Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.
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your lack of research don't cut it!
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him.
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
"Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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The Village Anus wrote
Unlike the prick Big Woody who quotes just about anyone who writes sonething likes and that he can find on Wikipedia.
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Just keeps getting better and better.I should be charging for this. Monty failed once and that was continuously so i see how you like him. Ya Alan Brooke and the Germans who were there didn't know but you in your hive of hallucination does?You know who wasn't there? Bernard Law Montgomery.Not sure if it's dementia,delusion or denial Little Villa cobbles together falsehoods & fantasy while scuttling facts not previously encountered making discussion itself intolerable.
It took 6months after failing at Monty Garden for Bernard to cross the RHine and that was with Simpsons 9th US ARMY The Hurtgen mistakes does not turn Market Garden's failure into a success. Also, the Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure. Get use to and over it.
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedell-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
This from the BBC
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
From Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 63 General Browning cautioned General Gavin "Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges,it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it
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Little Villa your favorite perv admits it after the war
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce. But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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Cleaning latrines no doubt in your case,you have elementary reasoning or perhaps none at all . Monty had 4 full years to cross a 30 mile channel - what was the problem - Hollwood?Ya best let the bigboys get it sorted
♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.
♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore
♦Hollywood didn't make 32,000 Tommies surrender at Tobruk
♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did.
♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel for 4 full years - after getting driven into it
♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty
♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown.
♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later.
♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin then couldn't even make it to Arnhem - Monty did
♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group,IKE did. Then Bernard was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them
♦Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did.
♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Bernard bathing little boys Nigel Hamilton reported them in The Full Monty .
♦Hollwood wasn't "evacuated" from:
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
Want to know who was?
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From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Here you have it Irving Burns - Brooke and Monty admitting it,maybe you should come clean before it's too late.Repeating all of your fabulous fibs won't get you past the pearly gates
Alan Brooks own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"*...*During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Monty fessing up
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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@matso3856 good job Mats - read "It Never Snows in September" Monty owns this.Regardsless of what Cornhole barks
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.His distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.
The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 64 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance.
The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation.
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But Monty puhleeeze,What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction,you idiot
Szun Zu - The Art of War"the worst mistake for a general is to underestimate its enemy...!"
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Cornhole,Your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones .One almost needs a bucket when you post!
So Brooke,Ramsey,Keegan and Tedder are full of shit but you a monty nutthugger are to be believed.LMAO - say that out loud and see how it sounds
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Even John Keegan
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan.
Cornhole are you Monty's little Swiss Boy?
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This just keeps getting earier and easier. BTW how is it Monty got driven into the ENGLISH channel,and never got Dunkirked after the GIs arrived? Read Monty's confession
Monty's misadventures - where was he when this debacle started coming apart everywhere almost immediately? Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses at the Belgian border until the Troop support and supply flights went over at 2:30 in the Afternoon?Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why didn't Monty or the Others think to put the bridging equipment up front?17 bridges over 12-13 canals might have come in handy ON TIME don't you think? All 4 Senior British officers and not one thought of this glaring over site - that explains why the RN & RAF was much better led than anything Monty came up with. Try reading what the top officers in the Alliance had to say
Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
Fancy some more little villa?
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Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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Correct,This operation was condemned at it's inception it shouldn't have been considered let alone launched. And good men paid the price for Monty and IKE ignoring the red flags
Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p. 43 "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse."
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
Center of Military History
United States Army
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
Pages 199-200 Perhaps the real fault of the plan was overambition.Yet all of the handicaps possibly could have been overcome had the British ground column been able to advance' as rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. Another glaring fault was dependence upon but one road. In any event, the ground troops were delayed for varying amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal bridge in Nijmegen. Combined with the kind of resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the West might be down but they were not out.
page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be maintained. Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust."
September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.329 On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. (ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet)
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This fools errand should never have been considered let alone launched.Way too many moving parts to coordinate.
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th
Brereton and Dempsey along with most of Allied HQ warned the Laggard Monty not to play looses with men's lives.But the creep seeking glory ordered it forward
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.256-257
The crucial link ups between airborne and ground forces was more problematic; they were interlinked and interdependent. So much that the failure to capture of just one objective could lead to the failure of the entire undertaking. Given that no large-scale airborne operation mounted by the Allies or Germans had ever previously secured absolute mission success, there was a strong probability that Market Garden would fail.
Market Garden was founded on flawed suppositions, massaged intelligence, the neglect of past lessons and the acceptance of innumerable risks, which substantially reduced its chances of success even before it was placed in front of Eisenhower. The idea of conducting multiple lift operations against deep and well defended objectives was fundamentally unsound and can only be deemed a blunder of truly staggering proportions. And required repeated daytime airlifts to far inside enemy territory more that 300 miles from Allied Transport bases
1)Monty was a no show - in every army that marched except evidently yours the commander is responsible for what does and does not occur under his watch during his Operation
2) Monty or the guys right under him Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur sat on their arses until 2:30 in the afternoon on the 1st day at the Belgian border waiting for the planes to fly over .Did they some how think they'd catch up? Had they left at day break they would have made the bridge at Son. That the Gerries blew up in the afternoon
3) Of Monty/Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur NOT ONE thought to put the bridging equipment up front. How ignorant of so called veteran officers. Didn't they think going over 17 Bridges and 12-13 rivers/canals that might come in handy at some point in time?
Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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What other rare gems have you two poltroons mined for us today? little villa probably because you only have read to you the crown's comics
♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.
♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore,
♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did.
♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel after getting driven into it,for 4 full years after Dunkirk.
♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty
♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown.
♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later.
♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin and didn't even make it to Arnhem,Monty did
♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group and was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them
♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Montgomery bathing little boys The Full Monty reported them
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Stevie when you are done scribbling in your comic books ask the nurse to read to you
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.*
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
Monty admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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How come Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student was able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November Montgomery
This from Seth 1422 who throttled your sorry self
Sunset on the first day, September 17, was at 19:50, darkness was at 20:30. When the Irish Guard halted at 19:30 it also was not in contact with the enemy, so advance in darkness was not impossible. Sunrise on the 18th was at 07:15, meaning that the Irish Guards did not move for half of the available daylight on the second day. No Irish Guard tanks were destroyed immediately, but instead contact with the enemy was made around 16:00. It should also be noted that according to JOE Vandaleur’s own account, he had lunch with his cousin and a female reporter, then went for a swim in a roadside villa before starting the Guards moving on September 18th. Whatever resistance they did ultimately encountered late that afternoon could have only been an increase on what they might have faced with a swift advance at 07:30. So that is the place where swifter advance was possible. The Irish Guards had suffered badly the first day, so I understand their reluctance to smash ahead. But if that formation was spent it should have been rotated out before dawn. These delays only made the Germans better able to obstruct the road.
According to the one British officer Major Hibbert of 1st para starting here https://youtu.be/50ogHjrQFBE?t=2282 in this video they had disabled the charges on the Bridge. So if accurate and I believe he would know Horrocks tankers sitting back on the Nijmegen Bridge could have made it. But they didn't move even though elements of the 82nd wanted to carry the fight forward.It's interesting....and unfortunate
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There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp .In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem
Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.
Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area."
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armored units had moved into the Arnhem area
Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.
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Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcover by Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.
Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.'
So Montgomery ignored:
Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith
SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong
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You've lied once - continuosly
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors,"Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."*
ULTRA decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed the various units from Normandy had been ordered to western Holland to refit and subsequent intercepts indicated that this included the II SS Panzer Corp. Not until September 15 had SHAEF high command taken note that the corps two divisions the 9th & 10th Panzer seemed to encamped at Arnhem.
Montgomery's senior commanders almost to a man voiced skepticism about Market Garden. Beetle-Smith grew anxious enough to alert Eisenhower, who hesitated to intervene in tactical dispositions but authorized Smith to raise the issue with the field marshall. Smith flew to Brussels on Friday,48 hrs before the assault was to begin and suggested strengthening the force to be dropped at Arnhem. "Montgomery ridiculed the idea and laughed me out of his tent" Smith later reported *"he waved my objections airily aside"
For 7 miles from the Belgium border to Valkenswaard the XXX Corp drive stopped cold for 12 hrs
Um no you misguided monty fanboi, when the Air Marshalls finally found out from IKE they warned Monty - too many flights - too long and not enough daylight. There were SIX HUNDRED more flights than D-Day. This debacle was originally Linnet then Comet then Monty Garden.But he told IKE anyway he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem
Historynet dot com
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them.
Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it
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CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..."
The Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson Given British grievous disappointments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the fragile nature of any military alliance,General Montgomery was an extremely poor choice to command an Allied Army
Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion.Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak
From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after
Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
Rub-a-dub-dub Burns in the tub
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/26/books.booksnews Prof Hamilton, who was befriended by the field marshal at age 11 and knew him well for the last 20 years of his life, has no doubt of the nature of Monty's feelings. "These were quasi love affairs. He became really passionately involved with these young men - and then, more and more, boys, who he would call 'my sons'. They were nothing of the kind, of course, but in his own personality he would frame them in this way. "I myself have more than 100 very loving letters from him. My relationship with him wasn't sexual, in the sense that it wasn't acted upon, but I had been through enough years at British boarding schools to know what kind of enormous affection and feeling he had for me. "And I wasn't alone, this was a consistent pattern in Monty's life."
One boy was Lucien Treub, Montgomery's "little Swiss friend", who met him at 12, and told Hamilton how the Montgomery would bathe him personally and rub him down so he would not catch cold "I've interviewed him several times and he was quite clear he didn't feel there was any molesting going on, but it's a tricky area," Prof Hamilton said.
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The whole plan was assinine,SHAEF knew the deep water port of Antwerp would have been to open to keep the operation supplied.5 tanks made it to The Nijmegan,even if more showed up they would have been blasted with the Reich and Ruhr right there.Cornhole reads Monty coloring books,the nearest port of supply was Cherbourg 499 miles away,but to johnny boy that's brilliance
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
Let's see.
1)Arnhem because of a crap plan by an amatuer wasn't captured.
2)The rocket sites weren't touched and still operating
3) In the nine days of Market Garden combined losses-airborne and ground forces killed, wounded and missing amounted to more than 17.000.
4)The deep water Port of Antwerp was still closed and needed for massive supplies
5)The Nazi reprisals included the Dutch Honger Winter that starved/froze at least 21,000 of its citizens to death.
6)Monty wasn't there to direct while Student and Model were in fact conducting a clinic on speed and placement of everything available
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Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this.The little villa has his head so far up monty's ass he can tell us what he had for lunch .The RAF didn't want to drop too close to the bridges because of AA guns.
You monkeys in a mango tree swinging from limb to limb slinging feces.Hoping there are some thicko's out there as bent as you
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel. Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice,by Marshal of the Royal Air Force,Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
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-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians. Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been. Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
The Germans and Americans both logged XXX Corp stopped on 20 September at 1700 hrs(9PM)-That's 3 days and it is a fact Viktor Graebners 9th SS stopped the Paras on the 1st morning - they had Haalf Tracks with mounted Anti-Aircraft guns that shredded some GIs.And APCs with mounted mg42s and some AT guns 75 mms. The 82nd had the most objectives over the largest area. they had the City, the Bridges,and LZ/DZ on the heights. Ist off it was Monty's terrible plan ,then XXX Corp took their time after successful Panzer Faust attacks took out 9 tanks after just 3 miles,stopping the whole column - that made 7 miles
NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November. Probably because unlike Monty ,Model was an actual Field Marshall
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Outside of your posts being full of shit they were pretty good.And Ryan interviewed perhaps more German and Allied Officers than anybody not at Nuremburg. Monty lied incessantly and belittled damn near everyone he came across - stop acting offended and was given that title to assuage his bruised ego,He faffed everthing from Caen,Falaise,Market Garden
A PHD at King's College who lectured at Sandhurst
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
A Pulitzer Prize Winner
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding a bad mistake on my part
Not only did Brooke,Tedder and Ramsay all point right at Monty,only later did he admit it.Hastings,Hart,Beevor,Bennet,Barnet,Barr,Kershaw,Keegan also back that up
From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
Again, None of the objectives were met
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
he more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life.
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From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the*Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp.
From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
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https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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Burns you really should go to a library - once your ankle monitor gets removed and the restraining order is rescinded.ENJOY
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.616 July 17,1944 The RAF had dropped a concentration of 7000 tons of bombs to help the ground troops break through the German defense ring.Around evening Air Marshall Tedder had called IKE and and mentioned Monty had stopped his armor from going any farther.IKE was mad as Monty was drawing up his "administrative tail".The Americans got Saint-Lo,taken in fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow and settled in the streets
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day. Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken
IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile? The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress
From My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - august 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day"
My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651
On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American general, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front, as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command. Some of the London papers have reflected this feeling. Ike has a first class problem on his hands."
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1st off mantueffel was getting his shit shoved in by Patton's 3rd Army not Monty who wanted to withdaw.And I don't owe you sir an explanation after your rant assholes like little villa were pissing on the honor of dead GIs previously. Hasso had no idea who was doing what on the allied side. Also Monty lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, he told the Field Marshall you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise
THE ARDENNES:BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,page 647*CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive . Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views
Oh and whether you admit it or not Monty was a major player at Dunkirk along with Brooke and Gort.Caen - ass kicking,took it in 43 days when he said he'd have it in 1Only took it after 7000 tons of ordinence were shot or dropped from Naval guns(per mile) and Allied BombersFalaise he played politics.Epsom,Goodwood look them up yourself .Market Garden is totally on Monty.
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Watch that video I linked by proffessionals - then you may tackle history
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.Holes got blasted in this very bad plan from Arnhem all the way down below Valkenswaard Fanboy distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Irish Guards there
How about Lt.Col. Vandeluer?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over.
