1* Churchill warned Roosevelt that his country would not be able to pay cash for military supplies or shipping much longer https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc Why couldn’t Britain pay? Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States. From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources.But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most. The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
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  2329. The contempt shown for Britain's much-bruited naval prowess was epitomised by Japanese torpedo bombers destroying HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in a matter of 10 minutes off the cost of Malaya as the Japanese infantry overpowered all before it. In response, Curtin put the nation on a total war footing and there were warnings of invasion. At the same time, he memorably wrote in the Melbourne Herald: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with Britain." "We know the problems that Britain faces" We know the dangers of dispersal of strength but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy." Nope From the beginning of WWII until the United States reduced the IJN at Midway and Guadalcanal, the Imperial Japanese Navy was superior to the Royal Navy. As capital ships, battleships were obsolete. If we assume that the start of WW2 was 1941 when the IJN Imperial Japanese Navy turned a European war into a global conflict, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the strongest - stronger than even the USN. The Japanese navy had an elite naval aviation force - and their bombers with superior range (because they didn't bother with armor or self-sealing tanks) were superb ship-killers. They had the Long Lance torpedoes which to the dismay of the British and Americans were more robust and could be launched further and faster than anyone else; and because they were oxygen powered left no visible trails. They operated very strong offensive land based air units - fast twin engine torpedo bombers. That is how they easily sank the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse - which was in the words of Churchill one of his greatest shocks. Compare that action with the battles with the Bismarck. What did the British have in comparison? In 1941 the British navy was still operating antiquated Swordfish biplanes. Their RN carriers could only operate a quarter of the number of aircraft the IJN could. In a major naval engagement the RN would most likely lose. The IJN cruisers and destroyers were also fast and heavily armed and excelled in night fighting - they did tremendous damage to the USN during the initial naval battles (until the USN mastered radar controlled gun fire) The IJN had11 Fleet Carriers, 10 Battleships, 40 Cruisers, 112 Destroyers and 63 Submarines. At the same time Period, Royal Navy have were 4 Fleet Carrier and 3 Escort Carrier, 15 Battleship and Battlecruiser, 66 Cruiser, 184 Destroyers, 60 Submarines Due to, undisputed Superiority of Aircraft in Naval engagement in WW2 - The IJN Bigger carrier fleet and Air power - combined with high morale and experience from war in China. It make them easily the Strongest Naval Power on the Planet for that period From the beginning of WWII until the United States reduced the IJN at Midway and Guadalcanal, the Imperial Japanese Navy was superior to the Royal Navy. As capital ships, battleships were obsolete. That does not mean that battleships were useless, just not capable of defeating the new capital ship, which was the aircraft carrier. The carriers of the Royal were excellent ships and they were famously armored for the European theater. However, the carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy could out plane and out range them. For some reason, just prior to WWII, the Royal Navy skipped developing the next generation of carrier-borne aircraft. The Imperial Japanese Navy fielded more modern aircraft and a better aerial torpedo than the Royal Navy. That is why the IJN was superior. A comparison of aircraft illustrates the point. Planes that entered service after 1942 are omitted because by 1943, the IJN had already been defeated by the United States Navy. In order the numbers given are speed in miles per hour, ceiling in feet, and range in miles. Torpedo Bombers: Fairey Albacore: 162/20,500/930 Fairey Swordfish: 138/19,000/545 Nakajima B5N: 235/27,000/1200 Dive Bombers: Blackburn B25 Roc: 224/18,000/811 Aichi D3A Val: 267/34,000/840 Fighters and fighter-bombers: Fairey Fulmar: 272/27,000/780 Hawker Sea Hurricane: 314/34,500/750 Supermarine Seafire (?): 348/24,000/553 Mitsubishi A6M Rei-sen: 354/37,000/1200 Aerial Torpedoes: British Type XII: 40 knots/not applicable/1500 yards British Type XIV (?): 45 knots/not applicable/ 2950 yards Japanese Type 91: 40 knots/not applicable/ 2200 yards Radar gave the British some advantage, but not enough to offset the Japanese advantage in range. The Japanese also had better aerial torpedoes, which is what sinks ships, heavily armored or not. Advantage Japan. Of course, against the USN, it was a different story.
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  2331. WIKI again what about it? It appears youve been editing it content to back your bombast. The Empire had more men but the GI's took more casualties.And the UK left ANZAC hanging. So what is your point except the one on your head? The USA held the Japanes in check that you fauntleroys srrender 81,000 to and and Hong kong also.The ANZACs hated your brandy adled churchill that left them in the lurch.No worries the USA ruled the waves Australia's perilous situation throughout 1942 as repeated attacks aimed at Australia by Japan were repulsed by American and Australian forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and in the bloody Kokoda and Guadalcanal campaigns. Important changes in Japan's strategic aims were produced during 1942 by events such as the carrier-launched Doolittle Raid on Japan and as the tide of the Pacific War turned against Japan. Those changes are mentioned elsewhere in the context of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Kokoda Campaign, and the Guadalcanal Campaign. None of which the British participated in The US Pacific Fleet by 1945 comprised 1200 ships. All of the major battles in the Pacific War were naval: Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, Phillippine Sea, Leyte Gulf, and Okinawa in none of which did the Brits took any part. The Royal Navy did manage to assemble a Pacific Fleet late in the war, in November, 1944, consisting of 214 ships. The RN fleet took part in no major battles having been designed merely to "fly the flag," probably to attempt to regain lost colonies after the Japanese defeat. The British managed to avoid the heaviest fighting in both Europe and the Pacific, leaving it to the Russians to defeat Germany and the Americans to defeat Japan.The UK had no role at all in the occupation of Japan. South East Asia Command’s operations were the cause of much bitter argument between the British and the Americans, exemplified by the American claim that the command’s initials, SEAC, stood for Save England’s Asian Colonies.There was much truth in this, and the Americans did not necessarily share this aim But talk up the Victorious that sailed under the umbrella of the US 3rd Fleet as the Enterprise was refitted/repaired Year end: Dec 31, 1942, In the Pacific Four of the five great carrier battles of WW2 have been fought. While losing 4 of the 6 Carriers of the US Pacific Fleet Lexington (may '42) Yorktown (June '42) Wasp (Sept '42) Hornet( Oct '42) How many British Carriers were lost in the ferocious fighting? ZERO stay inland in Burma so they didn't get annilated - agian
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  2339. Montgomery never halted the rocket attacks nor did he cross the rhine for 6 more months. And nobody pressured Winston into installing Monty when much better officers had already won in the Desert.Both O'Connor and Auchinleck. His real intent was to get headlines and beat the Americans across.He didn't do that either but got even mor men butchered with Operation Victory. From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,29 A merger over all would have permitted a more efficient allocation of air transport assets.This was a matter of some urgency,given that the British were becoming increasing reliant upon USAAF resources owing to the on going failure of the Air Ministry to supply sufficient aircraft and personnel to lift more than a fraction of the British Airborne force From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial. The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination, the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances. (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days) From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p49 Major General Richard Gale who converted the British Airborne from a small group of Raiders into a conventional parachute brigade in confidence told Major G.G.Norton in the '70s then curator of the Airborne Forces Museum "that he would rather have resigned his command than execute MARKET as it was foisted on Urquhart" .It is unclear if Gale made his views clear to Browning at the time From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,490-491 Launching Market in a no moon period ruled out a night landing and lack of illumination was also a factor in restricting flight operations.The allied airlift lacked sufficient navigators and trained crews.The post Overlord expansion of aircraft numbers created a shortage of ground crews to service,refuel and repair the aircraft in the time available.There was insufficient transport aircraft to move all three Air Born Divisions simultaneously in their entirety. *Browning was essentially powerless owing to the total control the RAF exercised over the planning and delivery process*However he was connected to a number of errors and these were largely committed because of personal ambition.
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  2351. 2nd fiddle Johnny much like you and Villa at parties A couple of fine British Historians,not the Carnival Barkers you quote. Burns Big Book of Bollocks 🤣 Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War. Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there
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  2355. Now Johnny have your handler read all of this to you, of course this being after Benrard and the Burns family got sheperded out of Norway,Netherlands,Belgium,France,Dunkirk and off of the continent Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak Fancy some more?
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  2363. not a little bit - at least on his Monty Garden boards.He listed books he read on the subject an most don't come to his conclusions because I had used quotes from the books to shoot down his robust theories getting monty off the hook. TIK slowly bends the narrative to appear legitimate He's actually a gamer and that were he gets all his maps and such. The 82nd airborne or any one else were not responsible for that debacle except monty for pushing for it and IKE for letting him off his leash. Many brought this up also,sadly many of those posts mysteriously went missing. TIK covers for the fact the Crown needed and received our help, they couldn’t forgive us for the humiliation of becoming a junior partner to a country they couldn't colonize - twice. A little too much for someone who thinks Englishmen are "LORDS" He quoted two guys(Nielands & Poulussen) that were neither peer reviewed or accredited Historians that access proper historical resource. For instance WIKI that you our I can edit all day long and many do and I actually went in to correct one of these revisioinst slappies. Read It Never Snows in September by the Germans Sabastian Ritchie,Arnhem Myth and Reality ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" by R.W. Thompson A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 by Antony Beevor - all British Historians both Monty and TIK get jiggy with the facts
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  2370. Look matt, you're a confused, nationalistic fanboi spitting out complete fantasy nonsense. From a Balkans Poster - Monty was mediocre - to arguably even poor. Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Montgomery does and regardless of what happens to him - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order Your argument for Montgomery's quality as a general seems to be based on revision and Germany losing WWII :-). I can't think of a more dimwitted position. He was in fact one the worst overall commander of any combatant in WWII. Your claims are so absurd it basically disqualifies you from any serious discussion on this topic. You are an indoctrinated fauntleroy and don't know the first thing about what you're talking about. Monty didn't plan Normandy ,he planned the disaster at Caen you unread rube.Adml Ramsay and US Officers brought in from the Pacific that were landing every damn day planned the beach landings.The only thing Monty knew of beaches was getting shoved off one at Dunkirk. Of course after the GIs arrived that never happened again.Bernard had 4 full years to cross 30 miles of channel,go ask the euros shouldn't take you 4 yrs Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan. National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war.Monty was jealous of the success of others and unable to admit that something had not gone exactly as he had intended
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  2371. Try by using using the address bar at the top of the page to relieve others from the responsibility of furthering your education. You were wrong about what stopped the column immediately and you are wrong here. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones 🔶 There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd. So these slappies apply their British Mythology and try to blame bernard's buffoonery on an Americans 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN 🔶 The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command 🔶 Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown 🔶 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔶 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔶 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
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  2419. More fauntleroys singing out of key, john burns being unbelievable has switched to his davemac account - interesting Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Capt. David Fraser who as a Grenadier took part in the Battle of Nijmegen wrote later "with out Antwerp, I do not believe that Market Garden could possibly have been exploited for the pupose for which it was devised. Operation Market Garden was as an exact sense ,futile . It was thoroughly a bad idea, badly planned and only tragically redeemed by the outstanding courage of those who executed it". He also believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton.There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” -Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes. Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles
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  2423.  @davidrendall7195  Thanx for your response and sharing your insight but that is not proof of anything & doesn't go with saying The Auk should be let go especially after just winning 1st Alamein. So what - Monty was an insider doesn't change the fact that during Caen,Falaise,Monty Garden he was a marginal Commander at best insubordinate/incompetent at worst.He in fact telling out right lies during Caen and OMG telling IKE/Brooke/Press things were going smashingly when in fact they were swirling the drain. And the Auk/Dorman-Smith laid those mine fields at Alam Halfa Ridge that the Knob Monty tried to take credit for. So the Auk was set up to fail? Perhaps Brooke should have taken the high road and not done that. But not sure if that is something that is bred into the Aristocracy . I could see if O'Connor was available but Monty?Meh - regarding Collins we're splitting hairs he was mentioning actual commanding chronological order so sans the ranks he's right about positioning While Claude certainly hung onto Cunnigham and Ritchie too long it certainly wasn't more flagrant than Monty's cock ups. After Gott's plane never arrived courtesy of the Luftwaffe Monty didn't go on the offensive for 9 weeks and that was Auchinleck's time line. Winnie sacked him for not moving immediately - that was wrong. Time was needed to refit/resupply and obviously reinforce. Monty turned around and told Winnie he had to do all of those things.So the PM had to eat crow as he wasn't never admitting The Auk was let go under false pretenses. Bernard fed the hero starved press a lot of hooey and played them like a cheap violin. His pumped up resume from the Desert is collected from a situation that any capable commander could have handled - seriously. He created absolutely Zero of those many advantages in N.A.,8th Army morale wasn't low after just tasting victory - that's a bunch of revisionist rot Coningham/Cunningham (alsoTedder)hated his guts and not out of professional jealousy .They did so much to clear the Med's Skies/Seas of the Wehrmacht supply line. Bernard couldn't help himself telling any one who would listen how he did it all. Of course no one could mention ULTRA he prattled on obnoxiously so. Once in Normandy the BEF was hemmed in on the beach as he didn't grab or clear any airfields.This is where his bs was on display as he made it clear (obviously it wasn't) that he was going to break out and head inland with out grabbing airfields. That was an objective he blew past and Mallorey/Tedder/Coningham were none to happy PS I don't get the "too Senior to Command" statement about The Auk - then what great things did he go on and do in India? Were these administrative? IMO Claude worked off of Smith well and vise versa. I know about Gott/Slim but am not familiar with Anderson/Lumsden
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  2424. There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration: -- The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. -- The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. -- General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps. In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges. -- Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem. -- Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. -- Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway, the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. -- Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, “The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.”
