Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Drachinifel"
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The "pitiful retreat" from the continent in 1940, was a result of a geographical advantage London enjoyed compared to continental powers.
In a nutshell, they "put their tail between their legs" because they could and France couldn't.
As far as London was concerned, France was a part of the continent...a useful tool to protect the British Empire.
Nothing more.
Nothing less.
The London lords misused whoever stepped forward to offer themselves, as useful tools. Paris accepted, and was therefore abandoned like the "tool" is was.
Outdated.
No longer useful to the lords...
Remember the above.
Because the nice part follows...
There is a big picture.
In fact, let's call it a "massive picture", almost never addressed in documentaries and popular history books (unless very specific ones about geopolitics).
Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
What really counts is a geographical advantage.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
At the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
[Google: The American Century and what was behind it]
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
[Google: American_exceptionalism]
In 1945, it was GB which couldn't "run" anymore.
The world had shrunk.
New technology and weapons made the world a much smaller place that the turn of the century (say 1900).
As far as Washington DC was concerned, GB was a part of Europe.
LMAO. Talk about "a little misunderstanding".
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Under De Gaule, France finaly put on their "big boy boots".
No more begging for Spitfires (Battle of France), and no more begging for help from an uncaring world of "fwiends" with an attitude problem: cheering you on in an hour of need...but little else. No soldiers, no tanks, no battleships, no honor. Just "hopes and prayers", just silent admiration, and a pat on the back...but not much more. Paris would no longer be begging for help, or grovelling for assisistance. No more having your ships blown up by "best fwiends" and their "pwomises", if one is down and out and forced to surrender by a vastly superior enemy.
No more "cordial" amistad.
Under De Gaule, France had own nukes now, and a "new best fwiend" Konrad Adenauer, and leverage.
A marriage made in heaven :-)
Finaly after hundreds of years, and with a different set of "balance of power", it would not be "empires" squaring off, but "new best friends" with a common enemy this time, and if those Russians were going to come storming through the Fulda Gap, it wasn't London or Washington DC which was going to decide whether West Germans were "poor enough" to start a "world war" for.
Well done France.
One might not like De Gaule for all his other faults, and the list is long. But he did get that one thing right. He rid France of the need for "best fwiends". No more "faraway empires" with a "geographical advantage" going "well, it doesn't really look that bad...for me...so good luck..."
Accompanied by snidy remarks of "who saved you last time duh?", De Gaule did the only right thing: if Paris wasn't on the same level as Washington/London in NATO, it would be out, and an "associated power".
(Google how that unfolded with "France/De Gaulle/Force the Dissuasion")
No more "cordial" ententes.
No more "pwomises" to the one with an inferior geographical location.
Paris would decide if Germans were "poor enough" to help, not London with their "well most Belgians, but not all of them are 'poor enough', but the people in Luxembourg are not really 'poor enough' to deserve our blood"-attitude problem ...lol. That what happens if one believes "pwomises" of being "best fwiends".
No contract.
Just "pwomises"...
When it comes to the crunch, or in an hour of need, it's "me first" in the dog-eat-dog world of big boys and their aspirations.
From that point on, Paris would decide, and Paris only, if Germans are "poor enough"...and wipe a sufficiet amount of mother Russia off the map, should a single Russian ever set a single foot on a single "poor West German" in their new barrier state.
And De Gaule?
I guess he threw in a bit of that "revenge is a dish best served cold"-attitude. When London was desparate for "markets", Paris denied entry into the EU with a veto. Third in line, after the "old best fwiends of WW2," Washington DC, and Moscow (rescinding the "percentages agreement" for markets in Eastern Europe), France would now kick London while it was down and out, economically weak and economically failing...
De Gaule: "You want markets for your Vauxhalls? I want markets for my Citroens and my Renaulds..."
(Google: "Paris vetoes UK applications for EU membership 1963 and 1967")
If it were up to De Gaule, no more London "hopping onto" some continental power across the English Channel, when it suited London, only to "hop" somewhere else the minute it didn't suit London no more...
And De Gaule was right: the economy in the UK started brightening up, and viola...Brexit.
Oh, they did ooops do it again...
After EU-membership did its fair share of pulling the cart out of the rut of after a failure of "Empire", it was "we're Brexiting now. Cheerio...oh, but we want that and that and that and that..."
No responsibilities.
Just advantages.
Just like the "600 London lords" of Empire geostrategists.
Loosely quoting Lord Palmerston: "England has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. Only eternal interests."
And that counts for everyone.
"King" one day, "pauper" the next.
That's how it goes in the dog eat dog world of "empires"...
Too bad, London didn't make some real friends while it was "in charge".
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@manilajohn0182 Excellent first paragraph. I might borrow it at some point :-)
Yes, and that is excactly what happened after WW2.
London got "screwed over" by her WW2 "best friends", because she no longer had the leverage to impose or insist on agreements once made in war.
Of course, wars are "won" by men in suites, after the last shots have been fired, and the parades to soothe the tormented souls are over.
After the war, that is what counts: Leverage
Agreed about Putin.
In the bigger picture he is a "Wilhelm II" of sorts.
