Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "Biographics"
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@OscarDirlwood
While Napoleon was a great commander, he was often too arrogant to realise the limitations of his own army. This can be seen in the French conquest of Syria (which failed), where he underestimated Ottoman defenses at Acre, thus losing the campaign, and eventually, after he left, Egypt. Such arrogance would’ve caused Napoleon to make mistakes against a well prepared, formidable Frederick the Great, and Frederick the Great would’ve defeated Napoleon.
Frederick understood the limitations of the Prussian Army. He barely expanded Prussia out of Germany, and usually fought defensive wars against aggressors. If Napoleon and Frederick fought, Frederick would have the advantage of the terrains and home-turf, and he would’ve been able to use his tactics against the French like he did against the Russians and Austrians. The Prussian soldiers of Fredericks era were also far more professional and better trained than the Prussians that Napoleon fought who by that point had turned into a conscript army.
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There are many directives for this operation: Monty's original, Monty's later notes (that went missing enroute to SHAEF), Dempsey's instructions and O'Connor's orders. A transcript of Monty's revised notes below:
Notes on Second Army Operations 16th July-18th July
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.
A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.
But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unstable the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.
3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.
4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.
Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.
5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.
The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.
But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and despondency, and discover 'the form.'
6. 2 Canadian Corps.
While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.
7. Later Operations 8 Corps.
When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.
But not before 6 is done.
8. To sum up for 8 Corps.
Para 5.
Para 7.
Finally.
Para 6 is vital.
B.L. Montgomery
15-7-44
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