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  2425. Center of Military History The United States Army The Sigfried Line Campaign Page174 Spearheading* the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal. Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on Arnhem Counting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem Borrowed this from a US vet on these pages Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did. The subordinate commanders only planned their part of the operation based on the flawed intelligence provided to them by Montgomery's HQ. Instead of facing old men, cripples, and boys, the Airborne Carpet of Market Garden was thrown against two SS Panzer Divisions, and other quality German Units. Hell even the Luftwaffe showed up for a bit. People criticize Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne for taking the time to secure his drop zones, and supplies before attempting to take the Nijmegen bridge. That is just stupid criticism from people who benefit from 20/20 hindsight. What do you call an Airborne soldier with no secure drop zones and no re-supply? You call that Airborne soldier a corpse, or a prisoner of war. See British First Airborne
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  2428.  @davidrendall7195  Little Villa calls me Para Dave(repeatedly) because I defended your dismemberment of his mate John Cornell - a sick little joke between the two .Who evidently has changed his name but still cavorts with his tart Vile .If you'd like I can direct you to his unflattering remarks, provided Villa hasn't deleted them. Vile has crapped on dead GIs blaming them repeatedly. Villa didn't leave a link because he'd be pointing out his own slanderous cheap shots that he mentioned regarding you go ahead sak him for links,he has the spine of a gummy bear.Go look for yourself the shit he has said on the 8,000 post TIK board(waste of time)and now (s)he's pissing his bloomers knowing you'd beat him like a dusty rug. Ask him about his mum who took 3 Gerries prisoner.He gets his wires crossed all the time,even tried babbling about the obsolete German equipment.I broke down every tank/artillery/pistol/rifle/land mine,pointed out V-rockets,ME 262,yup really behind the times.And the authors he slanders have the bibliography to prove it.Ya Dr Buckingham is shyt,but he'll quote a hack that wrote 90 books in 30 years under different names - and only 30 of them on the war. Villa makes up shit tell him to pull the actuall post where I degraded cancer sufferers - this is what a petulant juvenile (s)he is. As he was badmouthing GIs I simply pointed out my sources were taken from the archives at The Center of Military History of the United States Army.And that his fictitious formations were coerced from a guy who had 5 wives and committed suicide.That is nothing like him throwing dead GI's under the bus in an attempt to prop up a someone who wasn't even there to direct VILLA is a sick knob who has made up other accounts to agree with himself.just a coincidence I'm sure Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
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  2429. Vile Just so you don't go back and and start deleting posts there are 2975 there You have the spine of a Gummybear sucking up to a guy you were badmouthing 2 yrs ago with Cornell. Since you seem inclined to share old posts you obviously left out what I was responding to so here goes.I mentioned 2-3 years ago the guy had a relative in OMG and attended Sandhurst and sarcastically you flip the script. Seagulls have come out of jet engines making more sense than You juvenile delinquent troll act all offended when you get responses to posts like those VVVV The Villa Aston1 year ago ​ @akgeronimo501 Big Woody also goes by the name of 'Para Dave' - who has been to Sandhurst and is a realtive of Brian Urquhart. Doubtless the only Sandhurst he has been to is Sandhurst Drive, Cleveland, Ohio, USA. The bit about Brian Urquhart might be true. After all, its so likely that a relative of a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations would comment on YouTube. The Villa Aston1 year ago My mother captured a German airman in September 1940. Doubtles his mum, when confronted with his biological father and a few others said 'OK, I will take you all on, you can toss a coin to decide who goes first.' I am not a nice person.Btw. You and Para Dave/Big Woody's mother have a connection. Signed The Cad. The Villa Aston1 year ago @akgeronimo501 R Damn what? Jabo's sister, Para Dave / Big Woody's mother. Para Dave's, sorry Big Woody's mum made a mistake in the back seat of a car in Cleveland , Ohio, USA about 17 years ago. I wonder if the biological dad is British. It might explain a lot. Big Woody1 year ago @TheVilla Aston dickhead for the 20th time you keep telling yourself this Para Dave bullcrap and for the 21st time I'll tell you delusional asshole produce a post - that I claim to be the guy who destroyed your bitch Cornhole .Still hoping Ireland gets fire bombed? You've been caught lying almost as much as Burns and Monty .Oh now you quote Hastings when it serves your purpose. Book and Page number please Big Woody1 year ago VA I see you actually came across Dave Rendall - why didn't you call him out about his relatives at OMG. You talk a lot of shit out of hearing distance don't you?It was on TIK's Beevor Board - ya know TIK - the guy you claimed on this board to know nothing about .You have one thing right - Lying Hound, ROTFL
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  2430. Quick check on Lumsden, having served under Monty and MacArthur - which I can't even imagine - he's earned the pearly gates Career In January 1942 Lumsden joined the Desert War when he was appointed commander of the 1st British Armed Division. Soon after arriving he was badly wounded in an air attack and was replaced by Frank Messervy. Lumsden returned to duty in May, 1942, and serving under Neil Richie, suffered defeat at Gazala in June. This military disaster resulted in the appointment of General Bernard Montgomery as commander of the Eighth Army. Montgomery immediately removed most of the senior officers who had been fighting in Egypt under General Claude Auchinleck. As Lumsden had only just arrived he was promoted to commander of the new 10th Corps. Lumsden suffered heavy losses in the battle at Kidney Hill (27th October - 4th November) but still managed to break through the lines of the Deutsches Afrika Korps and reached El Agheila. General Bernard Montgomery and Lumsden disagreed about the tactics being used in the Desert War and this led to several arguments. On 13th December 1942 Montgomery sacked Lumsden and replaced him with Brian Horrocks. Afterwards Lumsden commented that "There just isn't room in the desert for two - like Montgomery and me." Lumsden was liked and respected by Winston Churchill and in 1944 he was sent to join the staff of General Douglas MacArthur. On 6th January 1945 Lumsden was observing the bombardment of Lingayen Gulf on board New Mexico when it was hit by a kamikaze pilot. Herbert Lumsden died from his injuries and was buried at sea.
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  2446.  @OldWolflad  The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. Montgomery discounted the basic logistical reality that he ignored not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers The Germans had mastered this practice exiting the Eastern Front then proceeding to France. The German Divisions could be quickly refitted and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go Also ignoring the ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Montgomery *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border town of Neerpelt. And it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out. But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe.It was a bad plan right from the start and right from the top - MONTY GARDEN* 🔸 The 1st day Panzerfaust teams were taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt .Bringing the whole column to a halt. XXX Corp advance stopped for the night 7 miles from the start!!! This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command 🔸 The lack of initiative/tactics by ground force commanders - Dempsey/Horrocks/Vandeleur sitting on their arses in their tanks until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the afternoon - did they think they would catch up? Stopping at 6:00 pm when it was dark by 7:30 (5 hours later) on the 1st day? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown Instead of limping into Valkenswaard 🔸 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
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  2461. As much as I admired Churchill the statesman in military matters he faffed thing to hell and back. You know this after watching the desert generals doco https://youtu.be/duOYnIGivys?t=1580 time stamped were Historians Barr and Barnett blast Monty's novelish narrative. Claude Auchinleck and Dorman -Smith had just won 1st Alamein FDR and American Foreign Policy,1932-1945,by Robert Dallek,page 347 "Trobruk has surrendered with 25,000 men taken prisoner "the telegram said."....one of the heaviest blows I can recall during the war......I did not attempt to hide from the president the shock I had received" Churchill wrote President Roosevelt made an offer of immediate help. The Americans agreed to ship 300 new Sherman tanks and 150 self propelled 105mm howitzers to the British in North Africa Auchinleck didn't have these as they had not yet arrived but won anyway.So Churchill demands they immediately go on the offensive.They had to refit,resupply,reinforce first.Which would take some time.When Gott got killed in the plane crash they brought in the pedo-Monty.Who sat on his ass for 9 weeks!Which was the time Auchinleck wanted in the 1st place.Luckily for the runt Monty Rommel had to attack because the Torch Landings were bringing in more men/material and the mine fields Auchinlech had laid prevented the Afrika Corp from advancing on the flank at Alam Halfa.Also the Tanks/Artillary that FDR gave Churchill were delivered after Monty got there.He was an extremely lucky little bitch.9weeks he did nothing but Churchill had just fired a much better commander than the Pedo.That video says it all for those to lazy to read
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  2470. Nobody studies Monty manuevers except for you and the other 4 aliases on your account Johnny. You have a particular faculty of realizing hallucinations,has Montgomery been getting rough with you in the tub again? Ring the nurses station and report this!!! The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at 9 days of Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. *Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success - it was a failure. Look at a map you don't get it - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war. Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up.Patton wasn't going to leave 90,000 Landsers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th read it - There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. General De Gaulle, but most importantly the French people, wanted German Wehrmacht divisions beaten, destroyed or otherwise pushed out of France. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced ferro concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers. And the GIs still took it on Dec 13th
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  2476. no Johnny's not corret he's a bent freak with a bruised brain. Monty's boss and everyone else blamed the ankle biter From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Bernard stayed back at his caravan and gave John Burns THE FULL MONTY
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  2497. Here is a clarification for you "Montgomery Memoirs page 276" "The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September." So clearly Monty stated they were "my plans" that 34,000 went into arnhem and 17,000 came out - in 9 days - there's your hero & the culprit The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." ( from Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." MONTY GARDEN And at no point did Gavin or Browning stop to reconoiterre the woods.But British fanbois bring that up to stear attention away XXX Corp in the so called armored advanced that was 24 hrs behind by the end of Day two.Tea time and walkabouts
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  2524.  @etangdescygnes  he did,Little Villa is a bullshit revisionist and throws dead GIs under the bus to save British face. You can get these books and check out these references - Even Brooke The Top British Officer and Admiral Ramsay both blamed Bernard. There is alot more but you'll see the point From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p229 Monty liked to keep his objectives vague,so that if there was a break out he could claim credit for it.And if the operation ran into the sand he could simply say that they'd been tying down the German Forces to help the Americans The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945, page 495 “The little British Field-Marshall’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944 The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction
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  2547. Bullcrap Johnnie,page number and book you plaster your bollocks in italics hoping no one looks it up. The 43 wessex just arrived last week. But hey they showed up unlike Monty, the evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered? How about these guys below? Unlike you or Monty they were all there 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked *"the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance ' Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords, were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. *That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem" Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major is even less charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces. Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians. Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept.
