Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "Drachinifel" channel.

  1. Nimitz was superior to Halsey, so it was simply a matter of whether to overlook his gaffes or not. Macarthur was not only a different branch outside of Nimitz'es chain of command, but was also thankfully given his own little South Pacific playground by the higher ups, while the US Navy could concentrate on the trully important Central Pacific drive up until Leyte. King was a brilliant superior whose bad temper flashed when he encountered incompetence, which he did not find in Nimitz, so not that remarkable after all.
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  2. Or the italian Spica-class torpedo boat Lupo.
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  3. Fun fact: the French cider Calvados got its name from the area of Normandy which in turn got its name from a Frenchified name of a Spanish Armada galleon San El Salvador, that got wrecked there.
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  4. Iachino and Cunningham switching sides is a pointless debate. Italians had a lot of system disadvantages compared to the British that no single admiral could solve. Limited and later depleted stocks of fuel. Atrocious communications with catastrophic lags due to primitive coding and decoding techniques. Terrible coordination between the Italian navy and air force. Comparatively poor intelligence. Atrocious gun accuracy due to poor shell quality. No radar. No aircraft carriers or naval aviation save the floatplanes. Cunningham could do little to address any of these. Instead I see him developing the habit of hurling binoculars from the bridge of Vitorio Veneto if you are catching my drift. Iachino's decision to try to save Pola at Matapan was in line with Cunningham's persistance in evacuating the British army from Greece a few months later. Both were agressive commanders and not too dissimilar in character, although Cunningham was more experienced in command of large fleets.
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  5.  @scott2836  During WW1 the Italian navy actually managed to sink an enemy Dreadnought-type battleship. British navy did not... PS: only idiots are searching for importance in politicians' statements...
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  6. One mistake regarding the fate of the Yugoslav navy during the invasion was that the fleet was captured by the Italians. The truth is that the provisions of the surrender of the Yugoslav armed forces (not the country) stipulated that the surviving ships (very few were sunk by enemy action during the brief war) are to be handed over to the Italians - which was carried out with exception of the ships mentioned in the video to have defiantly escaped to Alexandria and the destroyer Zagreb which was defiantly scuttled in the Kotor Bay by two junior officers, who went down with the ship.
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  7. Also: David Beatty (mostly unjustly) Seymor (mostly justly), HMS Captain (100/100 justly), the French pre-dreadnought Jaureguibbery (mostly unjustly), French ship design comittees (mostly justly), Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (mostly unjustly)
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  8. Unify and problem solved.
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  9. 00:54:56 - One important change is that Japan abandoned extensive welding in hull construction - going back to tried and tested but heavier, and, (compared to proper welding) weaker rivets. Had they persisted in sorting out welding problems without a pause they might have reaped the benefits of it sooner.
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  10. Iwo Jima: IM THE MOST DIFFICULT PLACE ON EARTH TO INVADE! Stalingrad and the Kursk salient "You are adorable :)"
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  11. Some of the IJN armored cruisers were just as successful as the Averoff. Asama, Tokiwa, Izumo and Iwate for instance. Took part in multiple successful battles, stood in the line of battle and also saw service in WW2.
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  12. The best WW2 fighting USN admiral was Raymond Spruance. His biggest mistake was the dusk strike at the Phillipine Sea which cost him 80 planes and 25 aircrew (to Ozawa's credit too) but still they sank a carrier for their troubles.
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  13. Kinda what the French, under the finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, did in the 17th century burning the Dutch.
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  14. Karl Marx: I AM the propulsion!
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  15. Transarctica 😊
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  16. 19:57 So this was the famous Patton's "Rommel, you magnificent basterd, I read your book" 1813 style?
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  17. Takakazu Kinashi. THE pro gamer in the IJN submarine force.
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  18.  The USS Johnston  Kumano was sunk by US Avenger torpedo bombers in Santa Cruz days after the battle of Samar was over 🙄.
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  19. 6:38 Caniares class :) Canarias. Canary Islands
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  20. 5:45 "HAUBITZEN!!!" 😂 6:27 definitely haubitzen
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  21. It was actually the Japanese airpower that neutralized the British naval defense of Singapore, and the British carriers did not posess a very good interceptor force. But even if the Japanese bombers were driven off by a handful of Fulmars, at best their presence would have postponed the invasion of Malaya for a month or two until the Kido Butai returned from Pearl Harbor, Wake and Rabaul and drove them off.
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  22. Well, sinking the Tirpitz cost the British 36 aircraft, 3 X craft and a trawler with 2 human torpedos. Not bad given that pre war theorists considered 43 aircraft to be an equivalent of a battleship in combat.
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  23. Kurita and Nishimura checking in... (interesting to compare Nishimura - Shima team to Jellicoe - Beatty. All in reverse, and in totally different strategic situation).