Just like Wilhelmine Germany once refused the requests of the "alpha" (London) to become a tool for an "empire", I assume (without evidence) that Putin refused the USA's requests to become a tool to encircle China.
Of course, it's all about "Chy-naah" and the "bomb, bomb, bomb; bomb, bomb Iran"-wishes of a certain fraction in Washington DC.
That was clear even before Trump turned up, trying to jank "little rocket man" off the Beijing leash...
The historical "narrative" re. Germany/Wilhelm II is dead wrong.
At the time, say the late 1890s, the British Empire approached Berlin, with a request/suggestion for an alliance (see Balfour/Chamberlain).
Of course, such an "alliance" had the main objective of turning Berlin into a temporary "best friend" and "lightning rod" for Russian and French venom, boiling up due to imperialistic differences of the three powers (GB/France/Russia).
Berlin was not that naive.
It wanted to be considered an alliance partner on eye level, with the own risks it would be taking (wedged in between Russia and France) suitably considered in such an "alliance".
It would have meant that London would have to voluntarily step down from its self-appointed role of "balancer of powers/decider of wars", and accept Berlin on the top "rung" of "Empires". Or, imagine an athlete, having to share the top position on the podium...
Of course, by the late 19th century, Berlin had also already become London's "default rival/default enemy in war", as decided per "economy/weight", same as "Chy-naah" starting becoming the new alpha's "default rival/default enemy in war" around the turn of the century (around 2000).
And Putin?
I assume he said "no".
He was no "drunk Jelzin" or "naive Gorbachov".
And so history repeats itself...seemingly.
Of course, I'll have to wait for the "30-year rules" to pass, and the archives opened to the backdoor dealings of our dear leaders.
So at the moment it is just a haunch.
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What was the REAL "lesson" of the Barbary Wars, and the subsequent series of events?
What is the strategic lesson almost no historian ever talks about?
Answer: the price of not unifying to speak with a single voice.
First they (outside powers, more or less "united" in a cause), came for the Barbary States.
The last one to "go" was Morocco, finally "carved up" by European powers, in conjunction with the USA, in 1911.
Last to "go" was The Ottoman Empire, in WW1.
From "empire" to "Turkey" (post WW1) in around 200 years.
Later this maxim of POWER would repeat again, and again.
The price of not uniting in time.
This is regardless of any "feelings."
Since "facts" (strategy) count higher than "feelings."
Same as the Ottoman Empire failed to unite into a single cohesive "united states" speaking with a single voice, and neither did Europe, so the USA could pick them apart piecemeal...
First to "go" was Spain.
First the USA came for Spain, but the rest of Europe was like "I don't care, I'm not the Spanish Empire..."
Lastly, they came for the British Empire, but there was nobody left to speak for them...
"What actually occurred was that Britain and other countries became hopelessly indebted to the United States once again (edit: during World War 2) ... “We have profited by our past mistakes,” announced Roosevelt in a speech delivered on September 3, 1942. “This time we shall know how to make full use of victory.” This time the U.S. Government would conquer its allies in a more enlightened manner, by demanding economic concessions of a legal and political nature instead of futilely seeking repayment of its wartime loans (of World War 1). The new postwar strategy sought and secured foreign markets for U.S. exports, and new fields for American investment capital in Europe’s raw materials producing colonial areas. Despite Roosevelt’s assurances to the contrary, Britain was compelled, under the Lend-Lease agreements and the terms of the first great U.S. postwar loan to Britain, to relinquish Empire Preference and to open all its markets to U.S. competition, at a time when Britain desperately needed these markets as a means by which to fund its sterling debt. Most important of all, Britain was forced to unblock its sterling and foreign-exchange balances built up by its colonies and other Sterling Area countries during the wartime years. Instead of the Allied Powers as a whole bearing the costs of these wartime credits to British Empire countries, they would be borne by Britain itself. Equally important, they would not be used as “blocked” balances that could be used only to buy British or other Sterling Area exports, but would be freed to purchase exports from any nation. Under postwar conditions this meant that they would be used in large part to purchase U.S. exports." (page 115/116)
"By relinquishing its right to block these balances, Britain gave up its option, while enabling the United States to make full use of its gold stock as the basis for postwar lending to purchased generalized (primarily U.S.) exports. At a stroke, Britain’s economic power was broken. What Germany as foe had been unable to accomplish in two wars against Britain, the United States accomplished with ease as its ally." (Page 117)
"Furthermore, under the terms on which it joined the International Monetary Fund, Britain could not devalue the pound sterling so as to dissipate the foreign-exchange value of these balances. Its liability thus was maximized – and so was America’s gain from the pool of liquidity that these balances now represented." ("Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire." -- Michael Hudson, 2nd edition 2003)
In case that seems a bit technical, here is the "nutshell version": Just like the bank takes your house if you don't pay up in the real world, the British Empire was run into the ground by the "best friends" USA, who stole the Empire's markets; hidden behind a whole lot of "technical jargon", thereby taking the means London had to pay its debts. A suitable micro level example would be the bank having an eye on your house, then making sure you get fired so you can't pay your debt. On the macro level the term is "debt trap diplomacy", and on the (privatized) propaganda level the means is "projection: accuse somebody else of being something which one is oneself", and that "being" has started waaaaaay earlier as a matter of own policy. A "debt trap" the Allies walked into after 1916, after they had spent all their own money, and squeezed as much out of their colonies as they could get away with, but refused to come to terms at the negotiating table: another factor usually associated with the Central Powers.