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  2562.  @johnbrereton5229  They were finally forced to surrender after Monty let them go repeatedly.The British Navy,Air Force and ULTRA all made this Possible. The only reason Winston hung on to monty was because he realized his mistake of interferring with the other two (O'Conno & Auchinleck) The Germans had alreay Dunkirked Monty when the odds were even. As bent as you are you could taken those armies and won - MONTY built NONE of it. Monty's so called advance in a desert was emptier than his head. In 1500 miles he let Rommel escape time after time with the bigest advantages of any general in the Desert. Much more than either Auchinleck and O'Connor. Monty's clownish attempts at command would be pointed out the rest of the war .Much worse at commanding than you are commenting - that's quite distressing I'm sure you'd agree *Rommel's War in Africa,W.Heckman,p.312 "Field Marshall Rommel judges the tactics and operations, but not the supply situation to be favorable......fuel stocks at the front line are not adequate for both the German or Italian side" An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p418-20 The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front.The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again" The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521​ Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it. Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable."
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  2577. The Brits weren't arrogant it was slappies like burns and bernard,let's see shall we 1940 Norway the Burns family of warriors lasted 13 days,then Netherlands,Belgium,France - Dunkirk.A whole 16 days fighting 4 days scrambling up the gang planks. After the GIs arrived you weren't Dunkirked again - imagine that.Tell your twisted tales to Trinidad & Tobago and look up Monty and Lucian Trueb. Read these direct quotes not from your ample backside Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.160 "In private to Herriman. "The PM bluntly stated that he could see no prospect of victory until the United States came into the war." DeGaulle said after Pearl Harbor; "well the war is over. Of course, there are more operations,battles and struggles ahead; but the out come is no longer in doubt. In this industrial war nothing can resist the power of American industry. From now on the British will do nothing with out Roosevelt's agreement." Harold Nicolson wrote "we simply can't be beaten with America in But how strange it is that this great event should be recorded and welcomed here with out any jubilation. Churchill had cabled to Antony Eden who was en route to Moscow - "The ascension of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory." Churchill after Pearl Harbor No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” . The Friendship Between Britain And The USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt | Timeline go to 2:30 then listen.*Churchill emphatically stated his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States.”* That night of December 7, 1941, Churchill wrote in a draft of his memoirs that 'saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.' There you have it Johnny you can return to your coloring books but please pick up your plastic army soldiers - the nurses there at the home keep slipping on them
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  2585.  @sean640307  sources? by who?when? Investigate,bring evidence if it's not asking too much.Matter of fact why don't we leave this cheering section and try a comment section with some credibility rather than carnival barking. The so called host here deletes information accurate but opposed to the revisionist narritive he's trying to drive home. The Americans by this time had more men coming in had higher casualties because they weren't hunkered down in one place. In deed the broad front was proving deadly as they not Bernard fanned out. The Tommies thought shackled by Monty still gave a good account of themselves My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day. Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress. With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.551-52 Rommel reported on June 12th in Normandy would be rendered exceptionally difficult and partially immpossible by the extraordinary strong and in some respects overwhelmingly superiority of the Allied Air Force and by the effect of the heavy naval artillery....the enemy has complete control over the battle area and up to 60 miles behind the front Almost all transport on roads and in open country is prevented by day by strong fighter bomber and heavy bomber formations. Movements of our troops by day are also almost completely stopped, while the enemy can move freely.....this crippling and destructive operation of the enemy Air Force With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.557*​​ The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. *I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles.After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.559 The problem was Montgomery who could be neither removed or moved to action. Later that day, Generals Morgan and Gale,Deputy CoS and Senior Administrative officer respectively, spoke to me of their apprehensions about the slow pace of the Army's advance D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p229 Eisenhower was fuming with impatience,yet Monty refused to be hurried and 21st Army HQ provided SHAEF with little information. Montgomery had mentioned to Dempsey on quite a few occasions "there's no need to tell IKE" Montgomery liked to keep objectives vague,often with metaphors, so if there was a breakout he could claim credit for it and if the operation ran into the sand he could say that they had simply been tying down the German forces to help out the Americans. IT was not of course Montgomery who determined this state of affairs but the Germans who sent their Panzer Divisions My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day" With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause. Montgomery had in effect stopped his armour from going farther.Later I reported saying that the British Chiefs of Staff would "support any recommendation that Ike might care to make in respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push" Air Marshall Tedder thru ULTRA had been reading the reports,it appears the massive bombings and Naval Shellings must have taken place as as IKE's personal aide Butcher,Rommel and Tedder all apparently agree. Tedder goes on to agree with Conningham also. So tell me where was he banging away here, taken right from HQ,Monty's a proven liar. Probably why you won't re-visist Desert Generals. Where 3 of the 4 Historians point out his inflating his roll and ghastly diregarding others contributions. Everyone,EVERYONE in SHAEF heard Monty's directives to take CAEN on D-Day. To take on D+ One is too late.
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  2586. Tedder is not the one with credibility issues - Montgomery is, all of these men there and in real time are full of it,bang on revisionist With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies​ in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.275 Monty launched Goodwood on July 18,It was preceded by a massive air attack.Some 1,700 heavy bombers and plus 400 medium bombers dropped nearly 8,000 tons of bombs on the German front. On the afternoon of July 20 when the rains turned the battleground into a sea of mud,Monty, declaring himself well pleased with the results of Goodwood,abruptly halted it. It had gained six miles south of the city. The cost had been appalling:4,000 casualties and 500 tanks - over 1/3 of all the tanks in Monty's command​. Monty oversold Goodwood and his preliminary "ballyhoo" was too exultant and a disastrous miscalculation had raised expectations to an almost giddy level and then dashed them.IKE,Bedell-Smith, Tedder and the whole of SHAEF was furious with Monty Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.171 Not surprisingly nowhere in Dempsey's diary or notes for this period is there any mention what so ever of a British strategy of attracting and pinning down Rommel's reserves Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.247 SHAEF and COSSAC Planning Officer, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean is quoted as calling Monty a "big cheat" in his claims: "for Montgomery to say that he was holding the Germans so Bradley could break out was absolute rubbish and a complete fabrication that only developed after he was stopped outside of Caen" *https://warfarehistorynetwork.com Montgomery began his disinformation campaign by claiming that it was not important either to take Caen or to gain any more ground in the Caen sector* Other British officers who had served with Montgomery during the war were not convinced of his claim that attracting the German armor to Caen had always been part of his plan. Montgomery’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Francis De Guingand wrote, “We had, as I have already said, hoped to take Caen and get out into the open country beyond in the first few days and in that event we should have been able to make the fullest use of our tanks.”​ P.J. Grigg worked at the War Office in London but made frequent trips to France and was thoroughly familiar with Montgomery’s plans. After the war he wrote, “Of course his [Montgomery’s] original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen into the open in the first few days after landing—it would be idle to deny that*. The problem was that Montgomery never admitted to anyone that he had changed his plans. *Grigg remarked that Montgomery “tried to make himself look bigger by saying he planned it all beforehand. He didn’t.”
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  2590. Monty? Puhleeeze,What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.......and poorly. He was a propped up fraud and rode everyone else's accumulative hard work to a headline.Until the truth unraveled and it was obvious his command abilities were greatly exaggerated as IKE later figured out​ This is why he was so loathed amongst other British Commanders.The navies & air corps completely strangled the Afrika Corp even Monty couldn't cock it up .The British Press needed a Hero and Monty reveled in the roll,pissing off the others who had done so much for the War effort.He loved grabbing the Glory at least twice later he almost got sacked.And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have. Claude Auchinleck and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th. Auchilech/Dorman-Smith were relieved and General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win. Churchill wrongly removed The Auk because he insisted(rightfully) they needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for by Churchill. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. In the desert Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount.Yet the yapping little jackel Monty didn't grab airfields or open any ports - this continued into Italy- Normandy. Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for)also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point.And they also had 2 fresh divisions moved over from the Nile Delta. Then The Torch Landings forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.And of course ULTRA was now fully operation and provided updates. By August '42 USA had sent the 300 Shemans and over 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers sent by Order of FDR.The 8th Army had an 5:1advantage of tanks over the AK.And with the landings 3:1 in manpower.​ The Afrika Korp was short on everything and their armor and vehicles had been in the desert for over 2 yrs. The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. So even you can clearly see reality exists All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and deflecting blame that was - all thru the war. In 1500 miles with overwhelming advantages Monty never captured Rommel.Hell even you could have won there Monty left a vastly numerical inferior forces in front of him get away None of those benefits were enjoyed by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith. Save the Air Superiority. All of it in place and none of it Bernard's doing long before he sashayed into this mirage. Page 33, Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
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  2591.  @robertmoneypenny6028  Truth, EVERYTHING was already in place to win in the desert. Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation Auchileck/Dorman-Smith needed 6 weeks to refit,reinforce and resupply. Made perfect sense sand in all of the equipment and working parts. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance​ - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place. 🔶The Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria. Claude Auchinleck called over two fresh divisions from the Nile Delta after winning 1st alamein.Both of these troop deployments forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with. And he wasn't getting either reinforced or resupplied 🔶Monty didn't defeat Rommel in Africa. The British Navy did by starving Rommel of resources. 🔶Monty didn't build up the arms/men/tanks/materiel - the allies did -Dorman-Smith had engineers and infantry plant the massive mine field on the Alam Halfa ridge , that Bernard attempted to take credit for. 🔶ULTRA became fully operational in August 1942 after the Germans had changed some wheels/gears on Enigma 🔶The RAF and Royal Navy completely strangled the Afrika Korps supply lines. Sweeping the skies and seas in/over the Mediterranean 🔶Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery and still Montgomery never captured Rommel 🔶Mongomery never opened ports or captured Air Strips for them in return this would continue into Sicily and Normandy where Monty's deficiencies would be exposed - Rommel in his memoirs credited complete Air superiority by Conningham's RAF that they could hardly sleep in the heat and battle of the day and could only move at nite 🔶 Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.282-83 On 12 September 1942 Churchill had cause to thank Roosevelt telling him the 317 Sherman tanks and 94 self propelled 105 mm guns "which you kindly gave me on that dark Tobruk day in Washington" and arrived safetly in Egypt and been received with the greatest enthusiasm.....as these tanks were taken from the hands of the American Army Montgomery had ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with any of the above actions. He reaped the benefits of them and others who came before. The the brandy soaked Winston fired the wrong guy The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable."
