Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on ""Arnhem" by Antony Beevor Book Review" video.
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Bernard didn't sort squat in the Ardennes he had to apologize to IKE for suggesting he did,and Churchill addressed this at Parliament. You just keep repeating bullshit hoping someone as bereft as you believes it.Monty's orders were to fall back Harmon and Collins thankfully ignored him.And Monty never showed up to direct at Monty Garden, like a real Field marshall Walter Model.Of course the armored column didn't arrive until 3 days later and the 82nd was left to take on armored cars,halftracks with Mounted mg-42s and 20mm AAguns mounted.
The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British.Montgomery's disasterous press conference and the clamour of the British Press had stoked a rampant Anglophobia in the USA and especially among Senior American Officers in Europe.And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence.Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed
The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory" .It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/memoirs.pages/marsh.pages/ardennes.campaign.htm
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action. Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK." "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Lightning Joe Collins did alot of the shoving at the North Shoulder of the Ardennes.Collins found himself on the northern side of the German 'bulge' at the start of their Ardennes offensive. He played a major part in the defeat of the German attack, disengaging on his eastern front and turning south to attack the northern shoulder of the 'bulge', blocking the German transport routes through St. Vith
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes. 16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces. Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector. While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US.
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page415
Montgomery wrote on December 15th "that Hitler's plight was so dire that he cannot stage major offensive operations"
(Oops,on December 16th the Ardennes offensive began.The twisted twirp wasn't even right for a day.)
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Beevor's Arnhem is the single most exhaustive and best description and sourced of Operation Market Garden written.Kershaws "It Never Snows in September" covers the German perspective,both basically agree it is the fault of the so called Field Marshall Montgomery failed foreray.Unlike the revision of this host and th rags he quotes. It is written with the benefits of an exhaustive research of the British, American, Dutch and German records, the book provides amazing detail to "The Bridge Too Far" in Arnhem, Nethlerlands. The whole plan suffered from the plain fact that it relied on a single road of attack by the British XXX Corps where going off the road was a near impossibility due to the wet, boggy polders, obvious to anyone who has spent any time in The Netherlands (they rarely use fences in pastures as a dug ditch will quickly fill with water creating a natural barrier). The failure to listen to Dutch military personnel about the geographical defeat of the plan was just another in a string of Montgomery ego led disasters.
The utter evil -- absolutely barbaric and shocking to the conscious -- actions of the Nazi SS, the German commanders in The Netherlands, the Dutch SS and the average German soldier are properly detailed and the Dutch people would rightly demand a fuller accounting of the barbarous actions during those months. The author thoroughly explores the lack of planning by Montgomery and Browning, the willful self delusion of Montgomery borne from an ego that held little regard for the futility and needless death of British and American troops.
Reluctantly and very mistakenly Eisenhower put American Divisions under the command of the British General Montgomery in what turned out to be the greatest loss of any American Airborne Division -- before or since. Montgomery should be a national disgrace to the British, that is clear. Eisenhower began acting as a politician in deferring to Monty's superhuman ego, and abdicated his role as general commanding in a war.
The greatest suffering was then endured by the Dutch people. Epic in its tragedy. A lesson in failed leadership by the British and American commanding generals. A shock and outrage to the conscious in the inhumanity and pure evil of the German army. A story that needs to be retold -- and very well done.
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Iriving Burns you indoctrinated dweeb,have your handler at the group home there get you out into the court yard and off your ample backside .Every senior officer blasted Bernard for it after he demanded and recieved top priority .No one was shocked the stammering little snot got worked - AGAIN as before
The Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe 11 September 1941-8 May 1945 “There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, informed me that at General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings. I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division, presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission. I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, he still insists, we will go in as planned.
The Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe 3 October 1941-8 May 1945Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton It absolutely was a plea to change the order. A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit
*Arnhem,by William Buckingham,PHD;p.489-90* The scapegoating of Sosabowski and his men was a spiteful,unwarranted and unforgivable slur on a competant,conscientious commander whose only crime was to refuse to play Whitehall politics to Brownings satisfaction, and upon the courageous men whose only failing was an inability to walk on water
The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control, specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road Bridge
The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September,after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM) The Guards Armored did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition.Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs.
