Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?" video.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- This operation was condemned at it's inception.
How could anyone suppose that Montgomery would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of commander capable of conducting a fast,,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
Guards Armored crossed the Nijmegen Bridge at 7:10PM the Nite of Sept 20th.Three and a half days after the operation started surprising no one. Horrocks stated the tanks would arrive on time and in force well neither happened. Monty not only mismanaged this he never planned on the Germans fighting back and ignored ULTRA warning about the 9th & 10th Panzers refitting there
Too many flights - too long of flights and not enough daylight. But Bernard promised IKE he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem. Even the British planners going over Operations Linnet/Comet rightfully stated their concern that the element of surprise would be lost. As the flights starting 50 miles west of London were just over 300 miles total - one way. As soon as the flights reached the coast German units(15th Army I believe) all along the scheldt estuary would radio back about enemy formations approaching so the element of surprise was completely lost. I don't think you know how truly daft this daisy bernard was - you realize he had canaries,bunnies and other sorts of pets traveling with him in that circus wagon of his.
No one ever mentions why really the previous two operations were cancelled - because the British planners thought them fool hardy.Just adding 2 more airborne divisions doesn't make it sound just more problematic. But Monty looking for a head line couldn't help himself .And IKE allowed him and his dimwitted single thrust a long leash to hang himself with it.
Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. The Germans got the britsh supplies and left smart ass notes thanking them. Has that army done a hurried thing ever?
The Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that get you the title of Field Marshall
You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road.
And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?
Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November
None of the above have a damn thing to do with the 82nd,Gavin or Browning.Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job
There is a reason TIK doesn't write a book because he'd get filleted with archived history .
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
*Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este* from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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This was previously from Achilles Smith and well presented
Just a few points, have you read or referenced the 82nd AB Division Field Order No.11 of 13 September 1944, it explains a lot of detail but it may be complicated for those whom haven't served in an military environment; it explains the mission, the regimental task, tactical study of the terrain, enemy situation in operational area, it has lots of nice grid references and etc. It shows why the Grosebeek Heights was taken; it's key terrain (that's an area you deny to the enemy) and the intelligence estimate provided a fairly accurate assessment of German forces; none of this "1000 tanks" business.
TIK have you read or referenced 1st British AB Corps Operational Instruction No.1 and its mission designated by the Airborne Forces Ground Commander of Operation Market to the 82nd AB Division, it illustrates context.
-Gavin's book 'Airborne Warfare' provides a good account of the operation, here's a nice quote: “At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D1) General Browning directed the CG (Commanding General) of the 82d ‘not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek,
- Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands’This expression of the Corps commander’s evaluation of the separate portions of the mission given the 82d Airborne Division was most helpful since the Divison was to be so widespread”. The book also provides more insight into the rationale behind the planning phase
-There is a follow up quote from Browning: “I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend”, this is from the US official history book; The Siegfried Line.
--From the Captain Westover Letter of July 1945, quote: “For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I (Gavin) quote the 82d's mission:‘The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task’. This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized."
-The "1000 tanks" nonsense is easily dismissed by the Situation of Enemy Forces in Field Order No.11, and the single line from the after action report of the 2Bn/505 is conjuncture, based on rumour and carried out only by one reconnaissance patrol. From the Beevor video, you display confusion and uncertainty over issue but you have displayed this as though Gavin himself was predominated over this rumour.
-Also you side with Poulussen over the Lindquist misunderstanding and came to your own conclusions, that it's a "cover-up" in your words. Except the Lindquist pre-drop instructions is corroborated by Captain Chester Graham of the 508th; "Prior to the Holland jump I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation". Indeed, it was in Field Order No.11 of September 1944 that the 508th was to "Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility and be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at Nijmegen on instruction of Div Comdr".
The interpretation was flawed with hindsight and the "evidence" was the books from Poulusson and Neillands, which is featured at the start of the Beevor video.I agree Seth 1422 dragged both of these not historians over the coals.Neither were historians and Poulussen couldn't identify an M-1.Pretty damning when you can't recognize one of the most widely dispersed weapons in one of the war's bigger battles
Read Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality, he spells it all out and is the Official historian of the Air Historical for the Royal Air Force, with responsibility for writing documented narratives on RAF operational activity. He has a PhD from King's College in London
William Buckingham,(Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944)with a PhD explains the massive Air effort that Monty barely recognized or considered because he wasn't really a army commander much less a Field Marshall. Like Model for instance who could adapt and change as the circumstances unfolded and changed
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From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.
Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and september 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions.Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities
that tended to run counter to those aims Browning who handed over to Brerton that all 17 Bridges had to be sized with thunderclap surprise.And stressed that time constraints meant any arrangements at this stage had to be binding,before imposing a series of conditions and constraints
*From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 * the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal.(Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances. (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days)
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
*Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este* from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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Monty wasn't a real field Marshall Like Walter Model - who actually showed up and directed
General Montgomery pushed for this debacle and got it .Then doesn't show up to command, as his plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward .And things continued to come apart for the next 64 miles .It was a horribly disjointed plan contrived by a damaged little man interested in his own glorification.
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What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction
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You and history have but a fleeting acquaintance Pinhead Monty dawdled and in fact crossed after Bradley/Hodges/Patton/291st Enginneers .Do readers of the comment sections a favor - next time you're pulling numbers and opinions out of your ass,get your head out of there 1st
you need a suppository in your mouth and a history lesson
Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!!
Montgomery in Europe 1943-45,by Richard Lamb pages 360-362 "British 6th Airborne had lost 30% of it's personnel killed and wounded;the Air landing brigade,which came in gliders had lost over 70% of its equipment The Army that needed to keep casualty count low lost over 3,100 men crossing the Rhine north of Wesel The disparity between the number of lives lost at Wesel and the 2 earlier American crossings is striking
Casualty figures for the Rhine River crossings tell a grim story. Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded.
Simpson's 9th US Army had to wait and cross with Montgomery;they suffered 491 casualties crossing south of Wesel.The US 17th Airborne Division lost 921 Paratroopers and 350 air crew(all with Montgomery's 21st Army Group)
Then they lost another 841 casualties crossing south The sad fact is Monty rode the GI's coat tails.The only reason IKE went along with anything the he proposed was to give Stalin and the Soviets a look of solidarity
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Your Poof Monty lost over 3,100 men crossing north of Wessel and another almost 1,000 crossing south of it. No wonder you neighbor named his dog Monty - he left a bunch of steaming piles everywhere he went
Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south.Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!!
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September. The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time.
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
*Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este* from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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Monty wasn't a real Field Marshall like Walter Model. Bernard never even showed up at Monty Garden.Major Tony Hibbert on the BBC docu said you could almost here XXX Corp.Evidently the Germans/Irish Guards/82nd are in agreement - no revision to be had. Great Book Try September Hope and A Magnificent Disaster also
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th, and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shortfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so. Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun, Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp. General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the initiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
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So a Man with a PHD is full of it?Had not I got the same thing from other authors you may have a point. How about the Gerries in It Never Snows in September ?Why do you think the 82nd got filleted crossing the Waal. Just so "LORD" Carrington could tell them no dice? Is Lt.Brian Wilson of the Irish Guards or Heinz Harmal of 10 Panzer both full of it? In any other Army the overall commander is responsible right or wrong for what happens but not Bernard? How about Brooke and Ramsay,Tedder and Bedell-Smith pointing right at Monty?
And Monty was in fact getting his picture painted and stating that it would make a big stir at Sandhurst's graduation or sumsuch - Hastings,Beevor,Keegan all have wrote it and they leave a bibliography with references. Horrocks also told Tucker/Cook I believe that Guards armor would come up expediently and in force - and none of that occurred
This operation was so dis jointed start to finish - it should have never been considered let alone hatched. And what ever your Uncle did after the war doesn't take away from his 1st hand experience in real time.The asshole Monty wanted to keep going afterward. Do you really think if the Allies got to Arnhem Model wouldn't have dropped the bridge?Or 88's open up on it enfilade . As you stated 4 yrs ago the Ruhr was only 2 lefts/rights there & back
On one of these boards- a poster who was in the US Army in Germany during 1970's NATO said in joint exercises while in a helicopter right over some British Tanks under trees he couldn't see the tanks(nor did he know their where abouts).Not with out thermal radar enhancement could the crews see them. Which obviously wasn't available in the '40s. So what Brian Urquhart stated was very plausible and very likely factual either by pictures or radio dispatches. Don't join the group think here. As Patton stated "if everyone is thinking alike than someone isn't thinking"
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
Center of Military History
United States Army
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will limit the forces which can be maintained." Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust."