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  2599. Lyndon When the smoke cleared there were two world powers left standing and neither you or monty belonged with them you're welcome you cheeky chode.The Russians on the east were fighting the same vicious battles also cupcake.That's why it's called a war. The GIs kept grinding and not going backward like Monty to Antwerp - screwing the Canadians over and leaving them to mop up the mess. IKE gave monty his chance and like you he didn't show up. But where you come from evidently they call you a Field Marshall,ya right :face-blue-smiling: IKE even gave the all supplies and stopped 2 US Army groups to do so and like CAEN and Falaise he failed yet again. You are not doing any better as Lyndon than you did as John Cornell The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec,not just 9 days in the Netherlands, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden in just 9 days (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure. Look at a map I don't think you get it - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war.Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up Patton wasn't going to leave 90,000 Landsers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced ferro concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers and they still took it
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  2600. Ya and Monty ignored not only logistics but intel - but do give a listen to monty not only admitting it but Brooke/Ramsey/Tedder blaming him also (all British BTW) ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944) ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum. On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role. Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcover by Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears. Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.' So Montgomery ignored: Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong Williams & Strong being British Officers
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  2601. Alan Brooke??? "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." Monty after the war admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." (Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth. How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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  2619. 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw, p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park. SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions 'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193. The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The Kampfgruppe Henke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. *The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North. 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." Ah good old Carrington sitting on his arse as Jerry himself said there were no guns down the road to stop them. The 82 and the Irish Guards agree also. But hey Carrington at least showed unlike a certain failed marshall
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  2630. Monty should have been shot and IKE reassigned for caving into the clown and this abortion of his ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time(they were 7 miles from where they started) ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch. Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.*General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry* his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial .The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured .LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair" ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,489​-490 The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all. To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road bridge The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness.This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM). The Guards Armored did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition. Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs. The same lack of urgency was on display when the Grenadier Guards on the evening of 20 September with the North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed Illness could explain Horrocks contradictions in his Garden orders and intentions.Responsibility does not lie soley with him but with his superiors​ and the patronage the British Army used to allot Senior command positions
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  2638. Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16 - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Holland, that German armoured units were stationed there.' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594. Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  2639. What's your point little Vila besides the one on your head. Dempsey? the same guy that said "not trying was a big problem in 21st Army" .You plaster babble was Wilmont with Monty when driven from the continent? The 43 days at Caen that was D+1 objective.Falaise where Monty faffed around not wanting to get embarrased by Patton closing the Gap,as Bernard's star was fading fast ever since the Desert where he couldn't lose.If you'r going to print a lot at least say something with.This from those there and in the know that would not include you or Wilmont Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak Fancy some more?
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  2659. From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him -
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  2661. LMAO - he ended up in a Channel and couldn't take Caen until over 7 weeks with the heaviest naval & aerial bombardment of the campaign From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  2676. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel. Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
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  2682. Lyndon Latrine - any sources on that besides your backside? Nevermind I found them for you. Shocking I'm sure you'd agree Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt. Refresh my memory - when did Guderian,Blumentritt,Rommel or Bayerlein drive the GIs off of the continent and into the sea like they did bernard? I do know the GIs loaded ship after ship stem to stern with men,materiel,food,fuel,tanks,trucks and artillery and sail 3,500 to help some loudmouth limpdicks like you go the last 30 miles - those Aston ankle biters posing as head hunters - ROTFLMAO When interviewed in 1945,Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place General Gunther Blumentritt: We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets. From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7. Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference - in spite of several sorts of frailty of human nature! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944.I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph" - an excellent report! With very good wishes
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  2685. No it didn't limp bizkit good excuse to get the pratt off the hook Beevor's Arnhem is the single most exhaustive and one of the best sourced of the books on Operation Market Garden that I've read - .Cornelius Ryan has probably talked to as many of the actual combatants as anyone.Kershaws "It Never Snows in September" covers the German perspective,they basically agree it is the fault of the so called Field Marshall Montgomery failed foreray. It is written with the benefits of an exhaustive research of the British, American, Dutch and German records, the book provides amazing detail to "The Bridge Too Far" in Arnhem, Nethlerlands. The whole plan suffered from the plain fact that it relied on a single road of attack by the British XXX Corps where going off the road was a near impossibility due to the wet, boggy polders, obvious to anyone who has spent any time in The Netherlands (they rarely use fences in pastures as a dug ditch will quickly fill with water creating a natural barrier). The failure to listen to Dutch military personnel about the geographical defeat of the plan was just another in a string of Montgomery ego led disasters. The utter evil -- absolutely barbaric and shocking to the conscious -- actions of the Nazi SS, the German commanders in The Netherlands, the Dutch SS and the average German soldier are properly detailed and the Dutch people would rightly demand a fuller accounting of the barbarous actions during those months. The author thoroughly explores the lack of planning by Montgomery and Browning, the willful self delusion of Montgomery borne from an ego that held little regard for the futility and needless death of British and American troops. Reluctantly and very mistakenly Eisenhower put American Divisions under the command of the British General Montgomery in what turned out to be the greatest loss of any American Airborne Division -- before or since. Montgomery should be a national disgrace to the British, that is clear. Eisenhower began acting as a politician in deferring to Monty's superhuman ego, and abdicated his role as general commanding in a war. The greatest suffering was then endured by the Dutch people. Epic in its tragedy. A lesson in failed leadership by the British and American commanding generals. A shock and outrage to the conscious in the inhumanity and pure evil of the German army. A story that needs to be retold -- and very well done.
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  2687. Complaints go up orders come down.Whatever Brerton did or didn't do was approved by who? A certain FM who evidently was AWOL.Again Burnhole Pierre.None of the objectives were met you knob.And has been pointed out this was Monty's brainchild .You know it, I know it ,your fookin' Mouse pad knows it. Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe 11 September 1941-8 May 1945“There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, informed me that at *General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings. I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division, presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, he still insists, we will go in as planned. Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton It absolutely was a plea to change the order A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success The berk's top general didn't like the plan From Carlo D'este,Decision in Normandy From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable*1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Nor did his Chief of Staff - can't make this up I tell you Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
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  2688. Monty even admitted it,SHAEF and Alan Brooke and Admiral Ramsay pointed right at Monty.He was supposedly a Field Marshall,either demand your directives be followed or cancel the operation From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth. From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions..He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
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  2689. From Eisenhower & Montgomery ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .*Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare". The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf Yup an excerpt a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain.”  1  Kirkpatrick later goes on to attempt to explain the intelligence failure by saying, “In the one week between the decision to mount the operation and the attack there was not time to collect additional information on the enemy forces in the area.”  2  This last statement of his is clearly incorrect based on the Ultra messages, and brings his first statement into question. After the fall of Antwerp to the British Second Army on 4 September 1944, Ultra began to provide a very clear picture of the German forces moving into Holland, the reorganization within their command structure, the repositioning of panzer divisions to Holland, and the fact that the Germans anticipated an Allied attack, possibly with airborne forces, towards either Arnhem or Aachen. The intelligence information was available; whether commanders were adequately warned of the risks to the operation is really the question, as well as whether intelligence failed during this operation
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  2691.  @johnpeate4544  More BS sources were left SHAEF AND Alan Brooke pointed right at Monty This from a Dutch Poster isn't it ironic that the biggest Rhine bifurcation was the WAAL at nijmegen and the 30crps effectively HAD crossed the Rhine and all they had to do is do the same as the Germans at ferry crossings:PUT TANKS ACROSS the rivers/canals and you were in free accessible German tank land !Only a small river Oude Ijssel at Doetinchem (which was there too after Market Garden )and go go go into das deutsche Reich?! Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November I like Atkinson to The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy." Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright ..the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can advance nothwards from Nijmegen to their support.There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke,he added, I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfctory" This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed.Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged "in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well." From The Guns at Last Light,page 282,by Rick Atkinson The new bridgehead over the Waal failed to uncork failed to uncork the advance to Arnhem as Montgomery had hoped. After a 35 hr delay at Nijmegen,XXX Corps vanguard sat for another 18hrs .Enemy raids on Hell's Highway played hob:reinforcements from the 43rd Division took 3 days to travel 60 miles in reaching the Irish Guards and 82nd Airborne .Gavin concluded after 4 yrs british veterans were excessively cautious,nurturing what he called "Why die now" sentiments.He found Colonel Tucker in a farmhouse near the rail bridge seething at the delay. "What in the hell are they doing,why the hell don't they get on to Arnhem" Tucker demanded. WELL THERE YOU HAVE IT
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  2704. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be be Patton in Lorraine,Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson) Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops
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  2707.  @johnburns4017  This one's barking - bernard was worse at commanding than you are commenting Montgomery in Europe 1943-45,by Richard Lamb pages 360-362 "British 6th Airborne had lost 30% of it's personnel killed and wounded ;the Air landing brigade,which came in gliders had lost over 70% of its equipment The Army that needed to keep casualty count low lost over 3,100 men crossing the Rhine north of Wesel. The disparity between the number of lives lost at Wesel and the 2 earlier American crossings is striking Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded Operation Varsity, for the northern route casualty figures tell a grim story. Into the industrial heart of Germany The 6th Airborne had suffered 590 killed and another 710 wounded or missing. Several hundred of the missing later turned up to rejoin their units, however. The 17th Airborne had 430 killed, with 834 wounded and 81 missing. Casualties among the glider pilots and the troop plane pilots and crews included 91 killed, 280 wounded and 414 missing in action. Eighty planes were shot down, and only 172 of the 1,305 gliders that landed in Germany were later deemed salvageable. A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne 158 on D-Day. Operation Varsity, March 24, 1945, was the worst single day for Allied airborne troops. Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south.Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!! It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time. Monty should have been dismissed maybe brought up on charges. His morbid craving for fame got 1100 men KILLED in one day crossing the Rhine. Churchill,Brooke,Eisenhower and the Press were all called to pay attention to what instead showed Montgomery's complete lack of tactical and moral integrity. The GIs crossed 70 miles to the south with less than 70 casualties and no fanfare. Market Garden took 17,000 casualties in 9 days - that he didn't have the decency to show up for and direct either. He was nothing but a trouble tart
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  2708. In The Last Offensive, the U.S. Army’s official account of Operation Varsity and the final drive into Germany, Charles B. MacDonald a veteran infantry​ officer who had served with the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, in Europe in World War II, stated that with the weak condition of German units east of the Rhine, “some overbearing need for the special capability of airborne divisions would be required to justify their use, ” and that the specific need never existed. The objectives were important, the ground forces could have taken them without difficulty, and in all likelihood, with fewer casualties. As evidence, he pointed out that the amphibious crossings faced very little resistance; the two American divisions in the river assault, the 30th and 79th Infantry Divisions, lost a total of forty-one killed, 450 wounded, and seven missing. *James A. Huston, in his book, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II, agreed with MacDonald, adding that “had the same resources been employed on the ground, it is conceivable that the advance to the east may have been more rapid than it was.” Jack Ariola US Soldier in side a glider "the anti-aircraft fire was so thick we could have got out and walked on it. Bullets and FLAK were coming thru the glider and every time one hit the bottom glider and came out the top it sounded like the crack of a whip only 10 times louder Otto Leitner, German Lieutenant "with so many aircraft it was difficult not to hit something.I ordered my men to keep firing in the hope to fill the sky with metal and damage the aircraft" Burns you're a steaming pile and your family is like wise
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  2709. Puddles the only thing that supercedes your stupidity is your willingness to express it From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander. Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "InTunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education" Fancy some more you poor trampled cabbage leaf?
