Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8" video.
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
TIK your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. This debacle was lost because of Monty didn't have the balls to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall Modell and XXX Corp sloth . Perhaps your secondary school instructors can interest you in military history.Monty faffed up everything he touched he was back at his caravan playing with bunnies,birds and based on the FULL MONTY - some of the lads
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine."
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely . IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare"
Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion.Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports.He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders; he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy."
Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance nothwards from Nijmegen to their support.There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke,he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfctory"
This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory.Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed..Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it As XXX Corps account later acknowledged,"in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well."
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196
Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF
Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions..He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198
Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Dave Hack you are worse at commenting than Monty commanding if one can imagine
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine."
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
1
-
Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244
The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
The Guns at Last Light,page 282,by Rick Atkinson The new bridgehead over the Waal failed to uncork failed to uncork the advance to Arnhem as Montgomery had hoped. After a 35 hr delay at Nijmegen,XXX Corps vanguard sat for another 18hrs .Enemy raids on Hell's Highway played hob:reinforcements from the 43rd Division took 3 days to travel 60 miles in reaching the Irish Guards and 82nd Airborne .Gavin concluded after 4 yrs british veterans were excessively cautious,nurturing what he called "Why die now" sentiments.He found Colonel Tucker in a farmhouse near the rail bridge seething at the delay. "What in the hell are they doing,why the hell don't they get on to Arnhem" Tucker demanded.
September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening
It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself.'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'
"Six Armies in Normandy" by John Keegan - Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. With the principal organizations scattered in far-flung locations they never met to coordinate and resolve Market Garden’s obvious flaws or question its contradictions
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Montgomery & his colleagues threw away all that they had learned since 1939 about the speed & reaction of Hitlers Army..Its brilliance at improvisation,its dogged skill in defense,its readiness to punish allied mistakes.
Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'este - From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex
No myths just the ones being made up by revisionists 7 decades after the facts, it was a crap plan by a small minded man.
1
-
1
-
Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244
The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
From The Guns at Last Light,page 282,by Rick Atkinson The new bridgehead over the Waal failed to uncork failed to uncork the advance to Arnhem as Montgomery had hoped. After a 35 hr delay at Nijmegen,XXX Corps vanguard sat for another 18hrs .Enemy raids on Hell's Highway played hob:reinforcements from the 43rd Division took 3 days to travel 60 miles in reaching the Irish Guards and 82nd Airborne .Gavin concluded after 4 yrs British veterans were excessively cautious,nurturing what he called "Why die now" sentiments.He found Colonel Tucker in a farmhouse near the rail bridge seething at the delay. "What in the hell are they doing,why the hell don't they get on to Arnhem" Tucker demanded.
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders . Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening
From It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'
From "Six Armies in Normandy" by John Keegan - Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. With the principal organizations scattered in far-flung locations they never met to coordinate and resolve Market Garden’s obvious flaws or question its contradictions
From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Montgomery & his colleagues threw away all that they had learned since 1939 about the speed & reaction of Hitlers Army..Its brilliance at improvisation,its dogged skill in defense,its readiness to punish allied mistakes.
From Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'este - From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex
No myths just the ones being made up by revisionists 7 decades after the facts, it was a crap plan by a small minded man.
1
-
1
-
1
-
revisionist bullshit
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice, by Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsay ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" -
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan
Monty owns this disaster He campaigned for and got it,BTW he never showed up on the front like the Real Field Marshall Model
.When your done cleaning your tooth with your finger try flipping the pages of a history book
But this is all still on Monty problems arose everywhere that either he or his plans were involved. Monty didn't show up to direct his own operations as it was coming apart rather quickly and by the seams
Max Hastings The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945; referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
ENJOY
https://www.history.com/news/operation-market-garden-failure-allies
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196
In launching Market Garden with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198
Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies.
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599
* " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."*
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Um,no the petulant tosser demanded and got his wish,then disappeared as it came apart just another in his long string of misadventures. You lie almost as much as he did
Ardennes 1944,By Antony Beevor,p.14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. "The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later"
page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
1
-
1
-
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine."
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Try by using using the address bar at the top of the page to relieve others from the responsibility of furthering your education. You were wrong about what stopped the column immediately and you are wrong here.
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
🔶 There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd. So these slappies apply their British Mythology and try to blame bernard's buffoonery on an Americans 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN
🔶 The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command
🔶 Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown
🔶 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔶 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔶 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Burnhole,sure the Britsh were - the Gerries were laughing so hard after the Dunkirking they couldn't defend themselves. Ans as usual you're cherry picking, Churchill blundered into him by firing the good generals.
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317
Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role.
For a host of reasons Montgomery's usefulness came to an end in Normandy,probably with in a few weeks of the invasion.Any other British General could have done as well as Montgomery did at Caen;and very few would have handled the Battle of the Falaise Gap so incompetently
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 320
The poor performance of the British 2nd Army in Normandy had tied Monty's hands.He did not expect the Germans to be that good.But when the Americans broke the German lines at St Lo instead of turning the Americans loose on the open German flank,Montgomery stopped the Americans at Argentan and sent them North east to Paris-orleans gap.There were simply too many bitter pills on Montgomery's desk.He could not allow the Americans,especially George Patton to take Falaise away for m his 2nd British Army regardless of the cost
Ike and Monty:Generals at War,by Norman Gelb,page 329
Monty's egocentric nature made it impossible for him to respond to complex situation in which he found himself by insisting he had not been mistaken about anything.
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318
Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex.
Monte,Making of a General,by Nigel Hamilton,page 278
Montgomery's stepson John Carver talked about his "....schizoid tendencies engendered by his upbringing...."
1
-
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18
National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else.
We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war.Monty's admirers would not deny that he was cocky,self-assured,fiercely ambitious,domineering,often unsociable,desperate for success,frequently undiplomatic,jealous of the success of others,unable to admit that something had not gone exactly as he had intended
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
. Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command.SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout troop.Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
Model being an actual Field Marshall conducted a clinic in modern mechanical warfare.I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
an excerpt a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain.”
1 Kirkpatrick later goes on to attempt to explain the intelligence failure by saying, “In the one week between the decision to mount the operation and the attack there was not time to collect additional information on the enemy forces in the area.”
2 This last statement of his is clearly incorrect based on the Ultra messages, and brings his first statement into question. After the fall of Antwerp to the British Second Army on 4 September 1944, Ultra began to provide a very clear picture of the German forces moving into Holland,
3 the reorganization within their command structure, the repositioning of panzer divisions to Holland, and the fact that the Germans anticipated an Allied attack, possibly with airborne forces, towards either Arnhem or Aachen.
4 The intelligence information was available; whether commanders were adequately warned of the risks to the operation is really the question, as well as whether intelligence failed during this operation
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1