Lt Brian Wilson?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea."
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south.By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
Heinz Harmel?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
LT John Gorman?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"
How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408 on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his dsiquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
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Cornhole Monty's Market Garble changed the game.The brits were out as a player and the Allies couldn't jump over it because Monty already had most of 3 Air Borne divisions wiped out
Page 409 from Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb "There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare"
Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...."
From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves.Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke
Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this
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There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.
Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area."
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area
Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland
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Ah more of Monty's apologists poking their heads out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan.Allied HQ finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 70 mile lane with no room for maneuver during a wet autumn is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
"Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie
Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944).ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum.
On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
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1st off XXX Corps did not cross the damn bridge until 7:10 PM on the 20th - a full 3 & 1/2 days,suppose to be there in two.2ndly Lord Carrington stopped in his tracks after crossing just 10 miles away. And 3rd Monty was a no-show unlike an actual Field Marshall Walter Model. Any idiot that thought it a good idea to shoehorn a whole amored column over 70 miles on an elevated lane surrounded by polder marshes shouldn't even be leading a boy scout assembly = MONTY GARDEN
Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
Monty admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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From the Germans there/then
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance*
"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p.129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.143 18 September,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platton attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge. They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park.
SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions
so reality exists,Bad Bernard Planning
'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North
OMG was cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications. Too many flights(700 more than D-Day), too long of flights and over 2hrs less daylight than the D-Day drops in June. And that wasn't even factoring in unfavorable weather conditions - that did arise.
The planners earlier stated when the massive flight formations hit the coast the German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach losing all element of surprise.
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https://youtu.be/duOYnIGivys?t=1580 even time stamped it where you need to learn
https://youtu.be/Amo1f1_Hvho?t=2140 by a British PHD,in your case piled higher and deeper
https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
You are welcome Swiis Boy Burns,pretty impressive huh coming across an Ocean just to carry Monty back across a channel
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The 82nd has nothing to do with the British XXX Corp showing up late and bernard not showing up at all.The whole concept for Operation Market-Garden was premised on the FALSE idea that the German Wehrmacht was in a shambles in September, 1944. This notion underrates the expertise of German military planners to reconstitute new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him.
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. *Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs* until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.
LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair.
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From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 292 Despite Montgomery's message to IKE that he thought there was still a "sporting chance" of taking the bridge at Arnhem he must have sensed by then that a terrible disaster was taking place,which would considerably damage his reputation. After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles .And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.The very next day Monty wrote in his diary "I am very doubtful now if 1st airborne will be able to hold out and we may have to withdraw them". And the fact he never visited Horrocks during the entire battle confirms the impression that he was keeping his distance,a rare event for the "Master"
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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Davie doesn't read he creates - and not very good either
from John Frost's book - A Drop Too Many *"We had been given to understand that the key Nijmegen Bridge had been captured by the Guards Armoured Division, and the saga of the river crossing by the U.S. 82nd Airborne in daylight against most formidable opposition was left untold"
From Frost when speaking of Patton's 3rd Army (They liberated him), "All ranks of this Army, when they saw our red berets, would say: 'Arnhem. Aye. We'd have gotten through. Yes, sir. We'd have gotten through.' I could not help believing that they would have. There was nothing slow or ponderous about them and they didn't stop for tea or the night for that matter." Those were the words of an Englishman of note. Fascinating.
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, p. 333-Tom Hoare,who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: *'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords,* were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. *"There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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@ninjakid6 he didn't and because you aren't well read on the matter isn't my problem. It seems you and history have but a fleeting acquaintance.Did you read Beevor,Hastings,Keegan,Kershaw,Bennett,Barnett,Hart,Barr,McManus,Weidner - did you watch that Desert general Video?
British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units.
Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance.
The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
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ninjakid6 - good no sense in blaming the 82nd Airborne who fought valiently then.Plenty points right at Monty and IKE
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports. He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders;he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy."
Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable
Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance northwards from Nijmegen to their support. There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke, he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfactory"
This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory. Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed. Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged, "in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well."
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
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John Keegan - his rigidity, slowness, narrow-mindedness and inability to evolve his military ideas beyond First World War tactics. In fact, Brooke and Alexander were frequently exasperated with him, among other British commanders. Not entirely clear to me is why he was kept on - supposedly he was beloved by British citizens but that is a poor excuse for keeping on an inept commander when the case is made that better generals were waiting in the wings.
Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that. General Whitely .
IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians. After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role. For a host of reasons Montgomery's usefulness came to an end in Normandy,probably with in a few weeks of the invasion.Any other British General could have done as well as Montgomery did at Caen;and very few would have handled the Battle of the Falaise Gap so incompetently
Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle. There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2IArekP8ws cornhole you are pathetic
From Tony Hibbert not the cornhole chronicles.Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..."
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 318 Eisenhower thought Montgomery was a psychopath suffering from an inferiority complex
Montgomery,Making of a General,by Nigel Hamilton,page 278 Montgomery's stepson John Carver talked about his "....schizoid tendencies engendered by his upbringing..."
Cornhole,Your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones .One almost needs a bucket when you post! So Brooke,Ramsey,Keegan and Tedder are full of shit but you a monty nutthugger are to be believed.LMAO - say that out loud and see how it sounds
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Even John Keegan The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan
Cornhole are you Monty's little Swiss Boy?
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Don't take this board for it's word the Germans there/then
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked *"the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."*
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance*
"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p.129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.143 18 September,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platton attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge. They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park.
SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions
so reality exists,Bad British Planning
'It never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North
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@nickdanger3802 Tell VILE the to stop accessing his ample backside.Denial and revision aren't acceptable answers.Specially when quoted from Parliament.WE should be charging VILE for this
From a professor who lectured at Sandhurst and is Employed at King's College
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee120/book/export/html/237
Americans Fuel Britain’s War Needs
The two critical questions of importance to Britain for war with the Germans were whether oil would be available and if they could pay for it. *The United States was responsible for two-thirds of total world production and, therefore, the answer to whether oil would be available was yes. To help Britain overcome the question of payment on March 1941, the Lend Lease was instituted. This removed the problem of finance as a constraint on American supply to Britain, since, with the Lend Lease, American oil could now be lent and repaid later. The neutrality legislation which had placed restrictions on the shipment of supplies was also gradually lifted to help loosen restrictions on shipment of supplies to Britain. Thus, by spring 1941, all the important steps had been taken to ensure adequate flow of oil from America to Britain
Although there were temporary shortages, there was never a serious oil supply crisis in the US . The overall production record in the US was quite good - from 1940-1945, America’s overall production increased by 30% from 3.7 million barrels per day to 4.7 million barrels per day. Meanwhile, between December 1941 and August 1945, the Allies consumed 7 billion barrels of oil, 6 billion of which came from the United States It is also interesting to note that the wartime oil output was more than ¼ of all oil produced in the US from the time of Colonel Drake to 1941!
8https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc*
Why couldn’t Britain pay?
Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States.
From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources. But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States. Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most.
The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” Said by Churchill after Pearl Harbor.
"Now they say that the allies never helped us, but it can't be denied that the Americans gave us so many goods without which we wouldn't have been able to form our reserves and continue the war," Soviet General Georgy Zhukov said after the end of the War. "We didn’t have explosives, gunpowder. We didn’t have anything to charge our rifle cartridges with. The Americans really saved us with their gunpowder and explosives.” "I want to tell you what, from the Russian point of view, the president and the United States have done for victory in this war," Stalin said. "The most important things in this war are the machines.... The United States is a country of machines. Without the machines we received through Lend-Lease, we would have lost the war."
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I've read 30 books on the ETO Monty was a shyster,Churchill screwed up - Monty Took 4 more weeks than Claude Auchileck wanted (who BTW was a hell of a general) .He even benefitted the most from ULTRA as it was then fully operational. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued . He had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery.And only with 2 fresh Divisions moved over from the Nile Delta(coutesy of Dorman-Smith) and the Torch Landings(courtesy of IKE) forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.The RAF and RN (great job by both) had swept the skies and seas clean of any resupport from the Reich.Rommel couldn't move during the day because of Connigham's Air coverage,who BTW hated Monty for grabbing so much credit that belonged to others
Claude Auchinleck and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved and General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory.
The BEF had 1,100 tanks and 225,000 men. FDR agreed to send Churchill after Trobruk - the 300 tanks and 100,105 mm howitzers Montgomery built NON of that
Rommel had 200 tanks,90,000 men ,low on fuel,food, water
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Monty couldn't even cross the Rhine until 6 ,months after Arnhem with the USA's help - what an impudent Chimp
Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945 By Sir Max HastingsThe US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance" all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale
Montgomery in Europe 1943-45,by Richard Lamb pages 360-362 "British 6th Airborne had lost 30% of it's personnel killed and wounded;the Air landing brigade,which came in gliders had lost over 70% of its equipment The Army that needed to keep casualty count low lost over 3,100 men crossing the Rhine north of Wesel. The disparity between the number of lives lost at Wesel and the 2 earlier American crossings is striking
Casualty figures for the Rhine River crossings tell a grim story. Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded
Simpson's 9th US Army had to wait and cross with Montgomery;they suffered 491 casualties crossing south of Wesel.The US 17th Airborne Division lost 921 Paratroopers and 350 air crew(all with Montgomery's 21st Army Group)
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Operation Market Garden where a British Pathfinder was captured on 17 September with the radio and the plans for the ground markers and smoke signals. Also where The Germans also listened in to British radio signals on No.68P sets which captured paratroopers had not destroyed.
Dave Hack unlike you they were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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Stop reading the Cornhole Chronicles and try some historians
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary.Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
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Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."
(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
"Montgomery's Memoirs page 276 "
"The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September."
Oh others blame him also
Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
How about Air Marshall Tedder???
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside"
Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, Monty ignored him. Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff.
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies.
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This nutthuigger continues to pull facts from his dark crevasse.SHAEF instructed the rube to open up Antwerp 1st.IKE,Brooke,Ramsey,Tedder,Bedell-Smith,even Freddie and Dempsey in his own Army advised against this very bad plan
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415
After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
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@billballbuster7186 Why don't you go visit monty's statue in Arnhem - oh,that's right there isn't one. 11,000 go into Arnhem 2,100 come out Jr commanders aren't libel for the boss's baffonerey - MONTY GARDEN. One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all
The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec, not just 9 days, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure.Where was monty - biggest air drop in History up to that point and he couldn't be bothered as HIS plan came apart from the very beginning
Thicko the only thing you source is your ample backside.I left direct quotes from actual participants upthread.Reread them they are in English or have your handler do it for you.One road with polder marshes on both sides. The column made it awhole 3 miles before being stopped by panzerfausts
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle. There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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Vile Asston has shit on dead GIs blaming them for Monty's misadventure who never showed up for his own operation and Tankers that in fact sat and did not move. Pissing on dead GIs sent so his D-Day daddy who really wasn't
so explain this Vile Asston.Just a coincidence?Sure it is ,of course
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So Vile the Germans/GIs/Irish Guards are all in agreement. The Tanks sat after the 82nd crossed the Waal and Monty unlike a real Field Marshall Walter Model was nowhere around
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray.Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored. The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington "you'd better go! it's only 8 miles".To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile..Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun, Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it *the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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@mathewm7136 the allies not that minstrel stopped it. O'Connor and Auchinleck/Dorman-Smith built that Desert Army. And Auchinleck won the 1st battle of El Alamein against ROMMEL. With ULTRA now supplied enemy movements. And the RAF and the RN strangling Rommel's supply lines and strafing the AK's columns during the day. Long before Monty sashayed in to the picture. The British & Allies won that Desert War but Monty took the credit. FDR himself gave Churchill 317 new Shermans and 94 105 mm self-propelled guns when news of the surrender at Tobruk came in. Along with the Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria.
After that Monty dithered with much greater forces - a malevolent drag on American Supplies,Men and materiel
An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p418-20 The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front.The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.
Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again"
*The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddel-Hart,p.521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong pointBritish officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable"
R.W. Thompson, Churchill and the Montgomery Myth, p. 92, 105. Retired British General Sir Francis Tuker offered perhaps the best appraisal of Montgomery's generalship: "If Monty is the best commander we had in the last war, then our standard could not have been very high." Raymond Callahan, Churchill and His Generals, p. 215. The truth is that Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery was probably the worst senior commander of any major combatant nation during World War II.
British historian R.W. Thompson wrote, "Montgomery was completely formed as a soldier at the end of the First World War. He did not grow after that. He became increasingly efficient, but he did not absorb a new idea. At fifty he was the same man he had been at thirty..." Thompson quotes one of Montgomery's officers saying, "Monty was living in 1918 and never left it."
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Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.202 Nothing whatsoever in Monty's D-Day plans notes or speeches ever alluded to holding on to the left permitting Bradley to take Cherbourg and break out on the right.
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.171 Not surprisingly nowhere in Dempsey's diary or notes for this period is there any mention what so ever of a British strategy of attracting and pinning down Rommel's reserves
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.204 Brigadier Edgar "Billy" Williams was a brilliant scholar and an Oxford don. For nearly 3 years he was Montgomery's senior intelligence officer and privy to all of his plans. "we did not expect the bulk of German armor against 21st Army Group. Monty tries to change the story"
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.210. Brigadier E.J.Foord Deputy G-2 of SHAEF told Liddell hart,recorded in 1946 "Foord thinks that it was only when Monty failed to make progress in the Caen sector that it was always been realized that the bulk of the German forces would tend to be drawn in the Caen sector but he never heard any theory to draw them in there deliberately.
