Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  2.  @thevillaaston7811  From historians.org: " Just exactly what was Britain’s ability to keep on with cash payments in December 1940? She had entered the war in September 1939 with about 4.5 billion dollars of gold and investments in securities in the United States. Most of these belonged to private British citizens and British companies. During the first year of the war the British government had bought these holdings from its citizens, paying for them in British government bonds. Then it sold the securities and gold reserves for dollars, and pooled the whole amount in one fund. This process produced a supply of dollars on this side with which Britain could purchase war goods in the United States. From September 1939 to the end of 1940 the British managed to realize some 2 billion dollars—in addition to the 4.5 billion dollars mentioned above—from sales of gold newly mined in the British Empire, from exports, and other sources. But this additional amount had been spent in 1940 for war purchases, chiefly in the United States. Thus, by December 1940, the British supply of dollars was down to about 2 billion. About 1.5 billion of this would be needed to pay for munitions and supplies already ordered in the United States but not yet delivered. So low was Britain’s dollar reserve that new orders for war goods had almost stopped at the time when she needed them most." All that cash for the American Century coffers. Bleeding Empire dry... Nothing's free baby. Yes, yes....
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  4.  @thevillaaston7811 Yes. Your "best fwiends" over on the other side of the Atlantic, far far away from the action...in no danger whatsoever...and the American Century for those who walk the corridors of power, and fairy tales of the "Big Three" and cute "Uncle Joe" for those who don't understand how the world works... Ever wonder why the "best friends" over in the New World didn't sail in like heroes to help out in 1939 or 1940? Because during WW2 the concept of "a Big Three" was a joke, because the "big three" were not only allies, but also rivals. Each wanting to be on top once the war was over... At the turn of the century, nothing symbolized power and rule like the big gun battleships, and by 1945 nothing symbolized power and rule like the mushroom cloud of a nuke... But while at the end of WW1 the powers got together and divided and negotiated who would get what share of the "symbol of power (Washington Naval Treaty, 1922), at the end of WW2, there would be no such negotiations. Strange... The USA said to the rest of the world, including "good friends", you shall not have nuclear weapons! https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/british-nuclear-program Strange, how "best friend forever" would let the financially drained GB spend 5 years and millions of Pounds on developing a weapon for themselves which was already completed in development...and just had to be handed over to "a friend"... Strange also, that during WW2 GB merrily gave their "special friend" all the best war-winning secrets (Tizzard Committee, and all that), but when it became time for the "new best friend" to return the favor, and give the secret of nuclear arms back to GB whose scientists had helped develop nukes in the USA, the answer was "no, it's mine". @TheVilla Aston Cash, cash, cash....for the coffers of the American Century... https://www.ucg.org/the-good-news/the-american-century-what-was-really-behind-it Thanks GB. You not only practically financed the development of our nukes, costing around 2 billion dollars, you also gave us your scientists to help the US develop them... Thanks "best fwiends" :-) That is some weird "special relationship" if you ask me. A "friend" who does not even want you to have nukes, if he has some himself?
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  9.  @thevillaaston7811  Looks like I'll have to answer my own question again... They didn't because there was nothing "in it" for Washington D.C. Washington DC followed the principle of "America first", even if not propagating this aloud... https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Century If London or Paris thought there'd be "another Versailles" after WW2, with the British and French empires "drawing lines on the map" and "carving up power" to protect their own interests, they were to be disappointed... https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power The attempt by Churchill to use the USA to throw Stalin out of Eastern Europe, and remain "the balancer" of power, too transparent. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable There would be no US support to start Unthinkable. The "poor Poles have to be liberated"-argument, wasn't swinging... Of course "not enough nukes", or "there are just tooooo many of them Winnie", and "it's soooooo risky, my fwiends" were made. A fool, is one who cannot distinguish between "excuses" and "ulterior motives"... After being dragged into another European (World) War, Washington decided to become the "balancer of powers" herself, and Europe was divided in "East" and "West"... Stalin: "I figured out Washington isn't going to support you in your efforts to restore the post-WW1 Balance of Power, so I changed my mind about the Percentages Agreement we made. Here's Greece, now eff off and I'll take the rest 100%. Whadda ya gonna do about it?" Churchill: "...but, but, but...you pwomised..."
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  12.  @thevillaaston7811  British and French leaders went to Versailles under the rather childish illusion that the SU and Germany would stay weak forever and ever and ever.... They ignored the big picture... And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all... The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire. The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent. For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world... According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire... Therefore, totally destroying Germany, or alienating France was neither wise nor in GB 's interests. Not hindsight, but a lack of foresight (aka "short-sightedness") Concerning WW2. Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.). After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow). France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir had slipped under Washington's wings... Germany = alles kaputt Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies... GB was no longer the boss. Nothing left to "balance" with... Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south... https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself. And down went the British Empire too... Sad. So sad...
