Comments by "Patrick Cleburne" (@patrickcleburneuczjsxpmp9558) on "Defense Politics Asia (DPA)" channel.

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  16. The tide very much seems to be going the direction of Ukraine since Russia was forced to withdraw from most of Kharkiv Oblast, but like you say, how much the two sides are willing to escalate could make a big difference going forward. Russia is clearly beginning another level of escalation by calling up two or three hundred thousand reservists and could potentially escalate in other ways, e.g. it seems it could take greater risks with its air force to use it more aggressively. On the other side, it's hard to see how Ukraine can escalate further. The West could send more and newer weapons to Ukraine, but that would require a much bigger commitment than giving Ukraine older weapons that more or less needed to be replaced anyway plus some limited weapons that the West already had in relative abundance. It seems like giving Ukraine more weapons at this point is going to mean seriously depleting the West's own militaries. The West could commit to rapidly manufacturing replacements, but that would come at a much steeper cost than what the West has done so far, and meanwhile the West's attention span is short. And if we add to the fact that the West is already losing interest in the war (excluding, of course, the military-industrial complex), inflation, recession, and the costs and hardships the European West will face this winter without regular supplies of Russian natural gas, it seems very possible that Western leaders will be forced to take other priorities. So it seems Ukraine may be forced to de-escalate before long, all while Russia escalates, assuming the war doesn't come to an end first.
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  39.  @youareliedtobythemedia  Ukraine's pre-war birth rate was almost as low as Vatican City, the lowest of any country in the world. Russia's is very low, but still close to double Ukraine's. Likewise, the population of Russia and Ukraine both dropped between the break-up of the USSR and 2014, but in percentage terms Ukraine lost nearly twice as many people as Russia in that time. And then a significant percentage of the people that have fled Ukraine since 2022 are now living in Russia. Ukraine's dire population issues are the reason that Ukraine is conscripting men over 40 but not "normal" fighting age men of 18-27. Yes, the pre-Russian invasion population of Ukraine was greater than post-WWII, but with all of the young women and children that fled since 2022 Ukraine's population now (even if you're not just looking at the parts of pre-2014 Ukraine that are currently under Ukrainian control) might be about as low as 1945, but the big difference between 1945 and today is that the Ukrainian population in 2021 was extremely heavy on old people. In 2021, there were more than twice as many 60 year old Ukrainian women as 18 year old women (or men), and, of course, it's overwhelmingly younger women and children that have left since then, dramatically exacerbating that problem even further, and many of those young women and children are never going to return for the same reasons so many were leaving even before 2014, and there will be even more reasons not to return after the war is over. You're not going to rebuild a country with 60+ year old women and disabled veterans.
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