Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Biographics"
channel.
-
When the attempts at ending "Splendid Isolation" began, London started negotiations with all continental powers, incl. Germany.
Since no historian has ever pointed out that the intention of such talks were ultimately multi-lateral (in other words, single treaties which could form a basis for some yet unknown long-term goal of a "united Europe") we can safely assume that the intentions were bilateral only, and that there were no long-term aims at all at the "veto powers"-level of London politics.
Famously around 1900: "On the initiative of Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, there were three rounds of British-German talks between 1898 and 1901. The British decided not to join the Triple Alliance, broke off the negotiations with Berlin, and revived the idea of a British-French alliance.[6]" (wiki)
Note how the history books often blame Germany for the failure of these talks. What London wanted was "continental armies" opposing each other, or a "continental army" for the advantage of own British Empire aims and goals. Suffice to say, Berlin recognized the nature of the counter-offers made by London.
Another reason was of course also London's intention to head off the German naval programs (see the exact timeline under the wiki entry "German Naval Laws") up for approval, by dangling the "sweet carrot" of an alliance in front of the German Reichstag. The intention was obviously to "divide" the Reichstag's "hawks" and "doves", which would then torpedo the Naval Laws...lol, pun intended...
London strangely always appeared on Berlin's doorstep, with offers of sorts, when changes to upgrade Berlin's naval laws were underway. Weird coincidence, I'm sure...
Anyways.
Not for the first time, it was London which broke off, because London never intended, or seriously considered such a possibility which would have ended "Splendid Isolation". Not following the year 1890, when it was also negotiated between London and Berlin, and turned down by London, and not at the turn of the century. It does not matter that there were some in London who did favor more European unity. What mattered was that the "veto powers" like Chamberlain, did not regard any unity in Europe as desirable, and would have vetoed any attempt by others to achieve it. All in combination with other lords who also enjoyed the power of the veto, in peer-controlled "top down" groups outside of the forces of democratic means (which were from the "bottom up"). No UK citizen could influence such "peer controlled" ingroups in charge of strategies, because "democracy" did not affect them. The same was true in the USA at the time BTW, in case the criticism is "the undemocratic others" on the continent of Europe. With regards to the question "who controls the strategies", all the powers were in the same boat, and it did not matter if one power was a democracy, and the other more autocratic.
Any attempt to "spin" history in efforts to point fingers elsewhere eventually falls flat, based on evidence. Overwhelming evidence, the nature of which is revealed in the many comments below.
Suffice to say: London did not want unity in Europe, and never aimed for it, because London intended to "divide and gain/impose" from the division of continental powers.
There was never the intention (despite "kind words") for herself to be a part of any European unity, nor to tolerate any form of powerful continental European unity, should this arise somewhere.
Any unity arising on the continent = the feared "single hegemony".
Of course anybody can launch a counter-theory stating that London's ultimate goal was a "United States of Europe" in some or other form. They would then just have to point to how the first binding mutually agreed-upon treaty/alliance which was signed, then intended to incorporate all European powers in some or other "play by ear" step-by-step approach (also two strategies).
Good luck...
Strategies.
Here is the reality.
As a general rule, if there is no signed deal safeguarding own interests then a nation/state must implement steps to safeguard these interests herself. As long as there was no understanding (treaty/alliance/accord) between London and Berlin whatsoever, Berlin would have to accept that Germany would be GB/Empire's enemy in case there was war on the continent, regardless of "who started it."
London determined its "interests" on the continent herself, based on the policy of "balanced powers", and London would oppose the winning side, not the "wrong" side. For London, the sole determining factor was "who was winning", and it would then join the weaker/losing side.
In order to become London's "best fwiend", Germany would have to lose in a war on the continent, regardless of "who started it".
A ridiculous supposition, implied by London's own policies.
Berlin simply reacted to a London policy standpoint, and therefore prepared for this eventuality. The danger of a naval blockade had to be countered as a contingency in case of war (see below essay regarding the "security dilemma of states").
The lords wanted it that way, so the lords got it that way.
The "ententes" with France (1904) and Russia (1907) and the end results of long negotiations going back decades, changed nothing in regards to the above.
"Empires" don't have "friends".
In case a war broke out on the continent, for whatever reason, or whoever "started it" (according to whatever cherry-picked "hopped on" criteria): London would still oppose the winning side, to avoid the single hegemony.
In case the winning side happened to be the own "best fwiends" France and Russia, London would join whomever opposed them...
Should the "Russian steamroller" roll into Germany, crushing Germany against "the anvil" France, it would simply join Germany against Russia and France. Others would bleed, and end up "mutually exhausted", and London would gain for "little ventured" (all strategies).
There was no binding treaty that would have avoided this.
Who needs binding treaties, if one has the geographical advantage, guarded by the strongest navy?
London did not need anything from any continental power, or so they thought.
They thought they could simply "hop around" onto any power, for the short-term gain of avoiding any one (or alliance) from gaining during times of peace, and winning during times of war.
The lords therefore never made serious offers for any alliances in times of peace, with any other power in Europe even though they should have (search for: Machiavelli/Balance of Power).
A "balance of powers" is not subjective, but an objective reality which needs to be attained.
"Friends" means nothing.
London never addressed its own collective attitude problem, which was that it wanted "junior partners" on the continent which would implement the aims and goals of Empire indirectly, and that all that was needed to ensure this was the strongest navy in the world ("Two Power Standard"). Lords with veto powers went around looking for "friends" and these "friends" were given the feeling of being equals. "Feelings" means nothing though.
Interesting in this respect were British intentions to find such perceived "equals/friends" in Sweden/Norway in 1939/40. The strategists here in Scandinavia were smarter, and knew exactly what their "function" was to "empires" (strategies). They therefore tactfully declined British advances in regards to "just passing through to help Finland", recognizing that "ending like Poland" was not a desirable potential future. These strategists knew what they were talking about, and the habit "empires" had of finding gullible "lightning rods" and "soft underbellies" for their own aims and goals, often leaving the chosen "best fwiend" in a state of total ruin. A little known detail tucked away in the folds of a few history books regarding how the world really works, drowned out the 99% of ancillary details...
Norway/Sweden 1939/1940 = Ukraine 2008 - 2022
The Ukraine today, "ending like Poland".
Little friends who will be encouraged and supported to fight to the last man.
Empire and her little helpers: "Can you bring me some more popcorn and chips, dear...great show, great show..."
End of Part 2
(This essay is not a singularity, but fits in with other comments made over the course of the past few years under this video, and must be read as a continuous thought with re. to the strategies states/empires employed, and still emplo
4
-
The more authoritarian German government is often criticised in hindsight (historian fallacy).
Germany was a constitutional monarchy, with limited democracy for "normal" people. That can of course be criticized from a modern perspective, but most other countries at the time weren't better either. Most were far worse.
Germany's government was a reflection of its surroundings, its geographical disadvantage in terms of grand strategy in Central Europe (google "situational dispositioning").
Re. the military influence on the Berlin government: it was certainly not unique either. A reality which many historians today also forget to criticize. Russia, Serbia and other capitals had similar "decision making shortcuts".
In Berlin the military decision makers had no or little parliamentary oversight and it was left to a few strategists to determine "war" or "no war". Again it is easy to criticize using modern criteria, but also easy to understand when using the valid facts at the time: Germany was the only European country threatened by a 2-front war, so that a rapid chain of command was in response to the circumstances at the time (geography).