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  2733. Monty was relieved because he was an in competant supposed FM who embellished his limp wristed efforts.You're only an authority on the electro-shock therapy you receive. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac.He bragged to the press he did great things even his own staff was motified at his morbid twist of the facts.Britain had many good soldiers but he wasn't one of them "CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one. Page 438 from Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb Montgomery had served the Allied cause well.But his egotism and irrepressible tactlessness did neither himself or Allied unity any good at a critical moment when important decisions affecting both him and it were about to be made.The military attache' at the American Embassy in London reported back to Washington "I have the strong impression that most British Officers,including many in the influential War Office are much less enthusiastic over Montgomery than is the British Public. Lord Ismay in the House of Commons expressed the wish that someone would "muzzle" or better still chloroform Monty. "I have come to the conclusion that his love of publicity is a disease,like alcoholism or taking drugs and that it sends him equally mad." The sorry fact is the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities otherwise he would have been sacked
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  2739. Stop making shit up from the Cornhole Chronicles.No one agreed except IKE finally caved in to get Monty to at least move From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" Even John Keegan The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan
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  2742. Burnhole,sure the Britsh were - the Gerries were laughing so hard after the Dunkirking they couldn't defend themselves. Ans as usual you're cherry picking, Churchill blundered into him by firing the good generals. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role. For a host of reasons Montgomery's usefulness came to an end in Normandy,probably with in a few weeks of the invasion.Any other British General could have done as well as Montgomery did at Caen;and very few would have handled the Battle of the Falaise Gap so incompetently Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 320 The poor performance of the British 2nd Army in Normandy had tied Monty's hands.He did not expect the Germans to be that good.But when the Americans broke the German lines at St Lo instead of turning the Americans loose on the open German flank,Montgomery stopped the Americans at Argentan and sent them North east to Paris-orleans gap.There were simply too many bitter pills on Montgomery's desk.He could not allow the Americans,especially George Patton to take Falaise away for m his 2nd British Army regardless of the cost Ike and Monty:Generals at War,by Norman Gelb,page 329 Monty's egocentric nature made it impossible for him to respond to complex situation in which he found himself by insisting he had not been mistaken about anything. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex. Monte,Making of a General,by Nigel Hamilton,page 278 Montgomery's stepson John Carver talked about his "....schizoid tendencies engendered by his upbringing...."
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  2780. John Burns bellowed: If the 82nd had not failed in securing the bridge, the ride between would have been a breeze. -------------------------------------------------------- Clean Monty's cack out of your eyes, Geronimo is right you think a battlefield is flat like the coloring books on your coffee table that you source. You again have displayed your extraordinary capacity not to think. From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park. SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth. From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 227 Gavin's CoS thought that the task of the 82nd called for 2 divisions not one .It was difficult and risky to 1st secure the LZ,Gavin'e essential task then attempt to capture the Nijmegen Road Bridge,the grave Bridge and at least one other bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal.Gavin did try to strike out on D-Day for the Nijmegen Bridge.They had to be recalled owing to the threats on the heights and need to retake the LZ,parts of which were occupied by German Troops
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  2799. From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters" From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,633 "I felt" one Frenchman wrote in watching the Yanks make war,"as if the Americans were digging the Panama Canal right through the German Army." What Churchill called the American "prodigy of organization" had shipped 18 million tons of war supplies to Europe,equivalent to the cargo in 3,600 Liberty Ships oe 181,000 rail cars from 800,000 military vehicles to footwear.U.S munitions plants had turned out 40 Billion small arms ammunition,56 million grenades,500 million machine gun bullets & 23 million artillary rounds. By 1945 the USA had built 2/3rds of all ships afloat and was making half of all manufactured goods in the world including half of all armaments.The enemy was crushed by logistical brilliance,yet the War absorbed barely 1/3rd of American gross domestic product. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes.16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group. It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces.Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector .While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete
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  2802. Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions". General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
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  2814. Four distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. ♦Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” ♦Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” ♦Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became Field-Marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes ♦Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles. So now you know Johnny.
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  2815. How about the brutal truth from a New Zealander: Andrew Brown YAWNING this makes me sleepy, the Poms are next to useless whenever there is an armed force opposing them that is perhaps even half as strong in men and material. The poms' most glorious land battles have been historically fought against tribesmen with spears. When it came to WW2 Britain was so unimportant in the grand scheme that it didn't matter what Churchill or Montgomery thought. Britain had no money, compared to USSR and USA and limited production capability and not all that many men really. In reality the UK played a very small part. It was the Russians that fought the Germans.They had more casualties in the last battle of the war than the UK had in all the war. Britain served as an unsinkable carrier for the GIs during the French invasion - and that's about it. I know it hurts - the truth often does You seem to think that Britain was important to WW2 and that people like Montgomery were important characters. Wrong. Montgmery was an uppity little nothing who thought rather too much of his own position in things. Churchill knew the score and treated him exactly as his paymasters (USA told him too. British Field Marshall? He was about as important as a soviet latrine digger.)*The USSR would still have required support in material from the States. You're the worst of commentators because you're always looking to get a swelled chest and misty eyed over the perceived glory of your own fighting forces. The reality is that the UK and commonwealth played a very very small role in the whole war. You don't want to see it because history is not important to you. You want to watch rousing movies that make you think you won the war when in reality you barely had a part in it. As for Poland - look where it was in 1939 and where it was left by its allies in 1946. Do you really think Britain discharged its obligations by abandoning Poland to the Russians at the end of the war?? Or abandoning the Czechs to the Reich in 1938 for that matter - Good Grief your view is shallow.The weak, whiney, whingey, broke Poms had a treaty with Poland. Do you understand now when I say abandoned by the Poms??? Also, what was it that Britain did before 1941? Not much. There was the phony war followed by the Dunkirk fiasco followed by the Battle of Britain - the most overblown event in WW2 and some skirmishes in North Africa. Really... you've got to stop watching all those WW2 movies that like to make out that England was the brightest light in the whole war. Actually, the hopeless hague afflicted poms would have lost WW1 without the Yanks. The poms leadership was so poor that without the Pershing lead Yanks they would have run from the field of battle in ever larger numbers. The poms deserted in more numbers than any other force (even more than the French!!!!) in ww1. Spring Offensive, More Englishmen turned and ran than any other point in the war. Shameful,sad and expected "hopeless hague afflicted poms" :face-blue-smiling: HA!!! A truly cheerful & refreshing essay to contemplate considering the distortions and ludicrous attempts presented here to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved.
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  2819. YAWNING, How about Allied HQ and these British Officers above Monty Alan Brooke "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow." Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." (Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.
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  2820. How about those under Monty Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Those all of those British Officers there in real time above and below bernard in command all place the blame right on the absent idgit.
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  2821. How about the front line soldiers​ Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333.Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords, were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. "There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem* Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major less than charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces. Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Losing an eye soon after D-Day, Major refused repatriation. He only needed one eye, he said, to aim his rifle. During the Battle of the Scheldt in occupied Holland, he was recommended for a DCM for a solo recon mission, from which he returned with 93 German prisoners. Major refused it because the medal would be awarded by Field Marshal Montgomery, whom he despised. His reason was simple: Arnhem. Major felt Monty’s ill-fated airborne assault stopped Allied forces attacking on a broad front, delaying the liberation of Holland. Major believed Monty to be responsible for the deaths of some 20,000 Dutch citizens during 1944’s “hunger winter”. To quote Major exactly, “He had made an awful mistake. I didn’t like him at all.” Fancy some more you frauds???
