Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Drachinifel"
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They paid the price later on.
Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
[Google: The American_Century]
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
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@raywest3834 No, in view of how London had "set up" continental Europe to protect their Empire, it was unwise to "diss France", with 2 (note two, not one) hostile systems eyeing territory.
First and foremost, despite what our history books say, was "communism", exemplified by "Moscow/Stalinism/Stalin".
There were other, and better options, even at the time.
Fatal mistake in June 1940?
Not leaving it to capable commanders "on the spot", or the entire "leading from the front"-narrative.
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@raywest3834 To add to the above, or to expanding a bit on the concept of "leading from the front".
Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons.
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
True.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant...
Conclusion: It was a mistake at the time, not only in hindsight.
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@raywest3834 How was France dissed?
It is mentioned in almost every doc about Mers.
Remember?
The pledge to rather scuttle the own ships, rather than hand them over, was simply ignored.
That decision would also come back to haunt the Allies later.
A worthy and mutually agreed upon agreement would have aided the war effort in multiple ways.
Remember the decision of French soldiers, who would rather repatriate to France rather than fight on? Remember the bravery of the few French soldier who protected Bir Hachim in the Western Desert campaign? Imagine there were 100,000 French soldiers in the Western Desert, rather than a few thousand...
The Indian and ANZAC soldiers fighting here could have been stationed in Singapore, fighting off the Japanese.
And the French ships sunk in Toulon in 1942, as promised?
They could have hunted submarines, provided shore bombardment for Allied landings, served as AA defense for convoys, etc., etc.
Like I said before.
It was not only wrong in hindsight.
Not trusting own capable commanders "on the spot", to make accurate judgements when given an objective (say, for example: "ensure that the French fleet doesn't join the Axis"), rather given a specific order is an attitude problem, which comes back to those adhering to such fallacious command structures.
Usually, politicians, overriding the better judgment of capable military commanders present on site.
Our history books are full of such cases, and Mers is simply another such case of "politics meddling in a military issue".
What is your standpoint re. "The generals sitting in faraway chateauxs", directing actions hundreds of miles away, of which they don't even have exact realtime information?
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All agreed.
Of course there were choices.
Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons (lack of communication).
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
True.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant.
Somerville, given an objective ("ensure that the French Navy doesn't switch sides") would have meant enough leeway for alternatives.
Peace of mind for London, and a "face saving way out" for the new French leaders, barely in office.
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@Doveton Sturdee
You seem to be a regular "defender" of the British Empire here.
Read below please.
All you'll have to do is to figure out how and where "Mers el Kebir" fits into the big picture reality:
Today, Washington DC intends to keep its role as "alpha" of the world, gained from European empires after WW2.
There is even an "insider joke" about NATO, which is that it intends to "keep Germany down, and Russia out".
Effect: Washington DC/USA stays the master of European affairs.
NATO is now just another tool in the toolbox of "divide and conquer", going back all the way to the 18th century, when the USA was first established.
European powers failed to morph NATO into a more suitable system following the end of the Cold War "around the year 2000".
A system including Russia and all post-Warsaw Pact nations equally, in a comprehensive security agreement.
Note always: What did not happen.
Of course a comprehensive security agreement without ...ahem...."parallel tweaties", and a "morphed NATO" into a strong arm of international law = power to actually follow up with punch if "the law" is broken.
A new system under which laws, codified by the international community, actually formed a basis of cooperation, not "muh interests you know..."
US leaders realized that the key to their own superiority lay in dividing Europeans any which way they could (note, "Europe" is a geographical term, and includes Russia).
Sowing dissent.
The "freedom and democracy"-argument, backed up by coffers filled to the brim with "slush fund" money...
Sow dissent.
Irrelevant of whether the actors come with good intentions, or are even aware of what they are ultimately doing: Divide and Rule/Conquer, for a different system.