Cause and effect.
If there was a war in Europe, countries like GB could afford to debate for a few weeks (an island).
The same is also true for France or Russia which had no "2-front war"-danger, and Paris-St Petersburg could also afford a slightly slower reaction time.
The authoritarian attitude and the "short decision making routes" was largely determined by geography. With less warlike and imperialist neighbours, especially Russia (see below comments), Germany could also have afforded to, and would have transformed to a more pure form of democracy earlier and volutarily.
Here we should use biblical logic which says "do not judge unless one is in the shoes of the one being judged".
That is what the Bible as a moral compass suggests, in efforts to avoid "sowing seeds"...
4
-
By 1914 Europe had divided itself into two power blocks.
A circumstance often blamed on Berlin and especially on Wilhelm II.
Two powerful "blocks": Germany/Austria-Hungary in a Dual Alliance (with the "sorta"-partner Italy joining later), and on the other side France/Russia in a military alliance with their "sorta"-partner GB.
These two blocks are often conflated or talked about as being the effects of the same logic and reasoning, or even more fallacious, that the first logically lead to the second (causation).
Only one was a result of necessity.
The other was voluntary, without a real need.
"However, the impact of these decisions [edit for clarification: effects of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1878] had serious consequences on German-Russian relations, as Tsarist officials blamed Germany for allowing England and Austria-Hungary to win major concessions at the Congress (edit: more on that later). And despite a long-standing friendship, the Tsar threatened a war of retaliation against Germany. This sudden crisis helped solidify the growing close relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in October 1879, a defensive alliance was signed by the two German powers. This would prove to be the first alliance in the slow build-up of tensions leading to World War I."
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Kenneth Allen Shafer for the Master of Arts in History presented June 29, 1989. Title: The Congress of Berlin of 1878: Its Origins and Consequences
Bismarck had to act because of a specifically voiced threat (note: no "feelings" involved).
There was no choice.
Re. the second "block":
Some 20 years after her ill-fated attempt to torpedo Bismarck's German unification process with a preventive war (aka "war of choice") in 1870, the emotions caused by this war had died down somewhat, and Paris was given a "test" by Berlin's new management (Wilhelm/Caprivi): the choice between better relations with Germany (aka "rapprochement") as evidenced by a "New Course" in Berlin after 1890, or expanding her own power by an alliance with another European empire.
Paris' choice was not quite unexpected.
According to the "101 rules of empire building", states have the possibility to increase their power by alliances. And that is what Paris did the minute they were "released" from their political isolation. No sooner than they had found their "new friends" in St Petersburg, and the new power it afforded, than Paris indulged in a more confrontational course against British expansionism, including threats of war, in SE Asia (see 1893).
The treaties made by Bismarck were not aimed at any expansion nor did it have an aggressive intent.
Wilhelm took over these treaties in 1888 because they already existed.
After 1890, Wilhelm II did not extend the Reinsurance Treaty because he wanted better relations with all neighbors: Russia, France and GB. The Reinsurance Treaty had stood in the way of better relations because it isolated France. Wilhelm ended this isolation hoping it would result in a "new course" (under Caprivi) with "simplified/better relations". Unlike the events leading to the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1878, France/Russia were not threatened by the "Neuer Kurs" (Caprivi). The often claimed "German threat" by "nasty Wilhelm" was simply a convenient smokescreen for Paris/St Petersburg to hide their real intentions (ulterior motive).
So why did they ally, stating a very specific course of action for the event of an (entirely fictional since never threatened) "German/A-H mobilisation"?
Because such an alliance was "de facto" also directed against GB/Empire, and such mobilisations were only plausible in the event of an Anglo-German Alliance resulting due to better understanding between London and Berlin (potentially possible after a good start offered by the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty in 1890).
Fact? Wilhelm never threatened either France nor Russia, but he did hope for a deal or an accord of sorts between Berlin and London, which aroused suspicion in Paris/St Petersburg.
Christopher Clark devotes an entire chapter (with sources) as to how this unfolded in his book Sleepwalkers.
2
-
When comparing big picture/macro-level events today and 125 years ago, the fact that today's stability is safeguarded by treaties, is clear to most people.
Unity can only be achieved through treaties, which benefit all equally, and which consider the security issues of all equally.
With a negotiated and signed treaty, both parties (bilateral) or all partners (multilateral) know were they are standing, and there are binding conditions which can be refered to, resulting in mutually beneficial rewards for all.
*The foundations of security granted by the EU and NATO (amongst others) are all in the form of treaties.*Such treaties have given Europe its second period of extended relative peace after WW2 (the first was generally considered to be 1815 to 1914). These two periods had only few and limited wars in Europe.
The first lasted almost a hundred years.
As for the second extended period of peace, we shall see...
Bismarck acknowledged the value of binding treaties with mutually agreed upon clauses, as a major contributing factor towards safety and stability. The bigger the scope of such all inclusive treaties, the bigger the benefit for all of those citizens/inhabitants so included. Bismarck intended to enhance the scope of "little treaties" with a local impact, into bigger and more comprehensive treaties with an ever widening impact on those included in these treaties (Dual Alliance, turned into the Triple Alliance). A step by step approach. If not this year, then the next...
The Triple Alliance was open to all, but unfortunately one can only lead a horse to the water, but can't make it drink.
Once there is security via treaties for all, all can grow.
Nothing avoid the Triple Alliance, from being turned into a Quadrilateral security dialogue, followed by a treaty.
True today.
True, 100 or 150 years ago
Furthermore, most people see treaties as only to "address a specific outside danger", which is only half the story. The other half being that it also contributes to the internal unity of the masses so combined "per signature" of leaders, and should such a big picture treaty/agreement be missing, there is the danger that outside forces will open Pandora's Box ("divide and rule", by preying on the emotions of weaker minds in every society...greed, hate, fear, envy, anger, etc.).
It does not matter how "evil" anybody terms treaties like the EU/NATO to be: Only a fool would wish to return to the world as it was 100 years ago with no such comprehensive mutually beneficial binding treaties (EU = mainly economic in nature/NATO = security).
If anybody thinks that the value of such treaties are only determined or "weighed" by the threats posed by outside forces, think again. You don't believe that Europeans can ever become enemies again, and such treaties are meaningless because "people today are different/better"? Look around the blogs and comments sections of the internet. It does not matter how good majorities are. All it needs is a few misguided fools, to get any ball rolling. Once the ball rolls, it quickly snowballs as every Tom Dick and Harry jumps on the bandwagon with the own agenda...
If you believe that good people will create a better world, without binding and mutually beneficial agreements, you are already living in a fool's paradise.
It's like signing away laws/regulations/neighborhood cops on the micro level of society, thinking that the "decency of the many" will then unite and rule...lol, no.
Peace during those times (leadup to WW1) was widely accepted to be considered "honor" for the leaders, and achieved by "balanced powers", not treaties as such. Treaties at the time were broad in scope at the very top (Concert of Europe), and almost all treaties dealt only with specific issues. There was no treaty even remotely similar to what the EU or NATO is today.
Logic of "balance": as long as all powers were similar in capability, then any war would end in a draw or at best a Pyrrhic victory even for the "winners", thereby removing the incentives to use war as an extention of politics or gain.
