Comments by "Spring Bloom" (@springbloom5940) on "Covert Cabal" channel.

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  5.  @BabyBird691  They are looking at a central depot being cleared, not at a decreasing amount of surplus. The point being that he implies and outright makes fallacious assumptions, based on a quite literally surface level review of low grade imagery and public defense industry information. Chief among the several reasons the large depots are being cleared, is dispersal. Ukraine has hit a few storage depots with ineffectual drone attacks. However, the fact that they did attempt to strike them, is an imperative to disperse their contents. Second is deployment, which does not imply replacement of a loss; this is perhaps the most pervasive fallacy. As for loss counts, the only source everyone cites, Oryx, has flawed methodology and clear biases. For example, counting the same vehicle multiple times, from multiple different images and counting Ukrainian vehicles as Russian. One specific example of this was a disabled Russian tank that was counted multiple times, as it was moved from location to location during recovery; another is a disabled Ukrainian BTR3, destroyed while in Russian possession during recovery and counted by Oryx as a Russian loss. There's a maxim we followed to keep everyone's head straight - 'Information is not intelligence, facts do not imply conclusion, you cannot tell the truth with a lie, you can tell a lie with the truth'. Ill give a broadstroke example of actual imagery analysis. On my first assignment, working on the operational planning for the 'Left Hook' in Desert Storm, the team I was on spent almost 3 months studying soil composition, sand grain structure and local botany, so that we were able to identify, from space, whether a truck was carrying personnel, subsistence materiel, or ordnance, based upon the color and distribution of surrounding vegetation. If youve ever wondered what it feels like to have a superpower, that comes pretty close. An example of assumption, is BDA for the 3 major armor engagements, where the Bradley and Abrams got their fearsome rep. We spent almost a year afterwards, re-counting the destroyed vehicles and sorting out the battles to provide combat assessment (weapon system and crew performance). The Bradley, first off, was responsible for the overwhelming majority of blue on blue, because they were largely detached from the main armor formations and able to engage well beyond positive identification range. Secondly, the Bradley killcount went down dramatically from initial reports, when we started performing onsite BDA of vehicles and found that most had been hit from angles that indicated top down attacks(airstrikes), prior to being shot up by Bradleys. They were just rolling around quickdrawing on anything that popped up in their sights. Destroyed tanks, friendly tanks, etc. They also frequently misidentified AFVs as tanks, from extended range under thermals; leading to its reputation as a 'tank killer'. The perceived superiority of Challengers and Abrams was extremely exaggerated, as about 40% of the armor that Iraq fielded, was non-deployable by US DoD standards. They suffered from a range of issues such as broken hydraulics, faulty electrical, poorly maintained/worn out engines, low fuel, low/no/improper ammunition etc. A large percentage of engaged armor was broken down, or out of fuel, or out of ammo, or just abandoned by crews that didn't want to fight. They fired canister shot at Challengers from 3 times its antipersonnel range because they didn't have proper ammo. Large numbers of tanks were parked on berms firing indirect, because they were immobile, or their turrets wouldn't traverse, or their guns wouldn't elevate. These all being revelations gleaned from combat assessment following the initial BDA and after action reporting that showed only counts and ratios. I mean, we figured out over a month later that an enemy kill credited to a Bradley, was a blue on blue that didnt even slow down the friendly. Yet, it was officially recorded as an enemy kill. The point being that while Iraq indeed had the largest armor force and densest, most up to date air defenses in the region, it was all shot up, broken down, worn out junk from 10 years of them and Iran tuning each other up. Thats what we steamrolled over. These are mistakes made by the mighty US military, best in the world at everything and unlimited resources. Now, go figure the quality of work from internet neckbeards. Analysis is more than looking at pictures and counting things. Thats just information. One of the biggest problems the Soviets had was massive information gathering with no analytical capability. Lots of people taking lots of pictures and lots of people counting and describing things in the pictures, with no one trying to understand why the things were there.