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.247 SHAEF and COSSAC Planning Officer, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean is quoted as calling Monty a "big cheat" in his claims: "for Montgomery to say that he was holding the Germans so Bradley could break out was absolute rubbish and a complete fabrication that only developed after he was stopped outside of Caen"
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"Sigh" Monty intended to get a headline then didn't show up. Again from the top - all British Officers from the meetings in September all privy to info & intel.
Alan Brooke???
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
Monty admitting it after the war???
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."
(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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@nickdanger3802 William Weidners book is excellqnt.The sources and footnotes are all there.Solid and accurate even polluted rubes like Villa Burns can't can't dismiss the evidenvce but they'll never stop trying
Ralph Ingersoll, in his book, "Top Secret," writes about Patton's Third Army and the Falaise Gap: Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 190. "Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the ... boundary line." George Patton and others said the same thing. He was guessing that the reason Montgomery halted the Americans was a combination of jealousy and ignorance of the situation. As it turned out, it was a pretty accurate guess. Continued movement by Patton would have violated the boundary between Bradley's 12th Army Group and Montgomery's 21st Army Group
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..."
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Total Bullshit because of British generalship Ya know Dunkirk,Singapore,Torbuk,Dieppe,AGAIN THE USA had to sail men/material/food/fuel 3,500 miles.Britain basiclly sat on the sideline while the GI's adminsistered the coup de gras to the Reich at the Ardennes as Monty showed his wares by ducking out of Monty Garden.Go ahead haed across the channel and brag yourself up to other Europeans who remember the tale a lot different.Specially the Czechs and the French
When interviewed in 1945, Heinz Guderian , the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place
General Gunther Blumentritt : We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies . . . His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education"
From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt.
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The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea."
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south*. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
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Yup your boys faffed it up,Caen,Falaise,Monty Garden.Back to mopping the adult theater Johnny
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358
LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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Dave Hack unlike you they were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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Carrington stopped in Lent and Harmal explained to Robert Kershaw that there were not artillary intallations between Nijmegen-Arnhem just a couple of units
'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J.Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 201. SS Captain Carl-Heinz Euling came to a decision "the 1st enemy tank was able to pass over the road bridge during the evening of 20 september,the railway bridge had already fallen*
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."
ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet - On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate.
While conferring with Monty, Bedell-Smith called attention to the ULTRA dispatches indicating the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were now located in Arnhem. Owing to this danger, Smith urged Monty to shift an additional airborne division to drop near Arnhem. But Smith recalled "Montgomery ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily away" (The Siegfried Line campaign : U.S. Army in World War II,by Charles B.MacDonald,p.122)
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@Johnny Carroll Little villa ignores post after post for 5 yrs now asking for evidence when it's provided he runs away to another board and repeats his drivel. That's why he and Burns either are the same guys or suffer froms the same delusions and denials as they simultaneosly flock to the same discussions. Chester Wilmot was a cheerleader(war coorespondent) who accompanied Monty's Army, so some of the master's novelish mischief obviously rubbed off on him ask little villa if he'd like pretty much all of SHAEF's statements on the matter. Which he gleafully ignores,men there in real time and in the know. Monty owns it at Caen,Falaise and Monty Garden. Even Monty's Men like Horrocks and Deguingand point at Monty when they were no longer under him
Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more. *Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated. The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQ "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare"
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
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@thevillaaston7811 from the RAF Historian the Britsh themselves cancelled it as linnet and Comet for many obvious reason
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance"
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.195 With the shortening of days,reduced number of hours this time of year,the increase in distance, the complications due to a late start due to bad weather General Williams pointed out it would not be possible to conduct more than one lift a day. Williams had a deserved reputation for close cooperation - he had commanded troop carriers in Husky,Neptune and Dragoon and was one of the most experienced of all Allied Airborne commanders
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.196 Lift details are some what of technical character which is why few historians address them in any detail.They concern time involved in turning around aircraft for the 2nd & 3rd lifts, the range from UK bases to their objectives in Holland,weather an visibility conditions and the co-ordination of the air lift with fighter Escort and Flak suppression operations. All of these were interlinked
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.198 At the beginning of September 1944 Lt.General Brereton had already warned Eisenhower that it would be very difficult to stage an airborne operation as far east as the Rhine River from bases in the UK (SHAEF in a memorandum)
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
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@ToolTimeTabor If I agreed with you we'd both be wrong.I used your words my friend try reading what you wrote.Blather on a real Field Marshall was dealing the cards though German. Again what you said last year that we agreed upon - What if they drop the Bridges immediately? That's how pathetic a plan going up a single road with no room to manuever really is with so many other moving parts.
Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.
A Pulitzer Prize winner
The Guns at Last Light,bt Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's intelligence chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
page270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944).ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and Hartenstein Museum.
On 6 September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army Group B, under the command of General Walter Model. The First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels and Maastricht. Further the message outlined the revised order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment. Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an anti-tank role.
ULTRA decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed the various units from Normandy had been ordered to western Holland to refit and subsequent intercepts indicated that this included the II SS Panzer Corp. Not until September 15 had SHAEF high command taken note that the corps two divisions the 9th & 10th Panzer seemed to encamped at Arnhem.
Montgomery's senior commanders almost to a man voiced skepticism about Market Garden. Beetle-Smith grew anxious enough to alert Eisenhower, who hesitated to intervene in tactical dispositions but authorized Smith to raise the issue with the field marshall. Smith flew to Brussels on Friday,48 hrs before the assault was to begin and suggested strengthening the force to be dropped at Arnhem. *"Montgomery ridiculed the idea and laughed me out of his tent" Smith later reported *"he waved my objections airily aside"
One Guy had access to this and Bettle Smith brought it up to him. And Gough/Gavin/Browning or Brereton weren't privy to it
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Get your head wound looked at dave hack,then have some history read to you
Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.*
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
Monty admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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Correct,This operation was condemned at it's inception it shouldn't have been considered let alone launched. And good men paid the price for Monty and IKE ignoring the red flags
Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p. 43 "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse."
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
Center of Military History United States Army The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald
Pages 199-200 Perhaps the real fault of the plan was overambition.Yet all of the handicaps possibly could have been overcome had the British ground column been able to advance' as rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. Another glaring fault was dependence upon but one road. In any event, the ground troops were delayed for varying amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal bridge in Nijmegen. Combined with the kind of resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the West might be down but they were not out.
page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be maintained. Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust."
September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.329 On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. (ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet)
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Forced labour and the Atlantic Wall
One of the biggest impacts on the Dutch people during the occupation was caused by the German ‘Arbeitseinsatz’, which forced every man aged between 18 and 45 to work in German factories. As part of this program, approximately 500,000 Dutchmen were transported by force to Germany. Life in the factories was hard, and dangerous too, as the buildings were regularly bombed by the Allies. Those that refused to go were forced into hiding.
By 1943, tensions between the Dutch people and the occupying German forces were rising. This enmity was only exacerbated by the construction of the Atlantic Wall, a gigantic coastal defence line that the Nazi’s built from southwestern France to Denmark and Norway. In Holland, the wall was built through large stretches of The Hague and Scheveningen, with some Dutch people being forced to work on its construction. In total, tens of thousands of homes were evacuated, and many more people had to leave their homes to accommodate for its erection. You can find out more about the story behind the Atlantic Wall by visiting the Wadden region in the north of Holland.
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Pretty straight forward little villa,go up there praisng your favorite poof Monty. And why are you soliticing another poster's approval? Hoping he comes to the same lopsided conclusions as yourself,when the post doesn't seem to indicate that at all
This from The Dutch Review
Allied forces had liberated the south of the Netherlands. But as the forces pushed further north, the failure of Operation Market Garden impeded their progress. The obvious and literal cause of the famine was a German blockade enacted in retaliation to a Dutch railway strike that aimed to help the Allied invasion of the country
The Allied forces failed to seize a bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. They decided to focus on other parts of the liberation process first, including capturing the French ports of Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk. Their progress into Germany slowed down at the time because they couldn’t use the port of Antwerp
How did people survive the Hunger Winter?
Between 18,000 and 22,000 people died during the Hunger Winter, most of whom were older men. When we talk about survival rates, it’s important to remember that it was not just the supply of food hampered by the blockade. It was also the supply of heating fuel: coal.When it came to heating, people desperately burned furniture and dismantled whole houses to get fuel for their fires.
Adults had to contend with only 1000 calories of food by the end of November 1944 — but that dropped to 580 calories a day by February 1945. Even the black market was empty of food.
Antwerp wasn't opened because Monty never ordered it opened until his debacle failed
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little villa,If I agreed with you we’d both be wrong. Like you Monty never showed up so you both have that going for you. When mum visits you over there at the center have her read you these below - it's in English
With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Autistic Irving Burns I was going thru the comment sections and every one had their way with you like the cheap floozy we know you to be. An epic throttling you did recieve to the delight of all the folks at the home where you reside. They were all there taking their turns,Imperial Commander,Agent Mulder,Achilles Smith,Seth 22,The Director,Answers Questions,Old Tanker,Nick Danger,Geronimo,Myself,Johnny Thunder I would take up too much band width mentioning the rest pounding you and the rest of your posse of cyber psychos a righteous throttling it was 🚑🚑🚑
More Monty victims
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013
Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013
John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013
John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013
John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013
TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
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From the Top,even Brooke couldn't defend him
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.*Alan Brooke* was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay he wrote in his diary.Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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thicko that's a lie I left the evidence but being bent and in the government home for the unfortunatesyou keep repeating drivel.Monty was going to get sacked for wanting to fall back then claiming he did it anything.The same little coward that didn't even show up at Monty Garden wanted to fall back
THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
By Don R. Marsh
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Montgomery's orders, he gave Harmon the OK.
"At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On that day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end
The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
- German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
- The Americans suffered 75,482 dead,wounded and missing
- The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
Shameful oh and the USA had to supply the trucks as this happened - AGAIN
Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.[1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
[1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group" p.47
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thicko that's a lie I left the evidence but being bent and in the government home for the unfortunatesyou keep repeating drivel.Monty was going to get sacked for wanting to fall back then claiming he did it anything.The same little coward that didn't even show up at Monty Garden wanted to fall back
THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
By Don R. Marsh
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Montgomery's orders, he gave Harmon the OK.
"At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On that day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end
The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
- German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
- The Americans suffered 75,482 dead,wounded and missing
- The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
Shameful oh and the USA had to supply the trucks as this happened - AGAIN
Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.[1] These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
[1]See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
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Conned my arse The Americans and Russians rightfully left you puufs on the side go across and ask the Euros.French,Czech,Poles Dutch,knew again who wore the pants. Your chickenshits thru the czechs under the bus hoping Hitler would leave you alone.
More British stategic retreats,again have the headmaster point these out
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
🍼🍼🍼🍼🍼🍼🍼🍼
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Monty did crap in the ardennes puhleeeze,What he won he won in NA with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind.
How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over,under the ever watchfull RAF and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November Just look at the maps
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction you idiot
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From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 437 Bedell Smith the showed De Guingand in strict confidence a telegram from Marshall to Eisenhower saying that it would be quite unacceptable to give Montgomery command of any substantial American Forces.He informed Eisenhower that the latter had the full confidence of the President himself and the whole of America in handling the campaign.DeGuingand then saw Eisenhower who mentioned the damage being done by Montgomery's indiscreet remarks.Eisenhower explained he was tired of the whole business (Montgomery's behavior) and that it was "now a matter for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a decision"The threat was clear;either he or Montgomery would have to be removed,and given Marshall's forthright support for the Supreme Commander,it was obvious that it was Montgomery who would have to go.Eisenhower had finally reached the point of no return with Montgomery.Many commentators and historians have expressed surprise that he had been so patient.
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 438 DeGuingand considered this deposition "too frightful to contemplate" and asked IKE a stay of execution for 24 hrs so that he could speak to Monty.When Freddie returned to Monty and told him he might have to go "he was genuinely and completely taken by surprise and found it difficult to grasp.Montgomery's bluff,after all his arguments and threats had finally been called."What shall I do,Freddie? he asked his Chief of Staff,and DeGuingand drafted a placatory message which Montgomery duly signed.Ultimately as on so many other times during the war,it was Eisenhower who made the relationship work.Montgomery later related to Brooke that the command question was settled and that it would be quite useless to open it up again - which what was preciously what Brooke had previously told him.
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 477 Brooke and the other chiefs of staff should never have allowed Churchill to dictate minor detail,nor to sack Generals and Admirals on a whim(the Air Marshalls got off lightly). Probably the worst example of picking the wrong man and backing him come what may,was in Brooke's constant support for Montgomery,who should have been dismissed once it became clear that he could not operate in a coalition environment,but whose retention soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War
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From a Pulitzer Prize Winner,where as we all know you and your sock accounts just pull it
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy."Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance nothwards from Nijmegen to their support.There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke,he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfctory"
This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory.Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any "sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged,"in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well."
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https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan.
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co.1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him.
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he only won with overwhelming supplies in men,materiel and munitions.Even you could have won in N.Africa
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role.
-Montgomery was very much a set-piece general whose mental rigidity and egotism left him unable to respond when battles didn't go exactly as he planned.And whose skills and abilities were grossly inflated by the British press and political leadership.Montgomery who was busy fighting with set piece tactics from the last war; Montgomery never learned the tactics of high speed mobile warfare.Unfortunately, Bradley and Eisenhower most probably aquiesed to Mongomery's demand for the sake of Allied unity.ButMonty, was lacking the flexibility for independent thinking necessary to adapt to changing conditions.
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-(Chapter 10: General Montgomery's Bitter Pills, page 312) I would submit that Prime Minister Churchill and the CIGS Allen Brooke were culpable in this ruse as well, as they were committed to ensuring the press showed the British in the best possible light. Having the Americans close the Gap, could well have finished the war early and showed the British to be struggling with manpower and unable to compete in a mechanized, mobile war, where the Americans truly were the masters.