Logic of "honor": As long as everybody remained "decent" and "honorable", there would be no need for treaties.
A fool's paradise.
Because "decency/honor" is not a defined term, and also not a self-evident truth, and it depends very much on intepretation.
It is subjective as a personal standpoint, and subservient to other factors to those who seek ever more power, wealth, and gain.
As soon as one implements conditions depending on emotions and "gut feelings" rather than signed agreements, one sets the stage for disaster.
And rising imperialism soon set that "stage" for Europe, as easily recognized by the USA, which stayed out or took over a largely ancillary function in "European imperialism" (from an elevated geographical advantage).
The British Empire, at the height of its power at the turn of the previous century (1900) was the key to "balanced European powers" according to the logic of those times.
Historians who refer to the European balance of power, usually forget one major point: the historical "European balance of power" as valid for the entire globe (because here was where "power" was centered), was being replaced by a new "global balance of power" which included the USA. A change taking place at the time ("around 1900") which London would have needed to address.
Note London, not anybody else.
London was the self-proclaimed "balancer of powers".
The need to end its own isolation was recognised.
The "spirit" was willing, but the "mind" was weak though.
Upon closer investigation, London never really ended its own "Splendid Isolation", despite claims to the contrary.
It never signed comprehensive, binding treaties with other major powers, let alone try to thread a comprehensive European security agreement. It never seriously considered establishing a more united Europe, to "balance out" the rise of the USA.
End of Part 1
(This essay is not a singularity, but fits in with other comments made over the course of the past few years under this video, and must be read as a continuous thought with re. to the strategies states/empires employed, and still employ today)
2
-
2
-
2
-
On the micro level, only a fool would try to ensure own safety, by making friends 200 miles away. No, of course, a strong neighborhood, and support of a competent local police is what people choose.
Yet, when it comes to states, and empires, leaders become erroneous in their decisions on alliances or co-operation...
Choosing a faraway state or empire to ensure own interests, is simply not a good idea.
Last entity to find this out the hard way was the Kurds, in the Middle East hellhole that evolved after the destabilizing 2003 invasion. Their ally, the faraway "empire" USA decided they'd seen enough body bags, and sunk enough resources (also financial) and withdrew. The effect was predictable to all those with a keen eye on how similar historical events unfolded...
America first...bye bye Kurdistan.
For example, at Versailles Poland decided to ally itself to faraway empires France and GB, in order to achieve their "Intermarium" dreams. Empires which saw Poland's main function in the protection of own interests...
How'd that work out in 1939, or 1944?
London: Sorry Poland. We're not ready yet. Hang in there...a few more months...
Or the creation of artificial entities like the "Switzerland of Central Europe" (aka "pistol pointing at the heart of Germany") imposed on the people without referendum.
Imposed "top-down" by rulers, rather than desired "bottom-up" by the people...
Czech leaders thinking that "faraway empires" would protect them forever and ever...nope.
1938: "Here you go Adolf...have your way. Just don't tickle us too hard..."
Even before that, France decided to ally itself to an empire which could simply "evacuate" by hopping across the channel if a conflict evolved.
How'd that work out in 1940?
British Empire: "Been nice knowing you chaps...but err, we're off...oh, and can we have your Navy please?"
Or the 1920s British Empire, thinking that a faraway empire (USA) would ensure their future. Leaders and people who for a large part didn't care about the British Empire.
In fact, the "new rich" many Europeans looked down onto, which had grown economically way above its previous colonial masters, simply didn't like the idea of colonies...
How'd that work out after WW2?
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
Lesson to be learnt by future leaders?
Read history, and analyze it correctly, not for the sake of current potential short-term gain...
Ally yourself with neighbors.
Reach agreements after mutual negotiations, no matter how difficult it is.
Create strong mutual alliances, independent of outside meddling.
Then, deepen relationships between the people (cultural, trade, education, tourism, knowledge, etc.).
Then, stand up to all outside efforts of "divide and conquer".
I hope our leaders have learned their lesson, and will stand up to outside attempts at division.
2
-
Re. each and every "Bismarck kept Germany safe"-narrative, or variations of that.
It is based on the confusion of terms and definitions of words.
The terms or concepts confused and whose definitions are often loosely conflated: geopolitics (international politics) and grand strategy (military scenario).
These are entirely different concepts.
Bismarck did not "keep Germany safe".
The reality was that Bismarck appeased St. Petersburg, hoping that this "appeasement" would "keep Germany safe".
Ahem...any historical similarities? :-)
The Reinsurance Treaty gave a lot, and received little in return.
It gave Russia a "shield for expansion", while in return it only offered limp geopolitical protection (not protection in regards to "grand strategy", or a "2-front war").
The reality of geopolitics at the time was that the Russian Empire was "cacooned" into a safe barrier created by geography/size. There was only one real "opening", which was Germany and Austria-Hungary in her west. If one has problems visualizing this, then image a horseshoe, placed on a map of pre-WW1 Russia, with the opening facing towards western Europe. The "horseshoe" is geography, which protected the Russian core with a barrier of geographical bariers with very few, and very limited (infrastructure) openings.
For all practical reasons (in geopolitics and grand strategy) a deal with Germany, kept Russia 100 % safe, while Germany was (in return) only 50% "safe" (geopolitics).
For Germany, there remained a dire threat of a 2-front war, and that was determined by geography also (Germany in the Center of the continent), which could only be closed by continuous vigilance and re-armament (quality was preferred over quantity).
A bad deal, since the decision to rescind or not renew the treaty obviously also lay in the hands of St. Petersburg.
Re the "100% safe Russia": For Russia, there was the Artic in the north, followed by Siberia, the Gobi desert, Himalayas, Hindukush, and mountainous Persia. These "barriers" continued with the Caspian Sea (not accessible to foreign navies), and the Caucasus. In Russia's south-west, there was only the weak "sick man", the Ottoman Empire (incl. by extension the Black Sea).
As long as the core remained strong, the periphery would remain easily defensible. The "shield" protecting her west, was provided by Germany and Austria-Hungary, who involuntarily or "by extension" of the Reinsurance Treaty, or any other deal, protected Russia's western border.
In regards to grand strategy, or the choice where to strike next: the initiative for such a choice remained in the hands of St. Petersburg for as long as her "non-aggression pact" was being "appeased" by Berlin (aka Reinssurance Treaty) remained intact.
What was there not to like for St. Petersburg?
The Reinsurance Treaty did not sit well with the London lords, regardless of the "kind words"-narrative we are reading about in our history books.
I wonder why...LOL...
Further details often demoted to "ancillary status" if mentioned at all, but are in fact important concerning "what really happened".
1) Unlike the previous agreements with Russia (Three Kaiser League) the Reinsurance Treaty was "secret", as far a "secrecy" was possible in the world of diplomacy.
Why could that possibly have been deemed as a neccessity?
In the age of the "Glastnost and Perestroika" of the times (openness/honesty of the Concert of Europe), why should none of the other powers know about this deal between Berlin and St. Petersburg?
2) It was St Petersburg who came up with the suggestion to replace the unworkable Three Kaiser League, which (initially) did not include Austria-Hungary (obvious hoodwink...let's leave HINT, HINT Austria-Hungary out of "our little deal" aka "throw the third little Kaiser under the bus").