The same lack of urgency was on display when the Grenadier Guards on the evening of 20 September with the North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed
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Oh Johnny there's more,see when you come in from the land of make believe even the disadvantaged like you can learn something.Not good Johnny not good
Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak
Fancy some more?
More from Bernard
from his Memoirs, Monty says: [quote] “My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles, and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could reorganise sufficiently to stop us.
Montgomery Memoirs page 267; [quote] “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1 Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so” [end quote]
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You are asuming all the commanders were idiots then - you wouldn't guess enemy tanks were in that Forest after the 1st invasion in 1940 ? that was massive and not hindsight.And the 82nd couldn't hold the bridge for the 3 days as they didn't have any artillary yet ,they were still on foot. As The Reconnaissance Battalion, a 40-vehicle unit commanded by Victor Graebner's 9th ss advanced and drove them off.He had APCs with mounted mg-42s and halftracks with some 20mm AA Guns mounted and some self propelled artillery against foot soldiers with Thompson's and M-1s. Do you know what is like carrying up/down the M-30s or 150 lbs of mortar tubes/base plus ammo from the Groesbeek Heights to the bridge and parts of the city then back again as the LZs got attacked numerous times sometimes simultaneously.TIK gleefully glosses over this and the setbacks leading up to Nijmegen .Hell in JOhn Frosts book he stated had he known he would have brought AT guns and left the mortars
Even if XXX Corps tankers displayed the same initiative moving down the road as the 82 nd did crossing the Waal OM-G still would have stalled.Antwerp's port of supply wasn't open because Monty ignored warnings by Brooke/Tedder/Ramsey to do so.Gerries would have reorganized North of the Bridge with reinforcements tactfully sent by Model from the near by Ruhr. Field Marshall Walter Model didn't drop either of the Arnhem/Nijmegen road bridges - because he planned on using them - that's a Commander ,however had he dropped them immediately,then what?Game/set/match.And had any stragglers made it over it was one choke point it would have been Dunkirk II as Model was bringing tanks/troops/artillary/materials in from the near by Ruhr - but some here like to dabble in delusion. Jim Gavin's decision to secure his drop zones, and re-supply probably prevented the US 82nd Airborne division from duplicating the British 1st Airborne's fate.
Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. TIK ignores the reality of the situation as he is a Monty fanboy The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool. He criticize General Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne for taking the time to secure his drop zones, and supplies before attempting to take the Nijmegen bridge. That is just stupid criticism from people who benefit from 20/20 hindsight. What do you call an Airborne soldier with no secure drop zones and no re-supply? You call that Airborne soldier a corpse, or a prisoner of war. Unfortunately the fate of the British First Airborne
It became apparent rather quickly to the commanders on the ground that the intelligence regarding the positions, strength, and composition of enemy forces they had been given by Monty's HQ was worthless. Gavin did the only thing he could have based on the realization that Monty's intelligence on enemy forces was based on a fantasy assumption.General Gavin secured his drop zones, and his ability to resupply his men while they were fighting behind enemy lines. Market Garden resulted in the destruction of most of the British First Airborne division. Then less than 2000 or so who escaped from Arnhem had to abandon almost all of their equipment. Market Garden resulted in the loss of one Allied Airborne Division, Jim Gavin's decision to secure his drop zones, and re-supply probably prevented the US 82nd Airborne division from duplicating the British 1st Airborne's fate
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I would say Montgomery appeared helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all.Ludendorf was right Lions led by jackasses.CLOSE? horse shoes and handgrenades. I'm not giving this fraud TIK any more Clicks.There are plenty of legitimate sources.He talks about New History or information. - it's not - it's facts he didn't bother to look up or deliberately ignored.Peruse these boards plenty of dialed in sources/posters tearing up his theories
XXX Corp made it a whole 3 miles before Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans halting the column.Again XXX Corp didn't didn't start until 2 pm then quit at 6 on the 1st day Monty not only didn't show up he admitted of course after the war Big Mistake.Horrocks liked nite attacks,yet didn't attempt one. To many objectives with too many moving parts and everything needed to go off with out a hitch.TIK has deleted previous attempts to link proof from legit websites