-American commanders Eisenhower and Bradley covering for Montgomery in the interest of harmony in the allies camp.it was Monty's bruised ego that he would not permit the Americans (and Patton in particular) to be praised for what his British 21st Army Group had failed to accomplish. Monty's efforts to attack south and close the gap were curiously half-hearted. Rather than a full-blooded push using his experienced British divisions, Monty entrusted the effort to two Canadian and Polish units in which he had shown little prior confidence. Why? Certainly, Monty realized/resented the accolades heaped on Patton by both American and British press and the innuendo that Monty's troops weren't doing their part.
-Montgomery's campaign shortcomings which led to this result were manifested in his failure to capture Caen and the Port of Antwerp on the allied timetable, his failure to close the Falaise Gap until it was too late, and his carefully orchestrated "showcase" British 2nd Army crossing of the Rhine (when elements of Patton's 3rd Army and General Courtney Hodge's U.S. 1st Army were already across). Montgomery's crossing, which was augmented by U.S. Airborne troops, resulted in some 5,000 allied casualties.
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The evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered?
The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles
As the Dutch poster Oddball SOK stated on this board Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944. So tell me, how come ?How come the Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Monty/Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
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No they didn't arrive on time they only made 7 miles the 1st day.And the bridge at son was blown up.Seriously, get lost kid, go away. You're obviously British and are being patriotic about this
Arnhem, Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, p. 333-Tom Hoare,who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords, were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.
Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. *"There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major less than charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces.
Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians
Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all."
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Oh lookie monty fanbois taking a break from taking a break - you windbags have lied once and that has been continuously
Alan Brooke's own words blaming bernard with Adml Ramsay chiming in
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
Monty admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth
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This monty circle jerk is laughable go across the channel and ask the euros - shouldn't take you 4 yrs like it did monty. But burns still has his restraining order and ankle monitor so who knows
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be be Patton in Lorraine,Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson)
Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson In Early September,Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops
R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson)
Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"
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The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. Also the Germans falling back on their stores of Men,material,tanks and artillary,while the allied port to support this debacle wasn't even open
♦ Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown.
♦The Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that get you the title of Field Marshall
♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road.
♦ And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?
♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November
♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job
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And it was very clear from the beginning that only one drop a day was doable as there were simply not enough trained air crews/pilots/planes to go around because of:
OMG = Operation Monty Garden or more appropriately "Oh My God"
♦There was already 24/7 strategic bombing going on of the Reich and Bomber Harris and Hap Arnold were not cutting their crews for Monty or anyone else
♦OMGwas cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications.
♦D-Day had 30 mile flights across the Channel.
♦Market Garden had 300 mile flights(one way) into NE Netherlands
♦D-Day had 900 flights. Market Garden had 1600 Flights
♦D-Day was June 6th.Market Garden was September 17th And had over 2 hrs less daylight to do all that in
♦So there were 700 MORE FLIGHTS than D-Day. They were 300 miles away in North East Netherlands not 30 miles across a channel. And 2 hrs less daylight to do it in. SMDH
With Monty's pathetic plan, the HEER only needed to focus on a single road and cut it off. More over , thanks to Monty , the allies were very lacking supplies , which if he had been clearing out the Germans north of Antwerp that was agreed to , it could by now not only supply him , but the American armies as well.
♦Ambition over reaching capability, shameful but expected
With that in mind this is Montgomery's fault through and through, This comes back to bite Monty in the ass, this is not Eisenhower's or Gavin's fault , the Americans halted 2 other US armies and gave ALL of the supplies to one of his allies instead , in this case Montgomery , to execute his operation to end the war by Christmas.
The Folly of Generals, by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be Patton in Lorraine, Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem.
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The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port." ( from Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard
Eisenhower's Armies, by Dr Niall Barr, page 415
After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.
"During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place"
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..... "The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knockout blow." Foot Note: ("Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219")
How about Air Marshall Tedder???
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
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@warspite1807 Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcoverby Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.
Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.'
How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
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Bernard wasn't there until after hostilities,like showing up after the Funeral
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports. He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders; he was having his portrait painted,again and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy.
Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 292 Despite Montgomery's message to IKE that he thought there was still a "sporting chance" of taking the bridge at Arnhem he must have sensed by then that a terrible disaster was taking place,which would considerably damage his reputation.After all his demands for priority which he received in the north to get across the Rhine,he could not have wanted to face IKE,Patton,Bradley and SHAEFF in Versailles.And could not have been keen to encounter General Bedell-Smith or Strong ,whose fears about German strength in the southern Netherlands Monty had ridiculed.The very next day Monty wrote in his diary "I am very doubtful now if 1st airborne will be able to hold out and we may have to withdraw them". And the fact he never visited Horrocks during the entire battle confirms the impression that he was keeping his distance,a rare event for the "Master"
A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
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Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Monty even admitted - a bad mistake on my part
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
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@Johnny Carroll I've already ran Vile Asston thru with the logistics before but the oozing boil conveniently gets amnesia.There were over 2 less hours sunlight on September 17 than on June 6th there were 700 more flights and not right across the channel into France but up into N.E.Netherlands,so reality exists.Yet crickets on why Walter Model a real Field Marshall was there to direct in person and Bernard was no where around for Monty Garden. Read this book it explains alot
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. The key issue was lack of natural illumination, the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days)
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke.It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so. Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Compant HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
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I should be charging for this,have the ward boy bust that boil between your ears,LMAO Burns
The United States Army,Bedell-Smith,ULTRA,a Pulitzer Prize Winner and even Monty say you are full of shit AGAIN Burns
Center of Military History
United States Army
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
Page122 By 10 September, the day when General Eisenhower approved the operation, the British had remarked that "Dutch Resistance sources report that battered panzer formations have been sent to Holland to refit, and mention Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception areas." 9 A few days later the SHAEF G-2 announced that these panzer formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division and presumably the 10th SS Panzer Division.
Page 143The 9th SS Panzer was the stronger with 1 armored infantry regiment, 1 artillery battalion, 2 assault gun batteries, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 company of Panther (Mark V) tanks, and increments Of engineers and antiaircraft troops. The 10th SS Panzer probably had 1 armored infantry regiment, 2 artillery battalions, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 engineer battalion, and 1 anti aircraft battalion.
Page 156The possibility of counterattack from this direction took on added credence from the Dutch resistance reports of panzer formations assembling in the Netherlands. The 82d Airborne Division was led to believe that this armor was concentrating in the Reichswald. This information became "a major and pressing element in the predrop picture of German forces
From Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th &10th* Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
Retreat to the Reich from Stackpole Military History Series
and gives an account of how many Panther Tanks both the 9th and 10th SS had just before Market-Garden:7 Sept,1944
Page 243 The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, which was commanded by 31 year old Lieutenant Colonel Walter Harzer, had 3,500 men,five tanks plus assualt guns
The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which was led by 38 year old SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz Harmel, had 6,000 men,20 Panther Tanks, 40 armored personal carriers, and several guns (both flak and howitzers)
That's 25 tanks and 40 APC with 20mms mounted with Flak & Howitzers on Sept 7th as ULTRA reported
History of War .Org Reports by Dutch resistance & aerial photos indicated armored formations. Maj.Brian Urquhart Chief of Intel.British 1st Airborne Corp commented - "There,in the photos,I could clearly see tanks,if not on the very Arnhem landing & drop zones then certainly close to them" .He became convinced that the plan was critically flawed, and attempted to persuade his superiors to modify or abort their plans in light of crucial information obtained from aerial reconnaissance and the resistance.Major Urquhart was visited by a Medical officer whom suggested he take some sick leave. -
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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@johnburns4017 references were given.Brooke,Ramsey,Tedder all British blamed Monty.Bedell-Smith,ULTRA and Brian Urquhart who became under Secretary of the UN all said Monty ignored every one in his last pitiful grasp for glory.
Here's Monty's sodiers,I've printed these over 1 hundred times you troll
Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945 .By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, Monty degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker.With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British*1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
*
From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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@derekhooker7086 did you read what pathetic bullshit this asshole writes.He gets blasted and runs to another thread - real slander.I leave direct quotes from Hisrorians/Authors and he pulls opinions out of his rather robust and disgusting backside
British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945; referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force over 60 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. *The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
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Look here Field Marshall Alan Brooke blamed Monty as did and Admiral Ramsey and an Air Marshall Tedder
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding"a bad mistake on my part"
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly,that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."*
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AGAIN Burns from the BBC,Everything you write is certifiable bullshit everything,About antwerp and XXX Corp
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
Even the germans knew XXX Corp tanks were slow
From 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war, *why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further*The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself.'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance: 'The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks'-
From "It Never Snows in September" page 307 Robert Kershaw. Market-Garden was condemned therefore,to move in the Allies favor only at XXX Corps laborious pace through the airborne corridor.Progress was made difficult and the road cut on at least 2 occasions by the sudden deployment of newly arrived German Panzer & infantry forces.
The United States Army
Center of Military History,The United States Army,The Sigrfied Line CampaignPage174 Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal
Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on ArnhemCounting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem
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There you go BURNS Monty and Student(along with Browning and Brererton) blaming the slowness of the XXX Corp advance - but it was still Monty's fault as Allied HQ reasoned
From Market Garden Reconsidered There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline.
General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem
Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day
Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area,the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland
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Pierre Puddles Pulling more nonsense out of your ample backside .At least you are remembering to sign out of one account before popping of in another.Thank your hander at the home for me
John Burns babbled
On the US entering WW2, it was about the British defending the USA and teaching them how to wage war.
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LMAO keep posting even your bunkmates at the home don't believe that.Let's see 1776,1812 Dunkirk and Singapore say hello.Brilliant British defense - said no one ever .It was a case study at West Point at what not to do in battle.You're dive into delusion is deep even for you.Have them dial back the voltage on your Electro-shock therapy.If Monty could show the GIs to back peddle and Percivall how to stick our hands up - we'd be grateful.SMDH.Churchill was to the point of practically blowing FDR for men and material and was even in the White House when Tobruk in Libya fell.And by the time the Tub left Washintgon he took everything he could but a red hot stove.Again no serious sources except for the land of make believ you cavort in.
https://anzacday.org.au/ww2-1942-an-overview-of-the-battle-for-australia
The USA was fighting for Australia/NZ because obviously Britannia wasn't ruling the waves
The arrival of the Americans
By the end of March 1942, there was a line of Japanese-held territory directly to the north of Australia, stretching from Rabaul to Singapore. The Japanese had conquered their Asian/Pacific empire. Australians believed it was only a matter of time before Australia too was invaded.
Just after the defeat in Malaya, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Curtin, declared that “the fall of Singapore opens the Battle for Australia.” Curtin was aware that Great Britain, herself facing a huge challenge from Germany in Europe and North Africa, could do little to help Australia. Already at the end of 1941, Curtin indicated that Australia would have to seek a new ally to help defend its shores – the United States. On 22 December 1941, the first American soldiers arrived in Brisbane.
In February 1942, the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, decided to make Australia the main American base in the south-west Pacific. American and Australian forces would launch the fight back against Japan from Australia. Roosevelt ordered General Douglas MacArthur, the US commander in the Philippines, to proceed to Melbourne and there to take command of all allied forces in the area. Throughout 1942, Australia began providing camps, airfields and a whole range of other materials for the increasing number of American service personnel arriving in the country.
See there you pathetic prat.The Aussies fought for the crown and that's how they got paid back .As I told your other sock account the English have a way of using colonials as their sandbags – ask Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and especially the Irish .No Worries though the Emerging World Power picked up the tab and wouldn't throw ANZACs under the Bus like London did
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Pierre Burns this just keeps getting easier an easier.Your novels are swirling the drain whistle britches
https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1 Churchill warned Roosevelt that his country would not be able to pay cash for military supplies or shipping much longer
Want more - of course you do .Pay attention there will be a test on this .Just joking I wouldn't do that to the disadvataged
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc
Why couldn’t Britain pay?Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States.
From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources.But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases,chiefly in the United States
Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most. The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
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Oh dear Puddles it appears your novels have been vanquished .Here's some more goodies from a Pulitzer Prize Winner.Unlike you who just pulls it
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.633
What Churchill called the American "prodigy of organization" had shipped 18 million tons of war supplies to Europe equivalent to the cargo in 3,600 Liberty Ships oe 181,000 rail cars from 800,000 military vehicles to footwear.U.S munitions plants had turned out 40 Billion small arms ammunition,56 million grenades,500 million machine gun bullets & 23 million artillary rounds .By 1945 the USA had built 2/3rds of all ships afloat and was making half of all manufactured goods in the world including half of all armaments.The enemy was crushed by logistical brilliance,yet the War absorbed barely 1/3rd of American gross domestic product.
From a fine Brit with a PHD Dr. Niall Barr is Professor of Military History and Deputy Dean of Academic Studies in the Defence Studies Department
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America. Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of"cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War
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Marshall Never planned on a '42 invasion,43 at the earliest .As the Wehrmacht was a far cry from having the atlantic wall shored up.The folly lied in Churchill wanting to 2,000 miles out of the way up the Itallian boot in the Mediteranean rather than go over a 30 mile wide channel.Allied soldiers had taken the Po Valley in northern Italy from German forces in Italy on may 1945.That didn't include traversing the Alps
Marshall proved less sure-footed in his approach to the most important strategic choice facing the United States in World War II: when and where to employ American forces on a large scale. Marshall’s support of a Germany-first strategic priority was on the mark, but his advocacy of an Anglo-American invasion of France in 1943 put him on shaky ground. Until American forces had gained more experience against the Wehrmacht, until command of the Atlantic was achieved in mid-1943 and until command of the air was secured in early 1944, an amphibious assault across the English Channel would have carried great military risk. And given that the British would have supplied the bulk of the troops for a 1943 invasion, military failure would have involved the political risk of undercutting Britain’s commitment to the war effort. Franklin Roosevelt, although overruling the chief of staff on this crucial strategic issue, came to regard him as so indispensable in Washington that, when the cross-Channel assault was finally mounted in 1944, he could not let Marshall assume command of the invasion force. The general was sorely disappointed but characteristically never uttered a word of complaint.