3) It was Bismarck himself who revealed it shortly before he died (1896), in an obvious attempt of a domestic political smear directed at Wilhelm II. In other words, in an attempt to get back at Wilhelm II for be "fired" and to discredit him or his status, he openly embarassed his own country by revealing "secret scheming" in an age where (LOL again) "everyone was supposed to be "transparent as glass"...
The reality is that it was Bismarck himself who largely "wrote that history" with regards to "his" Reinsurance Treaty, and how he (backpat, backpat) "kept Germany safe". And because this fit in perfectly with "finger pointers", it was simply largely taken over by our own historians, who seemingly never bothered to investigate the premise of such an assumption.
Historians quoting historians.
Appeals to authority, and other fallacies...
Reality couldn't have been further from the truth.
As a general truth.
Actions speak louder than words.
Actions "count more" than mere words.
Just like today, we should weigh "words" especially those of politicians and other power people (also words spoken across the divide of time in our history books) with a grain of salt.
What they did (historical sense) and do today (our reality today) is what counts, not what they say or said.
1
-
Wilhelm is often compared to Bismarck.
An interesting "episode" regarding "duplicity" and the way European states interacted at the time, occured in the late-1870s.
Bismarck stepped forward and offered himself as the "honest broker" (Congress of Berlin) to avoid a potential war between the saber-rattling London and St Petersburg, because of the after effects of Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78 (San Stefano).
As a "thank you" for his efforts as peacemaker and for avoiding war, Bismarck attracted the wrath of the Russian Tzar. Russian anger for getting cheated out of the spoils of this war between Russia and the "evil Ottomans who were oppressing Christians in the Balkans" (the usual widespread "appeal to emotion" for the masses, to cover up the real aims of wars: rule/domination/interests/territory/power/etc., and in this case, St Petersburg heading for the Dardanelles), was suddenly refocussed from London onto Berlin.
Bismarck had triggered a deep feeling in St Petersburg of betrayal: after Russian neutrality had done a large share of "enabling" Bismarck's German unification, St Petersburg now felt that it was obviously time for a "reward" of sorts. Berlin should in return, "enable" further Russian expansion south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Dardanelles, the "warm water port"-narrative) and support St Peterburg against British, French or Austrian-Hungarian protests as they realized their long-sought ports outside of the Black Sea ("Greater Bulgaria").
Even worse, while London walked away with a reward (Cypress), Berlin got a crumpled Three Kaiser League and an angry Tzar breathing down their necks. His efforts for securing peace between Russia and Great Britain, resulted in an enhanced risk of war for millions of people in Eastern/Central Europe. All exactly as the "pat our own backs" lords of London (Disraeli/Salisbury) intended. The intention of London throwing their weight into the after-effects of the Russo-Ottoman War, and by supporting the "bad guys" (Ottoman Empire) during this war, had from the outset been to drive a wedge between the "three kaisers", which were perceived to be a threat to the own British Empire.
On analysis, it was a London move to prevent a potentally possible alliance forming out of the existing agreement between the "three kaisers"(Germany/Russia/Austria-Hungary)by driving a wedge between the three.
Is that how London rewarded their peacemakers?
Bismarck: "Once bitten, twice shy..."
The apprentice Wilhelm: "What conclusions can we draw from the above?"
Strangely enough, the same actions by Wilhelm II (1905: the Morrocan "crisis" = avoid a potentially dangerous alliance forming) is interpreted by some historians as having an "evil", or "world conquering" intent, and is widely believed.
So how should we judge the attempt to drive a wedge between potentially dangerous alliances forming? "Evil", or "normal"? Surely it can't be both ;-)
Anyway...
After the Berlin Congress peacekeeping mission, Germany ended up in the vulnerable "middle of Europe", endangered by a 2-front war, with a shattered agreement and potentially without anybody to ally with at all. Fearfull visions of the days of Friedrich must have returned, and only the rapid action by Bismarck averted a disaster. Should Berlin have simply ignored Austria-Hungary's resulting weakness after the Three Kaiser League so rapidly dissolved, Vienna might have simply distanced themselves to look for a "good deal" elsewhere. Russia maybe? A war for Germany on three fronts? His very own agreement between the three empires and kaisers, to keep the peace and which was well within the scope of the "gentleman's agreement" of the Congress of Europe, was almost turned into a complete enciclement of the country whose leaders had stepped forward as "peacemaker".
Another example of the amorality of states.
1
-
Wilhelm is often compared to Bismarck.
An interesting "episode" regarding "duplicity" and the way European states interacted at the time, occured in the late-1870s.
Bismarck stepped forward and offered himself as the "honest broker" (Congress of Berlin) to avoid a potential war between the saber-rattling London and St Petersburg, because of the after effects of Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78 (San Stefano).
As a "thank you" for his efforts as peacemaker and for avoiding war, Bismarck attracted the wrath of the Russian Tzar. Russian anger for getting cheated out of the spoils of this war between Russia and the "evil Ottomans who were oppressing Christians in the Balkans" (the usual widespread "appeal to emotion" for the masses, to cover up the real aims of wars: rule/domination/interests/territory/power/etc., and in this case, St Petersburg heading for the Dardanelles), was suddenly refocussed from London onto Berlin.
Bismarck had triggered a deep feeling in St Petersburg of betrayal: after Russian neutrality had done a large share of "enabling" Bismarck's German unification, St Petersburg now felt that it was obviously time for a "reward" of sorts. Berlin should in return, "enable" further Russian expansion south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Dardanelles, the "warm water port"-narrative) and support St Peterburg against British, French or Austrian-Hungarian protests as they realized their long-sought ports outside of the Black Sea ("Greater Bulgaria").
Even worse, while London walked away with a reward (Cypress), Berlin got a crumpled Three Kaiser League and an angry Tzar breathing down their necks. His efforts for securing peace between Russia and Great Britain, resulted in an enhanced risk of war for millions of people in Eastern/Central Europe. All exactly as the "pat our own backs" lords of London (Disraeli/Salisbury) intended. The intention of London throwing their weight into the after-effects of the Russo-Ottoman War, and by supporting the "bad guys" (Ottoman Empire) during this war, had from the outset been to drive a wedge between the "three kaisers", which were perceived to be a threat to the own British Empire.
On analysis, it was a London move to prevent a potentally possible alliance forming out of the existing agreement between the "three kaisers"(Germany/Russia/Austria-Hungary)by driving a wedge between the three.
Is that how London rewarded their peacemakers?
Bismarck: "Once bitten, twice shy..."
The apprentice Wilhelm: "What conclusions can we draw from the above?"
Strangely enough, the same actions by Wilhelm II (1905: the Morrocan "crisis" = avoid a potentially dangerous alliance forming) is interpreted by some historians as having an "evil", or "world conquering" intent, and is widely believed.
So how should we judge the attempt to drive a wedge between potentially dangerous alliances forming? "Evil", or "normal"? Surely it can't be both ;-)
Anyway...
After the Berlin Congress peacekeeping mission, Germany ended up in the vulnerable "middle of Europe", endangered by a 2-front war, with a shattered agreement and potentially without anybody to ally with at all. Fearfull visions of the days of Friedrich must have returned, and only the rapid action by Bismarck averted a disaster. Should Berlin have simply ignored Austria-Hungary's resulting weakness after the Three Kaiser League so rapidly dissolved, Vienna might have simply distanced themselves to look for a "good deal" elsewhere. Russia maybe? A war for Germany on three fronts? His very own agreement between the three empires and kaisers, to keep the peace and which was well within the scope of the "gentleman's agreement" of the Congress of Europe, was almost turned into a complete enciclement of the country whose leaders had stepped forward as "peacemaker".