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"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
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@rinzler9171 Agreed then.
Because there were basically two types of US Presidents (administrations). One "leaning inwards" = concentrating on the USA and its people aka "isolationism"...
And those leaning outwards. Set on expanding the US sphere of influence at the expense of other powers, dragging the USA (and the overwhelming percentage of inhabitants, against their will, into international wars).
Wilson was an American Century advocate, and dragged the USA into WW1.
FDR was also, and did the same concerning WW2.
Because all throughout the late-19th/early-20th centuries, while Europe armed itself to the teeth, wasting away their inherence on weapons, the USA made use of this disunity (remaining isolationist, concentrating on the sphere of interest protected y the Monroe Doctrine), and were saving their pennies for a rainy day.
US military spending, a fraction of that of Europe.
For US leaders set on expansion had a plan, greatly aided by their geographical and political isolation (aka "geopolitics")....
In a nutshell, to hang in there long enough, until Europe had torn itself to shreds. And if not, also okay. They were already the undisputed regional power controlling "the new world" of North and South America.
A win-win.
1) A destructive war in Europe = a win for Washington DC/The American Century advocates, and their "hard power" approach.
2) No destructive war in Europe = a win for the isolationist, with their focus on trade, soft power, etc.
In case of war in Europe then, step in and pick up the (financial) "debris"...in a nutshell:
The American Century.
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@rinzler9171 100% agreed.
And that was no coincidence, but known as "never let a crisis/war" go to waste.
Especially possible to implement, if an own geographical position allows it to remain distant from those squabbling and scrambling for more power, potentially clashing.
I say "no coincidence", because in the leadup to WW1, the USA was the "new power", whose political position was basically (in a nutshell) "to observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
Washington DC was very good at "biding time" and "keeping a low profile" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old Europe", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Unlike the arsenals of M-A-I-N they also used another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Washington DC: "If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them."
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@rinzler9171 Yes, FDR is greatly admired for "winning WW2", although his favoritism of the madman/mass-murderer Stalin meant that we in the west ended up giving away half the world, in return for "trusting Stalin's signature".
Dumbest move ever, and we ended up fighting the communist we supported in WW2, in the other half of the world, for the next 50 years during the Cold War.
Of course, Stalin the crook never had any intention to stick to any agreement he had made under the duress of WW2, with the Nazis breathing down his neck intent on his destruction.
After the war was over, the "niceties" were soon forgotten, treaties torn up like "scraps of paper", and we were forced to defend "our half" of the world (China, Korea, Vietnam, Latin America, ME, Africa, etc.) by overwhelming use of military/financial power.
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@rinzler9171 Of course, another option existed to "the Big Three".
We in the west shouldn't have had even the slightest inhibitions about "tweaking Lend-Lease" (to avoid the complete collapse of the SU, but not enough for communism to win). In other words, just as much Lend-Lease as needed, but not enough for the commie to storm all the way into Central Europe.
We should have "aided" the Nazis by as little strategic bombing as possible, but only as much as necessary to aid D-Day, but to avoid the complete collapse of Germany, the backbone of the Axis.
Why shouldn't it have bothered us in the least if the Eastern Front had settled somewhere between Leningrad and the Black Sea, with the two sides fighting until utter exhaustion?
Because we owed Stalin nothing.
Not single Jeep and not a single Studebaker truck, carrying commies into Central Europe by the millions.
Not a single drop of blood.
"Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR, the Land of the Toilers, that war breaks out between the [German] Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done so that the war lasts as long as possible in order that both sides become exhausted. Namely for this reason we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany, and use it so that once this war is declared, it will last for a maximum amount of time."
Stalin 19th August 1939
So our leaders sacrificed own soldiers, own resources, and millions of own dollars, to hand over half the world to the commies. Only to end up fighting them in the other half for the next fifty years. Korea, Vietnam, the ME. Thousands of body bags of "our boys".
Rather silly to "help Stalin", if we could have just let them "slug it out to utter exhaustion, and then march over the ruins, a fate Stalin had intended for us.
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@rinzler9171 Yes, top US leaders must have known that the Japanese were going to attack.
Mainly because
1) not leaving Japanese negotiators the diplomatic "face saving" way out
2) British troops in Malaysia were already on high alert, following the spotting of Japanese convoys 2 days before Pearl Harbor
3) the Japanese attack on Malaysia took place 2 hours before Pearl Harbor (on Dec 8th, but because it was on the other side of the International Date Line, it Dec 7th in Hawaii)
Not saying they should have known it was going to be PH, but a high alert of all Pacific bases should have been called for.
It should have been inexcusable to be caught like that, totally unprepared, and then blaming the local base commander (scapegoating).
