Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944" video.
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Ah Lyndon playing in the latrine again - At least 6 people quoted here think you are full of it
"He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII
From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major is even less charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces.
Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians
Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all."
Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak.
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 254 In terms of the Anglo-American divide the Sicilian episode demonstrated that antagonism was not confined to American officers.Montgomery's behavior made enemies of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder as well as their staffs. The much vaunted rivalry between Patton and Montgomery was minor compared to the depths hostility that had developed with the Royal Air Force.Tedder told Patton that Monty was "a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of himself as Napoleon - he is not"
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Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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what author, book and page number??? Monty isn't studied except as a bad example and didn't cross the channel for 4 full years - only with the big boys after the dunkirking. Blumentriit didn't know the GIs were propping up the snogging wanker Bernard for political purposess. IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"
Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July. I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause
With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies in Normandy"
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Mikey You yammering ham - Bradley wasn't there he was in Luxembourg. And Monty almost got relieved he did nothing
THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
By Don R. Marsh
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
--German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
--The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.
--The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
So both Collins and Harmon ignored monty who wanted to fall back then VII Corps went forward to finish off 2nd Panzer and sent 9th Panzer retreating. The British lost 200 KIA while GIs lost 8,500 killed and the Germans had more in 6 weeks of fighting mike kenny you lying lump
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Bradley took Normandy while the poof Bernard camped around Caen with the largest Bombing of the Normandy Campaign, Naval guns 12 miles away lobbing shells in also with Air corp right across the channel and the laggard still muffed it
My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day.Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken. IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress
My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day"
My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651 On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American General, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command.
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again you talk shyt bradley and collins took their objective,monty needed the massive bombings and shellings. Try reading a book or have your handler or mum do it for you. Then you may leave some sources. or try using the the search bar above to relieve me of furthering your education. Monty and you both need to be spoon fed. US forces captured over 3/4 of the prisoners. Truth hurts - always does. Russia and the USA were now dealing the cards slappy.
St. Lô 1944: The Battle of the Hedgerows, by Steven J. Zaloga
Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, commanding the German 84th Army Corps, the battle was “a monstrous blood-mill, the likes of which I have not seen in my 11 years of battle.”
By the beginning of July 1944—three weeks after D-Day—Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy, was not progressing as rapidly as anticipated. The British Second Army had yet to secure one of its primary objectives, the pivotal crossroads city of Caen, effectively halting its advance on Paris before it began. To block the Second Army the Germans had deployed a staggering force of tanks and armored fighting vehicles along a tight 20-mile front.
Farther to the west the American First Army under Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley had just achieved its first tactical objective by seizing the port city of Cherbourg, on the northern tip of the Cotentin Peninsula.“The Battle of the Hedgerows involved no dramatic advances or decisive maneuvers,” Zaloga summed up. “It was a grinding battle of attrition.” The ultimate butcher’s bill was staggering. In less than three weeks of brutal, relentless fighting the First Army suffered more than 40,000 casualties.American troops occupied Saint-Lô proper on July 18.
The Battle of the Hedgerows and capture of what remained of Saint-Lô and its neighboring towns opened the gate to Bradley’s Operation Cobra, which enabled Patton’s historic armored breakthrough and race across France, the liberation of Paris and, in less than a year, the defeat of Germany
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@thevillaaston7811 He did right from the top as Tedder was his right hand man.But you don't read as hIstory isn't important to you. As bernard and the whole Lucien /Nigel thing ya know plus British "strategic" withdrawals from:
-Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 (338,000,British,Dutch,French Troops in all evacuated)
-Greece, Crete & Hong Kong in 1941 (3700 captured in Greece, 12,274 captured in Crete,10,000 captured in Hong Kong)
-Tobruk and Singapore in 1942 (28-33,000 captured at Tobruk ,81,000 captured in Singapore)
This is well known in historical academia but not by TIK and his hamlet of unhinged halfwits here. Do tell about mum taking Gerry prisoners, that always leaves them in the isle :face-blue-smiling:
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@street_cheeks you are getting your wires crossed try reading below
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes Campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end
The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
--German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
--The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.
--The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
Monty lied - the GIs actually thru him into a detaining cage look that up on Mark Felton's Board. Rumors ran rampant there was a monty look alike.Smacked the wisp around a tad,served him right for wanting to retreat then claiming vctory
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,p.356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. Monty Didn't seize Caen (day one objective) for over a month. Didn't close Failaise pocket. Didn't capture Rommel's army at El Alemian and took high losses just to win by default, Didn't trap Afika Corp in Tunisia, couldn't capture any vital channel ports, Didn't open Antwerp's approaches when it was wide open, Didn't even make it to the half way point in MarketGarden (Arnhem was only end of first half), Didn't get past Nijmegen for over 6 months.... I could go on and on. His failures are the stuff of legend.
Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak.
More Monty victims
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@sean640307 SEAN, the Dutch Army had advised going west and north over terrain that could support armor. They could fan out and flank the Gerries. Instead of the polder marshes and flood plains that surrounded most of Hell's Highway which basically created choke points that the Gerries exploited. Oh and then there is this.
Horrock's words
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine. But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him.
Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September, Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops *Billy E.T. Williams who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities"*
Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. *Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"
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You girls and your knitting circles - when your done cleaning your teeth with your fingers try leafing thru pages of a history book with them
1. Dr Forrest C.Pogue,interviews,US Army Military Institute,1947Montgomery's intelligence officer, Brigadier E.T. Williams. Pogue quotes Williams as telling him when Bradleys troops came up to the inter-army group boundary line, "Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. *We [Williams and Freddie De Guingand, Montgomery's Chielf of Staff] were indignant on Bradley's behalf." Quoted in Rohmer's "Patton's Gap" and in Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy," p. 449,450.
2. Maj-Gen. Francis De Guingand, "Operation Victory," p. 407. "My impressions at the time were that he [Montgomery] had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group*......*It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group commander [Bradley] as to the limit of his northward movement." Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery.
3. Stafford Diary from Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441 Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary."
4. Hansen Diaries, Sunday, August 13, 1944, reads: "It is suggested in G-3 [Operations] that we were ordered to hold at Argentan rather than continue the drive to Falaise since our capture of that objective would infringe on the prestige of forces driving south [British/Canadians] ... Accordingly, our forces were held at Argentan and subsequently refueled while the British were still short of their objective [and] permitted much of the strength in the pocket to escape eastward toward the Seine."
5. Ralph Ingersoll, in his book, "Top Secret," writes about Patton's Third Army and the Falaise Gap: "Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the ... boundary line."
Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 190 George Patton and others said the same thing. He was guessing that the reason Montgomery halted the Americans was a combination of jealousy and ignorance of the situation. As it turned out, it was a pretty accurate guess. 6. Both British Air Chief Marshals Sir Arthur Coningham and Sir Arthur Tedder said that Montgomery was responsible for the 'halt order.' According to Antony Beevor, Tedder said, "One of Monty's great errors was at Falaise. There he imperiously told US troops to stop and leave the British area alone. He didn't close the gap
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@brucebartup6161 troll? My Uncle was with the 12 armored Division under Gen. Patch so what . doesn't change the fact Monty got 1100 men killed - A-HOLE.
From History net operation varsity allied airborne assault over the rhine river
Some have speculated that the airborne phase of the assault may have been unnecessary for the success of the overall operation. Montgomery has been accused of using the airborne troops to ‘put on a good show’ and to further his own reputation. The Americans, on the other hand, saw Montgomery as a pompous and sought to enhance his public image and tried to take credit for success even when it was not due him.
For Operation Varsity, the northern route into the industrial heart of Germany was now wide open. The cost had been high. The 6th Airborne had suffered 590 killed and another 710 wounded or missing. Several hundred of the missing later turned up to rejoin their units, however. The 17th Airborne had 430 killed, with 834 wounded and 81 missing. Casualties among the glider pilots and the troop plane pilots and crews included 91 killed, 280 wounded and 414 missing in action. Eighty planes were shot down, and only 172 of the 1,305 gliders that landed in Germany were later deemed salvageable. A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne 158 on D-Day. Operation Varsity, March 24, 1945, was the worst single day for Allied airborne troops.
Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!
Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded.
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D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263-264 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns.Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved .Conningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African campaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit .Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields.
Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook.Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power.
