Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "Why did Eisenhower stop Devers from crossing the Rhine?" video.
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Rightfully so these two thought it prudent.Specially when you factor in British Lorrie situation breaking down
Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
So the GI's Red Ball express couldn't keep lugging all that tonnage 483 miles from Cherbourg. Not without assistence from either an open port or the British Lorries pulling their weight rather than in tow
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In The Last Offensive, the U.S. Army’s official account of Operation Varsity and the final drive into Germany, Charles B. MacDonald, a veteran infantry officer who had served with the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, in Europe in World War II, stated that with the weak condition of German units east of the Rhine, “some overbearing need for the special capability of airborne divisions would be required to justify their use, ” and that the specific need never existed. the objectives were important, the ground forces could have taken them without difficulty, and in all likelihood, with fewer casualties.
As evidence, he pointed out that the amphibious crossings faced very little resistance; the two American divisions in the river assault, the 30th and 79th Infantry Divisions, lost a total of forty-one killed, 450 wounded, and seven missing. James A. Huston, in his book, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II, agreed with MacDonald, adding that “had the same resources been employed on the ground, it is conceivable that the advance to the east may have been more rapid than it was.”
Jack Ariola US Soldier in side a glider
"the anti-aircraft fire was so thick we could have got out and walked on it. Bullets and FLAK were coming thru the glider and every time one hit the bottom glider and came out the top it sounded like the crack of a whip only 10 times louder
Otto Leitner, German Lieutenant "with so many aircraft it was difficult not to hit something. I ordered my men to keep firing in the hope to fill the sky with metal and damage the aircraft"
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"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."
Monty later admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 *In his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway." For not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. *Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply . Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
The Year of D-Day:The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, p. 151 - Montgomery:"1st Army have withdrawn 6th Division - ready to launch attack to the Rhine with British 2nd Army on October 12th." Ramsay: this afforded me the que I needed to lambaste him for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery .Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply . Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life
Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
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The only thing causing problems was British bumbling in the form of Monty.Monty garden and Caen set everything back and that propped up fraud should have been sacked. And IKE reassigned for catering to him sending him men,materiel,tanks,trucks,artillery,fuel.Should have called back either O'Connor,Auchinleck or moved Slim over
The broken old, British industries couldn't keep up leaving the USA to provide the hardware here's the real problem down below
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks.
and of course another drag on supplies
Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
"The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
"Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281
Yet Montgomery had been unable to avoid lowering his logistical sights from arguing for a forty-division offensive to settling for an eighteen-division advance. For one thing, he had on his hands an embarrassing fiasco of British logistics which increased his dependence on American help. Some 1,400 British three-ton lorries, plus all the replacement engines for this model, had been discovered to have faulty pistons rendering them useless. The represented the loss of 800 tons a day.
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