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 244 I put the responsibility for the operation squarely on the shoulders of Montgomery,who launched it then refused to listen to anyone who wished to modify a bad plan.Finally,he made the incredible statement that the operation was 90% successful.- Brian Urquhart,2003
Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
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re read what i wrote,I know who your uncle was,years ago i saw a video he was lecturing or interviewed at Cal Berkley. He wasn't happy then about what transpired - in his own words Go watch the Desert Generals on YT Dr Niall Barr,Tim Collins,Corelli Barnett,Nigel Hamilton. I'd link it but they get bounced. Anyway The 82nd,The Germans,Irish Guards all stated the Guards Amored tanks sat they were there . Weak sauce blaming vetted sources because you don't like their findings
I'm not a MacArthur or Clark fan either. Guys like O'Connor,Collins,Middleton,Krueger,Slim,Simmonds were much better than those knobs. Monty was shyt and almost cost an alliance and in fact did after the war. Actual participants were sourced and you question the guys quoting them? But Poulussen/Neilands write rags 70 yrs later and that gets traction?LMAO. As you told Cornell I'm a user not a pusher. All these guys full of it c'mon you've been converted by carnival barkers if you believe that. Beevors Books were released 3 -4 months before I could read it here state side. Hardly pandering to the American Market It's called research evidently the British like everyone to take their word for it. Right now I'm reading Winston's War by Hastings - very balanced .I had read Overlord/Armageddon also - I recommend them. Read Willaim Weidner - Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap very well sourced. Again Monty may have been shot had Brooke not punched his ticket
You throw credible evidence under the table to rescue a questionable commander.Prove them wrong,America has nothing to do with the fact the BEF didn't cross their own channel in 4 years. Does the UK always have blame assigned before your allies arrive? 3 miles in Monty's plan was getting blasted by Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans. TIK's hive of hallucination is one big echo chamber. There is a Dutch Poster on here somewhere who lived along the HighWay and studied the battle here is what he said.
Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November how come indeed
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Courtesy of Answers Questions down thread
In his 1947 book Airborne Warfare page 75, about Browning.
Have people stopped reading books?
July Letter 1945:
Dear Captain Westover:
Your letter of July 17th to my Chief of Staff, regarding operation MARKET, has come to my attention. First, let me say that I am very glad to find the Theater Historian's Office taking a close interest in this operation. Those of us who participated in the operation consider it a model airborne show. I have had the good fortune to be present at the planning of most of our operations in the ETO and to have participated in four of them. The 82d Airborne Division's participation in MARKET was well conceived and very well planned considering the short time available (6 days). The mechanics of its execution were almost perfect. The entire operation was conducted on an extremely marginal scale. I do not believe that one battalion less could have done the job, and if the Germans had committed one good battalion more at any point of our perimeter we would have been in serious difficulty. We, therefore, appreciate your interest in the operation and any of my Staff will be only too glad to try to answer any questions you may have at any time.
For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I quote the 82d's mission:
"The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task."