The embargo you mentioned was of course because of China, which the Japanese had invaded in 1937. Then, to cut off supplies to China, the Japanese invaded French Indochina, directly triggering the US oil and scrap metal embargo.
So, not for the first time, it was "Nam" leading to a US war in the Pacific. Ironical that the US would be fighting in East Asia twice because of the weakness of France (first during WW2, later after the commies kicked the French out of Vietnam).
IMO (debatable) the US should never have made a deal with Stalin concerning Manchuria.
Seeing that Stalin had already tried to gain China twice before (invasion of Xinjiang in 1934, and supporting Mao's Long March) they should have known that Stalin would not be bound by any "honor" or "signature" on a piece of paper.
The fact that China is socialist today, and a western rival, and a united regional power, is a direct result of that.
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When reading the ultimatum, the inexperienced "Limbic brain thinker" is mesmerizingly drawn to "choice (a)"...
I wonder why?
" ... His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives; (a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans, (b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment. If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. (c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to OUR satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated. If you refuse these fair offers (edit: LOL, a false premise), I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours ..."
Note here: All alternatives would have resulted in the removal of these French naval vessels, meaning that there would be no defense against seaborne elements of a potential future attack, to protect French citizens in Tunesia and Algeria.
London: "Looky here. I have a scrap of paper that says WE have the same enemy, but YOU are going to do most of the dying, and our common best fwiends in Washington DC are totally fine with that."
SIR Bolivar: "How honorable of us (ingroup conclusion."
How the mind of a deceiver works:
The deception offered by option (a), sticks out like a sore thumb
If chosen, it would mean that France broke the armistice conditions shortly after signing it, meaning that Italy would no longer be bound by these Armistice conditions. Not only Italy of course, but nothing then stopped Germany from occupying ALL of France as a result, leading to more FRENCH bloodshed and destruction of FRENCH property. If the French stuck to the armistice, on the other hand, it would leave roughly 80% of the French navy as deterence in the Med (40% in Oran/40% in Toulon/status quo). If they chose option (a), it would leave only 40% of the French Navy in Toulon, and possibly none, should Germany decide to occupy all of France because it broke the armistice. NO French ships to deter an attack to French North African territory, because they would have nowhere to operate from should Germany occupy all of France, and Italy if struck at Tunesia/Algeria.
Goading Italy into sending her massive Libyan armies westwards to fight France, rather than eastwards to fight GB, towards the Suez Canal, or if both were tried by Italy, then seriously weakening the forces available for attacking Egypt.
Choosing option (a) would have risked that the entire French Navy had no legal basis to operate under (no French based state), becoming fugives, maybe being forced to hope for breakaway French colony as harbor, and if none of the above then to join Great Britain like the Dutch Navy before, because the Empire HAD naval bases, just what London wanted: the French fleet under British CONTROL, to protect the British Empire "for free."
THE "DIVISION" PER "RULING" OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE
Note here that the Dutch government/navy can NOT serve as an example of "honorable solution" for France a few weeks later, since after May 1940, the Netherlands had nothing more to lose in Europe. All its unoccupied territory was far outside of the reach of the Axis powers (Indo-Pacific),an therefore a typical "apples/oranges"-comparrison.
If France chose the same "honorable government-in-exile" solution as Den Hague, as one can be easily misguided into thinking, France would lose even more: potentially French North Africa, to the "hyena Italy" and the total occupation of all her citizens by Germany. Meanwhile, for all of that, there was no guarantee that London might not simply make a deal with Berlin herself a few weeks later, in order to save its Empire from collapse, because a weak London offered the perfect opportunity for an expanded Axis Berlin-Moscow.
Note here, it was all about the British Empire, while saying "we".
Not a single word is wasted about any contigencies for the protection of French territory or citizens in North Africa, in the event of an attack by (most likely) Italy, being in the most advantageous location to make use of this stage of "French weakness" to invade Tunesia and Algeria (main attack/land warfare), and use the wide-open ports if the French navy bowed down to British demands, as re-supply and landing points for stores and equipment. The entire purpose of a navy is defense against such forms of enemy naval operations in support of land warfare. The ultimatum was a cleverly disguised intention to trade the French Navy in for a "promise" of protecting these with the Royal navy, or a combination of ships under British control.
London: YOU shall be given the choice between deception (a) and dishonor (aka the "false dichtomy").
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall break your armistice agreement, by choosing either deception or dishonor, and continue the Battle of France because it is advantageous to US.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall continue the Battle of France, with NO visible potential for success, because neither WE or the USA is lifting as much as a finger to help (effective support). YOU shall "extend Germany" for as long as possible, to the LAST FRENCH SOLDIER, and goad Italy into attacking Tunesia/Algeria which is YOUR territory, away from Egypt, which is OUR territory.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: Your citizens in France, and your cities and towns, shall goad Germany into continuing their attack, because you broke the armistice with them ...ahem "voluntarily" (he, he,he) so it's ALL YOUR OWN FAULT if the Germans choose to occupy all of France, just like we successfully implemented in Norway in April ("drawing" the bull, off the matador).