"In Holland, a bourgeois democratic revolution had been defeated and its leaders, who had been instructed in the American Revolution by John Adams, were cruelly suppressed or driven into exile by the Stadtholder, William V, Prince of Orange, in league with the old oligarchs and with the intervention of Britain and Prussia. Adams and Jefferson agonized for the Dutch Patriots, but felt that they had been betrayed by their own excesses as well as by their Bourbon ally. The fact that France, pledged to the Patriots, had not lifted a finger in their support offered a melancholy lesson for the United States..."
(from ugapress manifoldapp)
Who doth even recognize the "freedom and democracy"-argument here?
Irrelevant of intentions, it fits the definition of "sowing dissent" in an existing "system".
Irrelevant of whether the reader has any personal preferences: the actions fit words, and words have definitions, which are a strategy. Divide others, to avoid unity.
Of course, at this early stage the USA had no way to implement "rule" in any form.
A divided Europe suited Washington DC just fine, because should Europe ever unite, it could pose an existential threat to the new USA...
The more division in Europe, the better.
Support whatever divides.
Oppose whatever unites.
For the own side: the more unity in North America, the better.
The "rule"-part over Europe would have to wait...
And in North America, other...ahem..."systems" would have to go too (American Civil War, all about "poor slaves" we are told...)
So much for the New World.
In the leadup to WW1, London thought they were clever, and that they could gain by dividing everybody else in Europe. "Divide and rule/conquer": note that "rule" has different meanings, and one meaning of the word is simply to "dictate terms" to others, based on an advantage in power.
To make it clear, London never intended "direct rule" over any continental country or adversary, because they were to weak for that, but rather to divide continental powers and thereby gain the advantage of dictating terms in case of negotiations, crisis, or wars.
What "the lords" didn't seem to notice, was that while they were "ruling" over the continent, based on a geographical advantage, somebody else was playing the same game with them.
It was Washington DC, playing "divide and conquer/rule" with Europe, and to the leaders here, GB was simply a part of "Europe" (geographical entity).
There are two ways to conquer people: one is by war, the other by debt, which is exactly what Washington DC did.
After a few hundred years, the game had simply been flipped 180 degrees.
Around 1900 there were "two systems" in Europe: one "librul" (lol), one "conservative"...
The "dividers and rulers" could play to their heart's content...
And around 2000 "history rhymed", and nobody noticed...
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In view of the overall grand strategy implications as painted below, in which the military collapse of France offered the potential of an "strengthening Eurasian block of authoritarian states" formating, and "striking outwards", the British pressure on France to remove the French fleet from North Africa, where they protected the French Empire against potential Italian attack (a potential "hyena move" by Mussolini) becomes clear.
If the French fleet could be strongarmed into leaving North Africa wide open to a seaborne assault, the Italians could be baited into attacking here, rather than concentrating their forces on British territories like Egypt or East Africa (first shots fired in June 1940), or reinforcing their military forces for attacks on Greece. Or in other words, luring Italy into "overextending" her forces in what looked like already defeated or weakened enemies.
How could Italy be goaded into attacking French North Africa?
French strategists of course, already knew what "game" was being played.
For Italy, the exposed seaborne flank of French North Africa was the "honeypot" (strategy) intended to divert Rome's attention into "going west", rather than "going east" (grand strategy).
Sticking a knife into the back of an old "ally" was not a difficult choice, and the only mistake Paris ever made was trusting these deceitfull "Albions" in London in the first place, when they first came with their "fwiendly offers" for burrying the hatchet way back in the 1880s...
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It would be one of the last times.
After WW2, GB lost the political leverage to impose onto others, and lost their Empire.
All causal effects of the own "attitude problem".
"Right or wrong", or "Was it a war crime", is all irrelevant.
Because there's always a big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Google: britannica & balance-of-power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, or dissing it (like France) would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, alienating France, and totally destroying Germany was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to play "balancing games" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...you loose your empire to the new kids in town...
From the unmistakable "Nr.1" in 1900, down to "merely on par" with Washington DC after WW1, down to "third fiddle" during the Cold War. All in less than a single lifetime...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself. The world was divided in "East" and "West".
And down went the British Empire too...
I suggest not wasting your time arguing with immoral people.
Simply tell them the outcome of own actions.
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