This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized
13 September 1944: 82nd Field Order No.11, 508th will “Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal Crossing at Nijmegen on order of Div Comdr”
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Cherry picking creatively leaving out 13 September 1944: 82nd Field Order No.11, 508th will “Seize, organize and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal Crossing at Nijmegen on order of Div Comdr” Who's the Commander, You ask
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P157
General Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to
the effect that the division was "not to
attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen
Bridge until all other missions had been
successfully accomplished
In his formal order
General Browning stated: "The capture
and retention of the high ground between
Nijmegen and Groesbeck is imperative in
order to accomplish the Division's task
Monty/IKE/Horrocks own it.1st Para get slaughtered they're gallant,82nd get slaughtered and blamed.Sorry Graebners 9th got across before Frost arrived at the Bridge.Not his fault,just like the 101 getting a Bridge blown right in front of them,so called able minds at the top let down the boys in baggy pants. Carrington should never have led men in battle and damn sure not referred to as "LORD".And as you probably know Bernard was getting his picture painted.The fact Guards Armor didn't cross until 7:00Pm the 20th and god knows where the 43 Wessex was
One group wanted to carry the fight forward another sat - this we know.Enemy gets a vote have to adjust accordingly. It appears Monty shrunk from responsibility, sad fact is he never appeared at all
AGAIN From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
- Their words
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So Dave goes on a pub crawl 49 yrs after the battle with the lads from the BEF pointing out for one reason or another why he speculates some of the GI objectives were not met. And admits the Heights are a dominating feature - thanks for that smashing bit of insight. Can't seem to remember the fact the Tommies were indeed tumbling along because I'm not seeing alot. Only part of 82nd landed the 1st day,many more came in with Artillery and supplies the following 2 days . It's GIs fault 4 Tanks show up on the 3rd day crossing the Nijmegen Bridge and maybe out of ammo ? He's going to have to try harder .Like the plan was shit and it's author not around. We know were Model/Student were,how about Monty?Biggest Para drop in history up until that point and somehow he couldn't be inconvenienced to bother popping in?
Also I stated/quoted previously that Dave forgets/ignores Browning made his statement about ordering Gavin in 1955 - it's sourced - his words
Did Dave run up and back down the Groesbeek Heights carrying Mortar tubes?the smallest being the M2 that weighed 42 lbs,I reckon you'd have to tote along some ammo too. If you want to step up in class to the preferred M-1mortar a 44.5-pound tube, a 46.5-pound mount, and a 45-pound base plate,the total package is almost 100-pounds heavier than the 60mm mortar but it had a 3,000 yd range - bitch lugging it though .How about carrying M30s/M50s over his shoulder? As the drop zones were attacked twice?ON FOOT?Then back down again? And realize the 9th SS had indeed crossed the Nijmegen Bridge in APCs/Halftracks/ Kübelwagen’s the APCs had mounted MG-42s,halftracks had 20mm AA guns mounted and some self propelled. With units fighting in Nijmegen City,the Bridge ,the Heights - reality exists and the enemy gets a vote
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 p. 495* “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek.
Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 70 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation.
As General David Fraser recalled "Nevertheless I remember the impressive silhouette of the long bridge across the Maas (Meuse) at Grave. This had been captured by the American airborne troops and took us across the first main water obstacle at about ten o’clock in the morning of 19th September. By then the operation had been running for over forty hours and was already well behind schedule."
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This is fun Johnny how about the Tommies who were there.Shocking I'm sure you'd agree
Arnhem,Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945 .By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem
So Johnny you have answers just not the right ones
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Johnny your pants a filled again and you're blowing snot bubbles.Ring the nurses station
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.160 "In private to Herriman. "The PM bluntly stated that he could see no prospect of victory until the United States came into the war."
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.353 With Stalin, continued to seek bargains, but his expectations were pitched low. The American relationship ,however was fundamental to every of aspect war; to feeding British people; to all prospect of sustaining the Empire in the post war world
DeGaulle said after Pearl Harbor; "well the war is over. Of course,there are more operations,battles and struggles ahead; but the out come is no longer in doubt. In this industrial war nothing can resist the power of American industry. From now on the British will do nothing with out Roosevelt's agreement."
Churchill had cabled to Antony Eden who was en route to Moscow: "The acession of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory."
Winston's War,by Max Hastings,p.181-83 Churchill considered the Dec 7,1941 attack "a blessing.....greater good fortune has never happened to the British Empire." Churchill wrote in his memoirs: saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful. One hopes that eternal sleep may be like that
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Burns you've done enough drugs to send sniffer dogs into early retirement .You seem angry did Monty miss your bubble bath - like he missed showing up for Market Garden
Quiz: Who was Ground Commander for Operation Market?And why didn't he show up?