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall bow down to a mere captain, who doesn't even have the slightest POWER OF NEGOTIATION, who will decide the future of your citizens and your navy.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall sacrifice French cities and towns and French blood, to save OURS, because you were stupid enough to make a treaty with us. Guess what? WE are an island, which we shall largely retreat to, and YOU have a border with our enemy (imbalance in power).
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall bleed MORE so that WE shall bleed less, just like Poland before.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: And the coolest, COOLEST thing all, YOU are not going to complan about all your BLEEDING, because it was avoluntary decision. We had absolutely nothing to do with YOUR choices.
France: Yeah, right...
London: We have the POWER of the superior mind, because it doesn't matter what WE do, the overwhelming majority of our citizens, in blind trust and incapable of grasping how we tick (strategy), will cheer us along because of our words, and they will do so into their own destruction.
Paris: Yeah, I guess I'm fine with that.
London: Let me rephrase those famous words for you... YOU shall fight on (faraway) beaches, FOR the interests of the British Empire, without even being aware that you are fighting for the British Empire. YOU shall fight in the hills in Tunesia or Algeria, FOR the interests of the British Empire, without even being aware that you are fighting for the British Empire. WE will ensure that the Battle of Britain will start with "a depleted Luftwaffe", and far less firepower, because most of the planes were bombing somewhere else.
(Sounds of cheering crowds in the background)
Paris: I said, nah thanks...
On the 3rd of July 1940, France finally found out what it had signed up for as mere "entente"-best fwiend in 1904, as "buck catcher" (Prof. John Mearsheimer) for the British Empire. It went out the "buck catching"-way, same as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway before, and the same way the Ukraine is being "extended today", and will most likely go out the same "buck catching"-way.
Obviously, viewed through the lens of systems/strategy (specifically grand strategy), if the "favored nation" os the "buck catcher", it can also be used to goad a rival of the "buck passer" (the greater power in the relationship). The "buck passer/s" can then steer, manage, or moderate the resulting crisis or war.
Even Churchill was not convinced that every London lord would be fine with such a mockery of the term "friendship", and prepared two speeches. One defiant, one conciliatory. But he was wrong, and after the bloodbath there was no need to roll out the "conciliation".
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@lilinamouse2111 Germany and Austria-Hungary were not blameless re. the start of WW1.
However, when it came to the concept of "setting up Europe for failure", the lion's share of the blame goes to Russia, France, and the UK.
Notice how almost every history book mentions the M-A-I-N causes of WW1, and of that "A" is for alliances. It was the alliance system which caused the "domino stones" to topple one after the other.
It was Wilhelm and Berlin which tried to change the alliance system, to remove the built in "automation", and as the main benefit, remove the threat of a 2-front war, but their plans to do so were torpedoed at every possible opportunity.
Russia, France and GB wanted to keep Germany "under the boot" of encirclement, so they could control and/or threaten its trade and international expansion.
They wanted to expand their own sphere of influence, markets, and colonies, at the expense of Germany, making dirty little backroom deals amongst each other, excluding Berlin wherever possible.
Greed destroyed Europe.
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@lilinamouse2111 One such example of changing the alliance system, is the Treaty of Bjorko in 1905, and signed by Willhem II and Tzar Nicolas.
If ratified, and as foreseen to include France, it would have served as an early form of collective security for every citizen of continental Europe.
Of course, GB could have used the temporary Russian weakness in 1905 too (Tsushima, revolution, etc.) to conclude a separate peace with St Petersburg, with good prospects of success.
Once implemented successfully, it would have engineered an "impossible big war scenario", per treaty clauses (google this treaty for more info. The wiki article has the exact treaty clauses).
Wilhelm always wanted peace.
A peace which would not draw Germany into one of the many imperialistic Russian "adventures", and potentially drag Germany into a resulting war with another power.
Notice the complete absence of secret land exchanges, scheming little "side plots", the "signing away" of 3rd party territories or rights...
A truly visionary concept.
But of course, for visionaries to succeed, it needs a visionary environment.
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@lilinamouse2111 Tzar Nicolas signed Bjorko, but was outvoted by his 2nd tiers...
Because Russia (1905) was already in discussions with GB (Japan's ally), re. "a deal" concerning the Dardanelles. That is on record, and not speculative. There was obviously more "in it" for St. Petersburg to make a deal with London (chance of expanding into a long desired sphere of influence), rather than with Berlin ("only" a chance of peace between Russia, Germany, and by extension, to include France).
By ratifying Bjorko, it would have been for St Petersburg to convince Paris to "sign up" as well, something they obviously thought too difficult.
As it was, "little a deal" with London could potentially bring them access to a warm water port.
[See the entire "warm water port"-narrative, which is also established historiography, not speculation]
London is on record for dangling "a sweet carrot" in front of St Petersburg's ever greedy nose, in order to torpedo a "grand alliance" on the continent.