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  24. I disagree with your assessment of the Japanese aircraft carrying submarines. Firstly they were extremely useful as scouts. Note that many of the successess the German auxilliary cruisers had were due to their scout planes leading them to prey, also FW-200 guided wolfpacks - Japanese B class submarines could deploy scout planes anywhere. It was the advent of radar that made them more vulnerable and also somewhat decreased their usefullness, but still, a scoulplane can scout beyond the horizon. The fact that their impact was not that great should be seen within the fact that the entire Japanese submarine force was not particularly successful overall in spite of some notable individual successess against warships. It was more down to weaker intelligence (with exception of the first few months of the Pacific War), failings in Japanese submarine doctrine of use and, as the war progressed increased strain on Japanese submarine force to be employed to supplied the cut-off garrissons, bypassed by the Americans in their island hopping campaign (made possible by their gain of sea and air superiority as they thoroughly out-produced and out-trained Japan). Also I'd argue the concept of submarine aircraft carrier is pretty much alive today - every missile submarine is a descendant of the concept that marries two major WW2 era developments: modern missiles (courtesy of several countries but most notably Germany with their V2) with the submarine hangars (courtesy of several countries, but the Japanese developed it the furthest). Add another major WW2 invention - the nuclear weapons and you have a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine.
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  25.  @jlvfr  It probably helped that most of the time there were bigger targets available sailing with her, but then again destroyers too sank all around her and also quite a few of the engagements she fought in were the unpredictable night battles, but the damn thing barely received a scratch...
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  26. 1:02:50 By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority. One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer. The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning). A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
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  27. IJN submarines could not really hurt US economy since the West Coast sea lanes were far away from any Japanese bases where refueling of submarines could be done, and furthermore US had a lot of ASW assets there that would require carrier raids to clear (unfeasable due to distance from closest Japanese bases) but they'd be back once the raid was over. Furthermore, much of US strategic transportation was not done by sea but by trains. As for strategic military transports between US and their forward Pacific bases, and/or Australia - those were concentrated in convoys heavily guarded by destroyers and dozens of escort carriers. Very tough targets (if they could even be detected in the vast Pacific ocean) The best place to hunt for merchants for the Japanese was the Indian ocean, accessible from bases on Sumatra. But also, the British were good at ASW, besides, the IJN submarine fleet was not that big numerically, when all submarines that took part in the war in each country were considered.
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  28. ... or actually launching enough ordinance towards the enemy pretty much guarantees a "lucky" shot sooner or later...
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  29. Well, I assume the Spanish Navy habitually hand picked their very best third rates to carry the treasure given the importance of the mission.
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  30. Curious case of German battleships: almost first to be built, last to be sunk. Not bad for a class dubbed the "5 minute ships" three decades before they were finally sunk...
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  31. 44:16 Radar detection devices were famously used in battles of Kula Gulf, Kolombangara and Vella Lavella in 1943. by the Japanese (who did not have radar at the time) with some success.
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  32. There was an interesting episode involving Orion and Komet when they jointly shelled Australian phosphate plant on the island of Nauru. And Komet returned a few days later and shelled it again. Also Orion laid mines at the approaches to Auckland harbor in Australia and one of the ships that was sunk in the minefield was RMS Niagara carrying a large amount of British gold bullion to a less endangered place of Australia.
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  33. The ship was still being built and that was obviously a work-related temporary structure.
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  34. Why didn't allies win faster? Distance... Logistics and offensive warfare is always harder than defense when both sides are alert, mobilized, seasoned and comparable in tech and numbers (which wasn't 100% the case during the Axis offensives).
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  35. British empire was way overstretched to be defended from multiple simultaneous attacks just from the UK.
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  36. During the 1st Balkan War, after the Serbian army took what is now North Macedonia from the Ottomans it decided to take its allotted (per prewar allied agreements) Ottoman north of Albania. Due to poor roads and railroad network there it decided to do so with a shipborne invasion, chartering the necesary ships from the Greek government with a rate of 1000 dinars per ship per day to take its troops from the as of recently Greek port of Salonika (which was close to where its troops that took North Macedonia were) to Albanian ports and supply them thereafter. The profit-minded Greeks, naturally picked the ships on the small side for the task and it went on. Meanwhile the Ottoman navy, bottled down in the Dardanelles by the Greek naval blockade decided to send their fast protected cruiser Hamidiye to run the blockade and raid the Greek sea lanes, hoping to lure the Giorgios Avereroff to chase her which would in turn enable the main Ottoman fleet to defeat the Hydras and the rest of the Greek fleet and to break the blockade, but the Greek naval command initially decided not to send anything after Hamidiye. However, after Hamidiye managed to catch a group of unprotected Greek ships offloading Serbian troops in the Albanian port of San Giovani di Medua and sink and damage several causing more than 150 Serbian dead (and it would have been worse had two Serbian artillery NCOs not set up their mountain guns on the deck of their Greek transport ship Trifimia and fired back, prompting Hamidiye to open the range and lose accuracy), the Serbian high command and government complained bitterly to the Greeks about the lack of naval escort. The Greeks then detatched the Psara (which was too slow to catch Hamidiye) and 3 destroyers to escort the subsequent Serbian troop convoys which it performed successfully.
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  37. IJN Yukikaze.
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  38. The "missed the action due to re-fit" torpedo pin pillow carrier.