D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p185 The RAF was furious especially when Montgomery pretended that everything had gone according to plan. ALL air preparations had been calculated on establishing forward airbases for Spitfires and Typhoons with in a few days Now because of the shallow depth of the the beach head,any airfield they built would be well within the range of German Artillery.*There was little room left for fuel depots,supply dumps.repair workshops,base camps,field hospitals and vehicle parks.Almost every orchard and field in the area was crammed. *"The British were so crowded they overflowed in to our area" Bradley later stated a tactical remark concealing his degree of frustration
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p 326 Apart from having secured the beachhead,little else Monty was doing was working .No one forgot his promise about how quickly Caen would fall to him - over a month would pass before he took it or how he would advance steadily to places by anything like the dates he predicted
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p 331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
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D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p 320-21 Field Marshall Brooke flew to France at midday to see Monty. The gulf between the claims he made before the operations began and the reality of the situation revealed after his press conference was becoming a major embarrassment.Journalists thru back at him what they had been told before the offensive.On July 20 Operation Goodwood was called off officially. For the troops who had taken part the situation was a bitter disappointment after all the promises*
My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher "Lack of progress on the British front at Caen has produced BBC coverage that is almost exclusively American.The British Public has become so annoyed at the coverage of events in France that our British hostess switched off the radio while her American Officer guests were listening to the late news"
Triumph and Tragedy:The Second World War by Winston Churchill. Winston S Churchill to General Montgomery:"For my own secret information,I should like to know whether the attacks you spoke of to me,or variants of them,*are going to come off* .It certainly seems important to the British Army to strike hard and win through otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies that which will lead to dangerous recrimination
The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122 The British had only advanced 6 miles and taken 2,000 prisoners by July 20th.Their casualties totaled more than 4,000 men and about 500 tanks,more than 1/3 of all the tanks brought to Normandy This is nowhere near the results Montgomery had led everyone to expect The discontent was wide spread many senior Allied leaders felt they had been had,taken by promises Montgomery had no intention of fufilling or had been unable to fufill.Harry Butcher Eisenhower's aide said others were discussing "who would succeed Monty when he was sacked"
The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122-23 Goodwood damaged Monty's prestige and he never fully recovered.Eisenhower was "disappointed and angered" by the difference between Montgomery's promise and his performance Air Marshall Tedder "redoubled" because Monty had deceived the Air Forces
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No his pathetic plan was getting Tommies killed 3 miles in when 9 tanks were taken out by panzerfuasts. They made it a whole 7 miles as Urquhart disappeared for 38 hrs lathbury got wounded and Monty was having his picture painted - literally.They gave him everything. 3 US Armies were stopped to feed,fuel and facilitate the bent little freak's fantasy.
Where was Monty during the largest air drop up until that time? "LORD" Carrington stopped after crossing the Nijmegen Bridge in Lent and going no further. So evidently the British award such valiant dithering by referring to him as *LORD*. And if you don't show up at all like bernard you achieve the lofty label of "Field Marshall",can't make that shit up. I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all.
A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF. Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign . It was inexcusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence *As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
You can even ask your stable of Pseuds
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@johnpeate4544 how clever you rewrite your bollocks in italics and put red diamonds next to it. Here I FIFY 💩💩💩
Try one of the other aliases on your account
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Type this into the search field of Youtube The Friendship Between Britain And The USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt | Timeline go to 2:30 then listen. Churchill emphatically stated his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States.”
Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"
My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day"
A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.275 Monty launched Goodwood on July 18,It was preceded by a massive air attack.Some 1,700 heavy bombers and plus 400 medium bombers dropped nearly 8,000 tons of bombs on the German front. On the afternoon of July 20 when the rains turned the battleground into a sea of mud,Monty, declaring himself well pleased with the results of Goodwood,abruptly halted it. It had gained six miles south of the city. The cost had been appalling:4,000 casualties and 500 tanks - over 1/3 of all the tanks in Monty's command. Monty oversold Goodwood and his preliminary "ballyhoo" was too exultant and a disastrous miscalculation had raised expectations to an almost giddy level and then dashed them.IKE,Bedell-Smith, Tedder and the whole of SHAEF was furious with Monty
Triumph and Tragedy:The Second World War, by Winston Churchill Winston S Churchill to General Montgomery:"For my own secret information,I should like to know whether the attacks you spoke of to me,or variants of them,are going to come off .It certainly seems important to the British Army to strike hard and win through otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies that which will lead to dangerous recrimination
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407
Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"
From Winston Churchill dot org
After 6 June, Montgomery makes no mention of his initial failure to take the city. Monty’s failed plan to capture Caen on D-Day stalled the entire Normandy campaign. Monty had always made it perfectly clear that D-Day required an initial aggressive thrust that gained more ground and broke through the German defenses to take Caen. None of Montgomery’s pre-invasion planning,reports, or presentations ever suggested that the British would stop short of attacking and quickly taking Caen
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Thanx for tagging along johnny
Britsh Historian Ronald Lewin,Royal Institute for defense Studies "World War II: A Tangled Web,RUSI Journal,p82
"Thus we were brought to that dreadful day that the Alliance very nearly cracked asunder the day when Montgomery was really within a pen stroke of being removed by Eisenhower,the consequences of which I dread to think"
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.247 SHAEF and COSSAC Planning Officer, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean is quoted as calling Monty a "big cheat" in his claims: "for Montgomery to say that he was holding the Germans so Bradley could break out was absolute rubbish and a complete fabrication that only developed after he was stopped outside of Caen"
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.427 as early as August 12th Bradley's Staff had been grumbling that "the British effort appears to have logged itself in timidity and succumbed to the legendary Montgomery vice of over caution
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America. Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete
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NO SOURCES AGAIN - you lampshade Bradley wasn't there I told you this .Ask your special needs instructor to take you to the history section no coloring books this time . Here you go since you evidently don't know what a search engine is. That's alright you don't know what history is either. the GIs defeating the The same army that drove Bernard into the channel where evidently he gave you the Full Monty. See even the Germans themselves Mantueuffel and Model - look them up admitted Patton had them beat. Monty who knows where the wisp went maybe with you. After all he didn't show at Dieppe and Market Garden either
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,p. 647CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views.
THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
By Don R. Marsh
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders to fall back he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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maybe your special needs center there can turn on sponge bob or some other cartoons for you as history isn't your thing. And get your head wound looked at
Two officers one was Gen Freddie Deguingand the other Billy"E.T." Williams both heard Monty's halt order as they were in the British Operational.Deguingand was Monties Chief of Staff. And Williams was the Intelligence Officer. Intelligence is something you know nothing about.
And another thing you ignoranus the ports were blown up long before any Tommies or GIs got anywhere near
See here you unread rube 3 different sources now you may return to your land of make believe
Carlo D'Este, "Decision in Normandy," p. 441 (Stafford Diary)Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford was SHAEF's Chief of Air Operations and Plans. He was a British Officer with no ax to grind. He also kept a diary and on 14 August 1944, he recorded this statement from General Bradley at a meeting: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21st Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-army group boundary."
Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory," p. 407 Major General Francis De Guingand confirms this statement in his own book, Operation Victory "My impressions at the time were that Montgomery had been a little to optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group Bradley as to the limit of his northward movement." Since De Guingand was unaware of any discussions Eisenhower and Bradley may have had, the order limiting Bradley's northward movement must have come from Montgomery
D-Day, The Battle for Normandy," p. 478 from Antony Beevor Both British Air Chief Marshals Sir Arthur Coningham and Sir Arthur Tedder said that Montgomery was responsible for the 'halt order.' . Tedder said, "One of Monty's great errors was at Falaise. There he imperiously told US troops to stop and leave the British area alone He didn't close the gap."
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What do you expect Kesselring to say who BTW some how wiggled off the hook for war crimes. "Ya he flanked me twice what a failure he is." Botom line Patton drove him out of Sicily. But since you want to quote Germans fine. Rommel as you know thought much more of Auchinleck.
Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein" Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt.
When interviewed in 1945,Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place
General Gunther Blumentritt : We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets.
The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education"
From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7. Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference - in spite of several sorts of frailty of human nature! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944. I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph" - an excellent report! With very good wishes
Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin
General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
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Here is what some reviewers said abour Harry :
The author didn't have the guts to stake his reputation on a convincing and definite verdict. Tacking on the name "Patton" to this book's title is just a ploy to separate a buyer from his hard-earned cash. Don't waste your time and money on this one if your purpose is to discover what Patton's reputation was among the Germans.
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The author had bias and supposition from beginning. Author could magically read Hitlers mind. According to Yeide, Patton was the most lucky person in the world. The only reason he won all his battles was because the Germans didnt care about him and abandoned the battlefield allowing Patton to "fill the void" When the Germans fought the French they completely fled the area. Yet when Patton landed in North Africa the Vichy French were levels above Patton and fought valiantly till the Naval bombardment would knock them out.
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An exciting title but a total disappointment in the text - If you HAVE to read it get it at the library. If you have any knowledge of WWII history stay away because it is nothing but the authors premise then his ideas to support it. Big gaps in facts. WAY too many details about German combatants then nothing about the battles. The Germans would continually outsmart Patton and then just fall back for no reason and suffer heavy losses with no credit going to Patton who was causing the heavy losses. By the time I got to the Sicily invasion I couldn't finish because of the suppositions by the author. "Island was abandoned because of Italian politics, not because of anything the Allies did." Even though Hitler ordered them to not give an inch and fight to the last man Pure poppycock.
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The book is confusing, especially when examining the fighting in Lorraine. The Germans have a First Army. The US has a First Army. Who in the hell is attacking who at times is up in the air. Is the US First Army attacking the German First Army, or vice versa? Maybe adding the "US First Army" would have helped. The editor was asleep at the switch on that one. And the maps are hopeless to follow.
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Why the author felt it necessary to break down, to the brigade level, the composition of German forces in Russia (yes, Russia, a theater that Patton had nothing to do with) is beyond grasp and comprehension. And the continuous use of German names and titles was beyond distraction, that Patton did not engage perhaps to impress the uninitiated
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The reader should know, it is not until approximately page 250 (of 420 of text) that the author first actually provides a German assessment of Patton. Yeide contradicts himself many times throughout the book - on page 197 he details the Herman Goering Division facing Patton in Sicily as green with hardly any soldiers who had fought before. Then after the Division is shifted away from Patton to fight Montgomery on the east coast of Sicily Yeide describes them as the most powerful Axis Division in Sicily.