The 82nd had nothing to do with Monty's poor planning and XXX Corps slow progress,or 43 wessex disappearance or the Germans still between Nijmegen and Arnhem that brought armor the 1st day across the Arnhem Road bridge.Try reading about Victor Graebner's 9th SS that brought APCs with mounted mg42s self propelled 20 mm AA guns and halftracks.that turned back back the 82nd and sure as hell would have turned you back.Ignore 50 miles of cock ups and blame you tanker boys.The 82nd fought in the CITY,Bridge and up and down the Heights.try carrying 100-150 lb equipment around to 3 different spots.field machine guns and mortar tube,base plate,ammo,etc.They didn't have artillary dropped until late the 2nd day
Plenty went wrong south of Nijmegen down past Eindoven and well south to Valkenswaard and before there even,that that guys like Poulussen,Neilands,TIK ignore
.the objective was to cross the Rhine,and the Port of Antwerp was needed for that.All else is bullshit to cover for this failure ..Monty the plug ignored directives from SHAEF to open Antwerp on September 4th on the 10th he sprung the idea to grab the bridges - and glory for himself.And IKE foolishly acquiesced to get him to do something - anything.But the rube really wasn't a Field Marshall like Model.The deep water port for supply was desperately needed as it is 499 miles from Cherbourg to Arnhem but sadly monty ignored it.Monty and Ike own this debacle - not the soldiers
As a Dutch poster said - How come Field Marshall WalterModel and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!!.
from his Memoirs, *Monty says: [quote] “My plan was to drive hard for the Rhine across all these obstacles, and to seize a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the enemy could reorganise sufficiently to stop us.
Montgomery Memoirs page 267; [quote] “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1 Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so” [end quote]*
From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p310-311
101st AB Division Objectives
-Eindoven
-Son Bridge
-St Oedenrode Bridge
-Veghel Road and Rail Bridges
-Wooded Areas
1st AB Division Objectives
-Arnhem
-Arnhem Road Bridge
-Pontoon Bridge
-Railway Bridge
-Wooded Areas
82nd AB Division Objectives
-Nijmegen
-Hueman Bridge
-Malden Bridge
-Hatert Bridge
-Honinghutie Road & Rail Bridge
-Grave Bridge
-Nijmegen Road and Rail Bridges
-Groesbeek Heights DZ/LZ
The 82 nd had the most objectives and the furthest apart.Had Either Monty,Maj. General Roy Urqhart,Gen.William Lathbury made arrangements to secure 1st para drop zones perhaps they don't get slaughtered - that's how important they were/are and less than half the 82nd was dropped at that time
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@ToolTimeTabor Great story, outside of the polder marshes it was my understanding it was unusually wet autumn and of course the Gerries flooding everything on top of that.Well i believe the Dutch at least knew their way around Holland so might have given the locals a listen.And every nation has arrogant fools but they certainly suffered specially following Market Marden which decimated Arnhem,Nijmegen and parts of Eindoven.Also the horrific Honger Winter that followed,that was brought on by OMG
A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies. When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Canadian Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious . In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219* "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp*
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend. "With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar"
The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
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@ToolTimeTabor Share these with precious
Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know Johnny just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak
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Monty pushed this forward and that is a fact - it should not have been considered let alone launched. Trying to push a whole armored column up one road elevated 55 of it's 70 miles should have been warning enough. The criticism of Market Garden is redeemed by its utter failure. Not sure how one can argue away the loss of time/men/materiel/machines on a reckless adventure that accomplished nothing except prolonging the war
And kept the port of Antwerp that was desperately needed, from being opened If they by some miracle make the Bridge at Arnhem, they are killed,captured or wounded. Out of supplies/ammo/food/fuel and Model is bringing everything in fresh by rail from the nearby Ruhr.
The subordinate commanders did not plan the overall operation, Monty did. The subordinate commanders only planned their part of the operation based on the flawed intelligence provided to them by Montgomery's HQ Instead of facing old men, cripples, and boys, the Airborne Carpet of Market Garden was thrown against two SS Panzer Divisions, and other quality German Units. It became apparent rather quickly to the commanders on the ground that the intelligence regarding the positions, strength, and composition of enemy forces they had been given by Monty's HQ was worthless. Hell even the Luftwaffe showed up for a bit.