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  39. I think U-571 did include the note at the end in which they mentioned the various historical captures of the Enigma machine. Still a horrible movie.
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  40. Right after Gerald R Ford, George H W Bush, JFK, Carl Vinson, John C Stennis 😂...
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  41. Just start counting the combinations
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  42. 44:43 All Greek navy ships entering Pireus honor Georgios Averoff, now a museum ship.
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  43. Don't rush to conclusions based on one, purposefully recorded angry phonecall made from a cozy office. The guy later entered politics, and the call served the cruize liner company well to deflect blame from its many systemic problems that were actually the single biggest reason for the disaster and the casualties.
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  44. 1:16:18 Rodney uses WASD hack 😊
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  45.  @dennisweidner288  Distracting the US with light carriers is exactly what the Japanese tried in the next carrier battle - The Eastern Solomons but again the result was a defeat due to lack of radar. Had they had radar they could have detected the US airstrike heading for Ryujo and got from that the locatioon of the US carriers early and launced a strike at them while no US strike would be heading for the main Japanese force. But since they did not have radar they had to wait for a scout plane to find the US fleet so the opposing main carrier fleets exchanged simultaneous airstrikes at each other with the Japanese coming off worse due to mistakes and bad luck. The reason Hiryu was able to counterrattack at Midway in the first place was because it was 10 miles away from Akagi Kaga and Soryu as they were being bombed so she escaped destruction at that time. So actually you have a vindication of division of forces at a tactical level there rather than detraction. Japanese ships were deficient in AAA. Much of their AAA (25mm) was fairly light and its effective range (1 km) was such that it was good only for self defense of the ship rather than defense of other ships. They had some 40 mm pom poms before the war but they concluded 25 mm suited them better and got rid of them replacing them with 25 mms while adding more of the latter (and kept adding as the war progressed)... Supposedly dual purpose main guns of their destroyers (with the exception of the Akizukis) did not have the elevation and rate of fire to be really effective. Also there was no VT fuze back then - instead each large celibre AAA shell had to be set manually after how much time to burst based on eye-gauged estimate of the target's distance, speed and heading while the ship is rolling in the sea. Yeah, good luck hitting two squadrons of dive bombers that just burst through the clouds with that... A few more AAA batteries, even if the ships were tightly packed would have hardly made any difference. But they would have lowered the Kido Butai's top speed (adding Yamato - by 1 knot, older BBs more, with exception of two remaining Kongos which would have made sense) making it easier to find and more difficult to retire if need be.
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  46.  @dennisweidner288  Midway was decided by US codebreaking, poor Japanese scouting, lack of radar and a bit of luck. Of those 4 reasons only the poor scouting could really be blamed on the Japanese commanders.
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  47.  @dennisweidner288  Yes. What you are talking about is true grand strategic consideration which takes into account perceived balance of power worldwide. Kantai kessen was an operational doctrine based on percieved operational doctrine of the enemy (notably plan Orange) and designed to give Japan the best operational and tactical chance to respond to it successfully. But the outcomes of the wars depend on many things other than tactical and operational doctrines. If you look at it, kantai kessen was not wrong at all... Most of the decisive US island hopping thrusts in the pacific were done with massed surface seapower and could only be effectively parried with massed surface seapower which Japan tried an the Philippine Sea and Leyte. And in both cases, in spite of them being terrible defeats it is generally recognized that doctrinally, the Japanese operational plans were sound, possibly the best available and and, superior to US plans in the same battles as ultimately implemented. The reasons for defeats lie elsewhere. Even the earlier battles such as Midway and to a lesser degree Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz involved concentration of nearly all first rate striking power of both sides in one place (sorry, battleships, you are outpaced and outranged by this point by carrier airstrikes) which is no surprise. Japan, at least in the first year of the war often fared quite well in smaller battles where the enemy managed to mass his fleet only partially or locally (Force Z, Java Sea, even Coral Sea a to an extent) which allowed Japan to concentrate enough forces to outnumber them decisively or fight under their own terms (ironically using tactics developped for the kantai kessen) - dealing with them was less of a problem than with full fleet actions. Kantai kessen essentially says: when they come, they will mostly come in full force (rather than peacmeal) since that will give them the best chance to achieve their objective. They will outnumber us due to treaties and our industrial disadvantage. Now this is how we best deal with this and defeat them... Kantai kessen does not decide whether or when Japan declares war on the US but is a plan prepared in case war is already declared. It does not contain plans for Japanese war economy, just acknowledges the current reality. It reeally gets too much misplaced hate.
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  48. It would have been really funny had the royalists in Toulon actually got to use the Commerce de Marseille to attack the commerce of nearby Marseille...
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  49. 43:48 In particular, during the Third Anglo-Dutch War a personal rivalry between Edward Spragge and Cornelis Tromp extended to their ships, the Prince Royal and Gouden Leuw which finally ended with Spragge's death. As for later examples: during the Russo-Japanese War IJN Fuji participated in 3 attacks on Port Arthur and the Battle of Yellow sea facing Russian battleships like the Pobieda there.
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  50. Lee lost all ships other than his own in this battle.
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