Another example of the amorality of states.
Shame these British leaders did not live to see the day the American Century rammed London's "stiff upper lip" up where the sun don't shine, and took over the Empire's bestest and most profitable markets :-)
1
-
So the London lords set off to set Europe up for failure...TWICE.
London was always going to oppose the strongest continental country/power/alliance, as a default setting, and as a matter of policy. No "feelings" or "opinions" were involved in this decision by a few London lords. Ever since the establishment of her "Empire", London aimed to expand and protect it by (as a matter policy), making the strongest continental power/alliance the rival in peace/enemy in war.
By own admission:
"The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side, opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single, State or group at any time."
[From Primary source material: Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_and_Germany]
In a nutshell, oppose every major diplomatic advance made by the strongest continental power in times of peace, and ally against it in times of war. An own policy standpoint (Splendid isolation) meant that London shied away from making binding commitments with continental powers. London made "temporary best friends" to temporarily use and abuse, not lasting alliances.
The own historical policy standpoint resulted in the eternal motivation to set continental powers up against each other, in a bid to "sit on the fence and eat popcorn" when the shtf...
In case of differences? Pick the side against the strongest power.
In case of war? Oppose the power (alliance) most likely to win.
That is how the lords "played".
Under a thin veneer of "civility" and protected by an army of apologists.
After WW1 (Versailles, St. Germaine, etc.) the lords set off on the same path: divide and rule.
Set up Hungarians against Czechs, set up Austrians against Czechs, set up the Poles against the Russians and Germans (see Limitrophe States).
Create just enough "peace" for a short-term advantage.
Just enough dissatisfaction to cause eternal strife...divide and rule. Bring in a few others to gather around the round table (Paris), so you can pass the buck around if things go predictably wrong. When things go wrong: blame everybody else...
Drawing lines on the map, divide and rule.
Imposing on many millions, and give power to a few betas. Divide and rule...
Seperating families. Divide and rule.
Seperating companies from their markets. Divide and rule...
Taking from some without asking. Giving to others, without consent.
These are the "tools" of "divide and rule".
Never a "price tag" for own actions...
Right?
WRONG
Brits: "The Woyal Navy will pwotect us and our Empire forever and ever..."
Right?
WRONG
To avoid the dreary hassle of working to achieve a long-term stable Europe, the lords set of to look for "best fwiends" elsewhere...
"By 1901, many influential Britons advocated for a closer relationship between the two countries. W. T. Stead even proposed that year in The Americanization of the World for both to merge to unify the English-speaking world, as doing so would help Britain "continue for all time to be an integral part of the greatest of all World-Powers, supreme on sea and unassailable on land, permanently delivered from all fear of hostile attack, and capable of wielding irresistible influence in all parts of this planet."
[Google: The_Great_Rapprochement]
Sooooo gweat.
Everybody "speaking English" and being "best fwiends" and ruling the world together as equals....
Right?
WRONG
After 1895, London snuggled up to the rising power USA, thinking such action would bring further easy victories, an expansion of own sphere of influence, while protect their Empire: Meanwhile, dividing their neighbors on the continent as a policy standpoint.
What could possibly go wrong?
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
So they woke up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their most profitable markets.
No markets = no trade = no money = no power = no "Empire".
US President Adams said there are two ways to enslave a people: one is with invasion, the other way through debt.
They thought their American Century "best fwiends" would help out for free...TWICE.
Right?
WRONG...
A minor detail the "oh so honest" lords forgot about, finally had an effect: "Empires" don't have "friends".
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
Good ol' USA didn't have to invade GB in order to succeed London as the "ruler of the world"...
And after the war ended?
They became the American Century's involuntary "little helpers", when Truman declared that the Brit's "best fwiends" (the commies in Moscow) were now suddenly the "new default enemy" (Truman Doctrine, 1946).
Did they ask the London lords desperately selling everything they could get their hands on in an effort to save the Empire, if this was agreeable? ROTFL
Of course not.
Washington DC needed a lapdog, not an equal partner...
So Brits lost their Empire fighting their "pwevious tempowawy best fwiends the commies", now the "new enemy" as declared by Washington DC.
That's what happens if one has leaders that make the strongest continental power "the enemy" as a default setting.
Hop over here for a "temporary best fwiend" this year, then hop over there for a "temporary best fwiend" the next. Hopped into extinction.
1
-
A lot of ancillary and totally irrelavant details.
It was a London policy which made the strongest continental power the default "rival in peace", and the default "enemy in war".
London had 2 chances to correct their faulty reasoning.
One with Wilhelm II, roughly until 1900, until German leaders lost their patience trying to get a mutually beneficial treaty with London.
The 2nd chance, after WW1, while Germany was a democracy.
They blew both chances, and would subsequently lose their Empire.
Because roughly in parallel to Germany on the continent across the English Channel, there was another "new power" rising across the Atlantic, whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
It was the USA.
Or "maybe they (Europe) won't notice if we sneak up on them..."
The American Century advocates in Washington DC were very good at "biding time" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Note: it was "a plan" of sorts.
Wait.
Simply wait.
Washington DC/The American Century: "Let's see what happens. Never let a crisis or war go to waste."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
The main big difference?
While London afronted/confronted the strongest continental power/alliance which was Germany and the Dual Alliance at the time, as a matter of policy, the USA made the strongest power/alliance the "temporary friend" during crises and wars, only to overpower it commercially/economically/financially after WW2 was over."
Smart.
Kaiser Bill wished for "a place in the sun" (i.e. "markets", and "spheres of influence").
IMHO they should've just given him one, without the push-back.
It was greed and the control-freak instincts of "old empires", jealously guarding their own.
What unfolded after that, was basically a bed Europe had made for themselves, and with WW1, Versailles (and others like Saint-Germaine, or Trianon) and WW2, had to sleep in.
1
-
@michealmcneal2259 On the micro level, only a fool would try to ensure own safety, by making friends 200 miles away. No, of course, a strong neighborhood, and support of a competent local police is what people choose.
Yet, when it comes to states, and empires, leaders become erroneous in their decisions on alliances or co-operation...
Choosing a faraway state or empire to ensure own interests, is simply not a good idea.
Last entity to find this out the hard way was the Kurds, in the Middle East hellhole that evolved after the destabilizing 2003 invasion. Their ally, the faraway "empire" USA decided they'd seen enough body bags, and sunk enough resources (also financial) and withdrew. The effect was predictable to all those with a keen eye on how similar historical events unfolded...
America first...bye bye Kurdistan.
For example, at Versailles Poland decided to ally itself to faraway empires France and GB, in order to achieve their "Intermarium" dreams. Empires which saw Poland's main function in the protection of own interests...
How'd that work out in 1939, or 1944?
London: Sorry Poland. We're not ready yet. Hang in there...a few more months...
Or the creation of artificial entities like the "Switzerland of Central Europe" (aka "pistol pointing at the heart of Germany") imposed on the people without referendum.
Imposed "top-down" by rulers, rather than desired "bottom-up" by the people...