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  2825. Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen *With Prejudice, by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, p557*​​ The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles.After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, *it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.559 The problem was Montgomery who could be neither removed or moved to action. Later that day, Generals Morgan and Gale,Deputy CoS and Senior Administrative officer respectively, spoke to me of their apprehensions about the slow pace of the Army's advance With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263-264 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns. Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved . Conningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African campaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields.Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook.Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power. Overlord,by Max Hastings,p. 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...." ​ Churchill and the Montgomery Myth,by R.W. Thompson,p.170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves. Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke
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  2826. Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.197 Until the arrival of 2nd Panzer at Caen there was little other than Wittman's small Panzer force,to stop the British. The Germans never understood why Montgomery failed to press his advantage. Of the period around Of the period around June 10th Gen Fritz Kraemer wrote: it is still incomprehensible why the enemy exerted himself with assaults in the direction of Caen and did not make a powerful drive to exploit the open Gap on either side of Bayeux.The enemy left a favorable opportunity slip D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 264 - Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook. Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power *My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.616 July 17,1944 The RAF had dropped a concentration of 7000 tons of bombs to help the ground troops break through the German defense ring.Around evening Air Marshall Tedder had called IKE and and mentioned Monty had stopped his armor from going any farther IKE was mad as Monty was drawing up his "administrative tail". My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained *can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,Page 325 Monty was dismayed that others seemed to have forgotten the plan he maintained he had set out with absolute clarity prior to the invasion for all those concerned to understand.According to that plan he would draw the main enemy forces onto his sector of the allied line while Bradley's Americans on his right would secure the peninsula before making the break out.Not all of Montgomery's growing band of critics at SHAEF remembered it that way.He later claimed his critics completely misunderstood his plan Triumph in the West,by Arthur Bryant,page 243 Brooke wrote in his diary"The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward.But now comes the trouble;the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122 The British had only advanced 6 miles and taken 2,000 prisoners by July 20th.Their casualties totaled more than 4,000 men and about 500 tanks,more than 1/3 of all the tanks brought to Normandy This is nowhere near the results Montgomery had led everyone to expect.The discontent was wide spread many senior Allied leaders felt they had been had,taken by promises Montgomery had no intention of fufilling or had been unable to fufill.Harry Butcher Eisenhower's aide said others were discussing "who would succeed Monty when he was sacked"* The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122-23 Goodwood damaged Monty's prestige and he never fully recovered.Eisenhower was "disappointed and angered" by the difference between Montgomery's promise and his performance.Air Marshall Tedder "redoubled" because Monty had deceived the Air Forces
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  2827. In Eisenhowers unpublished transcripts at the Presidential library "....after we were ashore in Normandy we had not been achieving the advances that Monty that had earlier predicted on his maps. Mr Churchill expressed unhappiness at the lack of progress and the failure to capture Caen. Churchill came to see me one day accompanied by General Brooke.He pointed out the pre-invasion briefings and the seizure of Caen within 24 hrs had been assumed The failure after fighting to take this key city strengthened his fear that we were descending into bitter WW1 "trench-warfare" Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.80 HQ 21 Army Group,14 April 1944 , B.L.Montgomery, CiC ."the whole of aggressive tactics would be to retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds of the enemy .To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to wait till D plus 1 would be to lose the opportunity, and also to lose the initiative." My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day.Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken. IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p. 331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were had put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.557*​​ The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles. *After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause Montgomery had in effect stopped his armour from going farther.Later I reported saying that the British Chiefs of Staff would "support any recommendation that Ike might care to make in respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push" D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p183-84 .On June 11 after a meeting with Bradley Monty wrote DeGuingand that his objective "was to pull the Germans on to 2nd Army so that the US Army could extend & expand. The problem was that Montgomery partly for reasons of morale partly for pride could not admit that any of his plans had gone wrong. IT was not of course Montgomery who determined this state of affairs but the Germans who sent their Panzer Divisions
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  2833. Burns your backside is not recognized as military archives.Perhaps your hero can chime in - oh here he is Montgomery Memoirs page 267 Monty says: [quote] “My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles, and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could reorganise sufficiently to stop us. “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1st Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so” [end quote] The Operation was approved by who?If Bernard was a real Field Marshall like Model he would have made his battle assessments and made any necessary alterations.But the dim bulb did not. So almost 2x as many flights with just under 3 less hours daylight on September 17th than on June 6th then the flights were much longer(300 miles) into N.E Netherlands instead of just across the 30 mile channel. Quit reading your coloring books.They could hardly get the same amount of flights in the same day with the afore mentioned detriments. Now clean up your room and help mum with the groceries and get your green plastic army soldiers off of the floor.Mum could slip & fall she works so hard for you therapy and all
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  2840. ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. ♦ And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launching sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter got 22,000 Dutch Civilians froze/starved - too bad blisterhead Burns and Monty weren't amongst them
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  2846. Well your dissertation was Bollocks but since you lie/distort the truth to get monty off the hook a like ponce like john burns will take notes with his crayons for the crown's comics. How about actual Britsh Officers who blamed the dullard Monty and his so called plan "Montgomery Memoirs page 276" (Monty admitting his failure) "The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September." So clearly Monty stated they were "my plans" that 34,000 went into arnhem and 17,000 came out - in 9 days - there's your hero & the culprit The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." ( from Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)​ A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Alan Brooke(Monty's Boss) placing the blame on Bernard Eisenhower's Armies, by Dr Niall Barr, page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. "During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place" Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..... "The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knockout blow." Foot Note: ("Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219") How about Air Marshall Tedder??? With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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  2870. What other gems have you mined for us today you poltroon?None of the objectives were met 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent.If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp. General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him. Richard Winters said it happened to
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  2871.  @davemac1197  I read all most those you're cherry picking .Harmel was the Germans security/Intel officer in that section from Arnhem-Nijmegen .Read Kershaw's book,he stated there was one field gun there and Carrington stopped anyway.The 82nd crossed to carry the fight in but he wouldn't move - that is afact and they were all incensed. Even the Irish Guards agreed with his assessments. I don't think Harmel,Tucker,Gavin,Wilson,Gorman(German/Irish Guards/GIs) all witnessing/pointing out the same thing below(that you won't read). I'll take their word for it - they were there. Monty owns this debacle and Ike also for letting him off his leash Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp. General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs​ until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea ​the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced - Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy, taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair*
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  2873. Kershaw got it from the Germans themselves,unlike that coloring book you're trying to exonerate your favorite little absent freak from. I've read the original and such bullshit you spew. In England they call Carrington LORD,bernard Field Marshall - they'll probably anoint you nobel laureate - no wonder you lost an empire.Frost hated Carrington ,that's even worse carrington stopped like you should posting your pitiful opinion and passing it off as fact. This waterhead TIK had to take down one of his boards for libel 3-4 yrs ago and he won't dare attempt to write his rag.He'd rather mislead you lampshades into the land of make believe. see here none of your mysterious summaries,pretty simple even you can't cock it up 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us." 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance ' 'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegen 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900,There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North. It Never Snows in September" page 306 Robert Kershaw. XXX Corp advancing along one easily defended road was never able proportionally to match the German build up,and achieve the odds ratio necessary for rapid success More specifically it was never able to push forward sufficient infantry by ground or fly them in by air,to secure what were essentially infantry objectivesThis was crucial of crucial signifigance because General Gavin's 82nd Airborne lacked sufficient infantry to storm the Nijmegen bridges before the arrival of XXX Corp on 20 September It doesn't appear the Gerries were referring to failures of Brerton,Gavin or the 82nd Airborne Yet the tanks sat-this we know. Nothing further barring the road - is that concept just a little too complex.Even left the damn page number so slappies like you can pin point the narrative,not that you'd be interested in actual history
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  2880. and they were driven from the field and Monty was one of 3 senior officers. BTW RIP to 3,500. but it was just not those authors That is but a pinch of what i've cached about the guy. If Monty and Mac took a slow boat to China the war would have finished before they returned. Both were detrimental to the outcome of the war and those around them *Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” --Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes. The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, p. 151 - Montgomery:"1st Army have withdrawn 6th Division - ready to launch attack to the Rhine with British 2nd Army on October 12th." (Author's Footnote p.152 - This indicates that even after the failure,Montgomery still intended to move toward the Ruhr before opening the Scheldt) Ramsay: this afforded me the que I needed to lambaste him for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed .Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay p. 159 "the Army was far behind organising as I knew they would be as they entirely under estimated their task and Monty had not given the Canadians sufficient support for the work (Author's Footnote In fact ,Montgomery had finally committed himself without reservation to the Scheldt campaign in a directive issued on 16 October, after receiving 3 "hurry up" messages from Eisenhower during the previous week) Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles.
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  2890. . Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command.SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout troop.Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics Model being an actual Field Marshall conducted a clinic in modern mechanical warfare.I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf an excerpt a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain.” 1 Kirkpatrick later goes on to attempt to explain the intelligence failure by saying, “In the one week between the decision to mount the operation and the attack there was not time to collect additional information on the enemy forces in the area.” 2 This last statement of his is clearly incorrect based on the Ultra messages, and brings his first statement into question. After the fall of Antwerp to the British Second Army on 4 September 1944, Ultra began to provide a very clear picture of the German forces moving into Holland, 3 the reorganization within their command structure, the repositioning of panzer divisions to Holland, and the fact that the Germans anticipated an Allied attack, possibly with airborne forces, towards either Arnhem or Aachen. 4 The intelligence information was available; whether commanders were adequately warned of the risks to the operation is really the question, as well as whether intelligence failed during this operation
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  2900. How about some book names and page numbers rather than your usual backside bombast lil villa? Mostly British Historians BTW The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,633 What Churchill called the American "prodigy of organization" had shipped 18 million tons of war supplies to Europe,equivalent to the cargo in 3,600 Liberty Ships or 181,000 rail cars from 800,000 military vehicles to footwear.U.S munitions plants had turned out 40 Billion small arms ammunition,56 million grenades,500 million machine gun bullets & 23 million artillary rounds By 1945 the USA had built 2/3 rds of all ships afloat and was making half of all manufactured goods in the world including half of all armaments.The enemy was crushed by logistical brilliance,yet the War absorbed barely 1/3rd of American gross domestic product The Second World War by John Keegan,p. 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks. The Second World War 1939-45,p.85,By Maj.Gen. J.F.C.Fuller. Britain was placed in a such a desperate situation as she must have accepted a negotiated peace with out American economic support she could not continue the struggle Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.160 "In private to Herriman. "The PM bluntly stated that he could see no prospect of victory until the United States came into the war." DeGaulle said right after Pearl Harbor; "well the war is over. Of course,there are more operations,battles and struggles ahead; but the out come is no longer in doubt. In this industrial war nothing can resist the power of American industry. From now on the British will do nothing with out Roosevelt's agreement." Harold Nicolson wrote "we simply can't be beaten with America in. But how strange it is that this great event should be recorded and welcomed here with out any jubilation. We should have gone mad with joy if it had happened a year ago....not an American Flag flying in the whole of London - how odd we are." Churchill had cabled to Antony Eden who was en route to Moscow: "The ascension of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory." An Army At Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p.8 "I knew the United States was in the War,up to the neck and into the death." Churchill later wrote."I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful." Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.181-83 Churchill considered the Dec 7,1941 attack "a blessing.....greater good fortune has never happened to the British Empire." Churchill wrote in his memoirs: saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful. One hopes that eternal sleep may be like that
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  2906. revisionist British bullshit ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. ♦ *And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site& ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job - MONTY GARDEN
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  2908.  @johnburns4017  Germans after smacking around the English - AGAIN said it was a Big mistake fighting actual soldiers losing between 80000-100,000 troops. you delusional knob are your bath toys a radio and a toaster? Because your circuits are burnt,Monty wanted to retreat and in fact almost got relieved for attempting to take credit for the GIs defeating the The same army that drove Bernard into the channel where evidently he gave you the Full Monty THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,page 647CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive. Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views. THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN By Don R. Marsh Monty's orders were to withdraw​ farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order​ and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses." Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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  2909. Thicko you mean the Metz the British never took in1815? From the Warfare History Network The very large thorn in the Third Army’s side was the sprawling Metz fortress system whose octopus-like tentacles spread six miles west of the Moselle and reached back another four miles to the east of the old Gallo-Roman city. The massive system, which made Metz the most heavily fortified city in Europe at the time, consisted of 43 forts arrayed in an inner and outer belt that together mounted 128 heavy guns Artillery fired from strategic forts in the outer belt had wreaked havoc on attempts by Walker’s infantry divisions to cross the Moselle above and below the city during September. Taking the city of Metz would be a challenging task for the allies. There were a series of natural as well as man-made obstacles these included, the Moselle River, a multitude of forts and a plethora of pill boxes. Patton’s army made attempt after attempt to cross the Moselle River but these fortresses rained heavy artillery fire down upon them making it a daunting task. These forts and pill boxes dated back to the 19th century making them almost a natural part of the landscape this made the structures much harder to detect and therefore defeat. (9) another reason the pill boxes created a challenge was, because of their small size. Two German soldiers could easily hide inside and shot a .50 caliber machine gun at the Allies and have little chance of being hit by small arms fire. So the GIs attacked at night to avoid that and mortar barrages. The Combination of these natural and unnatural defenses had made the city of Metz a formidable opponent for invaders for more then 1500 years since it is placed superbly for defense on the east bank of the Moselle River. As well as being surrounded by barbed wire and earth fortifications that had been built around the city. Its best defense however, was the fact it was surrounded by hills that were turned into dominating underground forts composed of passageways and well dug in steel and concrete doors placed in a fashion that not only concealed them but protected them from artillery fire.