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p145 the Irish Guards were an hour and 11 miles behind when it's tanks rolled into Valkenswaard main square on the night of the 17th and Horrocks no movement after dark extended this shorfall to 12 hours at a stroke. It remained to be seen if Guards Armored Division would prove capable of moving the following day with sufficient dispatch to make up at least some of the lost time
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 at the North end of the Bridge Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Amored Division to push on immediately for Arnhem just 10 miles up the road.Their elation turned toward anger as the growing British force remained immobile. LT Patrick Murphy from 3rd Battalion,504th Regiment climbed aboard Sg Robinson's tank and urged him to move only to be informed by the willing Robinson that he had no orders to do so.Capt.Burris was reportedly so furious he threatened the deputy commander of no.1 Squadron Capt.Peter (Lord) Carrington with his Thompson gun,Carrington dropped inside the tank and locked the hatch.
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude
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Max Hastings, states the following in his book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945; referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495;
“The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was
responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek.
Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance.
The decision to launch Operation ‘Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation.”
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MONTY GARDEN -- you are here to get clicks - as Geronimo stated in any other army but yours,the Commander is responsible for what happens or fails to happen under his watch - do you not read history? you try getting your hero off the hook. Poullusen was a photographer who could not identify a an M-1,You need read those books(don't lie) as it wasn't new evidence - it was evidence you didn't read. Unlike Montgomery an actual Field Marshall Walter Model showed up and directed in person.There is a reason when you blame dead memmbers and the 82nd for a fraud who wasn't around
The 82nd had nothing to do with Monty's/Horrocks poor planning and XXX Corps slow progress or the Germans still between Nijmegen and Arnhem,keep deflecting it was only pointed out on your original board by about 1,000 actually dialed in history buffs.5 tanks from XXX Corp show up then sit, and the germans themselves said there was nothing to stop them,you are either hypocrite or ignorant.
Where the F*** where Monty/Horrocks?there were 17 bridges over what 12/13 canals and rivers and the Largest air drop in history up to that point - where were they? -you are not off the hook for blaming JR officers and in fact attempting changing the narrative. Monty was a propped up fraud and rode everyone else's accumulative hard work to a headline.Until the truth unraveled and it was obvious his command abilities were greatly exaggerated as IKE later figured out.Oh and there were 48-51 soldiers from the 82nd killed and 138 injured - Monty caused the disaster - The issue a debate to sir anthony - please or write a book,puhleeze.Poullusen was a photographer who could not identify a an M-1, and it wasn't new evidence - it was evidence you didn't choose read or bring up
As the Dutch poster odball SOK stated and I'm paraphrasing How come Field Marshall WalterModel and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!!
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Enjoying the land of make believe are you? - the Vicar will be by the center to see ,he's a nice man.He'll take you for a walk about but you'll have to wear your ankle bracelet,you tried running away last time and that got embarrassing
In 1940 British forces "evacuated" from Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and FranceDunkirk 1941 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya. 1942 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore.
As Bradley said, Montgomery rarely won a battle any other competent general wouldn't have won as well or better. Most historians and other officers agreed Monty wouldn't attack until his strength was such as to ensure victory Even worse was his surfeit of caution. Eisenhower once said "that Monty will never willingly make a single move until he has concentrated enough resources so that anybody could practically guarantee the outcome...".
Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US.
MAX Hastings.Armageddon: the battle for Germany, 1944-45 By 1945, the Russians cared little for British remonstrances, but they respected the power of the Americans.All those holding power in the United States recognized that only two powers would count in the post-war world, and Britain would not be one of them.
Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
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John Burns dabbles in delusion the way other artists work on canvas or clay. 3 different Authors all pointing out the obvious that John burns and history have but a fleeting acquaintance
Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance. It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
With Prejudice, by Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Page 599 Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
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@gordonsmith4884 huh,I didn't mention a battalion? And you assited Sir Antony? Were you with him in Russia in the early '90s when the Soviet Military Vaults were open to Western Authors/Historians?When he and Luba Vinogradova had taken Vasily Grossman's raw notes from when he was a special correspondent for the Red Star, the Soviet Army's newspaper, and edited and printed them? Beevor graduated from Sandhurst,served in the British Army,Lectured at Sandhurst,Cambridge,Princeton,University of London,Fellow in the Royal Society of Literature and a member of the Royal Historical Society.He's received the Pritzger Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military writing and was knighted in 2017,there is more but you get the point.Gordon if i looked your profile up I'm sure all these and more will be included in it,Right?