Czech leaders thinking that "faraway empires" would protect them forever and ever...nope.
1938: "Here you go Adolf...have your way. Just don't tickle us too hard..."
Even before that, France decided to ally itself to an empire which could simply "evacuate" by hopping across the channel if a conflict evolved.
How'd that work out in 1940?
British Empire: "Been nice knowing you chaps...but err, we're off...oh, and can we have your Navy please?"
Or the 1920s British Empire, thinking that a faraway empire (USA) would ensure their future. Leaders and people who for a large part didn't care about the British Empire.
In fact, the "new rich" many Europeans looked down onto, which had grown economically way above its previous colonial masters, simply didn't like the idea of colonies...
How'd that work out after WW2?
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
Lesson to be learnt by future leaders?
Read history, and analyze it correctly, not for the sake of current potential short-term gain...
Ally yourself with neighbors.
Reach agreements after mutual negotiations, no matter how difficult it is.
Create strong mutual alliances, independent of outside meddling.
Then, deepen relationships between the people (cultural, trade, education, tourism, knowledge, etc.).
Then, stand up to all outside efforts of "divide and conquer".
I hope our leaders have learned their lesson, and will stand up to outside attempts at division.
1
-
1
-
Wilhelm is often compared to Bismarck.
An interesting "episode" regarding "duplicity" and the way European states interacted at the time, occured in the late-1870s.
Bismarck stepped forward and offered himself as the "honest broker" (Congress of Berlin) to avoid a potential war between the saber-rattling London and St Petersburg, because of the after effects of Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78 (San Stefano).
As a "thank you" for his efforts as peacemaker and for avoiding war, Bismarck attracted the wrath of the Russian Tzar. Russian anger for getting cheated out of the spoils of this war between Russia and the "evil Ottomans who were oppressing Christians in the Balkans" (the usual widespread "appeal to emotion" for the masses, to cover up the real aims of wars: rule/domination/interests/territory/power/etc., and in this case, St Petersburg heading for the Dardanelles), was suddenly refocussed from London onto Berlin.
Bismarck had triggered a deep feeling in St Petersburg of betrayal: after Russian neutrality had done a large share of "enabling" Bismarck's German unification, St Petersburg now felt that it was obviously time for a "reward" of sorts. Berlin should in return, "enable" further Russian expansion south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Dardanelles, the "warm water port"-narrative) and support St Peterburg against British, French or Austrian-Hungarian protests as they realized their long-sought ports outside of the Black Sea ("Greater Bulgaria").
Even worse, while London walked away with a reward (Cypress), Berlin got a crumpled Three Kaiser League and an angry Tzar breathing down their necks. His efforts for securing peace between Russia and Great Britain, resulted in an enhanced risk of war for millions of people in Eastern/Central Europe. All exactly as the "pat our own backs" lords of London (Disraeli/Salisbury) intended. The intention of London throwing their weight into the after-effects of the Russo-Ottoman War, and by supporting the "bad guys" (Ottoman Empire) during this war, had from the outset been to drive a wedge between the "three kaisers", which were perceived to be a threat to the own British Empire.
On analysis, it was a London move to prevent a potentally possible alliance forming out of the existing agreement between the "three kaisers"(Germany/Russia/Austria-Hungary)by driving a wedge between the three.
Is that how London rewarded their peacemakers?
Bismarck: "Once bitten, twice shy..."
The apprentice Wilhelm: "What conclusions can we draw from the above?"
Strangely enough, the same actions by Wilhelm II (1905: the Morrocan "crisis" = avoid a potentially dangerous alliance forming) is interpreted by some historians as having an "evil", or "world conquering" intent, and is widely believed.
So how should we judge the attempt to drive a wedge between potentially dangerous alliances forming? "Evil", or "normal"? Surely it can't be both ;-)
Anyway...
After the Berlin Congress peacekeeping mission, Germany ended up in the vulnerable "middle of Europe", endangered by a 2-front war, with a shattered agreement and potentially without anybody to ally with at all. Fearfull visions of the days of Friedrich must have returned, and only the rapid action by Bismarck averted a disaster. Should Berlin have simply ignored Austria-Hungary's resulting weakness after the Three Kaiser League so rapidly dissolved, Vienna might have simply distanced themselves to look for a "good deal" elsewhere. Russia maybe? A war for Germany on three fronts? His very own agreement between the three empires and kaisers, to keep the peace and which was well within the scope of the "gentleman's agreement" of the Congress of Europe, was almost turned into a complete enciclement of the country whose leaders had stepped forward as "peacemaker".
Another example of the amorality of states.
1
-
Wilhelm is often compared to Bismarck.
An interesting "episode" regarding "duplicity" and the way European states interacted at the time, occured in the late-1870s.
Bismarck stepped forward and offered himself as the "honest broker" (Congress of Berlin) to avoid a potential war between the saber-rattling London and St Petersburg, because of the after effects of Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78 (San Stefano).
As a "thank you" for his efforts as peacemaker and for avoiding war, Bismarck attracted the wrath of the Russian Tzar. Russian anger for getting cheated out of the spoils of this war between Russia and the "evil Ottomans who were oppressing Christians in the Balkans" (the usual widespread "appeal to emotion" for the masses, to cover up the real aims of wars: rule/domination/interests/territory/power/etc., and in this case, St Petersburg heading for the Dardanelles), was suddenly refocussed from London onto Berlin.
Bismarck had triggered a deep feeling in St Petersburg of betrayal: after Russian neutrality had done a large share of "enabling" Bismarck's German unification, St Petersburg now felt that it was obviously time for a "reward" of sorts. Berlin should in return, "enable" further Russian expansion south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Dardanelles, the "warm water port"-narrative) and support St Peterburg against British, French or Austrian-Hungarian protests as they realized their long-sought ports outside of the Black Sea ("Greater Bulgaria").
Even worse, while London walked away with a reward (Cypress), Berlin got a crumpled Three Kaiser League and an angry Tzar breathing down their necks. His efforts for securing peace between Russia and Great Britain, resulted in an enhanced risk of war for millions of people in Eastern/Central Europe. All exactly as the "pat our own backs" lords of London (Disraeli/Salisbury) intended. The intention of London throwing their weight into the after-effects of the Russo-Ottoman War, and by supporting the "bad guys" (Ottoman Empire) during this war, had from the outset been to drive a wedge between the "three kaisers", which were perceived to be a threat to the own British Empire.
On analysis, it was a London move to prevent a potentally possible alliance forming out of the existing agreement between the "three kaisers"(Germany/Russia/Austria-Hungary)by driving a wedge between the three.
Is that how London rewarded their peacemakers?
Bismarck: "Once bitten, twice shy..."
The apprentice Wilhelm: "What conclusions can we draw from the above?"
Strangely enough, the same actions by Wilhelm II (1905: the Morrocan "crisis" = avoid a potentially dangerous alliance forming) is interpreted by some historians as having an "evil", or "world conquering" intent, and is widely believed.
So how should we judge the attempt to drive a wedge between potentially dangerous alliances forming? "Evil", or "normal"? Surely it can't be both ;-)
Anyway...