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@OldWolflad The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. Montgomery discounted the basic logistical reality that he ignored not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers
The Germans had mastered this practice exiting the Eastern Front then proceeding to France. The German Divisions could be quickly refitted and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go
Also ignoring the ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Montgomery
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border town of Neerpelt. And it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out. But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe.It was a bad plan right from the start and right from the top - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 The 1st day Panzerfaust teams were taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt .Bringing the whole column to a halt. XXX Corp advance stopped for the night 7 miles from the start!!! This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command
🔸 The lack of initiative/tactics by ground force commanders - Dempsey/Horrocks/Vandeleur sitting on their arses in their tanks until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the afternoon - did they think they would catch up? Stopping at 6:00 pm when it was dark by 7:30 (5 hours later) on the 1st day? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown Instead of limping into Valkenswaard
🔸 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
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Monty should have been shot and IKE reassigned for caving into the clown and this abortion of his
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time(they were 7 miles from where they started)
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.*General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry* his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
.The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured .LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,489-490
The primary reason MARKET GARDEN didn't meet it's stated aim was the Failure of XXX Corps to reach Arnhem on schedule or indeed at all. To a degree this is due to events out of the forces control specifically the Germans destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son on 17 September and their stuborn defense of the South End of the Nijmegen Road bridge
The Guards Armored Division did not start off until 14:35 on Sunday 17 September after the Market force had been delivered and therefore squandered 8 hrs of of precious daylight and they had banned movement during the hours of Darkness.This despite the fact they were suppose to cover the 15 miles or so to the 101st at Eindhoven by nightfall on the 17th which ocurred around 1900(7 PM). The Guards Armored did not reach Eindhoven until18:30 on 18 September despite minimal German opposition. Already behind schedule that was to see them 40 miles further to Nijmegen or onto the approach to Arnhem - and the additional time needed to erect a bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal extended the schedule deficit to 36 hrs.
The same lack of urgency was on display when the Grenadier Guards on the evening of 20 September with the North end of the Nijmegen Bridge still in British hands and the 10 miles virtually undefended(to Arnhem).The repeated failure of the Guards Armored Division to press on after crossing the River Waal marks the point where the operation failed
Illness could explain Horrocks contradictions in his Garden orders and intentions.Responsibility does not lie soley with him but with his superiors and the patronage the British Army used to allot Senior command positions
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From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him -
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The Center of Military History.of The United States Army
Battle of The Bulge
Date16 December 1944 – 28 January 1945
LocationThe Ardennes, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany
Allied Troop Strength,80,000 initially; ultimately 610,000+
250,000 Germany initially; ultimately 500,000
German casualties: 12,652 killed, 38,600 wounded, 30,000 missing
American casualties: 10,276 killed, 47,493 wounded, 23,218 missing
British casualties: 200 killed, 969 wounded, 239 missing
As I said Monty didn't do shit
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My bad this was Poullusens review who TIK quotes,Ill see if I can dig up the Neilands,who isn't much better.This is one review
"I was a paratrooper for many years if you don't hold your DZ then hold nothing. I'm reading one of your sources now. Do you realize he lists as sources "combat interviews"? LOL Of whom, by whom, when, where, for what purpose? The number 19 is funny. Who said that? If you say some General or Colonel said so, then there you go. Neither of them would know the exact number. To them it would be a platoon. Lost at Nijmegen is easily the worst resourced document I have ever read. Like his assertion that the 508 didn't know they were going to have to take the bridge. Laughable! In their own operations order be prepared to attack and seize the Highway Bridge, on order from Division Command. That means they knew for damn sure they were going to do it."
"I would take it when I was told to. My point was in the book Lost at Nijmegen the fool that wrote it, in the same chapter, asserts that the 508th had no idea they were taking the bridge. Then turns around and references the first page of the 508th's Operational Order and dang, there it is in the mission statement, paragraph two."
More Sources your new genius author used.
"Statistical Study" : Of what? By whom? When? Where? For what purpose?You learned much from that idiot who wrote "Lost at Nijmegen". If the facts don't work then don't tell it all just the parts that support your argument."
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@ArmchairAdmiral-42 don't care what you think he ignores many fatcs printed by much better historians with accumen - Barr,Beevor,Bennet,Barnett,Hastings,Hart,Keegan,Kershaw,Ryan,McManus,MacDonald,Weidner,D'este,Atkinson - mostly British BTW.
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