When Patton is about to attack Metz later in the war, he says the battle is unnecessary and results in many costly casualties for no reason at all. However during the same discussion on the Metz battle, he says that Hitler refused to allow a German retreat and told his generals to fight to the death. Well which is it Mr Yeide
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they used his exact words and and present the contradictions,Yeilde hasn't won any literary awards of note. He wouldn't even make a good youtuber let alone a vetted and peer reviewed Historian Hell TIK is better and that's not exactly a ringing endorsement. Being a fan of revision i understand why you would present his sham graffiti. And read what the guy who wrote that hack piece - he is referencing Yeilde instead of checking his sources/facts like he is a credible source . Harry flat out never interviewed any of the authors who credited Patton. Yeilde makes statements like it appears that,it seems like,it maybe noted sheesh. At least twice reviewers points out his woeful descriptions and proves nothing with the maps. Stating there were impotant battles then doesn't even mark the maps properly
here are more
He constantly quotes German generals as saying Patton was cautious and failed to exploit weaknesses in the German lines, yet he also points out on numerous occasions that Patton was ordered to stop, or to go in a different direction, or simply ran out of gasoline and supplies because of his rapid advances. So hardly failing to exploit,in addition then saying Patton is slow and overly cautious then Patton has the Germans on the run, and on the defensive. Who does he think pushed the German Army from Normandy back across the Rhine???
He agrees with the Germans who said Patton was average at best, but scoffs at the ones that called him a brilliant tank commander. He continuously says that the Germans did not care where Patton was, and that he was mentioned in very few memoirs of the Germans. Yet there are no examples of where any other American or British generals were specifically mentioned either - in fact the Germans were retreating so quickly and losing men and material so fast, I don't think they cared who on the Allied side were shooting and killing them with increasing speed.
One last thing that was mentioned were the battle maps throughout the book - they were worthless in trying to identify who were the Germans and who were the Allies. He has arrows going in numerous directions, none of which identifies what side he is trying to depict. Several times he identifies a town or village as being pivotal to a battle but then it is not even on it. :body-green-covering-eyes:
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@jeffreybeigie5244
MacArthur didn't make any adjustments in the Phillipines after knowing Pearl had just been pounded.Planes were still lined up on the air fields and defensive measures weren't taken when he had a hole day to react. In his abscence GOD knows how many GIs/Phillipinos suffered horrifically and that arrogant ass is having a a film reel made about himself. He rehersed that landing bit over a Dozen times - a DOZEN
AT ABOUT 3:40 A.M. on December 8, 1941, the phone rang inside Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur’s lavish apartment atop the Manila Hotel. It was MacArthur’s chief of staff, calling with the shocking news that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor earlier that morning—December 7 across the international date line in Hawaii. MacArthur, commander of American forces in the Philippines, hastened to his headquarters, where his air chief arrived shortly thereafter with a request: Major General Lewis H. Brereton wanted permission to launch a bombing raid against Japanese bases in Formosa before the Japanese could strike Clark Field, the main American air base in the Philippines. Despite repeated appeals from Brereton, however, and even several minor Japanese air raids on the Philippines, nearly seven hours went by before MacArthur finally authorized the strike
By then, it was too late. At 12:30 p.m. Brereton’s B-17 Flying Fortresses were on the ground at Clark Field, being fueled and loaded with bombs for the Formosa mission, when 88 Japanese bombers and fighters attacked. Brereton’s B-17s were defenseless. Of the 17 on the ground at the time, 12 were destroyed and five were badly damaged. Not a single one was flyable.
Brereton’s heavy bombers were the linchpin of the Philippines’ planned defense—but in one stroke, Japan had obliterated that threat. Why MacArthur had held back and waited for the enemy to strike first was a mystery even to his colleagues. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall couldn’t fathom “how MacArthur happened to let his planes get caught on the ground,”
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Nobody studies Monty manuevers except for you and the other 4 aliases on your account Johnny. You have a particular faculty of realizing hallucinations,has Montgomery been getting rough with you in the tub again? Ring the nurses station and report this!!!
The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at 9 days of Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account.
*Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success - it was a failure.
Look at a map you don't get it - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war. Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up.Patton wasn't going to leave 90,000 Landsers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th read it - There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. General De Gaulle, but most importantly the French people, wanted German Wehrmacht divisions beaten, destroyed or otherwise pushed out of France. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back.
Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced ferro concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers. And the GIs still took it on Dec 13th
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@sean640307 sources? by who?when? Investigate,bring evidence if it's not asking too much.Matter of fact why don't we leave this cheering section and try a comment section with some credibility rather than carnival barking. The so called host here deletes information accurate but opposed to the revisionist narritive he's trying to drive home. The Americans by this time had more men coming in had higher casualties because they weren't hunkered down in one place. In deed the broad front was proving deadly as they not Bernard fanned out. The Tommies thought shackled by Monty still gave a good account of themselves
My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day. Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress.