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  29. Obviously, the only mistake France ever made was choosing GB as a "friend". When it comes to history, it doesn't take long for historians large and small, to appear on the scene with "shouda done"-logic. Of course, everybody else "shouda just" done this or done that, then the world "wouda been" such a gweat place... Japan for example. Japan suffered from a geographical dilemma typical of powers which lacked the ability (economy/industry) to focus on one strategy, like France. Just like France, which also had (a result of geography) political forces which divided economic/industrial/financial power between a "navy league" of supporters, and an "army league", resulting in both being less powerfull. Japan, as an island, should have concentrated on the navy at the expense of the army, just like GB which was also an island. Its failure was trying to do both, at the expense of her own population (domestic economy). If one sees the logic of that: Same with France. So where are the historians pointing out that France "coulda" started a rapprochement with Germany after "Francophobe"-Bismarck took his hat, thereby enabling France to concentrate on its navy and its empire? Obviously, with a treaty in its pocket, there would be no need for such a powerful army. France instead "chose" Russia, thinking that there would be more "in it" for herself (imperialism). End effect 50 years later, is that it went down. Some would say that this was a good thing. "Obviously", millions dying to "end colonialism" was a great thing, since no other option ever ever ever existed... So. Back to square one. Where are these "shouda done" historians stating that France should have simply morphed its own empire into a "franc block of equals" (economic/military block of equal partners), avoiding their own bloody colonial/decolonisation history altogether, which would even have made Machiavelli very happy in his grave indeed... Of course, according to the "finger pointers", it's only always and ever only the other guy who always only ever "shouda done" something different. Never the own leaders. Never point back at the own self, or "best friends"... The above is of course the "false dilemma", stating that the own "dear leaders" only and ever always had that 1 choice, and made the right one, while everybody else was always just "wrong/evil". From wiki: "A false dilemma, also referred to as false dichotomy, is an informal fallacy based on a premise that erroneously limits what options are available. The source of the fallacy lies not in an invalid form of inference but in a false premise. This premise has the form of a disjunctive claim: it asserts that one among a number of alternatives must be true. This disjunction is problematic because it oversimplifies the choice by excluding viable alternatives, presenting the viewer with only two absolute choices when in fact, there could be many. For example, a false dilemma is committed when it is claimed that, "Stacey spoke out against capitalism; therefore, she must be a communist". (end of quote) The truth is of course that everybody always had multiple choices at most times in history, and own leaders simply did not choose correctly, but were enticed by their "darker side" to step towards the wrong side of history. France's main mistake was not Mers el Kebir, but choosing GB as a "best friend" looooong before WW1.
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  32.  @m00nch11d  Betrayed came at a price. Because there was the big picture...and this is how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it. The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire. The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent. [Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power] For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world... According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire... Therefore, neither totally destroying Germany, nor dissing France, was either wise or in GB 's interests. Concerning WW2. Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.). After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow). France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings. Germany = alles kaputt Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies... GB was no longer the boss. Nothing left to "balance" with... Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south... Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
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  50. THE BARBARY WARS; AND LUISIANA The Barbery Wars were of course not about "ending slavery." The Barbary States employed an economy partly based on plunder and slavery, and it was attacked by a new state (USA) which partly based its economy on plunder and slavery. Sweden was still an imperialist power back then, and "player." Why the US economy was based on plunder, and land-theft? See the consecutively running Indian Wars, accompanied by land theft and attrocities. US slave trade and slavery was only decided 50 years later, during the Civil War. Search for the "appeal to emotion. There were no "good guys" vs. "bad guys" at all, only the stronger, better organized, and technologically more advanced ingroup ("us") vs. the weaker outgroup ("them"). How do the Barbary Wars fit into the global picture, which was the Napoleonic Wars, just kicking off in earnest? (1803) Because at this early point in time, the USA needed a few "friends" in North America, and paying tribute to deflect the forces of the Barbery States (affiliated with the Ottoman Empire) away from the own trade interests, meant that this money and these resources could then be employed by pirates to attack others: and both Spain and France were needed as friendly powers (Luisiana Purchase). One could hardly expect a solid foundation of a better political understanding, whilst US resources were employed to attack those one wished to align with. A "gift" was needed. A war to ...cough, cough..."end slavery"... Such land purchases were of course not to be understood the same way we as commoners "buy" houses. These were simply the exchange of "spheres of influence" under which the understanding was that the "seller" would no longer meddle in the affairs of the "buyer," and that the "buyer" could do with the territory as seen fit. A similar deal was later also struck with Spain (1819/Adams-Onis Treaty), already too weak to really influence matters globally anymore, after the Napoleonic Wars in Europe collectively and conveniently "extended" all the major European powers. US money was simply re-routed from "paying pirates" to "buying a sphere of influence," in broad terms. Outside powers paid the Barbary states tribute, which meant safety for the own, whilst directing the pirates at whomever was not paying tribute. That meant richer states with means to pay could direct the attacks away from themselves, at others. In other words, the Berbers were the proxies of whoever paid them. How the Barbary Wars fit into the bigger overall global geopolitical "picture," see below...
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