Duplicious as ever, Grey made a non-committing "promise", and St Petersburg fell for it:
Note all 1905:
"Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey thought entente with Russia a good idea. On 20 October 1905, during the election, he said:[10]
...if Russia accepts, cordially and whole-heartedly, our intention to preserve the peaceable possession of our Asiatic possessions, then I am quite sure that in this country no government will make it its business to thwart or obstruct Russia's policy in Europe. On the contrary, it is urgently desirable that Russia's position and influence be re-established in the councils of Europe.
and later, writing to his ambassador to Russia Sir Arthur Nicolson:[9]
It is not for us to propose changes with regard to the treaty conditions of the Dardanelles. I think some change in the direction desired by Russia would be admissible and we should be prepared to discuss the question if Russia introduces it.
In early 1907, Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris, raised the question. and talks were carried on in London with Russian Ambassador Count Alexander Benckendorff. Little is known but the "suggestion appears to have been made that Russia should have free egress from the Black Sea through the Straits, while other powers should have the right to send their vessels of war into the Straits without going into the Black Sea" together with some talk of "Russia's occupying the Bosphorus and England the Dardanelles, after which the Straits might be opened to other warships as well." In the event nothing came of the discussions at the time.[9]"
[Wiki]
Obviously, London made "promises" to St Petersburg it never intended to keep, just to avoid an alternative alliance system on the continent, which would have ensured peace (as a "collective system" of security).
Bjorko would not be ratified.
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@thevillaaston7811 The only thing "wall to wall" here is your lack of historical comprehension :-D
"The mid-1870s witnessed a series of violent rebellions against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, and equally violent and repressive responses from the Turks. The Russian Tsar, Alexander II, wanting to intervene against the Ottomans, sought and obtained an agreement with Austria-Hungary. In the Budapest Conventions of 1877, the two powers agreed that Russia would annex Bessarabia, and Austria-Hungary would observe a benevolent neutrality toward Russia in the pending war with the Turks. As compensation for this support, Russia agreed to Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[9]"
[From wiki]
It was a simple "territorial exchange", or the mutual agreement of "no interest".
Russia got the "rights" to annex parts of Besarabia.
Austria-Hungary got the "exchange" to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Aka "a bilateral deal".
They simply just didn't annex Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately.
If the power mongers in St Petersburg have a short-term memory, and then throw a hissy fit (in 1908) in order to "save face" in respect to their own upset citizens (see there), that is really their problem, aka "war mongering".
Austria-Hungary did nothing wrong.
Nice try, [yawn] again ;-)
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@alexh479 Kind words in diplomacy are often a result of necessity rather than what the leaders really thought.
Maybe "revenge" is the wrong word, but De Gaule certainly got some gratification/satisfaction out of his later stand re. British entry into the EU.
Under De Gaule, France finaly put on their "big boy boots".
No more begging for Spitfires (Battle of France), and no more begging for help from an uncaring world of "friends across the Atlantic": cheering you on in an hour of need (May 1940)...but little else. No soldiers, no tanks, no battleships, no honor. Just "hopes and prayers", just silent admiration, and a pat on the back...but not much more. Paris would no longer be begging for help, or grovelling for assisistance.
No more having own ships blown up by "best friends" and their "promises", if one is down and out and forced to surrender by a vastly superior enemy.
No more "cordial" amistad.
Under De Gaule, France had own nukes now, and a "new best fwiend" Konrad Adenauer, and leverage.
A marriage made in heaven :-)
Finaly after hundreds of years, and with a different set of "balance of power", it would not be "empires" squaring off, but "new best friends" with a common enemy this time, and if those Russians were going to come storming through the Fulda Gap, it wasn't London or Washington DC which was going to decide whether West Germans were "poor enough" to start a "world war" for.
One might not like De Gaule for all his other faults, and the list is long. But he did get that one thing right. He rid France of the need for "best friends". No more "faraway empires" with a "geographical advantage" going "well, it doesn't really look that bad...for me...so good luck..."
Accompanied by snidy remarks of "who saved you last time duh?", De Gaule did the only right thing: if Paris wasn't on the same level as Washington/London in NATO, it would be out, and an "associated power".
(Google how that unfolded with "France/De Gaulle/Force the Dissuasion")
Paris would decide if Germans were "poor enough" to help.
When it comes to the crunch, or in an hour of need, it's "me first" in the dog-eat-dog world of big boys and their aspirations.
From that point on, Paris would decide, and Paris only, if Germans are "poor enough"...and wipe a sufficiet amount of mother Russia off the map with own nukes, should a single Russian ever set a single foot on a single "poor West German" in their new barrier state.
And De Gaule?
I guess he threw in a bit of that "revenge is a dish best served cold"-attitude. When London was desparate for "markets", Paris denied entry into the EU with a veto. Third in line, after the "old best fwiends of WW2," Washington DC, and Moscow (rescinding the "percentages agreement" for markets in Eastern Europe): France would now also kick London while it was down and out, economically weak and economically failing...
De Gaule: "You want markets for your Vauxhalls? I want markets for my Citroens and my Renaulds..."
(Google: "Paris vetoes UK applications for EU membership 1963 and 1967").
Just like the "600 London lords" of Empire geostrategists.
Loosely quoting Lord Palmerston: "England has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. Only eternal interests."
And that counts for everyone, also Paris/de Gaule.