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Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan,cool to know you still pull history out of your arse
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.*I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Pop off on your media backwaters all you want - you started the condescending remarks the only thing that supersedes your ignorance is your willingness to express it.All these vetted Historians and actual participants are full of it and you are to be believed,sure. Repeat that out loud and see how it sounds
From Carlo D'este,Decision in Normandy From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal* was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions..He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
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The war was fought in the past you are a simpleton who refuses historical fact.I have quoted 3 Historians with PHD's and actual participants of the battle British/German/American and you babble "I was schooled in the conventional wisdom" Have your handler take you to the library's history section.I should be charging for this!
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Theirelation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile .LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have they been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Compant HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 329-31 The 82nd lost 48 KIA,138 wounded,it was now the British allies from XXX Corp turn to roll over the bridges with tanks and reinforcements and to fight their way to Arnhem to relieve the embattled countrymen from 1st Airborne.There wasn't a second to lose .In the Americans view the time to attack was right now,while the Germans were in disarray. Instead XXX Corp Tankers halted for the night,prompting a bitter dispute between the 82nd and Guards Armored.The 82nd just lost half of their men and the British Paras in Arnhem were being cut to shreds. Carrington said "I can't go with out orders .Lt A.D.Demetras overheard Col Tucker arguing with Carrington you'd better go it's only 8 miles To no avail the British tankmen refused to push for Arnhem that evening
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
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When you are done cleaning your teeth with your finger - try turning the pages of a History Book with it. The 82nd AB had 89 men killed & 138 wounded crossing the Waal,many died later of those wounds .Just to hook up with the Tankers and carry the fight forward but they sat there instead.What part of that could you not grasp?Those quotes aren't repeated just by actual participants go ask a Bobby if witnesses mean anything. 11,000 go in 2,100 come out.There is nothing new except for your steaming piles.
The 82nd didn't sit there safe and sound inside their tanks while 1st Para and the 82nd fought bravely. How dare a chicken shit steaming pile like you badmouth men like that. Try sourcing something other than you backside. Are you incapable of comprehending the written word? Go back and read those eye witness accounts real men in real time,Germans/Americans/British relaying what they witnessed, pretty straight forward but evidently that concept is just a little complex for you? Oh but you have new information by people who weren't there 75 yrs ago, as you sit here kicking and screaming attempting to flip the script. It was a crap plan from a so called field marshall that never showed up unlike a German Field Marshall who did. It got blasted stem to stern much like you in the comment sections. Horrocks himself called it the most gallant act he witnessed in the whole of the war - is he full of shit too? This whole debacle was Monty's last gasp grab for glory after his many cock ups like Sicily/Caen/Falaise/OMG
Look these up to if you'd like
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333*Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, *he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem
when asked how he intended to win the war, Churchill responded I'll drag the United States into it.He's full of shit to?Try sourcing something other than one's ample arse.
Here's another guy whose probably full of shit,boy you got a million of them
From Six Armies in Normandy,by John Keegan In just 30 days, Patton finished his sweep across France and neared Germany. The Third Army had exhausted its fuel supplies and ground to a halt near the border in early September.Allied supplies had been redirected northward for the normally cautious General Montgomery’s reckless Market Garden gambit. That proved a horrible scheme to leapfrog over the bridges of the Rhine River; it devoured Allied blood and treasure, and accomplished almost nothing in return. Meanwhile, the cutoff of Patton’s supplies would prove disastrous Scattered and fleeing German forces regrouped. Their resistance stiffened as the weather grew worse and as shortened supply lines began to favor the defense
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You're an idiot hoping to achieve imbecility
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it The English drank too much tea,the 4Tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent , if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us
A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 As LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured .LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge - we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
The more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life
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Pulling history out of your very rank crevasse
I suppose John Keegan perhaps the most learned man on WWII history and lectured at Sandhurst is full of it too
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command
OMG failed because the rancid Runt didn't open Antwerp - deliberately I might add.He thought (because he was mentally ill) he could play keep away men,material and most of all fuel.Because Patton embarrassed the slow moving Monty at Sicily as he would later at Bastogne and crossing the Rhine.The Crown couldn't have that because they saw their once glorious Empire losing face - which they most certainly did
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 63 General Browning cautioned General Gavin "Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges,it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.
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Monty was superior to no one Better generals than him were let go before the drunk Winnie realized his mistake but Ike kept kissing hiney of the Crown just to shut him up but it backfired.But it didn't matter partnering with the USA meant the end of the Reich.Never tossed into the channel either
Here is the rest of Monty's debacle
From Market Garden Reconsidered There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges .Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and ArnhemMajor General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day. Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude. Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area." There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area,but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland pretty much the norm
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Never happened he almost got relieved for suggesting such .You poor trampled cabbage leaf Monty was awful at commanding. Terrible. As in, no fooking good.He held a a shoulder and wanted to with draw from that.Churchill even address parliament because the rancid runt attempted to take credit when in fact he wanted to flee as usual.Montgomery's skills and abilities were grossly inflated by the British press and political leadership
The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy
From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 General Joe Collins in a memorandom on Wednesday December 27,laid out 3 options and endorsed "Plan no 2" a strong attack from the north on St Vith,complimented by 3rd Army's lunge from the south. Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not."nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen."If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61*Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
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You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. We've already discussed this thicko Monty was 12 miles from the Beaches in the summer Patton was over 300 miles inland in fall-winter w/o near the air cover or naval guns
My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944, "IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile? The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress"
from D-Day Overlord Dot Com
The commander of the 21st Panzer Division, Edgar Feuchtinger, has 16,000 men, 146 tanks, 4 battalions of motorized infantry, about 50 guns and a battalion of Flak guns with 24 88-caliber pieces buried north of Caen. Even with Panzer Lehr in total, the German force in the sector of Caen represents 228 tanks, 150 guns of 88 mm as well as multiple canons divers.
The British Forces, namely the 1st, 8th and 30th Corps 60,000 men, 600 tanks and 700 guns. That did not meet the hopes of Montgomery who, from his headquarters in Blay, was worried by the catastrophic reports of British losses since the start of Epsom. On 1 July, when Operation Epsom was stopped by order of Montgomery's command, Caen still did not fall
He set up operation code-name Goodwood, which begins on July 18: 750 tanks must pierce from the east towards Bourguébus. At the same time, a diversion attack must attract enemy defenders to the west of the city two hours before Goodwood starts. Previously, 4,500 allied bombers have to destroy all targets on the British routes: they drop 7,000 tons of bombs and are backed up by naval artillery and ground artillery, which fire close to 250,000 shells
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley
Von Mellenthin wrote - "The US 3rd Army had received orders to stand on the defensive during Market Garden, it certainly simplified our problems and gave us a few weeks grace to rebuild our battered forces and get ready to meet the next onslaught.*
Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.197 Until the arrival of 2nd Panzer at Caen there was little other than Wittman's small Panzer force,to stop the British. The Germans never understood why Montgomery failed to press his advantage. Of the period around June 10th Gen Fritz Kraemer wrote: it is still incomprehensible why the enemy exerted himself with assaults in the direction of Caen and did not make a powerful drive to exploit the open Gap on either side of Bayeux.The enemy left a favorable opportunity slip.
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From the Warfare History Network
Taking the city of Metz would be a challenging task for the allies. There were a series of natural as well as man-made obstacles these included, the flooded Moselle & Saar Rivers, a multitude of forts and a plethora of pill boxes. Patton’s army made attempt after attempt to cross the Moselle River but these fortresses rained heavy artillery fire down upon them making it a daunting task. These forts and pill boxes dated back to the 19th century making them almost a natural part of the landscape this made the structures much harder to detect and therefore defeat. (9) another reason the pill boxes created a challenge was, because of their small size. Two German soldiers could easily hide inside and shot a .50 caliber machine gun at the Allies and have little chance of being hit by small arms fire. So the GIs attacked at night to avoid that and mortar barrages.
The Combination of these natural and unnatural defenses had made the city of Metz a formidable opponent for invaders for more then 1500 years since it is placed superbly for defense on the east bank of the Moselle River. As well as being surrounded by barbed wire and earth fortifications that had been built around the city. Its best defense however, was the fact it was surrounded by hills that were turned into dominating underground forts composed of passageways and well dug in steel and concrete doors placed in a fashion that not only concealed them but protected them from artillery fire.
*There were almost 13,000 monthly sorties being flown June-Sept over Normandy that dwindled to 2,500 because of the colder weather & distance away from the coast yet unlike OM-G it still was a success driving the Wehrmacht to the Sigfreid line before turning north for the Battle of the Bulge.Monty effed up so bad SHAEF never again game him precedence
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331, Apparently even the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command. *General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
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Johnny Burns accessing your ample backside again I see? If they've removed your ankle monitor you can go to the library. Until then chew on this
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.210 SHAEF and Eisenhower should have been focused the Allied attack on one feasible break through area. Whether it be be Patton in Lorraine,Gerow at Wallendorf, or Collins at Achen. Instead it decided to concentrate on the risky ill advised attack on Arnhem
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stopr us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine.But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson)
Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops
R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson)
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.215 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine" (Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111)
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Cherry picking again,why didn't your empire cross a crappy channel in 4 full yrs ? Why bother the amatuer GIs crossing 3500 miles of Ocean to help you out of the whole you dug for yourselves? The Euros know what side your bread was buttered on,Funny you never bring up that with every other Army in Europe the BEF ended up in the Channel. And who chaperoned them back over.
Or who refitted,resupplied and reinforced the Crown after being Dunkirked and carried the fight forward.Billions of dollars in military hardware were left on the French Beach during that mad dash. One of Churchill's biographers is he wrong to?
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts,p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there "No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” Said by Churchill after Pearl Harbor
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.148-49 The Governor of the Bank of England,Montagu Norman wrote in 1941: *"I have never realized so strongly as now how entirely we are in the hands of American friends over direct investments and how much it looks as if with kind words and feelings,they were going to extract these one after another."*
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.157 On march 8,1941 passed Congress the new measure insured that even when Britain's cash was exhausted the shipments kept coming. The President extracted for the British thru lend lease the most generous terms a U.S. legislature would allow, much preferable to the straight loans of World War 1,which Britain alienated U.S opinion by failing to repay
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,p.116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.
The Second World War 1939-45,p.85,By Maj.Gen. J.F.C.Fuller Britain was placed in a such a desperate situation as she must have accepted a negotiated peace with out American economic support she could not continue the struggle.
Did you read that?The Crown failing to repay loans from the USA in WW1.The US didn't owe you allegiance. God forbid some sirs,lords and other assorted fauntleroys would you have to sell off their Castles or estates and perhaps go to work instead of Fox Hunting,playing polo or crikett
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Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.195 With the shortening of days,reduced number of hours this time of year, the increase in distance, the complications due to a late start due to bad weather General Williams pointed out it would not be possible to conduct more than one lift a day. Williams had a deserved reputation for close cooperation - he had commanded troop carriers in Husky,Neptune and Dragoon and was one of the most experienced of all Allied Airborne commanders
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.196 Lift details are somewhat of a technical character which is why few historians address them in any detail. They concern time involved in turning around aircraft for the 2nd & 3rd lifts, the range from UK bases to their objectives in Holland,weather an visibility conditions and the co-ordination of the air lift with fighter Escort and Flak suppression operations. All of these were interlinked
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.198 At the beginning of September 1944 Lt.General Brereton had already warned Eisenhower that it would be very difficult to stage an airborne operation as far east as the Rhine River from bases in the UK (SHAEF in a memorandum)
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
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@davemac1197 tore apart :face-blue-smiling:, you mean the pumpkin head that had to take one board down for libel - he's a bigger carnival barker than you. I'll leave this - from 5 top tier SHAEF Allied Officers(4 British) - perhaps you can identify them you can even ask your hero TIK o your other aliases on your account if you're stumped
Alan Brooke blaming Bernard???
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
Monty admitting it after the war???
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."
(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
How about Air Marshall Tedder???
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith???
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside"
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Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US - in that order.Monty was an ankle biter passing himself off as a head hunter who had 4 years to come across his 21-30 mile channel.Your Welcome - Your army was too small,poorly lead,ill equipped & ineffective - kind of like you in a comment sections.
The fuel was from the USA like the tanks,trucks,artillary, 6 years ?Typical troubled limey tart,where?declared war then sat from sept '39 until May '40.Then monty skedaddled in 16 days - 20 if you want to include hastening up the gangplanks a smashing royal reversal it was .Do regale for the congregation the 1,400 lorries that like Monty stayed put,and of course their replacement engines that did the same. Then after this string of tactical briliance you runaway 3000 miles into a desert that was producing no oil at the time.After telling FDR and Stalin - Germany 1st, banging practitioner of bollocks - 🤣. Everything was given to you by the GIs amost all of your aviation fuel you lying hound.
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How about the Irish Guards there
How about Lt.Col. Vandeluer?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over.
Lt Brian Wilson?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea."
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
Heinz Harmel?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
LT John Gorman?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"
How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408 on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his dsiquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
So the Germans and the Irish Guards are in agreement with the GIs - MONTY GARDEN. Do they treat you like mushrooms in Britain? - keep you in the dark and feed you crap or is it personnel preference?