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  6.  @BabyBird691  You forgot to call me Boris... They are looking at a central depot being cleared, not at a decreasing amount of surplus. The point being that he implies and outright makes fallacious assumptions, based on a quite literally surface level review of low grade imagery and public defense industry information. Chief among the several reasons the large depots are being cleared, is dispersal. Ukraine has hit a few storage depots with ineffectual drone attacks. However, the fact that they did attempt to strike them, is an imperative to disperse their contents. Second is deployment, which does not imply replacement of a loss; this is perhaps the most pervasive fallacy. As for loss counts, the only source ever cited, Oryx, has flawed methodology and clear biases. For example, counting the same vehicle multiple times, from multiple different images and counting Ukrainian vehicles as Russian. One specific example of this was a disabled Russian tank that was counted multiple times, as it was moved from location to location during recovery; another is a disabled Ukrainian BTR3, destroyed while in Russian possession during recovery and counted by Oryx as a Russian loss. There's a maxim we followed to keep everyone's head straight - 'Information is not intelligence, facts do not imply conclusion, you cannot tell the truth with a lie, you can tell a lie with the truth'.  Ill give a broadstroke example of actual imagery analysis. On my first assignment, working on the operational planning for the 'Left Hook' in Desert Storm, the team I was on spent almost 3 months studying soil composition, sand grain structure and local botany, so that we were able to identify, from space, whether a truck was carrying personnel, subsistence materiel, or ordnance, based upon the color and distribution of surrounding vegetation. If youve ever wondered what it feels like to have a superpower, that probably comes pretty close. An example of assumption, is BDA for the 3 major armor engagements, where the Bradley and Abrams got their fearsome rep. We spent almost a year afterwards, re-counting the destroyed vehicles and sorting out the battles to provide combat assessment (weapon system and crew performance). The Bradley, first off, was responsible for the overwhelming majority of blue on blue, because they were largely detached from the main armor formations and able to engage well beyond positive identification range. Secondly, the Bradley keelcount(YouTube keeps deleting my post for the K word)went down dramatically from initial reports, when we started performing onsite BDA of vehicles and found that most had been hit from angles that indicated top down attacks(airstrikes), prior to being aired up by Bradleys. They were just rolling around quickdrawing on anything that popped up in their sights. Destroyed tanks, friendly tanks, etc. They also frequently misidentified AFVs as tanks, from extended range under thermals; directly leading to its reputation as a 'tank slayer'. The perceived superiority of Challengers and Abrams was extremely exaggerated, as about 40% of the armor that Iraq fielded, was non-deployable by US DoD standards. They suffered from a range of issues such as broken hydraulics, faulty electrical, poorly maintained/worn out engines, low fuel, low/no/improper ammunition etc. A large percentage of engaged armor was broken down, or out of fuel, or out of ammo, or just abandoned by crews that didn't want to fight. They fired canister rounds at Challengers from 3 times its effective antipersonnel range, because they didn't have proper ammo. Large numbers of tanks were parked on berms firing indirect, because they were immobile, or their turrets wouldn't traverse, or their guns wouldn't elevate. These all being revelations gleaned from combat assessment following the initial BDA and after action reporting that showed only counts and ratios. I mean, we figured out over a month later that an enemy keel credited to a Bradley, was a blue on blue that didnt even slow down the friendly, yet was recorded as a successful enemy engagement. The point being that while Iraq indeed had the largest armor force and densest, most up to date air defenses in the region, it was all shot up, broken down, worn out junk from 10 years of them and Iran tuning each other up. These are mistakes made by the mighty US military, best in the world at everything and unlimited resources. Now, go figure the quality of work from internet neckbeards. Analysis is more than looking at pictures and counting things. Thats just information. One of the biggest problems the Soviets had was massive information gathering with no analytical capability. Lots of people taking lots of pictures and lots of people counting and describing things in the pictures, with no one trying to understand why the things were there.
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  17.  @rodgersericv  You dont know that. The point of 'secret weapons' is to hold them in reserve until they are needed, or to use covertly, so an adversary cant develop a defense. As it stands, the US has no apparent need for dedicated antiship missiles, because a number of other weapon systems fill the bill. As long as an enemy thinks the US doesnt have such weapons, they might believe their ships are safe, as long as they have their own secret defense to the known systems. We know for fact, that the US has 'unveiled' various operational EW weapons, only after they were discovered by enemies or press. Its reasonable to assume the US has an array of EW systems, the existence of which are secret. As long as the acknowledged arsenal provides adequate deterrent, there is no value in disclosing more advanced systems, until needed to restore balance. That said, some weapons are meant exclusively to be used, not brandished. I have first hand knowledge in this. After the Gulf War(513th MI-BDE), I rolled with a survey and documentation team, inspecting targets that had been hit with precision munitions. We saw LGB/GBU hits, TLAM hits and Harpoon hits. We also saw some hits from weapons we couldnt identify. The film was taken directly from the cameras, notes, debris and residue samples collected and put into a locked case with a 'civilian auditor' and team members searched, all before leaving the site. For sure, Ive been somewhat out of the loop, but Ive been to the sandbox recently and seen the work of all the currently acknowledged weapons and to date, nothing Im familiar with, matches the signatures we saw. Maybe a developmental precursor to current weapons? Maybe an abandoned project? Maybe something no one knows about... yet...
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