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  2916. Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.91 Australian PM John Curtain was disagreeing with British proposals for defending Australia. Which Curtin thought needed to be done by Australian troops presently fighting for the British in North Africa Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.156​ American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. *Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there Australian Financial Review John Curtin, the leader who turned Australia to the United States The contempt shown for Britain's much-bruited naval prowess was epitomised by Japanese torpedo bombers destroying HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in a matter of 10 minutes off the cost of Malaya as the Japanese infantry overpowered all before it. In response, Curtin put the nation on a total war footing and there were warnings of invasion. At the same time, he memorably wrote in the Melbourne Herald: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with Britain." "We know the problems that Britain faces. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy."
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  2923. Montgomery was very much a set-piece general whose mental rigidity and egotism left him unable to respond when battles didn't go exactly as he planned.And whose skills and abilities were grossly inflated by the British press and political leadership.Montgomery who was busy fighting with set piece tactics from the last war never learned the tactics of high speed mobile warfare.Unfortunately, Bradley and Eisenhower most probably aquiesed to Mongomery's demand for the sake of Allied unity.butMonty, was lacking the flexibility for independent thinking necessary to adapt to changing conditions. . -(Chapter 10: General Montgomery's Bitter Pills, page 312) I would submit that Prime Minister Churchill and the CIGS Allen Brooke were culpable in this ruse as well, as they were committed to ensuring the press showed the British in the best possible light. Having the Americans close the Gap, could well have finished the war early and showed the British to be struggling with manpower and unable to compete in a mechanized, mobile war, -American commanders Eisenhower and Bradley covering for Montgomery in the interest of harmony in the allies camp.it was Monty's bruised ego that he would not permit the Americans (and Patton in particular) to be praised for what his British 21st Army Group had failed to accomplish.Monty's efforts to attack south and close the gap were curiously half-hearted. Rather than a full-blooded push using his experienced British divisions, Monty entrusted the effort to two Canadian and Polish units in which he had shown little prior confidence. Why? Certainly, Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton by both American and British press and the innuendo that Monty's troops weren't doing their part.When they were - it was just Monty wasn't up to the task
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  2934. Monty like you dweebs was nowhere around probably lathering up the lads - look that up is that why you like him? I've posted this before but you'd rather languish in the land of make believe HQ blaming Montgomery Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary Monty Garden go over and ask the Europeans, shouldn't take you 4 years like it did Bernard
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  2942. The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley Montgomery’s and Browning’s apparent combined ignorance of combined airborne & mobile armor was only exceeded by their pompous arrogance, recalcitrance and unbelievably engorged egos. It has been stated that if Montgomery had advanced his concept for Market-Garden as a young staff officer attending the Royal Dutch Military Command College, he would have been cashiered out of the course, and very possibly the army. (Single axis of attack and logistics, lack of infantry support of armor, limited maneuver room (single road on raised embankment) and bad trafficability (flat and marshy) for armor, three major rivers,3 minor rivers and three canal systems (six bridges), length of time before linking up with the airborne elements, to cite but a few fatal flaws.) The official publication of the British Army which was patently ignored and categorically violated by both these high ranking officers. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS, Pamphlet No. 1, GENERAL, 1943 (Provisional), May, 1943 Prepared under the direction of The Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In its 49 pages the pamphlet details "considerations" (read battle proven axioms) regarding the planning and execution of airborne operations. The contents of this document were subsequently further codified and discussed in greater detail in a major volume entitled AIRBORNE FORCES, LtCol T.B.H. Otway DSO, Army Council, HMSO, London, 1951 (Confidential) As some may recall LtCol Otway commanded the 9th Bn, 6th Airborne Division at Normandy. The battalion's mission to neutralize the Merville Battery was decisive and successful, for which he was awarded the DSO. When the overall strategy and planning for Operation Market-Garden are compared with the contents of the pamphlet, it is as if each one of the fundamental elements was reviewed, then categorically ignored or violated. LtGen Browning reviewed the plan with MajGen Richard "Windy" Gale, OC, 6th Airborne Division, who had commanded that division during highly successful D-Day operations at Normandy, only a few months earlier. MajGen Gale expressed serious reservations regarding the plans for Operation Market-Garden. LtGen Browning chose to totally ignore his adamant recommendations. It is truly ironic that although not classified. the cover of the pamphlet contains two strongly worded admonitions; NOT TO BE PUBLISHED, The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or any person not holding an official position in His Majesty's Service and THIS DOCUMENT MUST NOT FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS. Apparently it didn't even fall into the hands it should have, let alone those of the enemy.
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  2947. Davie your career as a historian continues to sky rocket - said no one ever. The tanks were given to XXX Corps but they montied instead of advancing. How about the Germans there in real time? Their views are quite the opposite of Davie's trip thru his land of make believe. With page number so your handler could read them to you but it might keep you awake at night. "It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p,129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw ,p.141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm flak cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 143 18 september,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platoon attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks* 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were able to to maintain their positions 'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944. The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North
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  2953. Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’ Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient. As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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  2958. Ha Little Villa there's another voice of truth and reason - said no one ever.Hey Johhny reading about Churchill getting worked by Uncle Joe at Yalta, telling the taffy nosed bastard to quit stalling.Winnie explained all he had to work with was deluded dweebs and malingerers like Vile and Burns - he completely understood and explained the Yanks would take the bull by the horns - AGAIN Johnny try to asking Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 oh my still sticking to the aliases,you two are legit - sure you are,of course 🤣 This from an Australian poster Patton beat Monty to Messina going around the whole island. He also broke out of Normandy at operation cobra. Those 15 miles at bastogne was also made while pivoting in the middle of an attack on the Siegfried line. Listen, Monty was an infantry commander. He was not skilled in maneuver warfare. Patton was a calvary man and knew how to push and exploit breakthroughs. Monty got jealous, put together a stupid plan for his ego and got good men killed. Add on top of that what would have happened if Monty did cross the Rhine (the slaughter of xxx corp) and you should realize how horrible of a commander Monty truly was. Alexander was way better and he at least knew his role as a subordinate to the Americans. The British (Monty) wanted to be in charge because they had more experience. But most of their experience was retreating or being defeated Even they can spot the problem,clean Monty's cack out of your eye sockets then read some history.He planned it while ignoring to open up the Port of Antwerp,then disappeared when the pathetic plan unraveled
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  2959. Please stop,Montgomery let him slip away numerous times not wanting to risk his new found fame. Generals Lumsden,Gatehouse,Briggs all capable veterans of the Desert.All ended up getting sacked and reassigned by Mony out of fear of being upstaged.Great Book BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis,XVIII - In Africa Montgomery was incapable of finishing off Rommel even when his tanks were numbering in single digits and his plans were fully known to British intelligence BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p249-250 on 20 December LT Gen. von Sponeck of the 90th Light Division told his staff "Nobody can see any escape. The British outnumber us enormously. The puzzle is why are they following us so slowly? Time and again they have allowed us to dodge encirclement" The British Generalship under Montgomery remained unequal to the task of finishing them off. ✔✔✔*BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.280-81* during Operation Lightfoot Montgomery's commanders were skeptical about their ability to move forward on such a forward and cluttered axis. Unfortunately their objections did not prompt Montgomery to question his own judgement but clouded it yet further. For Montgomery was a very new commander in a very hot seat,and felt extremely insecure. Monty simply dared not admit to himself,that his subordinates particularly Desert Veterans,like Lumsden of X Corps,Briggs of 1 Armoured Division and Gatehouse of the 10th might actually be right. He closed his mind to rational analysis,honest doubts regarding the passage of minefields were dismissed as mere bellyaching or a market aversion to coming to grips with the enemy. The 1st 2 days of the battle made it perfectly clear that the problem of the minefields had been badly underestimated. Along most of its front the "the congestion was appalling and the confusion considerable. The whole area looked like a badly organized car park held in a dust bowl BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.287 Rommel wrote of his retreat through Egypt "The British commander had shown himself to be over-cautious. He risked nothing in anyway doubtful and bold solutions were completely foreign to him" BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.299 On 20 March 1943 began his own attack with 743 tanks available to 8th Army were faced by only 73 German tanks of 15 & 21 Panzer Divisions. Also 692 Field Artillery vs 447 in the whole Afrika Korp and 1,033 Anti-tank guns against only 260 German.But the pace of operation was slow as ever BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.286 On 8 November when General Gatehouse& 10th Armoured entered Mersa Matruh Gatehouse suggested to Montgomery that he might press straight forward as his tanks were all fueled and his petrol lorries fully laden. Montgomery told him that there was to be "no mad rush" withdrew his division,except for one brigade and sacked him for good measure. They could of cut off The German Line of retreat like a repitition of Gen. Richard O'Connor's short cut across the enemy during Operation Compass. Evidently this smacked of too much maneuver for Montgomery
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  2960. Did you actually read ANY OF THAT - do so?The Desert War was no great work of Monty's.This is why he was so loathed amongst other British Commanders.The Navy & Air Corps completely strangled the Afrika Corp even Monty couldn't cock it up .The British Press needed a Hero and Monty reveled in the roll,pissing off the others who had done so much for the War effort.He loved grabbing the Glory at least twice later he almost got sacked.And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have. Claude Auchinleck and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved and General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win.They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance​ - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place. Churchill was furious but he just painted himself into a corner Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery. Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated.In the Mediteranean & the desert Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet Montgomery didn't grab airfields or open any ports - this continued into Italy- Normandy. Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for)also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point. And it was Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith that had 2 fresh divisions moved over from the Nile Delta. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued Then The Torch Landings forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.And of course ULTRA was now fully operation and provided updates. By August '42 USA had sent the 300 Shemans and over 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers sent by Order of FDR.The 8th Army had an 5:1advantage of tanks over the AK.And with the landings 3:1 in manpower.​ The Afrika Korp was short on everything and their armor and vehicles had been in the desert for over 2 yrs. The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. So even you can clearly see reality exists All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and deflecting blame that was - all thru the war. In 1500 miles with overwhelming advantages Monty never captured Rommel Monty left a vastly numerical inferior forces in front of him get away None of those benefits were enjoyed by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith. Save the Air Superiority. All of it in place and none of it Bernard's doing long before he sashayed into this mirage
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  2961.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  you are thick,they could have been bagged.O'Connor and Auchinleck just won and Monty took 4 more weeks than Auchinleck wanted.That is all fact read Desert Generals,Churchill and the Montgomery Myth, Brute Force for starters they all point it out. So did Lumsden,Gatehouse,Griggs.Monty pretty much failed after the desert because he would never again have such overwhelming advantages in EVERYTHING. The other officers knew it also,not the misguided souls in this hive of hallucination though. Just finished Reality and Myth by Sabastian Ritchie - PhD. and RAF Historian Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front! The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61*"Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable
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  2968. That was the port of Antwerp and Monty ignored it.But TIK encourages revision on the board to get the dithering dolt bernard off of the hook Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September,Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine. But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops ​ R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"
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  2989. Villa Anus Monty's little swiss boy popping off again From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co.1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944,Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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  2993. The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy. HA!!! just more ludicrous attempts to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. Logic and reason are frowned upon with this gaggle of squawking twats in it's shabby hamlet Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"* A Bridge Too Far, p.508,by Cornelius Ryan, British and American units had Dutch military liaison officers who were completely familiar with the terrain and had studied its military application. In fact, for several years at Dutch war colleges an exam was given with the final question pertaining to an armored attack from Nijmegen to Arnhem. If the answer provided involved an attack along the main road 69 leading between the two the student failed
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  2999. D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p183-84*​ Any thought of pivoting on Caen as Montgomery had claimed,had become impossible in the 1st few days a pattern of attrition had been established. *Monty had to change his approach,although he refused to admit this later*On June 11 after a meeting with Bradley Monty wrote DeGuingand that his objective "was to pull the germans on to 2nd Army so that the US 1st Army could extend & expand. *this rather more modest assessment was hardly in keeping with his earlier pugnacious declarations! "Inaction and a defensive mentality are criminal in any officer - however Senior He had told this to senior Officers 2 months before the invasion and "Every officer & man must be enthusiastic for the fight and have the light of battle in his eyes The problem was that Montgomery,partly for reasons of morale partly for pride could not admit that any of his plans had gone wrong.He created resentment among his colleages by claiming that he always intended to pull the bulk of the Panzer Divisions on to his front,to give the Americans the great chance of a break out. IT was not of course Montgomery who determined this state of affairs but the Germans who sent their Panzer Divisions From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p229 Eisenhower was fuming with impatience,yet Monty refused to be hurried and said to Dempsey on several occasions "there's no need to tell IKE" Monty liked to keep his objectives vague,so that if there was a break out he could claim credit for it.And if the operation ran into the sand he could simply say that they'd been tying down the German Forces to help the Americans Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved .Coningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African camaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields. Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236*​ Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle: *"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...." From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170​ None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke Page 326, Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apart from having secured the beachhead,little else Monty was doing was working .No one forgot his promise about how quickly Caen would fall to him - over a month would pass before he took it or how he would advance steadily to places by anything like the dates he predicted. Or some could not help wondering what was going on when they were told first one thing and then something completely different *Lord Carver commanding an armored brigade in Normandy said,"one was so often being told that the coming battle would be the break thru.Then the whole thing would come to a grinding halt​ Like Monty Villa lies alot.