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@manilajohn0182 Yes, correct of course.
All existing and aspiring empires are "perfidious by nature". Self-serving, more or less.
Or as I always say "nobody does anything for free", and that includes all empires.
Some might be more benevolent than others, but there is always a "price tag" for "help", and "help" is often self-serving.
It reminds me of the airline safety message of "put on your own oxygen mask first before helping others".
That's how "empires" tick. They "put on their own oxygen mask", and only then "help others"...sometimes :-)
Mackinder is great.
But unfortunately London did not seem to understand nor follow their own geopolitical "logic", and somehow missed the USA's rise "across the pond".
Or the fact that there might be some long-term grievances resulting from history.
Logic almost dictates that London should have sought to unite Europe, not play their "divide and rule" games with the continental powers.
After WW1, they descended one rung, and after WW2 they would lose their markets to the USA, their sphere of interest in Central Europe/Baltics/most of the Balkans to Moscow, the nr.1 position as "ruler of the world, the privilege of "Pax Britannica, both to the USA", their self-determined role of "balancer of powers" for the continent, their stated goal of being the "decider of wars" on the continent, and finally their "Empire".
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For the British Empire, commencing roughly the year 1900, every "victory" was in fact a nail in the own coffin.
The following essay will explain how first London, and then Washington DC used mainly divide and rule/conquer strategies at key watershed moments throughout history in order to effect world domination, mainly facilitated by a geographical advantage. Unlike conventional wisdom suggests, such policies were not only implemented in overseas territories and colonies, but were indeed also used against the continental European powers, within the limitations of the power balance at any given time in history. In order to first become and then later stay the world hegemon, distance coupled with a financial and technological edge, were converted into political means (policies) by London power players. Up to the early-20th century, these realities gave London that slight edge over their continental rivals which were already divided due to a variety of reasons. As time progressed and war ravaged Europe in the first half of the 20th century, technology advanced further, so that the geographical advantage once enjoyed by London, passed over to the USA and Washington DC's power players. After World War 2 the multipolar world up to the 19th century turned bipolar, then unipolar as the Cold War ended or the systems morphed.
Historically, European conflicts between systems based on structurally similar dynasties, turned into a struggle between ideologically different systems. Rather than the previous limited wars up to the early-20th century, wars then became total. The different systems tended to strive to overpower, marginalize, integrate or destroy other conflicting systems if symbioses was not possible. The key to success here, and the novelty of the theory presented, was that the core means employed were strategies resembling divide and rule/conquer. The systems which had the geographical advantage, either allied with, beguiled, befriended or otherwise favored other systems if useful for own gain. What set these loose alliances of friendships or ententes apart from other systems which also united, was a lack of obligation to react in any specific way during times of crises or wars. The distinct advantage of geography being that those with such a competitive advantage would not have to fear an existencial threat to the own systems and could be more bold in international relations, or delaying actions in crises or wars until a favorable point on the timeline, based on the technological standpoint humanity had reached at the point in time.
Such divide and rule strategies were in fact standing London policies, disguised by careful use of language in policies. Since the logic of balanced powers to avoid great wars was widely accepted within the framework of the Concert of Europe, no other capital city seemed to have noticed or objected. Rather than aiding relative peace, which persisted in most of Europe for around a century after 1815, London's policy standpoint as sole "balancer of powers", resulted in an ever greater risk of a total war of the systems. At the core of Europe, these older continental European systems grew in extent and power in the leadup to 1914, under constant stress in efforts to balance power due to the fact that land borders resulted in more exposure to danger from a neighboring system: placing continental powers in a situation of a relative geographical disadvantage while engaging in crises or wars. While London could always find a power to temporarily ally with on the continent, the reverse was not possible (on Britain), because the UK had achieved an early unification process. The "decider" would always be London. Continental powers therefore faced the geographically disadvantageous locations with regards to expansive aims. This was directly opposed to faraway systems which had the geographical advantage of distance from this core of the Old World. Few seemed to have noticed the potential for MAD as time passed. Due to her geographical advantage, and at London's sole discretion, the "balancer" London stood aloof. The technological standpoint at the time meant she was detached from all danger to the own heartland which was England. A role which was guarded by the Royal Navy. London was the "sole divider and sole decider of wars". That eventually lead to the unintentional end of European world rule and domination, including their own. It was a careful use of language which meant that most of the above did not need to be kept hidden, but the words used indeed reveal a standing policy of "divide et impera". In fact, most of it happened out in the open, in newspaper articles, treaties, conferences, political summits, etc. and for all current witnesses to observe and study because just like today, it is possible to drive multiple policies in parallel. Most observers simply did not recognize the events for what they were, or they noticed and considered the status quo as a meritocracy or a well-deserved own right, or they did not pay attention. Distinct systems with many similarities and many differences employing strategies as a way to achieve greater gain for the own system.
The theory comes in two parts, that of 1) divide and rule, in which case the dividing power is actually in a position to exploit an imbalance in power, to impose a ruling on another side by ensuring the continued rift between opposing systems, and the more common 2) divide and gain, where the power intent on creating an advantage for its own system, has to suffice with splitting potential unity in the making apart, but lacks sufficient power to impose a ruling.
