Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "Who to Blame? John Frost on Operation Market Garden's Failure WW2" video.
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Monty was an idiot,even the Russians used the Broad front thrust.
British author of Military History, Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer
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@akgeronimo501 Model was playing chess and Monty with himself
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them, Monty rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 167 It probably would have been difficult for Warren of the 82nd to hold both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge against the combined might of Kampfgruppe Henke,the SS recon.battalion and other reinforcements from the 10th SS panzer Division .In that sense his mission was somewhat unreasonable,it reflected the unrelenting problem the 82nd AB faced in Market Garden namely how it was to hold the Groesbeek heights while at the same time capturing the Nijmegen bridges,especially with only part of the division on the ground.This was the great flaw in the OMG Design and Warren's soldiers paid the price for it.The sad reality was the push for the bridge had failed and was almost preordained to do so.
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 331-332 Because the Allied route of advance was so constricted and slender any German counter attack was disruptive,no matter how strong or weak.Truck drivers were spending as much time taking cover in the ditches as driving their vehicles,instead of roaring north to Arnhem,tankers & infantrymen were absorbed into pushing the Germans away from the vital road .As a result of all these problems,ammunition,food and gasoline were running dangerously low for Horrock's frontline units as well as the 82nd AB. The amiable Horrocks realized he was actually fighting 3 distinct battles:one to keep the corridor open,one to hold the Groesbeek Heights and one to make it to Arnhem.Obviously this is too much,and it was a direct result of market garden's overly ambitious nature,not to mention everything had to go right for the operation to succeed
(this snippett right here is just some of the evidence of how far Montgomery was in over his head.)
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 228 Gavin knew he faced a staggering task.He tried to rise to the challenge of a bad plan without complaint and achieved a remarkable success.The 82nd could hardly hold the Groesbeek Heights and take the key bridges at the same time.With the presumption of minimal German opposition - there was no margin of error for the operation.Which was open to the assumption of maximum risk.Most of the tactical objectives were outside,not within the landing areas
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TheVilla Aston scribbled in crayon
What fairytales? Eisenhower made the decision to prioritise Market Garden over the Scheldt.
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You are pathetic - you really are I have produced evidence by British sources and Alan Brooke himself dozens of times then you run away attmepting to convince others of your disturbed views somewhere else.Monty ignored the Scheldt even later blaming the CanadiansALL British Historians and Officers,except D'Este
From Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex. British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" -
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
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Oh my the inmate agreeing with himself
Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. From those there not a monty nutthugger.Who admitted Monty was shameful,then moved to America.Monty even admits - a bad mistake on my part
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
The Pedo Monty was never there and Scarrington stopped - sounds like the John Burns Brigade.That about seals it,LMAO.Have Monty give you a bath Cornhole - maybe you'll wake up
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You are realizing hallucinations again Burns,Monty never crossed the 30 mile wide channel for 4 yrs,that is after getting driven into it. So fast I might add that he beat your uncles up the gangplanks.GIs had to come 3,500 miles to help the lollygagging limpwrist
MONTY GARDEN
This abortion of Monty's involved crossing three major rivers, three minor rivers, and criss-crossing canals, across terrain(polder marshes) where tanks couldn't maneuver away from the major roads without sinking. And we saw how that went even with complete surprise.And taking one elevated lane 70 miles with no room for manuever
Bernard planned the whole thing - IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open.Which was accurate to supply this operation and everything else moving forward. The Allies couldn't keep lugging supplies 499 miles from Cherbourg. Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong.
♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road.
♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown
♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command.
♦ And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site
♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November
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