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.551-52 Rommel reported on June 12th in Normandy would be rendered exceptionally difficult and partially immpossible by the extraordinary strong and in some respects overwhelmingly superiority of the Allied Air Force and by the effect of the heavy naval artillery....the enemy has complete control over the battle area and up to 60 miles behind the front Almost all transport on roads and in open country is prevented by day by strong fighter bomber and heavy bomber formations. Movements of our troops by day are also almost completely stopped, while the enemy can move freely.....this crippling and destructive operation of the enemy Air Force
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.557* The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. *I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles.After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.559 The problem was Montgomery who could be neither removed or moved to action. Later that day, Generals Morgan and Gale,Deputy CoS and Senior Administrative officer respectively, spoke to me of their apprehensions about the slow pace of the Army's advance
D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p229 Eisenhower was fuming with impatience,yet Monty refused to be hurried and 21st Army HQ provided SHAEF with little information. Montgomery had mentioned to Dempsey on quite a few occasions "there's no need to tell IKE" Montgomery liked to keep objectives vague,often with metaphors, so if there was a breakout he could claim credit for it and if the operation ran into the sand he could say that they had simply been tying down the German forces to help out the Americans. IT was not of course Montgomery who determined this state of affairs but the Germans who sent their Panzer Divisions
My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - August 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day"
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause. Montgomery had in effect stopped his armour from going farther.Later I reported saying that the British Chiefs of Staff would "support any recommendation that Ike might care to make in respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push"
Air Marshall Tedder thru ULTRA had been reading the reports,it appears the massive bombings and Naval Shellings must have taken place as as IKE's personal aide Butcher,Rommel and Tedder all apparently agree. Tedder goes on to agree with Conningham also. So tell me where was he banging away here, taken right from HQ,Monty's a proven liar. Probably why you won't re-visist Desert Generals. Where 3 of the 4 Historians point out his inflating his roll and ghastly diregarding others contributions.
Everyone,EVERYONE in SHAEF heard Monty's directives to take CAEN on D-Day. To take on D+ One is too late.
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Tedder is not the one with credibility issues - Montgomery is, all of these men there and in real time are full of it,bang on revisionist
With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.275 Monty launched Goodwood on July 18,It was preceded by a massive air attack.Some 1,700 heavy bombers and plus 400 medium bombers dropped nearly 8,000 tons of bombs on the German front. On the afternoon of July 20 when the rains turned the battleground into a sea of mud,Monty, declaring himself well pleased with the results of Goodwood,abruptly halted it. It had gained six miles south of the city. The cost had been appalling:4,000 casualties and 500 tanks - over 1/3 of all the tanks in Monty's command. Monty oversold Goodwood and his preliminary "ballyhoo" was too exultant and a disastrous miscalculation had raised expectations to an almost giddy level and then dashed them.IKE,Bedell-Smith, Tedder and the whole of SHAEF was furious with Monty
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.171 Not surprisingly nowhere in Dempsey's diary or notes for this period is there any mention what so ever of a British strategy of attracting and pinning down Rommel's reserves
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.247 SHAEF and COSSAC Planning Officer, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean is quoted as calling Monty a "big cheat" in his claims: "for Montgomery to say that he was holding the Germans so Bradley could break out was absolute rubbish and a complete fabrication that only developed after he was stopped outside of Caen"
*https://warfarehistorynetwork.com Montgomery began his disinformation campaign by claiming that it was not important either to take Caen or to gain any more ground in the Caen sector*
Other British officers who had served with Montgomery during the war were not convinced of his claim that attracting the German armor to Caen had always been part of his plan. Montgomery’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Francis De Guingand wrote, “We had, as I have already said, hoped to take Caen and get out into the open country beyond in the first few days and in that event we should have been able to make the fullest use of our tanks.”
P.J. Grigg worked at the War Office in London but made frequent trips to France and was thoroughly familiar with Montgomery’s plans. After the war he wrote, “Of course his [Montgomery’s] original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen into the open in the first few days after landing—it would be idle to deny that*. The problem was that Montgomery never admitted to anyone that he had changed his plans. *Grigg remarked that Montgomery “tried to make himself look bigger by saying he planned it all beforehand. He didn’t.”
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Lyndon When the smoke cleared there were two world powers left standing and neither you or monty belonged with them you're welcome you cheeky chode.The Russians on the east were fighting the same vicious battles also cupcake.That's why it's called a war. The GIs kept grinding and not going backward like Monty to Antwerp - screwing the Canadians over and leaving them to mop up the mess. IKE gave monty his chance and like you he didn't show up. But where you come from evidently they call you a Field Marshall,ya right :face-blue-smiling: IKE even gave the all supplies and stopped 2 US Army groups to do so and like CAEN and Falaise he failed yet again. You are not doing any better as Lyndon than you did as John Cornell
The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec,not just 9 days in the Netherlands, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden in just 9 days (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure.