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:face-blue-smiling: too bad you haven't read it as he places the blame on monty and XXX Corp. You throw names out there like you are a source . Monty ignored more facts than you
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. More over it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance"
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.195 With the shortening of days,reduced number of hours this time of year,the increase in distance, the complications due to a late start due to bad weather General Williams pointed out it would not be possible to conduct more than one lift a day.* Williams had a deserved reputation for close cooperation - he had commanded troop carriers in Husky,Neptune and Dragoon and was one of the most experienced of all Allied Airborne commanders
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and he had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.108 Arnhem could not be captured unless all else below it was secured 1st.With 1st Para in Arnhem the rest would be left with 3 brigades to secure the Bridges at Grave,over the Maas-Waal Canal and the bridge over the Wall itself. In addition it was necessary to capture and hold an area of high ground south east of Nijmegen at Groesbeek only a few miles from Germany. German possession of the heights would have left XXX Corp's eastern flank dangerously exposed to counter attack.
Never the less Montgomery's plan required 100% mission success something unkown in large scale Airborne operations. Failure to capture a single objective would jeopardize the entire XXX Corp offensive
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113* yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it."
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assesments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops. Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.147 Lacking any direct contact with Brereton or his staff,Montgomery had no knowledge of the range,weather,command,control and communication problems that would potentially accompany a airborne Rhine crossing from England.
I'm tired - MONTY GARDEN
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From a Pulitzer Prize Winner,where as we all know you and your sock accounts just pull it
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 281 Montgomery monitored the battle through liaison officers and radio reports.He had neither visited the battlefield at Market Garden nor seen his field commanders; *he was having his portrait painted,again*and seemed intranced by the experience,boasting that his likeness would "create a tremendous sensation at next year's Academy."Yet at 10:50 PM on wednesday he felt confident enough of the view from Brussels to cable Eisenhower: Things are going to work out alright...the British airborne division at Arnhem has been having a bad time but their situation should be eased now that we can adv- ance nothwards from Nijmegen to their support.There is a sporting chance that we should capture the bridge at Arnhem. In the subsequent message to Brooke,he added, "I regard the general situation on the rivers as now very satisfctory"
This assessment was nothing less than hallucinatory.Despite the valor at Nijmegen,any *"sporting chance" to take the Arnhem Bridge had passed*Things in Holland were not going to work out,even if the high command did not yet know it .As XXX Corps account later acknowledged,"in front,on the flanks,and in the rear,all was not well."
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https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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@lyndoncmp5751 ya OK john why was ULTRA picking up their dispatches? BTW he has a PHD in History
Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 243 How many Panther Tanks both the 9th and 10th SS had just before Market-Garden:
7 Sept,1944 The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, which was commanded by 31 year old Lieutenant Colonel Walter Harzer, had 3,500 men,five tanks plus assualt guns
The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which was led by 38 year old SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz Harmel, had 6,000 men,20 Panther Tanks, 40 armored personal carriers, and several guns (both flak and howitzers)
That's 25 tanks and 40 APC with 20mms mounted with Flak & Howitzers on Sept 7th
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Center of Military History
United States Army
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
Page122 By 10 September, the day when General Eisenhower approved the operation, the British had remarked that "Dutch Resistance sources report that battered panzer formations have been sent to Holland to refit, and mention Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception areas." A few days later the SHAEF G-2 announced that these Panzer formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division and presumably the 10th SS Panzer Division
Page 143 The 9th SS Panzer was the stronger with 1 armored infantry regiment, 1 artillery battalion, 2 assault gun batteries, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 company of Panther (Mark V) tanks, and increments Of engineers and antiaircraft troops. The 10th SS Panzer probably had 1 armored infantry regiment, 2 artillery battalions, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 engineer battalion, and 1 anti aircraft battalion.
Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 243
How many Panther Tanks both the 9th and 10th SS had just before Market-Garden:7 Sept,1944Page 243
-The 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, which was commanded by 31 year old Lieutenant Colonel Walter Harzer,
- 3,500 men,
-five tanks plus assualt guns
-The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which was led by 38 year old SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz Harmel,
- 6,000 men
-20 Panther Tanks
-40 armored personal carriers, and several guns (both flak and howitzers)
so That's at least 25 tanks and 40 APC with MG-42s mounted with Flak & Howitzers on Sept 7th
From Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
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No cornhole here is what was said you sad spin doctor.The Wehrmacht already ran Monty off the continent once. Um,they weren't impressed
Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin
General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him
From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 Erwin Rommel - "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces,,Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education"
Patton:A Genius for War,by Carlo D'Este,page 815 General Fritz Bayerlein,the able commander of the Panzer Lehr Division and a veteran of North Africa,asses the escape of Rommel's Panzer Afrika Corp after Alamein: I do not think General Patton would have left us get away so easily Their Words
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Once again davie you picked the wrong week to quit sniffing glue
"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p,129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw ,p.141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm flak cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 143 18 september,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platoon attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks*
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park
SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were able to to maintain their positions
'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944. The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.
A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.
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https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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And the were virually unopposed as wehrmacht was falling back after the Horrific bombing of Falaise/ I'll take Horrocks words for it,Monty over played his hand in the desert repeatedly ignoring advice of front line soldiers
The Folly of Generals,by David P.Colley,p.213-14 On 29 August Horrocks XXX Corp set out on a drive that some conclude might have altered the course of the war. They advanced 250 miles through northern France and into Belgium unopposed and captured the strategic port of Antwerp virtually with out a fight. Horrocks admitted as much "we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might have even have succeeded in bouncing across the Rhine - if we had taken the chance and and carried straight on" There were no significant German forces between Horrocks and the Rhine. But instead of ordering Horrocks forward on September 4 Montgomery halted him. (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.170,by R.W. Thompson)
Montgomery failed to exploit his opportunity by failing to cross the Albert Canal and advance down the Walcheren Rd to capture the coastal batteries situated along the Scheldt that prevented shipping from reaching the port of Antwerp and delivering critical supplies to the Allied Armies massing along the Siegfried Line. The Germans quickly took advantage of Monty's failure by sending in heavy reinforcements to the Walcheren area. It would take 21 st Army group more than 2 months to clear the region of enemy troops
R.W.Thompson who was an Intelligence Officer in the British Army during WWII,also lays the blame for the army's failure with the Field Marshall "At the crucial hour leadership was lacking,the decision that only Field Marshall Montgomery could have exercised for which the hour demanded on seizing options and opportunities" (Montgomery the Field Marshall,p.171,by R.W. Thompson)
Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine."
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little villa bernard will see you for your FULL MONTY in the channel, bring you loofah you poof - don't have to make that up
unlike you these participants were there and inteviewed by British war coorespondents and Historians
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move" While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie.
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Carlo D'este From the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed by Montgomery
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely Brooke was moved to write I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred)
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.Such widespread mistrust of the little British General did not bode well for future Allied operations in which Monty played a role.
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 477 Brooke and the other chiefs of staff should never have allowed Churchill to dictate minor detail,nor to sack Generals and Admirals on a whim(the Air Marshalls got off lightly).Probably the worst example of picking the wrong man and backing him come what may,was in Brooke's constant support for Montgomery,who should have been dismissed once it became clear that he could not operate in a coalition environment,but whose retention soured Anglo-American relations for years after the War
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Like Monty lyndon/Burnhole here lie alot. They ignore the truth because it does not get the bent freak monty.The column madeit 3 miles before the poundings started.Monty like pretty much everything he touched deserves to get drubbed only fanboys 75 yrs later try writing another narrative.Why did Robinson with no orders move his tank while Carrington who guys like Lyndon here refer to as "LORD" stay put.
From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p229 Monty liked to keep his objectives vague,so that if there was a break out he could claim credit for it.And if the operation ran into the sand he could simply say that they'd been tying down the German Forces to help the Americans
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a considerable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.
Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and September 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions. Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities
That tended to run counter to those aims Browning who handed over to Brerton that all 17 Bridges had to be sized with thunderclap surprise.And stressed that time constraints meant any arrangements at this stage had to be binding,before imposing a series of conditions and constraints
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke.It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp .General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.yet Guards Armored did not move
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
The Americans/Germans even members of the IRISH Guards agree
but this is all still on Monty problems arose everywhere that either he or his plans were involved. Monty didn't show up to direct his own operations as it was coming apart rather quickly and by the seams
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From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
* From page 19* ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp*
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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So what you found some one who likes him his pathetic European Campaign speaks for itself
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
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the evidence suggests that Monty was terrible at commanding,awful,as in no fooking good.
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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@Phantomrasberryblowe From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete
FDR and American Foreign Policy,1932-1945,by Robert Dallek,page 347 "Trobruk has surrendered with 25,000 men taken prisoner "the telegram said."....one of the heaviest blows I can recall during the war......I did not attempt to hide from the president the shock I had received" Churchill wrote .President Roosevelt made an offer of immediate help.The Americans agreed to ship 300 new Sherman tanks and 150 self propelled 105mm howitzers to the British in North Africa
Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
guess what The Auch won at Alamein and the rancid runt continued using his plans.The Torch Landings forced Rommel into a pinch.And the minefield were laid by the Troops under Auchinleck and Dorman - Smith https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duOYnIGivys Monty had over a 2 1/2 to 1 in Tanks and 5 to 1 in men Auchinleck did not have the advantages Montgomery did.And almost all of Rommel's tanks were 4 yrs old
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WATCH THE VIDEO
You can print Hamilton's whole book here if you want to thicko,he's nothing but a silly scribbler not unlike yourself.Try Corelli Barrett,Max Hastings,Dr Niall Barr,Dr William Buckingham,Antony Beevor,David Bennet - you know someone with pedigree
Ike orderes the Marseilles-Toulon amphibious invasion because he needed all the ways possible to get those proverbial 600 to 800 tons of supplies per day for each American infantry division. IKE NEEDED THE PORT OF ANTWERP for the shiploads of supplies he had to have everyday not worthless isolated bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem. Ike was good at thinking in strategic terms. Churchill wanted those V-weapons sights cleared because more British civilians were killed from those Crossbow launching sights than British soldiers in combat.Remember those pesky facts that EACH American Armored division required around 850 tons of supplies per DAY for sustained offensive operations. EACH mechanized or motorized U.S. Army infantry division required 600 to 800 tons of supplies for sustained offensive operations per DAY.
Oddball SOK wrote and isn't it ironic that the biggest Rhine bifurcation was the WAAL at Nijmegen and the 30crps effectively HAD crossed the Rhine and all they had to do is do the same as the Germans at Pannerden Ferry:PUT TANKS ACROSS THE Pannerden and you were in free accessible German tank land !Only a small river Oude Ijssel at Doetinchem (which was there too after Market Garden ;p )and go go go into das deutsche Reich?!Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944.So tell me, how come ? How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over,under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November Just look at it at google maps: the river looks like nothing...
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It is unlikely that a person of your status among the ignorant could teach me a thing
* https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1*
Churchill warned Roosevelt that his country would not be able to pay cash for military supplies or shipping much longer
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-13-how-shall-lend-lease-accounts-be-settled-(1945)/how-muc
Why couldn’t Britain pay?
Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States.
From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources.But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most.
The job placed before Congress was to provide the country with a law that would meet the situation in spirit and in fact. It required an epoch-making decision on policy and the setting up of machinery to provide the needed help in ships, planes, tanks, guns, food, and other supplies.
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The contempt shown for Britain's much-bruited naval prowess was epitomised by Japanese torpedo bombers destroying HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in a matter of 10 minutes off the cost of Malaya as the Japanese infantry overpowered all before it. In response, Curtin put the nation on a total war footing and there were warnings of invasion. At the same time, he memorably wrote in the Melbourne Herald: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with Britain." "We know the problems that Britain faces" We know the dangers of dispersal of strength but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy."
Nope From the beginning of WWII until the United States reduced the IJN at Midway and Guadalcanal, the Imperial Japanese Navy was superior to the Royal Navy. As capital ships, battleships were obsolete.
If we assume that the start of WW2 was 1941 when the IJN Imperial Japanese Navy turned a European war into a global conflict, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the strongest - stronger than even the USN. The Japanese navy had an elite naval aviation force - and their bombers with superior range (because they didn't bother with armor or self-sealing tanks) were superb ship-killers. They had the Long Lance torpedoes which to the dismay of the British and Americans were more robust and could be launched further and faster than anyone else; and because they were oxygen powered left no visible trails.
They operated very strong offensive land based air units - fast twin engine torpedo bombers. That is how they easily sank the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse - which was in the words of Churchill one of his greatest shocks. Compare that action with the battles with the Bismarck.
What did the British have in comparison? In 1941 the British navy was still operating antiquated Swordfish biplanes. Their RN carriers could only operate a quarter of the number of aircraft the IJN could. In a major naval engagement the RN would most likely lose.
The IJN cruisers and destroyers were also fast and heavily armed and excelled in night fighting - they did tremendous damage to the USN during the initial naval battles (until the USN mastered radar controlled gun fire)
The IJN had11 Fleet Carriers, 10 Battleships, 40 Cruisers, 112 Destroyers and 63 Submarines. At the same time Period, Royal Navy have were 4 Fleet Carrier and 3 Escort Carrier, 15 Battleship and Battlecruiser, 66 Cruiser, 184 Destroyers, 60 Submarines
Due to, undisputed Superiority of Aircraft in Naval engagement in WW2 - The IJN Bigger carrier fleet and Air power - combined with high morale and experience from war in China. It make them easily the Strongest Naval Power on the Planet for that period
From the beginning of WWII until the United States reduced the IJN at Midway and Guadalcanal, the Imperial Japanese Navy was superior to the Royal Navy.