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Have the ward boy at the home read these for you
Alan Brooks own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"*...*During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him*
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
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more bombast from burns bloated backside - Johnny see the staff shrink your halucinations are getting worse.From the boys there.
Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333 Tom Hoare, who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes:'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’
From Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings,page 50 Jack Reynolds and his unit,the South Staffords,were locked into the long,messy,bloody battle.There was no continuous front,no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.We knew what even a handful of Germans could do - they were so damned efficient.
As Bob Peatling of the 2 Para said "Marshall Montgomery dropped a clanger at Arnhem"
Maj. Freddie Hennessy the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”
"He had made an awful mistake. I didn't like him at all." Leo Major, the most decorated Canadian soldier of WWII pages 2 and 3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150204042341/http://www2.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=fbcc446c-231f-4781-940a-3ebc3dee9f94&p=2.
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How come Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student was able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November Montgomery
This from Seth 1422 who throttled your sorry self
Sunset on the first day, September 17, was at 19:50, darkness was at 20:30. When the Irish Guard halted at 19:30 it also was not in contact with the enemy, so advance in darkness was not impossible. Sunrise on the 18th was at 07:15, meaning that the Irish Guards did not move for half of the available daylight on the second day. No Irish Guard tanks were destroyed immediately, but instead contact with the enemy was made around 16:00. It should also be noted that according to JOE Vandaleur’s own account, he had lunch with his cousin and a female reporter, then went for a swim in a roadside villa before starting the Guards moving on September 18th. Whatever resistance they did ultimately encountered late that afternoon could have only been an increase on what they might have faced with a swift advance at 07:30. So that is the place where swifter advance was possible. The Irish Guards had suffered badly the first day, so I understand their reluctance to smash ahead. But if that formation was spent it should have been rotated out before dawn. These delays only made the Germans better able to obstruct the road.
According to the one British officer Major Hibbert of 1st para starting here https://youtu.be/50ogHjrQFBE?t=2282 in this video they had disabled the charges on the Bridge.So if accurate and I believe he would know Horrocks tankers sitting back on the Nijmegen Bridge could have made it.But they didn't move even though elements of the 82nd wanted to carry the fight forward.It's interesting....and unfortunate
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There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. The Germans had flooded the Moselle and the Seille rivers and they still took it with all of the moats, mines, interlocking machine guns fields of fire
There were no roads across the flooded plains that would support either amor or trucks and they still took it unlike the British in 1815. It had important transport road hubs and communication leading to the Rhine river. It was a military necessity to clear it of German Wehrmacht divisions to gain avenues of approach to the Rhine. The supply lines for Patton's 3rd Army & Hodges 1st Army were overextended in September, 1944 well over 400 miles from Cherbourg. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport.
The Lorraine campaign lasted from 1 Sep to Dec,not just 9 days in the Netherlands, 6,657 were killed over 3 months and they took 75,000 German PoWs, compared with 17,000 casualties at Market Garden in just 9 days (which was more than the invasion of Normandy) including nearly 2,000 Brits and Poles killed before taking the American killed into account. Market Garden had nearly 3 times the casualties per day. Op Queen and the Hurtgen Forest battles (of which Queen was part) were costly failures, also, but the same argument applies - the period was far longer and the average losses less together with much higher Axis casualties and PoWs and they do not turn Market Garden into a success. Market Garden was a failure.
Look at a map - where the hell do think they were going to punch thru?THEY HAD TO FIGHT THRU - that is why it's called a war.Stalin himself pointed this out to Churchill at Tehran and accused the British of stalling - look that up Patton wasn't going to leave 25,000 Heer soldiers behind him at Metz that fell to 3rd Army. You are simply a fanboy continually ignoring military logic. Unlike Monty in the Netherlands who took 6 more months to cross the Rhine. Where he had to go back and open up the port of Antwerp on November 28th
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There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
-- The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure.
-- The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline.
-- General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps. In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
-- Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem.
-- Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.
-- Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway, the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
-- Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower.
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area
Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, “The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.”
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Center of Military History
The United States Army
The Sigfried Line Campaign
Page174 Spearheading* the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal.
Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on Arnhem Counting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem
Borrowed this from a US vet on these pages
Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did. The subordinate commanders only planned their part of the operation based on the flawed intelligence provided to them by Montgomery's HQ. Instead of facing old men, cripples, and boys, the Airborne Carpet of Market Garden was thrown against two SS Panzer Divisions, and other quality German Units. Hell even the Luftwaffe showed up for a bit. People criticize Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne for taking the time to secure his drop zones, and supplies before attempting to take the Nijmegen bridge. That is just stupid criticism from people who benefit from 20/20 hindsight. What do you call an Airborne soldier with no secure drop zones and no re-supply? You call that Airborne soldier a corpse, or a prisoner of war. See British First Airborne
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Vile Just so you don't go back and and start deleting posts there are 2975 there You have the spine of a Gummybear sucking up to a guy you were badmouthing 2 yrs ago with Cornell. Since you seem inclined to share old posts you obviously left out what I was responding to so here goes.I mentioned 2-3 years ago the guy had a relative in OMG and attended Sandhurst and sarcastically you flip the script. Seagulls have come out of jet engines making more sense than You juvenile delinquent troll act all offended when you get responses to posts like those VVVV
The Villa Aston1 year ago
@akgeronimo501 Big Woody also goes by the name of 'Para Dave' - who has been to Sandhurst and is a realtive of Brian Urquhart. Doubtless the only Sandhurst he has been to is Sandhurst Drive, Cleveland, Ohio, USA. The bit about Brian Urquhart might be true. After all, its so likely that a relative of a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations would comment on YouTube.
The Villa Aston1 year ago
My mother captured a German airman in September 1940. Doubtles his mum, when confronted with his biological father and a few others said 'OK, I will take you all on, you can toss a coin to decide who goes first.' I am not a nice person.Btw. You and Para Dave/Big Woody's mother have a connection. Signed The Cad.
The Villa Aston1 year ago
@akgeronimo501 R Damn what? Jabo's sister, Para Dave / Big Woody's mother.
Para Dave's, sorry Big Woody's mum made a mistake in the back seat of a car in Cleveland , Ohio, USA about 17 years ago. I wonder if the biological dad is British. It might explain a lot.
Big Woody1 year ago
@TheVilla Aston dickhead for the 20th time you keep telling yourself this Para Dave bullcrap and for the 21st time I'll tell you delusional asshole produce a post - that I claim to be the guy who destroyed your bitch Cornhole .Still hoping Ireland gets fire bombed? You've been caught lying almost as much as Burns and Monty .Oh now you quote Hastings when it serves your purpose. Book and Page number please
Big Woody1 year ago
VA I see you actually came across Dave Rendall - why didn't you call him out about his relatives at OMG. You talk a lot of shit out of hearing distance don't you?It was on TIK's Beevor Board - ya know TIK - the guy you claimed on this board to know nothing about .You have one thing right - Lying Hound, ROTFL
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What's your point little Vila besides the one on your head. Dempsey? the same guy that said "not trying was a big problem in 21st Army" .You plaster babble was Wilmont with Monty when driven from the continent? The 43 days at Caen that was D+1 objective.Falaise where Monty faffed around not wanting to get embarrased by Patton closing the Gap,as Bernard's star was fading fast ever since the Desert where he couldn't lose.If you'r going to print a lot at least say something with.This from those there and in the know that would not include you or Wilmont
Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery - based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak
Fancy some more?
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The idea of Monty in charge of a operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable terror.And the Krauts with incredible Joy. HA!!! just more ludicrous attempts to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. Logic and reason are frowned upon with this gaggle of squawking twats in it's shabby hamlet
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02.General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p.16 Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armored units were stationed there However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Horrocks: The General Who Led From the Front,by Philip Warner,p.111 - "There was only a single low grade division ahead of Horrocks on Sept 4. it was spread over a 50 mile front along the Albert Canal. Horrocks believed that this could have been brushed aside and XXX Corps could have gone on to cross the Rhine"*
A Bridge Too Far, p.508,by Cornelius Ryan, British and American units had Dutch military liaison officers who were completely familiar with the terrain and had studied its military application. In fact, for several years at Dutch war colleges an exam was given with the final question pertaining to an armored attack from Nijmegen to Arnhem. If the answer provided involved an attack along the main road 69 leading between the two the student failed
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
*Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este* from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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