Look at a map I don't think you get it - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war.Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up Patton wasn't going to leave 90,000 Landsers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th
There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced ferro concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers and they still took it
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Ya and Monty ignored not only logistics but intel - but do give a listen to monty not only admitting it but Brooke/Ramsey/Tedder blaming him also (all British BTW)
ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944) ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum.
On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role.
Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcover by Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.
Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.'
So Montgomery ignored:
Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith
SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong
Williams & Strong being British Officers
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Alan Brooke???
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
Monty after the war admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."
(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
How about Air Marshall Tedder???
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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Lyndon Latrine - any sources on that besides your backside? Nevermind I found them for you. Shocking I'm sure you'd agree
Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin
General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education"
Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt. Refresh my memory - when did Guderian,Blumentritt,Rommel or Bayerlein drive the GIs off of the continent and into the sea like they did bernard? I do know the GIs loaded ship after ship stem to stern with men,materiel,food,fuel,tanks,trucks and artillery and sail 3,500 to help some loudmouth limpdicks like you go the last 30 miles - those Aston ankle biters posing as head hunters - ROTFLMAO
When interviewed in 1945,Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place
General Gunther Blumentritt: We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets.
From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7. Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference - in spite of several sorts of frailty of human nature! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944.I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph" - an excellent report! With very good wishes
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Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
*With Prejudice, by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, p557* The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles.After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, *it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.559 The problem was Montgomery who could be neither removed or moved to action. Later that day, Generals Morgan and Gale,Deputy CoS and Senior Administrative officer respectively, spoke to me of their apprehensions about the slow pace of the Army's advance
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause
D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 263-264 The slowness of Monty's attack in Normandy was one of Ike's chief concerns. Eisenhower even had spoken to Churchill about it while the battle was in full swing. Air Chief Marshall Tedder and Air Marshall Coningham even discussed the possibility of having Montgomery relieved .
Conningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group,had loathed Montgomery since the North African campaign.He had never been able to forgive Montgomery's compulsion to take all the credit
Now they were infuriated by Mongomery's pretence that his strategy was proceeding according to plan when he had manifestly failed to take the ground needed for airfields.Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook.Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power.
Overlord,by Max Hastings,p. 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...."
Churchill and the Montgomery Myth,by R.W. Thompson,p.170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves. Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke
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Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.197 Until the arrival of 2nd Panzer at Caen there was little other than Wittman's small Panzer force,to stop the British. The Germans never understood why Montgomery failed to press his advantage. Of the period around
Of the period around June 10th Gen Fritz Kraemer wrote: it is still incomprehensible why the enemy exerted himself with assaults in the direction of Caen and did not make a powerful drive to exploit the open Gap on either side of Bayeux.The enemy left a favorable opportunity slip
D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,page 264 - Montgomery's reluctance to incur losses in Normandy has long been a target of criticism. An aversion to risk had become wide spread and opportunities were seldom exploited.The repeated failures to crack the German front around Caen inevitably blunted an aggressive outlook. Increasingly the 2nd Army in Normandy relied on Artillery and Air Power
*My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.616 July 17,1944 The RAF had dropped a concentration of 7000 tons of bombs to help the ground troops break through the German defense ring.Around evening Air Marshall Tedder had called IKE and and mentioned Monty had stopped his armor from going any farther IKE was mad as Monty was drawing up his "administrative tail".
My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained *can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,Page 325 Monty was dismayed that others seemed to have forgotten the plan he maintained he had set out with absolute clarity prior to the invasion for all those concerned to understand.According to that plan he would draw the main enemy forces onto his sector of the allied line while Bradley's Americans on his right would secure the peninsula before making the break out.Not all of Montgomery's growing band of critics at SHAEF remembered it that way.He later claimed his critics completely misunderstood his plan
Triumph in the West,by Arthur Bryant,page 243 Brooke wrote in his diary"The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward.But now comes the trouble;the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war
The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122 The British had only advanced 6 miles and taken 2,000 prisoners by July 20th.Their casualties totaled more than 4,000 men and about 500 tanks,more than 1/3 of all the tanks brought to Normandy This is nowhere near the results Montgomery had led everyone to expect.The discontent was wide spread many senior Allied leaders felt they had been had,taken by promises Montgomery had no intention of fufilling or had been unable to fufill.Harry Butcher Eisenhower's aide said others were discussing "who would succeed Monty when he was sacked"*
The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.122-23 Goodwood damaged Monty's prestige and he never fully recovered.Eisenhower was "disappointed and angered" by the difference between Montgomery's promise and his performance.Air Marshall Tedder "redoubled" because Monty had deceived the Air Forces
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In Eisenhowers unpublished transcripts at the Presidential library "....after we were ashore in Normandy we had not been achieving the advances that Monty that had earlier predicted on his maps. Mr Churchill expressed unhappiness at the lack of progress and the failure to capture Caen. Churchill came to see me one day accompanied by General Brooke.He pointed out the pre-invasion briefings and the seizure of Caen within 24 hrs had been assumed The failure after fighting to take this key city strengthened his fear that we were descending into bitter WW1 "trench-warfare"
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.80 HQ 21 Army Group,14 April 1944 , B.L.Montgomery, CiC ."the whole of aggressive tactics would be to retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds of the enemy .To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to wait till D plus 1 would be to lose the opportunity, and also to lose the initiative."