After the Berlin Congress peacekeeping mission, Germany ended up in the vulnerable "middle of Europe", endangered by a 2-front war, with a shattered agreement and potentially without anybody to ally with at all. Fearfull visions of the days of Friedrich must have returned, and only the rapid action by Bismarck averted a disaster. Should Berlin have simply ignored Austria-Hungary's resulting weakness after the Three Kaiser League so rapidly dissolved, Vienna might have simply distanced themselves to look for a "good deal" elsewhere. Russia maybe? A war for Germany on three fronts? His very own agreement between the three empires and kaisers, to keep the peace and which was well within the scope of the "gentleman's agreement" of the Congress of Europe, was almost turned into a complete enciclement of the country whose leaders had stepped forward as "peacemaker".
Another example of the amorality of states.
1
-
In the leadup to WW1, there was another "new power", whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
Or "maybe they won't notice if we sneak up on them."
Google The American Century for more info...
Washington DC was very good at "biding time" and "keeping a low profile" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
1
-
1
-
And while Europe armed itself to the teeth, wasting away their inherence on weapons, others made use of this disunity and were saving their pennies for a rainy day.
US military spending, a fraction of that of Europe.
For their leaders had a plan, greatly aided by their geographical and political isolation (aka "geopolitics")....
In a nutshell, to hang in there long enough, until Europe had torn itself to shreds. And if not, also okay. They were already the undisputed regional power controlling "the new world" of North and South America. A win-win.
A destructive war in Europe = a win for Washington DC/The American Century advocates, and their "hard power" approach.
No destructive war in Europe = a win for the isolationist, with their focus on trade, soft power, etc.
In case of war, then, step in and pick up the (financial) "debris"...in a nutshell:
The American Century.
1
-
Europe's weakness, was the alliance system.
Note: Europe's weakness...
Of all the four M-A-I-N causes for WW1 three were basically a given factor, while only one could have been politically changed, if the desire to do so had existed by European leaders, to avoid the potential scenario of "a great (European) war".
Militarism and imperialism were deep-seated traditional "values" (debatable) at the time, and along with the rather new appearance of nationalism, were deeply entrenched beliefs, shared by a large percentage of the populations of all European states.
These were unchangeable factors, or would need considerable efforts on behalf of entire societies to change.
The alliance system was however flexible.
It could, and should have been changed, at around the turn of the century (around 1900), and only needed a few visionary leaders to do so.
Only London was in a position to offer an alliance, on eye level, with the continent's strongest power, Germany, thereby safeguarding their Empire.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
A lot of ancillary and totally irrelavant details.
It was a London policy which made the strongest continental power the default "rival in peace", and the default "enemy in war".
London had 2 chances to correct their faulty reasoning.
One with Wilhelm II, roughly until 1900, until German leaders lost their patience trying to get a mutually beneficial treaty with London.
The 2nd chance, after WW1, while Germany was a democracy.
They blew both chances, and would subsequently lose their Empire.
Because roughly in parallel to Germany on the continent across the English Channel, there was another "new power" rising across the Atlantic, whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
It was the USA.
Or "maybe they (Europe) won't notice if we sneak up on them..."
The American Century advocates in Washington DC were very good at "biding time" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Note: it was "a plan" of sorts.
Wait.
Simply wait.
Washington DC/The American Century: "Let's see what happens. Never let a crisis or war go to waste."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
The main big difference?
While London afronted/confronted the strongest continental power/alliance which was Germany and the Dual Alliance at the time, as a matter of policy, the USA made the strongest power/alliance the "temporary friend" during crises and wars, only to overpower it commercially/economically/financially after WW2 was over."
Smart.
Kaiser Bill wished for "a place in the sun" (i.e. "markets", and "spheres of influence").
IMHO they should've just given him one, without the push-back.
It was greed and the control-freak instincts of "old empires", jealously guarding their own.
What unfolded after that, was basically a bed Europe had made for themselves, and with WW1, Versailles (and others like Saint-Germaine, or Trianon) and WW2, had to sleep in.
1
-
The real "WW1", or first "great" war actually took place from 1803 to 1815.
In terms of scope and victims, it was mainly limited by technology. Still, despite the limited capabilities of the weapons of the times, there were more than 4 million victims, in all corners of the globe.
The first truly "global war".
Notice however how historians (correctly btw) separate this "first global war" (aka The Napoleonic Wars) into seven distinct phases, based on a scientific and exact analyses of the reasons/motivations at the time, whereas for WW1/WW2 there are attempts to create one big emotionally steered mashup.
Regarding the Napoleonic Wars, historians are of course far more candid re. "motivations/reasons" (note: the real reasons, not the ancillary details). Most people are entirely emotionally detached from events 200 years ago, so there is also no need to spin history either to appease an own population.
There are no endless debates about "Who started it?"
The Napolionic Wars were of course declared by London, as a preventive war, in May 1803, and the (correct) reason/motivation given for this declaration of war, by most historians, is that it was to "avoid the single hegemony" on the continent.
In 1914, "WW1" evolved out of a local conflict, which started in the Balkans, and through a few unfortunate twists and turns developed into the second truly "world" war, in order to establish domination and rule.
Hanlon's Razor states "not to attribute to mallice, what can adequately be explained by stupidity", and with WW1, Europe started its own demise because of efforts to remain individually dominant/relevant.
Of course, on the other side of the Atlantic, wars were always fought for unity, and common goals (aim of expansion).
The American Century was a ship already launched, but renamed halfway.
The "ship" started its journey with a war of unity (Civil War because of "poor slaves" aka "the emotional argument"), then expanding westwards (Manifest Destiny, Mexican-American War), getting rid of entities which could be misused by foreign powers to "divide and rule" ("Trails of Tears" of the unfortunate "losers" of history), and the consolidation of own strength (Monroe Doctrine/Spanish-American War).
And with that, the "ship" bumped up against the "dock", which was European rule and domination of the globe.
Didn't anybody notice?
The history of the west I guess, in a five minute nutshell...
1
-
Simon Bolivar was a tool or a proxy of the rising USA.
Washington DC used foreign blood (South Americans) while Europeans were off to look for easier targets of exploitation in Africa and Asia, and local South American "iron and blood" was "employed" indirectly to drive a slowly fading European colonial power out of the Americas (geopolitics/grand strategy) by offering a "shield" (Monroe Doctrine) that revolutionaries in the Americas could operate behind, whilst at the same time doing most of the "bleeding" (aka the "freedom"-argument). Strange thing though, is that nobody has ever bothered to find out what percentage of the population who lived in these regions at the time, actually wanted this "freedom" for themselves. It is simply assumed that most wanted it, 'cos "who can argue against freedom"...
After the "freedom" set in after the series of wars left many exhausted, the road to own US economic and political domination into these reformed political systems was paved, in the form of taking away the markets of the European Empire (Spain). Carved up into statelets, each of minor power inferior to the USA, is of course a classical "divide and rule"-strategy...
A template Washington DC later expanded on in a much larger scale as it "came for" Europe, and a little bit later (see footnote) the last powerful European empire in the world, the British Empire.
A historical observation of "carving up potential opposition into statelets" (Spanish Empire territory, turned into "statelets" like Venezuela and Columbia), each of lesser power than the "divider"...
This exact same technique was later used, scaled up sufficiently by Washington DC, to overpower the British Empire after 1945.
Footnote: The Father Niemöller logic of "morality", is of course as much a warning to heed a "balance of power", since if once destroyed, there will be nobody left to unite with in order to protect the own interests from an overpowering rival (or the own "best friend/s").