Divide and rule/conquer is revealed by events.
Unlike human beings, events don't lie, steal, or kill.
Unlike human beings, events which are proven to have happened, and are not disputed to have occured, do not deceive, manipulate, or "tweak" the own perceived "truths" in order to generate positive feelings in a flurry of "99% ancillary details", which then distorts vision...
The biggest mistakes France ever made was making "best fwiends" with rimlands (geoploitics/London/Washington DC), who were not on the continent of Europe.
In 1940, Paris finally found out how much they were "valued".
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Correct.
French leaders were dumb as a pile of bricks concerning geopolitics and geostrategy.
Because after the "won" WW1, it was the USA and GB which divided the "rule of the world" amongst themselves.
According to Mahan, those who rule the oceans, rule the world.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Thayer_Mahan
France finished WW1 with a mighty army, but was not granted the "rule" of the World Island with this army (see Heartland Theory).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History
Unattainable for the French economy anyway, since according to one historian France had a "giant appetite, but had rotten teeth" (meaning that the willpower of their elites to rule and dominate was not matched by the economy or political landscape which was a shambles after WW1).
In other words, London had the "leverage" to control the destiny of the French Empire (naval power), but in return France did not have the leverage to control the destiny of the British Empire (land forces).
A bad deal, in my books...
France relinquished it's position as a first class naval power in return for "a deal" to dominate or share a few regions (Balkans, ME , Central Europe), but not the geostrategically vital Heartland (aka the "pivot" of Eurasia from which the destruction/dismantling of the British Empire by land forces was possible).
According to London, if London could not rule this herself, or by proxy, it would be divided or "balanced " amongst several rivals.
France allied herself to another power which could simply hop across the channel if a war didn't turn out as expected...
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Yet, once the "unfortunate WW1" (which French leaders played a large part in starting and expanding) was "won"...
My school French isn't the best, so I copied and pasted this from another YT poster, in case you can read French:
"Pour la politique secrète de réarmement de l'Allemagne, d'après les archives (partiellement numérisées dans google books) des services secrets français du 2e Bureau, l'Allemagne avait été prise en flagrant délit de détention et d'exportation d'armes chimiques en 1921 à l'Espagne, alors que ça lui était interdit.
L'Allemagne a semble t'il aussi fait une action de guerre économique contre le franc depuis l'Espagne, alors qu'ils étaient supposé être "écrasés par le diktat".
On aurait pu arrêter la stratégie hostile des 1er allemands militaristes qui allait servir Hitler à cette date là.
Et tous les petits accords des allemands militaristes avec les autres pays, la Yougoslavie, l'URSS,... étaient aussi plus ou moins connu des services secret français et d'après les rapports les anglais savaient aussi.
Quant on lit dans les rapports des services secrets que les anglais faisait du lobbying anti-français dans le Monde, c'est pas cool.
Et la France va en réunion diplomatique avec les autres pays, la France dit que l'Allemagne se réarme secrètement, viole le traité de désarmement, tout le monde fait comme si c'était faux, alors que tout le monde est complice ou témoin du réarmement allemand. L'allemagne avait de l'argent pour faire des recherches en armement interdits et des guerres économiques secrètes, mais pas pour payer d'indemnités de la guerre, xd."
(Waard la France)
In a nutshell, French leaders whining to London about Germany re-arming, even though...uhm...they knew why London wasn't going to do anything about it.
London's policy for the continent was called "Balance of Power".
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power#:~:text=Balance%20of%20power%2C%20in%20international,power%20of%20the%20other%20side.
That meant that London had unilaterally decided that it would be "the balancer" of power on the continent.
With Berlin, Moscow and Vienna (temporarily) out of the picture, this policy did not favor a re-emergence of an overpowering Paris or Warsaw.
This was a well-known fact at the time: the British admiral-in-chief, more or less expressed it this way to his French counterpart in February 1919 when the discussions on the first treaty of naval limitation began (they couldn't believe it).
Discussions which have been archived and scanned at the archives at the Quai d'Orsay
If Paris did not agree with the attitude of the lords in London, they should have looked for a more powerful continental ally than the weak states in the Little Entente, or the economically impotent Warsaw....
So the symbol of world domination (Navies and Battleships) was decided on in Washington 5-5-3-2-2....
A mere "2" for France, making it quite clear what Washington and London thought about France's position in the world after WW1.
They, the new rulers, gave themselves a "5".
A mere "2" for France, who had scraps of diplomatic "world rule" (Balkans, Central Europe, and the ME) thrown at her, and who had leaders who thought "walls" (Maginot) and encirclement of Berlin would protect her forever and ever in a military sense...
What was needed was the wisdom of "a de Gaulle", allying himself to an arch enemy, "an Adenauer".
Unfortunately, it took another world war, more endless death and suffering, the collapse of the British Policy of Balance of Power at the end of WW2, and last not but least...the threat of mutual destruction by red hordes storming through the Fulda Gap and not stopping until they reached Paris, before wiser heads came together and decided to bury the hatchet...
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