As capital ships, battleships were obsolete. That does not mean that battleships were useless, just not capable of defeating the new capital ship, which was the aircraft carrier. The carriers of the Royal were excellent ships and they were famously armored for the European theater. However, the carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy could out plane and out range them.
For some reason, just prior to WWII, the Royal Navy skipped developing the next generation of carrier-borne aircraft. The Imperial Japanese Navy fielded more modern aircraft and a better aerial torpedo than the Royal Navy. That is why the IJN was superior.
A comparison of aircraft illustrates the point. Planes that entered service after 1942 are omitted because by 1943, the IJN had already been defeated by the United States Navy. In order the numbers given are speed in miles per hour, ceiling in feet, and range in miles.
Torpedo Bombers:
Fairey Albacore: 162/20,500/930
Fairey Swordfish: 138/19,000/545
Nakajima B5N: 235/27,000/1200
Dive Bombers:
Blackburn B25 Roc: 224/18,000/811
Aichi D3A Val: 267/34,000/840
Fighters and fighter-bombers:
Fairey Fulmar: 272/27,000/780
Hawker Sea Hurricane: 314/34,500/750
Supermarine Seafire (?): 348/24,000/553
Mitsubishi A6M Rei-sen: 354/37,000/1200
Aerial Torpedoes:
British Type XII: 40 knots/not applicable/1500 yards
British Type XIV (?): 45 knots/not applicable/ 2950 yards
Japanese Type 91: 40 knots/not applicable/ 2200 yards
Radar gave the British some advantage, but not enough to offset the Japanese advantage in range. The Japanese also had better aerial torpedoes, which is what sinks ships, heavily armored or not.
Advantage Japan. Of course, against the USN, it was a different story.
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WIKI again what about it? It appears youve been editing it content to back your bombast. The Empire had more men but the GI's took more casualties.And the UK left ANZAC hanging. So what is your point except the one on your head? The USA held the Japanes in check that you fauntleroys srrender 81,000 to and and Hong kong also.The ANZACs hated your brandy adled churchill that left them in the lurch.No worries the USA ruled the waves
Australia's perilous situation throughout 1942 as repeated attacks aimed at Australia by Japan were repulsed by American and Australian forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and in the bloody Kokoda and Guadalcanal campaigns. Important changes in Japan's strategic aims were produced during 1942 by events such as the carrier-launched Doolittle Raid on Japan and as the tide of the Pacific War turned against Japan. Those changes are mentioned elsewhere in the context of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Kokoda Campaign, and the Guadalcanal Campaign. None of which the British participated in
The US Pacific Fleet by 1945 comprised 1200 ships. All of the major battles in the Pacific War were naval: Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, Phillippine Sea, Leyte Gulf, and Okinawa in none of which did the Brits took any part. The Royal Navy did manage to assemble a Pacific Fleet late in the war, in November, 1944, consisting of 214 ships. The RN fleet took part in no major battles having been designed merely to "fly the flag," probably to attempt to regain lost colonies after the Japanese defeat. The British managed to avoid the heaviest fighting in both Europe and the Pacific, leaving it to the Russians to defeat Germany and the Americans to defeat Japan.The UK had no role at all in the occupation of Japan.
South East Asia Command’s operations were the cause of much bitter argument between the British and the Americans, exemplified by the American claim that the command’s initials, SEAC, stood for Save England’s Asian Colonies.There was much truth in this, and the Americans did not necessarily share this aim
But talk up the Victorious that sailed under the umbrella of the US 3rd Fleet as the Enterprise was refitted/repaired Year end: Dec 31, 1942, In the Pacific Four of the five great carrier battles of WW2 have been fought. While losing 4 of the 6 Carriers of the US Pacific Fleet Lexington (may '42) Yorktown (June '42) Wasp (Sept '42) Hornet( Oct '42) How many British Carriers were lost in the ferocious fighting? ZERO stay inland in Burma so they didn't get annilated - agian
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Protection of the British Crown B-W-W-A-A-A-H-A-A,YOU MAKE ME LARF.I know you'd feel awful if you took something out of context
https://anzacday.org.au/ww2-1942-an-overview-of-the-battle-for-australia
By the end of March 1942, there was a line of Japanese-held territory directly to the north of Australia, stretching from Rabaul to Singapore. The Japanese had conquered their Asian/Pacific empire. *Australians believed it was only a matter of time before Australia too was invaded
*
The arrival of the Americans
Just after the defeat in Malaya, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Curtin, declared that “the fall of Singapore opens the Battle for Australia.” Curtin was aware that Great Britain, herself facing a huge challenge from Germany in Europe and North Africa, could do little to help Australia. Already at the end of 1941, Curtin indicated that Australia would have to seek a new ally to help defend its shores – the United States. On 22 December 1941, the first American soldiers arrived in Brisbane.
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Look matt, you're a confused, nationalistic fanboi spitting out complete fantasy nonsense. Monty was mediocre - to arguably even poor.Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Montgomery does and regardless of what happens to him - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order
Your argument for Montgomery's quality as a general seems to be based on revision and Germany losing WWII :-). I can't think of a more dimwitted position. He was in fact one the worst overall commander of any combatant in WWII. Your claims are so absurd it basically disqualifies you from any serious discussion on this topic. You arte an indoctrinated fauntleroy and don't know the first thing about what you're talking about.
Monty didn't plan Normandy ,he planned the disaster at Caen you unread rube.Adml Ramsay and US Officers brought in from the Pacific that were landing every damn day planned the beach landings.The only thing Monty knew of beaches was getting shoved off one at Dunkirk. Of course after the GIs arrived that never happened again.Bernard had 4 full years to cross 30 miles of channel,go ask the euros shouldn't take you 4 yrs
Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war.Monty was jealous of the success of others and unable to admit that something had not gone exactly as he had intended
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You broken sprocket this from Seth
Seth 1422
It’s clear what was taking place if you read the entry from September 11.Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe, 11 September 1941-8 May 1945 “There were several undesirable features of MARKET. General Browning, who had been charged with planning for MARKET with the 21st Army Group, informed me that at General Montgomery’s insistence he had virtually agreed to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis 30 miles in length to seize key crossings. I objected to this because such dispersion destroys the tactical integrity of a division, presents an insurmountable supply problem, and renders the smaller groups susceptible to being destroyed in detail without accomplishing the mission. I decided that General Taylor, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, would see General Montgomery about a more concentrated landing. If, after the disadvantages of the first maneuver have been explained to General Montgomery, he still insists, we will go in as planned. *”Excerpt FromThe Brereton Diaries: The War In The Air In The Pacific, Middle East And Europe,Lieutenant-General Lewis H. BreretonIt absolutely was a plea to change the order. A division commander would not fly to the continent in wartime four days prior to a major operation for a purely social visit
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More fauntleroys singing out of key, john burns being unbelievable has switched to his davemac account - interesting
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton.
-Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.”
-Capt. David Fraser who as a Grenadier took part in the Battle of Nijmegen wrote later "with out Antwerp, I do not believe that Market Garden could possibly have been exploited for the pupose for which it was devised. Operation Market Garden was as an exact sense ,futile . It was thoroughly a bad idea, badly planned and only tragically redeemed by the outstanding courage of those who executed it". He also believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton.There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.”
-Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.
Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles
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*From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415
*
After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
Fancy some more?There's tons,have your handler at the home read you some
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@etangdescygnes he did,Little Villa is a bullshit revisionist and throws dead GIs under the bus to save British face. You can get these books and check out these references - Even Brooke The Top British Officer and Admiral Ramsay both blamed Bernard. There is alot more but you'll see the point
From D-Day,The Battle for Normandy,p229 Monty liked to keep his objectives vague,so that if there was a break out he could claim credit for it.And if the operation ran into the sand he could simply say that they'd been tying down the German Forces to help the Americans
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945, page 495 “The little British Field-Marshall’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944 The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction
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Beevor has been knighted and awarded by literary societies all over he's spent months/years digging thru archives stored in Libraries/Universities/Academies/Museums chronicled by combatants themselves, from intelligence,logistical appraisals, official reports, war diaries, unit dispatches ,personal letters, journals,field orders, operational plans,battle logs,transcripts, AARs (after action reports) Officer correspondence & messages, casualty lists, speeches, press releases, just read his acknowledgements,foot notes,bibliographies. His books are replete with those accounts. Just like Buckingham, Hastings,Atkinson and Kershaw's of the Market-Garden battles by those who participated. Much more reliable and accurate than history being constructed 80 yrs after the events by a shabby hamlet of forum fanbois & revisionist rubes
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Bullcrap Johnnie,page number and book you plaster your bollocks in italics hoping no one looks it up. The 43 wessex just arrived last week. But hey they showed up unlike Monty, the evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered?
How about these guys below? Unlike you or Monty they were all there
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked *"the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance '
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords, were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. *That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
"He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII
From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major is even less charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces.
Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians.
Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept.
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The Brits weren't arrogant it was slappies like burns and bernard,let's see shall we 1940 Norway the Burns family of warriors lasted 13 days,then Netherlands,Belgium,France - Dunkirk.A whole 16 days fighting 4 days scrambling up the gang planks. After the GIs arrived you weren't Dunkirked again - imagine that.Tell your twisted tales to Trinidad & Tobago and look up Monty and Lucian Trueb.
Read these direct quotes not from your ample backside
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.160 "In private to Herriman. "The PM bluntly stated that he could see no prospect of victory until the United States came into the war."
DeGaulle said after Pearl Harbor; "well the war is over. Of course, there are more operations,battles and struggles ahead; but the out come is no longer in doubt. In this industrial war nothing can resist the power of American industry. From now on the British will do nothing with out Roosevelt's agreement."
Harold Nicolson wrote "we simply can't be beaten with America in But how strange it is that this great event should be recorded and welcomed here with out any jubilation.
Churchill had cabled to Antony Eden who was en route to Moscow - "The ascension of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory."
Churchill after Pearl Harbor No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured the marshall might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!” .
The Friendship Between Britain And The USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt | Timeline go to 2:30 then listen.*Churchill emphatically stated his plan for winning the war was "I shall drag in the United States.”*
That night of December 7, 1941, Churchill wrote in a draft of his memoirs that 'saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.'
There you have it Johnny you can return to your coloring books but please pick up your plastic army soldiers - the nurses there at the home keep slipping on them
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LMAO - he ended up in a Channel and couldn't take Caen until over 7 weeks with the heaviest naval & aerial bombardment of the campaign
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: *--Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Stevie If I agreed with you we’d both be wrong. You think Burns leaves leaves facts :face-blue-smiling: perhaps your High School will let you repeat History next year. In the mean time read the Full Monty,nevermind it's past your bed time
A Professor of Military History and Deputy Dean of Academic Studies in the Defence Studies Department,King's College - London
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
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From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel. Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
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Puddles the only thing that supercedes your stupidity is your willingness to express it
From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 317 Montgomery got along with neither the Americans nor the Canadians.After Dunkirk the French absolutely refused to serve under a British commander.
Ladislas Farago - Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin
General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 "InTunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces, Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education"
Fancy some more you poor trampled cabbage leaf?
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Stop making shit up from the Cornhole Chronicles.No one agreed except IKE finally caved in to get Monty to at least move
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Even John Keegan
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan
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John Burns bellowed: If the 82nd had not failed in securing the bridge, the ride between would have been a breeze.
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Clean Monty's cack out of your eyes, Geronimo is right you think a battlefield is flat like the coloring books on your coffee table that you source. You again have displayed your extraordinary capacity not to think.
From - 'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park.
SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 227 Gavin's CoS thought that the task of the 82nd called for 2 divisions not one .It was difficult and risky to 1st secure the LZ,Gavin'e essential task then attempt to capture the Nijmegen Road Bridge,the grave Bridge and at least one other bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal.Gavin did try to strike out on D-Day for the Nijmegen Bridge.They had to be recalled owing to the threats on the heights and need to retake the LZ,parts of which were occupied by German Troops
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From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed.*Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding*"a bad mistake on my part"*
Not only did Brooke,Tedder and Ramsay all point right at Monty, he admitted it
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From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp*
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From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407
Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,633
"I felt" one Frenchman wrote in watching the Yanks make war,"as if the Americans were digging the Panama Canal right through the German Army."
What Churchill called the American "prodigy of organization" had shipped 18 million tons of war supplies to Europe,equivalent to the cargo in 3,600 Liberty Ships oe 181,000 rail cars from 800,000 military vehicles to footwear.U.S munitions plants had turned out 40 Billion small arms ammunition,56 million grenades,500 million machine gun bullets & 23 million artillary rounds. By 1945 the USA had built 2/3rds of all ships afloat and was making half of all manufactured goods in the world including half of all armaments.The enemy was crushed by logistical brilliance,yet the War absorbed barely 1/3rd of American gross domestic product.
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes.16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group. It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces.Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector .While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete
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YAWNING, How about Allied HQ and these British Officers above Monty
Alan Brooke
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."
Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part –I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."
(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."
Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.
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How about those under Monty
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Those all of those British Officers there in real time above and below bernard in command all place the blame right on the absent idgit.
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How about the front line soldiers
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333.Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: 'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords, were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed. We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. "There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem*
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII From the Ottawa Citizen,May 7th ,2005 Mr. Major less than charitable to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, who headed up British and Canadian forces.
Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated thrust deep into occupied Holland in the fall of 1944, a paratroop attack on river crossings, was an utter failure and undertaken at the expense of a broad steady advance. That delayed the the liberation of the country's biggest cities, Mr. Major figures, and condemned their populace to slow starvation through the infamous "Hunger Winter" that took the lives of 20,000 Dutch civilians
Pte. Major had an opportunity to express his displeasure with Field Marshall Monty soon afterward. It was during the battle for Scheldt, an estuary guarding the Belgian port of Antwerp. The exploit was supposed to win him a field decoration directly from the hands of Field Marshall Montgomery, but Pte. Major couldn't bring himself to accept. "He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all."