If you wish to truly understand the "how" and "why" the British Empire failed, then go to the Kai..ser Wilh_elm II video of the "Hi--story R--oom" educational channel (distorted to avoid the autoblock function of some channels). Divide and rule as a strategy is elaborated in more detail in the comments thread under this video. Go to the other channel, select "latest comments" first (three little bars at the top of every comments section), and read as far back as desired.
Most of what we are fed by our systems, as "rote learning" details, are "99% ancillary details": not saying these are untrue or wrong, but simply that they are not as important on the ranking or "tiers" of events as geopolitics and grand strategy.
For these geostrategists, divide and rule/conquer is their main strategy, regardless of what you as an individual believes.
1
-
Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty is often stated as an example of wise diplomacy, in order to avoid "great war"-scenarios, by creating (de jure) deadlock situations.
From wiki:
"The treaty signed by Bismarck and the Russian Foreign Minister Nikolay Girs had two parts:
Germany and Russia each agreed to observe benevolent neutrality should the other become involved in a war with a third country. If Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary, this provision would not apply. In those cases, the distinguished bilateral alliances could come into effect. The Reinsurance Treaty only applied when France or Austria-Hungary were the aggressors.
In the most secret completion protocol, Germany would declare neutrality in the event of a Russian intervention against the Ottoman control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."
Hmmm. "Most secret" :-)
Of course, the "most secret part" set Russian forces free to serve...ahem..."elsewhere". Wonder where that would be, and who it would be directed at...
Notice however how the "benevolent neutrality" created a situation of deadlock in Central and Western Europe.
Unless Germany was the aggressor, it would remain safe, and it could likewise influence Vienna/Budapest to remain docile in the Balkans.
Benevolent neutrality, in layman's terms, meant that "if you are the aggressor, I'm free to act as I please" (no "tied hands"-clauses).
But if you are the victim of a 3rd party's aggression, then you are free to act as you please, and I'll remain neutral (again, no "tied hands"-conditions).
Yes, Bismarck's wisdom is often praised, but often not analyzed sufficiently regarding later European treaties.
The strategic precedent caused by neutrality treaties or clauses in treaties often have a wide-ranging impact.
In regards to the Reinsurance Treaty it set St. Petersburg free to send the majority of its forces south and east, for as long as the treaty remained intact.
On a sidenote, many years later, a similar "neutrality accord" led to war in the Pacific.
In April 1941 Stalin concluded a neutrality agreement with Japan, meaning that they were now free to "focus elsewhere".
With that, the IJA's (army's grand strategy preference) focus on expansion in China, and the majority of Japan's military resources, was replaced by the IJN's (navy's grand strategy preference) expansion south, into the weakened (by WW2 in Europe) colonial powers' territories in SE Asia.
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 Yes, Bismarck planned on creating an opposing power to cancel out the grip London had on continental powers.
London could always use the ambitions of continental leaders against each other, by creating "shifting", non-binding, temporary "friendships". When France (Napoleon) threatened to take control of all of the continent, Prussia were the "friends", etc. (see alliances in the Napoleonic Wars). France, as the dominant continental power was the "rival by default", "enemy in war". When Germany united and surpassed France as the single most powerful state/alliance, Berlin automatically took over the role of "rival by default" from Paris. Berlin (plus their junior partners in Vienna/Budapest) now had to be "balanced out".
"The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Within the European balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the “balancer,” or “holder of the balance.” It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by one consideration—the maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function."
[Britannica]
If Bismarck could have managed some sort of understanding between Berlin, St Petersburg, and Vienna/Budapest, with mutual goals, it would've become an unconquerable power.
That however, was difficult, if not impossible (the powers had incompatible aims).
Such an alliance could have shown London the middle finger, and done whatever they pleased (the "leverage" in political crises and the geographical advantage in a time of war would have been firmly on their side).
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 "The vital question was how to secure control for the Heartland. This question may seem pointless, since in 1904 the Russian Empire had ruled most of the area from the Volga to Eastern Siberia for centuries. But throughout the nineteenth century:
The West European powers had combined, usually successfully, in the Great Game to prevent Russian expansion.The Russian Empire was huge but socially, politically and technologically backward—i.e., inferior in "virility, equipment and organization".
Mackinder held that effective political domination of the Heartland by a single power had been unattainable in the past because:
The Heartland was protected from sea power by ice to the north and mountains and deserts to the south.Previous land invasions from east to west and vice versa were unsuccessful because lack of efficient transportation made it impossible to assure a continual stream of men and supplies.
He outlined the following ways in which the Heartland might become a springboard for global domination in the twentieth century (Sempa, 2000):
Successful invasion of Russia by a West European nation (most probably Germany). Mackinder believed that the introduction of the railroad had removed the Heartland's invulnerability to land invasion. As Eurasia began to be covered by an extensive network of railroads, there was an excellent chance that a powerful continental nation could extend its political control over the Eastern European gateway to the Eurasian landmass. In Mackinder's words, "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland." A Russo-German alliance. Before 1917 both countries were ruled by autocrats (the Tsar and the Kaiser), and both could have been attracted to an alliance against the democratic powers of Western Europe (the US was isolationist regarding European affairs, until it became a participant of World War I in 1917). Germany would have contributed to such an alliance its formidable army and its large and growing sea power.Conquest of Russia by a Sino-Japanese empire (see below).
The combined empire's large East Asian coastline would also provide the potential for it to become a major sea power. Mackinder's "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland ..." does not cover this scenario, probably because the previous two scenarios were seen as the major risks of the nineteenth century and the early 1900s.
One of Mackinder's personal objectives was to warn Britain that its traditional reliance on sea power would become a weakness as improved land transport opened up the Heartland for invasion and/or industrialisation (Sempa, 2000)."
[Mckinder "Pivot of History", from wiki]
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 The theory (when presented) dealt with the existing and potentially future development of power.
Power (like today) concerns a wide spectrum of criteria [military, industry, GDP, infrastructure (incl. railways), population development, education (well educated = good soldiers in modern wars), technology, advances in societies, etc.]
You don't have to tell what happened (history).
I know what happened.
The theory remains intact.
Had Eurasia united, it would have overpowered the British Empire.
Note again: you don't have to try and "counter" the above with a "comeback" of what happened (history). I know what happened.
The theory is still correct (standpoint of technology when the theory was created).
Only after the creation of LR strategic bombers and nukes (1940s) and ICBMs (1960s) was it outdated.
By that time the British Empire was toast anyway, so it didn't matter anymore.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@bolivar2153 OK, just so that we're on the same level here.
Nobody was "better" when it came to their "attitude problems", expressed by the acronym "MAIN" (here, militarism and imperialism).
There was indeed nothing wrong by Wilhelm calling London out for their crooked scheming.
You mean your point of "which of Wilhelm's attempts (under Caprivi aimed at better understanding between Berlin and London"?
Answer:
See the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, threaded in by Bismarck, and carried out by Wilhelm in an attempt at better understanding concerning imperialism/colonialism, by signing a win-win agreement, which was later used in attempts to discredit him, both internationally and internally (Bismarck called the treaty he had supported himself when he was in charge, "an exchange of a button against a trousers" in an attempt to inflame the pro-colonial movement against Wilhelm, aka "the Kolonialvereine").
1