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  3000. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 301 Dr Forrest C.Pogue,interviews,US Army Military Institute,1947 On the evening of August 12 Gen.Bradley called Gen. Montgomery's HQ requesting to send Gen Haislips XV Corps north to the boundary at Argentan toward Falaise. Bradley's request was denied Montgomery's staff officer Brigadier E.T.Williams said he was in Freddie DeGuingand's truck near Bayreaux when Bradley's call went through; Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back.Bradley was indignant.We were indignant on Bradley's behalf...Monty missed closing the sack Bradley,Deguingand and Williams argued in favor of the Americans moving north to Argentan to close the gap, but Monty would not change his mind https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/22/books/mistake-in-the-master-plan.html By Drew Middleton -MONTGOMERY - how small a man, how large his shadow in history. It is now nearly 40 years after D-day and the Normandy campaign, but the man and the shadow will not rest. The normal reaction to a new book on Montgomery and the battle for Normandy is to think, ''Enough already - not another book on Ike and Bradley and Monty.'' In this case, that reaction would be wrong. ''Decision in Normandy'' is not just another book about the great military campaign of 1944. It is the best-researched, best-reasoned, best-written account of that campaign I have read. - The book is an indictment of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. Carlo D'Este's charge is that in his dispatches, news conferences and memoirs, he gave a false picture of his strategy in battles he directed as the commander of the Allied land forces in this crucial phase of World War II. Specifically, Mr. D'Este asserts,Montgomery was faking when he later claimed all had gone according to his ''master plan''in Normandy and he had always intended to attract and pin the German panzer divisions on the left flank of the Allied line,thus enabling Gen. Omar Bradley's American troops to break out on the right flank -In fact, as the author demonstrates from battlefield reports,interviews with participants and war histories,Montgomery's plan was to seize the city of Caen and then spill out onto the plains leading to Paris I was a correspondent attached to Allied headquarters at the time, and I should add that that scenario was the one most people accepted for British operations in the campaign From Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441 (Stafford Diary)Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 190 "Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the ... boundary line." George Patton and others said the same thing. He was guessing that the reason Montgomery halted the Americans was a combination of jealousy and ignorance of the situation As it turned out, it was a pretty accurate guess. Continued movement by Patton would have violated the boundary between Bradley's 12th Army Group and Montgomery's 21st Army Group.
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  3002. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. If Monty didn't like anything he should have assessed his operationals orders and changed them.Monty planned the whole thing IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open. Attacking up a 70 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly. Bernard squandered every opportunity in Normandy The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports.He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders,he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy." Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance nothwards from Nijmegen to their support.There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke,he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfctory" This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory. Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed.Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged,"in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well."
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  3030. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches *Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este*​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  3031. Dave hac what other rare gems have you mined for the comment section today you poltroon?None of the objectives were met ♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.​ ♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore ♦Hollywood didn't make 32,000 Tommies surrender at Tobruk ♦Hollywood didn';t make 11,800 troops surrender at Crete ♦ Hollywood didn't make 13,958 troops surrender in Greece ♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich selling out the Czech Republic - Britain did. ♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel for 4 full years - after getting driven into it ♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty ♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up a crumbling crown. ♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later. ♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin then couldn't even make it to Arnhem - Monty did ♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group,IKE did. Then Bernard was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them ♦Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did. ♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Bernard bathing little boys Nigel Hamilton reported them in The Full Monty . ♦Hollwood wasn't "evacuated" from: Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 Want to know who was?
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  3035. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,p. 219 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..." The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary From Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".
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  3036. Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113​ yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it." Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assesments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops.Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p46 the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal. Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances​Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days. The September days were shorter and the and the mornings mistier - Williams ruled out 2 lifts in a day. These changes meant that it would take up to 3 Days to deliver the Airborne Divisions and that depended on perfect flying weather.The fault lay far more with Montgomery and his determination to impose an ill-considered plan The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies If Bernard was a real Field Marshall like Model he would have made his battle assessments and made any necessary alterations.But the dim bulb did not. So almost 2x as many flights than D-Day with just under 3 less hours daylight to do it in. The flights were much longer(300 miles) also - into N.E Netherlands instead of just across the 30 mile English Channel. They could hardly get the same amount of flights in the same day let alone more with the afore mentioned detriments.
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  3041.  @billballbuster7186  Tedder,Freddie DeGuingand,Miles Dempsey,Bedell-Smith did also,and Monty later admitted "a big mistake on my part" Typed these while reading the various books Monty's boss - Alan Brooke's own words​ "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it ​ The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. *The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
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  3046. Billy ​ infantile is an asshole like you keep propping up apathetic little prick named monty .Bernard had his chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940.He failed miserably, From that point onward, whatever he does and regardless of what happens to him - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US - in that order.Next time you pick up a book will be the 1st time .Monty is only studied as a bad example CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce. *But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one. Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .*IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".* Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
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  3051. Auchinleck won with much less in a much shorter time Bullcrap the allies built the advantages not monty they were already in place when auchinleck got sacked for performing much better than monty.A fact that churchill tried to hide for the rest of the war -EVERYTHING was already in place to win in the desert. Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance​ - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place. -Monty didn't defeat Rommel in Africa. The British Navy did by starving Rommel of resources. Monty should have been sacked at Normandy for being afraid and inaction. -Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery and still Montgomery never captured Rommel -Monty didn't build up the arms/men/tanks/materiel - the allies did -Dorman-Smith had engineers and infantry plant the massive mine field on the Alam Halfa ridge , that Bernard attempted to take credit for. -ULTRA became fully operational in August 1942 after the Germans had changed some wheels/gears on Enigma -The Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria. -Claude Auchinleck called over two fresh divisions from the Nile Delta after winning 1st alamein. -The Air and Naval Corp completely strangled the Afrika Korps supply lines. Sweeping the skies and seas in/over the Mediterranean -Mongomery never opened ports or captured Air Strips for them in return -Montgomery had ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with any of the above actions. He reaped the benefits of them and others who came before. The drunk Churchill fired the wrong guy. monty was a disaster the rest of the war much like his mongrels here
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  3081. Burns get your head wound looked at.When was Britain fighting for 6 yrs.Declare war in Sept'39 do nothing until May '40.Even the Germans called it the "SitzKreig".Then in less than 3 weeks unfortunately driven into the sea.Then head 3,000 miles into the desert, not crossing the English Channel until 4 yrs later - with the GI's of course.If you listen closely can hear Guderian snickering across the channel and the French screaming sacre bleu.And Stalin is like WTF *https://www.historyandheadlines.com/history-september-26-1944-market-garden-montgomerys-biggest-failure * From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem" *https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml * At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers. Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred) From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 4 "When Eisenhower strayed from his Broad Front Advance and gave Montgomery permission to launch Market-Garden,he made his worst decision of the war .Market Garden was a bad idea because it took the focus off of Antwerp - and Antwerp mattered the most.Without the necessary supplies,the Allies had no chance of sustaining a victorious push into Germany. This never ends well for you puddles
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  3082. Germans had so thoroughly demolished the port that months would pass before it was again operational. Securing another port, hopefully intact, would do a great deal to reduce the supply bottleneck still running through the Normandy beaches, and hopefully fuel Patton’s tanks. The Germans knew this as well, however, and had done a great deal to fortify and garrison the most important harbors in Brittany—especially Brest. To ensure that the garrison would be able to hold on to the city almost indefinitely, without having to feed civilians, the Germans had forcibly evacuated the population. Paratroop General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke, a wily veteran who had served under General Erwin Rommel in North Africa, commanded the 40,000-man garrison in Brest, which Adolf Hitler had declared a fortress to be defended to the last bullet. Two infantry divisions and one parachute division with associated elements, including ample artillery and machine guns, defended a formidable network of bunkers, pillboxes, emplacements, and trenches, all placed for mutual support. These were arrayed in exterior and interior lines, with the intention of eventually drawing any attackers into the city for house-to-house fighting and heavy casualties. As the fighting intensified, American engineers worked to clear minefields and blow up strongpoints one at a time. Fifteen British “Crocodiles”—Churchill tanks equipped with flamethrowers—were brought in to scorch the inner German fortifications. Finally, the inner city garrison surrendered on September 18. General Ramcke, having symbolically fired the last shell from an artillery piece, surrendered on September 19. At the cost of almost 10,000 casualties, the Americans had killed or captured the entire German garrison. But Brest, along with its harbor facilities, was utterly destroyed. So Monty got a whole city leveled at Caen and didn't grab the airfields until late.And with the fighting forces in such close proximity they didn't enjoy the heaviest aeriel bombbing and naval shelling of Normandy that bernard did at Caen.
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  3086.  @sean640307  no you dismissed facts previously presented because of the obnoxious revision pursued by this so called presenter. Montgomery himself faffed this up on September 4th.Then of course he doesn't show up until after hostilities are over.And bernard never left enough men or materiel instead sending 10,400 men into Arnhem of which 2,100 came out. Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine" The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"
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