Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "Drachinifel"
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0:58:03 Goeben was sent to the Mediterranean during the 1st Balkan War (1912-1913) and the reasons are a bit complex: The Balkan League (the anti-Ottoman alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro in that war) was backed by Russia which was hoping for it to chase the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and hopefully from the Bosporus strait (as kinda proxies or at least small countries easier to bully or bribe than even the declining Ottoman Empire). Bosporus was (and still is) to Russia a hostile-held bottleneck that was shutting their Black Sea fleet in the Black Sea in case of war. Even if the League failed to take Bosporus it would still be a bite and hold step towards it - it was a long-term plan. Other European powers were for a long time doing their best to maintain the balance of power in Europe (although Germany managed to get away with the unification but the late response materialized during WW1). Earlier Russian moves towards Bosporus were countered with direct intervention in the Crimean War and a joint threat of intervention in 1878. which was diffused at the Berlin Congress (1878). During the 1st Balkan War the European powers agreed to throw the wrench into the League's plan (and indirectly Russian plans) by agreeing to form an "independent" country of Albania (in reality it was to be a kinda international protectorate mostly in the Austro-Hungarian and Italian spheres of influence). According to Balkan League agreements Albania was to be split between Greece, Serbia (thereby finally giving it a long coveted access to the sea) and Montenegro (a small part). The Balkan League quickly defeated the Ottoman field armies, failed to conquer the heavily defended Bosporus and besieged the several remaining holdout fortified towns. The poor, mountainous Albania was very poorly connected overland with Macedonia (where the decisive fighting of the Serbian theatre of that war took place) at the time and supplying a large conquering army via the existing roads was difficult to impossible.Therefore, Serbia agreed with Greece that the Serbian army which just conquered its part of Macedonia was to be ferried and supplied with Greek merchant ships from Salonika to Albanian ports to conquer its part of Albania and help the poorly equipped Montenegrin Army conquer the besieged Ottoman stronghold of Scutari (Shkoder) in their part. This was opposed by the other European powers who insisted Albania be made a separate country, The first batches of Serbian troop transports were already sent and arrived (disembarkation of one was interrupted by the Ottoman protected cruiser Hamidiye, sent to harass the Greek shipping in hopes the Greek armored cruiser Georgios Averoff would be detached from the blockade of the Dardanelles to catch her but to no avail - the Ottoman cruiser sank several ships in the shallow harbor of San Giovani di Medua but was prevented from sinking more still by the Serbian mountain guns firing from the deck of the merchant ship Trifimia which forced her to sail beyond range and the geography of the harbor, abysmal Ottoman accuracy and limited shell supply did the rest). Anyway, to stop the Serbian troop transports and ensure the creation of an independent Albania, the big powers (Austria Hungary, Germany, Italy, France, UK) sent a joint fleet to blockade the Albanian coast and prevent further seaborne transport and threatened direct intervention. That is why Goeben was originally sent there. The top left photo on the infobox montage is showing the flags of the intervening powers over the Shkoder fortress after it fell, note the German one in the foreground:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Scutari_(1912%E2%80%9313)
Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins persisted and eventually conquered the whole Albania overland including Shkoder (via bribery) but agreed to evacuate it after the war at Russian advice. (note the heavy Serbian and Montenegrin casualties during the siege of Shkoder, a testament to difficulties of properly supplying the besieging army in 1913 Albania overland) With most of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies fighting the Ottomans in 1913, Austro Hungarian army could have easily overrun Serbia and Montenegro (the League members with the greatest Russian influence) if it decided to intervene and with UK and even its ally France also backing independent Albania, Russia (and its proxies) would be defeated if they tried force their agenda. The Russians however got their Serbian proxies to intensify stirring Slav nationalism in Bosnia hoping to create national uprisings in Austria Hungary (the same tactic was used on the Ottomans by all the Balkan League Allies just before the 1st Balkan War) - which later resulted in the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The creation of independent Albania led to a dispute among the Balkan League countries about the division of spoils taken from the Ottomans, now when the total was reduced at everyone but Bulgaria's expense which resulted with the 1913 2nd Balkan War and the dissolution of the Balkan League. Goeben stayed in the region along with other ships to protect German interests during that conflict too and beyond - until WW1 started. Serbia and later Yugoslavia continued to attempt to assert its influence over Albania by supporting factions within the newly formed country and was opposed in those efforts chiefly by Italy which had the same goals and methods - that game continued until WW2.
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1:02:50
By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority.
One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer.
The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning).
A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
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@dennisweidner288 Yes. What you are talking about is true grand strategic consideration which takes into account perceived balance of power worldwide. Kantai kessen was an operational doctrine based on percieved operational doctrine of the enemy (notably plan Orange) and designed to give Japan the best operational and tactical chance to respond to it successfully. But the outcomes of the wars depend on many things other than tactical and operational doctrines. If you look at it, kantai kessen was not wrong at all... Most of the decisive US island hopping thrusts in the pacific were done with massed surface seapower and could only be effectively parried with massed surface seapower which Japan tried an the Philippine Sea and Leyte. And in both cases, in spite of them being terrible defeats it is generally recognized that doctrinally, the Japanese operational plans were sound, possibly the best available and and, superior to US plans in the same battles as ultimately implemented. The reasons for defeats lie elsewhere. Even the earlier battles such as Midway and to a lesser degree Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz involved concentration of nearly all first rate striking power of both sides in one place (sorry, battleships, you are outpaced and outranged by this point by carrier airstrikes) which is no surprise. Japan, at least in the first year of the war often fared quite well in smaller battles where the enemy managed to mass his fleet only partially or locally (Force Z, Java Sea, even Coral Sea a to an extent) which allowed Japan to concentrate enough forces to outnumber them decisively or fight under their own terms (ironically using tactics developped for the kantai kessen) - dealing with them was less of a problem than with full fleet actions.
Kantai kessen essentially says: when they come, they will mostly come in full force (rather than peacmeal) since that will give them the best chance to achieve their objective. They will outnumber us due to treaties and our industrial disadvantage. Now this is how we best deal with this and defeat them... Kantai kessen does not decide whether or when Japan declares war on the US but is a plan prepared in case war is already declared. It does not contain plans for Japanese war economy, just acknowledges the current reality. It reeally gets too much misplaced hate.
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