Losing an eye soon after D-Day, Major refused repatriation. He only needed one eye, he said, to aim his rifle. During the Battle of the Scheldt in occupied Holland, he was recommended for a DCM for a solo recon mission, from which he returned with 93 German prisoners. Major refused it because the medal would be awarded by Field Marshal Montgomery, whom he despised.
His reason was simple: Arnhem. Major felt Monty’s ill-fated airborne assault stopped Allied forces attacking on a broad front, delaying the liberation of Holland. Major believed Monty to be responsible for the deaths of some 20,000 Dutch citizens during 1944’s “hunger winter”. To quote Major exactly, “He had made an awful mistake. I didn’t like him at all.”
Fancy some more you frauds???
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@davemac1197 I read all most those you're cherry picking .Harmel was the Germans security/Intel officer in that section from Arnhem-Nijmegen .Read Kershaw's book,he stated there was one field gun there and Carrington stopped anyway.The 82nd crossed to carry the fight in but he wouldn't move - that is afact and they were all incensed. Even the Irish Guards agreed with his assessments. I don't think Harmel,Tucker,Gavin,Wilson,Gorman(German/Irish Guards/GIs) all witnessing/pointing out the same thing below(that you won't read). I'll take their word for it - they were there. Monty owns this debacle and Ike also for letting him off his leash
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.
General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea."
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south.
By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over.
Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy, taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge. Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair*
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Kershaw got it from the Germans themselves,unlike that coloring book you're trying to exonerate your favorite little absent freak from. I've read the original and such bullshit you spew. In England they call Carrington LORD,bernard Field Marshall - they'll probably anoint you nobel laureate - no wonder you lost an empire.Frost hated Carrington ,that's even worse carrington stopped like you should posting your pitiful opinion and passing it off as fact. This waterhead TIK had to take down one of his boards for libel 3-4 yrs ago and he won't dare attempt to write his rag.He'd rather mislead you lampshades into the land of make believe.
see here none of your mysterious summaries,pretty simple even you can't cock it up
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215 Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit:The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 221 SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'*It was a lost chance '
'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegen 17-20 September 1944.The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense. The Waal had been secured by 1900,There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.
It Never Snows in September" page 306 Robert Kershaw. XXX Corp advancing along one easily defended road was never able proportionally to match the German build up,and achieve the odds ratio necessary for rapid success More specifically it was never able to push forward sufficient infantry by ground or fly them in by air,to secure what were essentially infantry objectivesThis was crucial of crucial signifigance because General Gavin's 82nd Airborne lacked sufficient infantry to storm the Nijmegen bridges before the arrival of XXX Corp on 20 September
It doesn't appear the Gerries were referring to failures of Brerton,Gavin or the 82nd Airborne Yet the tanks sat-this we know.
Nothing further barring the road - is that concept just a little too complex.Even left the damn page number so slappies like you can pin point the narrative,not that you'd be interested in actual history
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Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.91 Australian PM John Curtain was disagreeing with British proposals for defending Australia. Which Curtin thought needed to be done by Australian troops presently fighting for the British in North Africa
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. *Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there
Australian Financial Review
John Curtin, the leader who turned Australia to the United States
The contempt shown for Britain's much-bruited naval prowess was epitomised by Japanese torpedo bombers destroying HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in a matter of 10 minutes off the cost of Malaya as the Japanese infantry overpowered all before it. In response, Curtin put the nation on a total war footing and there were warnings of invasion. At the same time, he memorably wrote in the Melbourne Herald: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with Britain." "We know the problems that Britain faces. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy."
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Davie your career as a historian continues to sky rocket - said no one ever. The tanks were given to XXX Corps but they montied instead of advancing. How about the Germans there in real time? Their views are quite the opposite of Davie's trip thru his land of make believe. With page number so your handler could read them to you but it might keep you awake at night.
"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,p,129 Capt Viktor Graebner had a mixture of 22 Armoured vehicles at his disposal,APCs and half tracks some of which mounted 75 mm guns.They represented the highest concentration of armoured vehicles in the 9 SS.All at the minimum,possesed a machine gun mount
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw ,p.141 German defenses put 2 - 20 mm flak cannon placed at the access points of both bridges (rail & road) able to fire across and mutually support each other
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 143 18 september,south of Grave from Schijndel towards the station at Erde S.W of Veghel.General Student "I was able to observe a flak platoon attached from the Reichsarbeitsdienst who fired with both their 88 guns at a single American Paratroopers sniping from high buildings,harassing our attack from the flanks*
'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park
SS Capt.Schwappacher was supproting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were able to to maintain their positions
'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference pages 192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944. The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent.
A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.
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Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
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Please stop,Montgomery let him slip away numerous times not wanting to risk his new found fame. Generals Lumsden,Gatehouse,Briggs all capable veterans of the Desert.All ended up getting sacked and reassigned by Mony out of fear of being upstaged.Great Book
BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis,XVIII - In Africa Montgomery was incapable of finishing off Rommel even when his tanks were numbering in single digits and his plans were fully known to British intelligence
BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p249-250 on 20 December LT Gen. von Sponeck of the 90th Light Division told his staff "Nobody can see any escape. The British outnumber us enormously. The puzzle is why are they following us so slowly? Time and again they have allowed us to dodge encirclement" The British Generalship under Montgomery remained unequal to the task of finishing them off.
✔✔✔*BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.280-81* during Operation Lightfoot Montgomery's commanders were skeptical about their ability to move forward on such a forward and cluttered axis. Unfortunately their objections did not prompt Montgomery to question his own judgement but clouded it yet further. For Montgomery was a very new commander in a very hot seat,and felt extremely insecure. Monty simply dared not admit to himself,that his subordinates particularly Desert Veterans,like Lumsden of X Corps,Briggs of 1 Armoured Division and Gatehouse of the 10th might actually be right. He closed his mind to rational analysis,honest doubts regarding the passage of minefields were dismissed as mere bellyaching or a market aversion to coming to grips with the enemy. The 1st 2 days of the battle made it perfectly clear that the problem of the minefields had been badly underestimated. Along most of its front the "the congestion was appalling and the confusion considerable. The whole area looked like a badly organized car park held in a dust bowl
BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.287 Rommel wrote of his retreat through Egypt "The British commander had shown himself to be over-cautious. He risked nothing in anyway doubtful and bold solutions were completely foreign to him"
BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.299 On 20 March 1943 began his own attack with 743 tanks available to 8th Army were faced by only 73 German tanks of 15 & 21 Panzer Divisions. Also 692 Field Artillery vs 447 in the whole Afrika Korp and 1,033 Anti-tank guns against only 260 German.But the pace of operation was slow as ever
BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.286 On 8 November when General Gatehouse& 10th Armoured entered Mersa Matruh Gatehouse suggested to Montgomery that he might press straight forward as his tanks were all fueled and his petrol lorries fully laden. Montgomery told him that there was to be "no mad rush" withdrew his division,except for one brigade and sacked him for good measure. They could of cut off The German Line of retreat like a repitition of Gen. Richard O'Connor's short cut across the enemy during Operation Compass. Evidently this smacked of too much maneuver for Montgomery
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Did you actually read ANY OF THAT - do so?The Desert War was no great work of Monty's.This is why he was so loathed amongst other British Commanders.The Navy & Air Corps completely strangled the Afrika Corp even Monty couldn't cock it up .The British Press needed a Hero and Monty reveled in the roll,pissing off the others who had done so much for the War effort.He loved grabbing the Glory at least twice later he almost got sacked.And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have.
Claude Auchinleck and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved and General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win.They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place. Churchill was furious but he just painted himself into a corner
Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery.
Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated.In the Mediteranean & the desert Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet Montgomery didn't grab airfields or open any ports - this continued into Italy- Normandy. Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for)also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point. And it was Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith that had 2 fresh divisions moved over from the Nile Delta. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued
Then The Torch Landings forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.And of course ULTRA was now fully operation and provided updates. By August '42 USA had sent the 300 Shemans and over 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers sent by Order of FDR.The 8th Army had an 5:1advantage of tanks over the AK.And with the landings 3:1 in manpower. The Afrika Korp was short on everything and their armor and vehicles had been in the desert for over 2 yrs.
The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. So even you can clearly see reality exists All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and deflecting blame that was - all thru the war. In 1500 miles with overwhelming advantages Monty never captured Rommel
Monty left a vastly numerical inferior forces in front of him get away None of those benefits were enjoyed by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith. Save the Air Superiority. All of it in place and none of it Bernard's doing long before he sashayed into this mirage
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- you are thick,they could have been bagged.O'Connor and Auchinleck just won and Monty took 4 more weeks than Auchinleck wanted.That is all fact read Desert Generals,Churchill and the Montgomery Myth, Brute Force for starters they all point it out. So did Lumsden,Gatehouse,Griggs.Monty pretty much failed after the desert because he would never again have such overwhelming advantages in EVERYTHING. The other officers knew it also,not the misguided souls in this hive of hallucination though. Just finished Reality and Myth by Sabastian Ritchie - PhD. and RAF Historian
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61*"Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Try reading up as I told you, I'm not going to print page by page.Auchinleck just won with a lot less .Racing willy nilly? After Alamein opportunities abounded. Rommel was there, Hanns-Gert von Esebeck was there. Fritz Baterlein was there.Ma.Gen. Fuller was there.
Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp. He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein - I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt.
The Second World War 1939-45,p.163,by Maj.Gen. J.F.C.Fuller Most humiliating of all,as Alexander Clifford points out was that the British "let exactly the same catastrophe happen for 2 yrs running.Tactically one of the most remarkable things about this brief campaign was that,in spite of British command of the air, Rommel advanced over 350 miles in 17 days "with out any air support at all"
Read Desert Generals,Brute Force,Churchill and the Montgomery Myth,
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Villa Anus Monty's little swiss boy popping off again
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
*https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
*
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co.1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944,Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Dave hac what other rare gems have you mined for the comment section today you poltroon?None of the objectives were met
♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.
♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore
♦Hollywood didn't make 32,000 Tommies surrender at Tobruk
♦Hollywood didn';t make 11,800 troops surrender at Crete
♦ Hollywood didn't make 13,958 troops surrender in Greece
♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich selling out the Czech Republic - Britain did.
♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel for 4 full years - after getting driven into it
♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty
♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up a crumbling crown.
♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later.
♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin then couldn't even make it to Arnhem - Monty did
♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group,IKE did. Then Bernard was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them
♦Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did.
♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Bernard bathing little boys Nigel Hamilton reported them in The Full Monty .
♦Hollwood wasn't "evacuated" from:
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
Want to know who was?
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Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.113 yet Dempsey writing in his diary, pondering the wisdom of the Arnhem Operation harbored the gravest doubts about crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. "It's clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on for the defense of the Albert Canal and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. it looks as though he's going to do all he can to hold it."
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assesments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops.Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p46 the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal. Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstancesBecause of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days.
The September days were shorter and the and the mornings mistier - Williams ruled out 2 lifts in a day. These changes meant that it would take up to 3 Days to deliver the Airborne Divisions and that depended on perfect flying weather.The fault lay far more with Montgomery and his determination to impose an ill-considered plan
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
If Bernard was a real Field Marshall like Model he would have made his battle assessments and made any necessary alterations.But the dim bulb did not. So almost 2x as many flights than D-Day with just under 3 less hours daylight to do it in. The flights were much longer(300 miles) also - into N.E Netherlands instead of just across the 30 mile English Channel. They could hardly get the same amount of flights in the same day let alone more with the afore mentioned detriments.
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Not so IKE presented the importance of opening Antwerp in the September 4th of Sr Allied Officers. By the 10th Monty convinced him of Morphing Comet into Market Garden.And almost everyone in SHAEF was against it for many tactical reasons. Single elevated,road surrounded by poulder marshes being just one of the troubles.IKE ok'd the plan with the stipulation that the deep water port of Antwerp be opened in the process as they couldn't keep lugging supplies from Cherbourg to Arnhem just under 500 miles. Atkinson,Barr,Hart,Hastings,Bennet,McManus,Ellis,Thompson,Beevor,Buckingham,D'Este to name just a few bring this out
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@billballbuster7186 Tedder,Freddie DeGuingand,Miles Dempsey,Bedell-Smith did also,and Monty later admitted "a big mistake on my part"
Typed these while reading the various books
Monty's boss - Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. *The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
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Billy infantile is an asshole like you keep propping up apathetic little prick named monty .Bernard had his chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940.He failed miserably, From that point onward, whatever he does and regardless of what happens to him - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US - in that order.Next time you pick up a book will be the 1st time .Monty is only studied as a bad example
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce. *But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .*IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".*
Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb,p.331 Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
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Burns get your head wound looked at.When was Britain fighting for 6 yrs.Declare war in Sept'39 do nothing until May '40.Even the Germans called it the "SitzKreig".Then in less than 3 weeks unfortunately driven into the sea.Then head 3,000 miles into the desert, not crossing the English Channel until 4 yrs later - with the GI's of course.If you listen closely can hear Guderian snickering across the channel and the French screaming sacre bleu.And Stalin is like WTF
*https://www.historyandheadlines.com/history-september-26-1944-market-garden-montgomerys-biggest-failure
*
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
*https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
*
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred)
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 4 "When Eisenhower strayed from his Broad Front Advance and gave Montgomery permission to launch Market-Garden,he made his worst decision of the war .Market Garden was a bad idea because it took the focus off of Antwerp - and Antwerp mattered the most.Without the necessary supplies,the Allies had no chance of sustaining a victorious push into Germany.
This never ends well for you puddles
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