My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day.Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken. IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile?The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p. 331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were had put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.557* The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles. *After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause
Montgomery had in effect stopped his armour from going farther.Later I reported saying that the British Chiefs of Staff would "support any recommendation that Ike might care to make in respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push"
D-Day,The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor,p183-84
.On June 11 after a meeting with Bradley Monty wrote DeGuingand that his objective "was to pull the Germans on to 2nd Army so that the US Army could extend & expand. The problem was that Montgomery partly for reasons of morale partly for pride could not admit that any of his plans had gone wrong. IT was not of course Montgomery who determined this state of affairs but the Germans who sent their Panzer Divisions
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You are rewriting bullshit again leaving out page and chapter,You are are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren't going to want to go on reading
British forces were driven from
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
If the Americans were bad Monty should have stayed home and saved a bunch of Englishmen
Imagine what this yapping jackel Repeate would say about IKE if he lost say 200,000 @ Dunkirk or 81,000 @ Singapore or 25-30,000 @ Tobruk but who the hell has losses like that? 🤣
More Monty victims
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013
Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013
John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013
John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013
John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013
TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
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and they were driven from the field and Monty was one of 3 senior officers. BTW RIP to 3,500. but it was just not those authors
That is but a pinch of what i've cached about the guy. If Monty and Mac took a slow boat to China the war would have finished before they returned. Both were detrimental to the outcome of the war and those around them
*Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton.
-Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.”
-Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.”
--Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.
The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, p. 151 - Montgomery:"1st Army have withdrawn 6th Division - ready to launch attack to the Rhine with British 2nd Army on October 12th." (Author's Footnote p.152 - This indicates that even after the failure,Montgomery still intended to move toward the Ruhr before opening the Scheldt)
Ramsay: this afforded me the que I needed to lambaste him for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed .Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow
The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay p. 159 "the Army was far behind organising as I knew they would be as they entirely under estimated their task and Monty had not given the Canadians sufficient support for the work (Author's Footnote In fact ,Montgomery had finally committed himself without reservation to the Scheldt campaign in a directive issued on 16 October, after receiving 3 "hurry up" messages from Eisenhower during the previous week)
Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles.
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Germans had so thoroughly demolished the port that months would pass before it was again operational. Securing another port, hopefully intact, would do a great deal to reduce the supply bottleneck still running through the Normandy beaches, and hopefully fuel Patton’s tanks. The Germans knew this as well, however, and had done a great deal to fortify and garrison the most important harbors in Brittany—especially Brest. To ensure that the garrison would be able to hold on to the city almost indefinitely, without having to feed civilians, the Germans had forcibly evacuated the population.
Paratroop General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke, a wily veteran who had served under General Erwin Rommel in North Africa, commanded the 40,000-man garrison in Brest, which Adolf Hitler had declared a fortress to be defended to the last bullet. Two infantry divisions and one parachute division with associated elements, including ample artillery and machine guns, defended a formidable network of bunkers, pillboxes, emplacements, and trenches, all placed for mutual support. These were arrayed in exterior and interior lines, with the intention of eventually drawing any attackers into the city for house-to-house fighting and heavy casualties.
As the fighting intensified, American engineers worked to clear minefields and blow up strongpoints one at a time. Fifteen British “Crocodiles”—Churchill tanks equipped with flamethrowers—were brought in to scorch the inner German fortifications. Finally, the inner city garrison surrendered on September 18. General Ramcke, having symbolically fired the last shell from an artillery piece, surrendered on September 19. At the cost of almost 10,000 casualties, the Americans had killed or captured the entire German garrison. But Brest, along with its harbor facilities, was utterly destroyed.
So Monty got a whole city leveled at Caen and didn't grab the airfields until late.And with the fighting forces in such close proximity they didn't enjoy the heaviest aeriel bombbing and naval shelling of Normandy that bernard did at Caen.
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